Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Global Marine Exploration, Inc., Petitioner v. Republic of France, et al.

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE NO. 24-10148

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit (August 19, 2025) ................... 1a

William Pryor, Chief Judge, concurring .......... 33a

Errata................................................................ 41a

Order Granting Motion of the United States to

Intervene, U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit (May 27, 2025)...................... 42a

Order Denying Postjudgment Motion,

U.S.District Court for the Northern District

of Florida Tallahassee Division

(December 15, 2023) ......................................... 43a

Order Granting Summary Judgment,

U.S. District Court for the Northern District

of Florida Tallahassee Division

(September 29, 2023)........................................ 47a

REHEARING ORDER

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc,

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

(October 6, 2025) .............................................. 71a

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)

CASE NO. 20-14728

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit (May 12, 2022) ...................... 73a

Errata................................................................ 98a

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, U.S. District

Court for the Northern District of Florida

Tallahassee Division (November 16, 2020) ..... 99a

STATUTORY PROVISION

Sunken Military Craft Act.................................... 113a

App.1a

OPINION, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

(AUGUST 19, 2025)

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

GLOBAL MARINE EXPLORATION, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,

Defendant-Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor.

________________________

No. 24-10148

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00181-AW-MJF

Before: WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge,

and LUCK and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether the

Sunken Military Craft Act bars a salvage claim

App.2a

brought by Global Marine Exploration, Inc., against

the Republic of France. In 1565, la Trinité—a French

ship sent to resupply and defend a struggling French

fort in Florida—sunk off the coast of Cape Canaveral

during a hurricane. In 2016, Global Marine—an

underwater exploration com-pany—discovered the

remains of la Trinité on the ocean floor. After France

claimed the ship and obtained a dismissal without

prejudice of an in rem action filed by Global Marine,

Global Marine brought an in personam action against

France for the salvage value of its work. It also sued

for unjust enrichment, misappropriation of trade

secrets, and tortious interference. The district court

granted summary judgment for France. We affirm.

I.

Background

We describe the background of this appeal in four

parts. We first review the record developed by the

parties to describe the last voyage of la Trinité and the

hurricane that sank it. We next describe the events

that led to la Trinité’s discovery. We then describe the

in rem action Global Marine brought against the ship.

And we last recount the in personam action Global

Marine brought against France.

A. In 1565, la Trinité Sinks Off the Coast of

Florida.

Two 16th-century storylines set the stage for the

sinking of la Trinité and France’s doomed efforts to

colonize Florida. The first is one of empire: France,

England, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands all

hungered for new lands, new trade routes, and new

resources in the so-called New World. The second is

one of religion: Europe, long united in faith under the

App.3a

Catholic Church, fractured and descended into religious

wars as the Protestant Reformation spread from

kingdom to kingdom.

In 1562, France sat at the center of both

storylines. For decades, the kingdom had disputed

Spain’s claim to all newly discovered lands in the

Americas. And for decades, fleets of French ships had

stalked Atlantic waters, raided Spanish colonies, and

attacked Spanish ships. These fleets, carrying French

mariners called corsairs, often were controlled by

French nobles and merchants. And often the French

monarch granted the ships’ captains letters of marque,

which allowed the corsairs to engage in privateering

that would otherwise be called piracy.

The French corsairs’ raiding and trading in the

Americas ignited diplomatic flare-ups with Spain and

eventually a war. The two kingdoms reached an uneasy

truce in 1559, when they signed the Treaty of CateauCambrésis. Although this treaty generally permitted

merchants from France to conduct business in Spain’s

colonial territories, negotiations stalled over France’s

rights, if any, to lands in the New World.

As France addressed its geopolitical crisis abroad,

it also faced a religious crisis at home. By the 1550s,

the Protestant Reformation had attracted converts,

eventually known as Huguenots, within the kingdom’s

borders. This religious schism threatened French

national identity, destabilized the kingdom, and led to

outbreaks of religious violence. But by 1561, despite

religious persecution, approximately 10 percent of the

French population had converted to Protestantism.

This geopolitical and domestic unrest set the

stage for France’s three ill-fated attempts to establish

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a colony in Florida. The efforts were led by Gaspard

de Coligny, Lord of Châtillon and Grand Admiral of

France. King Henri II appointed Coligny Admiral of

France in 1552. Coligny retained his position as

Admiral even after he became a Huguenot. In this

role, Coligny oversaw defense of the French coastline.

He directed French missions to the Americas. He

negotiated with Spain. And he used his position to

advocate for religious tolerance.

In 1562, Coligny appointed Jean Ribault, another

Huguenot, to lead the first French naval expedition to

Florida. Ribault was more than qualified to take command. A storied seafarer, he had commanded French

vessels in battles against the Spanish, English, and

Flemish for years.

Under Ribault’s command, two ships sailed from

France on February 18, 1562, and made landfall in

Florida two months later. Once ashore, the ships’

crews erected a “piller or colume of hard stone, our

kinges armes graven therin,” near the mouth of the

River May (known today as the St. Johns River). From

there, the ships sailed north until they reached Parris

Island, off the coast of present-day Georgia. Ribault

ordered part of the crew to disembark, stay behind,

and build a settlement, named Charlesfort. Ribault

departed Charlesfort in June 1562 after promising to

return the next year with supplies and reinforcements.

Ribault returned to a France at war with itself.

In March 1562, only a month after he set sail for

Florida, a massacre of Huguenots sparked the beginning

of the first War of Religion. Ribault joined a Huguenot

rebellion against the crown. When that rebellion failed,

and its leadership surrendered to royalist forces,

Ribault fled to England, where he was imprisoned in

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the Tower of London as a suspected spy. Meanwhile,

the settlers of Charlesfort, starved without reinforcements, abandoned the French outpost and set

sail for Europe.

With Ribault confined in the Tower of London,

Coligny needed a new leader for his second mission to

Florida. He recommended René Goulaine de Laudonnière, a Huguenot and Ribault’s second-in-command

during the 1562 mission, to King Charles IX. After

King Charles IX approved the commission and furnished

ships and supplies for the voyage, Laudonnière set

sail for the New World on April 22, 1564, taking with

him soldiers, sailors, and Huguenot settlers. The fleet

landed at the St. Johns River on June 22, 1564, and

established a new settlement, called Fort Caroline,

upriver.

The third and final French foray to Florida took

place in 1565. Ribault, released from English custody,

resumed service in the French naval forces. And

Admiral Coligny again commissioned Ribault to command a fleet headed to Florida—this time, to resupply

and reinforce Fort Caroline. As with the 1564 expedition,

King Charles IX approved of and supported the mission.

He summoned Ribault to “the court” and “honor[ed]

him with the title of . . . lieutenant and leader of the

troops which he had been commanded to raise.”

Mindful of the fragile peace with Spain, King Charles

IX also “forbade [Ribault] from making a landfall in

any other country or island, especially those which

were under the dominion of the King of Spain.”

By then, Spain had caught wind of France’s

encroachment in Florida. In 1564, King Philip II ordered

his forces in Havana to investigate and eradicate any

French presence. But when the first Spanish expedition

App.6a

stumbled upon Charlesfort, the French settlers were

gone.

King Philip II’s second attempt to wrest Florida

away from the French took on greater urgency when

he learned about Fort Caroline and Ribault’s upcoming

1565 expedition. On March 20, 1565, he gave Pedro

Menéndez de Avilés—an experienced Captain General

who had long commanded ships in Spain’s treasure

fleets—a royal appointment to settle and govern

Florida. Days later, Spain learned of France’s second

settlement, Fort Caroline.

A Spanish spy at the French port of Dieppe sent

news of Ribault’s new fleet. The spy’s report described

“[seven] ships,” “very well armed with artillery, people

and munitions,” including “[f]ive hundred soldiers.”

And he added that “the King of France released from

his Rouen profits 100 thousand francs for this enterprise.” In the light of this fresh intelligence, Spain

bolstered Menéndez’s forces, expanding the fleet to

over 10 ships and 995 soldiers and sailors.

While Menéndez outfitted his armada, the French

ambassador in Spain sent back news of Spain’s planned

attack on Fort Caroline. This intelligence changed the

nature of Ribault’s voyage from relief mission to

military venture. As of April 1565, Ribault had focused

his efforts on recruiting more Huguenot settlers and

garnering supplies. But after word of Menéndez’s

armada reached the French on April 3, Ribault and

Coligny expanded the scope of the expedition. Seven

ships, instead of the planned five, prepared to go to

Florida. Each ship was a heavily armed “galleass[],”

and four weighed over 100 tons. At least 500 soldiers

joined the civilian settlers, with the final headcount

for the expedition numbering between 700 and 1,000.

App.7a

French Registers of Artillery for May 1565 confirm

that the “treasurer and guard of artillery and munitions

of the Navy in Normandy” issued arms and equipment

to “Ribault[,] ordinary captain of the Navy [and] chief

and conductor of the ships and people of war that the

King sends presently to the country of New France.”

Elsewhere, the armament records referred to la Trinité

and another ship, l’Émérillon, as “belonging to the

King.” Both were armed with “artillery, both of bronze

and wrought iron, powder, cannonballs, [and] artifices

of war.”

With both the Spanish and French fleets stocked

and armed, the race to Florida began. On May 22,

1565, Ribault set sail on la Trinité, the flagship leading

the seven French ships. Over a month later, on June

29, 1565, Menéndez followed Ribault to Florida on

San Pelayo, one of Spain’s largest warships.

Both fleets reached Florida on the same day. On

August 28, 1565, Ribault’s fleet made landfall south of

Fort Caroline, and Menéndez grounded his armada

near present-day Cape Canaveral. Ribault sent the

three smaller ships upriver to Fort Caroline while the

four larger ships—too large to sail over the sandbar—

anchored offshore of the mouth of the St. Johns River.

In the meantime, Menéndez sailed north in search of

Ribault’s fleet.

On September 4, 1565, the Spanish fleet spotted

the four anchored French ships. Menéndez drew close

to the ships under the cover of night, with plans to

attack in the morning. But before dawn came, the

fleets’ crews traded escalating threats. Menéndez

warned that he “had come to this coast to burn and

hang the French Lutherans whom [he] should find . . . in

the morning [when he] should board their vessels.”

App.8a

The Frenchmen urged him to “come on and not wait

till morning.” But before Menéndez could order an

attack, Ribault’s ships “cut their cables, and hoisted

their sails, and all four of them took to flight.”

Menéndez gave chase but could not make ground on

Ribault’s ships.

Outpaced, Menéndez retreated and sailed south.

He made landfall at a natural harbor, which he named

St. Augustine and claimed in the name of King Philip

II. From there, Menéndez began disembarking soldiers

and armaments in preparation for a land invasion of

Fort Caroline.

One of Ribault’s ships tailed Menéndez to the

newly christened St. Augustine. Reports that the

Spanish fleet had anchored and set up base reached

Ribault soon after. He decided to attack, and on September 8, 1565, his largest ships, reinforced with

soldiers from Fort Caroline, sailed south.

Ribault descended on the Spanish fleet on September 10, 1565. But Menéndez’s ships, protected by

landed cannons, took shelter in the harbor before

Ribault could overtake them. While Ribault’s fleet lay

in wait, a “hurricane and terrible storm came upon

them.” The French ships, caught in the hurricane,

were driven south and sank off the coast of Cape

Canaveral.

A few days later Menéndez—now sure that

Ribault’s fleet posed no further threat—marched

Spanish troops northward. In quick succession, his

forces stormed the depleted Fort Caroline, captured it,

and then used the Fort’s own cannons to sink one of

the small French ships that remained. Captain

Laudonnière, who had remained behind to defend

App.9a

Fort Caroline, fled on the two remaining ships and

sailed back to Europe.

As for Ribault, he did not go down with la Trinité.

Instead, he swam ashore, along with many of the

soldiers who sailed to attack the Spanish fleet. It took

Menéndez only about a month to track down the

French survivors. He beheaded almost all of them,

including Ribault.

B. In 2016, Global Marine Discovers the

Remains of la Trinité.

La Trinité rested undisturbed in its watery grave

for more than four centuries. Then, in 2015, Global

Marine applied for and received an exploration permit

from the Florida Department of State, Division of

Historical Resources. The permit gave Global Marine

permission to explore a three-square-mile area offshore

of Cape Canaveral. Under the permit’s terms, Global

Marine could “delineate the extent of historic shipwreck

site(s)” and “[e]valuate the potential characteristics

and significance of any historic shipwreck site in

consultation with the Division.”

The permit conditioned Global Marine’s exploration

activities on the submission of daily field notes and

logs, interim reports, and final reports. Detailed regulations, promulgated by the Division of Historical

Resources, provided the specifics of those reporting

requirements. For example, one regulation required

Global Marine to submit “Survey Log Sheets” with

“topographic quadrangle map[s],” “site locations,” and

photos to the Division. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.

1A-46.001 (2025). Another permit condition required

Global Marine to “immediately contact” the Division

upon the discovery of “a historic or prehistoric

App.10a

archaeological site” so that the Division could help

“coordinat[e] submission of new or revised Florida

Master Site File site forms.”

After more than a year of searching, Global

Marine identified five shipwrecks at six sites off the

coast of Cape Canaveral. Eager to cash in on the find,

Global Marine’s CEO and president, Robert Pritchett,

first contacted France about the discoveries. In a May

30, 2016, email to the French Embassy in Washington,

D.C., Pritchett stated, “I am working with the State of

Florida in the Area of Cape Canaveral and we may

have found French shipwreck related items from the

16-17th century.” He also included a list of questions

about “the Trinity,” its cannons, anchors, coat of arms,

and Ribault’s fleet. And he offered to enter “an

agreement” with France to “bring up” the discovered

“items/artifacts.”

Under the permit’s requirements, Pritchett next

submitted a “Notification of Find Report” to the

Division on June 3, 2016. The report described the

discovery of a cannon (marked with the French fleur

de lis) and a stone monument (likely the one Ribault

erected near St. Johns Bluff during his first voyage to

the new world) at what it called Site #2. Weeks later,

on June 30, 2016, Global Marine sent the Division its

“Final Dig & Identify Report and Request for Rescue

Recovery Permit.” The report contained additional

photos of bronze cannons on the ocean floor and the

marble monument. The report also acknowledged

“strong indications” that the artifacts belonged to la

Trinity, and that “France, Spain, England and other

countries must be contacted.”

Instead of responding to Pritchett’s outreach,

France issued a diplomatic note to the United States

App.11a

Department of State about la Trinity in July 2016.

The note made clear that France would not enter a

relationship with Global Marine. France stressed that

“as part of a royal fleet of Charles IX, the sunken ship

and all its contents are under the ownership of the

French Republic.” This position, the note explained,

was consistent with France’s formal notice, published

in the Federal Register, that “every State craft (e.g.

warship, naval auxiliary and other vessel . . . owned

or operated by a state) enjoys sovereign immunities,

regardless of its location and the period elapsed since

it was reduced to wreckage.” France categorically

“oppose[d] any commercial exploration on the vessel

discovered by Global [Marine].”

Pritchett followed up with the Division about his

Final Report in mid-July 2016. A Division employee

responded that Pritchett’s final report was incomplete.

Missing from its pages was “[l]ocation information,”

including the “coordinates of the archeological material,”

“[b]oundaries for potential sites, and coordinates of

site components.” Not only were these details “critical”

for the Division’s “potential assessment of the site,”

but they were “also necessary to advance the discussion

with the appropriate French authorities.” Pritchett

explained that Global Marine did not include “specific

coordinates in the reports due to the fact it would

become public information.” But in the end, he

acquiesced and promised to send “the GPS coordinates.”

The Division employee, in turn, explained that the

Division had “an exemption under Florida’s public

records law and [was] not required to divulge site

location information as part of public records requests.”

Pritchett followed up with France on July 21, 2016.

He asked whether France’s diplomatic note represented

App.12a

the “position of France on [the] issue.” He also emphasized that he “never said” that the shipwreck “was

[F]rench”; instead he had asked to “make a[n]

arrang[e]ment in the State of Florida” or otherwise

“IF it turn[ed] out to be a Military French ship.” An

attaché at the French embassy in Washington, D.C.,

replied that France would permit “no commercial

exploitation whatsoever.” Pritchett responded that he

“respect[ed] France’s wish[es].”

C. Global Marine Brings an In Rem Salvage

Claim Against la Trinité.

Despite Pritchett’s assurance, Global Marine

filed suit in rem against the sunken ship in the Middle

District of Florida in October 2016. See Glob. Marine

Expl., Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & (for FindersRight Purposes) Abandoned Sailing Vessel (Global

Marine I), 348 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1223 (M.D. Fla. 2018).

It now disputed whether the ship was, in fact, la

Trinité. Id. at 1223–24, 1228. Global Marine brought

a claim under the law of finds and sought a salvage

award. Id. at 1224. It also asked for a declaratory

judgment that “no government ha[d] the authority to

interfere with” its “exploration and recovery” of the

vessel and for a preliminary injunction that prohibited

“rival salvors” from accessing the site. Id.

The Middle District issued a warrant of arrest in

rem for the vessel. Id. To execute the warrant, United

States Marshals seized several artifacts—including “3

cannon balls, 3 ballast stones, [and] one pick head”—

that Global Marine had recovered from the site of la

Trinité. Id. The Marshals then surrendered those

artifacts back to Global Marine, which the Middle District appointed as custodian of the vessel. Id.

App.13a

France then appeared in the suit, contested

Global Marine’s claim, and moved to dismiss for lack

of jurisdiction. Id. The res in question, France asserted,

was a ship from “the French Royal Fleet of 1565 commanded by Jean Ribault and sunk by a hurricane in

the vicinity of what is now Cape Canaveral, Florida.”

Id. And the Middle District, France argued, lacked

“subject matter jurisdiction because the res [was] the

French Royal Vessel la Trinité and ha[d] immunity”

from Global Marine’s claims. Id. at 1225.

In the meantime, Florida learned about Global

Marine’s removal of artifacts from la Trinité. It determined that the artifacts “were illegally recovered in

violation of” Global Marine’s permit and Florida regulations. Not only had Global Marine used “methods

beyond the scope of the permit” to recover artifacts not

“authorized for recovery by the permit,” but it had also

failed to notify the “Project Archaeologist prior to

recovery.”

Florida responded to Global Marine’s artifact

recovery with legal and administrative action. On the

legal side, the Middle District granted Florida’s request

to take over as custodian of the ship in the in rem

action. Id. at 1224–25. On the administrative side,

Florida “suspend[ed]” Global Marine’s exploration

permit. Then, after Global Marine failed to “return the

artifacts,” Florida notified Global Marine that it

“intend[ed] to revoke” its permit. Later, Florida denied

Global Marine’s “application for recovery of materials

in the permit area” because the company failed to

comply with the terms of its previous permit.

The Middle District—after much jurisdictional

discovery—granted France’s motion to dismiss. Id. at

1226. It explained that “[a]lthough federal courts have

App.14a

the exclusive power to adjudicate in rem suits against

a vessel, that power is dependent on the court’s jurisdiction over the res.” Id. at 1227. “If the res at issue is

the property of a foreign state,” the court continued,

“the federal courts only have jurisdiction to arrest the

res if authorized by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

Act.” Id. (alteration adopted) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Under that Act, France and

its property “[were] presumptively immune from the

jurisdiction of the United States courts; unless a

specified statutory exception applie[d].” Id. (alteration

adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Global Marine did “not assert that any

exception to the [Act] appl[ied].” Id. at 1228. So the

“lone issue to be decided . . . [was] a question of fact:

Is the res la Trinité?” Id.

After an exhaustive historical and geographic

survey, the Middle District ruled that France “establish[ed] by a preponderance of the evidence that the

res is la Trinité.” Id. at 1242. It explained that Global

Marine “ha[d] not come forward with sufficient evidence to undermine [that] conclusion.” Id. Instead,

Global Marine relied on “speculation” that “[m]aybe

some unnamed non-French ship somehow gained

control of cannons like those on la Trinité and a

territorial monument like that on la Trinité and then

happened to sink in the exact place that la Trinité is

known to have sunk—all without leaving any documentary evidence.” Id. Those arguments, the Middle

District concluded, were “not persuasive.” Id. Global

Marine did not appeal this ruling.

With the identity of the vessel settled, France and

Florida announced a joint venture to protect and

recover la Trinité. This venture included the “recovery

App.15a

of the shipwreck” la Trinité and “the other shipwrecks”

from Ribault’s fleet.

D. Global Marine Brings an In Personam Suit

Against France.

Global Marine then filed this in personam action

in the district court against France in April 2020. This

suit no longer asserted any claims to the ship itself.

Instead, Global Marine sued France for damages

related to its efforts and the benefits those efforts

conferred on France.

The operative complaint alleged four claims. First,

it sought a “salvage and/or maritime lien” award

“under federal admiralty law” to compensate Global

Marine for “services in the discovery, location, identification, or mapping of the shipwreck sites being

recovered by France.” Second, it alleged a “quasi contract/unjust enrichment” claim to recover the value of

“services benefitting France.” Third, it alleged a claim

for “misappropriation of trade secret information”—

the secrets being “coordinate location data” for the

shipwrecks. And fourth, it alleged tortious interference with Global Marine’s relationship with the

Florida Department of State.

France again moved to dismiss. It asserted that

the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction

under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1604, and that the commercial-activity exception

was inapplicable to its recovery of la Trinité. The district court agreed with France and dismissed the

action.

We reversed. Glob. Marine Expl., Inc. v. Republic

of France, 33 F.4th 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022). We

App.16a

held that the commercial-activity exception to sovereign

immunity applied. Id. The “gravamen” or “core” of

Global Marine’s claims against France, we explained,

was “France’s failure to compensate” Global Marine

for “the value of [its] salvaging services.” Id. at 1324–

25.

On remand, France moved for summary judgment.

It argued that the Sunken Military Craft Act barred

the complaint for a salvage award. See Pub. L. No.

108-375, §§ 1401–08, 118 Stat. 1811, 2094–98 (2004)

(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 113 note). That Act provides

that “[n]o salvage rights or awards shall be granted

with respect to . . . any foreign sunken military craft

located in United States waters without the express

permission of the relevant foreign state.” Id. § 1406

(d)(2). And it defines “sunken military craft” to mean

“all or any portion of . . . any sunken warship, naval

auxiliary, or other vessel that was owned or operated

by a government on military noncommercial service

when it sank.” Id. § 1408(3)(A). France contended that

the categorical bar on salvage awards applied to

Global Marine’s in personam claim.

Global Marine’s response on salvage was twofold.

First, it argued that the Sunken Military Craft Act

barred only in rem salvage claims, not in personam

salvage claims. Second, it asserted that la Trinité was

not a “sunken military craft” under the Act because it

was not “on military noncommercial service when it

sank.”

In support of its arguments, Global Marine cited

the reports of two experts: Dr. Lubos Kordac and Dr.

Robert H. Baer. Dr. Kordac, in his one-page report,

argued that la Trinité “was not any military ship.”

Instead, la Trinité “was a cargo ship, bringing supplies,

App.17a

civilians and money to the new French colony.” He

cited no sources to back up his assertion. Dr. Baer,

who also submitted a one-page statement, also argued

that the “assertion that the Huguenot supply vessel,

the ‘Triniti’ was a military vessel on a military mission

is erroneous.” Instead, “the ‘Triniti’ was a civilian

(Huguenot) resupply vessel dispatched to the Fort

Caroline Huguenot outpost.” Baer, unlike Kordac,

included two pages that listed and briefly excerpted a

few sources.

France replied to Global Marine with its own

experts. The report of Dr. Frank Lestringant described

Ribault’s expeditions to Florida from the French

perspective. His report explained the geopolitical and

religious context that led to the voyages. It also

detailed the military nature of the 1565 mission,

describing Ribault’s fleets as composed of “warships.”

Lestringant backed up his report with citations to

nearly 250 pages of primary and secondary sources.

The report of Dr. James P. Delgado did the same but

from the Spanish perspective. He described the military

confrontation between Spain and France in a long

report supported by hundreds of pages of source

material.

Global Marine, perhaps recognizing the gap

between its two experts and those proffered by France,

asked to submit two more expert reports and a

surreply. Its first additional expert, Emmanuelle Lize,

submitted an eight-page report intended “to refute the

Lestringant Declaration.” To that end, she asserted

that France and Spain were at peace in 1565, so the

“mission of Ribault’s fleet cannot be military because

it would have been a violation of the Treaty [of

Cateau-Cambrésis].” She asserted that “Coligny was

App.18a

not following the King’s orders when he sailed La

Trinité and had his own private agenda to establish a

Protestant settlement.” She also argued that Coligny

had “close ties with privateers” and was the “main

organiser of the privateering war” against Spain.

Finally, she concluded that “Ribault’s 1565 fleet was

permitted by the King of France to transport Protestant

dissenters to Fort Caroline and any activities of war

or battle were beyond the scope of authority and were

not official state actions.” The body of her report contained no citations to primary or secondary sources.

Instead, Lize attached 200 pages of documents, almost

entirely in untranslated French.

Global Marine’s final expert, James J. Sinclair,

also responded to Dr. Lestringant’s declaration and

disputed its conclusions. Sinclair reviewed “the same

source materials” cited by Dr. Lestringant but argued

that “La Trinité was [on] a state-sanctioned voyage

[that] permitted only the transport of families, farmers,

and food to Fort Caroline.” “La Trinité was not,” he

asserted, “on military noncommercial service when it

sank—it sank in a hurricane, not because of a military

attack or engagement.” He also stated that “any military

activity exceeded and countermanded the crown’s

directive to maintain peace and required [the] fleet

[to] steer clear of Spain.”

The district court granted summary judgment for

France. It ruled that the bar on salvage awards, under

the Sunken Military Craft Act, covered both in rem

and in personam actions. It also ruled that France met

its “initial summary-judgment burden” to establish

that la Trinité was a “sunken military craft.” Global

Marine, it concluded, “point[ed] to no evidence contradicting the contention that la Trinité sank while on a

App.19a

mission to attack the Spanish fleet.” So Global Marine

failed to create a genuine dispute of fact about whether

the ship was on “military noncommercial . . . service

when it sank.” See § 1408(3)(A), 118 Stat. at 2098. For

the “quasi contract/unjust enrichment claim,” the district court ruled that Global Marine “pointed to no evidence that France knowingly accepted any benefit”

from Global Marine. For the “misappropriation of

trade secrets claim,” it ruled that Global Marine

“fail[ed] to show that the GPS coordinate information

qualifie[d] as a trade secret because there is no evidence that [Global Marine] took reasonable efforts to

protect the information.” And for the “interference”

claim, it ruled that the “privilege of interference” protected France’s actions.

II. Standard of Review

We review a summary judgment de novo. Bearden

v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 945 F.3d 1333, 1337

(11th Cir. 2019). We draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of Global Marine and view the evidence in the

light most favorable to it. CSX Corp. v. United States,

18 F.4th 672, 678 (11th Cir. 2021).

III. Discussion

We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we

address Global Marine’s salvage claim, and we reject

the argument that the bar on salvage awards, under

the Sunken Military Craft Act, extends only to in rem

actions. And we explain that the bar applies to this

suit because the undisputed record establishes that la

Trinité was on military noncommercial service when

it sank. Second, we explain that the record presents

no genuine issues of fact about the claims for unjust

App.20a

enrichment, trade-secret misappropriation, and tortious

interference.

A. The Sunken Military Craft Act Bars Global

Marine’s In Personam Salvage Claim.

In 2004, Congress enacted the Sunken Military

Craft Act. §§ 1401–08, 118 Stat. at 2094–98. The Act

prohibits “any activity directed at a sunken military

craft that disturbs, removes, or injures [it]” unless the

activity is authorized by a permit or some other law.

Id. § 1402. It also forecloses traditional maritime-law

claims of salvage for sunken military craft. Id. § 1406(d)

(“No salvage rights or awards shall be granted with

respect to . . . any United States sunken military craft”

or “any foreign sunken military craft located in United

States waters without the express permission of the

relevant . . . state.”). And it defines “sunken military

craft” as “any sunken warship, naval auxiliary, or

other vessel that was owned or operated by a government

on military noncommercial service when it sank.” Id.

§ 1408(3)(A).

Global Marine contends that the Sunken Military

Craft Act allows its in personam salvage claim against

France for two reasons. First, it argues that the Act

“preserves salvors’ in personam claims because such

claims are ‘not directed at a sunken military craft,’ but

at the owner of the craft itself.” Second, it argues that

“La Trinité is not a ‘sunken military craft”‘ under the

Act. We reject both arguments.

App.21a

1. The Sunken Military Craft Act Bars

Salvage Awards for Both In Rem

and In Personam Actions.

Global Marine argues that the Act’s bar on

salvage claims does not apply to in personam actions.

We disagree. The plain language of the Act, considered

in the context of traditional principles of admiralty,

belies Global Marine’s interpretation.

Traditionally, a salvor invoking admiralty jurisdiction could bring an in rem or an in personam action

to recover a salvage award. See 2 THOMAS J.

SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW

§ 16.1 (6th ed. 2024) (“Under settled principles of

admiralty jurisdiction, the federal district courts have

subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving marine

salvage. The salvage act gives rise to a right to a

reward, and a maritime lien is created in the salved

property. Accordingly, the courts may exercise jurisdiction both in personam and in rem under appropriate circumstances.” (footnotes omitted)). The Supreme

Court recognized this principle as early as 1880, when

it explained that “[s]uits for salvage may be in rem

against the property saved or the proceeds thereof, or

in personam against the party at whose request and

for whose benefit the salvage service was performed.”

The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 386 (1880). Venerable

admiralty treatises echo that although “[g]enerally, a

suit for a salvage award is one brought in rem,” “[t]he

salvor also has his remedy in personam against the

owners of the salved property.” E.g., 3A BENEDICT

ON ADMIRALTY § 288 (2025). And our predecessor

circuit likewise affirmed that a federal court exercising

its admiralty jurisdiction could grant salvage rights or

awards in rem or in personam. Treasure Salvors, Inc.

App.22a

v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing

Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 567 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981).

The Sunken Military Craft Act states that “[n]o

salvage rights or awards shall be granted with respect

to . . . any foreign sunken military craft located in United

States waters without the express permission of the

relevant foreign state.” § 1406(d), 118 Stat. at 2097

(emphasis added). This plain language makes no

distinction between in rem and in personam suits.

And its failure to do so makes sense in the light of

settled principles of admiralty regarding the movement

of vessels in maritime commerce. See 1 SCHOENBAUM,

supra, § 9:1 (discussing the relationship between in

rem and in personam actions based on maritime

liens).

Global Marine’s counterargument invokes the

structure of the Act. It points to section 1402, which

generally prohibits “activity directed at a sunken

military craft that disturbs, removes, or injures [it].”

118 Stat. at 2094. And it points to section 1406(a),

which makes clear that nothing in the Act “is intended

to affect” either “any activity that is not directed at a

sunken military craft” or “the traditional high seas

freedoms of navigation” like “the laying of submarine

cables” or “fishing.” 118 Stat. at 2096. Global Marine

argues that we must read the ban on salvage awards

in section 1406(d) in the light of sections 1402 and

1406(a), which focus on activities “directed at” sunken

vessels. In personam claims, it posits, are not “directed

at” sunken military craft. So section 1406(d)’s prohibition

of salvage claims, it reasons, does not reach in

personam claims.

We reject this strained interpretation. Section

1402(a) bans activities that could physically disturb a

App.23a

sunken military craft. Penalties in sections 1404 and

1405 provide enforcement mechanisms for that ban.

Section 1406(a) clarifies that the prohibition of section

1402 and the associated penalties do not apply if the

relevant physical activity was “not directed” at the

craft. It does not refer to salvage rights or litigation

activity. Section 1406(d), by contrast, stands on its

own. It lacks any limiting language—like “directed

at”—that mirrors or references section 1402. Nor does

its text hint at some other clue that suggests that its

bar on “salvage rights or awards” is limited to in rem

actions.

An amici curiae brief, submitted by two law

professors, argues that the Sunken Military Craft Act,

as construed by the district court, is “unconstitutional”

because it “removes claims under both the law of

salvage and the law of finds from the purview of

Article III courts.” They urge us to construe the Act to

allow for “in personam [salvage] remedies” to avoid

these constitutional concerns.

We decline to consider the law professors’ argument.

We discern no ambiguity in section 1406(d), and “our

adversarial system of adjudication” follows “the principle

of party presentation.” United States v. SinenengSmith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). Under that principle, we rely on parties to litigation “to frame the

issues for decision” and retain “the role of neutral

arbiter of matters the parties present.” United States

v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872 (11th Cir. 2022) (en

banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, no party raised a constitutional objection in the

district court or this Court. And although the amici

challenge the constitutionality of the Act, as applied,

their non-party brief does not cure the party-present-

App.24a

ation defect. Unless “exceptional circumstances” are

present, “amici curiae may not expand the scope of an

appeal to implicate issues not presented by the parties

to the district court.” Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of

Educ., 935 F.2d 1240, 1247 (11th Cir. 1991). No

exceptional circumstance warrants departure from

that rule here.

2. La Trinité Is a Sunken Military Craft.

Global Marine contends that the Sunken Military

Craft Act’s bar on salvage claims does not apply to la

Trinité because the vessel was not engaged in “military

noncommercial service when it sank.” We disagree.

France presented evidence that the vessel was so

engaged, and Global Marine’s experts failed to create

a genuine dispute of fact about the ship’s mission

when it sank. The Sunken Military Craft Act defines

“sunken military craft” to mean “any sunken . . . vessel

that was owned or operated by a government on

military noncommercial service when it sank.”

§ 1408(3)(A), 118 Stat. at 2098. No one disputes that

France owned la Trinité. So we ask only whether la

Trinité was “on military noncommercial service when

it sank.”

The undisputed record establishes that la Trinité

was “on military noncommercial service when it

sank.” To be sure, Ribault was tasked with providing

relief to Fort Caroline. To that end, he transported

families, civilians, food, goods, livestock, and tradesmen

to the settlement. But Ribault was also tasked with

defending Fort Caroline from a potential Spanish

attack. To that end, the French king armed him to the

teeth with artillery and gave him around 500 French

soldiers. And if we examine what la Trinité was doing

App.25a

“when it sank,” the answer is clear. On its way to

attack the Spanish fleet—a mission that can only be

described as “military noncommercial service”—la

Trinité sank in a storm. On that basis alone, the

undisputed record supports France’s position.

Global Marine unpersuasively argues that la

Trinité was not engaged in military service because

Ribault attacked the Spanish Fleet in defiance of King

Charles IX’s orders. Even if the Act allows us to

consider whether Ribault defied the King’s orders,

nothing in the record supports this argument. The

only evidence that even comes close is the statement

of one passenger, cited in the report by James Sinclair,

that King Charles IX “forbade [Ribault] from making

a landfall in any other country or island, especially

those which were under the dominion of the King of

Spain.” That statement, at most, confirms that Ribault

had no license to attack Spanish colonial lands. But it

does nothing to undermine the evidence that Ribault

was tasked with defending Fort Caroline from Spanish

attack. And that defense was unquestionably “military

noncommercial service.”

Global Marine next maintains that the ships in

Ribault’s fleet were cargo ships, not military ships.

But this argument misses the point of section 1408(3)(A).

What matters is whether la Trinité was engaged in

military noncommercial service when it sank. A cargo

ship qualifies as a “sunken military craft” under the

Act so long as it was “owned or operated by a government on military noncommercial service when it

sank.” § 1408(3)(A), 118 Stat. at 2098. Global Marine’s

assertion about Ribault’s fleet, even if true, would not

sway the outcome of this appeal.

App.26a

B. Global Marine’s Common-Law Claims Fail

as a Matter of Law.

Global Marine argues that the district court erred

when it granted summary judgment to France on its

claims for unjust enrichment, trade-secret misappropriation, and interference. We take each claim in turn.

1. Global Marine’s Unjust-Enrichment

Claim Fails.

Global Marine argues that the district court erred

when it granted summary judgment for France on its

unjust-enrichment claim. It contends that “France

took the benefit of [Global Marine]’s costs and risks

with full knowledge that [Global Marine]’s services

produced this benefit.” And it accuses France of

responding with “hauteur but no gratitude” when it

accepted the “windfall” of Global Marine’s work.

These arguments fail on the facts and on the law.

To succeed on an unjust-enrichment claim under

Florida law, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1)

he “conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has

knowledge thereof”; (2) the “defendant voluntarily

accepts and retains the benefit conferred”; and (3) “the

circumstances are such that it would be inequitable

for the defendant to retain the benefit without first

paying the value thereof to the plaintiff.” Pincus v.

Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 333 So.3d 1095, 1097 (Fla.

2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Put another way, “[w]here unjust enrichment is

asserted, a party is liable for services rendered only

when he requests the other party to perform the services

or knowingly and voluntarily accepts their benefits.”

Coffee Pot Plaza P’ship v. Arrow Air Conditioning &

App.27a

Refrigeration, Inc., 412 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1982).

The record contains no evidence that France

requested Global Marine’s services or that it knowingly

and voluntarily accepted the benefits of Global Marine’s

efforts. Indeed, all signs from France would lead a reasonable party to conclude the opposite. Since 2004,

France had publicly stated that it opposed any “intrusive

action” directed at any French “warship, naval auxiliary

[or] other vessel” without “the express consent of the

French republic.” 69 Fed. Reg. 5647 (Feb. 5, 2004).

Then, in 2016, when Global Marine contacted France

about the discovery of la Trinité, France refused the

company’s salvage services. Plus, far from “directly

confer[ring] a benefit to [France],” as Global Marine

must show to recover under Florida law, Kopel v.

Kopel, 229 So.3d 812, 818 (Fla. 2017), Global Marine

conducted its exploratory activity in the hopes of

making a profit for itself. When those efforts failed, it

brought a legal action, denied that it had located la

Trinité, and even submitted an expert report contending

that Global Marine “ha[d] not discovered a primary

shipwreck site at all.” Global Marine I, 348 F. Supp.

3d at 1234 n.8. No matter which way we look at it,

Global Marine has failed to create a genuine dispute

of fact that would warrant reversal for this claim.

2. Global Marine’s Trade-Secret-Misappropriation Claim Fails.

Global Marine argues that the district court erred

when it granted summary judgment for France on its

misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim. This claim

proceeds under the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets

Act. Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boatworks, LLC,

App.28a

898 F.3d 1279, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018). To prove

liability under that Act, Global Marine must prove

that “(1) it possessed a ‘trade secret’ and (2) the secret

was misappropriated.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Misappropriation occurs when

a trade secret is acquired “by someone who knows or

has reason to know that the secret was improperly

obtained or who used improper means to obtain it.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

No record evidence proves that France misappropriated the purported trade secrets—i.e., the “precise

locations” of Global Marine’s “discovered shipwreck

sites”—in question. Global Marine’s exploratory permit

required the company to turn over “Survey Log

Sheets” with “topographic quadrangle maps” and “site

locations” to the Florida Department of State. FLA.

ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1A-46.001 (2025). Global

Marine may believe that the Florida Department of

State, through “coercion and deception,” “induced” it to

turn over this location data. But that alleged coercion

has nothing to do with France. And Global Marine

failed to bring forth any evidence proving that France

knew that the precise location data “was improperly

obtained” or that France itself “used improper means

to obtain it.” Yellowfin Yachts, 898 F.3d at 1297

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

3. Global Marine’s Tortious-Interference

Claim Fails.

Global Marine argues that the district court erred

when it granted summary judgment for France on its

claim of tortious interference. More specifically, Global

Marine contends that France interfered with Global

Marine’s “rights and business relations” with the

App.29a

Florida Department of State when France joined

forces with the Department to explore and recover la

Trinité and “the other shipwrecks” from Ribault’s

fleet. We disagree. Any interference was justified

under Florida law.

To succeed on this claim, Global Marine must

prove “(1) the existence of a business relationship[;]

(2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the

defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified interference

with the relationship by the defendant; and (4) damage

to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship.” Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc.,

647 So.2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994) (alteration adopted)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

third element, most important here, requires the

plaintiff to allege “that the defendant acted without

justification.” Sec. Title Guarantee Corp. of Balt. v.

McDill Columbus Corp., 543 So.2d 852, 855 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1989). A defendant does not act “without

justification,” id., if he has “the privilege of interference.”

Wackenhut Corp. v. Maimone, 389 So.2d 656, 658 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1980).

Florida law provides a “protection privilege” against

liability for tortious interference when a defendant

“interfere[s] to protect [its] own financial and contractual interests.” Weisman v. S. Wine & Spirits of

Am., Inc., 297 So.3d 646, 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)

(citing Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith Schuster &

Russell, P.A., 742 So.2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).

“To defend using this privilege requires only that the

defendant show improper means were not employed.”

Id. “The burden to defeat the privilege then shifts to

the party that brought the tortious interference claim

to show improper means were employed.” Id. Under

App.30a

the protection privilege, a defendant cannot be liable

for tortious interference for “‘doing no more than

insisting upon existent legal rights in a permissive

way.’” Id. (alteration adopted) (quoting Horizons Rehab.,

Inc. v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 810 So.2d 958, 964

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)). The “controlling principle

is that so long as improper means are not employed,

activities taken to safeguard or promote one’s own

financial [and contractual interests] are entirely nonactionable.” Sec. Title Guarantee Corp. of Balt., 543

So.2d at 855 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

France’s interference related to la Trinité was

justified under the protection privilege because France

did nothing more than protect its economic and

financial interests in a permissive way. See Weisman,

297 So.3d at 651. France established a relationship

with the Florida Department of State and interfered

(in the legal sense) in Global Marine’s in rem action to

protect its ownership of and sovereign interest in la

Trinité. No evidence suggests that France protected

its interests using improper means.

In response, Global Marine asks us to infer that

France acted with a “malicious motive” because France

and Florida’s declaration of joint venture referred not

only to la Trinité but also to other “sites within the

state permit area previously awarded to” Global

Marine. But the question under the protection privilege

is whether France protected its rights without resorting

to “improper means,” id., not whether France acted

with a malicious motive. “[I]t is irrelevant whether the

person who takes authorized steps to protect his own

[economic] interests does so while also harboring some

personal malice or ill-will towards the plaintiff.” Ethyl

App.31a

Corp. v. Balter, 386 So.2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1980) (citing Chipley v. Atkinson, 1 So. 934, 938

(Fla. 1887)).

The declaration of joint venture does not suggest

that France acted improperly. The declaration outlines

France’s and Florida’s intent to “[p]rotect the

archeological site off the coast of Cape Canaveral,

State of Florida, where the shipwreck of the Trinité

and of other vessels from its fleet are located.” It also

describes efforts to study and preserve the “vestiges of

the Trinité, which will include in particular the study

and recovery of the shipwreck of the Trinité and of the

other shipwrecks from its fleet and the related activities

aiming to identify, preserve and commemorate this

heritage.” The declaration establishes that France

and Florida plan to search for other ships from

Ribault’s fleet, but it makes no mention of the five

additional sites identified in Global Marine’s reports.

This omission makes sense. As Global Marine

points out, there is little evidence that the five other

sites contained shipwrecks of the French fleet. At a

hearing, France’s legal representative agreed with

Global Marine on that point. He stated, the

“record . . . show[s] that la Trinité is the only one of

the Ribault fleet ships that was driven that far south.

The others are somewhere to the north remaining to

be found.” He also clarified that France did not “make

any claim as to those other[]” five sites.

France’s lawful financial and contractual interests

in recovering the other ships in Ribault’s fleet are the

same as its interests in recovering la Trinité. No evidence proves that France, in pursuit of these lawful

interests, interfered with the five other sites identified

by Global Marine in its reports. Global Marine’s drive-

App.32a

by request for an inference of “malicious motive” in its

favor does not create a genuine dispute of material

fact.

Moreover, though Global Marine faults France

for the demise of its “business relations” with Florida,

the record establishes that Global Marine’s own

conduct caused the fallout. “Imbedded within” the

elements of tortious interference “is the requirement

that the plaintiff establish that the defendant’s conduct

caused or induced the breach that resulted in the

plaintiff’s damages.” Chi. Title Ins. v. Alday–Donalson

Title Co. of Fla., 832 So.2d 810, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2002). When Global Marine filed its in rem suit, it

presented to the district court “3 cannon balls, 3

ballast stones, [and] one pick head” recovered from the

site of la Trinité. Florida determined that those

artifacts “were illegally recovered in violation of”

Global Marine’s permit. Florida then suspended the

permit and later revoked it because Global Marine

failed to “return the artifacts.” Missing from this

chain of causation is any evidence pointing to French

interference. Instead, Global Marine’s actions caused

Florida to revoke its permit and deny its “application

for recovery of materials in the permit area.”

IV.

Conclusion

We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of France.

App.33a

WILLIAM PRYOR,

CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURRING

I write separately to offer a comment about the

initial and reply briefs filed by the amici curiae, Associate Professor of Law Annie Brett and Staff Attorney

and Fellow Ryan L. Scott of the University of Florida,

regarding the Sunken Military Craft Act. See Pub. L.

No. 108-375, §§ 1401–08, 118 Stat. 1811, 2094–98

(2004) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 113 note). The amici

contend that the Act, as we and the district court have

interpreted its plain text, is “likely unconstitutional as an

impermissible repudiation of the federal courts[‘]

admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” See U.S. CONST.

art. III, § 2. Although the panel properly declines to

address this argument because no party raised it

either in the district court or on appeal, our silence

should not be understood as implying that it has

potential merit. The argument is, at best, dubious.

The amici maintain that the Act, as we have

construed it, unconstitutionally “removes claims under

both the law of salvage and the law of finds” from

admiralty jurisdiction. They contend that because

those claims have historically been allowed “against

both sunken and floating military craft,” Congress

cannot remove any in personam claims for salvage

from admiralty jurisdiction. And in support of that

novel argument, they rely on the following often

repeated but obscure passage from Panama Railroad

Co. v. Johnson: “[T]here are boundaries to the maritime

law and admiralty jurisdiction which inhere in those

subjects and cannot be altered by legislation, as by

excluding a thing falling clearly within them or

App.34a

including a thing falling clearly without.” 264 U.S.

375, 386 (1924).

Their argument, if meritorious, would also cast

doubt on the constitutionality of the Abandoned

Shipwreck Act of 1987, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101–06, which

likewise provides that the laws of salvage and finds

“shall not apply to abandoned shipwrecks” in United

States waters, id. §§ 2105(a), 2106(a). The issue is

important: “An estimated fifty thousand shipwrecks

lie in the territorial waters of the United States.”

Russell G. Murphy, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of

1987 in the New Millennium: Incentives to High Tech

Piracy?, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 167, 167 (2002).

Respectfully, the amici misunderstand the breadth

of congressional power to “alter, qualify or supplement”

maritime law and jurisdiction. Panama R.R. Co., 264

U.S. at 386. As the Supreme Court also stated in

Panama Railroad, “[T]here is no room to doubt that

the power of Congress extends to the entire subject

and permits of the exercise of a wide discretion.” Id.

Indeed, several years earlier, the Court declared “as

settled doctrine” that “Congress has paramount power

to fix and determine the maritime law which shall

prevail throughout the country.” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen,

244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). And as for the broad grant

of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts, U.S.

CONST. art. III, § 2, the Court later explained, “There

is nothing in that grant of jurisdiction—which sanctioned

our adoption of the system of maritime law—to

preclude Congress from modifying or supplementing

the rules of that law as experience or changing conditions may require.” O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge

& Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40–41 (1943) (emphasis

added). Indeed, Supreme Court precedents on this

App.35a

point lead the authors of one respected treatise

“irresistibly” to conclude “that, while limitations do

exist in theory, it is difficult to envisage circumstances

which would call for any maritime legislation

undertaken by the Congress, conforming to adequate

standards of harmony of a national system, to be

struck down by the courts.” 1 BENEDICT ON

ADMIRALTY § 110 (2025). Of course, Congress too

enjoys plenary power to define the jurisdiction of the

inferior courts that it creates. U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 1; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943)

(“The Congressional power to ordain and establish

inferior courts includes the power . . . ‘of withholding

jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and

character which to Congress may seem proper for the

public good.’” (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.)

236, 245 (1845))); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S.

226, 234 (1922) (declaring that jurisdiction “conferred

may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole

or in part”); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449

(1850) (stating that “Congress may withhold from any

court of its creation jurisdiction” over any cases or

controversies).

To be sure, some scholars debate whether the

general maritime law should preempt state law after

the demise of “federal general common law” in Erie

Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)

(“There is no federal general common law.”). Compare

Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH.

L. REV. 273, 275, 277 (1999) (proposing that after Erie

“there should be no special preemption doctrine in

admiralty”), and Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common

Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L.

REV. 1245, 1332–60 (1996) (critiquing the preemptive

App.36a

nature of general maritime law for private claims),

with Robert Force, An Essay on Federal Common Law

and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1367, 1367–68,

1377–82 (1999) (defending the doctrine of general

maritime law preempting state law). The critics of

treating general maritime law as federal law contend

that “preemption is extremely difficult to justify in the

absence of legislative action.” Young, supra, at 277.

But see Force, supra, at 1380 (“If the Supreme Court

applied the Erie rationale to the general maritime law

tomorrow, assuredly there would be chaos.”). Yet both

critics and defenders alike acknowledge the constitutionality and supremacy of federal maritime legislation.

See, e.g., Clark, supra, at 1259 (arguing that “the

Court must point to some source, such as a statute,

treaty, or constitutional provision, as authority for the

creation of substantive federal law”); Force, supra, at

1377 (“When Congress enacts maritime legislation

under the Commerce Clause or some other express

power, there is no question that conflicting state law

must yield to the Supremacy Clause.”).

The breadth of the discretion of Congress to

define the maritime law for sunken military craft

must also be understood in the light of its other enumerated powers. The Constitution grants Congress

several powers to effect the alteration of substantive

maritime law made by section 1402(b), 118 Stat. at

2095 (providing that “[n]o person may possess, disturb,

remove, or injure any sunken military craft,” ancient

or modern and domestic or foreign, except as otherwise

permitted), and section 1406(d), 118 Stat. at 2097

(preempting the ordinary laws of salvage and finds for

those craft), of the Act. These powers include the

power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,

App.37a

and among the several States”; “[t]o define and punish

Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and

Offences against the Law of Nations”; “[t]o declare

War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make

Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”; “[t]o

provide and maintain a Navy”; “[t]o make Rules for

the Government and Regulation of the land and naval

Forces”; and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing

Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8. Moreover, the Constitution grants

Congress, among its “other Powers,” id., the authority

“to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property

belonging to the United States,” id. art. IV, § 3.

Any sunken military craft carries enormous

significance to a nation. See Guidelines for Permitting

Archaeological Investigations and Other Activities Directed at Sunken Military Craft and Terrestrial

Military Craft Under the Jurisdiction of the Department

of the Navy, 80 Fed. Reg. 52588, 52588 (Aug. 31, 2015)

(codified at 32 C.F.R. § 767). For the sailors, pilots, or

soldiers who drowned, the craft serves as a graveyard

and a memorial to their service. Id. Its remaining

ordnance represents a threat to public safety. Id. Its

fuels, chemicals, or hazardous substances may cause

environmental pollution. Id. An ancient craft will

likely hold historical and cultural value for the nation

that operated it. Id. And a modern craft may contain

sensitive technologies and military secrets. Id.

The federal interests in preempting the general

maritime laws of salvage and finds for sunken military

craft and establishing a modern uniform law on this

App.38a

subject are easy to comprehend. When Congress

enacted, and President George W. Bush signed, this

law as part of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No.

108-375, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004), it permitted the federal government to protect not only its sunken military

craft but also to promote our foreign relations and

national security by respecting the military craft of

other nations. 80 Fed. Reg. at 52589 (“As more than

half of [the Navy’s] sunken military craft rest beyond

U.S. waters, the U.S. government has an interest in

reaching understandings or agreements with foreign

nations, . . . seeking assurances that U.S. sunken

military craft will be respected and protected[,] and

offering foreign nations reciprocal treatment.”). The

Act preserves title to our sunken military craft

regardless of location or age, § 1401, 118 Stat. at 2094,

and it protects any foreign military craft in United

States waters from private disturbance, §§ 1402(a)–

(b), 1408(3), 118 Stat. at 2094–95, 2098. It covers not

only naval vessels but also sunken aircraft and

spacecraft. § 1408(3)(B), 118 Stat. at 2098.

Contrary to the argument of the amici scholars,

the Sunken Military Craft Act does not “remove[]” a

maritime subject from its jurisdiction within the

meaning of Panama Railroad. That is, it does not

treat a maritime subject as the province of local law.

It instead supplants general law derived from the

ancient law of nations, see, e.g., 1 EMER DE VATTEL,

THE LAW OF NATIONS § 293, at 256 (Béla Kapossy

& Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2008)

(1758) (describing “the right to wrecks” in the law of

the sea); see generally ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. &

BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS

App.39a

AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 41–

134 (2017) (recounting the development of the law of

state-state relations and the law maritime in relation

to the Constitution), and fashions new uniform rules

of maritime law for the changed conditions of our

modern nation.

The Act creates a new regime for the salvage of a

sunken military craft within admiralty jurisdiction.

Under sections 1406(d)(1) and (2), 118 Stat. at 2097, a

salvor must have “the express permission” of the

nation that owns the craft to exercise any rights of

salvage or to obtain an award of salvage. Sections

1404 and 1405, 118 Stat. at 2095–96, give the United

States the authority to enforce the Act through steep

civil penalties for violations and to obtain enforcement

costs and damages for any injury. Section 1404(d), 118

Stat. at 2096, creates in rem liability for any vessel

used to violate the Act. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller,

510 U.S. 443, 446–47 (1994) (“An in rem suit against

a vessel is . . . distinctively an admiralty proceeding,

and is hence within the exclusive province of federal

courts.”). And section 1406(f), 118 Stat. at 2097,

excepts any violator of the Act from the benefit of the

Limitation of Liability Act. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–

30.

Under the Act, the subject of ownership and

recovery of sunken military craft remains both federal

and maritime even as its substantive rules have been

altered. Not surprisingly, when it sued la Trinité in its

in rem action in the Middle District of Florida, Global

Marine invoked maritime jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333.

See Complaint at 2, Glob. Marine Expl., Inc. v. The

Unidentified Wrecked & (for Finders-Right Purposes)

Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 348 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (M.D.

App.40a

Fla. 2018) (No. 6:16-cv-1742-Orl-KRS). And when it

sued France in this in personam action, it alleged that

it sought to enforce a “maritime lien under federal

admiralty law.” The jurisdictional issues that later

arose in both cases involved foreign sovereign immunity,

not any question about admiralty jurisdiction. The

subject of this controversy—a vessel in navigable

waters—remains, of course, the province of maritime

law. See generally 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,

ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW §§ 3.3, 3.6 (6th

ed. 2024) (explaining the importance of location and

vessel status in determining jurisdiction); 1 BENEDICT,

supra, § 106 (same). But Congress changed the substantive maritime law of salvage rights for sunken

military craft, and under the Act, Global Marine

enjoys no salvage rights. Congress knew what it was

doing when it enacted this law. And under the Constitution, we are duty-bound to respect its judgment on

this matter.

App.41a

ERRATA

The opinion of the Court has been changed as

follows:

On page 7, “1000” has been changed to “1,000”.

On page 13, “a” has been inserted between “for”

and “declaratory judgment”.

On page 15, the “é” in “la Trinité” has been

italicized.

On page 32, “Weisman, 297 So.3d at 651” has

been replaced with “id.”.

On page 32, italics have been removed from the

comma following “Salter”.

App.42a

ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF THE UNITED

STATES TO INTERVENE, U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

(MAY 27, 2025)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

GLOBAL MARINE EXPLORATION, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

No. 24-10148

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00181-AW-MJF

ORDER:

The motion of the United States to intervene to

defend the constitutionality of the Sunken Military

Craft Act is granted.

/s/ David J. Smith

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

ENTERED FOR THE COURT - BY DIRECTION

App.43a

ORDER DENYING POSTJUDGMENT MOTION,

U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

(DECEMBER 15, 2023)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

________________________

GLOBAL MARINE EXPLORATION, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,

Defendant.

________________________

Case No. 4:20-cv-181-AW-MJF

Before: ALLEN WINSOR, U.S. District Judge.

ORDER DENYING POSTJUDGMENT MOTION

The court granted summary judgment against

Plaintiff Global Marine Exploration (GME) on each of

its four claims against the Republic of France. ECF

No. 88. GME has moved to alter or amend under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59(e), or alternatively for relief from the judgment under Rule

60(b)(6). ECF No. 90. France filed a response in opposition. ECF No. 91. This order denies GME’s motion.

App.44a

First, GME has not shown any manifest errors

that would justify amendment under Rule 52(b). See

Johnson v. New Destiny Christian Ctr. Church, Inc.,

771 F. App’x 991, 995 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The purpose of [Rule 52(b) motions] is to correct manifest

errors of law or fact or, in some limited situations, to

present newly discovered evidence.” (alteration in

original) (quoting in parenthetical Fontenot v. Mesa

Petrol. Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986))).

Similarly, “[t]he only grounds for granting [a

Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered evidence or

manifest errors of law or fact.” Arthur v. King, 500

F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (second alteration in

original) (quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119

(11th Cir. 1999)). A “Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used]

to relitigate old matters, raise argument, or present

evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry

of judgment.” MacPhee v. MiMedx Grp., Inc., 73 F.4th

1220, 1250 (11th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original)

(quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 408

F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)). GME’s motion largely

repeats the same arguments previously made. See

ECF Nos. 63-65, 68-69, 77-78, 82-83, 87.

To the extent GME raises new arguments or cites

historical contentions that it did not reference before,

it has not shown that those arguments were previously

unavailable. See MacPhee, 73 F.4th at 1250; see also

Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1442 (11th Cir. 1998)

(“The purpose of a Rule 59(e) motion is not to raise an

argument that was previously available, but not

pressed.”).

Third, “[r]elief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)

. . . is an extraordinary remedy and requires a showing

of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to justify the reopening

App.45a

of a final judgment.” MacPhee, 73 F.4th at 1251

(quoting Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 628 (11th

Cir. 2014)). GME has not shown any extraordinary

circumstances that would justify relief under Rule

60(b)(6).

In short, GME merely reargues its case and has

not shown any reason to disturb the judgment. A few

additional points, though, are worth mentioning.

First, GME contends the court reached no conclusions

regarding whether the ship was on noncommercial

service. ECF No. 90 at 1 (“The order on summary judgment makes no findings that La Trinité’s activity at

the time it sank was ‘noncommercial.’”); id. at 7 (“The

Court’s Order ignores the condition that the vessel be

in noncommercial service when it sank.”). In fact, the

court’s order concluded that the cited portions of the

summary judgment record showed it undisputed that

the ship was in military noncommercial service. See

ECF No. 88 at 11 (“While GME makes several tangential arguments concerning the broader history of

Ribault’s voyage, it ultimately does not point to any

evidence that contradicts France’s assertion that la

Trinité was ‘on military noncommercial service when

it sank.’”).

Second, GME argues (again) that the Sunken

Military Craft Act (SMCA) does not preclude its statelaw claims. It says “[t]he Court seems to acknowledge

this but fails to directly make this ruling.” ECF No. 90

at 9. Indeed, the court did not explicitly make a ruling

regarding the SMCA’s application to GME’s state-law

claims, concluding “I need not decide that issue because GME’s other claims independently fail on the

merits.” ECF No. 88 at 16; see also id. (“I am doubtful

that the SMCA would reach the state-law claims of

App.46a

unjust enrichment, trade secret misappropriation,

and tortious interference with a business relationship—

even if the ‘gravamen’ or ‘core’ of GME’s claims relate

to the same facts.”). To the extent GME now asks the

court to make a ruling on an issue not necessary to the

resolution of the case, I decline.

Third, regarding the court’s conclusion that

GME’s trade-secret claim fails based on GME’s failure

to take reasonable steps to protect the purportedly

secret information, ECF No. 88 at 20, GME argues

that any “waiver” was not a knowing and voluntary

waiver, ECF No. 90 at 11. It cites two inapposite cases

for the proposition that courts must evaluate the

totality of the circumstances to determine a knowing

waiver. See Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So.2d 850, 861

(Fla. 2007) (holding that Florida’s homestead exemption

cannot be waived and noting that “waivers must be

made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently”); JeanLouis v. Forfeiture of $203,595.00 in U.S. Currency,

767 So.2d 595, 598 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“The instant

case involves appellants’ constitutional right against

deprivation of property without due process of law.

Therefore, consideration of the validity of the waiver

under the totality of circumstances . . . should be

undertaken.” (citations omitted)). But this is not a

waiver issue. The issue is whether GME presented

evidence from which a factfinder could conclude its

information constituted a trade secret, and it did not.

The motion (ECF No. 90) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED on December 15, 2023.

/s/ Allen Winsor

U.S. District Judge

App.47a

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

(SEPTEMBER 29, 2023)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

________________________

GLOBAL MARINE EXPLORATION, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,

Defendant.

________________________

Case No. 4:20-cv-181-AW-MJF

Before: ALLEN WINSOR, U.S. District Judge.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Global Marine Exploration, Inc. (GME), as its

name suggests, is a marine exploration company. Several years ago, it discovered centuries-old shipwrecks off

the coast of Cape Canaveral. Claiming ownership of

the ships and any artifacts, GME brought an in rem

admiralty action. Glob. Marine Expl., Inc. v.

Unidentified, Wrecked & (for Finders-Right Purposes)

Abandoned Sailing Vessel (“GME I”), 348 F. Supp. 3d

App.48a

1221 (M.D. Fla. 2018). France and the Florida Department of State (FDOS) intervened, and the district

court determined that one of the ships was la Trinité,

a sixteenth century vessel that had served as the

flagship of French Captain Jean Ribault’s ill-fated

mission to reinforce France’s colonial presence in

Florida. Id. at 1224-25, 1242.

The fact that the ship GME found was la Trinité

meant it was France’s sovereign property, which in

turn meant the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

Id. at 1225-26. The court dismissed, and GME did not

appeal that decision. Instead, it filed this in personam

action against France. Here, conceding it has no in

rem claim to la Trinité, ECF No. 69 (Resp.) at 20, GME

presents four claims: (1) in personam lien award to

compensate GME for finding la Trinité; (2) “quasi contract/unjust enrichment” to recover the value of services

rendered; (3) trade secret misappropriation; and (4)

tortious interference regarding GME’s relationship

with FDOS. ECF No. 3 (FAC) at 12-20.

This court previously granted France’s motion to

dismiss based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. ECF No. 29 at 3. The

Eleventh Circuit reversed, though, concluding that

the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applied and

that this court therefore had subject-matter jurisdiction.

Glob. Marine Expl., Inc. v. Republic of Fr., 33 F.4th

1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022).

On remand, France has moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 59 (Motion). After a hearing, and having

carefully considered the record and the extensive

briefing, I now conclude France is entitled to summary judgment.

App.49a

BACKGROUND

The facts come from the record, viewing the evidence and making all reasonable inferences in the

light most favorable to GME. Essex Ins. Co. v. Barrett

Moving & Storage, Inc., 885 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.

2018). Under this standard, the “‘facts’, as accepted at

the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may

not be the ‘actual’ facts of the case.” Priester v. City of

Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000).

What follows are the facts as accepted at this stage.

In 2015, GME entered into an authorization

agreement with the FDOS and obtained an exploration

permit. See ECF No. 53-6. GME then discovered five

shipwreck sites off the coast of Cape Canaveral. It

suspected (correctly, as it turned out) that site #2 was

la Trinité.

GME thought it might have found the remains of

Ribault’s fleet. As its authorization agreement required,

GME informed the FDOS and the Florida Division of

Historical Resources (FDHR) about its discovery.

GME submitted a “Notification of Find Report,”

explaining that GME “discovered possibly 2 Bronze

cannon[s]” it believed were of French origin and could

be from Ribault’s expedition. ECF No. 53-9 at 2-3, 8.

GME asked the FDHR to approve a recovery permit

so it could recover the artifacts. Tim Parsons, the

State Historic Preservation Officer, responded to the

request and explained that the FDHR had “reach[ed]

out to the French government” because “[a]s [GME]

pointed out, if these sites belong to Ribault’s fleet they

could be extremely significant to the history of Florida,

and France.” ECF No. 53-10 at 2.

App.50a

In May 2016, GME emailed the French Embassy

to inquire about making an agreement with France if

the ship turned out to be la Trinité. ECF No. 53-12 at

2. In response, the French Embassy issued a Diplomatic

Note stating France’s opposition to “any commercial

exploration on the vessel.” ECF No. 53-4 at 11.

GME then filed a Final Dig & Identify Report and

Request for Rescue Recovery Permit with the FDHR.

ECF No. 53-2. In the report, GME acknowledged that

“France, Spain, England and other countries must be

contacted,” and that “[e]ven though we do not know

what these finds are, there should be an understanding

with France and others.” Id. at 6.

In mid-July 2016, GME followed up on its request

for an FDHR recovery permit. Tim Parsons told GME

that the FDHR needed more information, most

importantly “the coordinates of the archaeological

material and site features.” ECF No. 63 at 5. This was

“not only for [the FDHR]’s potential assessment of the

site, but it [was] also necessary to advance the

discussion with the appropriate French authorities.”

Id. GME explained to Parsons that it omitted the

coordinates because it did not want them to “become

public information” and “GME want[ed] to protect the

site(s).” Id. at 6. Parsons responded and informed

GME that the FDHR was exempt from Florida’s public

records law, so the coordinates would not be publicly

divulged. Id. at 8. GME then provided the specific

coordinates.

On July 21, 2016, GME emailed the French

Embassy’s press officer to confirm France’s position on

salvaging the ship. ECF No. 53-13 at 2-3. The officer

stated that if the vessel “happens to be part of the

Royal fleet then yes [France] want[s] to make sure

App.51a

that no commercial exploitation whatsoever is operated

in any way on what is a piece of cultural heritage.” Id.

at 4. GME responded that it “respect[s] France’s

wishes and the sovereign international law.” Id. at 5.

GME never obtained a recovery permit from the

FDHR. It later filed the in rem action described above.

GME I, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 1223-24. It then filed this

in personam action.

STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the moving

party bears the burden of showing “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it “is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. Pro. 56(c)). France can meet its burden by showing

that GME “has failed to make a sufficient showing on

an essential element of [its] case with respect to which

[it] has the burden of proof.” Id. at 323. If France does

so, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material

fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an

essential element of [GME’s] case necessarily renders

all other facts immaterial.” Id.

DISCUSSION

GME seeks an in personam lien award based on

federal admiralty law. It also advances Florida-law

claims for “quasi contract/unjust enrichment”; trade

secret misappropriation; and interference with rights

and relations. FAC at 12-20. France’s principal argument

is that GME’s claims are all barred by the Sunken

Military Craft Act (SMCA), Pub. L. No. 108-375,

§§ 1401-08, 118 Stat. 1811, 2094-98 (2004). Motion at

18. That law provides that “[n]o salvage rights or

App.52a

awards shall be granted with respect to . . . any foreign

sunken military craft located in United States waters

without the express permission of the relevant foreign

state.” Id. § 1406(d)(2). In France’s view, this statute

precludes not only GME’s federal admiralty claim but

also all other claims because the Eleventh Circuit

concluded the “gravamen” and “core” of GME’s claims

are “France’s failure to compensate GME for the value

of GME’s salvage services.” Motion at 3 (quoting Glob.

Marine Expl., Inc., 33 F.4th at 1324-25); see also id. at

20. GME offers two responses. It says first that the

SMCA applies only to in rem actions. It alternatively

argues that if the SMCA applies, there is a disputed

fact about whether la Trinité was a “foreign sunken

military craft.”

The SMCA’s Application is Not Limited to In Rem

Actions.

First, GME argues that the SMCA does not apply

to in personam actions. Resp. at 17. But that is inconsistent with both the statute’s text and general

principles of salvage law. The text makes no distinction

between in personam and in rem actions. It prohibits

granting “salvage rights or awards.” § 1406(d). And

salvage rights or awards can be granted in an in rem

or an in personam action. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v.

Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,

640 F.2d 560, 567 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[A] salvor may

assert his right to a salvage award either in an in rem

proceeding against the salved vessel or cargo or in an

in personam proceeding against the owner of the

salved property.”); see also 3A Benedict on Admiralty

§ 288 (2023) (“Generally, a suit for a salvage award is

one brought in rem against the ship. . . . The salvor

also has his remedy in personam against the owners

App.53a

of the salved property. . . . ”).1 In fact, the Supreme

Court recognized that plaintiffs could bring in rem or

in personam salvage award suits as early as 1879. See

The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 386 (1879). Against this

historical backdrop, there is no indication that Congress

chose to limit the SMCA’s application solely to in rem

actions. It follows that the SMCA applies to bar

salvage award claims whether in rem or in personam.

In arguing otherwise, GME points to language

from § 1402(a), which generally prohibits engaging in

“activity directed at a sunken military craft that

disturbs, removes, or injures any sunken military

craft.” Resp. at 19. But as France notes, § 1402 is a

separate provision that deals with the disruption of

sunken military crafts. ECF No. 71 at 3. It is enforced

by penalties in § 1404 and § 1405. In contrast,

§ 1406(d)’s broad prohibition against salvage awards

falls under a heading titled “Relationship to Other

Laws” and does not reference any of the proceeding

sections. Thus, § 1402(a) should not be read to limit

§ 1406(d).

La Trinité is a Foreign Sunken Military Craft, and

the SMCA Precludes GME’s Claim for a Salvage

Lien.

GME next argues that even if the statute applies

to in personam actions, it does not apply here because

la Trinité is not a “sunken military craft,” which the

SMCA defines as “any sunken warship, naval auxiliary,

or other vessel that was owned or operated by a gov1 Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981 are binding

precedent. See Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209

(11th Cir. 1981).

App.54a

ernment on military noncommercial service when it

sank.” § 1408(3)(A). France disagrees, arguing first

that the issue was resolved in GME I and second that

the summary-judgment record shows indisputably

that la Trinité was, in fact, a “sunken military craft.”

France is wrong on the first point but right on the

second.

France focuses much of its argument on collateral

estoppel. It contends that “it is res judicata and a

matter of collateral estoppel that la Trinité was both

a warship of France and a vessel owned and operated

by France in military non-commercial service at the

time of sinking.” Motion at 5 (citing GME I, 348 F.

Supp. 3d at 1242-43).2 But in GME I, the court had no

reason to decide whether la Trinité was a military

craft or some other craft. It was “undisputed that la

Trinité is the sovereign property of the Republic of

France.” 348 F. Supp. 3d at 1242. The “lone issue” was

whether the ship GME found was la Trinité. Id. at

1228. The court concluded it was, and it dismissed the

claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

It is true that in its detailed historical findings,

the court concluded la Trinité was a military vessel,

but this was not a necessary part of the claim that was

“actually litigated.” See In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d

672, 676 (11th Cir. 1993), as corrected on reh’g (June

22, 1993) (noting that for issue preclusion to apply, the

2 As France acknowledged at the hearing, claim preclusion

would not apply here because the GME I was dismissed for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction and therefore was not an adjudication on the merits. Rough Trans. at 34; see also Davila v. Delta

Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that

jurisdictional dismissals cannot support claim preclusion). But

issue preclusion can still apply in these circumstances.

App.55a

issue must have been “actually litigated in the prior

proceeding” and that “the prior determination of the

issue must have been a critical and necessary part of

the judgment in the earlier decision”); see also B & B

Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138,

148 (2015). Because la Trinité’s status as a military

vessel was not essential to, or actually litigated in,

GME I, it cannot have a preclusive effect in this case.

France alternatively argues that the summaryjudgment record shows la Trinité is a “sunken military

craft.” As noted above, the statute defines the term to

include “any sunken . . . vessel that was owned or

operated by a government on military noncommercial

service when it sank.” § 1408(3)(A). All agree that la

Trinité is a sunken vessel that was owned by France.

The question is whether it was “on military noncommercial service when it sank.” On this point, France

met its initial summary-judgment burden.3

France’s historian, Dr. Frank Lestringant, states

in his declaration that after Ribault arrived in Florida,

the French had a close encounter with Pedro Menéndez

3 France contends that the historical evidence relied upon by

GME I to determine the vessel was la Trinité also supports that

la Trinité was on military noncommercial service when it sank.

ECF No. 71 (Reply) at 5. France has provided that same evidence

here and supplemented its Reply brief with two declarations

referenced in GME I. The declaration from Dr. Frank Lestringant,

ECF No. 71-5, consists of the sixteenth century French reports

and documents about la Trinité that GME I cited. See ECF No.

71-1 ¶ 9. The declaration from Dr. James Delgado, ECF No. 716, contains the 16th century Spanish reports about la Trinité

that GME I cited. See ECF No. 71-1 ¶ 9.

App.56a

de Aviles’s Spanish fleet. ECF No. 71-5 at 16.4

Menéndez, a Spanish captain, had been ordered by

Spain to pursue Ribault and to eliminate Fort Caroline,

France’s nascent colony in Florida. Id. at 15-16.

“During the night of September 4, 1565, the warships

of the Menéndez fleet approached the Ribault warships

anchored offshore, but the Ribault warships cut their

anchor cables and sailed away.” Id. at 16. Alerted to

the Spanish threat and Menéndez’s hostile intentions,

Ribault sent a ship to follow the Spanish. Id. He

learned that Menéndez was setting up a base along

the St. Augustine Inlet to the south. Id. After docking

at Fort Caroline, “Ribault decided to attack Menéndez

at St. Augustine Inlet and began preparing to sail

with la Trinité and three of his other larger ships.” Id.

He supplemented the strength of this expedition with

additional “soldiers from the Fort Caroline garrison.”

Id. “On September 8, 1565, the Ribault warships left

their anchorage and sailed south to attack Menéndez

at St. Augustine Inlet.” Id. On its way to attack the

Spanish, la Trinité was caught in a massive hurricane

and sank along with the rest of the French fleet. Id.

France’s evidence thus asserts that la Trinité

sank while on a military mission to attack Menéndez’s

Spanish forces. This falls within the SMCA definition

of “military noncommercial service.” § 1408(3)(A). To

avoid summary judgment on Count One, then, GME

4 This evidence was submitted with France’s reply. At GME’s

request, the court allowed a surreply so that GME could respond

with its own evidence, which it did. The court thus had the benefit

of extensive briefing and multiple evidentiary submissions from

both parties. ECF Nos. 59, 69, 71, 78. The court then held a hearing

and permitted both parties to file additional briefing afterward.

ECF Nos. 84, 87.

App.57a

had to present evidence from which a reasonable

factfinder could conclude otherwise. While GME makes

several tangential arguments concerning the broader

history of Ribault’s voyage, it ultimately does not point

to any evidence that contradicts France’s assertion that

la Trinité was “on military noncommercial service

when it sank.” § 1408(3)(A).

GME contends that la Trinité was a cargo ship,

not a military ship, and that Ribault’s mission to reinforce Fort Caroline was one of civilian resupply. Resp.

at 4, 24. It cites the verified statements of Dr. Robert

Baer and Dr. Lubos Kordac, which say as much. Dr.

Kordac writes, “[la Trinité] was not any military ship,

[it] was a cargo ship, bringing supplies, civilians and

money to the new French colony.” ECF No. 65 at 3.

But for SMCA purposes, whether la Trinité was a

cargo ship or a “military ship” is of no consequence.

The Act covers “any sunken warship, naval auxiliary,

or other vessel that was owned or operated by a government on military noncommercial service when it

sank.” § 1408(3)(A) (emphasis added). Similarly, the

overall purpose of Ribault’s mission is irrelevant;

what matters is whether la Trinité was “on military

noncommercial service.” § 1408(3)(A). In this regard,

neither Dr. Baer’s nor Dr. Kodac’s declaration contradicts

France’s evidence that la Trinité sank while on a

mission to attack the Spanish fleet. See ECF Nos. 64,

65.

Dr. Baer’s initial statement calls into question

the existence of a French Royal Navy in 1565 and

asserts that “the French Huguenot vessels, although

armed with cannons for self-protection, were not

‘Naval’ vessels or ‘Crown’ vessels, they were cargo

vessels on a re-supply mission to the Huguenot colony

App.58a

on the Atlantic Coast of present north Florida.” ECF

No. 64 at 3-4; accord id. (“During the civil wars after

1560, the French Navy disappeared for all practical

purposes. French maritime exploits of this period . . .

were organized along private or quasi-private lines.”).

Baer’s statement squares with France’s evidence that

Ribault’s fleet sailed to Fort Caroline to provide

supplies and reinforcements. Baer’s statement does

not discuss the circumstances surrounding la Trinité’s

sinking, so it does not contradict France’s evidence

that la Trinité sank while sailing to the St. Augustine

Inlet to attack the Spanish. It therefore does not

create a dispute of material fact over la Trinité’s

military noncommercial service.

Dr. Kordac’s statement says Spain and France

were not at war when la Trinité sank. ECF No. 65 at

3. This too is consistent with France’s evidence, which

shows France and Spain were competing to colonize

Florida and makes no mention of their being at war.

Kordac also acknowledges that Menéndez “attacked

and destroyed Fort Caroline,” admitting that while

France and Spain might not have been formally at

war, there remained a threat of conflict between the

two nations. Kordac states that la Trinité sank because of a hurricane, not because of “a naval encounter

with [Menéndez’s] Spanish war fleet.” Id. This is also

consistent with France’s evidence. And it is also

immaterial. A “sunken military craft” need not sink

during a naval encounter—or because of combat.

Kordac does not specifically address where la Trinité

was or what it was doing when it sank, so it does not

meaningfully contradict France’s evidence.

In its surreply, GME makes additional arguments

that la Trinité was not performing military noncom-

App.59a

mercial services when it sank. ECF No. 78 at 3.

Relying heavily on historian John McGrath’s work,

The French in Early Florida: in the Eye of the

Hurricane, GME contends that “the only Crownsanctioned purpose for La Trinité’s voyage was [the]

commercial transportation of people and cargo.”5 Id.

At 3-6 (emphasis added). GME also presents the declarations of French historian Emmanuelle Lizé and

archeologist James Sinclair to support the contention

that Ribault’s attack on the Spanish was not “Crown

sanctioned.”6 Lizé concludes that “[t]he King of France

permitted Ribault’s 1565 journey only to transport

Protestant dissenters to Fort Caroline; any war activities

5 While repeatedly citing McGrath’s historical analysis to support its argument that Ribault’s mission was commercial, GME

omits McGrath’s conclusion about the nature of the voyage:

It is difficult to conclude on the basis of this evidence

that, by the time the French sailed, this was merely a

civilian reinforcement intended to augment the

workforce in Florida and establish “effective settlement.” Whatever the composition of this fleet had

been originally, by May it had become a heavily armed

mission of war, intent upon defending Fort Caroline

from an anticipated Spanish attack.

ECF No. 77-1 at 25. (GME cites this same page for other purposes.)

6 Lizé’s declaration includes no citations but attaches some 200

pages of source materials, largely in French. Parties must cite

“particular parts of materials in the record” to support factual

assertions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). And “[t]he court need

consider only the cited materials.” Id. 56(c)(3). In my discretion,

I have declined to consider evidence that is not pinpoint cited in

the parties’ documents, except as otherwise addressed in this

order. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 56.1(F). I have also not considered

any untranslated materials.

App.60a

were prohibited.” Id. at 9 (summarizing Lizé statement). Sinclair echoes this finding, writing “La Trinité

was a state-sanctioned voyage permitted [sic] only the

transport of families, farmers, and food to Fort Caroline.”

ECF No. 77-4 ¶ 6. Ultimately though, this analysis

misses the point. Even if Ribault lacked the King’s

permission to engage in war, and even if the mission

included shipping Protestants, what matters is what

la Trinité was doing when it sank. Sinclair asserts

that “[La Trinité] sank in a hurricane, not because of

a military attack or engagement.” Id. ¶ 19. But, as

explained with Dr. Kordac’s similar assertion above,

this is in accord with France’s evidence. Nothing in the

declarations of McGrath, Lizé, or Sinclair contradicts

France’s evidence that the la Trinité sank while on a

mission to attack Menéndez’s forces. See ECF Nos. 771, 77-3, 77-4, and 78.

GME does offer evidence directly contradicting

some of Dr. Lestringant’s historical assertions, but

only on immaterial points. For example, relying on

historian Charles Bennett’s work, GME contends

Lestringant was wrong to conclude that the French

King sent a different French captain to avenge the

Spanish destruction of Fort Caroline after la Trinité’s

sinking. Id. at 6-7. Lizé’s declaration pushes back on

Lestringant’s positions that la Trinité was a warship

and that Ribault’s voyage from France to Florida was

ordered by the King as a “military exercise.” Id. at 2,

8. But none of this contradicts Lestringant’s assertion

that la Trinité sank while sailing to attack the

Spanish.

Because GME points to no evidence contradicting

the contention that la Trinité sank while on a mission

to attack the Spanish fleet, it has not disputed

App.61a

France’s showing that the ship was on “military

noncommercial military service when it sank.”

§ 1408(3)(A).

***

France has presented sufficient uncontested evidence to establish la Trinité sank while on military

noncommercial service, meaning la Trinité is a “sunken

military craft” under the SMCA. GME may not obtain

a salvage award from France, so GME’s Count One,

which asserts entitlement “to a salvage and/or maritime

lien,” FAC ¶ 39, cannot succeed.

France contends that the SMCA should bar all

GME’s claims. ECF No. 59 at 18. I am doubtful that

the SMCA would reach the state-law claims of unjust

enrichment, trade secret misappropriation, and tortious

interference with a business relationship—even if the

“gravamen” or “core” of GME’s claims relate to the

same facts. But I need not decide that issue because

GME’s other claims independently fail on the merits.

France is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the

“Quasi Contract/Unjust Enrichment” Claim.

GME’s next claim is for “quasi contract/unjust

enrichment.”7 FAC at 13-14. Under Florida law,

7 The complaint alleges GME can “enforce a claim for unjust

enrichment or quantum meruit against France, i.e., by contract

implied at law.” FAC ¶ 47. This conflates unjust enrichment and

quantum meruit claims. The “remedy of quantum meruit derives

from contracts implied in fact,” while an unjust enrichment claim

derives from a contract implied at law. Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT

Utensili, SRL, 198 F.3d 802, 806 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1999) (cleaned

up) (applying Florida law). As France notes (Motion at 25), to the

extent GME intended to raise a quantum meruit claim, it cannot

succeed because the parties did not have any sort of agreement.

App.62a

unjust enrichment claims “prevent the wrongful

retention of a benefit, or the retention of money or

property of another in violation of good conscience and

fundamental principles of justice or equity.” Marrache

v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1101 (11th Cir.

2021) (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Silver

Star Health & Rehab., 739 F.3d 579, 584 (11th Cir.

2013)). For an unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff

must show “(1) [he] has conferred a benefit on the

defendant, who has knowledge thereof; (2) the defendant

has voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit

conferred; and (3) the circumstances are such that it

would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the

benefit without paying the value thereof.” Tooltrend,

Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL, 198 F.3d 802, 805 (11th

Cir. 1999) (citing Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc., 705

So.2d 926, 930-31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)); see also

Pincus v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 333 So.3d 1095, 1097

(Fla. 2022).

GME contends France unjustly benefited from

GME’s efforts to discover, photograph, and locate

France’s property (la Trinité). Resp. at 26-27. But

Id. at 806 (explaining that quantum meruit is a remedy for contracts implied in fact, meaning contracts where “the parties have

in fact entered into an agreement but without sufficient clarity”);

see also Com. P’ship 8098 Ltd. P’ship v. Equity Contracting Co.,

695 So.2d 383, 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (en banc) (“[A] common

form of contract implied in fact is where one party has performed

services at the request of another without discussion of compensation. These circumstances justify the inference of a promise to

pay a reasonable amount for the service. . . . [By contrast], where

there is no enforceable express or implied in fact contract but

where the defendant has received something of value, or has

otherwise benefitted from the service supplied, recovery under a

quasi contractual theory may be appropriate.” (citation omitted)).

App.63a

Florida courts hold that “[w]here unjust enrichment is

asserted, a party is liable for services rendered only

when he requests the other party to perform the

services or knowingly and voluntarily accepts their

benefits.” Coffee Pot Plaza P’ship v. Arrow Air

Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc., 412 So.2d 883, 884

(Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (citing Nursing Care Servs. v.

Dobos, 380 So.2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)). France

never requested GME’s services. Likewise, France did

not knowingly and voluntarily accept the benefits of

GME’s services because “it did not come into control

of [la Trinité] until after [GME] had completed the

work.” Id.; see also id. (explaining that landlord had

not knowingly and voluntarily accepted the benefit of

refrigerator repairs that former tenant hired defendant

to perform because landlord repossessed apartment

and refrigerator after defendant completed the work).

E & M Marine Corp. v. First Union Nat’l Bank,

783 So.2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), is analogous. The

plaintiff salvaged a sunken boat and repaired its

electrical system. Id. at 312. The boat’s owner never

paid for the repairs and defaulted on her secured loan.

Id. After the lender repossessed the boat, the plaintiff

sued it for unjust enrichment. Id. But there was no

claim because the lender neither requested the plaintiff’s

services nor knowingly accepted the benefit of the

services:

First Union did not request that E & M

Marine repair the vessel. The engine repairs

were made before [the owner] had defaulted

on the loan and First Union had any right to

seek possession. First Union had no knowledge

of the vessel’s whereabouts until more than

three months after E & M Marine salvaged

App.64a

the vessel and made the electrical repairs.

First Union only gained control of the vessel

because it was forced to repossess it after

[the owner] defaulted on the loan. . . . First

Union did not knowingly and voluntarily

accept the benefit of E & M Marine’s repairs.

Consequently, E & M cannot recover due to

unjust enrichment.

Id. at 312-13 (citing Coffee Pot, 412 So.2d at 884).

Here, GME alleges it discovered la Trinité in 2016

and conducted “prolonged and expensive research,

survey, reporting, and identification of shipwrecked

sites and artifacts and contents.” FAC ¶ 11. In May

2016, GME contacted France about the discovery, and

France refused GME’s salvage services. ECF No. 53-4

at 11. The evidence shows—and GME counsel confirmed

at the hearing—that all services for which GME seeks

compensation came before France ever received any

benefit. Thus, GME has pointed to no evidence that

France knowingly accepted any benefit.8

France is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Claim.

Next, GME claims France misappropriated GME’s

trade secret in violation of the Florida Uniform Trade

Secrets Act (FUTSA). FAC at 14-17. To succeed, GME

“must show that ‘(1) it possessed a ‘trade secret’ and

(2) the secret was misappropriated.’” Fin. Info. Tech.,

LLC v. iControl Sys, USA, LLC, 21 F.4th 1267, 1273

(11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v.

8 Separately, GME has not shown “how it would be ‘inequitable’

for [France] to retain the benefit [it] received.” Marrache, 17

F.4th at 1102.

App.65a

Barker Boatworks, LLC, 898 F.3d 1279, 1279 (11th

Cir. 2018)). A “trade secret” is

information, including a formula pattern,

compilation, program, device, method,

technique, or process that:

(a) Derives independent economic value, actual

or potential, from not being generally known

to, and not being readily ascertainable by

proper means by, other persons who can

obtain economic value from its disclosure or

use; and

(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable

under the circumstances to maintain its

secrecy.

Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 688.002(4)). And “[m]isappropriation occurs when a trade secret is acquired

‘by someone who knows or has reason to know that

the secret was improperly obtained or who used

improper means to obtain it.’” Id. (quoting Yellowfin

Yachts, 898 F.3d at 1297).

GME claims the GPS coordinate information for

the shipwreck sites was a trade secret. FAC ¶ 57.

France argues GME made this information readily

ascertainable by publicly filing Exhibit 1 (ECF No. 31) in this case and in GME I. Motion at 16-17. Exhibit

1 is a photographic map with the various shipwreck

sites, and it has an arrow pointing to the location of la

Trinité’s bronze cannon and monument. ECF No. 3-1.

GME rejects that argument and insists the map only

shows the general location of the shipwrecks and lacks

the “precise pinpoint coordinates necessary to locate

specific artifacts,” or the precise pinpoint coordinates

App.66a

for the shipwrecks, so it did not publicly disseminate

its confidential information. Resp. at 30.

Regardless of whether the location was disclosed

or not, GME fails to show that the GPS coordinate

information qualifies as a trade secret because there

is no evidence that GME took reasonable efforts to

protect the information. After GME requested a

recovery permit, the FDHR informed GME that it

needed to provide the GPS coordinates for the shipwreck

sites so the FDHR could assess the sites and advance

discussions with France. ECF No. 63 at 5. GME told

the FDHR that it did not want the GPS coordinates to

be made public, and the FDHR responded that the

information was exempt from public records disclosure.

Id. GME then turned over the coordinates. It did so

without giving the FDHR any instructions about how

to protect the information. Essentially, all GME did to

protect its information was tell the FDHR that it

didn’t want the coordinates to be publicly divulged.

That is not enough. See Yellowfin Yachts, 898 F.3d at

1300-01 (upholding district court’s determination that

reasonable efforts were not made because “Yellowfin’s

efforts to secure [its confidential information] rest[ed]

upon a purported ‘implicit understanding’ between

Yellowfin and Barker that the information was to be

kept confidential,” and “Yellowfin relinquished the

information to Barker, who refused to sign a confidentiality agreement, with no instruction to him as to how

to secure the information on his cellphone or personal

laptop”). GME “effectively abandoned all oversight in

the security of the” GPS coordinate information, and

thus “no reasonable jury could find that [GME]

employed reasonable efforts to secure the informa-

App.67a

tion.”9 Id. at 1300-01. That means GME has not established that the GPS coordinates are a trade secret,

and France is entitled to summary judgment.

France is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the

Interference with Rights and Relations Claim.

GME alleges France tortiously interfered with

GME’s rights and relations with the Florida Department

of State. Resp. at 31; see also FAC ¶ 72. According to

GME, after it provided the shipwrecks’ pinpoint

coordinates to the FDHR, France joined forces with

the FDOS to recover all the shipwreck sites. Resp. at

32. GME says it had to “act[] quickly to protect its

interests,” so GME arrested site #2 and brought an in

rem admiralty claim, which prompted the FDOS to

refuse to grant GME a recovery permit. Id. at 31-32.

GME insists that “[h]ad France not interfered with

GME and [Florida’s] relationship, GME would not

have needed to arrest the ship and there would be no

reason for the State to reconsider the recovery permit.”

Id.

To prove France tortiously interfered with the

business relationship between GME and the FDOS,

GME must show “(1) the existence of a business relationship; (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part

of the defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified

interference with the relationship by the defendant;

and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the

breach of the relationship.” Duty Free Ams., Inc. v.

9 GME says—without elaborating—that “France received GME’s

confidential information under a duty to maintain its confidentiality.”

Resp. at 29. It does not explain how this argument saves the

claim from summary judgment.

App.68a

Estee Lauder Cos., 797 F.3d 1248, 1279 (11th Cir.

2015) (quoting Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor,

Inc., 647 So.2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994)).

GME’s claim fails on the third element, that “the

defendant acted without justification.” Id. at 1280

(quoting Sec. Title Guarantee Corp. of Balt. v. McDill

Columbus Corp., 543 So.2d 852, 855 (Fla. 1st DCA

1989)). Florida law “recognizes a ‘privilege of interference,’” which France invokes here. Id. (quoting

Wackenhut Corp. v. Maimone, 389 So.2d 656, 657-58

(Fla. 1st DCA 1980)). France explains that it invoked

its ownership and sovereign immunity over la Trinité,

as permitted by the privilege of interference. Motion

at 29-30. Thus, France’s “interference to protect its

economic interests is privileged unless [GME] alleges

a ‘purely malicious motive’ divorced from any ‘legitimate

competitive economic interest.’” Duty Free, 797 F.3d

at 1280 (quoting Heavener, Ogier Servs., Inc. v. R.W.

Fla. Region, Inc., 418 So.2d 1074, 1077 (Fla. 5th DCA

1982)). And GME has not met its burden to do so.

In fact, GME does not address France’s argument

that the privilege of interference protects France’s

actions. Instead, GME seems to suggest that France

improperly interfered by laying claim to all of the

shipwreck sites, instead of just la Trinité’s site.

France’s Declaration of Intent stated its plans to work

with FDOS to protect all of the shipwreck sites, and

GME argues “France had no basis to justify its claim

to the other shipwreck sites.” Resp. at 32-33. According

to GME, “[n]othing in the reports of discoveries gave

any indication those sites were of French origin.” Id.

at 33. Yet GME provides no citation to these reports

and points to no evidence showing how France acted

App.69a

with a “purely malicious motive” when it asserted its

claim to these sites.

GME Had Sufficient Opportunity for Discovery.

Finally, GME asserts that summary judgment

should not be granted before GME has had sufficient

opportunity for discovery. ECF No. 69 at 34. But the

parties had months for discovery, and the court’s

earlier limitation on discovery allowed discovery on all

issues raised in France’s summary-judgment motion.

ECF No. 60. On these issues, the parties have collectively assembled a record of well over a thousand pages

of historical documents and expert opinion. GME has

not explained what additional discovery it would seek

or why it did not have adequate time to seek it

already. It has thus not made any showing consistent

with Rule 56(d).

The court allowed a surreply and additional evidence, along with post-hearing briefing. In short, GME

has had an adequate opportunity for discovery. See

Jones v. City of Columbus, 120 F.3d 248, 253 (11th Cir.

1997).

App.70a

CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 59)

is GRANTED. The clerk will enter judgment that

says, “This case was resolved on a motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed on the merits,

and Plaintiff shall take nothing.” The clerk will then

close the file.

SO ORDERED on September 29, 2023.

/s/ Allen Winsor

U.S. District Judge

App.71a

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

REHEARING EN BANC, U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

(OCTOBER 6, 2025)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

GLOBAL MARINE EXPLORATION, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,

Defendant-Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor.

________________________

No. 24-10148

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00181-AW-MJF

Before: WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge,

and LUCK and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

App.72a

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION

FOR REHEARING EN BANC

PER CURIAM:

The Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED,

no judge in regular active service on the Court having

requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en

banc. FRAP 40. The Petition for Panel Rehearing also

is DENIED. FRAP 40.

App.73a

OPINION, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

(MAY 12, 2022)

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

GLOBAL MARINE EXPLORATION, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

No. 20-14728

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00181-AW-MJF

Before: LAGOA, BRASHER, and TJOFLAT,

Circuit Judges.

LAGOA, Circuit Judge:

This case arises out of the discovery of several

shipwrecks found off the coast of Cape Canaveral,

Florida, including La Trinité, the flagship of the 1565

fleet of the Royal Navy of France, which was captained

by Jean Ribault. In 1565, Ribault was dispatched by

the French Admiral Gaspard II de Coligny to reinforce

App.74a

the French Huguenot settlement of Fort Caroline

located on the St. Johns River near what is now

Jacksonville, Florida. The Spanish, however, also laid

claim to what they called La Florida, and Pedro

Menéndez de Avilés had founded the Spanish settlement

of St. Augustine near the French Fort Caroline. King

Phillip II of Spain ordered Menéndez de Avilés to

destroy the French settlement. Following a skirmish

at the mouth of the St. Johns River with Spanish

ships, Ribault left in pursuit of the Spanish flagship,

the San Pelayo. Ribault encountered a hurricane

which destroyed his fleet and drove Ribault and his

surviving crew members ashore. That same hurricane

allowed Menéndez de Avilés to succeed in capturing

Fort Caroline after an overland expedition from St.

Augustine. After Fort Caroline was destroyed, no further French settlements were established in Florida.

Global Marine Exploration, Inc. (“GME”), conducts

marine salvage activities and discovers historic shipwreck sites in Florida’s coastal waters. GME entered

into authorization agreements with the Florida Department of State, Division of Historical Resources

(“FDOS”), to conduct salvage activities in Florida

coastal waters off Cape Canaveral. Following a 2015

agreement between GME and FDOS, GME discovered

several shipwreck sites and informed FDOS of its

discovery. Soon after, however, GME learned that

FDOS was in contact with the Republic of France to

recover the shipwreck sites, assuming that one of the

sites was La Trinité. GME subsequently filed an in

rem admiralty action against the “Unidentified, Wrecked

and (for Finders-Right Purposes) Abandoned Sailing

Vessel” in federal court. FDOS and France became

parties to that action, and the Middle District of Florida

App.75a

concluded that the identity of the res was La Trinité

and that La Trinité is France’s sovereign property.

GME did not appeal the in rem action. See Glob.

Marine Expl., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & (for

Finders-Right Purposes) Abandoned Sailing Vessel

(“GME I”), 348 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (M.D. Fla. 2018).

Following GME I, GME sued France, alleging

claims for an in personam lien award, unjust enrichment,

misappropriation of trade secret information, and

interference with its rights and relations. France

moved to dismiss GME’s amended complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that

the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”),

28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11, and that the commercial activity

exception to the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), was

inapplicable. The district court agreed with France,

finding that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception

did not apply, and dismissed GME’s claims. GME now

appeals the district court’s dismissal, contending that

France engaged in commercial activity such that the

FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies.

For the reasons discussed below, and with the

benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the FSIA’s

commercial activity exception applies. Accordingly, we

reverse the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal and

remand for further proceedings.

I.

Factual and Procedural Background

GME is a Florida corporation that conducts marine

salvage activities and discovers historic shipwreck

sites in Florida’s coastal waters. GME conducts its

salvage activities under authorization agreements

with FDOS. In these agreements, Florida granted

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GME a fixed-term “cultural resource recovery easement

for salvage exploration and operational purposes” on

Florida-owned submerged lands, as well as permits

for GME to use those submerged lands and navigable

waters for construction work. GME then “undertook

prolonged and expensive research, survey, reporting,

and identification of shipwrecked sites,” including

artifacts, “with reasonable investment-backed expectation[s] and program assurances that its salvage

activity” would be fully compensated in line with the

value of the discovered sites. In doing so, “GME

expended millions of dollars and enormous time and

effort.”

In 2014, FDOS and GME entered into six

agreements governing salvage activity for six different,

three-square mile areas off the coast of Cape Canaveral.

On August 14, 2015, FDOS and GME entered into a

seventh agreement—designated as Permit No. 201503—authorizing GME to survey another designated

three-square mile area off Cape Canaveral and to locate

and report any shipwreck sites discovered. GME discovered five separate shipwrecks and six historic

shipwreck sites in this designated area, and GME’s

mapped conclusions of the area were provided as part

of its report and request to FDOS for approval to proceed with recovery. GME also excavated small artifact

items (and took photos and videos as identification

of other monuments) from one of the shipwreck sites.

GME provided FDOS with the photos and videos. And

FDOS directed GME to submit the location coordinate

information incident to the agency’s oversight and

inventory of historical resources division. According to

GME, the coordinate information would remain confidential and would be commercially used only by GME.

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At some point, GME learned that FDOS was

“collaborating and negotiating” with France to recover

the shipwreck sites discovered by GME without its

involvement, as FDOS and France believed that the

shipwreck was France’s La Trinité—the flagship of

the 1565 fleet of the Royal Navy of France that sank

during a hurricane off the coast of Florida. Concerned

by this development, GME filed the in rem admiralty

action—GME I—in September 2016, and FDOS and

France became parties to that action. See 348 F. Supp.

3d at 1224. In connection with filing that in rem

action, GME deposited with the district court several

small artifacts (e.g., ballast stones) from the site.

The next month, FDOS demanded GME turn over

those same artifacts to it, suspended GME’s salvage

activity permit, and prohibited GME from proceeding

with full recovery of the discovered shipwreck sites.

The GME I district court later conferred temporary in

rem custody to FDOS and precluded any shipwreck

recovery pending its decision. Ultimately, the GME I

district court granted France’s motion to dismiss the

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because

it concluded that the res at issue was La Trinité, which

was France’s sovereign property. See id. at 1242. GME

did not appeal that order.

Following GME I, France and FDOS entered into

a “Declaration of Intention Between the State of

Florida and the Republic of France On the shipwrecks

of Jean Ribault’s fleet”(the “Declaration of Intent”).

The Declaration of Intent stated that, as a result of

the district court’s decision in GME I, France was

authorized “to begin recovery operations” of La Trinité

and that the signatories would cooperate “concerning

research on, and protection and preservation of” La

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Trinité. FDOS and France further agreed to: protect

the shipwreck sites “to prevent any form of plundering”;

recover the shipwreck sites and present those discoveries

to the public in Florida, e.g., through exhibitions or

publications; (3) promote the common history of the

United States and France in Florida; and (4) identify,

evaluate, mobilize, and oversee resources and organizations to fulfill the Declaration of Intent’s objectives.

The Declaration of Intent also established a steering

committee to implement the agreement.

In April 2020, GME sued France, alleging that

“France is sending missions to Florida to oversee the

project and provide scientific expertise” under the

Declaration of Intent and that “work is on-going.”

GME also asserted that France was performing

commercial activity in Florida through France’s

agreement with FDOS and others, “and by activities

undertaken or to be undertaken, in relation to GME’s

discovered shipwreck sites for which GME claims

rights and interest.”

GME asserted four claims against France: (1) an

in personam salvage lien; (2) “quasi contract/unjust

enrichment”; (3) misappropriation of GME’s trade

secret information; and (4) interference with GME’s

rights and relations. As to its lien claim, GME alleged

that it was entitled to compensation because without

GME’s services the shipwreck sites would not have

been discovered and therefore GME’s services

significantly benefit any “full recovery of the historic

shipwreck sites.” In its count for unjust enrichment,

GME asserted that it had conferred a substantial

benefit to France based on its services related to the

shipwreck sites. As to its misappropriation of trade

secret claim, GME alleged that “[t]he precise locations

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of GME’s discovered shipwreck sites and the methods

used to identify those locations were proprietary and

confidential information owned by GME” and that

France’s use of that information was unauthorized

and without GME’s consent. And, as to its interference

claim, GME alleged that France knew of GME’s contractual rights and advantageous business and contractual relations with FDOS but intentionally acted

to influence, induce, and collaborate with FDOS for

the latter to abrogate its obligations to, and relations

with, GME.

France moved to dismiss GME’s amended complaint

under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that the district court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and

that GME failed to show that the commercial activity

exception to the FSIA applied. In particular, France

contended that the core conduct at issue was its “intergovernmental cooperation for the historic preservation

of [its] military vessel,” which was manifestly a governmental function. France submitted a declaration

from Florence Hermite, a “Magistrat de Liaison –

Legal Attaché,” who attested that France entered into

the Declaration of Intent under the Heritage Code of

France Section L522-1, which provides, as translated

into English, that France “prescribes measures aimed

at the detection, conservation of safeguarding by

scientific study of the heritage archaeological, designates the scientific manager of any preventative archeology operation and carries out control and evaluation

missions for these operations.”

The district court granted France’s motion to

dismiss. The district court explained that the commercial

activity exception had three components: whether “(1)

the action is based upon (2) a commercial activity (3)

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carried on in the United States by a foreign state.” The

district court concluded that the action at issue was

“France’s intergovernmental declaration with Florida—

and its overall relationship with Florida regarding the

shipwreck sites,” which “lack[ed] . . . a commercial

nature” because France was not involved in “the type

of actions by which a private party engages in trade

and traffic or commerce.” While noting that private

actors sometimes engage in marine exploration and

shipwreck recovery and preservation efforts, the district

court reasoned “that alone did not make France’s

activities commercial.” The district court explained

that “the nature of France’s activity is the recovery

and disposition of its own sovereign military property”

and that its choice to recover or preserve the property

was not like “entering a market and behaving as a

private person would.” The district court noted that

the Declaration of Intent, signed by government

actors, showed that France and FDOS were working

together to protect and preserve La Trinité and that,

as such, France had not entered the market or

engaged in trade or commerce.

The district court also concluded that, even if

France’s activities were commercial in nature, GME’s

claims against France were not “based upon” those

activities. The district court determined that “the

foundation” for GME’s alleged injuries was not France’s

intergovernmental declaration with Florida or activities

related to that declaration, i.e., GME was not injured

by the fact that France sought to preserve its culture

or recover its shipwreck’s artifacts. Rather, the district

court reasoned GME’s injuries were based upon the

fact that France took ownership of La Trinité, which

occurred in GME I, and that GME could not claim

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ownership of the res. The district court therefore

concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under

the FSIA.

This timely appeal ensued.

II. Standard of Review

“When evaluating a district court’s conclusions on

a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, ‘[w]e review the district court’s

legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for

clear error.’” Odyssey Marine Expl., Inc. v. Unidentified

Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir.

2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Carmichael v.

Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271,

1279 (11th Cir. 2009)). And we review de novo a

district court’s determination of whether it had jurisdiction under the FSIA. Devengoechea v. Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela, 889 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir.

2018).

III. Analysis

On appeal, GME argues that the district court

erred in dismissing its amended complaint for two

reasons. First, GME asserts that the district court

erroneously determined that the FSIA’s commercial

activity exception to foreign sovereign immunity did

not apply to France’s activities in the case. Second,

GME contends that its action against France was

“based upon” France’s commercial activities such that

subject matter jurisdiction existed under the FSIA.

We address these arguments in turn.

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A. Whether France’s activities are “commercial

activities” under the FSIA

The FSIA “supplies the ground rules for ‘obtaining

jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this

country.’” Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 141

S. Ct. 703, 709 (2021) (quoting Argentine Republic v.

Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443

(1989)). The FSIA “creates a baseline of immunity

from suit,” id.; accord 28 U.S.C. § 1604, and “unless a

specified exception applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign

state,” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355

(1993).

One such exception is the “commercial activity”

exception contained in the first clause of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)(2). The exception provides that “[a] foreign

state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of

courts of the United States or of the States in any

case . . . in which the action is based upon a commercial

activity carried on in the United States by the foreign

state.” § 1605(a)(2). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) defines

“commercial activity” as “either a regular course of

commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act,” and states that “[t]he commercial

character of an activity shall be determined by reference

to the nature of the course of conduct or particular

transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”

While the definition in § 1603(d) “leaves the critical

term ‘commercial’ largely undefined,” the Supreme

Court has explained that “when a foreign government

acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner

of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign’s

actions are ‘commercial’ within the meaning of the

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FSIA.” Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504

U.S. 607, 612, 614 (1992). Additionally, because the

FSIA “provides that the commercial character of an

act is to be determined by reference to its ‘nature’

rather than its ‘purpose,’ the question is not whether

the foreign government is acting with a profit motive

or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign

objectives.” Id. at 614 (quoting § 1603(d)). Instead, we

must determine “whether the particular actions that

the foreign state performs (whatever the motive

behind them) are the type of actions by which a private

party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.’” Id.

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 270 (6th ed. 1990)).

Thus, whether a foreign state is acting in the manner

of a private party “is a question of behavior, not

motivation.” Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360. For example, a

foreign state’s “issuance of regulations limiting foreign

currency exchange is a sovereign activity, because

such authoritative control of commerce cannot be

exercised by a private party” while “a contract to buy

army boots or even bullets is a ‘commercial’ activity,

because private companies can similarly use sales contracts to acquire goods.” Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614–15.

In Weltover, the Supreme Court concluded that

Argentina’s issuance of bonds as part of a plan to

stabilize its currency was a commercial activity within

the meaning of the FSIA. Id. at 620. The Court explained

that the “commercial character” of the bonds was

demonstrated by the fact that they were “in almost all

respects garden-variety debt instruments,” e.g., “[t]hey

[could] be held by private parties, they [were] negotiable

and [could] be traded on the international market[,]

. . . and they promise[d] a future stream of cash income.”

Id. at 615. And the Court rejected Argentina’s argu-

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ment that “the line between ‘nature’ and ‘purpose’

rests upon a ‘formalistic distinction [that] simply is

neither useful nor warranted’” because that argument

was “squarely foreclosed by the language of the FSIA.”

Id. at 617. It was thus “irrelevant why Argentina participated in the bond market in the manner of a

private actor; it matter[ed] only that it did so.” Id.

Subsequently, in Nelson, the Supreme Court

found that, unlike Argentina’s activities in Weltover,

the intentional conduct alleged by the plaintiffs—

”wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and torture” by the

Saudi Government—did not qualify as commercial

activity because the conduct at issue “boil[ed] down to

abuse of the power of its police by the Saudi Government”

and “a foreign state’s exercise of the power of its police

has long been understood for purposes of the restrictive

theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature.” 507 U.S. at

361. The Court explained that “[s]uch acts as legislation,

or the expulsion of an alien, or a denial of justice,

cannot be performed by an individual acting in his

own name,” and “can be performed only by the state

acting as such.” Id. at 362 (quoting Hersch Lauterpacht,

The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign

States, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 220, 225 (1952)). Thus, the

Court concluded that the “[e]xercise of the powers of

police and penal officers is not the sort of action by

which private parties can engage in commerce.” Id.

And regardless of the Saudi Government’s motivation

for its allegedly abusive treatment of the plaintiff, e.g.,

to resolve commercial disputes, the Court explained

that argument went to the activity’s purpose, which

was “irrelevant to the question of an activity’s commercial character” under the FSIA. Id. at 362–63;

accord Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Government

App.85a

of Honduras, 129 F.3d 543, 548 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]n

ascertaining whether the FSIA commercial exception

applies, it is irrelevant that Honduras may have had

a possible profit motive or that Honduras may have

intended only to fulfill its unique sovereign objectives.”).

We have since applied the principles of Weltover

and Nelson several times in analyzing whether a

foreign state’s activities are commercial activities

under the FSIA. For example, in Honduras Aircraft,

Honduras had decided to “upgrade and modernize” its

“civil aeronautics program to comply with international

aviation laws.” 129 F.3d at 545. In so doing, Honduras

contracted with the plaintiffs to provide goods and

services to help Honduras achieve this goal, including

setting up a data base for Honduras’s aircraft registry,

writing regulations, training government personnel,

and providing “the other things needed to register,

inspect and certify aircraft.” Id. at 547. Ultimately,

Honduras breached the contract, and plaintiffs sued.

Honduras moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, arguing that the FSIA’s commercial activity

exception did not apply because “the inspection and

registration of aircraft are powers peculiar to sovereigns,

as private persons cannot grant airworthiness certificates and register aircraft.” Id. We disagreed, explaining

that while “registering aircraft under the Honduras

flag is an act peculiar to its sovereignty,” plaintiffs

were not contending that the contract at issue “gave

them the right to register aircraft.” Id. at 548. Rather,

the plaintiffs sought to enforce their contract with

Honduras, in which “they contracted to provide goods

and services to Honduras in connection with its

expanded civil air program by inspecting and certifying

aircraft airworthiness so that Honduras would be able

App.86a

to appropriately register the aircraft under its flag.”

Id. Indeed, the contract provided “only that plaintiffs

would provide the means and do the technical work,”

and we reasoned that “[a]ny party, sovereign or not,

could contract for those goods and services.” Id. Thus,

we explained that Honduras commercially entered the

market as a private player to secure technical assistance and upgrades for its civil air program. Id. at

548–49.

Similarly, in Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 468

F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2006), we addressed “whether a

foreign state’s offer of a reward in return for information

enabling it to locate and capture a fugitive” fell within

FSIA’s commercial activity exception and we concluded

that it did so. Id. at 1292. We noted that “[t]he location

and capture of a fugitive by law enforcement officials

of a country may be a sovereign act.” Id. at 1298. But

we explained that the reward offer at issue “did not

promise that in return for the information it was

seeking Peru would locate and capture” the fugitive,

and the plaintiff was not seeking to compel the

fugitive’s capture. Id. at 1298–99. Instead, the plaintiff

sought the monetary reward that Peru offered in

exchange to anyone who furnished information “that

enabled Peru to capture” the fugitive. Id. at 1299. We

found the facts in Guevara similar enough to those in

Honduras Aircraft to compel the same result—instead

of using its sovereign powers to search for the fugitive,

Peru ventured into the marketplace to buy the information needed to locate the fugitive. Id. The plaintiff

provided that information for a price—Peru’s monetary

reward offer. Id. Thus, we concluded that “[t]he

underlying activity at issue—the exchange of money

for information—[was] ‘commercial in nature and of

App.87a

the type negotiable among private parties.’” Id. (quoting

Honduras Aircraft, 129 F.3d at 547); see also Devengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1221, 1224 (explaining that the

plaintiff’s claims based on Venezuela’s failure to pay

the plaintiff for artifacts was commercial activity because, similar to a private purchaser, Venezuela met

with the seller, examined the artifacts, and negotiated

to examine them further and to possibly purchase

them). We also rejected Peru’s argument that “commercial activity” only included activities “done for a

profit motive,” as “a ‘motive’ test tread[ed] too closely

to an examination of ‘purpose.’” Guevara, 468 F.3d at

1302.

By contrast, in Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

353 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003), we concluded

that the Pakistani government’s alleged actions of

expropriating Plaintiff’s land involved the power of

eminent domain—a sovereign power—and were therefore not commercial. We explained that “[c]onfiscation

of real property is a public act because private actors

are not allowed to engage in ‘takings’ in the manner

that governments are” and that “[d]etermining whether

or how to compensate property owners for takings is

also a sovereign function, not a market transaction.”

Id. at 1326–27. Thus, even though the Pakistani government allegedly failed to provide the plaintiff with

alternative property, “the nature of the foreign government’s act is public and not commercial.” Id. at

1327.

And, in Odyssey, a shipwreck recovery business,

Odyssey, discovered the remains of a Spanish vessel

in international waters and filed an in rem admiralty

action against the vessel and its cargo. 657 F.3d at

1166. Odyssey did not concern the FSIA’s commercial

App.88a

activity exception in § 1605(a) but rather 28 U.S.C.

§ 1609, the section of the FSIA that provides that a

foreign state’s property in the United States “shall be

immune from attachment[,] arrest[,] and execution

except as provided in [28 U.S.C. §§ ] 1610 and 1611.”

See Odyssey, 657 F.3d at 1175–76. Odyssey, however,

did not invoke the exceptions provided in §§ 1610 or

1611; instead, it argued for “a commercial activity

exception to § 1609’s immunity to arrest.” Id. at 1176.

This Court rejected Odyssey’s argument, as the

international treaty that Odyssey asserted was incorporated into § 1609 did not “appear to create a commercial activity exception to § 1609’s immunity to arrest.”

Id. We also noted that, even if such an exception

existed, the Spanish vessel at issue was not engaged

in commercial activity, as defined by § 1603(d), because it was not acting like an ordinary private person

in the marketplace. See id. at 1176–77. We explained

that at the time it sank the ship “was ‘act[ing] . . . like

a sovereign’ by transporting [Spanish coins and cargo]

during a time of threatened war” as part of the

Spanish Navy. See id. at 1177 (some alterations in

original) (quoting Guevara, 468 F.3d at 1298).

With these precedents in mind, we turn to the

case before us. In its dismissal order, the district court

determined that France’s activities in the case consisted

of “France’s intergovernmental declaration with

Florida—and its overall relationship with Florida

regarding the shipwreck sites”—and that these activities

were not commercial in nature. While recognizing

that private actors engage in marine exploration

activities and shipwreck recovery efforts, the district

court reasoned that those activities alone did not

make the nature of France’s activities commercial,

App.89a

comparing the case to mail service, which can take

both governmental and commercial forms. The district

court construed “the nature of France’s activity [as]

the recovery and disposition of its own sovereign

military property” and explained that, regardless of

whether France chose to recover its property or work

with Florida to preserve it, France was “not entering

a market and behaving as a private person would.”

The district court also reasoned that it mattered “to

some extent” that France’s agreement was with Florida,

not a private actor.

GME contends that the district court erred in

finding that France’s activities—a “marine archeological

recovery project for recovery of six historical shipwreck

sites in Florida”—did not constitute “commercial

activity” under the FSIA. GME argues that the “what”

of France’s activity—effecting archaeological salvage

recovery of historic shipwreck sites—and the “means”

employed for the activity—e.g., negotiating agreements

with Florida and others; directing, coordinating, and

participating in recovery efforts; securing private and

grant source fundings; and conserving and arranging

for the exhibition of artifacts—are commercial in

nature. GME notes that similar types of activity are

performed in commerce by private entities, including

GME itself, “with which [FDOS] proposed to ‘partner’

for the same project.” And GME asserts that the district court improperly looked to the “governmental

direction or purpose” of France’s activities, which is

irrelevant to the question of an activity’s commercial

nature.

We agree with GME and conclude that the nature

of France’s activities here are commercial under the

FSIA. As set forth by the Declaration of Intent,

App.90a

France, in cooperation with FDOS, planned to engage

in a marine archaeological recovery project of the

shipwreck sites off the coast of Cape Canaveral. And

the Declaration of Intent provides that, to conduct this

project, France will identify, evaluate, mobilize, and

oversee “public and/or private resources and organizations.” In other words, France, along with FDOS,

planned to acquire funding and to hire organizations

or businesses to conduct its shipwreck recovery efforts.

And, according to GME’s amended complaint, France

has performed actions and entered into agreements

with FDOS and others in connection with the shipwreck

recovery project. These actions—fundraising, contracting

with organizations and businesses to carry out excavations of shipwreck sites (i.e., asset recovery), and

overseeing the logistics of the project—are “commercial in nature and of the type negotiable among private

parties.” Guevara, 468 F.3d at 1299 (quoting Honduras

Aircraft, 129 F.3d at 547).

The district court focused on the fact that France

had entered into the Declaration of Intent with

another sovereign power (Florida) in order to recover

and preserve the shipwreck sites, including La Trinité,

and to promote the shared history of the United States

and France in Florida. But the district court’s analysis

of France’s activities was too narrow and “purpose”

oriented. “[T]he question is not whether the foreign

government is acting with a profit motive or . . . with

the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives.”

Guevara, 468 F.3d at 1298 (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S.

at 614). “Rather the issue is whether the particular

actions that the foreign state performs . . . are the type

of actions by which a private party engages in ‘trade

and traffic or commerce.’” Id. (quoting Weltover, 504

App.91a

U.S. at 614). Therefore, although the purpose of

France’s shipwreck recovery efforts may be to protect,

recover, and preserve the shipwreck sites, and to

promote its common history with the United States in

Florida, “it is irrelevant why [France engaged in this

shipwreck recovery project] in the manner of a private

actor; it matters only that it did so.” Weltover, 504 U.S.

at 617.

France, however, argues that its activities are not

commercial in nature because they are “required by

the patrimony laws of France,” as explained by the

Hermite declaration it submitted in support of its

motion to dismiss. In support of its position, France

relies on the Second Circuit’s decision in Barnet v.

Ministry of Culture & Sports of the Hellenic Republic,

961 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2020), which the district court

also relied on in dismissing GME’s amended complaint.

In Barnet, the Second Circuit faced the question of

whether Greece’s assertion of ownership over an

ancient Greek artifact constituted commercial activity

under the FSIA. Id. at 195. An auction house announced

it planned to auction the Greek artifact on behalf of a

trust. When Greek officials learned of the auction,

they emailed the auction house a demand letter,

stating that the artifact belonged to Greece under its

“patrimony laws” that declared Greek artifacts to be

Greece’s property. Id. The auction house withdrew the

artifact from the auction, and both the trust and

auction house filed suit against Greece, seeking

declaratory relief on the disputed issue of ownership

and asserting that the commercial activity exception—

specifically, the third clause of § 1605(a)(2)—to the

FSIA applied. Id.; see § 1605(a)(2) (“A foreign state

shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of

App.92a

the United States . . . in which the action is based . . .

upon an act outside of the United States in connection

with a commercial activity of the foreign state

elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the

United States.”).

On appeal, the Second Circuit explained that

Greece’s predicate act—sending its demand letter to

the auction house—was not taken “in connection with

a commercial activity” by Greece outside of the United

States. Barnet, 961 F.3d at 200 (quoting § 1605(a)(2)).

The Second Circuit explained that “Greece undertook

the act of sending the letter in connection with its

claim of ownership over the figurine pursuant to its

patrimony laws” and found that this act was sovereign

in nature—Greece claimed ownership of the artifact

“by adopting legislation that nationalizes historical

artifacts and by enforcing those patrimony laws.” Id.

at 200–01. The Second Circuit reasoned that

“[n]ationalizing property is a distinctly sovereign act”

and that Greece was “acting in a sovereign capacity by

enforcing laws that regulate ownership and export of

nationalized artifacts.” Id. at 201. And the Second

Circuit found that Greece’s “insistence on recognition

of and obedience to its patrimony laws [were] not ‘the

type of actions by which a private party engages in

trade and traffic or commerce,’” nor “analogous to a

private commercial transaction.” Id. (quoting Weltover,

504 U.S. at 614, 616). Thus, the Second Circuit

concluded that the adoption and pursuit of compliance

with patrimony laws established that the nature of

Greece’s “activity was sovereign rather than commercial.” Id. at 201–02.

But France’s activities here are not like Greece’s

activity in Barnet. Therefore, we do not find Barnet

App.93a

persuasive here. To begin with, the activity at issue in

Barnet—the sending of a letter claiming ownership of

an artifact—is both narrower in scope and different in

type than France’s activities here, i.e., planning and

executing a shipwreck recovery project with FDOS.

More critically, we find that focusing on the foreign

state’s “patrimony laws” in this case would be akin to

the “motive” test we warned of in Guevara that

“treads too closely to an examination of ‘purpose.’” 468

F.3d at 1302. While France’s motive in pursuing the

shipwreck recovery project may be to comply with its

patrimony laws, “the Supreme Court has instructed

us that the FSIA ‘unmistakably commands’ that we

consider the nature, rather than the purpose of a

transaction.” Id. at 1302. We must therefore look to

the nature of underlying activity and determine

whether it is commercial in nature, e.g., the type of

activity that is “negotiable among private parties.” Id.

at 1299 (quoting Honduras Aircraft, 129 F.3d at 547);

see Devengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1221 (“[W]hether a

foreign government acts out of a profit motive or out

of a desire to fulfill ‘uniquely sovereign objectives’ is

entirely irrelevant to the analysis of whether an

activity qualifies as ‘commercial.’” (quoting Weltover,

504 U.S. at 614)). And as we have already discussed,

fundraising, entering into contracts with third parties

to engage in marine excavation and asset recovery,

and overseeing the logistics of that project are commercial in nature, as they are the type of activities

that private parties (including GME) engage in.

France further relies on Odyssey, but that case is

also distinguishable from the case before us. As

explained above, in Odyssey, we faced an in rem action

to determine ownership of a shipwreck and the appli-

App.94a

cation of § 1609, not § 1605, of the FSIA. Odyssey

asked us to create a commercial activities exception to

§ 1609’s immunity to arrest, arguing that the Spanish

ship was engaged in commercial activity when it sank.

In rejecting this argument, we concluded that there

was not “a commercial activity exception to § 1609’s

immunity to arrest.” Odyssey, 657 F.3d at 1176. We

also noted that, even if such an exception existed,

Spain’s activities in operating the ship, during the late

18th and early 19th centuries, were sovereign in

nature. Id. at 1176–77. Unlike Odyssey, GME’s claims

concern France’s current-day activities in pursuing

recovery efforts with FDOS of the shipwreck sites—

the same activities GME was pursuing with FDOS—

not the military activities that France was pursuing

when La Trinité and other ships of the Royal Navy of

France sank in 1565. Thus, while Odyssey may have

some relevance to GME I—the earlier in rem proceeding—it does not apply to this case where GME seeks

damages based on the nature of France’s present-day

activities.

We therefore conclude that France’s activities

here are commercial activities under the FSIA.

B. Whether GME’s action is “based upon”

France’s commercial activities

Although we conclude that France’s activities are

commercial under the FSIA, our inquiry under § 1605’s

commercial activity exception does not end there.

Under § 1605(a)(2), we must also determine whether

GME’s action is “based upon” France’s commercial

activities. See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 356. To do so, “we

must identify the conduct upon which the suit is based”

by looking at “the ‘particular conduct’ that constitutes

App.95a

the ‘gravamen’ of the suit,” i.e., “the ‘core’ of the suit.”

Devengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1222 (quoting OBB

Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. 27, 35 (2015));

see also Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358 (explaining that the

only reasonable reading of the term “based upon” is

that it “calls for something more than a mere connection with, or relation to, commercial activity.”). But we

do not undertake an “exhaustive claim-by-claim,

element-by-element analysis” of the plaintiff’s cause

of action. Sachs, 577 U.S. at 34.

For example, in Devengoechea, the plaintiff filed

suit against Venezuela for failing to pay for or return

to him artifacts belonging to Simón Bolívar. 889 F.3d

at 1217. In determining whether the plaintiff’s action

was “based upon” Venezuela’s commercial activity, we

explained that the conduct that injured the plaintiff—

and made up the gravamen of his suit—was Venezuela’s

failure to pay for or return the artifacts. Id. at 1223.

Here, the district court assumed, for the sake of

this part of its analysis, that France’s activities were

commercial in nature and found that GME’s injury

was not “based on” the Declaration of Intent and that

France’s activities were not related to the Declaration,

i.e., the shipwreck recovery project. Rather, the district

court found that GME’s action was “based upon the

fact that France took ownership of the ship,” which

“occurred the moment the [GME I district court]

concluded that the res was La Trinité and belonged to

France.” GME contends that this characterization of

its suit against France was in error. Rather, GME

argues, the gravamen of its suit is France’s activities

related to the shipwreck recovery project and France’s

failure to compensate GME for a substantial benefit it

conferred to France—the value of its services that led

App.96a

to the discovery of the shipwreck sites including La

Trinité. And GME argues that, without its services,

France could not have undertaken the shipwreck

recovery project.

While we pass no judgment on the merits of

GME’s claims, we find that the “gravamen” of GME’s

suit is France’s activities in executing the shipwreck

recovery project and its failure to compensate GME

for the value of the services. Indeed, the core of GME’s

claims against France—claims for an in personam

salvage lien award, unjust enrichment, misappropriation

of trade secret information, and interference with its

rights and relations—is France’s failure to compensate

GME for the value of GME’s salvaging services. See

Devengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1223 (“The conduct that

actually injured Devengoechea—and therefore that

makes up the gravamen of Devengoechea’s lawsuit—

is Venezuela’s failure to return the Bolívar Collection

to Devengoechea or to pay him for it.”). GME’s salvage

services led to the discovery of La Trinité and the

other shipwreck sites, which, in turn, led to France’s

joint shipwreck recovery project with FDOS, as set

forth by the Declaration of Intent. And, as explained

above, France’s activities in planning and executing

the shipwreck recovery project qualify as “commercial

activity.”

We therefore hold that the FSIA’s commercial

activity exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies

because GME’s action is “based upon” France’s commercial activity in the United States. Accordingly, the

district court had subject matter jurisdiction over

GME’s suit against France.

App.97a

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s

order dismissing GME’s amended complaint for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction and remand for further

proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

App.98a

ERRATA

This opinion has been changed as follows:

On page 17, “FISA’s” is changed to “FSIA’s”

App.99a

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS,

U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

(NOVEMBER 16, 2020)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

________________________

GLOBAL MARINE EXPLORATION, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,

Defendant.

________________________

Case No. 4:20-cv-181-AW-MJF

Before: ALLEN WINSOR, U.S. District Judge.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

In 1565, Jean Ribault led a French Royal Navy

Fleet to resupply a fort near present-day Jacksonville.

Glob. Marine Expl., Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked

& (for Finders-Right Purposes) Abandoned Sailing

Vessel (GME I), 348 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1228-33 (M.D.

Fla. 2018). The flagship of Ribault’s fleet was the

vessel la Trinité. At the time, France was hoping to

colonize Florida. Spain was too, and it sent a fleet to

App.100a

find Ribault. The fleets encountered one another near

St. Augustine inlet, and Spain drove Ribault’s ships

out to sea. With the French fleet anchored at sea, a

hurricane struck, destroying the fleet and its flagship

la Trinité. The la Trinité lay on the ocean floor for

nearly 500 years before Plaintiff Global Marine

Exploration, Inc., (GME) recently found it. Id.

GME, as its name would suggest, is in the business of marine exploration. In 2015, it secured a

permit from the Florida Department of State to

conduct salvage activities off the coast of Cape

Canaveral. ECF No. 3 (FAC) ¶¶ 13-14. GME discovered

several shipwrecks (id. ¶¶ 15-17) and filed an in rem

action for possession of its discovery, claiming ownership

and salvage rights. GME I, 348 F. Supp. at 1224,

1227-28. Based on earlier discussions with Florida,

GME believed it would keep eighty percent of what it

recovered, with Florida taking the rest. FAC ¶¶ 14,

21, 64. But France learned of GME’s discovery and

intervened in the in rem action, claiming the res was

la Trinité and therefore sovereign French property.

GME I, 348 F. Supp. at 1224. And after reviewing a

substantial record of historical evidence, the district

court agreed. It concluded that the res was indeed la

Trinité, that France had the exclusive claim to it, and

that the court thus lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Id. at 1242. It dismissed the case, and GME did not

appeal.

France, meanwhile, entered a declaration of

intention with the Florida Department of State to

“[r]ecover this historical and cultural heritage”;

“[p]romote the common history of the United States

and France in Florida”; and study and preserve the

vestiges of la Trinité. ECF No. 3-2 at 1-2. It did so con-

App.101a

sistent with Section L522-1 of the Heritage Code of

France, which makes such activities the responsibility of

the Ministry of Culture. ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 4.1 The idea

was that France and Florida, working together, would

protect, recover, preserve, and study la Trinité, and

promote their shared history. Id.

That all led to this case, which involves many of

the same facts as GME I, but which presents a

different jurisdictional question. The earlier case was

an in rem action against the property; this is an in

personam action against France.2 GME no longer

asserts any claim to the ship itself; it has sued France

for damages relating to its efforts and the benefits

those efforts conferred on France. GME presents four

claims: (1) in personam lien award, (2) quasi contract/unjust enrichment, (3) misappropriation of trade

secrets, and (4) interference with rights and relations.

FAC at 12-20. GME seeks to recover its investment in

finding la Trinité. Id. ¶ 1.

France moved to dismiss, arguing that the court

lacks jurisdiction. ECF No. 13. Having considered the

evidence submitted and the parties’ arguments, I

conclude that France is correct. The Foreign Sovereign

1 In addition, France is a party to the 2001 UNESCO Convention

on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, which

precludes France from commercially exploiting its underwater

cultural heritage. ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 5.

2 An in rem action is “prosecuted to enforce a right to things.”

R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 957 (4th Cir. 1999)

(quoting The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 388 (1879)). An action is in

personam if it charges an individual personally. Id. A judgment

in an in rem action affects “only the property before the court,”

while in personam actions “adjudicate the rights and obligations

of individual persons or entities.” Id.

App.102a

Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., deprives this

court of subject matter jurisdiction, so the case must

be dismissed.

I.

France’s jurisdictional challenge is a factual challenge, which means the court may consider matters outside of the pleadings. Odyssey Marine Expl., Inc. v.

Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159, 1169

(11th Cir. 2011). The allegations in GME’s complaint

need not be accepted as true, and evidence is not

viewed in the light most favorable to GME. Id.; see

also Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,

572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009).

Both parties have submitted evidence. France

filed a declaration from Florence Hermite, a Magistrate

Judge of the Republic of France and Attaché for Legal

Affairs of the Embassy of France to the United States

of America. ECF No. 13-1. GME filed public website

information about private marine archaeological

recovery projects (ECF No. 16), emails and documents

produced from a Florida public records request (ECF

No. 17), GME’s operating officer’s affidavit (ECF No.

18), and a statement from Dr. Robert H. Baer, a professional archaeologist (ECF No. 19).

I considered all the documents. I also considered

the attachments to GME’s complaint, including the

declaration of intention France and Florida entered

(ECF No. 3-2). The parties confirmed at the telephonic

hearing that there were no material factual disputes

and that no evidentiary hearing was needed. See also

Odyssey, 657 F.3d at 1170 (finding it within the court’s

discretion to determine if an evidentiary hearing is

needed on a Rule 12(b)(1) factual challenge).

App.103a

II.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)

“provides the sole basis for obtaining subject matter

jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in the United

States.” Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 468 F.3d 1289,

1294 (11th Cir. 2006). Under the FSIA, foreign states

are generally immune from jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1604, but there are exceptions. Under the relevant

exception here, there is no immunity if “the action is

based upon a commercial ac

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