Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Benancio Garcia, III, Petitioner v. Steven Hobbs, Secretary of State of Washington, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 23, 2026
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APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Memorandum Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, filed 8/27/2025 ...................... A1
Amended Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, filed 3/25/2024 .... A4
Opinion and Order of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, filed 9/8/2023 ...... A6
Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, filed 9/8/2023 ................... A55
A1
FILED 8/27/2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-2603
BENANCIO GARCIA III,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary
of State of Washington and STATE OF
WASHINGTON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington. D.C. No. 3:22-cv05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV. Robert S. Lasnik, District
Judge, Presiding.
Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and OWENS, Circuit
Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Benancio Garcia III sued the State of Washington
and its Secretary of State, Steven Hobbs, alleging that
Legislative District 15 (“LD 15”), drawn by an
independent state redistricting commission (the
“Commission”), was an illegal racial gerrymander in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Submission was vacated
pending this court’s resolution of Palmer, et al. v.
Trevino, et al., Nos. 23-35595 & 24-1602, 2025 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22068. Because the court has issued its
A2
decision in Palmer v. Trevino, we now turn to the
merits of this appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Reviewing the district court’s dismissal for mootness,
Rosemere Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S. Env’t Prot.
Agency, 581 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2009), we
affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the facts,
we need not recount them here.
In Palmer v. Trevino, we affirmed the district
court’s invalidation of LD 15 and the adoption of a
remedial map that invalidated LD 15 and replaced it
with a new legislative district, Legislative District 14
(“LD 14”). No. 23-35595, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22068
(9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025). Garcia’s action, which
challenges LD 15 on equal protection grounds, is
therefore moot.
“[T]he repeal, amendment, or expiration of
challenged legislation is generally enough to render a
case moot . . . .” Teter v. Lopez, 125 F.4th 1301, 1306
(9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of
Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. Chambers, 941 F.3d
1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc)). Garcia, citing
North Carolina v. Covington, 585 U.S. 969, 138 S. Ct.
2548, 201 L. Ed. 2d 993 (2018), argues that even
though LD 14 has replaced LD 15, he experiences a
“continuing injury” of racial segregation. To avoid
mootness, the plaintiffs in Covington specifically
argued “that some of the new districts were mere
continuations of the old, gerrymandered districts.”
Covington, 585 U.S. at 976 (emphasis added).
To determine whether LD 14 is a continuation of
LD 15, “the case or controversy giving rise to
A3
jurisdiction is the touchstone.” Chem. Producers &
Distribs. Ass’n v. Helliker, 463 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir.
2006), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trs. of
Glazing Health & Welfare, 941 F.3d 1195. At the
district court, this case was centered entirely on the
Commission’s actions. The operative complaint
alleged that “[r]ace was the predominant factor
motivating the Commission’s decision to draw the
lines encompassing Legislative District 15.” At trial,
the parties submitted extensive trial exhibits,
including
expert
reports,
proposed
maps,
communications between commissioners, recordings
of committee meetings, and notes from negotiations.
Such evidence is plainly directed towards the intent of
the Commission and does not bear on whether the
district court similarly considered race as a
predominant factor in drawing LD 14.
LD 14 was crafted by an entirely different party—
the district court—from the Commission, the party
that drew LD 15, and thus the “character of the
system” has been “alter[ed] significantly.” Fusari v.
Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 386-87, 95 S. Ct. 533, 42 L.
Ed. 2d 521 (1975). Consequently, it is no longer
“permissible to say that the [Commission’s]
challenged conduct continues.” Chem. Producers &
Distribs., 463 F.3d at 875 (internal quotations
omitted). The case is moot.
AFFIRMED.
A4
FILED: 3/25/2024
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV
BENANCIO GARCIA III,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary
of State of Washington, and the STATE OF
WASHINGTON,
Defendants.
AMENDED JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
_____ Jury Verdict. This action came before the
Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried
and the jury has rendered its verdict.
__X__Decision by Court. This action came to
consideration before the Court. The issues have been
considered and a decision has been rendered.
This action is again before the Court on remand
from the United States Supreme Court with
instructions to enter a fresh judgment from which an
appeal can be taken to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The issues were
previously considered and a decision was rendered.
THE COURT HAS ORDERED that:
A5
This case is dismissed as moot.
DATED this 25th day of March, 2024.
RAVI SUBRAMANIAN,
Clerk of the Court
By: /s/ Victoria Ericksen
Deputy Clerk
A6
FILED: 9/8/2023
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV
BENANCIO GARCIA III,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary
of State of Washington, and the STATE OF
WASHINGTON,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AS MOOT
Chief District Judge David G. Estudillo authored
the majority opinion, in which District Judge Robert
S. Lasnik joined. Circuit Judge Lawrence J.C.
VanDyke filed a dissenting opinion. 1
Plaintiff Benancio Garcia III brings suit arguing
that Washington Legislative District 15 (“LD 15”) in
the Yakima Valley is an illegal racial gerrymander in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
1 Because Plaintiff “challeng[ed] the constitutionality of the
apportionment” of a “statewide legislative body” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284(a), the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit designated a
three-judge panel to hear Plaintiff’s constitutional claim. (See
Dkt. No. 18.)
A7
Fourteenth Amendment. The Panel sat for a threeday trial from June 5th to June 7th to hear evidence
regarding Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause claim. 2
In light of the court’s decision in Soto Palmer, the
Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim as moot.
I. MOOTNESS
“[T]he judicial power of federal courts is
constitutionally
restricted
to
‘cases’
and
‘controversies.’“ Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.
Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968). “There is thus no
case or controversy, and a suit becomes moot, when
the issues presented are no longer live or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”
Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172, 133 S. Ct. 1017,
185 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013) (cleaned up). Article III’s caseor-controversy requirement prevents federal courts
from issuing advisory opinions. See id. A party must
have “a specific live grievance,” and cannot seek to
litigate an “abstract disagreement over the
constitutionality” of a law or other government action.
Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 479, 110 S.
Ct. 1249, 108 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1990) (cleaned up).
2 The Panel heard evidence for the Garcia
case concurrent with
evidence presented for parallel litigation in Soto Palmer v.
Hobbs, No. 3:22-cv-5035-RSL (W.D. Wash.). For purposes of
judicial economy, the Court refers the reader to the procedural
and factual background in Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *1-3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2023)
and this Court’s prior order (Dkt. No. 56). The Court presumes
reader familiarity with the facts of this case. This order only
addresses Plaintiff Benancio Garcia III’s Equal Protection claim.
A8
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s challenge to the
constitutionality of LD 15 is moot given the Soto
Palmer court’s finding that LD 15 violates § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act (“VRA”). Plaintiff seeks declaratory
relief determining that LD 15 “is an illegal racial
gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and an
injunction “enjoining Defendant from enforcing or
giving any effect to the boundaries of [] [LD 15],
including an injunction barring Defendant from
conducting any further elections for the Legislature
based on [] [LD 15].” (Dkt. No. 14 at 18.) Plaintiff
further requests the Court order a new legislative
map be drawn. (Id.)
The Soto Palmer court determined that LD 15
violated § 2 of the VRA’s prohibition against
discriminatory results. See Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *11. In so
deciding, the court found LD 15 to be invalid and
ordered that the State’s legislative districts be
redrawn. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, [WL] at *13.
Since LD 15 has been found to be invalid and will be
redrawn (and therefore not used for further elections),
the Court cannot provide any more relief to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff does not assert that any new district drawn
by the Washington State Redistricting Commission
(“Commission”) would be a “mere continuation[] of the
old, gerrymandered district[].” North Carolina v.
Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 201 L. Ed. 2d 993
(2018). Plaintiff therefore lacks a specific, live
grievance, and his case is moot.
Traditional principles of judicial restraint also
counsel against resolving Plaintiff’s Equal Protection
Clause claim. “A fundamental and longstanding
A9
principle of judicial restraint requires that courts
avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of
the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.
Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1988); see also Three
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng’g,
P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157, 104 S. Ct. 2267, 81 L. Ed. 2d
113 (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial
restraint, however, that this Court will not reach
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of
deciding them.”). The court’s decision in Soto Palmer
makes any decision in the instant case superfluous. A
new Commission will draw new legislative districts in
the Yakima Valley and, if challenged thereafter, the
propriety of the new districts will be decided by
analyzing the motivations and decisions of new
individuals who constitute the Commission. 3 The
Court cannot and will not presume that the new
Commission will be motivated by the same factors
that motivated its predecessor. Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, and to unnecessarily
decide a constitutional issue where there are
alternate grounds available or where there is an
absence of a case or controversy is to overstep our
“proper, limited role in our Nation’s governance.”
Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. , 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2384,
216 L. Ed. 2d 1063 (2023) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Our dissenting colleague disagrees that the
instant case is moot. In his view, the Commissioners
3 In the event that the Commission fails to draw a new map by
the deadline set by the Soto Palmer court, the parties will submit
proposed maps to the Soto Palmer court and the court will adopt
and enforce a new redistricting plan. See Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *13.
A10
racially gerrymandered the 2021 Washington
Redistricting Map in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and therefore “the map was ‘void ab initio.”‘
Additionally, the dissent argues that longstanding
principles of judicial restraint and constitutional
avoidance are inapplicable here because the decision
in Soto Palmer does not completely moot the relief
sought by Plaintiff. These arguments are
uncompelling.
First, the view that LD 15 was void ab initio
presupposes that Plaintiff established an Equal
Protection violation. To the contrary, a full analysis of
the record presented does not yield such a result. The
Court declines to issue an advisory opinion on the
validity of Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim, however.
Rather, it is sufficient to note only that we disagree
with the dissent’s summary and interpretation of the
facts surrounding the creation of LD 15. Importantly,
the Commissioners’ testimony on the specific issue of
whether race predominated in the formation of LD 15
is absent from the dissent’s summary of the facts, and
the Court encourages readers to examine the
Commissioners’ testimony in full. 4 This testimony
4 Commissioner April Sims, for example, specifically disclaimed
that race was the most important factor. (See Dkt. No. 73 at 77.)
As she testified, “I would not agree that [race] [] was the most
important factor. But that it was a factor.” (Id.) Commissioner
Brady Walkinshaw similarly noted that the Commissioners
discussed a number of factors, including race, but “none of those
[factors] were predominant.” (Id. at 124.) He further emphasized
the impact that the Commissioners’ desire to unify the Yakama
Nation into one legislative district had on the map (see id.), a
factor that all Commissioners attested was important but is
conspicuously absent from our colleague’s analysis.
A11
weighs
heavily
against
finding
that
race
predominated in the drawing of LD 15 and against
finding an Equal Protection violation. 5
Commissioner Joe Fain testified that his overriding interest in
drawing maps for LD 15 was to ensure “competitiveness.” (See
Dkt. No. 74 at 48, 58.) He also testified that he believed
Commissioner Walkinshaw would have voted for a map in LD 15
that would not have had a majority Latino Citizen Voting Age
Population (“CVAP”). (Id. at 51.) Finally, Commissioner Paul
Graves testified that “race and the partisan breakdown of the
district were” tied in his mind as the most important factors.
(Dkt. No. 75 at 85.)
5 The
dissent’s “ab initio” argument leads to the surprising
assertion that the Soto Palmer court should have declined to
issue an opinion in that case. Soto Palmer was the first-filed
challenge to the redistricting map, and it presented a clearly
justiciable case and controversy. Federal courts have a “virtually
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them,”
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817,
96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976), and our dissenting
colleague makes no effort to show that one of the “exceptional”
circumstances that could justify a district court’s refusal to
exercise or postponement of the exercise of its jurisdiction
existed, Id. at 813 and 817. Although the intervenors in Soto
Palmer twice requested that the case be stayed, they did so on
the ground that judicial efficiency would be served by waiting for
the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1,
143 S. Ct. 1487, 216 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2023). At no point prior to the
dissemination of the dissent did anyone suggest that a decision
in Soto Palmer would be advisory or otherwise improper.
More importantly, the suggestion that the VRA claim should
have been stayed or held in abeyance while the Equal Protection
claim was resolved is not supported by case law or legal analysis.
The dissent does not discuss whether a stay of Soto Palmer would
have been appropriate pending the resolution of Garcia under
the rubric established in Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 25456, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936), nor does it cite any cases
A12
It is also erroneous to argue that “resolving Soto
Palmer in the Soto Palmer plaintiffs’ favor does not
moot Garcia.” As noted, LD 15 will be redrawn and
will not be used in its current form for any future
election. The Soto Palmer court has therefore granted
Plaintiff complete relief for purposes of our mootness
analysis. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc.
v. City of New York, New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526,
206 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2020) (vacating judgment as moot
where New York City amended its laws to grant “the
precise relief that petitioners requested in the prayer
for relief in their complaint” notwithstanding requests
for declaratory and injunctive relief from future
constitutional violations). 6
in which a decision on a VRA claim was postponed because of a
related Equal Protection challenge. Milligan itself presented just
such a confluence of claims, and the Supreme Court addressed
the appropriateness of injunctive relief on the VRA claim without
considering, much less prioritizing, the pending Equal Protection
challenge. See also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399, 410, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 165 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2006)
(resolving VRA claims without reaching the companion Equal
Protection claim); Singleton v. Allen, 2:21-cv-1291-AMM-SMTFM, Dkt. # 272 at 7-8, 194-95, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2023) (resolving VRA claims and reserving
ruling on Equal Protection claims in light of the fundamental and
longstanding principles of judicial restraint and constitutional
avoidance).
6 The
dissent attempts to distinguish New York State Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n, but the petitioners in that case argued, like our
colleague, that an intervening change to New York City’s
firearms laws did not moot their request for declaratory and
injunctive relief because of the continued possibility of future
harm from New York City’s unconstitutional firearms licensing
scheme. See Petitioners’ Response to Respondents’ Suggestion of
A13
Our colleague argues that this case is not moot
because Plaintiff may obtain partial injunctive and
declaratory relief. Specifically, the Court could declare
that LD 15 was an illegal racial gerrymander and
enjoin the state from “performing an illegal racial
gerrymander when it redraws the map.” This type of
relief is insufficient to avoid a finding of mootness. It
goes without saying that a federal court may only
direct parties to undertake activities that comply with
the Constitution, and the Soto Palmer court’s
directive to the State to redraw LD 15 properly
presumes that the State will comply with the
Constitution when it does so lest the future district be
challenged once again. Cf. Holloway v. City of Virginia
Beach, 42 F.4th 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2022) (rejecting
argument that VRA case was not moot and Plaintiffs
were entitled to court order “directing implementation
of a new system that ‘compl[ies] with Section 2’“ of the
VRA in light of changes to state law that provided
otherwise complete relief).
The dissent asserts that “the order in Soto Palmer
ensures that [Garcia] will not receive what he argues
Mootness at 15-17, New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S.
Ct. 1525, 206 L. Ed. 2d 798. As the petitioners noted in their
brief, “nothing in the City’s revised rule precludes the previous
version of the rule, which governed for nearly two decades, from
having continuing adverse effects.” Id. at 16. The petitioners
specifically sought a declaration from the Supreme Court that
“that the City’s longstanding restrictive [firearms] licensing
scheme is incompatible with the Second Amendment” and that
any attempt to impose a licensing scheme was “null and void ab
initio.” Id. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the petitioners’
argument and held that the case was moot notwithstanding the
continued possibility of constitutional harm from the newly
revised rule.
A14
is a constitutionally valid legislative map” because his
“claimed injury is not merely capable of repetition; it
almost is certain to repeat itself.” In the dissent’s
opinion, Garcia will most certainly suffer injury
because Soto Palmer “ordered that the State engage
in even more racial gerrymandering” than that
claimed by Garcia in this case. But this claimed injury
from a future legislative district is speculative
because compliance with § 2 of the VRA, as ordered in
Soto Palmer, would not result in a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. See Cooper v. Harris, 581
U.S. 285, 306, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 197 L. Ed. 2d 837
(2017) (“States enjoy leeway to take race-based
actions reasonably judged necessary under a proper
interpretation of the VRA.”); see also Milligan, 143 S.
Ct. at 1516-17 (“[F]or the last four decades, this Court
and the lower federal courts have repeatedly applied
the effects test of § 2 as interpreted in Gingles and,
under certain circumstances, have authorized racebased redistricting as a remedy for state districting
maps that violate § 2.”).
As the dissent concedes, “the Supreme Court has
given States ‘leeway’ to draw lines on the basis of race
in redistricting when States have good reasons, based
in the evidence, to believe the racial gerrymander
necessary under the VRA.” The Soto Palmer court
detailed in depth why a VRA compliant district is
required for the Yakima Valley. See, e.g., 2023 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *5-6, 11
(finding that the three Gingles factors were met and
that the State had “impair[ed] the ability of Latino
voters in [] [the Yakima Valley] to elect their
candidate of choice on an equal basis with other
voters”). The dissent would find that the prior
A15
Commissioners failed to judge a VRA district
necessary, and therefore any racial prioritization that
the Commissioners engaged in would not survive
strict scrutiny. But this determination is necessarily
fact-specific and only applicable to the actions of the
prior Commission. By the dissent’s own admission, so
long as the State judges the use of race necessary to
comply with the VRA it is not unlawful for the State
to create a district with a higher Latino CVAP.
The dissent also argues the case is not moot
because Plaintiff may want to appeal this case to the
Supreme Court. Whether Plaintiff may desire to
utilize this litigation to “challenge current precedent
that considers compliance with the VRA a sufficient
reason to racially gerrymander” is immaterial to the
issue of whether a case is moot. Neither Wis.
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S. 398,
142 S. Ct. 1245, 212 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2022), nor Allen v.
Santa Clara Cnty. Corr. Peace Officers Ass’n, 38 F.4th
68 (9th Cir. 2022), stands for the proposition that a
trial court, in deciding whether a case is moot, should
consider how a party might utilize the litigation to
challenge established Supreme Court precedent.
Indeed, such an argument reinforces the majority’s
finding that the case is moot because a desire to
appeal binding Supreme Court precedent, untethered
from any specific injury, is far removed from a specific,
live controversy. 7 It “would [also] reverse the canon of
[constitutional] avoidance . . . [by addressing] divisive
7 The dissent, like the State of Alabama, might wish for a
different interpretation of § 2 of the VRA than that which has
prevailed in this country for nearly forty years. The United
States Supreme Court, however, recently rejected Alabama’s
invitation to do so in Milligan.
A16
constitutional questions that are both unnecessary
and contrary to the purposes of our precedents under
the Voting Rights Act.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556
U.S. 1, 23, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 173 L. Ed. 2d 173 (2009).
This Court “is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for
the government of future cases, principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in
issue in the case before it.” People of State of
California v. San Pablo & T.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314,
13 S. Ct. 876, 37 L. Ed. 747 (1893). The fact remains
that the Soto Palmer court has ordered the State to
redraft legislative districts in the Yakima Valley.
Having done so, the relief Plaintiff seeks in this
litigation is now moot.
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES as moot
Plaintiff’s claim that LD 15 violates the Equal
Protection Clause. A judgment will be entered
concurrent with this order.
Dated this 8th day of September, 2023.
/s/ David G. Estudillo
David G. Estudillo
United States District Judge
/s/ Robert S. Lasnik
Robert S. Lasnik
United States District Judge
A17
Garcia v. Hobbs et al., No 3:22-cv-5152 (W.D. Wash.)
VANDYKE, J., dissenting,
In 2021, the State of Washington redistricted its
state legislature electoral map. In the process, the
State, acting through its Redistricting Commission,
made the racial composition of Legislative District 15
(LD-15), a district in the Yakima Valley, a
nonnegotiable criterion. In other words, the
Commission racially gerrymandered. See BethuneHill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 189,
137 S. Ct. 788, 197 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2017). This
discrimination means the map was enacted in
violation of the U.S. Constitution unless the
Commission had a “strong basis in evidence” to
believe, and in fact believed, that the federal Voting
Rights Act (VRA) required the Commission to perform
such racial gerrymandering. See Wis. Legislature v.
Wis. Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S. 398, 142 S. Ct. 1245,
1250, 212 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2022) (quotation omitted). A
majority of the Commissioners did not believe the
VRA required racial gerrymandering, so the map was
drawn—and later enacted—in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.
In a parallel case before a single district court
judge, Soto Palmer v. Hobbs, plaintiffs also challenged
the 2021 map as invalid. ___ F.Supp.3d___, 2023 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, No. 3:22-cv5035 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2023). But they alleged the
map violated the VRA, which presented a more
challenging
question
than
the
relatively
straightforward one presented in this matter.
Nonetheless, instead of waiting for this case to be
decided, which would have mooted Soto Palmer, the
A18
court in Soto Palmer undertook a complicated
analysis involving multiple expert witnesses and an
indeterminate nine-factor balancing test and opined
that the map violated the VRA and must be redrawn.
Worse than undertaking a needless analysis, the
court necessarily assumed that the map was not
enacted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
But it was. And because the map violated the Equal
Protection Clause, it was “void ab initio.” Mester Mfg.
Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561, 570 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted); see Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 178889, 210 L. Ed. 2d 432 (2021). As it was void ab initio,
the Soto Palmer decision amounts to an advisory
opinion on whether a void map would violate the VRA
if it existed. That decision should never have been
issued.
Even putting aside the advisory nature of the Soto
Palmer decision, it does not moot this case. Garcia is
seeking relief that the court in Soto Palmer never
provided, and he can still assert arguments not
foreclosed by Soto Palmer. I thus respectfully dissent
from my colleagues’ conclusion to dismiss this case
based on mootness.
BACKGROUND
I. In 2021, the State of Washington Drew New
Legislative and Congressional Electoral Maps
Following the Federal Census.
Under Washington law, the State of Washington
redistricts its “state legislative and congressional
districts” after the decennial federal census and
A19
congressional reapportionment. Wash. Const. art. II,
§ 43(1); see U.S. Const., art. I, § 2. Washington
performs this redistricting through a Redistricting
Commission consisting of four voting Commissioners
and one non-voting Commission Chair. See Wash.
Const. art. II, § 43(2). The “legislative leader of the two
largest political parties in each house of the
legislature” each appoints one Commissioner. Id. The
four voting Commissioners then select by majority
vote a nonvoting chairperson of the Commission. Id.
“The commission shall complete redistricting as soon
as possible following the federal decennial census, but
no later than November 15th of each year ending in
one.” Id. § 43(6). The “redistricting plan” must be
approved by “[a]t least three of the voting members.”
Id. After the Commission approves a plan, a
supermajority of two-thirds of the Washington State
Legislature may make minor amendments to the plan
or do nothing—either way, the map is enacted after
“the end of the thirtieth day of the first session
convened after the commission ... submitted its plan
to the legislature.” Id. § 43(7). And in neither event
can the Legislature reject the map. See id.
After the 2020 decennial census, Washington law
called for the appointment of a Redistricting
Commission to redistrict Washington’s “state
legislative and congressional districts.” Id. § 43(1).
The House Democratic leadership selected April Sims,
the Senate Democratic leadership selected Brady
Piñero Walkinshaw, the Senate Republican
leadership selected Joe Fain, and the House
Republican leadership selected Paul Graves. Garcia
Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 58-59. These four voting
A20
Commissioners selected Sarah Augustine as the
Commission chairperson. Garcia Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 60.
On September 21, 2021, each of the voting
Commissioners released proposed redistricting maps.
Garcia Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 62. According to 2020
American Community Survey 5-year estimates, every
Commissioner’s September legislative map proposal
included a legislative district in the Yakima Valley
area of Washington made up of less than 50%
Hispanic Citizen Voting Age Population (HCVAP).
Soto Palmer Dkt. No. 191 at ¶¶ 75-78, 87. The Yakima
Valley area, which is in southcentral Washington and
encompasses areas in Yakima, Adams, Benton, Grant,
and Franklin counties, would ultimately contain LD15, the district challenged in this case and in Soto
Palmer. Soto Palmer Dkt. No. 191 at ¶ 88.
Around a month later, the Commission received a
slideshow presentation file from the Washington
State Senate Democratic Caucus. Garcia Dkt. No. 64
at ¶ 68. The presentation was prepared by Matt
Barreto, PhD, who opined that there was “racially
polarized voting” in the Yakima Valley area and that
the Republican Commissioners’ maps “crack[ed]” the
Latino population into multiple districts. Ex. 179 at
17-18. The presentation also offered two alternative,
“VRA Complaint,” maps. Ex. 179 at 22-23.
From the circulation of this slideshow onward, the
racial composition of the Yakima Valley district
became an enduring focus of the Commission. Unlike
with any other district, the Commission focused
intensely on the racial composition of LD-15. As
Commissioner Fain put it, although the racial
composition of districts was a topic generally
A21
discussed for “many districts,” “it was more widely
discussed with regards to the Yakima Valley area.”
Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 86-87. For LD-15, the “racial
composition” was “a very important component of that
negotiation” and there were not “other districts where
[racial composition] was as important of a
component.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 87.
Commissioner Sims confirmed in her testimony
that without a “majority Hispanic ... CVAP in LD 15,”
she “[wasn’t] going to reach an agreement on LD 15.”
Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 440. More broadly, one of
Commissioner
Sims’s
“priorities
with
the
Redistricting Commission[] was to create a majorityminority district for Hispanic and Latino voters in the
Yakima Valley,” specifically, “to create a majority
CVAP Hispanic district in the Yakima Valley.” Garcia
Dkt. No. 73 at 37. One of Commissioner Walkinshaw’s
draft maps included a note that the map “[c]reate[d] a
majority Hispanic district” in the Yakima Valley.
Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 132; Ex. 150 at 17. And a
member of Walkinshaw’s staff confirmed in her
testimony that a district that “perform[ed] for Latino
voters” “should be nonnegotiable.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75
at 111.
Commissioner Fain paid attention to the “Hispanic
CVAP measurement” “through the various iterations
of maps, in most cases.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 49. He
“belie[ved]” that “the Hispanic CVAP was a metric
that was important to Democratic commissioners”
and he was “willing to give [an increase in Hispanic
CVAP in LD-15] in order to secure support for a final
compromise map.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 49-50.
Ultimately, “creating more minority-majority, or
majority-minority districts” was important to Fain “as
A22
part of the negotiation in getting a final map.” Garcia
Dkt. No. 74 at 61. Fain testified that “[he] tried to
prioritize greater CVAP districts” and that one of the
things he was “willing to do” was “of course ... most
definitely increasing minority-majority districts.”
Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 84.
Commissioner Graves testified that he thought a
majority Hispanic CVAP district in LD-15 would be
required to obtain both Commissioner Sims and
Commissioner Walkinshaw’s votes. He “had [it] in
mind” that he “would need to draw a major[ity]
Hispanic CVAP district in the 15th LD[] if [he] wanted
to secure [Commissioner Walkinshaw’s] vote for the
final plan.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 67. Based on a
variety of indicia, Graves believed that a majority
Hispanic CVAP district in LD-15 “would probably be
a
go,
no-go
decision
point
for
[Commissioner Walkinshaw].” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at
67-68. Graves also thought that a majority Hispanic
CVAP LD-15 was necessary “to get Commissioner
Sims’s vote for a final plan.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 70.
It was “[v]ery hard for [Commissioner Graves] to see
three of the voting commissioners voting for a map
that did not have a majority Hispanic CVAP district
in the Yakima Valley.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 73.
Anton Grose, one of Commissioner Graves’s
staffers, testified that “[a]s time went on, it became
apparent that a Yakima Valley district that was
majority Hispanic, by citizens of voting age
population, ... would be a requirement to get support
from both Republicans and Democrats.” Garcia Dkt.
No. 73 at 153. Grose testified that for LD-15, in
particular, [HCVAP data] was very, very important to
our kind of counterparts, and it was [thus] very
A23
important to us.” Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 153-54. LD15, “in particular, certainly was far more race-focused
than [Grose] th[ought] any other district on the map.”
Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 155. “[T]here were some other
considerations neglected in the drawing of the 15th,”
Grose thought, “race predominantly being ... the
major focus of that district.” Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 153.
When drawing proposed maps, Grose was “cognizant”
of racial compositions because Commissioner Graves
wanted a majority HCVAP district so that he could get
a map that passed. Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 186-87.
The Commission had a November 15 deadline to
agree to a redistricting plan. Wash. Const. art. II, §
43(6). As the negotiations got underway, the
Commissioners split up for negotiations into two
groups of two. Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 17, 49.
Commissioners Graves and Sims were primarily
responsible for negotiating the legislative map, while
Commissioners Walkinshaw and Fain were primarily
responsible for the congressional map. Garcia Dkt.
No. 75 at 49. Several days before a final agreement
was reached on November 15, Commissioners Graves
and Sims “agreed to ... make the district 50 percent
Latino CVAP.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 31; see also id.
at 91 (noting that before the November 15th deadline,
Commissioner Graves had reached an agreement with
Commissioner Sims that LD- 15 “would be a majority
Hispanic district[] by eligible voters”). There was “an
agreement ... between [Commissioner Graves] and
Commissioner Sims that this district would be greater
than 50 percent [Hispanic] CVAP.” Garcia Dkt. No.
75 at 32. The partisan balance of LD-15 was still “up
in the air,” but however that turned out, the district
A24
would contain above 50% Hispanic CVAP. Garcia Dkt.
No. 75 at 32.
Commissioner Sims appears to have made a
Hispanic CVAP district a nonnegotiable criterion
because she believed such a district was required by
the VRA. Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 51. Commissioner
Walkinshaw might have believed this, but his
testimony on the point was less clear. Garcia Dkt. No.
73 at 135. Commissioners Graves and Fain did not
think that the VRA required a legislative district in
the Yakima Valley containing a majority HCVAP.
Garcia Dkt. Nos. 75 at 71 (Graves); 74 at 50 (Fain).
When November 15 finally arrived, the
Commissioners moved their negotiations to a hotel in
Federal Way, Washington. Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 30.
There the Commissioners reached what they referred
to as a “framework agreement.” Garcia Dkt. Nos. 73
at 16-17; 74 at 71; 75 at 42. Although they did not vote
on specific maps before the deadline, they voted on an
agreement that they testified could be turned into a
legislative map. Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 41
(Commissioner Graves confirming that he stated in a
press conference “that the framework that had been
agreed to was sufficiently detailed that, without
discretion, it could be turned into a map”). The
framework agreement was “that [LD-15] would be
that 50.1 Hispanic CVAP number.” Garcia Dkt. No.
75 at 42. The framework agreement did not “stipulate
the racial composition of any other district[] besides
the 15th.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 72.
After the Commissioners shook on their
framework agreement in the evening of November 15,
the Commissioners and their staff began turning the
A25
framework agreement into an actual map. Garcia
Dkt. No. 73 at 192. This process went late through the
night and into the morning of November 16. During
this time, the map drawers tweaked the racial
composition (i.e., the percentage of Hispanic citizens
of voting age) of LD-15, bringing it as close as
reasonably possible to 50% while staying barely above
a 50/50 split. Ex. 487 at 7 (comparing Commissioner
Graves’s November 12 map, with a 50.2% Hispanic
CVAP, to the enacted map, with a 50.02% Hispanic
CVAP). While drawing the maps in the early morning
hours of November 16, Grose was “also trying to
ensure the district was majority Hispanic by CVAP.”
Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 205. It is clear the map
drawers were aware of the nonnegotiable criteria that
LD-15 must be over 50% HCVAP.
On November 16, 2021, the Commission
transmitted its final maps to the Washington State
Legislature. Ex. 123. The Legislature made minor
amendments to the maps, changing only a few census
blocks that resulted in no change in the population of
LD-15, and voted to enact the maps in February 2022.
See H. Con. Res. 4407, 67th Leg. Reg. Sess., at 2:3536, 71:9-77:26.
II. Following Redistricting, Two Challenges
Were Brought Against the Enacted 2021
Legislative Map.
On January 19, 2022, several plaintiffs—including
lead plaintiff Susan Soto Palmer—filed a lawsuit
against the Washington Secretary of State alleging
that the legislative map ratified by the legislature in
February, the “2021 Legislative Map,” was enacted in
A26
violation of the VRA because (i) the map diluted the
voting power of Hispanic residents of LD-15 and
because (ii) the Commission drew the map with
discriminatory intent. Soto Palmer Dkt. No. 70 at 3940. On March 15, 2022, Benancio Garcia, III, filed a
lawsuit against the Washington Secretary of State
alleging that the Commission, in drawing LD-15,
racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. Garcia Dkt. No. 14 at 17.
Pursuant to Garcia’s request under 28 U.S.C. § 2284,
a three-judge panel was drawn consisting of my
colleagues in the majority and me. Garcia Dkt. No. 1
at 1, 18. The court in both cases joined the State of
Washington as a defendant, and the court in Soto
Palmer granted several individuals’ motion to
intervene and defend the map. Garcia Dkt. No. 13;
Soto Palmer Dkt. Nos. 68-69. The court consolidated
the cases for trial, which was held the week of June 5,
2023. 1 On August 10, the court in Soto Palmer issued
a decision finding in favor of the Soto Palmer plaintiffs
and directing the State of Washington to redraw the
legislative map. Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *13.
ANALYSIS
The majority dismisses this case as moot. It is not.
Not only is the case not moot, but the panel should
have acknowledged the map was enacted in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, found in favor of
1 Soto Palmer also included an additional trial day on June 2,
2023.
A27
Garcia, and directed the State of Washington to
redraw the maps in a way that does not violate the
Constitution. That would have mooted the VRA
challenge in Soto Palmer and avoided the issuance of
an advisory opinion in that case.
I. This Case Is Not Moot.
The majority concludes Garcia’s lawsuit is “moot”
because, in the panel’s opinion, the court in Soto
Palmer concluded that the 2021 map violated the VRA
and ordered the State of Washington to redraw it.
That opinion was advisory, should never have been
rendered, and even putting that aside, does not moot
this case.
The Soto Palmer decision should never have been
issued. Because the 2021 map violates the Equal
Protection Clause, it was “void ab initio.” Mester Mfg.
Co., 879 F.2d at 570 (citation omitted). “An act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.
Ed. 60 (1803). Indeed, as the Supreme Court put it
recently, “an unconstitutional provision is never
really part of the body of governing law (because the
Constitution automatically displaces any conflicting
statutory provision from the moment of the provision’s
enactment).” Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1788-89. In
deciding the claim in Soto Palmer— while necessarily
aware of this challenge against the map on
constitutional grounds—the Soto Palmer court simply
ignored the unconstitutionality of the map and
jumped ahead to decide whether a hypothetically
constitutional map would violate the VRA.
A28
In other words, the Soto Palmer court issued an
advisory opinion. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90
S. Ct. 200, 24 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1969) (declining to
address the constitutionality of a statute that was no
longer legally extant on other grounds because of the
need
to
“avoid
advisory
opinions
on
abstract propositions of law”). Opining on “important”
but hypothetical “questions of law” is not a function
within the “exercise of [the] judicial power” granted in
Article III of the U.S. Constitution. United States v.
Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 300-01, 29 S. Ct. 507, 53 L. Ed.
803
(1909).
Indeed,
“[federal
courts]
are
constitutionally forbidden from issuing advisory
opinions.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d
865, 879 (9th Cir. 2009); see also United Pub. Workers
of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89, 67 S. Ct.
556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947) (“[F]ederal courts
established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution
do not render advisory opinions.”).
Beyond the jurisdictional reason to avoid deciding
the VRA claim, there is also an important prudential
reason that the court in Soto Palmer should have at
least deferred resolution of the VRA claim until this
panel resolved the Equal Protection claim. The VRA
claim in Soto Palmer was complex and involved the
application of a nine-factor indeterminate balancing
test. See Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893,
2023 WL 5125390, at *6-11. As a matter of prudence,
it makes little sense to undertake a complicated test
that involves indeterminate balancing when a simpler
threshold basis exists for resolving the matter.
The majority cites to Landis v. North American
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936),
as a possible reason not to have prioritized this panel’s
A29
Equal Protection claim. First, it’s not clear Landis is
even relevant. Landis considered a court’s power to
grant a motion for a stay, whereas the issue here
involves a court’s internal docket management. See id.
at 256. I do not suggest, as the majority believes, that
Soto Palmer should have been formally “held in
abeyance.” Different considerations come into play
when a court is assessing its own order-of-business
than when a court is considering an application for a
formal stay or for a case to be held in abeyance. But
even assuming Landis did govern, it was no bar to the
court in Soto Palmer appropriately deferring.
“Especially in cases of extraordinary public moment,
the individual may be required to submit to delay not
immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its
consequences if the public welfare or convenience will
thereby be promoted.” Id.
Similarly, despite the majority’s assertion
otherwise, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Allen v. Milligan does not indicate that a court should
undertake a many-factored VRA analysis ahead of a
simple Equal Protection analysis that would moot the
VRA claim. 599 U.S. 1, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 216 L. Ed. 2d
60 (2023). The Supreme Court in Allen granted review
on only one question: “Whether the State of Alabama’s
2021 Redistricting Plan ... violated Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.” The Court did not grant review on
any Equal Protection claim. There was thus no Equal
Protection claim pending before the Court that would
have potentially mooted the case and which it could
have answered before addressing the VRA question.
The Supreme Court’s discretionary docket allows it to
limit itself just to a question granted. See Izumi
Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips
A30
Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 28, 114 S. Ct. 425, 126 L. Ed. 2d
396 (1993). But we, of course, are not the Supreme
Court.
While my colleagues in the majority opine that the
Soto Palmer decision was not advisory because of the
principle of constitutional avoidance, that principle
has no application here. That discretionary principle
indicates that a nonconstitutional decision should
usually be preferred to a constitutional decision when
the nonconstitutional decision would render the
constitutional decision unnecessary. See Ashwander
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S. Ct. 466,
80 L. Ed. 688 (1936); see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 446, 108 S.
Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1988) (explaining that,
“before addressing [a] constitutional issue,” courts
should consider “whether a decision on that question
could have entitled respondents to relief beyond that
to which they were entitled on their statutory
claims”). Perhaps if there were a symmetrical
relationship between the Soto Palmer and Garcia
cases, such that a decision in one would necessarily
moot the other case, and vice versa, there might be a
better argument for constitutional avoidance in
Garcia. But that is not the case. There is instead an
asymmetry, where the correct decision in Garcia
would moot Soto Palmer, but a decision in Soto
Palmer, regardless of the result, does not moot Garcia.
Resolving Garcia in the plaintiff’s favor would
have mooted Soto Palmer. It would have meant
recognizing that the map challenged in Soto Palmer
has never legally existed—enacted in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, there never was a
constitutionally valid map that could possibly violate
A31
the VRA. See Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1788-89; Mester
Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d at 570. That recognition would
leave no map for the Soto Palmer plaintiffs to
challenge, and thus moot their action.
By contrast, resolving Soto Palmer in the Soto
Palmer plaintiffs’ favor does not moot Garcia. The
majority disagrees, stating that because LD-15 is now
gone as a result of the decision in Soto Palmer, the
Garcia plaintiff got what he wanted. But he didn’t, of
course. Consider what happened: In this case,
Plaintiff Garcia complains that the State considered
race unlawfully in drawing the legislative map. In
Soto Palmer, the plaintiff complained that the State
violated the VRA because LD-15 did not consider race
enough—that is, that the final LD-15 contains too few
Hispanic voters. The Court in Soto Palmer agreed
with the plaintiff that there were not enough Hispanic
voters in LD-15 to comply with the VRA and directed
the State to go redraw the map in a way that complies
with the VRA. The State will do this by placing more
Hispanic voters in LD-15, a task which necessarily
requires the State to consider race. 2
2 The majority cites a recent order in the now-remanded Milligan
litigation as support for its decision to dismiss Garcia’s claims as
moot. See Milligan v. Allen, 2:21-cv- 1530-AMM, Dkt. No. 272 at
7-8, 194-95, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5,
2023). But the relationship between the VRA and constitutional
claims in Milligan is noticeably different from the relationship
between Soto Palmer’s VRA claim and Garcia’s constitutional
claim. Thus, Milligan does not support the majority’s reliance on
constitutional avoidance here.
The Milligan litigation involves several consolidated cases, but
among those with constitutional claims are the aforementioned
A32
Milligan case and the Singleton v. Allen case. The Milligan
plaintiffs argue that Alabama’s remedial proposal fails to remedy
the VRA violation, and because Alabama’s racial
gerrymandering cannot otherwise survive strict scrutiny, it also
violates the Equal Protection Clause. See id., Dkt. No. 200 at 1619, 23-26. As the Milligan plaintiffs have presented their
arguments, their VRA and Equal Protection claims seek the
same thing, and both depend on their underlying theory that
Alabama has an affirmative obligation to use race properly to
satisfy the demands of the VRA. Thus, their constitutional claims
effectively serve as a backstop to their VRA claims, and so relief
on the latter necessarily eliminates any need to reach the former.
That is a textbook application of mootness. Garcia’s argument
here, in contrast, is that the Equal Protection Clause requires
the State to abstain from considering race, which is, of course,
directly at odds with the Soto Palmer plaintiffs’ arguments that
the State must consider race more. Unlike in Milligan, where
plaintiffs received all the relief they sought (under either of their
claims) when the district court tossed Alabama’s remedial maps
based on the VRA, the majority here cannot avoid Garcia’s
constitutional claim based on Soto Palmer, which does not offer
relief that redresses Garcia’s claim.
The Singleton plaintiffs, who are advancing only constitutional
claims, have taken a different view of the Alabama redistricting
dispute. They have offered alternative congressional maps that
they contend comply with the VRA without taking race into
consideration at all. See Singleton v. Allen, 2:21-cv-1291-AMM,
Dkt. No. 147 at 19-20, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998. If race need
not be considered to satisfy the demands of the VRA, they argue,
then Alabama’s admitted consideration of race must violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 17-18. Because the Alabama
court again granted relief on VRA grounds, it had no need to
separately consider at this point in the litigation the Singleton
plaintiffs’ claim that VRA compliance can be achieved without
resort to racial gerrymandering. But that reasoning has no
purchase here, where Garcia’s claim that the State is improperly
using race is neither addressed nor resolved by the Soto Palmer
court’s admonition that the State needs to double down on its use
of race to comply with the VRA’s demands.
A33
The majority’s position is thus that an order
directing the State to consider race more has
“granted . . . complete relief” to a plaintiff who
complains the State shouldn’t have considered race at
all. This kind of logic should make us wonder if this
case is really moot.
It is not, for at least two reasons. First, the plaintiff
in this case may wish to appeal this matter to the
Supreme Court to challenge current precedent that
considers compliance with the VRA a sufficient reason
to racially gerrymander. See Wis. Legislature, 142 S.
Ct. at 1248; Allen v. Santa Clara Cnty. Corr. Peace
Officers Ass’n, 38 F.4th 68, 70 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022)
(noting that the appellants “concede[d] that binding
precedent forecloses” one of their arguments “and only
seek to preserve that claim for further appellate
review”). While that issue is currently foreclosed by
current Supreme Court precedent, the plaintiff in
Garcia could ask the Supreme Court to revisit that
precedent. Even assuming success in that endeavor is
a longshot, that doesn’t moot this case. I agree with
the majority that, if Garcia had no ongoing injury, he
could not litigate a case with simply the hope that he
And in any event, while it is true that, when faced with both VRA
and constitutional claims, the Alabama court in its recent
Milligan order decided only the VRA claims, the court neither
ultimately rejected the constitutional claims nor took any other
action preventing their future adjudication. Instead, it merely
“reserve[d] ruling” on them. Milligan v. Allen, 2:21-cv-1530AMM, Dkt. No. 272 at 8, 194, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998.
Especially in view of the Singleton plaintiffs’ claim, which—not
unlike Garcia’s—do not wholly depend on the outcome of the
VRA claim, the Alabama court’s decision was a measured and
constrained course of action that undercuts rather than supports
the majority’s severe and terminal decision here.
A34
could persuade the Supreme Court to revisit one of its
precedents. But he still has injury. He claims injury
from past racial gerrymandering. The decision in Soto
Palmer ordered that the State engage in even more
racial gerrymandering. That does not somehow
eliminate Garcia’s injury.
Secondly, even putting aside the possibility of
Garcia seeking relief from the Supreme Court, the
Garcia case is also not moot because, notwithstanding
the finding of a VRA violation in Soto Palmer and the
resulting invalidation of the redistricting maps, “there
is still a live controversy” in Garcia “as to the
adequacy of” the remedy in Soto Palmer in addressing
all of the relief sought by Garcia in this case. Knox v.
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 30708, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 183 L. Ed. 2d 281 (2012). “A case
becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to
grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing
party. As long as the parties have a concrete interest,
however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the
case is not moot.” Id. (cleaned up). And “the burden of
demonstrating mootness is a heavy one.” Los Angeles
Cnty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S. Ct. 1379, 59 L.
Ed. 2d 642 (1979) (cleaned up). Moreover, a case is not
moot simply because the exact remedy sought by the
plaintiff cannot be fully given. The existence of a
possible partial remedy “is sufficient to prevent [a]
case from being moot.” Church of Scientology of Cal.
v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13, 113 S. Ct. 447, 121 L.
Ed. 2d 313 (1992).
In this case, Garcia seeks a declaration “that
Legislative District 15 is an illegal racial gerrymander
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause” and an
order from this court that the State create a “new
A35
valid plan for legislative districts ... that does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.” Garcia Dkt. No.
14 at 18. Although the decision in Soto Palmer might
moot some of the relief that Garcia sought to obtain in
this case, the court in Soto Palmer did not issue an
order directing the State to avoid performing an
illegal racial gerrymander when it redraws the map—
that is, to avoid violating the Equal Protection Clause.
See Soto Palmer, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023
WL 5125390, at *13. Garcia requested the map be
redrawn without violating the Equal Protection
Clause, and this unfulfilled request for relief “is
sufficient to prevent this case from being moot.”
Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13.
The majority disagrees because “a federal court
may only direct parties to undertake activities that
comply with the Constitution.” Thus, the panel
“presumes” that the court in Soto Palmer “direct[ed]
the State to redraw LD 15” in a way that complies
with the Constitution. The source of this presumption
is unclear. Although courts obviously should avoid
intentionally directing parties to violate the
Constitution, there is little reason to presume that the
court’s order in Soto Palmer implicitly instructed the
State not to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The
State had earlier violated the Equal Protection Clause
by unlawfully considering race, and the court’s order
directs the State to consider race more. It doesn’t set
any limit for how much more. Garcia has still not
received a court order directing the State to redraw
the map in a way that does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The majority is therefore wrong
that there remains no “availability of any meaningful
injunctive relief.”
A36
The majority relies on New York State Rifle and
Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York to support
its belief that the mere fact that the Soto Palmer court
directed the map be redrawn is enough to moot this
case. See 140 S. Ct. 1525, 206 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2020) (per
curiam). The Supreme Court in New York said no such
thing. The Court instead concluded that a case was
partially moot when plaintiffs challenged a rule that
was subsequently amended by state and local
authorities during litigation. See id. at 1526. In this
case, however, Garcia requested not just that the old
map be held invalid but that a new map be drawn in
a way that does not violate the Constitution. He is still
seeking that relief and has not received it from the
order in Soto Palmer. Indeed, the order in Soto Palmer
ensures that he will not receive what he argues is a
constitutionally valid legislative map. Garcia’s
claimed injury is not merely capable of repetition; it is
almost certain to repeat itself.
The majority’s insistent portrayal of this case as
indistinguishable from New York glosses over the
starkly different procedural postures of the two cases
and ignores the practical consequences of its own
decision to dismiss Garcia’s claim as moot. In New
York, petitioners’ constitutional claims were
considered on a discretionary basis by a court of last
resort. Here, Garcia’s constitution claim was
presented in the first instance to a district court with
a non-discretionary obligation to adjudicate it, and
that distinction makes a difference.
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in New
York, “the State of New York amended its firearm
licensing statute, and the City amended the
[challenged] rule” to provide “the precise relief that
A37
petitioners requested[.]” 140 S. Ct. at 1526. In
response to New York’s argument that the
amendments mooted their claims, the petitioners
noted (1) that the new rule shared some of the old
rule’s constitutional problems and (2) raised the
prospect of saving their complaint by amending it to
seek damages. Id. at 1526-27.
While the Supreme Court concluded that
petitioners’ old claims were moot, its subsequent
vacatur and remand (which, it bears noting, is
nowhere near the same thing as this court finally
dismissing this case for mootness) affirmatively
disclaimed neither of petitioners’ arguments. As to the
petitioners’ first argument, the Supreme Court gave
no indication that it disagreed with their contention
that New York’s replacement rule might have
constitutional problems of its own. Instead, it ordered
the lower court to address that argument in the first
instance. And then, just two years later, the Supreme
Court vindicated that exact argument from the very
same petitioners. See New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed.
2d 387 (2022). And as to petitioners’ second argument
that they might amend their challenge to the old rule
and avoid mootness by adding a damages claim, the
Supreme Court again merely sent that argument
back to the lower court to address in the first instance.
New York, 140 S. Ct. at 1527. It did not, like the
majority does here, reject and dismiss that claim. In
short, while the Supreme Court in New York did
conclude the petitioners’ challenge to the old rule was
“moot” for purposes of the Supreme Court’s own
continued review, the Court’s actions taken in
response to that conclusion bear no resemblance to the
A38
majority’s decision here. Instead, the Supreme Court
merely exercised its unique discretion to have the
lower courts address all the remaining non-moot
issues in the first instance.
But it bears repeating: we are not the Supreme
Court. A three-judge district court panel has nowhere
to remand the remaining non-moot issues in this case.
The Supreme Court’s unique method of managing its
own discretionary appellate docket, which in New
York kept alive the prospect that petitioners’ nonmoot claims would receive substantive review,
provides no support for the majority’s broad mootness
decision here, which kills Garcia’s entire case—
including the parts that aren’t moot—before any court
had the opportunity to review its merits.
In sum, the panel is wrong on the narrow question
of mootness in this case. More broadly—and more
disconcerting—the court in Soto Palmer was incorrect
to issue an advisory opinion opining on whether,
assuming LD-15 had been enacted in compliance with
the Constitution and was thus legally extant, the
district would have violated the VRA. My criticism
that the Soto Palmer decision is an advisory opinion
depends, of course, on my conclusion that the State of
Washington violated the Equal Protection Clause. I
thus turn now to that question. It is not a hard one on
this record.
A39
II. The State of Washington Violated the Equal
Protection Clause by Racially Gerrymandering
Without a Compelling Interest.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits a State
from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. “[A]bsent extraordinary justification,” this
clause prohibits a State from “segregat[ing] citizens
on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf
courses, beaches, and schools.” Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 911, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762
(1995) (internal citations omitted). Such sifting is
odious to the Constitution and our Republic. It is no
less so when a “State assigns voters on the basis of
race” and “engages in the offensive and demeaning
assumption that voters of a particular race, because of
their race, ‘think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls.’“ Id. at 911-12 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 647, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1993)).
These “[r]ace-based assignments embody stereotypes
that treat individuals as the product of their race,
evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very
worth as citizens—according to a criterion barred to
the Government by history and the Constitution.” Id.
In short, “[u]nder the Equal Protection Clause,
districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race
are by their very nature odious” and “cannot be upheld
unless they are narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.” Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct.
at 1248 (cleaned up).
A40
When a plaintiff has shown that a State racially
gerrymandered in drawing a particular district, the
burden shifts to the State to show that the
gerrymander was “narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 904; see also
Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1248. A State may have
a compelling interest to draw lines on the basis of race
when, “at the time of imposition,” it has a “strong
basis in evidence” to believe the racial gerrymander
was necessary to comply with the VRA and in fact
“judg[ed] [such gerrymandering] necessary under a
proper interpretation of the VRA.” Wis. Legislature,
142 S. Ct. at 1249-50. 3
In this case, the 2021 Washington State
Redistricting Commission (1) racially gerrymandered
in drawing LD-15 and (2) a majority of the
Commission did not, “at the time of imposition, judge
[such a gerrymander] necessary under a proper
interpretation of the VRA.” Id. (cleaned up). Because
3 The majority mischaracterizes me as “admi[tting]” that “so long
as the State judges the use of race necessary to comply with the
VRA it is not unlawful for the State to create a district with a
higher Latino CVAP.” That is incorrect. The mere fact that a
State (through its officials) “judges the use of race necessary to
comply with the VRA” is decidedly not the correct standard for
policing the line between racial discrimination that violates the
Equal Protection Clause and racial discrimination that complies
with the VRA. It is one thing to subject a State that is racially
gerrymandering to “the burden of showing that the design of
th[e] district withstands strict scrutiny.” Wis. Legislature, 142 S.
Ct. at 1249. It is quite another to bless a State’s racial
discrimination any time “the State judges the use of race
necessary to comply with the VRA.” While the Supreme Court
has sanctioned the former approach, it has never endorsed the
latter, and for good reason.
A41
the Commission racially gerrymandered without a
compelling interest, the 2021 Redistricting Map
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and was “void ab initio.” Mester Mfg. Co.,
879 F.2d at 570; see also Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 178889. But before discussing the evidence showing the
Commission grouped voters on the basis of race and
that its racial sorting was not in furtherance of a
compelling interest, a threshold question must first be
considered. Specifically, the parties dispute whether
the Commission or the Washington Legislature is the
entity whose intent matters for determining whether
the State violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
answer is not difficult: it is the Commission’s intent
that matters.
A. The Redistricting Commission’s Intent
Matters for Garcia’s Equal Protection Claim.
“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose
is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed.
2d 450 (1977). To establish his prima facie case that
the State of Washington violated the Equal Protection
Clause in enacting the 2021 map, Garcia must thus
show that the State intentionally racially
gerrymandered. But whose intent? The State of
Washington argues it is the Washington Legislature’s
intent. Garcia Dkt. No. 78 at 30. Because Washington
law structurally makes the Redistricting Commission
primarily responsible for redistricting and because
the Legislature made only minor changes to the map
submitted by the 2021 Redistricting Commission—
none of which affected the racial composition of LD-15
A42
imposed by the Commission—the State is incorrect. It
is the Commission’s intent that is legally relevant.
“[Supreme Court] precedent teaches that
redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed
in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for
lawmaking, which may include,” for example, the
popular “referendum and the Governor’s veto.” Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 808, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 192 L. Ed.
2d 704 (2015). Accordingly, it is important to first
attend to what institution Washington law makes
responsible
for
redistricting.
Structurally,
Washington law delegates redistricting to the
Redistricting Commission, leaving only a minor role
for the Washington Legislature.
The Washington Constitution provides that
“redistricting of state legislative and congressional
districts” shall be performed by “a commission.” Wash.
Const. art. II, § 43(1). “The legislature may amend the
redistricting plan but must do so by a two-thirds vote
of the legislators elected or appointed to each house of
the legislature.” Id. § 43(7). “After submission of the
plan by the commission, the legislature shall have the
next thirty days during any regular or special session
to amend the commission’s plan.” Wash. Rev. Code §
44.05.100(2). The Legislature’s amendments “may not
include [a change of] more than two percent of the
population of any legislative or congressional district.”
Id. Moreover, if the Legislature fails to timely make
any
amendments,
the
Commission’s
plan
automatically becomes “the state districting law.”
Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(7).
A43
It is plain from these state constitutional and
statutory requirements that Washington law
delegates primary redistricting responsibility to the
Commission, leaving only tightly circumscribed
discretion for a supermajority of the Legislature to
make minor changes to the map. Because Washington
law delegates almost all responsibility to the
Redistricting Commission, the Commission is at least
presumptively responsible for performing the
“legislative function” of redistricting and is thus the
entity whose intent matters for evaluating an Equal
Protection claim. Ariz. State Legislature, 576 U.S. at
808.
Even assuming that presumption could be
overcome in some case, it was not here. The
Legislature minimally amended LD-15, the district
that Garcia contends was drawn discriminatorily,
changing only a few census blocks that resulted in no
change in population to LD-15. See H. Con. Res. 4407,
67th Leg. Reg. Sess., at 2:35-36, 71:9-77:26. Moreover,
the House and Senate majority leaders both explained
that they viewed the Commission as the entity
responsible for drawing the maps, with the
Legislature playing a minor role. The House Majority
Leader discussed the changes as “technical in nature”
and explained that “[i]f we do nothing, then the maps
come into being without our vote” but that the maps
would then “come into being without [certain] changes
that
were
recommended
by
the
county
commissioners.” Ex. 1065 at 5:04-22. The Senate
Majority Leader explained that adopting the maps “is
not an approval of the redistricting map and the
redistricting plans; it’s not an endorsement of that
plan. The Legislature does not have the power to
A44
approve or endorse the redistricting plan that the
Redistricting Commission approved.” Ex. 126 at 2:102:38.
The intent of the 2021 Redistricting Commission is
the intent we must consider when evaluating Garcia’s
Equal Protection claim.
B. Race Predominated the Commission’s
Considerations in Drawing LD-15.
Garcia claims that the 2021 Redistricting
Commission racially gerrymandered when it drew
LD-15. The evidence establishes that he is right. “[A]
plaintiff alleging racial gerrymandering bears the
burden ‘to show ... that race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a
significant number of voters within or without a
particular district.’“ Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 187
(quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916). “Race may
predominate even when a reapportionment plan
respects traditional principles ... if race was the
criterion that, in the State’s view, could not be
compromised, and race-neutral considerations came
into play only after the race-based decision had been
made.” Id. at 189 (cleaned up) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899, 907, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207
(1996)). 4 Finally, it is no excuse that a government
4 The
Supreme Court recently reinforced that when a State
makes the racial composition of a district the criterion on which
it will not compromise, it has elevated race to a position of
predominance. See Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. at 1510-12
(plurality op.) (obtaining only a minority of the justices for an
A45
racially sorted voters so that it could accomplish an
ultimate non-race objective. See Cooper v. Harris, 581
U.S. 285, 291 n.1, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 197 L. Ed. 2d 837
(2017).
Race clearly predominated the considerations of
the 2021 Redistricting Commission when it drew LD15. The racial composition of LD-15 featured heavily
in the Commissioner’s negotiations over the
legislative map. Garcia Dkt. Nos. 73 at 117, 153-54,
177; 75 at 30-31. And in the ramp-up to final
negotiations, the Commissioners reached an
agreement to racially gerrymander LD-15 to be at
least a bare majority Hispanic CVAP. Garcia Dkt. No.
75 at 30, 91. This initial agreement to make LD-15 a
majority HCVAP district was then cemented in the
final
framework
agreement
among
the
Commissioners. Garcia Dkt. Nos. 73 at 16-17; 74 at
71; 75 at 42, 72. This agreement was the primary
criterion for LD-15, contrasting with the other
districts where the Commission was aware of racial
demographics but nonetheless did not make race a
nonnegotiable criterion. Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 42.
All the Commissioners, for varying reasons,
elevated the racial composition of LD-15 to be a
nonnegotiable criterion around which other factors
and passage of the map itself must fall. Commissioner
Sims believed that a majority HCVAP in LD-15 was
required by the VRA and also believed that the
Commission must follow the law. Garcia Dkt. No. 73
analysis opining that race does not necessarily predominate
when a State crafts a district with an objective of a specific racial
composition).
A46
at 48, 51. One of Commissioner Walkinshaw’s draft
maps included a note that the map “[c]reate[d] a
majority Hispanic district” in the Yakima Valley.
Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 132. And one of Walkinshaw’s
staff stated that a district that “perform[ed] for Latino
voters” should be nonnegotiable.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75
at 110-11. Making LD-15 a majority HCVAP was
critical to Commissioner Fain because he “belie[ved]
that “the Hispanic CVAP was a metric that was
important to Democratic commissioners” and he was
“willing to give [an increase in Hispanic CVAP in LD15] in order to secure support for a final compromise
map.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 49-50. Commissioner
Graves wanted LD-15 to be a majority HCVAP so that
he could get a map that obtained a majority of the
Commissioners’ votes; it was “[v]ery hard for
[Commissioner Graves] to see three of the voting
commissioners voting for a map that did not have a
majority Hispanic CVAP district in the Yakima
Valley.” Garcia Dkt. Nos. 73 at 186-87; 75 at 73.
Commissioners Fain and Graves may have wanted
LD-15 to be a majority HCVAP district for reasons
unrelated to their own concerns about race, but the
government may not “elevate[] race to the
predominant criterion in order to advance other goals,
including political ones.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291 n.1.
The Commissioners then transformed these
intents into an agreement that, come what may, LD15 would be a majority HCVAP district. In the days
leading up to the Commission’s deadline to agree on
maps, the two Commissioners responsible for
negotiating the legislative map (as opposed to the
congressional map) reached an agreement that LD-15
“would be a majority Hispanic district by eligible
A47
voters.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 91. They “agreed to ...
make the district 50 percent Latino CVAP.” Garcia
Dkt. No. 75 at 31. The district’s partisan makeup was
still “up in the air,” but it was agreed that the district
would be majority HCVAP. 5 Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 32.
And finally, when November 15 arrived, all the
Commissioners reached a framework agreement on
how the maps would be drawn, which included that
LD-15 would be a majority HCVAP district. Garcia
Dkt. Nos. 73 at 16-17; 74 at 71; 75 at 42, 72.
Underlining that race predominated the
Commission’s drawing of LD-15 is the fact that the
Commission did not elevate race to be the
predominant factor in drawing other districts. Grose,
one of Commissioner Graves’s staffers, testified that
LD-15, “in particular,” was “certainly ... far more racefocused than [Grose] th[ought] any other district on
the map.” Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at 155. Commissioner
Fain testified that the “racial composition” of LD-15
was “a very important component of that negotiation”
and confirmed that there were not “other districts
where [racial composition] was as important of a
component.” Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 87. In making the
racial composition of LD-15 nonnegotiable—the
5 The State of Washington notes that Commissioner Fain did not
remember the racial composition of LD-15 being a part of the
framework agreement. Garcia Dkt. No. 78 at 32 n.12. But
Commissioner Fain’s lack of memory is hardly surprising given
that he was negotiating the congressional map, not the
legislative map. Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 49. And his inability to
remember this part of the framework agreement is unpersuasive
evidence of whether the agreement contained this nonnegotiable
criterion, in light of testimony from one of the legislative map
negotiators that it was part of the agreement.
A48
“criterion that ... could not be compromised”—the
Commission elevated race, and it predominated the
drawing of LD-15. Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 189
(cleaned up).
The majority does not dispute that the racial
composition of LD-15 was nonnegotiable for the
Commission. The majority instead argues that race
did not predominate because the Commissioners
considered other factors when drawing the legislative
map and because the Commissioners later denied that
race predominated their considerations. The reason
several of the Commissioners gave for believing that
race did not predominate is the same reason relied on
by the majority: simply that, in addition to
considering race a nonnegotiable criterion, they also
considered other factors.
It is of course not surprising at all that the
Commissioners considered other factors. But it is also
irrelevant. When a map drawer elevates a specific
racial composition as “a “criterion that, in the [map
drawer’s] view, could not be compromised,” race
predominates. Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 189. If the
mere consideration of other factors in addition to
making race nonnegotiable meant race no longer
predominated, then race would literally never
predominate. Map drawers always consider more
than just race, even when they operate with the
express purpose of meeting a racial target. Take a
simple example. Map drawers always attempt to
comply with the Constitution’s requirement that
states’ legislative maps be drawn with “equality of
population among the districts.” Mahan v. Howell,
410 U.S. 315, 321, 93 S. Ct. 979, 35 L. Ed. 2d 320,
modified, 411 U.S. 922, 93 S. Ct. 1475, 36 L. Ed. 2d
A49
316 (1973). If the mere consideration of other factors
could stop race from predominating when a map
drawer makes racial composition a nonnegotiable
criterion, then it would make little sense for the Court
to repeatedly state that race predominates when it is
a “criterion that ... could not be compromised.” Shaw,
517 U.S. at 907; Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 189.
By the basic nature of their task, drawers of
legislative districts always take a number of essential
considerations into account. The ever-present nature
of such considerations cannot somehow dilute the
constitutional taint of a map drawer who makes race
a nonnegotiable criterion in drawing a map. See Lee v.
City of Los Angeles, 908 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir.
2018) (explaining that “traditional redistricting
principles are ‘numerous and malleable’“ and “a
legislative body ‘could construct a plethora of
potential maps that look consistent with traditional,
raceneutral principles’“) (quoting Bethune-Hill, 580
U.S. at 190). That the Commission here
unsurprisingly considered “traditional, race-neutral
principles” in addition to making race a nonnegotiable
requirement does not mean those other factors
somehow sufficiently watered-down race as the
Commission’s predominant consideration in drawing
LD-15. Id. The racial composition of LD-15—
specifically, that it be majority HCVAP—was a
“criterion that, in the [Commission’s] view, could not
be
compromised,”
and
thus
“race-neutral
considerations came into play only after the racebased decision had been made.” Bethune-Hill, 580
U.S. at 189 (quoting Shaw, 517 U.S. at 907).
A50
C. The 2021 Legislative Map Fails Strict
Scrutiny.
Race predominated the Commission’s decision to
draw LD-15 as it did. For the map to nonetheless be
constitutional, the State must show that it survives
strict scrutiny. Specifically, the State must show that
the map is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 904. The State
argues the gerrymander was justified under the VRA.
Garcia Dkt. No. 78 at 34. The Supreme Court has held
that complying with the VRA can be a compelling
state interest, but only if the State, “at the time of
imposition, judge[d] [the racial gerrymander]
necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA.”
Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1248, 1250 (cleaned up).
Because a majority of the voting Commissioners did
not “judg[e]” the gerrymander “necessary” under the
VRA at the time that the Commission approved the
2021 Legislative Map, the map fails strict scrutiny. Id.
Commissioner Graves testified that he was
“entirely uncertain” of whether the VRA required “a
Hispanic CVAP district.” He thought “that the law
was entirely unclear on that particular question.”
Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 71. When asked if he had a
“clear understanding of what the VRA required[] in
the Yakima Valley,” Commissioner Graves answered
that he was “not sure the VRA itself has a clear
understanding of exactly what it requires in the
Yakima Valley.” Garcia Dkt. No. 75 at 58. It is evident
that Commissioner Graves’s decision to racially
gerrymander LD-15 was not because he thought that
it was required by the VRA.
A51
So too Commissioner Fain. When he was asked
point-blank at trial whether he believed the Hispanic
CVAP majority in LD-15 was “required[] by the Voting
Rights Act,” Commissioner Fain answered: “No.”
Garcia Dkt. No. 74 at 50.
Commissioner Walkinshaw was less direct but
also unclear as to whether he believed a majority
HCVAP
was
necessary
in
LD-15.
He
certainly believed complying with the VRA was
important, calling it “mission critical.” Garcia Dkt.
No. 73 at 106. After he received the slideshow
prepared by Dr. Barreto, Commissioner Walkinshaw
released a new map that included an explanation that
“[n]ow that we have this information, we as
Commissioners should not consider legislative district
maps that don’t comply with the VRA.” Garcia Dkt.
No. 73 at 135. But his general statement that the
Commission should comply with the law does not
clearly evince that he actually believed the racial
gerrymander ultimately embodied in the final
legislative map was necessary under the VRA. It is
possible that Commissioner Walkinshaw believed the
VRA required a racial gerrymander, but his testimony
and the record are ambiguous.
Ultimately, only Commissioner Sims clearly
believed the racial gerrymander performed in LD-15
was required by the VRA. Commissioner Sims
straightforwardly answered “Yes” when asked
whether she “believe[d] that the VRA required the
Commission to create a majority Hispanic CVAP
district[] in the Yakima Valley.” Garcia Dkt. No. 73 at
51.
A52
The State bears the burden of showing that the
2021 Legislative map survives strict scrutiny.
See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 292. Even giving the State the
benefit of the doubt (which, of course, would not be
particularly strict scrutiny), and thus assuming
Commissioner Walkinshaw believed the VRA
required that LD-15 be racially gerrymandered, the
State cannot show that a majority of commissioners
racially gerrymandered because they intended to
comply with the VRA. Two of four commissioners do
not constitute a majority of the Commission, see
Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(6), and thus there was no
majority of the Commission who, “at the time of
imposition, judge[d] [the racial gerrymander]
necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA,”
Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1250 (cleaned up). The
judgment of only two Commissioners was not enough
to demonstrate that the Commission in any official
sense believed racial sorting was necessary to comply
with the VRA.
State governments may not arrange people into
districts based on race and then hope to justify it by
simply pantomiming at the VRA as an interest that
could have justified their gerrymander. “What
matters is ‘the actual considerations that provided the
essential basis for the lines drawn, not post hoc
justifications the legislative body in theory could have
used but in reality did not.’“ Lee, 908 F.3d at 1182
(cleaned up) (quoting Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 799).
For good or ill, the Supreme Court has given States
“leeway” to draw lines on the basis of race in
redistricting when States have good reasons, based in
the evidence, to believe the racial gerrymander
necessary under the VRA. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 306; see
A53
Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1250. But the Supreme
Court also understandably requires that states
actually judge such segregation necessary under the
VRA, not just hope that they can find good experts and
good lawyers to make post hoc arguments if someone
challenges it as violating the Equal Protection Clause.
The State of Washington took the latter approach and
so fails to satisfy strict scrutiny. The State thus
enacted the 2021 Legislative Map in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
***
My colleagues in the majority are not properly
dismissing an already dead case as moot. Instead,
after improperly (and unsuccessfully) trying to
indirectly kill this case from a distance in Soto
Palmer, they are forcefully pulling the plug on a case
that—even now—still has some life in it. And had they
properly reached the merits, a straightforward
analysis shows both that race predominated in the
drawing of LD-15 in the 2021 Legislative Map and
that, because a majority of the Commission did not
judge such racial ordering necessary under the VRA
at the time the map was adopted, the map cannot
survive strict scrutiny. We should have found in favor
of Garcia and directed the State of Washington to
redraw the Legislative Map without violating the
Equal Protection Clause. And then that map could be
properly evaluated for compliance with the VRA,
instead of the advisory analysis provided in the Soto
Palmer decision. I thus respectfully dissent.
Dated this 8th day of September, 2023.
A54
/s/ Lawrence VanDyke
Lawrence VanDyke
United States Circuit Judge
A55
FILED: 9/8/2023
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV
BENANCIO GARCIA III,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary
of State of Washington, and the STATE OF
WASHINGTON,
Defendants.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
•
Jury Verdict. This action came before the
Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been
tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.
•
Decision by Court. This action came to
consideration before the Court. The issues
have been considered and a decision has been
rendered.
THE COURT HAS ORDERED that:
This case is dismissed as moot.
Dated September 8, 2023.
A56
Ravi Subramanian
Clerk of Court
s/ Michael Williaims
Deputy Clerk
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.