Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Benancio Garcia, III, Petitioner v. Steven Hobbs, Secretary of State of Washington, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 23, 2026

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Ai

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Memorandum Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit, filed 8/27/2025 ...................... A1

Amended Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Washington, filed 3/25/2024 .... A4

Opinion and Order of the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Washington, filed 9/8/2023 ...... A6

Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Western

District of Washington, filed 9/8/2023 ................... A55

A1

FILED 8/27/2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2603

BENANCIO GARCIA III,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary

of State of Washington and STATE OF

WASHINGTON,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington. D.C. No. 3:22-cv05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV. Robert S. Lasnik, District

Judge, Presiding.

Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and OWENS, Circuit

Judges.

MEMORANDUM

Benancio Garcia III sued the State of Washington

and its Secretary of State, Steven Hobbs, alleging that

Legislative District 15 (“LD 15”), drawn by an

independent state redistricting commission (the

“Commission”), was an illegal racial gerrymander in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Submission was vacated

pending this court’s resolution of Palmer, et al. v.

Trevino, et al., Nos. 23-35595 & 24-1602, 2025 U.S.

App. LEXIS 22068. Because the court has issued its

A2

decision in Palmer v. Trevino, we now turn to the

merits of this appeal.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Reviewing the district court’s dismissal for mootness,

Rosemere Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S. Env’t Prot.

Agency, 581 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2009), we

affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the facts,

we need not recount them here.

In Palmer v. Trevino, we affirmed the district

court’s invalidation of LD 15 and the adoption of a

remedial map that invalidated LD 15 and replaced it

with a new legislative district, Legislative District 14

(“LD 14”). No. 23-35595, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22068

(9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025). Garcia’s action, which

challenges LD 15 on equal protection grounds, is

therefore moot.

“[T]he repeal, amendment, or expiration of

challenged legislation is generally enough to render a

case moot . . . .” Teter v. Lopez, 125 F.4th 1301, 1306

(9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of

Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. Chambers, 941 F.3d

1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc)). Garcia, citing

North Carolina v. Covington, 585 U.S. 969, 138 S. Ct.

2548, 201 L. Ed. 2d 993 (2018), argues that even

though LD 14 has replaced LD 15, he experiences a

“continuing injury” of racial segregation. To avoid

mootness, the plaintiffs in Covington specifically

argued “that some of the new districts were mere

continuations of the old, gerrymandered districts.”

Covington, 585 U.S. at 976 (emphasis added).

To determine whether LD 14 is a continuation of

LD 15, “the case or controversy giving rise to

A3

jurisdiction is the touchstone.” Chem. Producers &

Distribs. Ass’n v. Helliker, 463 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir.

2006), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trs. of

Glazing Health & Welfare, 941 F.3d 1195. At the

district court, this case was centered entirely on the

Commission’s actions. The operative complaint

alleged that “[r]ace was the predominant factor

motivating the Commission’s decision to draw the

lines encompassing Legislative District 15.” At trial,

the parties submitted extensive trial exhibits,

including

expert

reports,

proposed

maps,

communications between commissioners, recordings

of committee meetings, and notes from negotiations.

Such evidence is plainly directed towards the intent of

the Commission and does not bear on whether the

district court similarly considered race as a

predominant factor in drawing LD 14.

LD 14 was crafted by an entirely different party—

the district court—from the Commission, the party

that drew LD 15, and thus the “character of the

system” has been “alter[ed] significantly.” Fusari v.

Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 386-87, 95 S. Ct. 533, 42 L.

Ed. 2d 521 (1975). Consequently, it is no longer

“permissible to say that the [Commission’s]

challenged conduct continues.” Chem. Producers &

Distribs., 463 F.3d at 875 (internal quotations

omitted). The case is moot.

AFFIRMED.

A4

FILED: 3/25/2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV

BENANCIO GARCIA III,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary

of State of Washington, and the STATE OF

WASHINGTON,

Defendants.

AMENDED JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

_____ Jury Verdict. This action came before the

Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried

and the jury has rendered its verdict.

__X__Decision by Court. This action came to

consideration before the Court. The issues have been

considered and a decision has been rendered.

This action is again before the Court on remand

from the United States Supreme Court with

instructions to enter a fresh judgment from which an

appeal can be taken to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The issues were

previously considered and a decision was rendered.

THE COURT HAS ORDERED that:

A5

This case is dismissed as moot.

DATED this 25th day of March, 2024.

RAVI SUBRAMANIAN,

Clerk of the Court

By: /s/ Victoria Ericksen

Deputy Clerk

A6

FILED: 9/8/2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV

BENANCIO GARCIA III,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary

of State of Washington, and the STATE OF

WASHINGTON,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AS MOOT

Chief District Judge David G. Estudillo authored

the majority opinion, in which District Judge Robert

S. Lasnik joined. Circuit Judge Lawrence J.C.

VanDyke filed a dissenting opinion. 1

Plaintiff Benancio Garcia III brings suit arguing

that Washington Legislative District 15 (“LD 15”) in

the Yakima Valley is an illegal racial gerrymander in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

1 Because Plaintiff “challeng[ed] the constitutionality of the

apportionment” of a “statewide legislative body” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2284(a), the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit designated a

three-judge panel to hear Plaintiff’s constitutional claim. (See

Dkt. No. 18.)

A7

Fourteenth Amendment. The Panel sat for a threeday trial from June 5th to June 7th to hear evidence

regarding Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause claim. 2

In light of the court’s decision in Soto Palmer, the

Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim as moot.

I. MOOTNESS

“[T]he judicial power of federal courts is

constitutionally

restricted

to

‘cases’

and

‘controversies.’“ Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.

Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968). “There is thus no

case or controversy, and a suit becomes moot, when

the issues presented are no longer live or the parties

lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”

Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172, 133 S. Ct. 1017,

185 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013) (cleaned up). Article III’s caseor-controversy requirement prevents federal courts

from issuing advisory opinions. See id. A party must

have “a specific live grievance,” and cannot seek to

litigate an “abstract disagreement over the

constitutionality” of a law or other government action.

Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 479, 110 S.

Ct. 1249, 108 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1990) (cleaned up).

2 The Panel heard evidence for the Garcia

case concurrent with

evidence presented for parallel litigation in Soto Palmer v.

Hobbs, No. 3:22-cv-5035-RSL (W.D. Wash.). For purposes of

judicial economy, the Court refers the reader to the procedural

and factual background in Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *1-3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2023)

and this Court’s prior order (Dkt. No. 56). The Court presumes

reader familiarity with the facts of this case. This order only

addresses Plaintiff Benancio Garcia III’s Equal Protection claim.

A8

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s challenge to the

constitutionality of LD 15 is moot given the Soto

Palmer court’s finding that LD 15 violates § 2 of the

Voting Rights Act (“VRA”). Plaintiff seeks declaratory

relief determining that LD 15 “is an illegal racial

gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and an

injunction “enjoining Defendant from enforcing or

giving any effect to the boundaries of [] [LD 15],

including an injunction barring Defendant from

conducting any further elections for the Legislature

based on [] [LD 15].” (Dkt. No. 14 at 18.) Plaintiff

further requests the Court order a new legislative

map be drawn. (Id.)

The Soto Palmer court determined that LD 15

violated § 2 of the VRA’s prohibition against

discriminatory results. See Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *11. In so

deciding, the court found LD 15 to be invalid and

ordered that the State’s legislative districts be

redrawn. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, [WL] at *13.

Since LD 15 has been found to be invalid and will be

redrawn (and therefore not used for further elections),

the Court cannot provide any more relief to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff does not assert that any new district drawn

by the Washington State Redistricting Commission

(“Commission”) would be a “mere continuation[] of the

old, gerrymandered district[].” North Carolina v.

Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 201 L. Ed. 2d 993

(2018). Plaintiff therefore lacks a specific, live

grievance, and his case is moot.

Traditional principles of judicial restraint also

counsel against resolving Plaintiff’s Equal Protection

Clause claim. “A fundamental and longstanding

A9

principle of judicial restraint requires that courts

avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of

the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v. Nw. Indian

Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.

Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1988); see also Three

Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng’g,

P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157, 104 S. Ct. 2267, 81 L. Ed. 2d

113 (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial

restraint, however, that this Court will not reach

constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of

deciding them.”). The court’s decision in Soto Palmer

makes any decision in the instant case superfluous. A

new Commission will draw new legislative districts in

the Yakima Valley and, if challenged thereafter, the

propriety of the new districts will be decided by

analyzing the motivations and decisions of new

individuals who constitute the Commission. 3 The

Court cannot and will not presume that the new

Commission will be motivated by the same factors

that motivated its predecessor. Federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction, and to unnecessarily

decide a constitutional issue where there are

alternate grounds available or where there is an

absence of a case or controversy is to overstep our

“proper, limited role in our Nation’s governance.”

Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. , 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2384,

216 L. Ed. 2d 1063 (2023) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Our dissenting colleague disagrees that the

instant case is moot. In his view, the Commissioners

3 In the event that the Commission fails to draw a new map by

the deadline set by the Soto Palmer court, the parties will submit

proposed maps to the Soto Palmer court and the court will adopt

and enforce a new redistricting plan. See Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *13.

A10

racially gerrymandered the 2021 Washington

Redistricting Map in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause and therefore “the map was ‘void ab initio.”‘

Additionally, the dissent argues that longstanding

principles of judicial restraint and constitutional

avoidance are inapplicable here because the decision

in Soto Palmer does not completely moot the relief

sought by Plaintiff. These arguments are

uncompelling.

First, the view that LD 15 was void ab initio

presupposes that Plaintiff established an Equal

Protection violation. To the contrary, a full analysis of

the record presented does not yield such a result. The

Court declines to issue an advisory opinion on the

validity of Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim, however.

Rather, it is sufficient to note only that we disagree

with the dissent’s summary and interpretation of the

facts surrounding the creation of LD 15. Importantly,

the Commissioners’ testimony on the specific issue of

whether race predominated in the formation of LD 15

is absent from the dissent’s summary of the facts, and

the Court encourages readers to examine the

Commissioners’ testimony in full. 4 This testimony

4 Commissioner April Sims, for example, specifically disclaimed

that race was the most important factor. (See Dkt. No. 73 at 77.)

As she testified, “I would not agree that [race] [] was the most

important factor. But that it was a factor.” (Id.) Commissioner

Brady Walkinshaw similarly noted that the Commissioners

discussed a number of factors, including race, but “none of those

[factors] were predominant.” (Id. at 124.) He further emphasized

the impact that the Commissioners’ desire to unify the Yakama

Nation into one legislative district had on the map (see id.), a

factor that all Commissioners attested was important but is

conspicuously absent from our colleague’s analysis.

A11

weighs

heavily

against

finding

that

race

predominated in the drawing of LD 15 and against

finding an Equal Protection violation. 5

Commissioner Joe Fain testified that his overriding interest in

drawing maps for LD 15 was to ensure “competitiveness.” (See

Dkt. No. 74 at 48, 58.) He also testified that he believed

Commissioner Walkinshaw would have voted for a map in LD 15

that would not have had a majority Latino Citizen Voting Age

Population (“CVAP”). (Id. at 51.) Finally, Commissioner Paul

Graves testified that “race and the partisan breakdown of the

district were” tied in his mind as the most important factors.

(Dkt. No. 75 at 85.)

5 The

dissent’s “ab initio” argument leads to the surprising

assertion that the Soto Palmer court should have declined to

issue an opinion in that case. Soto Palmer was the first-filed

challenge to the redistricting map, and it presented a clearly

justiciable case and controversy. Federal courts have a “virtually

unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them,”

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817,

96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976), and our dissenting

colleague makes no effort to show that one of the “exceptional”

circumstances that could justify a district court’s refusal to

exercise or postponement of the exercise of its jurisdiction

existed, Id. at 813 and 817. Although the intervenors in Soto

Palmer twice requested that the case be stayed, they did so on

the ground that judicial efficiency would be served by waiting for

the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1,

143 S. Ct. 1487, 216 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2023). At no point prior to the

dissemination of the dissent did anyone suggest that a decision

in Soto Palmer would be advisory or otherwise improper.

More importantly, the suggestion that the VRA claim should

have been stayed or held in abeyance while the Equal Protection

claim was resolved is not supported by case law or legal analysis.

The dissent does not discuss whether a stay of Soto Palmer would

have been appropriate pending the resolution of Garcia under

the rubric established in Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 25456, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936), nor does it cite any cases

A12

It is also erroneous to argue that “resolving Soto

Palmer in the Soto Palmer plaintiffs’ favor does not

moot Garcia.” As noted, LD 15 will be redrawn and

will not be used in its current form for any future

election. The Soto Palmer court has therefore granted

Plaintiff complete relief for purposes of our mootness

analysis. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc.

v. City of New York, New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526,

206 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2020) (vacating judgment as moot

where New York City amended its laws to grant “the

precise relief that petitioners requested in the prayer

for relief in their complaint” notwithstanding requests

for declaratory and injunctive relief from future

constitutional violations). 6

in which a decision on a VRA claim was postponed because of a

related Equal Protection challenge. Milligan itself presented just

such a confluence of claims, and the Supreme Court addressed

the appropriateness of injunctive relief on the VRA claim without

considering, much less prioritizing, the pending Equal Protection

challenge. See also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,

548 U.S. 399, 410, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 165 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2006)

(resolving VRA claims without reaching the companion Equal

Protection claim); Singleton v. Allen, 2:21-cv-1291-AMM-SMTFM, Dkt. # 272 at 7-8, 194-95, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998

(N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2023) (resolving VRA claims and reserving

ruling on Equal Protection claims in light of the fundamental and

longstanding principles of judicial restraint and constitutional

avoidance).

6 The

dissent attempts to distinguish New York State Rifle &

Pistol Ass’n, but the petitioners in that case argued, like our

colleague, that an intervening change to New York City’s

firearms laws did not moot their request for declaratory and

injunctive relief because of the continued possibility of future

harm from New York City’s unconstitutional firearms licensing

scheme. See Petitioners’ Response to Respondents’ Suggestion of

A13

Our colleague argues that this case is not moot

because Plaintiff may obtain partial injunctive and

declaratory relief. Specifically, the Court could declare

that LD 15 was an illegal racial gerrymander and

enjoin the state from “performing an illegal racial

gerrymander when it redraws the map.” This type of

relief is insufficient to avoid a finding of mootness. It

goes without saying that a federal court may only

direct parties to undertake activities that comply with

the Constitution, and the Soto Palmer court’s

directive to the State to redraw LD 15 properly

presumes that the State will comply with the

Constitution when it does so lest the future district be

challenged once again. Cf. Holloway v. City of Virginia

Beach, 42 F.4th 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2022) (rejecting

argument that VRA case was not moot and Plaintiffs

were entitled to court order “directing implementation

of a new system that ‘compl[ies] with Section 2’“ of the

VRA in light of changes to state law that provided

otherwise complete relief).

The dissent asserts that “the order in Soto Palmer

ensures that [Garcia] will not receive what he argues

Mootness at 15-17, New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S.

Ct. 1525, 206 L. Ed. 2d 798. As the petitioners noted in their

brief, “nothing in the City’s revised rule precludes the previous

version of the rule, which governed for nearly two decades, from

having continuing adverse effects.” Id. at 16. The petitioners

specifically sought a declaration from the Supreme Court that

“that the City’s longstanding restrictive [firearms] licensing

scheme is incompatible with the Second Amendment” and that

any attempt to impose a licensing scheme was “null and void ab

initio.” Id. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the petitioners’

argument and held that the case was moot notwithstanding the

continued possibility of constitutional harm from the newly

revised rule.

A14

is a constitutionally valid legislative map” because his

“claimed injury is not merely capable of repetition; it

almost is certain to repeat itself.” In the dissent’s

opinion, Garcia will most certainly suffer injury

because Soto Palmer “ordered that the State engage

in even more racial gerrymandering” than that

claimed by Garcia in this case. But this claimed injury

from a future legislative district is speculative

because compliance with § 2 of the VRA, as ordered in

Soto Palmer, would not result in a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause. See Cooper v. Harris, 581

U.S. 285, 306, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 197 L. Ed. 2d 837

(2017) (“States enjoy leeway to take race-based

actions reasonably judged necessary under a proper

interpretation of the VRA.”); see also Milligan, 143 S.

Ct. at 1516-17 (“[F]or the last four decades, this Court

and the lower federal courts have repeatedly applied

the effects test of § 2 as interpreted in Gingles and,

under certain circumstances, have authorized racebased redistricting as a remedy for state districting

maps that violate § 2.”).

As the dissent concedes, “the Supreme Court has

given States ‘leeway’ to draw lines on the basis of race

in redistricting when States have good reasons, based

in the evidence, to believe the racial gerrymander

necessary under the VRA.” The Soto Palmer court

detailed in depth why a VRA compliant district is

required for the Yakima Valley. See, e.g., 2023 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *5-6, 11

(finding that the three Gingles factors were met and

that the State had “impair[ed] the ability of Latino

voters in [] [the Yakima Valley] to elect their

candidate of choice on an equal basis with other

voters”). The dissent would find that the prior

A15

Commissioners failed to judge a VRA district

necessary, and therefore any racial prioritization that

the Commissioners engaged in would not survive

strict scrutiny. But this determination is necessarily

fact-specific and only applicable to the actions of the

prior Commission. By the dissent’s own admission, so

long as the State judges the use of race necessary to

comply with the VRA it is not unlawful for the State

to create a district with a higher Latino CVAP.

The dissent also argues the case is not moot

because Plaintiff may want to appeal this case to the

Supreme Court. Whether Plaintiff may desire to

utilize this litigation to “challenge current precedent

that considers compliance with the VRA a sufficient

reason to racially gerrymander” is immaterial to the

issue of whether a case is moot. Neither Wis.

Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S. 398,

142 S. Ct. 1245, 212 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2022), nor Allen v.

Santa Clara Cnty. Corr. Peace Officers Ass’n, 38 F.4th

68 (9th Cir. 2022), stands for the proposition that a

trial court, in deciding whether a case is moot, should

consider how a party might utilize the litigation to

challenge established Supreme Court precedent.

Indeed, such an argument reinforces the majority’s

finding that the case is moot because a desire to

appeal binding Supreme Court precedent, untethered

from any specific injury, is far removed from a specific,

live controversy. 7 It “would [also] reverse the canon of

[constitutional] avoidance . . . [by addressing] divisive

7 The dissent, like the State of Alabama, might wish for a

different interpretation of § 2 of the VRA than that which has

prevailed in this country for nearly forty years. The United

States Supreme Court, however, recently rejected Alabama’s

invitation to do so in Milligan.

A16

constitutional questions that are both unnecessary

and contrary to the purposes of our precedents under

the Voting Rights Act.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556

U.S. 1, 23, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 173 L. Ed. 2d 173 (2009).

This Court “is not empowered to decide moot

questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for

the government of future cases, principles or rules of

law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in

issue in the case before it.” People of State of

California v. San Pablo & T.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314,

13 S. Ct. 876, 37 L. Ed. 747 (1893). The fact remains

that the Soto Palmer court has ordered the State to

redraft legislative districts in the Yakima Valley.

Having done so, the relief Plaintiff seeks in this

litigation is now moot.

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES as moot

Plaintiff’s claim that LD 15 violates the Equal

Protection Clause. A judgment will be entered

concurrent with this order.

Dated this 8th day of September, 2023.

/s/ David G. Estudillo

David G. Estudillo

United States District Judge

/s/ Robert S. Lasnik

Robert S. Lasnik

United States District Judge

A17

Garcia v. Hobbs et al., No 3:22-cv-5152 (W.D. Wash.)

VANDYKE, J., dissenting,

In 2021, the State of Washington redistricted its

state legislature electoral map. In the process, the

State, acting through its Redistricting Commission,

made the racial composition of Legislative District 15

(LD-15), a district in the Yakima Valley, a

nonnegotiable criterion. In other words, the

Commission racially gerrymandered. See BethuneHill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 189,

137 S. Ct. 788, 197 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2017). This

discrimination means the map was enacted in

violation of the U.S. Constitution unless the

Commission had a “strong basis in evidence” to

believe, and in fact believed, that the federal Voting

Rights Act (VRA) required the Commission to perform

such racial gerrymandering. See Wis. Legislature v.

Wis. Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S. 398, 142 S. Ct. 1245,

1250, 212 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2022) (quotation omitted). A

majority of the Commissioners did not believe the

VRA required racial gerrymandering, so the map was

drawn—and later enacted—in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution.

In a parallel case before a single district court

judge, Soto Palmer v. Hobbs, plaintiffs also challenged

the 2021 map as invalid. ___ F.Supp.3d___, 2023 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, No. 3:22-cv5035 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2023). But they alleged the

map violated the VRA, which presented a more

challenging

question

than

the

relatively

straightforward one presented in this matter.

Nonetheless, instead of waiting for this case to be

decided, which would have mooted Soto Palmer, the

A18

court in Soto Palmer undertook a complicated

analysis involving multiple expert witnesses and an

indeterminate nine-factor balancing test and opined

that the map violated the VRA and must be redrawn.

Worse than undertaking a needless analysis, the

court necessarily assumed that the map was not

enacted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

But it was. And because the map violated the Equal

Protection Clause, it was “void ab initio.” Mester Mfg.

Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561, 570 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation

omitted); see Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 178889, 210 L. Ed. 2d 432 (2021). As it was void ab initio,

the Soto Palmer decision amounts to an advisory

opinion on whether a void map would violate the VRA

if it existed. That decision should never have been

issued.

Even putting aside the advisory nature of the Soto

Palmer decision, it does not moot this case. Garcia is

seeking relief that the court in Soto Palmer never

provided, and he can still assert arguments not

foreclosed by Soto Palmer. I thus respectfully dissent

from my colleagues’ conclusion to dismiss this case

based on mootness.

BACKGROUND

I. In 2021, the State of Washington Drew New

Legislative and Congressional Electoral Maps

Following the Federal Census.

Under Washington law, the State of Washington

redistricts its “state legislative and congressional

districts” after the decennial federal census and

A19

congressional reapportionment. Wash. Const. art. II,

§ 43(1); see U.S. Const., art. I, § 2. Washington

performs this redistricting through a Redistricting

Commission consisting of four voting Commissioners

and one non-voting Commission Chair. See Wash.

Const. art. II, § 43(2). The “legislative leader of the two

largest political parties in each house of the

legislature” each appoints one Commissioner. Id. The

four voting Commissioners then select by majority

vote a nonvoting chairperson of the Commission. Id.

“The commission shall complete redistricting as soon

as possible following the federal decennial census, but

no later than November 15th of each year ending in

one.” Id. § 43(6). The “redistricting plan” must be

approved by “[a]t least three of the voting members.”

Id. After the Commission approves a plan, a

supermajority of two-thirds of the Washington State

Legislature may make minor amendments to the plan

or do nothing—either way, the map is enacted after

“the end of the thirtieth day of the first session

convened after the commission ... submitted its plan

to the legislature.” Id. § 43(7). And in neither event

can the Legislature reject the map. See id.

After the 2020 decennial census, Washington law

called for the appointment of a Redistricting

Commission to redistrict Washington’s “state

legislative and congressional districts.” Id. § 43(1).

The House Democratic leadership selected April Sims,

the Senate Democratic leadership selected Brady

Piñero Walkinshaw, the Senate Republican

leadership selected Joe Fain, and the House

Republican leadership selected Paul Graves. Garcia

Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 58-59. These four voting

A20

Commissioners selected Sarah Augustine as the

Commission chairperson. Garcia Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 60.

On September 21, 2021, each of the voting

Commissioners released proposed redistricting maps.

Garcia Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 62. According to 2020

American Community Survey 5-year estimates, every

Commissioner’s September legislative map proposal

included a legislative district in the Yakima Valley

area of Washington made up of less than 50%

Hispanic Citizen Voting Age Population (HCVAP).

Soto Palmer Dkt. No. 191 at ¶¶ 75-78, 87. The Yakima

Valley area, which is in southcentral Washington and

encompasses areas in Yakima, Adams, Benton, Grant,

and Franklin counties, would ultimately contain LD15, the district challenged in this case and in Soto

Palmer. Soto Palmer Dkt. No. 191 at ¶ 88.

Around a month later, the Commission received a

slideshow presentation file from the Washington

State Senate Democratic Caucus. Garcia Dkt. No. 64

at ¶ 68. The presentation was prepared by Matt

Barreto, PhD, who opined that there was “racially

polarized voting” in the Yakima Valley area and that

the Republican Commissioners’ maps “crack[ed]” the

Latino population into multiple districts. Ex. 179 at

17-18. The presentation also offered two alternative,

“VRA Complaint,” maps. Ex. 179 at 22-23.

From the circulation of this slideshow onward, the

racial composition of the Yakima Valley district

became an enduring focus of the Commission. Unlike

with any other district, the Commission focused

intensely on the racial composition of LD-15. As

Commissioner Fain put it, although the racial

composition of districts was a topic generally

A21

discussed for “many districts,” “it was more widely

discussed with regards to the Yakima Valley area.”

Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 86-87. For LD-15, the “racial

composition” was “a very important component of that

negotiation” and there were not “other districts where

[racial composition] was as important of a

component.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 87.

Commissioner Sims confirmed in her testimony

that without a “majority Hispanic ... CVAP in LD 15,”

she “[wasn’t] going to reach an agreement on LD 15.”

Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 440. More broadly, one of

Commissioner

Sims’s

“priorities

with

the

Redistricting Commission[] was to create a majorityminority district for Hispanic and Latino voters in the

Yakima Valley,” specifically, “to create a majority

CVAP Hispanic district in the Yakima Valley.” Garcia

Dkt. No. 73 at 37. One of Commissioner Walkinshaw’s

draft maps included a note that the map “[c]reate[d] a

majority Hispanic district” in the Yakima Valley.

Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 132; Ex. 150 at 17. And a

member of Walkinshaw’s staff confirmed in her

testimony that a district that “perform[ed] for Latino

voters” “should be nonnegotiable.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75

at 111.

Commissioner Fain paid attention to the “Hispanic

CVAP measurement” “through the various iterations

of maps, in most cases.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 49. He

“belie[ved]” that “the Hispanic CVAP was a metric

that was important to Democratic commissioners”

and he was “willing to give [an increase in Hispanic

CVAP in LD-15] in order to secure support for a final

compromise map.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 49-50.

Ultimately, “creating more minority-majority, or

majority-minority districts” was important to Fain “as

A22

part of the negotiation in getting a final map.” Garcia

Dkt. No. 74 at 61. Fain testified that “[he] tried to

prioritize greater CVAP districts” and that one of the

things he was “willing to do” was “of course ... most

definitely increasing minority-majority districts.”

Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 84.

Commissioner Graves testified that he thought a

majority Hispanic CVAP district in LD-15 would be

required to obtain both Commissioner Sims and

Commissioner Walkinshaw’s votes. He “had [it] in

mind” that he “would need to draw a major[ity]

Hispanic CVAP district in the 15th LD[] if [he] wanted

to secure [Commissioner Walkinshaw’s] vote for the

final plan.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 67. Based on a

variety of indicia, Graves believed that a majority

Hispanic CVAP district in LD-15 “would probably be

a

go,

no-go

decision

point

for

[Commissioner Walkinshaw].” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at

67-68. Graves also thought that a majority Hispanic

CVAP LD-15 was necessary “to get Commissioner

Sims’s vote for a final plan.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 70.

It was “[v]ery hard for [Commissioner Graves] to see

three of the voting commissioners voting for a map

that did not have a majority Hispanic CVAP district

in the Yakima Valley.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 73.

Anton Grose, one of Commissioner Graves’s

staffers, testified that “[a]s time went on, it became

apparent that a Yakima Valley district that was

majority Hispanic, by citizens of voting age

population, ... would be a requirement to get support

from both Republicans and Democrats.” Garcia Dkt.

No. 73 at 153. Grose testified that for LD-15, in

particular, [HCVAP data] was very, very important to

our kind of counterparts, and it was [thus] very

A23

important to us.” Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 153-54. LD15, “in particular, certainly was far more race-focused

than [Grose] th[ought] any other district on the map.”

Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 155. “[T]here were some other

considerations neglected in the drawing of the 15th,”

Grose thought, “race predominantly being ... the

major focus of that district.” Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 153.

When drawing proposed maps, Grose was “cognizant”

of racial compositions because Commissioner Graves

wanted a majority HCVAP district so that he could get

a map that passed. Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 186-87.

The Commission had a November 15 deadline to

agree to a redistricting plan. Wash. Const. art. II, §

43(6). As the negotiations got underway, the

Commissioners split up for negotiations into two

groups of two. Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 17, 49.

Commissioners Graves and Sims were primarily

responsible for negotiating the legislative map, while

Commissioners Walkinshaw and Fain were primarily

responsible for the congressional map. Garcia Dkt.

No. 75 at 49. Several days before a final agreement

was reached on November 15, Commissioners Graves

and Sims “agreed to ... make the district 50 percent

Latino CVAP.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 31; see also id.

at 91 (noting that before the November 15th deadline,

Commissioner Graves had reached an agreement with

Commissioner Sims that LD- 15 “would be a majority

Hispanic district[] by eligible voters”). There was “an

agreement ... between [Commissioner Graves] and

Commissioner Sims that this district would be greater

than 50 percent [Hispanic] CVAP.” Garcia Dkt. No.

75 at 32. The partisan balance of LD-15 was still “up

in the air,” but however that turned out, the district

A24

would contain above 50% Hispanic CVAP. Garcia Dkt.

No. 75 at 32.

Commissioner Sims appears to have made a

Hispanic CVAP district a nonnegotiable criterion

because she believed such a district was required by

the VRA. Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 51. Commissioner

Walkinshaw might have believed this, but his

testimony on the point was less clear. Garcia Dkt. No.

73 at 135. Commissioners Graves and Fain did not

think that the VRA required a legislative district in

the Yakima Valley containing a majority HCVAP.

Garcia Dkt. Nos. 75 at 71 (Graves); 74 at 50 (Fain).

When November 15 finally arrived, the

Commissioners moved their negotiations to a hotel in

Federal Way, Washington. Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 30.

There the Commissioners reached what they referred

to as a “framework agreement.” Garcia Dkt. Nos. 73

at 16-17; 74 at 71; 75 at 42. Although they did not vote

on specific maps before the deadline, they voted on an

agreement that they testified could be turned into a

legislative map. Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 41

(Commissioner Graves confirming that he stated in a

press conference “that the framework that had been

agreed to was sufficiently detailed that, without

discretion, it could be turned into a map”). The

framework agreement was “that [LD-15] would be

that 50.1 Hispanic CVAP number.” Garcia Dkt. No.

75 at 42. The framework agreement did not “stipulate

the racial composition of any other district[] besides

the 15th.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 72.

After the Commissioners shook on their

framework agreement in the evening of November 15,

the Commissioners and their staff began turning the

A25

framework agreement into an actual map. Garcia

Dkt. No. 73 at 192. This process went late through the

night and into the morning of November 16. During

this time, the map drawers tweaked the racial

composition (i.e., the percentage of Hispanic citizens

of voting age) of LD-15, bringing it as close as

reasonably possible to 50% while staying barely above

a 50/50 split. Ex. 487 at 7 (comparing Commissioner

Graves’s November 12 map, with a 50.2% Hispanic

CVAP, to the enacted map, with a 50.02% Hispanic

CVAP). While drawing the maps in the early morning

hours of November 16, Grose was “also trying to

ensure the district was majority Hispanic by CVAP.”

Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 205. It is clear the map

drawers were aware of the nonnegotiable criteria that

LD-15 must be over 50% HCVAP.

On November 16, 2021, the Commission

transmitted its final maps to the Washington State

Legislature. Ex. 123. The Legislature made minor

amendments to the maps, changing only a few census

blocks that resulted in no change in the population of

LD-15, and voted to enact the maps in February 2022.

See H. Con. Res. 4407, 67th Leg. Reg. Sess., at 2:3536, 71:9-77:26.

II. Following Redistricting, Two Challenges

Were Brought Against the Enacted 2021

Legislative Map.

On January 19, 2022, several plaintiffs—including

lead plaintiff Susan Soto Palmer—filed a lawsuit

against the Washington Secretary of State alleging

that the legislative map ratified by the legislature in

February, the “2021 Legislative Map,” was enacted in

A26

violation of the VRA because (i) the map diluted the

voting power of Hispanic residents of LD-15 and

because (ii) the Commission drew the map with

discriminatory intent. Soto Palmer Dkt. No. 70 at 3940. On March 15, 2022, Benancio Garcia, III, filed a

lawsuit against the Washington Secretary of State

alleging that the Commission, in drawing LD-15,

racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution. Garcia Dkt. No. 14 at 17.

Pursuant to Garcia’s request under 28 U.S.C. § 2284,

a three-judge panel was drawn consisting of my

colleagues in the majority and me. Garcia Dkt. No. 1

at 1, 18. The court in both cases joined the State of

Washington as a defendant, and the court in Soto

Palmer granted several individuals’ motion to

intervene and defend the map. Garcia Dkt. No. 13;

Soto Palmer Dkt. Nos. 68-69. The court consolidated

the cases for trial, which was held the week of June 5,

2023. 1 On August 10, the court in Soto Palmer issued

a decision finding in favor of the Soto Palmer plaintiffs

and directing the State of Washington to redraw the

legislative map. Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *13.

ANALYSIS

The majority dismisses this case as moot. It is not.

Not only is the case not moot, but the panel should

have acknowledged the map was enacted in violation

of the Equal Protection Clause, found in favor of

1 Soto Palmer also included an additional trial day on June 2,

2023.

A27

Garcia, and directed the State of Washington to

redraw the maps in a way that does not violate the

Constitution. That would have mooted the VRA

challenge in Soto Palmer and avoided the issuance of

an advisory opinion in that case.

I. This Case Is Not Moot.

The majority concludes Garcia’s lawsuit is “moot”

because, in the panel’s opinion, the court in Soto

Palmer concluded that the 2021 map violated the VRA

and ordered the State of Washington to redraw it.

That opinion was advisory, should never have been

rendered, and even putting that aside, does not moot

this case.

The Soto Palmer decision should never have been

issued. Because the 2021 map violates the Equal

Protection Clause, it was “void ab initio.” Mester Mfg.

Co., 879 F.2d at 570 (citation omitted). “An act of the

legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.

Ed. 60 (1803). Indeed, as the Supreme Court put it

recently, “an unconstitutional provision is never

really part of the body of governing law (because the

Constitution automatically displaces any conflicting

statutory provision from the moment of the provision’s

enactment).” Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1788-89. In

deciding the claim in Soto Palmer— while necessarily

aware of this challenge against the map on

constitutional grounds—the Soto Palmer court simply

ignored the unconstitutionality of the map and

jumped ahead to decide whether a hypothetically

constitutional map would violate the VRA.

A28

In other words, the Soto Palmer court issued an

advisory opinion. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90

S. Ct. 200, 24 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1969) (declining to

address the constitutionality of a statute that was no

longer legally extant on other grounds because of the

need

to

“avoid

advisory

opinions

on

abstract propositions of law”). Opining on “important”

but hypothetical “questions of law” is not a function

within the “exercise of [the] judicial power” granted in

Article III of the U.S. Constitution. United States v.

Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 300-01, 29 S. Ct. 507, 53 L. Ed.

803

(1909).

Indeed,

“[federal

courts]

are

constitutionally forbidden from issuing advisory

opinions.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d

865, 879 (9th Cir. 2009); see also United Pub. Workers

of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89, 67 S. Ct.

556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947) (“[F]ederal courts

established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution

do not render advisory opinions.”).

Beyond the jurisdictional reason to avoid deciding

the VRA claim, there is also an important prudential

reason that the court in Soto Palmer should have at

least deferred resolution of the VRA claim until this

panel resolved the Equal Protection claim. The VRA

claim in Soto Palmer was complex and involved the

application of a nine-factor indeterminate balancing

test. See Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893,

2023 WL 5125390, at *6-11. As a matter of prudence,

it makes little sense to undertake a complicated test

that involves indeterminate balancing when a simpler

threshold basis exists for resolving the matter.

The majority cites to Landis v. North American

Co., 299 U.S. 248, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936),

as a possible reason not to have prioritized this panel’s

A29

Equal Protection claim. First, it’s not clear Landis is

even relevant. Landis considered a court’s power to

grant a motion for a stay, whereas the issue here

involves a court’s internal docket management. See id.

at 256. I do not suggest, as the majority believes, that

Soto Palmer should have been formally “held in

abeyance.” Different considerations come into play

when a court is assessing its own order-of-business

than when a court is considering an application for a

formal stay or for a case to be held in abeyance. But

even assuming Landis did govern, it was no bar to the

court in Soto Palmer appropriately deferring.

“Especially in cases of extraordinary public moment,

the individual may be required to submit to delay not

immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its

consequences if the public welfare or convenience will

thereby be promoted.” Id.

Similarly, despite the majority’s assertion

otherwise, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Allen v. Milligan does not indicate that a court should

undertake a many-factored VRA analysis ahead of a

simple Equal Protection analysis that would moot the

VRA claim. 599 U.S. 1, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 216 L. Ed. 2d

60 (2023). The Supreme Court in Allen granted review

on only one question: “Whether the State of Alabama’s

2021 Redistricting Plan ... violated Section 2 of the

Voting Rights Act.” The Court did not grant review on

any Equal Protection claim. There was thus no Equal

Protection claim pending before the Court that would

have potentially mooted the case and which it could

have answered before addressing the VRA question.

The Supreme Court’s discretionary docket allows it to

limit itself just to a question granted. See Izumi

Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips

A30

Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 28, 114 S. Ct. 425, 126 L. Ed. 2d

396 (1993). But we, of course, are not the Supreme

Court.

While my colleagues in the majority opine that the

Soto Palmer decision was not advisory because of the

principle of constitutional avoidance, that principle

has no application here. That discretionary principle

indicates that a nonconstitutional decision should

usually be preferred to a constitutional decision when

the nonconstitutional decision would render the

constitutional decision unnecessary. See Ashwander

v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S. Ct. 466,

80 L. Ed. 688 (1936); see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian

Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 446, 108 S.

Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1988) (explaining that,

“before addressing [a] constitutional issue,” courts

should consider “whether a decision on that question

could have entitled respondents to relief beyond that

to which they were entitled on their statutory

claims”). Perhaps if there were a symmetrical

relationship between the Soto Palmer and Garcia

cases, such that a decision in one would necessarily

moot the other case, and vice versa, there might be a

better argument for constitutional avoidance in

Garcia. But that is not the case. There is instead an

asymmetry, where the correct decision in Garcia

would moot Soto Palmer, but a decision in Soto

Palmer, regardless of the result, does not moot Garcia.

Resolving Garcia in the plaintiff’s favor would

have mooted Soto Palmer. It would have meant

recognizing that the map challenged in Soto Palmer

has never legally existed—enacted in violation of the

Equal Protection Clause, there never was a

constitutionally valid map that could possibly violate

A31

the VRA. See Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1788-89; Mester

Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d at 570. That recognition would

leave no map for the Soto Palmer plaintiffs to

challenge, and thus moot their action.

By contrast, resolving Soto Palmer in the Soto

Palmer plaintiffs’ favor does not moot Garcia. The

majority disagrees, stating that because LD-15 is now

gone as a result of the decision in Soto Palmer, the

Garcia plaintiff got what he wanted. But he didn’t, of

course. Consider what happened: In this case,

Plaintiff Garcia complains that the State considered

race unlawfully in drawing the legislative map. In

Soto Palmer, the plaintiff complained that the State

violated the VRA because LD-15 did not consider race

enough—that is, that the final LD-15 contains too few

Hispanic voters. The Court in Soto Palmer agreed

with the plaintiff that there were not enough Hispanic

voters in LD-15 to comply with the VRA and directed

the State to go redraw the map in a way that complies

with the VRA. The State will do this by placing more

Hispanic voters in LD-15, a task which necessarily

requires the State to consider race. 2

2 The majority cites a recent order in the now-remanded Milligan

litigation as support for its decision to dismiss Garcia’s claims as

moot. See Milligan v. Allen, 2:21-cv- 1530-AMM, Dkt. No. 272 at

7-8, 194-95, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5,

2023). But the relationship between the VRA and constitutional

claims in Milligan is noticeably different from the relationship

between Soto Palmer’s VRA claim and Garcia’s constitutional

claim. Thus, Milligan does not support the majority’s reliance on

constitutional avoidance here.

The Milligan litigation involves several consolidated cases, but

among those with constitutional claims are the aforementioned

A32

Milligan case and the Singleton v. Allen case. The Milligan

plaintiffs argue that Alabama’s remedial proposal fails to remedy

the VRA violation, and because Alabama’s racial

gerrymandering cannot otherwise survive strict scrutiny, it also

violates the Equal Protection Clause. See id., Dkt. No. 200 at 1619, 23-26. As the Milligan plaintiffs have presented their

arguments, their VRA and Equal Protection claims seek the

same thing, and both depend on their underlying theory that

Alabama has an affirmative obligation to use race properly to

satisfy the demands of the VRA. Thus, their constitutional claims

effectively serve as a backstop to their VRA claims, and so relief

on the latter necessarily eliminates any need to reach the former.

That is a textbook application of mootness. Garcia’s argument

here, in contrast, is that the Equal Protection Clause requires

the State to abstain from considering race, which is, of course,

directly at odds with the Soto Palmer plaintiffs’ arguments that

the State must consider race more. Unlike in Milligan, where

plaintiffs received all the relief they sought (under either of their

claims) when the district court tossed Alabama’s remedial maps

based on the VRA, the majority here cannot avoid Garcia’s

constitutional claim based on Soto Palmer, which does not offer

relief that redresses Garcia’s claim.

The Singleton plaintiffs, who are advancing only constitutional

claims, have taken a different view of the Alabama redistricting

dispute. They have offered alternative congressional maps that

they contend comply with the VRA without taking race into

consideration at all. See Singleton v. Allen, 2:21-cv-1291-AMM,

Dkt. No. 147 at 19-20, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998. If race need

not be considered to satisfy the demands of the VRA, they argue,

then Alabama’s admitted consideration of race must violate the

Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 17-18. Because the Alabama

court again granted relief on VRA grounds, it had no need to

separately consider at this point in the litigation the Singleton

plaintiffs’ claim that VRA compliance can be achieved without

resort to racial gerrymandering. But that reasoning has no

purchase here, where Garcia’s claim that the State is improperly

using race is neither addressed nor resolved by the Soto Palmer

court’s admonition that the State needs to double down on its use

of race to comply with the VRA’s demands.

A33

The majority’s position is thus that an order

directing the State to consider race more has

“granted . . . complete relief” to a plaintiff who

complains the State shouldn’t have considered race at

all. This kind of logic should make us wonder if this

case is really moot.

It is not, for at least two reasons. First, the plaintiff

in this case may wish to appeal this matter to the

Supreme Court to challenge current precedent that

considers compliance with the VRA a sufficient reason

to racially gerrymander. See Wis. Legislature, 142 S.

Ct. at 1248; Allen v. Santa Clara Cnty. Corr. Peace

Officers Ass’n, 38 F.4th 68, 70 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022)

(noting that the appellants “concede[d] that binding

precedent forecloses” one of their arguments “and only

seek to preserve that claim for further appellate

review”). While that issue is currently foreclosed by

current Supreme Court precedent, the plaintiff in

Garcia could ask the Supreme Court to revisit that

precedent. Even assuming success in that endeavor is

a longshot, that doesn’t moot this case. I agree with

the majority that, if Garcia had no ongoing injury, he

could not litigate a case with simply the hope that he

And in any event, while it is true that, when faced with both VRA

and constitutional claims, the Alabama court in its recent

Milligan order decided only the VRA claims, the court neither

ultimately rejected the constitutional claims nor took any other

action preventing their future adjudication. Instead, it merely

“reserve[d] ruling” on them. Milligan v. Allen, 2:21-cv-1530AMM, Dkt. No. 272 at 8, 194, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998.

Especially in view of the Singleton plaintiffs’ claim, which—not

unlike Garcia’s—do not wholly depend on the outcome of the

VRA claim, the Alabama court’s decision was a measured and

constrained course of action that undercuts rather than supports

the majority’s severe and terminal decision here.

A34

could persuade the Supreme Court to revisit one of its

precedents. But he still has injury. He claims injury

from past racial gerrymandering. The decision in Soto

Palmer ordered that the State engage in even more

racial gerrymandering. That does not somehow

eliminate Garcia’s injury.

Secondly, even putting aside the possibility of

Garcia seeking relief from the Supreme Court, the

Garcia case is also not moot because, notwithstanding

the finding of a VRA violation in Soto Palmer and the

resulting invalidation of the redistricting maps, “there

is still a live controversy” in Garcia “as to the

adequacy of” the remedy in Soto Palmer in addressing

all of the relief sought by Garcia in this case. Knox v.

Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 30708, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 183 L. Ed. 2d 281 (2012). “A case

becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to

grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing

party. As long as the parties have a concrete interest,

however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the

case is not moot.” Id. (cleaned up). And “the burden of

demonstrating mootness is a heavy one.” Los Angeles

Cnty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S. Ct. 1379, 59 L.

Ed. 2d 642 (1979) (cleaned up). Moreover, a case is not

moot simply because the exact remedy sought by the

plaintiff cannot be fully given. The existence of a

possible partial remedy “is sufficient to prevent [a]

case from being moot.” Church of Scientology of Cal.

v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13, 113 S. Ct. 447, 121 L.

Ed. 2d 313 (1992).

In this case, Garcia seeks a declaration “that

Legislative District 15 is an illegal racial gerrymander

in violation of the Equal Protection Clause” and an

order from this court that the State create a “new

A35

valid plan for legislative districts ... that does not

violate the Equal Protection Clause.” Garcia Dkt. No.

14 at 18. Although the decision in Soto Palmer might

moot some of the relief that Garcia sought to obtain in

this case, the court in Soto Palmer did not issue an

order directing the State to avoid performing an

illegal racial gerrymander when it redraws the map—

that is, to avoid violating the Equal Protection Clause.

See Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023

WL 5125390, at *13. Garcia requested the map be

redrawn without violating the Equal Protection

Clause, and this unfulfilled request for relief “is

sufficient to prevent this case from being moot.”

Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13.

The majority disagrees because “a federal court

may only direct parties to undertake activities that

comply with the Constitution.” Thus, the panel

“presumes” that the court in Soto Palmer “direct[ed]

the State to redraw LD 15” in a way that complies

with the Constitution. The source of this presumption

is unclear. Although courts obviously should avoid

intentionally directing parties to violate the

Constitution, there is little reason to presume that the

court’s order in Soto Palmer implicitly instructed the

State not to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The

State had earlier violated the Equal Protection Clause

by unlawfully considering race, and the court’s order

directs the State to consider race more. It doesn’t set

any limit for how much more. Garcia has still not

received a court order directing the State to redraw

the map in a way that does not violate the Equal

Protection Clause. The majority is therefore wrong

that there remains no “availability of any meaningful

injunctive relief.”

A36

The majority relies on New York State Rifle and

Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York to support

its belief that the mere fact that the Soto Palmer court

directed the map be redrawn is enough to moot this

case. See 140 S. Ct. 1525, 206 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2020) (per

curiam). The Supreme Court in New York said no such

thing. The Court instead concluded that a case was

partially moot when plaintiffs challenged a rule that

was subsequently amended by state and local

authorities during litigation. See id. at 1526. In this

case, however, Garcia requested not just that the old

map be held invalid but that a new map be drawn in

a way that does not violate the Constitution. He is still

seeking that relief and has not received it from the

order in Soto Palmer. Indeed, the order in Soto Palmer

ensures that he will not receive what he argues is a

constitutionally valid legislative map. Garcia’s

claimed injury is not merely capable of repetition; it is

almost certain to repeat itself.

The majority’s insistent portrayal of this case as

indistinguishable from New York glosses over the

starkly different procedural postures of the two cases

and ignores the practical consequences of its own

decision to dismiss Garcia’s claim as moot. In New

York, petitioners’ constitutional claims were

considered on a discretionary basis by a court of last

resort. Here, Garcia’s constitution claim was

presented in the first instance to a district court with

a non-discretionary obligation to adjudicate it, and

that distinction makes a difference.

After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in New

York, “the State of New York amended its firearm

licensing statute, and the City amended the

[challenged] rule” to provide “the precise relief that

A37

petitioners requested[.]” 140 S. Ct. at 1526. In

response to New York’s argument that the

amendments mooted their claims, the petitioners

noted (1) that the new rule shared some of the old

rule’s constitutional problems and (2) raised the

prospect of saving their complaint by amending it to

seek damages. Id. at 1526-27.

While the Supreme Court concluded that

petitioners’ old claims were moot, its subsequent

vacatur and remand (which, it bears noting, is

nowhere near the same thing as this court finally

dismissing this case for mootness) affirmatively

disclaimed neither of petitioners’ arguments. As to the

petitioners’ first argument, the Supreme Court gave

no indication that it disagreed with their contention

that New York’s replacement rule might have

constitutional problems of its own. Instead, it ordered

the lower court to address that argument in the first

instance. And then, just two years later, the Supreme

Court vindicated that exact argument from the very

same petitioners. See New York State Rifle & Pistol

Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed.

2d 387 (2022). And as to petitioners’ second argument

that they might amend their challenge to the old rule

and avoid mootness by adding a damages claim, the

Supreme Court again merely sent that argument

back to the lower court to address in the first instance.

New York, 140 S. Ct. at 1527. It did not, like the

majority does here, reject and dismiss that claim. In

short, while the Supreme Court in New York did

conclude the petitioners’ challenge to the old rule was

“moot” for purposes of the Supreme Court’s own

continued review, the Court’s actions taken in

response to that conclusion bear no resemblance to the

A38

majority’s decision here. Instead, the Supreme Court

merely exercised its unique discretion to have the

lower courts address all the remaining non-moot

issues in the first instance.

But it bears repeating: we are not the Supreme

Court. A three-judge district court panel has nowhere

to remand the remaining non-moot issues in this case.

The Supreme Court’s unique method of managing its

own discretionary appellate docket, which in New

York kept alive the prospect that petitioners’ nonmoot claims would receive substantive review,

provides no support for the majority’s broad mootness

decision here, which kills Garcia’s entire case—

including the parts that aren’t moot—before any court

had the opportunity to review its merits.

In sum, the panel is wrong on the narrow question

of mootness in this case. More broadly—and more

disconcerting—the court in Soto Palmer was incorrect

to issue an advisory opinion opining on whether,

assuming LD-15 had been enacted in compliance with

the Constitution and was thus legally extant, the

district would have violated the VRA. My criticism

that the Soto Palmer decision is an advisory opinion

depends, of course, on my conclusion that the State of

Washington violated the Equal Protection Clause. I

thus turn now to that question. It is not a hard one on

this record.

A39

II. The State of Washington Violated the Equal

Protection Clause by Racially Gerrymandering

Without a Compelling Interest.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits a State

from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. “[A]bsent extraordinary justification,” this

clause prohibits a State from “segregat[ing] citizens

on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf

courses, beaches, and schools.” Miller v. Johnson, 515

U.S. 900, 911, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762

(1995) (internal citations omitted). Such sifting is

odious to the Constitution and our Republic. It is no

less so when a “State assigns voters on the basis of

race” and “engages in the offensive and demeaning

assumption that voters of a particular race, because of

their race, ‘think alike, share the same political

interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the

polls.’“ Id. at 911-12 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.

630, 647, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1993)).

These “[r]ace-based assignments embody stereotypes

that treat individuals as the product of their race,

evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very

worth as citizens—according to a criterion barred to

the Government by history and the Constitution.” Id.

In short, “[u]nder the Equal Protection Clause,

districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race

are by their very nature odious” and “cannot be upheld

unless they are narrowly tailored to achieve a

compelling state interest.” Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct.

at 1248 (cleaned up).

A40

When a plaintiff has shown that a State racially

gerrymandered in drawing a particular district, the

burden shifts to the State to show that the

gerrymander was “narrowly tailored to achieve a

compelling interest.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 904; see also

Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1248. A State may have

a compelling interest to draw lines on the basis of race

when, “at the time of imposition,” it has a “strong

basis in evidence” to believe the racial gerrymander

was necessary to comply with the VRA and in fact

“judg[ed] [such gerrymandering] necessary under a

proper interpretation of the VRA.” Wis. Legislature,

142 S. Ct. at 1249-50. 3

In this case, the 2021 Washington State

Redistricting Commission (1) racially gerrymandered

in drawing LD-15 and (2) a majority of the

Commission did not, “at the time of imposition, judge

[such a gerrymander] necessary under a proper

interpretation of the VRA.” Id. (cleaned up). Because

3 The majority mischaracterizes me as “admi[tting]” that “so long

as the State judges the use of race necessary to comply with the

VRA it is not unlawful for the State to create a district with a

higher Latino CVAP.” That is incorrect. The mere fact that a

State (through its officials) “judges the use of race necessary to

comply with the VRA” is decidedly not the correct standard for

policing the line between racial discrimination that violates the

Equal Protection Clause and racial discrimination that complies

with the VRA. It is one thing to subject a State that is racially

gerrymandering to “the burden of showing that the design of

th[e] district withstands strict scrutiny.” Wis. Legislature, 142 S.

Ct. at 1249. It is quite another to bless a State’s racial

discrimination any time “the State judges the use of race

necessary to comply with the VRA.” While the Supreme Court

has sanctioned the former approach, it has never endorsed the

latter, and for good reason.

A41

the Commission racially gerrymandered without a

compelling interest, the 2021 Redistricting Map

violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.

Constitution and was “void ab initio.” Mester Mfg. Co.,

879 F.2d at 570; see also Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 178889. But before discussing the evidence showing the

Commission grouped voters on the basis of race and

that its racial sorting was not in furtherance of a

compelling interest, a threshold question must first be

considered. Specifically, the parties dispute whether

the Commission or the Washington Legislature is the

entity whose intent matters for determining whether

the State violated the Equal Protection Clause. The

answer is not difficult: it is the Commission’s intent

that matters.

A. The Redistricting Commission’s Intent

Matters for Garcia’s Equal Protection Claim.

“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose

is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed.

2d 450 (1977). To establish his prima facie case that

the State of Washington violated the Equal Protection

Clause in enacting the 2021 map, Garcia must thus

show that the State intentionally racially

gerrymandered. But whose intent? The State of

Washington argues it is the Washington Legislature’s

intent. Garcia Dkt. No. 78 at 30. Because Washington

law structurally makes the Redistricting Commission

primarily responsible for redistricting and because

the Legislature made only minor changes to the map

submitted by the 2021 Redistricting Commission—

none of which affected the racial composition of LD-15

A42

imposed by the Commission—the State is incorrect. It

is the Commission’s intent that is legally relevant.

“[Supreme Court] precedent teaches that

redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed

in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for

lawmaking, which may include,” for example, the

popular “referendum and the Governor’s veto.” Ariz.

State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting

Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 808, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 192 L. Ed.

2d 704 (2015). Accordingly, it is important to first

attend to what institution Washington law makes

responsible

for

redistricting.

Structurally,

Washington law delegates redistricting to the

Redistricting Commission, leaving only a minor role

for the Washington Legislature.

The Washington Constitution provides that

“redistricting of state legislative and congressional

districts” shall be performed by “a commission.” Wash.

Const. art. II, § 43(1). “The legislature may amend the

redistricting plan but must do so by a two-thirds vote

of the legislators elected or appointed to each house of

the legislature.” Id. § 43(7). “After submission of the

plan by the commission, the legislature shall have the

next thirty days during any regular or special session

to amend the commission’s plan.” Wash. Rev. Code §

44.05.100(2). The Legislature’s amendments “may not

include [a change of] more than two percent of the

population of any legislative or congressional district.”

Id. Moreover, if the Legislature fails to timely make

any

amendments,

the

Commission’s

plan

automatically becomes “the state districting law.”

Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(7).

A43

It is plain from these state constitutional and

statutory requirements that Washington law

delegates primary redistricting responsibility to the

Commission, leaving only tightly circumscribed

discretion for a supermajority of the Legislature to

make minor changes to the map. Because Washington

law delegates almost all responsibility to the

Redistricting Commission, the Commission is at least

presumptively responsible for performing the

“legislative function” of redistricting and is thus the

entity whose intent matters for evaluating an Equal

Protection claim. Ariz. State Legislature, 576 U.S. at

808.

Even assuming that presumption could be

overcome in some case, it was not here. The

Legislature minimally amended LD-15, the district

that Garcia contends was drawn discriminatorily,

changing only a few census blocks that resulted in no

change in population to LD-15. See H. Con. Res. 4407,

67th Leg. Reg. Sess., at 2:35-36, 71:9-77:26. Moreover,

the House and Senate majority leaders both explained

that they viewed the Commission as the entity

responsible for drawing the maps, with the

Legislature playing a minor role. The House Majority

Leader discussed the changes as “technical in nature”

and explained that “[i]f we do nothing, then the maps

come into being without our vote” but that the maps

would then “come into being without [certain] changes

that

were

recommended

by

the

county

commissioners.” Ex. 1065 at 5:04-22. The Senate

Majority Leader explained that adopting the maps “is

not an approval of the redistricting map and the

redistricting plans; it’s not an endorsement of that

plan. The Legislature does not have the power to

A44

approve or endorse the redistricting plan that the

Redistricting Commission approved.” Ex. 126 at 2:102:38.

The intent of the 2021 Redistricting Commission is

the intent we must consider when evaluating Garcia’s

Equal Protection claim.

B. Race Predominated the Commission’s

Considerations in Drawing LD-15.

Garcia claims that the 2021 Redistricting

Commission racially gerrymandered when it drew

LD-15. The evidence establishes that he is right. “[A]

plaintiff alleging racial gerrymandering bears the

burden ‘to show ... that race was the predominant

factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a

significant number of voters within or without a

particular district.’“ Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 187

(quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916). “Race may

predominate even when a reapportionment plan

respects traditional principles ... if race was the

criterion that, in the State’s view, could not be

compromised, and race-neutral considerations came

into play only after the race-based decision had been

made.” Id. at 189 (cleaned up) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt,

517 U.S. 899, 907, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207

(1996)). 4 Finally, it is no excuse that a government

4 The

Supreme Court recently reinforced that when a State

makes the racial composition of a district the criterion on which

it will not compromise, it has elevated race to a position of

predominance. See Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. at 1510-12

(plurality op.) (obtaining only a minority of the justices for an

A45

racially sorted voters so that it could accomplish an

ultimate non-race objective. See Cooper v. Harris, 581

U.S. 285, 291 n.1, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 197 L. Ed. 2d 837

(2017).

Race clearly predominated the considerations of

the 2021 Redistricting Commission when it drew LD15. The racial composition of LD-15 featured heavily

in the Commissioner’s negotiations over the

legislative map. Garcia Dkt. Nos. 73 at 117, 153-54,

177; 75 at 30-31. And in the ramp-up to final

negotiations, the Commissioners reached an

agreement to racially gerrymander LD-15 to be at

least a bare majority Hispanic CVAP. Garcia Dkt. No.

75 at 30, 91. This initial agreement to make LD-15 a

majority HCVAP district was then cemented in the

final

framework

agreement

among

the

Commissioners. Garcia Dkt. Nos. 73 at 16-17; 74 at

71; 75 at 42, 72. This agreement was the primary

criterion for LD-15, contrasting with the other

districts where the Commission was aware of racial

demographics but nonetheless did not make race a

nonnegotiable criterion. Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 42.

All the Commissioners, for varying reasons,

elevated the racial composition of LD-15 to be a

nonnegotiable criterion around which other factors

and passage of the map itself must fall. Commissioner

Sims believed that a majority HCVAP in LD-15 was

required by the VRA and also believed that the

Commission must follow the law. Garcia Dkt. No. 73

analysis opining that race does not necessarily predominate

when a State crafts a district with an objective of a specific racial

composition).

A46

at 48, 51. One of Commissioner Walkinshaw’s draft

maps included a note that the map “[c]reate[d] a

majority Hispanic district” in the Yakima Valley.

Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 132. And one of Walkinshaw’s

staff stated that a district that “perform[ed] for Latino

voters” should be nonnegotiable.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75

at 110-11. Making LD-15 a majority HCVAP was

critical to Commissioner Fain because he “belie[ved]

that “the Hispanic CVAP was a metric that was

important to Democratic commissioners” and he was

“willing to give [an increase in Hispanic CVAP in LD15] in order to secure support for a final compromise

map.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 49-50. Commissioner

Graves wanted LD-15 to be a majority HCVAP so that

he could get a map that obtained a majority of the

Commissioners’ votes; it was “[v]ery hard for

[Commissioner Graves] to see three of the voting

commissioners voting for a map that did not have a

majority Hispanic CVAP district in the Yakima

Valley.” Garcia Dkt. Nos. 73 at 186-87; 75 at 73.

Commissioners Fain and Graves may have wanted

LD-15 to be a majority HCVAP district for reasons

unrelated to their own concerns about race, but the

government may not “elevate[] race to the

predominant criterion in order to advance other goals,

including political ones.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291 n.1.

The Commissioners then transformed these

intents into an agreement that, come what may, LD15 would be a majority HCVAP district. In the days

leading up to the Commission’s deadline to agree on

maps, the two Commissioners responsible for

negotiating the legislative map (as opposed to the

congressional map) reached an agreement that LD-15

“would be a majority Hispanic district by eligible

A47

voters.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 91. They “agreed to ...

make the district 50 percent Latino CVAP.” Garcia

Dkt. No. 75 at 31. The district’s partisan makeup was

still “up in the air,” but it was agreed that the district

would be majority HCVAP. 5 Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 32.

And finally, when November 15 arrived, all the

Commissioners reached a framework agreement on

how the maps would be drawn, which included that

LD-15 would be a majority HCVAP district. Garcia

Dkt. Nos. 73 at 16-17; 74 at 71; 75 at 42, 72.

Underlining that race predominated the

Commission’s drawing of LD-15 is the fact that the

Commission did not elevate race to be the

predominant factor in drawing other districts. Grose,

one of Commissioner Graves’s staffers, testified that

LD-15, “in particular,” was “certainly ... far more racefocused than [Grose] th[ought] any other district on

the map.” Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 155. Commissioner

Fain testified that the “racial composition” of LD-15

was “a very important component of that negotiation”

and confirmed that there were not “other districts

where [racial composition] was as important of a

component.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 87. In making the

racial composition of LD-15 nonnegotiable—the

5 The State of Washington notes that Commissioner Fain did not

remember the racial composition of LD-15 being a part of the

framework agreement. Garcia Dkt. No. 78 at 32 n.12. But

Commissioner Fain’s lack of memory is hardly surprising given

that he was negotiating the congressional map, not the

legislative map. Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 49. And his inability to

remember this part of the framework agreement is unpersuasive

evidence of whether the agreement contained this nonnegotiable

criterion, in light of testimony from one of the legislative map

negotiators that it was part of the agreement.

A48

“criterion that ... could not be compromised”—the

Commission elevated race, and it predominated the

drawing of LD-15. Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 189

(cleaned up).

The majority does not dispute that the racial

composition of LD-15 was nonnegotiable for the

Commission. The majority instead argues that race

did not predominate because the Commissioners

considered other factors when drawing the legislative

map and because the Commissioners later denied that

race predominated their considerations. The reason

several of the Commissioners gave for believing that

race did not predominate is the same reason relied on

by the majority: simply that, in addition to

considering race a nonnegotiable criterion, they also

considered other factors.

It is of course not surprising at all that the

Commissioners considered other factors. But it is also

irrelevant. When a map drawer elevates a specific

racial composition as “a “criterion that, in the [map

drawer’s] view, could not be compromised,” race

predominates. Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 189. If the

mere consideration of other factors in addition to

making race nonnegotiable meant race no longer

predominated, then race would literally never

predominate. Map drawers always consider more

than just race, even when they operate with the

express purpose of meeting a racial target. Take a

simple example. Map drawers always attempt to

comply with the Constitution’s requirement that

states’ legislative maps be drawn with “equality of

population among the districts.” Mahan v. Howell,

410 U.S. 315, 321, 93 S. Ct. 979, 35 L. Ed. 2d 320,

modified, 411 U.S. 922, 93 S. Ct. 1475, 36 L. Ed. 2d

A49

316 (1973). If the mere consideration of other factors

could stop race from predominating when a map

drawer makes racial composition a nonnegotiable

criterion, then it would make little sense for the Court

to repeatedly state that race predominates when it is

a “criterion that ... could not be compromised.” Shaw,

517 U.S. at 907; Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 189.

By the basic nature of their task, drawers of

legislative districts always take a number of essential

considerations into account. The ever-present nature

of such considerations cannot somehow dilute the

constitutional taint of a map drawer who makes race

a nonnegotiable criterion in drawing a map. See Lee v.

City of Los Angeles, 908 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir.

2018) (explaining that “traditional redistricting

principles are ‘numerous and malleable’“ and “a

legislative body ‘could construct a plethora of

potential maps that look consistent with traditional,

raceneutral principles’“) (quoting Bethune-Hill, 580

U.S. at 190). That the Commission here

unsurprisingly considered “traditional, race-neutral

principles” in addition to making race a nonnegotiable

requirement does not mean those other factors

somehow sufficiently watered-down race as the

Commission’s predominant consideration in drawing

LD-15. Id. The racial composition of LD-15—

specifically, that it be majority HCVAP—was a

“criterion that, in the [Commission’s] view, could not

be

compromised,”

and

thus

“race-neutral

considerations came into play only after the racebased decision had been made.” Bethune-Hill, 580

U.S. at 189 (quoting Shaw, 517 U.S. at 907).

A50

C. The 2021 Legislative Map Fails Strict

Scrutiny.

Race predominated the Commission’s decision to

draw LD-15 as it did. For the map to nonetheless be

constitutional, the State must show that it survives

strict scrutiny. Specifically, the State must show that

the map is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling

state interest.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 904. The State

argues the gerrymander was justified under the VRA.

Garcia Dkt. No. 78 at 34. The Supreme Court has held

that complying with the VRA can be a compelling

state interest, but only if the State, “at the time of

imposition, judge[d] [the racial gerrymander]

necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA.”

Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1248, 1250 (cleaned up).

Because a majority of the voting Commissioners did

not “judg[e]” the gerrymander “necessary” under the

VRA at the time that the Commission approved the

2021 Legislative Map, the map fails strict scrutiny. Id.

Commissioner Graves testified that he was

“entirely uncertain” of whether the VRA required “a

Hispanic CVAP district.” He thought “that the law

was entirely unclear on that particular question.”

Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 71. When asked if he had a

“clear understanding of what the VRA required[] in

the Yakima Valley,” Commissioner Graves answered

that he was “not sure the VRA itself has a clear

understanding of exactly what it requires in the

Yakima Valley.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 58. It is evident

that Commissioner Graves’s decision to racially

gerrymander LD-15 was not because he thought that

it was required by the VRA.

A51

So too Commissioner Fain. When he was asked

point-blank at trial whether he believed the Hispanic

CVAP majority in LD-15 was “required[] by the Voting

Rights Act,” Commissioner Fain answered: “No.”

Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 50.

Commissioner Walkinshaw was less direct but

also unclear as to whether he believed a majority

HCVAP

was

necessary

in

LD-15.

He

certainly believed complying with the VRA was

important, calling it “mission critical.” Garcia Dkt.

No. 73 at 106. After he received the slideshow

prepared by Dr. Barreto, Commissioner Walkinshaw

released a new map that included an explanation that

“[n]ow that we have this information, we as

Commissioners should not consider legislative district

maps that don’t comply with the VRA.” Garcia Dkt.

No. 73 at 135. But his general statement that the

Commission should comply with the law does not

clearly evince that he actually believed the racial

gerrymander ultimately embodied in the final

legislative map was necessary under the VRA. It is

possible that Commissioner Walkinshaw believed the

VRA required a racial gerrymander, but his testimony

and the record are ambiguous.

Ultimately, only Commissioner Sims clearly

believed the racial gerrymander performed in LD-15

was required by the VRA. Commissioner Sims

straightforwardly answered “Yes” when asked

whether she “believe[d] that the VRA required the

Commission to create a majority Hispanic CVAP

district[] in the Yakima Valley.” Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at

51.

A52

The State bears the burden of showing that the

2021 Legislative map survives strict scrutiny.

See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 292. Even giving the State the

benefit of the doubt (which, of course, would not be

particularly strict scrutiny), and thus assuming

Commissioner Walkinshaw believed the VRA

required that LD-15 be racially gerrymandered, the

State cannot show that a majority of commissioners

racially gerrymandered because they intended to

comply with the VRA. Two of four commissioners do

not constitute a majority of the Commission, see

Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(6), and thus there was no

majority of the Commission who, “at the time of

imposition, judge[d] [the racial gerrymander]

necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA,”

Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1250 (cleaned up). The

judgment of only two Commissioners was not enough

to demonstrate that the Commission in any official

sense believed racial sorting was necessary to comply

with the VRA.

State governments may not arrange people into

districts based on race and then hope to justify it by

simply pantomiming at the VRA as an interest that

could have justified their gerrymander. “What

matters is ‘the actual considerations that provided the

essential basis for the lines drawn, not post hoc

justifications the legislative body in theory could have

used but in reality did not.’“ Lee, 908 F.3d at 1182

(cleaned up) (quoting Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 799).

For good or ill, the Supreme Court has given States

“leeway” to draw lines on the basis of race in

redistricting when States have good reasons, based in

the evidence, to believe the racial gerrymander

necessary under the VRA. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 306; see

A53

Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1250. But the Supreme

Court also understandably requires that states

actually judge such segregation necessary under the

VRA, not just hope that they can find good experts and

good lawyers to make post hoc arguments if someone

challenges it as violating the Equal Protection Clause.

The State of Washington took the latter approach and

so fails to satisfy strict scrutiny. The State thus

enacted the 2021 Legislative Map in violation of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

***

My colleagues in the majority are not properly

dismissing an already dead case as moot. Instead,

after improperly (and unsuccessfully) trying to

indirectly kill this case from a distance in Soto

Palmer, they are forcefully pulling the plug on a case

that—even now—still has some life in it. And had they

properly reached the merits, a straightforward

analysis shows both that race predominated in the

drawing of LD-15 in the 2021 Legislative Map and

that, because a majority of the Commission did not

judge such racial ordering necessary under the VRA

at the time the map was adopted, the map cannot

survive strict scrutiny. We should have found in favor

of Garcia and directed the State of Washington to

redraw the Legislative Map without violating the

Equal Protection Clause. And then that map could be

properly evaluated for compliance with the VRA,

instead of the advisory analysis provided in the Soto

Palmer decision. I thus respectfully dissent.

Dated this 8th day of September, 2023.

A54

/s/ Lawrence VanDyke

Lawrence VanDyke

United States Circuit Judge

A55

FILED: 9/8/2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV

BENANCIO GARCIA III,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary

of State of Washington, and the STATE OF

WASHINGTON,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

•

Jury Verdict. This action came before the

Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been

tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

•

Decision by Court. This action came to

consideration before the Court. The issues

have been considered and a decision has been

rendered.

THE COURT HAS ORDERED that:

This case is dismissed as moot.

Dated September 8, 2023.

A56

Ravi Subramanian

Clerk of Court

s/ Michael Williaims

Deputy Clerk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.