Amicus Curiae Brief — Republican National Committee, et al., Petitioners v. Bette Eakin, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 16, 2026

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Nos. 25-962, 25-967

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

BETTE EAKIN, ET AL., Respondents.

____________________

PENNSYLVANIA, Petitioner,

BETTE EAKIN, ET AL., Respondents.

____________________

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR AMERICA FIRST LEGAL

FOUNDATION AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

__________

CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay Street

#22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

NICHOLAS BARRY

ALICE KASS

ROBERT A. CROSSIN

America First Legal

Foundation

611 Pennsylvania Ave SE

#231

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 964-3721

nicholas.barry@aflegal.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities ................................................... iii

Interest of Amicus Curiae ........................................... 1

Summary of the Argument ......................................... 2

Reasons for Granting the Writ.................................... 3

I. The Court Should Grant Review to Resolve a

Deepening Circuit Split Over AndersonBurdick. .............................................................. 3

A. Seven Circuits Apply Deferential Review to

Minimal, Neutral Burdens. .......................... 3

B. Four Circuits Permit Improper Judicial

Policymaking in an Area Reserved to the

States............................................................. 4

C. The Split Imposes Asymmetric Burdens on

State Legislatures and Requires This

Court’s Correction. ........................................ 5

II. The Decision Below Misapplied AndersonBurdick by Treating a De Minimis Compliance

Requirement as a Constitutional Injury. .......... 6

A. Anderson-Burdick Requires Identification of

a Genuine Constitutional Burden. ............... 6

B. The Court Improperly Measured the Burden

by the Consequences of Noncompliance. ..... 7

III. The Panel Improperly Elevated Scrutiny and

Discounted Legitimate State Interests. ............ 9

A. Pennsylvania Identified Legitimate and

Long-Recognized Election Interests. ............ 9

B. The Panel Improperly Discounted

Legislative Judgments................................ 10

C. Elevating Scrutiny for Routine Rules Risks

Destabilizing Election Administration. ..... 11

IV. This Case Presents a Clean Vehicle to Improve

the Anderson-Burdick Test. ............................. 12

Conclusion.................................................................. 15

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Anderson v. Celebrezze,

460 U.S. 780 (1983) ........................ 2, 3, 5–9, 11–15

Ariz. Democratic Party v. Hobbs,

18 F.4th 1179 (9th Cir. 2021) ............................ 4, 8

Barr v. Galvin,

626 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2010) .................................... 4

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

594 U.S. 647 (2021) .............................................. 10

Burdick v. Takushi,

504 U.S. 428 (1992) ........................ 2, 3, 5–9, 11–15

Center for Coalfield Justice v.

Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Elections,

348 A.3d 1178 (Pa. 2025) ..................................... 13

Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,

553 U.S. 181 (2008) ............................................ 7, 9

FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,

508 U.S. 307 (1993) .............................................. 10

Fish v. Schwab,

957 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2020) .............................. 5

Heller v. Doe,

509 U.S. 312 (1993) .............................................. 11

Luft v. Evers,

963 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2020) .................................. 4

Marcellus v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,

849 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2017) .................................. 4

Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,

479 U.S. 189 (1986) .............................................. 10

New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger,

976 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020) .......................... 4, 8

Obama for Am. v. Husted,

697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) .................................. 4

Pa. State Conf. of the NAACP Branches v.

Sec’y Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

97 F.4th 120 (3d Cir. 2024) .................................... 8

Price v. New York State Bd. of Elections,

540 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2008).................................... 4

Richardson v. Texas Sec’y of State,

978 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2020) .................................. 4

SD Voice v. Noem,

60 F.4th 1071 (8th Cir. 2023) ............................ 4, 5

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl.1 ......................................... 11

U.S. Const. amend. I ................................................. 15

U.S. Const. amend. XIV ............................................ 15

Statutes and Other Authorities

25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3146.6(a) ................................... 14

Br. for Intervenor Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

Eakin v. Adams County Bd. of Elections, No. 251644, Dkt. 72 (3d Cir. June 6, 2025).................... 14

Compl., Eakin v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No.

1:22-cv-340, Dkt. 1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2022) ........ 15

Mem. in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J.,

Eakin v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 1:22cv-340, Dkt. 288 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2023) .......... 15

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

America First Legal Foundation is a nonprofit

organization dedicated to promoting the rule of law in

the United States by preventing executive overreach,

ensuring due process and equal protection for every

American citizen, and encouraging understanding of

the law and individual rights guaranteed under the

Constitution and laws of the United States.

America First Legal has a substantial interest in

this case. AFL regularly litigates and files amicus

briefs in cases involving the constitutional limits of

federal judicial power and the proper allocation of

authority between the federal courts and state

legislatures. The question presented here—whether

federal courts may subject neutral, minimally

burdensome state election regulations to heightened

scrutiny—goes to the heart of AFL’s mission to

preserve the rule of law and ensure that elected state

legislatures, not federal judges, exercise the authority

the Constitution assigns to them.*

* Under Rule 37.2, amicus provided timely notice of their

intention to file this brief. Under Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party

authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than

amicus curiae or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its

preparation or submission.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Federal courts of appeals are divided over how to

review neutral, nondiscriminatory election regulations that impose only minimal burdens on voters.

Seven circuits apply deferential review. Four,

including the Third Circuit below, apply heightened

scrutiny regardless of the burden’s magnitude,

demanding empirical proof of incremental benefit. An

identical rule may be upheld in seven circuits and

enjoined in four, not because of anything in the rule

itself, but because minority circuits require states to

affirmatively justify even minimal regulations while

majority circuits defer.

The decision below committed two independent

errors. First, the panel measured the burden not by

what compliance requires—writing a date—but by the

consequence of noncompliance. This methodology

exposes every mandatory voting rule to federal

challenge. Second, even accepting a cognizable

burden, the panel discounted Pennsylvania’s

legitimate interests in fraud deterrence, orderly

administration, and ballot solemnity by demanding

record proof this Court has never required.

This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the

split: the question is pure federal law, no factual

disputes remain, and a recent Pennsylvania Supreme

Court decision has eliminated the panel’s premise that

defective ballots go uncorrected. This Court should

grant certiorari and clarify Anderson-Burdick.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Court Should Grant Review to Resolve a

Deepening Circuit Split Over AndersonBurdick.

The courts of appeals are divided over how to

review neutral, nondiscriminatory voting regulations

that impose only minimal burdens on voters. This

Court’s decisions in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.

780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428

(1992), instruct courts to weigh the “character and

magnitude” of a burden against the State’s regulatory

interests. But those decisions do not license

heightened scrutiny of routine election mechanics or

transform ordinary compliance requirements into

constitutional injuries. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433–

34. In the absence of further guidance, lower courts

have diverged sharply over how deferential review

should be when the burden is minimal and the rule is

generally applicable. Seven circuits apply rational

basis review, or close to it. Four others, including the

Third Circuit below, apply heightened scrutiny

regardless of the burden’s magnitude. The panel

acknowledged this division. App. 41a n.35.1 This Court

should resolve it.

A. Seven Circuits Apply Deferential Review

to Minimal, Neutral Burdens.

Seven circuits hold that neutral election

regulations imposing only the “usual burdens of

voting” warrant deferential, rational basis review. The

1 All references are to the petition appendix filed in No. 25-967.

First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and

Eleventh Circuits uphold such rules so long as they

serve important regulatory interests, asking only

whether a rational basis supports the legislature’s

choice. See, e.g., Barr v. Galvin, 626 F.3d 99, 110–11

(1st Cir. 2010); Price v. New York State Bd. of

Elections, 540 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2008); Marcellus

v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 849 F.3d 169, 179–

80 (4th Cir. 2017); Richardson v. Texas Sec’y of State,

978 F.3d 220, 239–41 (5th Cir. 2020); Luft v. Evers,

963 F.3d 665, 677 (7th Cir. 2020); Ariz. Democratic

Party v. Hobbs, 18 F.4th 1179, 1188–93 (9th Cir.

2021); New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger, 976 F.3d

1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2020).

Critically, these circuits measure the burden by

what compliance requires, not by the consequence of

noncompliance. The fact that a voter who ignores a

neutral requirement may have her ballot rejected does

not convert the requirement itself into a constitutional

injury.

B. Four Circuits Permit Improper Judicial

Policymaking in an Area Reserved to the

States.

Four circuits—the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth, now

joined by the Third—have broken from that approach

and apply heightened scrutiny regardless of whether

the burden is severe or merely incidental. These courts

demand empirical proof of incremental benefit,

dismiss legitimate state interests as “vague” or

inadequately documented, and substitute judicial

policy judgments for legislative ones. See Obama for

Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2012);

SD Voice v. Noem, 60 F.4th 1071, 1080–82 (8th Cir.

2023); Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1128, 1144

(10th Cir. 2020). The Third Circuit joined this group

below, acknowledging the burden was “minimal” yet

demanding evidentiary justification for each of the

Commonwealth’s interests. App. 38a, 44a–48a. The

panel’s 7–6 en banc denial confirms the divide is

genuine. See also App. 41a n.35. This approach

effectively converts federal courts into permanent

superintendents of state election administration,

displacing the legislative judgments that the

Constitution specifically assigns to the states and that

Anderson-Burdick was never designed to transfer to

the judiciary.

C. The Split Imposes Asymmetric Burdens on

State Legislatures and Requires This

Court’s Correction.

The split’s most concrete cost falls on state

legislatures. In the seven majority circuits, a

legislature may enact a neutral, generally applicable

election rule without generating an evidentiary record

to support each procedural choice. In the four minority

circuits, legislatures must anticipate litigation and

prove the incremental value of every ballot-casting

requirement against a standard that no majority

circuit imposes. An identical rule may be

constitutional in seven circuits and enjoined in four—

not because of anything in the rule itself, but because

minority circuits require states to affirmatively justify

even minimal, neutral election regulations, while

majority circuits apply deferential review. States in

the minority circuits face structural pressure to

abandon workable administrative procedures, and

election officials cannot build stable, reliable systems

when the validity of their rules turns not on whether

their decision had a rational basis, but whether

empirical proof can support the minimal burden. This

Court’s intervention is necessary to restore a uniform

constitutional baseline, ensure that Anderson-Burdick

is applied consistently throughout the country, and

reaffirm that the authority to regulate elections

belongs to the states.

II. The Decision Below Misapplied AndersonBurdick by Treating a De Minimis

Compliance Requirement as a Constitutional

Injury.

The decision below rests on a fundamental

methodological error: rather than measuring the

burden by what compliance requires, the panel

defined it by the consequence of noncompliance. That

inversion collapses Anderson-Burdick’s threshold

inquiry, elevates a de minimis compliance step into a

constitutional injury, and then compounds the error

by applying searching scrutiny to a burden the panel

itself characterized as “minimal.” App. 38a. Each

stage of the analysis departs from this Court’s

precedents.

A. Anderson-Burdick Requires Identification

of a Genuine Constitutional Burden.

Anderson-Burdick requires courts to first evaluate

the “character and magnitude” of the alleged injury

before weighing it against the State’s interests.

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.

That threshold inquiry is indispensable. Without a

cognizable burden on a protected right, heightened

scrutiny is unwarranted. The Constitution tolerates

the “usual burdens of voting,” including reasonable

procedural requirements that structure the mechanics

of voting itself. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,

553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008) (plurality op.). Writing a date

on a return envelope is a simple compliance step

requiring, at most, a pen and five seconds. See App.

94a (Bove, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en

banc). It does not implicate core political speech,

discriminate among voters, or restrict electoral

participation. Treating that modest act as a

constitutional injury simply because of the

consequence of failure collapses the framework’s first

step and exposes every mandatory election rule to

federal challenge.

B. The Court Improperly Measured the

Burden

the

Consequences

Noncompliance.

Rather than measuring the burden by the effort

required to comply with the date requirement, the

court of appeals defined the burden in terms of the

consequence of failing to comply. The panel repeatedly

emphasized that “[a] Pennsylvania mail-in voter who

fails to comply with the date requirement will not have

his or her vote counted. Period.” App. 36a; see also

App. 31a, 34a. It described those downstream

consequences as dispositive in assessing the burden’s

magnitude. App. 35a–38a.

That framing inverts Anderson-Burdick’s first

step. That step requires courts to evaluate the

“character and magnitude” of the burden imposed by

the regulation itself. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. The

burden here is the requirement to write a date, a task

that takes seconds to complete. See App. 94a (Bove, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The

possibility that a ballot will be rejected if a voter

chooses not to comply with a neutral, generally

applicable rule does not transform the compliance

requirement into a severe constitutional burden.

Other courts have rejected precisely this

consequence-based reasoning. See Ariz. Democratic

Party v. Hobbs, 18 F.4th 1179, 1188–1193 (9th Cir.

2021) (declining to measure burden by the

“consequence of noncompliance”); New Ga. Project v.

Raffensperger, 976 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2020)

(no disenfranchisement where voters must take

reasonable steps to comply with ballot rules). The

Constitution protects the right to vote; it does not

guarantee a right to have a ballot counted despite

failure to follow reasonable procedural requirements.

See Pa. State Conf. of the NAACP Branches v. Sec’y

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 97 F.4th 120, 133 (3d

Cir. 2024).

By equating noncompliance with disenfranchisement, the decision below effectively collapses the

distinction between access to the ballot and

compliance with neutral ballot-casting procedures.

That approach would render virtually any mandatory

voting rule constitutionally suspect, because every

rule carries consequences for noncompliance.

Anderson-Burdick does not compel, and this Court’s

precedents do not permit, that result. That error was

then compounded: even accepting a cognizable

burden, the panel applied searching scrutiny to a

burden it had just characterized as “minimal”—an

approach directly incompatible with this Court’s

instruction that nondiscriminatory regulations of that

kind warrant only deferential review. Burdick, 504

U.S. at 434.

III. The Panel Improperly Elevated Scrutiny

and Discounted Legitimate State Interests.

Even setting aside the question of the appropriate

standard, the panel’s treatment of Pennsylvania’s

interests was independently flawed. Under AndersonBurdick, the level of scrutiny tracks the burden’s

severity: minimal, nondiscriminatory burdens

warrant only deferential review, while severe burdens

require narrow tailoring. Id.; Crawford, 553 U.S. at

198 (plurality op.). The panel inverted that framework

by acknowledging that the burden was “minimal,”

then applying a searching inquiry demanding positive

proof of each interest’s incremental value.

A. Pennsylvania Identified Legitimate and

Long-Recognized Election Interests.

Pennsylvania

advanced

several

legitimate

interests served by the date requirement, including

deterring and prosecuting voter fraud, promoting

orderly election administration, and reinforcing the

solemnity and finality of ballot submission. App. 42a–

48a.

This Court has long recognized the legitimacy of

such interests. States may enact generally applicable

rules to safeguard the integrity and reliability of the

electoral process. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9.

Crawford, for example, credited Indiana’s interest in

deterring voter fraud even though the record

contained no evidence of “any such fraud actually

occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.” 553

U.S. at 194 (plurality op.). The absence of documented

fraud did not undermine the state’s interest; the

prophylactic purpose was sufficient. That principle

forecloses the panel’s reasoning here, which

discounted Pennsylvania’s fraud-detection interest

primarily because documented prosecutions were

infrequent. Even modest procedural requirements

may further these interests by promoting accuracy,

uniformity, and voter confidence.

B. The

Panel

Improperly

Legislative Judgments.

Discounted

Despite acknowledging these interests, the panel

discounted them based on its own assessment of their

incremental utility, concluding the requirement did

not sufficiently advance the State’s goals. App. 42a–

48a. In particular, it minimized the fraud-detection

interest because documented prosecutions were rare,

and questioned whether the date requirement added

“incremental solemnity” beyond a signature. App. 45a.

That reasoning is inconsistent with settled

principles of judicial review. Legislatures need not

produce empirical proof of effectiveness to justify

reasonable election regulations. See Munro v. Socialist

Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1986) (states

need not produce particularized proof of the harm they

seek to prevent through election regulations); see also

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. 647,

686 (2021) (“[A] State may take action to prevent

election fraud without waiting for it to occur and be

detected within its own borders.”). Legislative

judgments “may be based on rational speculation

unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” FCC v.

Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). Nor

may courts invalidate neutral rules based on

disagreement with legislative line-drawing: “[T]he

burden is on the one attacking the legislative

arrangement to negative every conceivable basis

which might support it, whether or not the basis has a

foundation in the record.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,

320–21 (1993) (citation modified). The panel put that

burden on Pennsylvania instead.

By demanding record evidence and secondguessing legislative judgments, the panel exceeded

the limited role Anderson-Burdick assigns to courts

reviewing routine election regulations.

C. Elevating Scrutiny for Routine Rules

Risks

Destabilizing

Election

Administration.

If neutral compliance requirements must survive

searching judicial review and empirical proof of

incremental value, routine election procedures will be

vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Every

mandatory

rule

carries

consequences

for

noncompliance. Thus, requiring states to justify each

procedural detail risks transforming ordinary election

administration

into

perpetual

constitutional

litigation.

Again, Anderson-Burdick does not compel, and this

Court’s precedents do not permit, that result. The

regulation of elections is an area the Constitution

generally reserves to state authority. U.S. Const. art.

I, § 4, cl.1. Where burdens are minimal and rules are

neutral and nondiscriminatory, judicial deference is

constitutionally required. By subjecting routine

legislative judgments to searching federal scrutiny,

circuits in the minority, including the Third Circuit

here, have taken on a supervisory role over state

election administration that the Constitution does not

allow. This Court should correct that overreach,

reaffirm the proper scope of Anderson-Burdick, and

restore the constitutional boundaries between judicial

review and state legislative authority over elections.

IV.This Case Presents a Clean Vehicle to

Improve the Anderson-Burdick Test.

This case provides the Court with an opportunity

to resolve a major circuit split by clarifying the

Anderson-Burdick test, as it presents a pure question

of law, the state law issues have been clarified in the

interim, and there are no obstacles to the Court taking

it up.

First, this case presents a vehicle for resolving the

longstanding circuit split. As discussed, the division

between the circuits over the proper application of

Anderson-Burdick is profound and frustrates the

informal process by which federalism resolves

questions of national dispute. This case is ideally

situated for revision of the Anderson-Burdick test as

it occupies what Judge Bove characterized as perhaps

the least burden imaginable, a whole “five seconds” of

effort. If any voting security measure is to be treated

as de minimis and subjected to rational basis review,

it should be this one. A clear framework on what is

permitted to ensure the safety of our elections would

go a long way toward providing clarity for state

legislatures, and this case presents the ideal vehicle to

do so.

Second, this case provides a clean vehicle because

it poses a pure question of law; there are no factual

disputes. The Third Circuit noted that summary

judgment requires that material facts not be disputed

when reviewing and affirming the grant by the district

court. App. 22a. None of the parties in their appellate

briefs argued that there were material facts in

dispute, and no judge on the Third Circuit raised

concerns about disputes of material fact when

considering the case for an en banc hearing. See App.

87a–155a. The question of law presented is

straightforward: whether a neutral de minimis ballotcasting rule creates a cognizable Anderson-Burdick

burden, and if so, what level of scrutiny should be

applied? Rather than vacate and remand, the Court

should decide the merits of this case and clarify the

Anderson-Burdick test.

Third, the recent decision by the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court in Center for Coalfield Justice v. Wash.

Cnty. Bd. of Elections, has clarified the doctrinal state

law question, such that the case now turns entirely on

whether writing a date is itself a cognizable burden.

348 A.3d 1178 (Pa. 2025). The Third Circuit panel

reached its decision, in part, because it interpreted

Pennsylvania law as giving voters with defective

ballots no notice or opportunity to correct the ballot,

thereby increasing the regulation’s burden on the

right to vote. App. 29a–31a. After the panel opinion

but before the denial of rehearing en banc, Coalfield

Justice clarified that Pennsylvania law entitles voters

to both notice of rejection and an opportunity to cure.

See App. 101a–102a (Bove, J., dissenting from denial

of rehearing en banc) (discussing the impact of

Coalfield Justice). For this Court’s purposes, the

decision both renders the burden posed by the

challenged regulation even more de minimis than

when the Third Circuit considered the case, and

resolves a state law issue, distilling the question

presented in this case into a purely federal law

consideration of whether a date requirement creates a

cognizable Anderson-Burdick burden.

Fourth and finally, there are no jurisprudential or

prudential obstacles to the Court taking up this case.

The case has been fully litigated and extensively

briefed. At no point in the appellate briefing did any

party raise concerns about standing, nor did the Third

Circuit. At issue is “a matter of exceptional

importance,” namely, the power of a state to enforce

even de minimis anti-fraud provisions in elections.

App. 93a (Phipps, J., dissenting from denial of

rehearing en banc). Even the Third Circuit panel

recognized that the case implicated the “State’s

constitutionally

mandated

duty.”

App.

9a.

Additionally, the case is not moot. Pennsylvania’s law

remains on the books despite the permanent

injunction restraining any attempt to enforce it, and a

merits decision by the Court upholding its

constitutionality would trigger the challenged

provision to resume effectiveness in time for the

upcoming midterm elections. See 25 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 3146.6(a).

The only jurisdictional dispute raised by any party

was the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s contention

that the Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently ground

their claims in a specific constitutional right. See Br.

for Intervenor Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at 11–

17, Eakin v. Adams County Bd. of Elections, No. 251644, Dkt. 72 (3d Cir. June 6, 2025). Plaintiffs alleged

violations of the “right to vote under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments.” Compl. at 14, Eakin v.

Adams Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 1:22-cv-340, Dkt. 1

(W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2022). They argued specifically that

the date provision disproportionally affected racial

minorities, implicating the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Mem. in Supp. of Pls.’

Mot. for Summ. J. at 21, Eakin v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of

Elections, No. 1:22-cv-340, Dkt. 288 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21,

2023). Ultimately, the Third Circuit panel found this

sufficient and concurred with the district court. App.

23a. But see App. 105a (Bove, J., dissenting from

denial of rehearing en banc) (declaring this finding

unpersuasive). While Pennsylvania raises this

argument again in its Petition for Certiorari, this

Court need not disturb something that was briefed at

summary judgment phase and deemed sufficient by

both the district and circuit courts. This Court should

take up the case on the merits and resolve the

Anderson-Burdick test circuit split.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

certiorari, take the case on the merits, and clarify the