Reply Brief — Richard Lowery, Petitioner v. Lillian Mills, Dean of the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 12, 2026

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No. 25-927

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

RICHARD LOWERY,

Petitioner,

v.

LILLIAN MILLS, DEAN OF THE

MCCOMBS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AT THE

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Fifth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Michael Lovins

Lovins | Trosclair

1301 South Capital of

Texas Highway

Building A, Suite 136

Austin, TX 78746

(512) 535-1649

michael@lovinslaw.com

Endel Kolde

Counsel of Record

Nathan Ristuccia

Institute for Free Speech

1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,

Suite 801

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 301-3300

dkolde@ifs.org

Counsel for Petitioner

121079

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

REPLY BRIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I.

This case presents an obvious circuit

split on whether employer threats are

s u f f i c i e nt for a n a c t ion able F i r s t

Amendment retaliation claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

II. Defendants have not borne their burden of

proving that Lowery’s claims are moot . . . . . . . . 9

III. The Fifth Circuit and the District Court

both correctly held that Lowery had

standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Akins v. Fulton County,

420 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Breaux v. City of Garland,

205 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 4

Click v. Copeland,

970 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Dodge v. Evergreen Sch. Dist. #114,

56 F.4th 767 (9th Cir. 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

FBI v. Fikre,

601 U.S. 234 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Fyfe v. Curlee,

902 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3

Hafer v. Melo,

502 U.S. 21 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Joyner v. City of Atlanta,

170 F.4th 1320 (11th Cir. 2026) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Keenan v. Tejada,

290 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4

iii

Cited Authorities

Page

Kubala v. Smith,

984 F.3d 1132 (6th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

NRA of Am. v. Vullo,

602 U.S. 175 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Pickering v. Bd. of Education,

391 U.S. 563 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Reges v. Cauce,

No. 24-3518, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 35243

(9th Cir. May 14, 2026) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4, 8

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Rules

Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1

REPLY BRIEF

The University of Texas (UT) administrators’

emphatic protestations that there is no meaningful circuit

split here are belied by the key authorities. Likewise,

the record below plainly contradicts their assertion

that the standard used to determine whether an action

is sufficiently adverse was not outcome determinative

here—it was. The Fifth Circuit, unlike almost every

other circuit, holds that threats of adverse employment

actions are never enough, so long as those threats are not

implemented.

Indeed, UT implicitly concedes that the split exists,

because it predicts that adoption of a more forgiving

standard used in other circuits would force the Fifth

Circuit to police too many faculty employment disputes.

If the standards are already identical, as UT asserts, then

adopting a new standard would have no effect.

Defendants also attempt to manufacture mootness

by announcing the future dissolution of the Salem Center

just as this petition is pending. But Lowery’s claims

encompassed all threats to his career, and were not limited

to his secondary employment with the center.

UT also re-argues standing, an issue that was twice

decided below in Lowery’s favor. There is no good reason

to re-visit those holdings.

2

I.

This case presents an obvious circuit split on

whether employer threats are sufficient for an

actionable First Amendment retaliation claim.

UT erroneously asserts that there is no meaningful

conflict here. In Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d

150 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit squarely held that

“any criticism, such as [the defendant’s] oral threats or

abusive remarks, does not rise to the level of an adverse

employment action.” Id. at 158. The Breaux Court went on

to hold that “[a]s the law stands now, retaliatory threats

are just hot air unless the public employer is willing to

endure a lawsuit over termination.” Id. at 160. This holding

doesn’t equivocate on threats or leave the door open.

The panel opinion in our case subsequently reaffirmed Breaux’s standard for assessing an adverse

action, holding that Lowery’s allegation that UT retaliated

against him by “threatening” various adverse actions was

insufficient—“none of Lowery’s allegations is sufficiently

adverse.” App. 22a-23a.

UT now strains to align the Fifth Circuit’s standard

for adverse employment actions with those of its sister

circuits, even going so far as to suggest that threats might

sometimes qualify as viable adverse actions. But the two

pre-Breaux cases UT cites discuss threats only in passing.

Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 109-10 (5th Cir. 1992)

involved a retaliatory transfer to a less prestigious work

position. So did Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 404-05 (5th

Cir. 1990). And in its own briefing to the Fifth Circuit, UT

repeatedly argued that threats alone were not enough. 5th

Circuit Resp. Brief (ECF No. 39) at 16, 18, 20.

3

Indeed, Breaux explicitly rejected the proposition that

Click ever provided that threats of termination alone could

suffice. 205 F.3d at 159. Breaux also interpreted Fyfe as

concerned with retaliatory transfers, not threats alone.

See id. at 159 n.16.

And the Breaux court similarly downplayed language

in Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968)

stating that “even the threat of discharge can be a potent

means of chilling the exercise of constitutional rights.”

The Breaux court focused instead on the fact that the

Pickering plaintiff had not just been threatened, but was

in fact discharged for speech critical of the school board.

205 F.3d at 159. Because Pickering outlawed retaliatory

dismissals, the Breaux court incorrectly reasoned that

it was not necessary to outlaw threats of dismissal,

characterizing them as “just hot air.” 205 F.3d at 160.

This reasoning was contrary to human nature because

most public employees cannot afford to risk termination

over whistleblowing or extramural speech on a matter of

public concern—nor should they be required to.

In any event, Breaux evidently sought to shut the

door on the proposition that threats of adverse actions

could ever suffice. If a threat of termination alone is

insufficient, then threats of lesser adverse actions, such

as docked pay, demotions, or a punitive job posting must

also be insufficient.

This point is further buttressed by the reality that

two years after Breaux, the Fifth Circuit applied a

more permissive Burlington Northern-like test to First

Amendment claims brought by ordinary citizens. Keenan

v. Tejada, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that

4

the second element of citizens’ retaliation claim is that “the

defendants’ actions caused them to suffer an injury that

would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing

to engage in that activity[.]”).

The Keenan court explicitly distinguished the bulk

of the Fifth Circuit’s First Amendment retaliation cases

which “involve an employment or other contractual

relationship between the plaintiffs and government

officials[.]” Id. The court noted that in “the employment

context this court’s requirement of an adverse employment

action serves the purpose of weeding out minor instances

of retaliation.” Id. at 258 n.4.

Making this distinction between public employees

and citizens would have been superfluous if the standards

were functionally the same. The Fifth Circuit demands

that public employees allege more retaliation than an

ordinary citizen in order to have a viable claim. Indeed, the

circuit openly acknowledges that its employment-context

standard provides that “some things are not actionable

even though they have the effect of chilling the exercise of

free speech.” App. 23a (quoting Breaux, 205 F.3d at 157).

Although UT suggests on the one hand that the

Fifth Circuit’s standard does not really conflict with that

adopted by most circuits, it also argues that allowing

Lowery’s claims of threats to survive a motion to dismiss

would lead to a new flood of employment litigation. It is

difficult to reconcile those arguments. Apparently then,

the standard used to measure adversity indeed matters

and even UT, in the end, at least tacitly acknowledges

that the Fifth Circuit’s standard differs materially from

most other circuits.

5

It is also obvious that, unlike the Fifth Circuit, other

circuits do allow threats of adverse employment actions

to underpin viable claims, even if the threats have not

been implemented.

For example, in Dodge v. Evergreen Sch. Dist. #114,

56 F.4th 767, 778 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit applied

its reasonably-likely-to-deter test for evaluating whether

an adverse employment action occurred. The court

noted that even minor acts of retaliation might qualify

and encompassed “the insinuation or threat” that some

adverse action may follow. Id. at 779. The plaintiff in that

case was a public-school teacher who wore, or displayed,

a MAGA hat at several training events, eliciting the

principal’s ire. Id. at 773-74. In holding that a triable

issue existed as to whether he was subject to an adverse

employment action, the court noted that the principal went

beyond criticizing the plaintiff’s political views when she

suggested “that disciplinary action could occur if she saw

Dodge with his hat again by referencing the need for union

representation[.]” Id. at 779. In Dodge, there was neither

a direct threat of disciplinary action, nor a specific form

of discipline threatened—yet the Ninth Circuit held the

claim actionable.

Similarly, in another recent Ninth Circuit case, a

teaching professor parodied the University of Washington’s

(UW) recommended “land acknowledgement” for course

syllabi with his own version, referencing Locke’s theory

that property rights are acquired through labor. Reges

v. Cauce, No. 24-3518, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 35243, at

*7, *14 (9th Cir. May 14, 2026). The UW administration

reacted swiftly. Id. at *16-20. Although the university

did not fire the professor, the Ninth Circuit held that

6

UW’s “ensuing conduct—which included opening a

lengthy disciplinary investigation (during which a merit

pay increase was withheld), reprimanding Reges, and

threatening him with further discipline—plainly qualifies

as adverse employment action under our precedents.” Id.

at *25-26 (emphasis added).

The standard used by the Ninth Circuit is obviously

different than the Fifth Circuit’s standard. The Sixth

Circuit supplied another example in Kubala v. Smith, 984

F.3d 1132, 1139-40 (6th Cir. 2021), where it applied a detera-person-of-ordinary-firmness standard and noted that

“threats alone” can constitute an adverse action. There,

the court ultimately concluded that the alleged threats

were insufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness

because they involved mere bullying behavior, such as

telling the plaintiff not to attend political functions and

how to vote; and also a management-connected lawyer’s

suggestion to change the plaintiff’s job classification

to offer him civil-service protection (a suggestion the

court plausibly found non-threatening). Id. at 1142. But

Kubala does not hold that a supervisor’s threats must be

delivered directly to the subordinate by the supervisor.

On the contrary, it posits that “a threat by proxy in no

way shields the principal when other evidence reveals a

threat.” Id. at 1141.

While UT may dispute the nature of its deans’ threats

by proxy toward Lowery, at the motion to dismiss stage

Lowery is entitled to have any factual disputes and

inferences drawn in this favor.

In summary, Lowery alleged that a member of the

President’s Office used an anonymous complaint as a

7

pretext to ask Dean Mills and Associate Dean Burris

to handle Lowery’s speech as a “personnel issue.”

EROA.3013. A week later, the deans met with Carlos

Carvalho and discussed the need to rein in Lowery’s

speech. EROA.3015-3016. Dean Mills’s own notes of

that meeting indicate that she emphasized that institute

directors “ser ve at her pleasure,” expressed her

requirement for cooperation amongst UT institutes and

“reasonable respect” for UT’s “Chain of Command.” Id.

This was not an exchange of views in the marketplace of

ideas.

Carvalho’s declaration, which must also be credited

at this stage, likewise sets forth the deans’ threats to

Lowery’s Salem Center affiliation. EROA.125-127. A

short time after this meeting, Lowery’s department chair

emailed Lowery that his speech was causing problems and

that it would be in his “interest to come up with a class

for the Spring that is likely to be popular[,]” a statement

that Lowery interpreted as meaning he might face “a

loss of pay or other disciplinary consequences if [he]

continued criticizing [UT’s Sustainability Institute] and

its events.” EROA.116. Lowery went dark shortly after

this and stopped tweeting and publicly criticizing UT.

EROA.118-119.

Carvalho further declared that at a follow-up meeting

two months later, Associate Dean Burris indicated that he

“must approve Lowery’s compensation,” and that although

he had just approved Lowery’s annual appointment to the

Salem Center, he might not do so in the future. EROA.126.

Unsurprisingly, the deans have already testified

that their goal in meeting with Carvalho and talking to

8

him about Lowery’s speech was to get Lowery to speak

differently or not at all. EROA.2977:3-9, 3008:22-3009:11.

It appears then that UT administrators obtained exactly

what they set out to obtain: Lowery’s silence.

It is of course to be expected that the parties advance

different interpretations of these events, some of which

remain contested. But Lowery’s retaliation claim was

adjudicated on a motion to dismiss and he is entitled to

have all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor. NRA

of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181 (2024).

What mattered here is that even crediting Lowery’s

version of events, he alleged only threats of adverse

actions, which the Fifth Circuit almost uniquely holds

is insufficient to support a First Amendment retaliation

claim. App. 23a. Cf. “If UT fires Lowery for his speech . . .

a § 1983 action would be appropriate.” App. 31a. But not

if UT only threatens him. Understandably, Lowery wasn’t

interested in testing whether UT would follow through

with disciplinary action. In ten other circuits, Lowery’s

plausible allegations would almost certainly have survived

a motion to dismiss.1

1. Defendants suggest that the Eleventh Circuit has clarified

its standard recently in Joyner v. City of Atlanta, 170 F.4th 1320,

1338 (11th Cir. 2026), but that case does not in fact align the

Eleventh Circuit with its ten sister circuits or hold that threats

may qualify as an adverse employment action. Rather, Joyner

limited that sufficient adversity to completed actions that alter

“important conditions of employment” such as firings or demotions.

Id. at 1339. And Joyner depended heavily on an earlier case, Akins

v. Fulton County, which held that “threats of suspension and job

loss” are not adverse actions. 420 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005).

And even if Joyner had changed the Eleventh Circuit’s standard,

that would only make the Fifth Circuit even more of an outlier.

9

II. Defendants have not borne their burden of proving

that Lowery’s claims are moot

UT also alleges that Lowery’s claims may soon be

moot because the Salem Center is slated for closure later

this summer. While Lowery does allege that UT used his

Salem Center affiliation as a pressure point to silence

him, his claims of adverse action were never limited to

his center stipend or affiliation.

In his First Amended Complaint, Lowery alleged

that he reasonably feared not only that Defendants

would eliminate his Salem Center affiliation, but that

they would “take other adverse actions.” FAC at 23-24

(WDTX ECF No. 126) (EROA.2729-2730). Lowery alleged

that Defendants threats to “reduce Lowery’s pay . . . or

otherwise discipline him” were designed to silence him.

FAC at 28, 31 (emphasis added) (EROA.2734, 2737). His

complaint also alleged that Burris warned Carvalho that

Burris must approve Lowery’s compensation. FAC at 18

(EROA.2724); see also EROA.126.

Lowery’s claim for relief similarly requested an

injunction and declaratory relief preventing UT from

threatening Lowery for protected speech (or implementing

those threats) by, among other things, reducing his pay,

removing his job responsibilities or engaging in “any

other adverse employment action.” FAC at 32-33 (EROA

2738-2739).

Similarly, in his declaration, Lowery stated that he

“interpreted Titman’s reference to needing to have a

popular class to imply that [Lowery] might face a loss

of pay or other disciplinary consequences if [Lowery]

10

continued criticizing [UT’s Sustainability Institute] and its

events.” EROA.116. Lowery also declared that his use of

Twitter wasn’t “worth the risk to [his] career.” EROA.119.

Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit opinions

discussed Lowery’s annual pay raises for his tenured

faculty position, which were separate from his Salem

Center stipend and unrelated to his Salem Center position.

App. 6a, 65a n.4, 84a, 88a, 97a. Those courts tended to

view his pay raises as evidence that Lowery had not

been subject to retaliation, but Lowery has steadfastly

maintained that those raises were only approved and reapproved after he began self-censoring. EROA.118-121,

2825, 2853. UT was, in effect, buying his continued silence

and threatening to remove future discretionary raises if

he resumed his prior speech.

It is also a rather strange coincidence that UT would

announce the dissolution of the Salem Center just as

this petition was pending. This Court should view with

skepticism UT’s late-breaking and self-serving attempt

to manipulate this Court’s jurisdiction.

“A case does not automatically become moot when

a defendant suspends its challenged conduct and then

carries on litigating for some specified period.” FBI

v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 243 (2024). It is UT’s “burden

to establish that it cannot reasonably be expected to

resume its challenged conduct.” Id. (cleaned up). Nothing

prevents UT administrators from renewing their nonSalem Center related threats to Lowery’s employment

after this litigation has concluded. Defendant Burris, or

his successor, could for example, again threaten not to

11

approve future raises if Lowery resumes his unwelcome

social-media posting or public criticism.

Since the outset of this case, Lowery has alleged that

UT has threatened him with adverse employment actions

unrelated to his Salem Center position, so potential relief

remains to be granted, even if the center is eventually

dissolved.

UT also claims mootness because some of the

Defendants in the caption have moved on to other roles.

But Lowery has brought only official-capacity claims for

prospective relief. FAC at 3 (EROA.2709). “Suits against

state officials in their official capacity therefore should be

treated as suits against the State. Indeed, when officials

sued in this capacity in federal court die or leave office,

their successors automatically assume their roles in the

litigation.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); see also

Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

Officials may come and go, but that does not moot

an official-capacity lawsuit. The civil rules address—

and easily resolve—this common occurrence in public

university-related litigation.

III. The Fifth Circuit and the District Court both

correctly held that Lowery had standing

The Fifth Circuit and district court both found that

Lowery had standing to bring his retaliation claims.

App. 9a-15a; App. 45a-53a. The Fifth Circuit noted that

since he had stopped tweeting altogether in response to

the perceived threats, Lowery’s “self-chilling is thus an

ongoing injury.” App. 14a. The Fifth Circuit also held that

12

“Lowery’s decision to self-censor is reasonable” because

he had alleged “several sanctions (both informal and

formal) that he would face if he continued to speak his

mind on public issues[.]” App. 15a.

Standing has already been thoroughly and repeatedly

litigated and UT raises no good reason to revisit standing

again. UT alleges that the courts below failed to consider

evidence of Lowery’s pay raises, but both courts referred

to those pay raises, an occurrence that no party disputes,

even if they draw different conclusions from those raises.

App. 6a, 65a n.4.

UT cites no authority for the proposition that pay raises

or post-filing disavowals automatically vitiate standing or

that a district or appellate court must resolve all factual

disputes in order to reach standing. Both parties sought to

fortify their claims with declarations and other evidence

in this case. And the Fifth Circuit’s opinion discussed

some of the very evidence which Defendants wrongly

assert was overlooked, before it found that Plaintiff had

met his burden of proving standing “with the manner

and degree of evidence required at the successive stages

of the litigation.” App. 6a, 9a. The lower courts rightly

concluded that Lowery had standing to bring his claims

for prospective relief.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael Lovins

Lovins | Trosclair

1301 South Capital of

Texas Highway

Building A, Suite 136

Austin, TX 78746

(512) 535-1649

michael@lovinslaw.com

Endel Kolde

Counsel of Record

Nathan Ristuccia

Institute for Free Speech

1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,

Suite 801

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 301-3300

dkolde@ifs.org

Counsel for Petitioner

June 12, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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