Reply Brief — Richard Lowery, Petitioner v. Lillian Mills, Dean of the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin, et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 12, 2026
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No. 25-927
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
RICHARD LOWERY,
Petitioner,
v.
LILLIAN MILLS, DEAN OF THE
MCCOMBS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of A ppeals for the Fifth Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
Michael Lovins
Lovins | Trosclair
1301 South Capital of
Texas Highway
Building A, Suite 136
Austin, TX 78746
(512) 535-1649
michael@lovinslaw.com
Endel Kolde
Counsel of Record
Nathan Ristuccia
Institute for Free Speech
1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Suite 801
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 301-3300
dkolde@ifs.org
Counsel for Petitioner
121079
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
REPLY BRIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I.
This case presents an obvious circuit
split on whether employer threats are
s u f f i c i e nt for a n a c t ion able F i r s t
Amendment retaliation claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. Defendants have not borne their burden of
proving that Lowery’s claims are moot . . . . . . . . 9
III. The Fifth Circuit and the District Court
both correctly held that Lowery had
standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
ii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Akins v. Fulton County,
420 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Breaux v. City of Garland,
205 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 4
Click v. Copeland,
970 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Dodge v. Evergreen Sch. Dist. #114,
56 F.4th 767 (9th Cir. 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
FBI v. Fikre,
601 U.S. 234 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Fyfe v. Curlee,
902 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3
Hafer v. Melo,
502 U.S. 21 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Joyner v. City of Atlanta,
170 F.4th 1320 (11th Cir. 2026) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Keenan v. Tejada,
290 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4
iii
Cited Authorities
Page
Kubala v. Smith,
984 F.3d 1132 (6th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
NRA of Am. v. Vullo,
602 U.S. 175 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Pickering v. Bd. of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Reges v. Cauce,
No. 24-3518, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 35243
(9th Cir. May 14, 2026) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4, 8
Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Rules
Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1
REPLY BRIEF
The University of Texas (UT) administrators’
emphatic protestations that there is no meaningful circuit
split here are belied by the key authorities. Likewise,
the record below plainly contradicts their assertion
that the standard used to determine whether an action
is sufficiently adverse was not outcome determinative
here—it was. The Fifth Circuit, unlike almost every
other circuit, holds that threats of adverse employment
actions are never enough, so long as those threats are not
implemented.
Indeed, UT implicitly concedes that the split exists,
because it predicts that adoption of a more forgiving
standard used in other circuits would force the Fifth
Circuit to police too many faculty employment disputes.
If the standards are already identical, as UT asserts, then
adopting a new standard would have no effect.
Defendants also attempt to manufacture mootness
by announcing the future dissolution of the Salem Center
just as this petition is pending. But Lowery’s claims
encompassed all threats to his career, and were not limited
to his secondary employment with the center.
UT also re-argues standing, an issue that was twice
decided below in Lowery’s favor. There is no good reason
to re-visit those holdings.
2
I.
This case presents an obvious circuit split on
whether employer threats are sufficient for an
actionable First Amendment retaliation claim.
UT erroneously asserts that there is no meaningful
conflict here. In Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d
150 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit squarely held that
“any criticism, such as [the defendant’s] oral threats or
abusive remarks, does not rise to the level of an adverse
employment action.” Id. at 158. The Breaux Court went on
to hold that “[a]s the law stands now, retaliatory threats
are just hot air unless the public employer is willing to
endure a lawsuit over termination.” Id. at 160. This holding
doesn’t equivocate on threats or leave the door open.
The panel opinion in our case subsequently reaffirmed Breaux’s standard for assessing an adverse
action, holding that Lowery’s allegation that UT retaliated
against him by “threatening” various adverse actions was
insufficient—“none of Lowery’s allegations is sufficiently
adverse.” App. 22a-23a.
UT now strains to align the Fifth Circuit’s standard
for adverse employment actions with those of its sister
circuits, even going so far as to suggest that threats might
sometimes qualify as viable adverse actions. But the two
pre-Breaux cases UT cites discuss threats only in passing.
Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 109-10 (5th Cir. 1992)
involved a retaliatory transfer to a less prestigious work
position. So did Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 404-05 (5th
Cir. 1990). And in its own briefing to the Fifth Circuit, UT
repeatedly argued that threats alone were not enough. 5th
Circuit Resp. Brief (ECF No. 39) at 16, 18, 20.
3
Indeed, Breaux explicitly rejected the proposition that
Click ever provided that threats of termination alone could
suffice. 205 F.3d at 159. Breaux also interpreted Fyfe as
concerned with retaliatory transfers, not threats alone.
See id. at 159 n.16.
And the Breaux court similarly downplayed language
in Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968)
stating that “even the threat of discharge can be a potent
means of chilling the exercise of constitutional rights.”
The Breaux court focused instead on the fact that the
Pickering plaintiff had not just been threatened, but was
in fact discharged for speech critical of the school board.
205 F.3d at 159. Because Pickering outlawed retaliatory
dismissals, the Breaux court incorrectly reasoned that
it was not necessary to outlaw threats of dismissal,
characterizing them as “just hot air.” 205 F.3d at 160.
This reasoning was contrary to human nature because
most public employees cannot afford to risk termination
over whistleblowing or extramural speech on a matter of
public concern—nor should they be required to.
In any event, Breaux evidently sought to shut the
door on the proposition that threats of adverse actions
could ever suffice. If a threat of termination alone is
insufficient, then threats of lesser adverse actions, such
as docked pay, demotions, or a punitive job posting must
also be insufficient.
This point is further buttressed by the reality that
two years after Breaux, the Fifth Circuit applied a
more permissive Burlington Northern-like test to First
Amendment claims brought by ordinary citizens. Keenan
v. Tejada, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
4
the second element of citizens’ retaliation claim is that “the
defendants’ actions caused them to suffer an injury that
would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing
to engage in that activity[.]”).
The Keenan court explicitly distinguished the bulk
of the Fifth Circuit’s First Amendment retaliation cases
which “involve an employment or other contractual
relationship between the plaintiffs and government
officials[.]” Id. The court noted that in “the employment
context this court’s requirement of an adverse employment
action serves the purpose of weeding out minor instances
of retaliation.” Id. at 258 n.4.
Making this distinction between public employees
and citizens would have been superfluous if the standards
were functionally the same. The Fifth Circuit demands
that public employees allege more retaliation than an
ordinary citizen in order to have a viable claim. Indeed, the
circuit openly acknowledges that its employment-context
standard provides that “some things are not actionable
even though they have the effect of chilling the exercise of
free speech.” App. 23a (quoting Breaux, 205 F.3d at 157).
Although UT suggests on the one hand that the
Fifth Circuit’s standard does not really conflict with that
adopted by most circuits, it also argues that allowing
Lowery’s claims of threats to survive a motion to dismiss
would lead to a new flood of employment litigation. It is
difficult to reconcile those arguments. Apparently then,
the standard used to measure adversity indeed matters
and even UT, in the end, at least tacitly acknowledges
that the Fifth Circuit’s standard differs materially from
most other circuits.
5
It is also obvious that, unlike the Fifth Circuit, other
circuits do allow threats of adverse employment actions
to underpin viable claims, even if the threats have not
been implemented.
For example, in Dodge v. Evergreen Sch. Dist. #114,
56 F.4th 767, 778 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit applied
its reasonably-likely-to-deter test for evaluating whether
an adverse employment action occurred. The court
noted that even minor acts of retaliation might qualify
and encompassed “the insinuation or threat” that some
adverse action may follow. Id. at 779. The plaintiff in that
case was a public-school teacher who wore, or displayed,
a MAGA hat at several training events, eliciting the
principal’s ire. Id. at 773-74. In holding that a triable
issue existed as to whether he was subject to an adverse
employment action, the court noted that the principal went
beyond criticizing the plaintiff’s political views when she
suggested “that disciplinary action could occur if she saw
Dodge with his hat again by referencing the need for union
representation[.]” Id. at 779. In Dodge, there was neither
a direct threat of disciplinary action, nor a specific form
of discipline threatened—yet the Ninth Circuit held the
claim actionable.
Similarly, in another recent Ninth Circuit case, a
teaching professor parodied the University of Washington’s
(UW) recommended “land acknowledgement” for course
syllabi with his own version, referencing Locke’s theory
that property rights are acquired through labor. Reges
v. Cauce, No. 24-3518, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 35243, at
*7, *14 (9th Cir. May 14, 2026). The UW administration
reacted swiftly. Id. at *16-20. Although the university
did not fire the professor, the Ninth Circuit held that
6
UW’s “ensuing conduct—which included opening a
lengthy disciplinary investigation (during which a merit
pay increase was withheld), reprimanding Reges, and
threatening him with further discipline—plainly qualifies
as adverse employment action under our precedents.” Id.
at *25-26 (emphasis added).
The standard used by the Ninth Circuit is obviously
different than the Fifth Circuit’s standard. The Sixth
Circuit supplied another example in Kubala v. Smith, 984
F.3d 1132, 1139-40 (6th Cir. 2021), where it applied a detera-person-of-ordinary-firmness standard and noted that
“threats alone” can constitute an adverse action. There,
the court ultimately concluded that the alleged threats
were insufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness
because they involved mere bullying behavior, such as
telling the plaintiff not to attend political functions and
how to vote; and also a management-connected lawyer’s
suggestion to change the plaintiff’s job classification
to offer him civil-service protection (a suggestion the
court plausibly found non-threatening). Id. at 1142. But
Kubala does not hold that a supervisor’s threats must be
delivered directly to the subordinate by the supervisor.
On the contrary, it posits that “a threat by proxy in no
way shields the principal when other evidence reveals a
threat.” Id. at 1141.
While UT may dispute the nature of its deans’ threats
by proxy toward Lowery, at the motion to dismiss stage
Lowery is entitled to have any factual disputes and
inferences drawn in this favor.
In summary, Lowery alleged that a member of the
President’s Office used an anonymous complaint as a
7
pretext to ask Dean Mills and Associate Dean Burris
to handle Lowery’s speech as a “personnel issue.”
EROA.3013. A week later, the deans met with Carlos
Carvalho and discussed the need to rein in Lowery’s
speech. EROA.3015-3016. Dean Mills’s own notes of
that meeting indicate that she emphasized that institute
directors “ser ve at her pleasure,” expressed her
requirement for cooperation amongst UT institutes and
“reasonable respect” for UT’s “Chain of Command.” Id.
This was not an exchange of views in the marketplace of
ideas.
Carvalho’s declaration, which must also be credited
at this stage, likewise sets forth the deans’ threats to
Lowery’s Salem Center affiliation. EROA.125-127. A
short time after this meeting, Lowery’s department chair
emailed Lowery that his speech was causing problems and
that it would be in his “interest to come up with a class
for the Spring that is likely to be popular[,]” a statement
that Lowery interpreted as meaning he might face “a
loss of pay or other disciplinary consequences if [he]
continued criticizing [UT’s Sustainability Institute] and
its events.” EROA.116. Lowery went dark shortly after
this and stopped tweeting and publicly criticizing UT.
EROA.118-119.
Carvalho further declared that at a follow-up meeting
two months later, Associate Dean Burris indicated that he
“must approve Lowery’s compensation,” and that although
he had just approved Lowery’s annual appointment to the
Salem Center, he might not do so in the future. EROA.126.
Unsurprisingly, the deans have already testified
that their goal in meeting with Carvalho and talking to
8
him about Lowery’s speech was to get Lowery to speak
differently or not at all. EROA.2977:3-9, 3008:22-3009:11.
It appears then that UT administrators obtained exactly
what they set out to obtain: Lowery’s silence.
It is of course to be expected that the parties advance
different interpretations of these events, some of which
remain contested. But Lowery’s retaliation claim was
adjudicated on a motion to dismiss and he is entitled to
have all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor. NRA
of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181 (2024).
What mattered here is that even crediting Lowery’s
version of events, he alleged only threats of adverse
actions, which the Fifth Circuit almost uniquely holds
is insufficient to support a First Amendment retaliation
claim. App. 23a. Cf. “If UT fires Lowery for his speech . . .
a § 1983 action would be appropriate.” App. 31a. But not
if UT only threatens him. Understandably, Lowery wasn’t
interested in testing whether UT would follow through
with disciplinary action. In ten other circuits, Lowery’s
plausible allegations would almost certainly have survived
a motion to dismiss.1
1. Defendants suggest that the Eleventh Circuit has clarified
its standard recently in Joyner v. City of Atlanta, 170 F.4th 1320,
1338 (11th Cir. 2026), but that case does not in fact align the
Eleventh Circuit with its ten sister circuits or hold that threats
may qualify as an adverse employment action. Rather, Joyner
limited that sufficient adversity to completed actions that alter
“important conditions of employment” such as firings or demotions.
Id. at 1339. And Joyner depended heavily on an earlier case, Akins
v. Fulton County, which held that “threats of suspension and job
loss” are not adverse actions. 420 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005).
And even if Joyner had changed the Eleventh Circuit’s standard,
that would only make the Fifth Circuit even more of an outlier.
9
II. Defendants have not borne their burden of proving
that Lowery’s claims are moot
UT also alleges that Lowery’s claims may soon be
moot because the Salem Center is slated for closure later
this summer. While Lowery does allege that UT used his
Salem Center affiliation as a pressure point to silence
him, his claims of adverse action were never limited to
his center stipend or affiliation.
In his First Amended Complaint, Lowery alleged
that he reasonably feared not only that Defendants
would eliminate his Salem Center affiliation, but that
they would “take other adverse actions.” FAC at 23-24
(WDTX ECF No. 126) (EROA.2729-2730). Lowery alleged
that Defendants threats to “reduce Lowery’s pay . . . or
otherwise discipline him” were designed to silence him.
FAC at 28, 31 (emphasis added) (EROA.2734, 2737). His
complaint also alleged that Burris warned Carvalho that
Burris must approve Lowery’s compensation. FAC at 18
(EROA.2724); see also EROA.126.
Lowery’s claim for relief similarly requested an
injunction and declaratory relief preventing UT from
threatening Lowery for protected speech (or implementing
those threats) by, among other things, reducing his pay,
removing his job responsibilities or engaging in “any
other adverse employment action.” FAC at 32-33 (EROA
2738-2739).
Similarly, in his declaration, Lowery stated that he
“interpreted Titman’s reference to needing to have a
popular class to imply that [Lowery] might face a loss
of pay or other disciplinary consequences if [Lowery]
10
continued criticizing [UT’s Sustainability Institute] and its
events.” EROA.116. Lowery also declared that his use of
Twitter wasn’t “worth the risk to [his] career.” EROA.119.
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit opinions
discussed Lowery’s annual pay raises for his tenured
faculty position, which were separate from his Salem
Center stipend and unrelated to his Salem Center position.
App. 6a, 65a n.4, 84a, 88a, 97a. Those courts tended to
view his pay raises as evidence that Lowery had not
been subject to retaliation, but Lowery has steadfastly
maintained that those raises were only approved and reapproved after he began self-censoring. EROA.118-121,
2825, 2853. UT was, in effect, buying his continued silence
and threatening to remove future discretionary raises if
he resumed his prior speech.
It is also a rather strange coincidence that UT would
announce the dissolution of the Salem Center just as
this petition was pending. This Court should view with
skepticism UT’s late-breaking and self-serving attempt
to manipulate this Court’s jurisdiction.
“A case does not automatically become moot when
a defendant suspends its challenged conduct and then
carries on litigating for some specified period.” FBI
v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 243 (2024). It is UT’s “burden
to establish that it cannot reasonably be expected to
resume its challenged conduct.” Id. (cleaned up). Nothing
prevents UT administrators from renewing their nonSalem Center related threats to Lowery’s employment
after this litigation has concluded. Defendant Burris, or
his successor, could for example, again threaten not to
11
approve future raises if Lowery resumes his unwelcome
social-media posting or public criticism.
Since the outset of this case, Lowery has alleged that
UT has threatened him with adverse employment actions
unrelated to his Salem Center position, so potential relief
remains to be granted, even if the center is eventually
dissolved.
UT also claims mootness because some of the
Defendants in the caption have moved on to other roles.
But Lowery has brought only official-capacity claims for
prospective relief. FAC at 3 (EROA.2709). “Suits against
state officials in their official capacity therefore should be
treated as suits against the State. Indeed, when officials
sued in this capacity in federal court die or leave office,
their successors automatically assume their roles in the
litigation.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); see also
Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
Officials may come and go, but that does not moot
an official-capacity lawsuit. The civil rules address—
and easily resolve—this common occurrence in public
university-related litigation.
III. The Fifth Circuit and the District Court both
correctly held that Lowery had standing
The Fifth Circuit and district court both found that
Lowery had standing to bring his retaliation claims.
App. 9a-15a; App. 45a-53a. The Fifth Circuit noted that
since he had stopped tweeting altogether in response to
the perceived threats, Lowery’s “self-chilling is thus an
ongoing injury.” App. 14a. The Fifth Circuit also held that
12
“Lowery’s decision to self-censor is reasonable” because
he had alleged “several sanctions (both informal and
formal) that he would face if he continued to speak his
mind on public issues[.]” App. 15a.
Standing has already been thoroughly and repeatedly
litigated and UT raises no good reason to revisit standing
again. UT alleges that the courts below failed to consider
evidence of Lowery’s pay raises, but both courts referred
to those pay raises, an occurrence that no party disputes,
even if they draw different conclusions from those raises.
App. 6a, 65a n.4.
UT cites no authority for the proposition that pay raises
or post-filing disavowals automatically vitiate standing or
that a district or appellate court must resolve all factual
disputes in order to reach standing. Both parties sought to
fortify their claims with declarations and other evidence
in this case. And the Fifth Circuit’s opinion discussed
some of the very evidence which Defendants wrongly
assert was overlooked, before it found that Plaintiff had
met his burden of proving standing “with the manner
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages
of the litigation.” App. 6a, 9a. The lower courts rightly
concluded that Lowery had standing to bring his claims
for prospective relief.
13
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Michael Lovins
Lovins | Trosclair
1301 South Capital of
Texas Highway
Building A, Suite 136
Austin, TX 78746
(512) 535-1649
michael@lovinslaw.com
Endel Kolde
Counsel of Record
Nathan Ristuccia
Institute for Free Speech
1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Suite 801
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 301-3300
dkolde@ifs.org
Counsel for Petitioner
June 12, 2026
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