Reply Brief — Nadarius Barnes, Petitioner v. United States

No. 25-936

In the Supreme Court of the United States

NADARIUS BARNES, PETITIONER,

v.

UNITED STATES

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITION ER

NICOLE MASIELLO

LISA CORDARA

DANA KHABBAZ

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

250 West 55th Street,

New York, NY 10019

(212) 836-8000

KENESHA STARLING

DUNCAN

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

700 Louisiana St., Ste. 4000

Houston, TX 77002

(713) 576-2400

R. STANTON JONES

ANDREW T. TUTT

Counsel of Record

TRIAL LAWYERS FOR JUSTICE

421 W. Water Street

Decorah, IA 52101

(866) 854-5529

Andrew@TL4J.com

DANA KAGAN MCGINLEY

SPENCER J. FABER

CONNOR MORGAN

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

601 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 942-5000

EDWARD K. FEHLIG, JR.

FEHLIG LAW FIRM, LLC

3002 S. Jefferson Ave., Ste. 207

St. Louis, MO 63118

(314) 359-5690

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Reply Brief for the Petitioner ..........................................1

Argument..........................................................................2

I. The Split Is Entrenched And Recurring...................2

II. The Question Presented Is Important ......................7

III. The Decision Below Is Wrong ...................................8

IV. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle ................................. 10

Conclusion....................................................................... 11

(i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Blackledge v. Perry,

417 U.S. 21 (1974)....................................................... 8, 9

In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc.,

19 F.4th 787 (5th Cir. 2021)............................................ 3

Brady v. United States,

397 U.S. 742 (1970) ................................................... 9, 10

Class v. United States,

583 U.S. 174 (2018) ................................................. 4, 8, 9

Grzegorczyk v. United States,

997 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2021) ........................................... 5

Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr.,

548 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................................... 3

Menna v. New York,

423 U.S. 61 (1975)....................................................... 8, 9

Missouri v. Frye,

566 U.S. 134 (2012)......................................................... 7

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v.

United States,

330 U.S. 395 (1947)......................................................... 9

United States v. Al Hedaithy,

392 F.3d 580 (3d Cir. 2004) ............................................ 6

United States v. Aquart,

92 F.4th 77 (2d Cir. 2024) .......................................... 5, 6

United States v. Bain,

925 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2019) ......................................... 4

United States v. Broce,

488 U.S. 563 (1989)................................................... 9, 10

United States v. Brown,

875 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2017) ......................................... 4

(ii)

iii

Cases—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Carrasco,

No. 23-50238, 2024 WL 64765

(5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024)..................................................... 3

United States v. Chavez-Diaz,

949 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2020) ......................................... 5

United States v. Cotton,

535 U.S. 625 (2002)..............................................1, 2, 4, 9

United States v. Delgado-Garcia,

374 F.3d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ....................................... 5

United States v. Fuller,

No. 25-10639, 2026 WL 33973

(11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026) ............................................... 4, 6

United States v. Jones,

75 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2023) ................................... 2, 3, 6

United States v. Nyandoro,

146 F.4th 448 (5th Cir. 2025) ......................................... 3

United States v. Ortiz,

927 F.3d 868 (5th Cir. 2019) ........................................... 3

United States v. Peter,

310 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 2002) .........................................4

United States v. Pittman,

125 F.4th 527 (4th Cir. 2025) ..................................... 5, 6

United States v. Porter,

933 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2019) ............................................ 6

United States v. Reasor,

418 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2005) ........................................... 2

United States v. Rosa-Ortiz,

348 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2003) ............................................. 6

United States v. Rubin,

743 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2014) .............................................. 5

iv

Cases—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Shortman,

No. 21-30198, 2022 WL 17500201

(9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2022) .................................................... 5

United States v. St. Hubert,

909 F.3d 335 (11th Cir. 2018) ......................................... 4

United States v. Turner,

94 F.4th 739 (8th Cir. 2024) ....................................... 5, 6

Statutes and Rules

18 U.S.C. § 924(c).......................................................... 3, 4

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3) ................................................ 10

Other Authorities

Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers

and the Future of Sentencing Policy,

55 Duke L. J. 209 (2005)................................................. 7

Petition for Certiorari, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v.

Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590 (2016) (No. 15-290) ............... 5

Petition for Certiorari, United States v.

Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381 (2018) (No. 17-312) ........ 5

U.S. Brief, Hunter v. United States,

(No. 24-1063) (argued Mar. 3, 2026) .............................. 8

U.S. Brief in Opp., Abouammo v. United States,

(No. 25-5146) (argued Mar. 30, 2026)............................. 7

U.S. Brief in Opp., Ellingburg v. United States,

607 U.S. 163 (2026) (No. 24-482) .................................... 7

U.S. Cert. Reply Brief, Comm’r v. Est. of Jelke,

555 U.S. 826 (2008) (No. 07-1582) ................................ 10

U.S. Cert. Reply Brief, Match-E-BeNash-She-Wish

Band v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012)

(Nos. 11-246, 11-247) .................................................... 10

U.S. Cert. Reply Brief, United States v. Bean,

537 U.S. 71 (2002) (No. 01-704) .................................... 10

In the Supreme Court of the United States

NADARIUS BARNES, PETITIONER,

v.

UNITED STATES

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

The courts of appeals are openly divided over

whether a guilty plea alone bars a defendant from arguing

on appeal that the conduct he admitted is not a crime. The

consequences are stark: Guilty pleas are central to the

operation of the federal criminal system. The effect of a

guilty plea on appeal rights shapes plea negotiations

every day. If the plea itself extinguishes the most

important of those rights, express appellate waivers are

virtually worthless.

Unable to deny the conflict or minimize the stakes,

the government focuses on the merits. It says United

States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), forecloses

defendants from appealing guilty pleas because Cotton

held that indictment defects are not jurisdictional and

guilty pleas impliedly waive all nonjurisdictional defenses.

But that argument rests on the mistaken premise that this

Court has never adopted: that a guilty plea impliedly

waives every nonjurisdictional claim. That claim is

disproven by the Court’s three cases recognizing that

guilty pleas do not impliedly waive constitutional

challenges.

(1)

2

The government’s lone vehicle argument fails. It says

review should be denied because petitioner will lose on

remand. That is not a vehicle problem. Speculation about

what might happen after the correct rule is applied is no

reason to deny certiorari.

This case presents an entrenched conflict on an

important and recurring question at the heart of federal

criminal practice. The petition should be granted.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE SPLIT IS ENTRENCHED AND RECURRING

The government does not deny the circuit conflict. It

does not deny that multiple courts of appeals have

recognized it. Pet. 17-18. It does not deny that leading

treatises and law-review surveys catalogue it. Pet. 18-19.

It does not deny that the government itself identified the

conflict in its Tenth Circuit brief in this very case. Pet. 2

& n.1. Instead, the government says the conflict is

“overstated” and unworthy of review. Opp. 10. It is

neither.

A. The circuits on petitioner’s side of the split are

consistent and clear: a guilty plea admits facts; it does not

impliedly waive the right to argue that those facts do not

constitute a federal crime.

1. Start with the Fifth Circuit. The government

concedes that the Fifth Circuit has held—recently, after

Cotton, and in a published decision—that a guilty plea

does not bar a defendant from arguing on appeal that “the

facts set forth in the record do not constitute a federal

crime.” United States v. Jones, 75 F.4th 502, 508 (5th Cir.

2023); see Opp. 13. The government tries to dismiss Jones

as an outlier because it cited United States v. Reasor, 418

F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2005), which in turn cited earlier

authority. Opp. 13. But that is not how circuit law works.

Jones is binding Fifth Circuit law. Under the Fifth

Circuit’s “well-settled” rule of orderliness, one panel may

3

not disregard another panel’s published decision absent

intervening controlling authority from this Court, the en

banc court, or Congress. Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr.,

548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008). That rule is “strict and

rigidly applied.” In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19

F.4th 787, 792 (5th Cir. 2021). So whatever the

government thinks about earlier Fifth Circuit decisions,

Jones settled the issue in that circuit.

The Fifth Circuit continues to entertain factual-basis

challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions after guilty

pleas. See, e.g., United States v. Carrasco, No. 23-50238,

2024 WL 64765, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024). As the Fifth

Circuit recently explained again, it has “repeatedly held

that ‘even if there is an unconditional plea …, th[e] Court

has the power to review if the factual basis for the plea

fails to establish an element of the offense which the

defendant pled guilty.’ ” United States v. Nyandoro, 146

F.4th 448, 458 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.

Ortiz, 927 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 2019)). The government

cannot wish the Fifth Circuit out of the split by

hypothesizing an internal disagreement the Fifth Circuit

itself has not recognized. The rule in that circuit is clear:

a guilty plea does not foreclose review where the

defendant argues that the admitted facts do not establish

a federal offense. This appeal would have been heard on

the merits there.

2. The Eleventh Circuit is equally clear. The

government told the Tenth Circuit that the Eleventh

Circuit would have heard petitioner’s claim on the merits.

See Pet. 2 & n.1. It now tries to walk that concession back

by saying the Eleventh Circuit has expressed “some

doubt” about its own rule. Opp. 14. But this Court

determines whether to grant certiorari based on conflicts

in holdings, not reservations in dicta. The Eleventh

Circuit’s rule is clear: a guilty plea does not waive a claim

that the indictment and admitted facts fail to state a

4

federal offense. United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 71315 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d

335, 341-44 (11th Cir. 2018). St. Hubert applied that rule

to the exact kind of claim here—a post-plea challenge to a

§ 924(c) conviction on the ground that the predicate

offense was not a crime of violence. The Eleventh Circuit

continues to apply that rule today. Only months ago in

United States v. Fuller, No. 25-10639, 2026 WL 33973

(11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026), it reviewed de novo a post-plea

§ 924(c) crime-of-violence challenge because “a defendant

does not waive such a challenge by pleading guilty.” Id. at

*1. Those are not the actions of a circuit moving away from

St. Hubert. The government cannot erase the Eleventh

Circuit from the split by pointing to reservations that

have never displaced the circuit’s binding rule.

3. Now consider the Ninth Circuit. The government

admits that the Ninth Circuit has held that an

unconditional guilty plea does not bar a defendant from

arguing that the facts of his case fall outside the statute of

conviction. Opp. 13. Its only answer is that the Ninth

Circuit “did not cite, let alone distinguish Cotton.”

Opp. 13. But that is a merits argument dressed up as a

split argument. The point at certiorari is not whether the

Ninth Circuit is right; it is that defendants in the Ninth

Circuit receive appellate review that defendants in the

Tenth Circuit do not. The Ninth Circuit’s rule is not some

isolated relic. In United States v. Brown, the court held

that a guilty plea did not bar review of whether the

defendant’s conduct was covered by the statute of

conviction. 875 F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 2017). Then in

United States v. Bain, the court reversed after an open

guilty plea because the admitted facts did not establish

armed bank robbery. 925 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.

2019). After Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018),

the Ninth Circuit again recognized that a guilty plea does

not automatically bar claims challenging “the

5

government’s power to criminalize [the defendant’s ]

(admitted) conduct.” United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 949

F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2020). In fact, that court recently

reversed a defendant’s conviction where the facts she

admitted at her plea colloquy did not establish the

elements of the offense. United States v. Shortman, No.

21-30198, 2022 WL 17500201, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2022).

The government may think those cases are wrong. But

they are the law in the Ninth Circuit. This case would have

been heard on the merits there too.

B. The other side of the split is equally clear. No one

disputes that the Tenth Circuit has now joined the Fourth

and Seventh Circuits in taking the opposite approach

from the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. The decision

below held that petitioner’s guilty plea waived his right to

argue that “the course of conduct confessed to in the plea

is not in fact criminal.” Pet. App. 7a; see Opp. 5. The court

below expressly aligned itself with Grzegorczyk v. United

States, 997 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2021), and United

States v. Pittman, 125 F.4th 527, 533 (4th Cir. 2025). Thus,

at minimum, the courts of appeals are divided 3-3 on the

question presented. 1 That is a mature and entrenched

split, not an “overstated one.” Opp. 10. The government

itself has successfully urged review of far shallower

splits.2

1

The Second, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits appear to apply the same

basic rule as the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth, making the split more

like 3-6. See United States v. Rubin, 743 F.3d 31, 40 (2d Cir. 2014);

United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2024); United States

v. Turner, 94 F.4th 739, 741-42 (8th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S.

Ct. 216 (2024); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337,

1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

2

See, e.g., Pet. at 11, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

578 U.S. 590 (2016) (No. 15-290) (1-1 split); Pet. at 25, United States

v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381 (2018) (No. 17-312) (2-1 split).

6

C. The First and Third Circuits only underscore the

need for review. The government devotes substantial

energy to arguing that the law in those circuits is muddled

and does not unambiguously support petitioner. 3 Opp. 1112. But uncertainty in additional circuits is a reason to

grant review, not deny it. The government does not

dispute that United States v. Rosa-Ortiz, 348 F.3d 33 (1st

Cir. 2003), and United States v. Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580

(3d Cir. 2004), applied petitioner’s rule. Nor does it

identify any decision overruling them. Instead, the

government points to later decisions that it says point the

other way. Opp. 11-12. But even if the law in the First and

Third Circuits is uncertain, that means that the Court’s

review would do more than resolve a square split; it would

also dispel the confusion the government identifies in two

additional circuits.

D. The upshot is simple: this is a real split with real

consequences. It is not a dispute over labels or

jurisdictional terminology. It determines whether a

defendant receives merits review at all. The conflict is not

stale. It has sharpened in recent years: Jones was decided

in 2023; Aquart and Turner in 2024; Pittman and Barnes

in 2025; and Fuller in 2026. Those decisions are not

artifacts of pre-Cotton doctrine. They reflect active

disagreement over the legal effect of a guilty plea.

3

As to the Third Circuit, the government’s invocation of United

States v. Porter, 933 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2019), Opp. 12-13, is hard to

square with what Porter actually held. There, the Third Circuit reaffirmed that “a claim need not attack subject matter jurisdiction to

survive an unconditional guilty plea.” Porter, 933 F.3d at 229. That

is a direct rejection of the very rule the government and the decision

below suggest. Porter “join[ed]” the First and Ninth Circuits, both

on petitioner’s side. Id.; see Pet. 14. The government’s lead Third

Circuit authority is not just unhelpful to the government; it is

squarely against it.

7

If anything, the conflict is understated. The

government focuses on reported appellate decisions, but

the rule’s most important consequences often occur

before any appeal is filed. The fact that reported cases

continue to arise despite those plea-bargaining pressures

only confirms how many federal prosecutions this rule

affects.

II.

THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPORTANT

This case raises an exceptionally important question,

the resolution of which would affect significantly more

criminal defendants than will any of this Court’s recent

criminal cases. While several of the petitions the Court

granted this Term asked the Court to answer questions

affecting only a few defendants, 4 this petition asks the

Court to resolve a question affecting the mechanism that

resolves nearly every criminal case. This case compares

favorably to recent criminal grants both because the split

is at least as deep and because the question recurs daily

across the plea-based system on which modern federal

criminal justice depends.

Most criminal defendants plead guilty, see Missouri

v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012), and most of these

defendants enter into express appeal waivers as part of

their plea agreements, see Nancy J. King & Michael E.

O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing

Policy, 55 Duke L. J. 209, 212 (2005). But under the

government’s theory, see Opp. 6-7, these express waivers

are basically worthless. The government argues that

4

E.g., U.S. Br. in Opp. at 12, Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S.

163 (2026) (No. 24-482) (explaining the question presented is “of

diminishing significance” because “[t]he number of individuals

potentially affected … [is] limited”); U.S. Br. in Opp. at 15,

Abouammo v. United States, (No. 25-5146) (argued Mar. 30, 2026)

(arguing that because the question presented pertained only to the

“specific statute at issue,” it is “unclear in what way or to what end

this Court might fashion a new general venue rule”).

8

defendants who unconditionally plead guilty impliedly

surrender nearly all their appellate rights, with “only

narrow exceptions”—which largely overlap with the

grounds that render appeal waivers unenforceable.

Compare Opp. 6, with U.S. Br. at 29-31, Hunter v. United

States, (No. 24-1063) (argued Mar. 3, 2026) (agreeing that

appeal waivers are unenforceable in certain limited

circumstances).

Consequently, one wonders why the government

represented to this Court in Hunter that appeal “waivers

are a valuable bargaining chip for defendants in plea

discussions,” id. at 12-13, given its assertion that the

government obtains the exact same benefit regardless of

whether a defendant negotiates an appeal waiver or

unconditionally pleads guilty. Opp. 6-7. Indeed, under the

government’s theory, the Court’s decision in Hunter will

be of remarkably little significance.

III. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG

The decision below rests on a premise this Court has

never adopted: that an unconditional guilty plea impliedly

waives every challenge to a conviction except those

labeled “jurisdictional.” That premise is wrong. A guilty

plea admits facts, not the legal conclusion that those facts

establish the charged crime.

This Court’s cases reflect that distinction. Class held

that a guilty plea, by itself, does not bar a defendant from

challenging the constitutionality of his statute of

conviction on direct appeal. 583 U.S. 174, 181-85 (2018).

That holding rested on the same principle reflected in

Blackledge and Menna: some claims survive a guilty plea

because they do not contradict the defendant’s factual

9

admissions, but instead challenge the government’s

authority to obtain a conviction on those admitted facts. 5

That principle long predates Class. This Court

recognized decades ago that guilty pleas may be reviewed

“to determine whether a crime is stated by the

indictment.” United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am.

v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 412 n.26 (1947). The

government’s premise cannot be right. If pleading guilty

waived every nonjurisdictional challenge to conviction,

Class, Blackledge, and Menna would all be wrong.

Constitutional claims, after all, are not “jurisdictional” in

Cotton’s sense.

The government tries to escape that problem by

subtly shifting theories. It leads with its argument that

petitioner’s claim is barred because it is nonjurisdictional

under Cotton. Opp. 8-9. But at other times, it invokes

Broce and Brady for the different proposition that a guilty

plea admits not only facts, but legal guilt regardless of the

statute’s actual scope. Opp. 6, 8-9.6 The government even

faults petitioner for “never citing Broce or Brady or

attempting to square his theory with those decisions.”

Opp. 9.

As to Cotton, this Court has never adopted the

position that pleading guilty waives all nonjurisdictional

defenses. It would be bizarre to do so. What, exactly, a

guilty plea impliedly waives turns on what the defendant

knows. There is no reason to believe that a criminal

defendant knows he is waiving his right to argue that the

judge has misconstrued the statute under which he is

charged.

5

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Menna v. New York, 423

U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).

6

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989); Brady v. United

States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

10

As to Broce and Brady, they do not establish the

sweeping rule the government claims. They do not hold

that a defendant’s plea conclusively establishes the legal

proposition that admitted conduct falls within a federal

criminal statute. That legal conclusion belongs to the

court, not the defendant. Rule 11 proves the point. A

district court may not accept a guilty plea unless it

determines that the admitted facts supply a factual basis

for the offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). If a defendant’s

admission of “guilt” itself resolved the legal sufficiency of

the charge, that inquiry would be unnecessary.

At bottom, nothing about pleading guilty impliedly

waives the argument that the court has misconstrued the

statute of conviction. Nothing in Broce or Brady

authorizes courts of appeals to refuse to hear a preserved

legal claim simply because the defendant pleaded guilty.

A plea can admit conduct. It cannot make noncriminal

conduct criminal.

IV. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE

The government’s vehicle objection (Opp. 14-15) is

not a vehicle objection. It is a prediction about what would

happen on remand. But it does not matter, at this stage,

that the government believes petitioner may lose on the

merits on remand. The government has elsewhere

acknowledged that very principle—that “the existence of

a potential alternative ground to defend the judgment is

not a barrier to review.” U.S. Cert. Reply Br. at 9,

Comm’r v. Est. of Jelke, 555 U.S. 826 (2008) (No. 07-1582);

see also U.S. Cert. Reply Br. at 10, Match-E-BeNash-SheWish Band v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012) (Nos. 11246, 11-247) (“The possibility that [respondent] might

ultimately be able [to win on alternative grounds] …

would not prevent the Court from addressing the

questions presented in the petition.”); accord

U.S. Cert. Reply Br. at 3, United States v. Bean, 537 U.S.

71 (2002) (No. 01-704). The government cannot wield that

11

principle when it seeks review and abandon it when a

defendant does.

*****

This is the right case in which to resolve the question

presented. The issue is important, recurring, and

squarely presented. Petitioner preserved the issue; the

Tenth Circuit decided it; and the answer controlled the

judgment. With the circuits openly divided, this is an

urgent issue for the Court’s review.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

NICOLE MASIELLO

LISA CORDARA

DANA KHABBAZ

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

250 West 55th Street,

New York, NY 10019

(212) 836-8000

KENESHA STARLING

DUNCAN

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

700 Louisiana St., Ste. 4000

Houston, TX 77002

(713) 576-2400

R. STANTON JONES

ANDREW T. TUTT

Counsel of Record

TRIAL LAWYERS FOR JUSTICE

421 W. Water Street

Decorah, IA 52101

(866) 854-5529

Andrew@TL4J.com

DANA KAGAN MCGINLEY

SPENCER J. FABER

CONNOR MORGAN

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

601 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 942-5000

EDWARD K. FEHLIG, JR.

FEHLIG LAW FIRM, LLC

3002 S. Jefferson Ave., Ste. 207

St. Louis, MO 63118

(314) 359-5690

MAY 2026