Petition for Writ of Certiorari — G. G., Petitioner v. Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families, et al.

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

GENA GREEN,

Petitioner,

VD.

ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN,

YOUTH, AND FAMILIES,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPENDIX

Gena Green

3 Parkview Dr

Clinton, PA 15026

(412) 506-7873

Pro Se Petitioner

Twenty-first day of November, MMXXV

See eee eee nnn

United States Commercial Printing Company * www.uscpc.us * (202) 866-8558

App-i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A

Order [discretionary appeal denied],

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Jn the

Interest of: M.G., a Minor, Petition of:

G.G., Mother,

No. 87 WAL 2025 (May 18, 2025) .............. App-1

Appendix B

Order [reconsideration denied],

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, In the

Interest of: M.G., a Minor, Petition of:

G.G., Mother,

No. 87 WAL 2025 (Jun. 24, 2025)... App-4

Appendix C

Opinion fjuvenile court disposition

affirmed], Superior Court of

Pennsylvania, In the Interest of: M.G., a

Minor, Petition of: G.G., Mother,

No. 616 WDA 2024 (Jan. 24, 2025) ........... App-5

Appendix D

Order [rehearing denied], Superior

Court of Pennsylvania, In the Interest of:

M.G., a Minor, Petition of: G.G., Mother,

No. 616 WDA 2024 (Mar. 11, 2028) ........ App-32

App-i

Appendix E

Opinion, Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, In Re:

M.G., a Minor, Appeal of: G.G., Natural

Mother,

No. CP-02-DP-0000050-2024

(Jul. 12, 2024) oe ccccececeeeseteeeeeeeeenes App-33

Appendix F

Order of Adjudication and Disposition,

Family Court of Allegheny County,

Pennsylvania, In the Interest of: M.G., a

Minor,

No. CP-02-DP-0000050-2024

(Apr. 24, 2024) oo... eececcceesseesessneessssereneeeenes App-53

Appendix G

Verbatim Texts of Law .............cceeeceeees App-58

Appendix H

About Bruce Chapman ..............:.::::0ee App-80

Appendix I

Expert Witness Transcript, Court of

Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Pennsylvania, In Re: M.G.,

No. CP-02-DP-0000050-2024 ....cccccsscesseee App-84

App-1

Appendix A

[Seal]

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Western District

June 24, 2025

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

310 Grant Street, Suite 600

Pittsburgh, PA 15219-2297

FILED

JUN 24 2025]

PITTSBURGH

OFFICE OF

SUPERIOR COURT

RE: In the Interest of: M.G., a Minor

Petition of: G.G., Mother

No. 87 WAL 2025

Trial Court Docket No: CP-02-DP-0000050-2024

Superior Docket Number: 616 WDA 2024

Appeal Docket No:

Date Petition for Allowance of Appeal Filed:

April 9, 2025

Disposition: Order Denying Petition for

Allowance of Appeal.

Disposition Date: May 13, 2025

App-2

Reargument/Reconsideration Disposition:

Order Denying Application for Reconsideration.

Reargument/Reconsideration Disposition Date:

June 24, 2025

/tet

App-3

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

IN THE INTEREST : No. 87 WAL 2025

OF: M.G., A MINOR

PETITION OF: : Petition for Allowance of

G.G., MOTHER : Appeal from the Order of

the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 13th day of May, 2025, the

Petition for Allowance of Appeal and Application for

Leave to File Post-Submission Communication are

DENIED.

App-4

Appendix B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

IN THE INTEREST : No. 87 WAL 2025

OF: M.G., A MINOR

PETITION OF: G:G., : Application for

MOTHER : Reconsideration

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24‘ day of June, 2025, the

Application for Reconsideration is DENIED.

App-5

Appendix C

J-S39017-24

2025 Pa Super 17

IN THE INTEREST OF: _ : IN THE SUPERIOR

M.G., A MINOR : COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: G.G.,

MOTHER

NO. 616 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered April 24, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Family Court at No(s): CP-02-DP-0000050-2024

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and

NICHOLS, J.

Filed: January 24, 2025

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:

G.G. (Mother) appeals pro se from the order

issued by the Allegheny County Court of Common

Pleas, which adjudicated dependent her then

fourteen-year-old son, M.G. (the Child), pursuant to

the Juvenile Act. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6302(1), 6351.

After review, we affirm.!

We discern the following factual background

from the juvenile court’s opinion issued pursuant to

Appellate Rule 1925(a). In 2014, when the Child was

approximately 5 years old, the family was involved in

a car accident in Ohio. The Child suffered a brain

injury which required a shunt. The Child also had

1 T.G. (Father) was also involved in this case, but he did not

appeal.

App-6

some unrelated mental health issues, including

Autism, and ADHD. Sometime after the accident, the

family moved to Western Pennsylvania.

Nearly a decade later, in July of 2023, law

enforcement responded to the family’s home for a

mental health call. The responding officer reported

that Mother was tethered with a medical grade

tether when he arrived. According to the Child,

the family began using the tether on him in July

of 2023.

In August, September, and October of 2023,

the Child saw a _ therapist for medication

management. The family did not discuss their use of

the tether with the therapist. Another therapist

began seeing the Child in November of 2023. The

second therapist developed a plan with the Child for

when he was feeling anxious or escalated in his

emotions. The plan did not include the use of

physical restraints; again, the family did not inform

the therapist that they were using physical

restraints. The therapist did not observe any

aggressive behavior from the Child.

On January 2, 2024, Mother called 911 and

wanted the Child transported to Western Psychiatric

Institute and Clinic. Mother claimed the Child had

barricaded himself in the bathroom. The responding

officers reported that the home was cluttered and

smelled of urine. Mother provided one officer with a

written safety plan. The officers saw a tether system

attached to a makeshift bed which resembled a

wooden bench with a cushion. An officer also saw that

the doorknob on the bathroom had been removed; the

family reported this was for safety reasons. The

Child did not appear to be in emotional distress but

App-7

was transported to the hospital. Mother reported to

medical staff that the Child was attacking people and

being aggressive. The Child was calm and

cooperative with the attending physician.

Mother gave the physician the written safety plan

which included the use of physical restraints. The

physician advised the Child needed different care

and a different safety plan.

The Allegheny County Office of Children,

Youth and Families (the Agency) was notified, and

two Agency caseworkers and a police officer went to

the home on January 4, 2024. The family did not

open the door for approximately twenty minutes.

When the caseworkers and police officer entered the

home, the Child was not tethered but reported that

he had been when they first arrived; the family

reported that Mother had also been tethered. Mother

provided a caseworker with a written safety plan

which involved the use of physical restraints on the

Child in many situations including: at night, during

the Child’s counseling sessions with his spiritual

advisor, when the Child was angry or defiant, when he

threw things, and when he could not control himself.

The caseworker explained to Mother that using the

tether was inappropriate and could be considered

child abuse. Mother agreed to stop using the tether,

and Father threw it away. However, the family had

a second tether that they did not disclose.

On January 26, 2024, the Agency received a

report that the Child was being tethered nightly

again. The Agency obtained an Emergency Custody

Authorization and removed the Child. After the

Child’s removal, the Agency determined several of

the Child’s specialist appointments had _ been

App-8

neglected prior to his removal, including a

neurosurgery examination, a neurological

examination, and an examination by the Traumatic

Brain Injury Clinic. The Child’s mental health

treatment was also of concern.

On April 24, 2024, the juvenile court

adjudicated the Child dependent and ordered that the

Child remain in his foster care placement.2 Mother

timely filed this appeal. She presents six issues for

our review, which we reorder for ease of disposition:

1. Did the trial court err when after the

Appellee unlawfully removed the

family’s [C]hild from the home [in

January 2024] using Judicial Deception

by omission and misrepresenting the

facts which violated the family’s 14th

Amendment rights under the United

States Constitution, when the court did

not verify reasonable efforts findings

with the [A]gency and return the [C]hild

home immediately for the duration of

the proceedings when it was discovered

that the [A]gency did not do their due

diligence?

2. Did the court and or legal counsel err

when the family was not given a fair

shelter care hearing due to ineffective

2 We note from the Appellant's, Agency’s, and Guardian ad

litem’s briefs that the Child’s dependency case has since been

closed, and the Child has been reunited with the parents. See

Mother’s Brief at 29, 31; see also Agency’s Brief at 10; see also

Guardian ad litem’s Brief at 12.

App-9

counsel that did not notify them of their

rights and the misconduct of the

hearing officer that was presiding over

the case.

. Did the trial court abuse its discretion

when [it] acted in erroneous preclusion

of the family’s two expert witnesses by

incorrectly classifying the witnesses,

pursuant to 225§702, §703 and is

supported by case law under J-S46032-

18 2019 Super 110 Bryan Wright,

Chanthavong, 682 A.2d at 338-39f. This

did not provide the family with an equal

and fair defense of their case, while also

failing to act impartially on how the

witnesses were determined and given

credibility for both the Appell [sic] and

Appellee.

. Did the Trial Court fail to ensure

meaningful exercise of a pro se litigant’s

constitutional right to equal access to

the courts. When pursuant to 237§1152

the court took two minutes in the

hearing requesting pro se status and did

not conduct a colloquy with the litigant

as required by law? The Court also did

not give the Appellant adequate time to

prepare for witnesses when they did not

provide discovery of evidence or

witnesses in a timely manner which was

a violation of the Shelter Care Court

App-10

Order and 237§1340? Did the court also

give the pro se litigant an unfair

disadvantage by not having any clear

procedures for evidence submission,

ensuring the litigant had access to the

PACFile system to ensure the litigant

was getting orders and notices of the

court in a timely manner and could file

needed motions which did not allow the

litigant to be fairly heard?

. Did the trial court abuse its discretion

and/or [err] as a matter of law or

misinterpret the law, in concluding that

the [Agency] established by clear and

convincing evidence that a dependency

existed pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. 6302.

Did the court misinterpret the law with

regard to what constitutes child abuse in

the Child Protective Services Code

based on 23§6304(D) exceptions to child

abuse per the child protective services

code and 18§509 (Commonwealth v.

Shayla Lynette Pierce, CP-22-CR-

0000759-2018) per the Pennsylvania

criminal code. These codes state clearly

what is and is not appropriate parental

discipline or control of a minor child by

a parent?

. Did the court err in finding that the

[Agency] made reasonable efforts to

prevent or eliminate the need for

App-11

removal from the home. The [A]gency is

required to provide services to families

pursuant to 62§2172, 62§2174,

5 5 §3130.61, § 3130.66, §3130.67,

§ 3130.12 (4)(c) (1) (3), § 3490.57(f) ( 1-4),

§3490.61(a)(c)(1), 23§6373, 42§6301(b)(3).

Did the court fail to ask the [A]gency to

verify what services have been tried to

help the family?

Mother’s Brief at 3-6.

Before addressing Mother’s issues, we must

first determine whether they are properly before us.

The juvenile court and the Agency urge us to find

all mother’s issues waived under Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Mother’s first Rule 1925(b) statement was eighty-one

pages, and her amended statement was thirty-nine

pages. The Agency filed a motion to dismiss for each

of Mother’s 1925(b) statements. We denied both

motions. While we agree that Mother’s amended

Rule 1925(b) statement contains “lengthy

explanations” not appropriate in a Rule 1925(b)

statement, our review of the statement reveals that

Mother raised six issues for appellate review in her

summary of errors on page three. See Amended

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement at 3; see also Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)Gv). Given Mother’s pro se status, the

juvenile court analyzed Mother’s issues to the best of

its ability. T.C.O. at 8.

We decline to find all issues waived based on

her voluminous Rule 1925(b) statement. However, as

explained below, we find that Mother’s first four

issues warrant no relief. Her first issue is waived as

App-12

untimely. Her second issue is not subject to appellate

review. Mother also waived her third and fourth

issues on appeal. Additionally, we caution Mother

that a Rule 1925(b) statement is not the place for

lengthy explanations or argument. Mother’s pro se

status affords her no special benefit, and she must

comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See

Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031,

1037-38 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted).

Mother’s first issue is waived because she failed

to raise a timely objection to defects in the

application for emergency custody. She presents her

first issue as a violation of the family’s 14th

Amendment rights in her statement of issues.

However, her arguments concern the Agency’s

completion of the emergency application for removal.

Mother argues that the Agency incorrectly and

incompletely filled out the application for emergency

protective custody. Mother’s Brief at 75. Mother

asserts that if the Agency had given accurate

information in the application, then the juvenile

court would not have entered an order for emergency

removal. Id. at 79. She also claims that she did not

have access to this information until after

adjudication and shortly before filing the appeal

because she did not have access to PACFile and was

not provided with the Agency’s Application. Id.

Rule 1126 of the Pennsylvania Rules of

Juvenile Court Procedure provides:

A child shall not be released, nor

shall a case be dismissed, because

of a defect in the form or content

of the pleading or a defect in the

App-13

procedures of these rules, unless

the party raises the defect prior to

the commencement of _ the

adjudicatory hearing, and the

defect is prejudicial to the rights

of a party.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1126.

Here, Mother did not object to any defect in

the application prior to the adjudicatory hearing.

Moreover, Mother was represented by counsel at the

shelter care hearing, and counsel made no objection

to the contents of the application nor claimed that

Mother did not receive the Agency’s Application.

Thus, Mother’s claim that the application was

defective or that her family’s 14th Amendment

rights were violated is waived.?

Mother’s second issue challenges the conduct of

the hearing officer at the shelter care hearing held

on January 31, 2024, with the order docketed on

February 5, 2024. T.C.O. at 15; see also Mother's

Brief at 80. This order is not subject to appellate

review as it is only a temporary order, to protect the

child’s best interests and welfare, pending a final

adjudicatory hearing.

3 Mother also did not claim prejudice by the alleged defective

application. She attended all hearings, was aware of the

allegations against her and presented defenses to the

dependency petition.

4 Even if we found Mother’s second issue to be subject to

appellate review, we note that Mother failed to fully develop

this issue on appeal. She included only three sentences in the

App-14

If a court determines that allowing a child to remain

in their home would be contrary to the child’s welfare, the

court can enter a protective custody order authorizing the

child’s removal from their home. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

6324(1). Once the child is removed, a shelter care

hearing must be held within 72 hours of removal.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6332(a); see also 23 Pa. C.S.A. §

6315(d). The shelter care hearing is intended to be

an “informal hearing,” and its main purpose is to

determine where the child should be placed pending

a formal adjudicatory hearing. See 42 Pa.C.S. A. §

6332(a); see also 23 Pa.C.S. A § 6315(d); see also

Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts Office

of Children and Families in the Courts, Pennsylvania

Dependency Benchbook 6-5 (8rd ed. 2019) (“The

primary purpose of the shelter care hearing is to

evaluate the agency’s contention that allowing the

child to remain in the home would be detrimental to

the child’s welfare and best interests.”).

Accordingly, the shelter care hearing does not

comprehensively address the merits of the case.

Instead, the formal adjudicatory hearing addresses

the merits, and that hearing must be held within ten

days of the filing of the dependency petition if the

Argument of Appellant section of her brief related to purported

“judicial misconduct” by the hearing officer. See Mother’s Brief

at 80. As such, even if this issue was properly before us, we

could potentially find it waived due to lack of development. See,

eg., Interest of R.H., 320 A.3d 706, 716 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a

claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the

issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that

claim is waived.”) (Quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 604

Pa. 176, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (2009)).

App-15

child is in custody. See 42 Pa.C.S. A. § 6335(a);

see also Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook,

supra, at 6-9 (“Since the [shelter care] hearing must

take place on short notice to everyone involved (even

the judge or hearing officer has little time to prepare

as it is often an add-on to the schedule), witnesses

and evidence may be unavailable. However, only a

preliminary determination is expected until the more

comprehensive adjudication hearing can occur within

10 days.”).

Notably, a shelter care order does not warrant

specialized review under our appellate rules. See,

e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 1610 (providing for specialized review

of an order granting or denying release or modifying

the conditions of release before sentence); Pa.R.A.P.

1612 (allowing a juvenile to file a petition for

specialized review if a court enters an order placing

the juvenile in an out- of-home overnight placement

in any agency or institution). Unlike review of bail

orders or review of out-of-home placement in juvenile

delinquency cases, there is no right to specialized

review of emergency custody or shelter care orders in

dependency cases.

Additionally, a shelter care order is not a final,

appealable order. See Interest of T.C., 239 A.3d 48

5 Our review of the record reveals that at the Shelter Care

Hearing on January 31, 2024 and in the Shelter Care Order

dated February 5, 2024, the adjudicatory hearing was

scheduled for February 28, 2024, which is beyond ten days from

the filing of the dependency petition on February 5, 2024.

However, we note that the Hearing Officer stated on the record

“[T]his will be scheduled for an adjudicatory hearing on

February 28th... .” N.T., 1/31/24, at 57. None of the parties

objected to this date, including Mother and Mother’s counsel.

App-16

(Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum). In

T.C., we concluded that the shelter care order was

not an interlocutory order appealable by right, nor

had the mother sought permission to appeal the order.

See id. Also, the order was not a collateral order

because it was not “separable from and collateral to

the main cause of action.” Id. Instead, “the salient

issue surrounding both the shelter care order and

the subsequent adjudication of dependency is [the

child’s] best interests and whether those interests

were served by [the child’s] removal from his parents’

home.” Id. Thus, this Court held that the shelter

care order was not immediately appealable and

quashed the appeal. Id.

Here, Mother waited to appeal the shelter care

order until the final adjudication of dependency.

Mother could have requested a juvenile judge to

conduct a rehearing following the hearing officer’s

recommendation, but she did not do so. Pa.R.J.C.P.

1191.C. Also, Mother’s claim that she was not told of

this option is belied by the hearing officer’s written

recommendation. Recommendation for Shelter Care,

1/31/24, at 3 (noting that “A party may challenge the

Hearing Officer’s recommendation by filing a motion

with the clerk of courts within three (3) days of

receipt of the recommendation.”).

Once the adjudication occurs, no appeal lies

from the shelter care order. The dependency rules and

informal nature of the shelter care hearing assume

that any defects that might occur at the shelter care

hearing will be remedied at the formal adjudication

of dependency. Thus, no appeal lies from the

temporary shelter care order, but rather from the

App-17

final dependency adjudication and disposition.* See

Interest of J.M., 219 A.38d 645, 650-51(Pa. Super.

2019) (citing In Interest of C.A.M., 399 A.2d 786

(Pa. Super. 1979)). We address Mother’s challenges

to the Child’s dependency adjudication and

disposition in Mother’s fifth and sixth issues below.

In her third and fourth issues, Mother alleges

that evidentiary and due process violations occurred

during the dependency hearing. Mother’s third issue

alleges that the juvenile court erred by precluding

and incorrectly classifying the family’s two expert

witnesses. Notably, Mother did not call these

witnesses to testify on her behalf. Rather, they were

introduced by Father’s attorney. Thus, we first

question whether Mother has standing to appeal the

juvenile court's rulings with respect to these

witnesses. Mother asserts that this issue was

preserved for appeal because Father’s attorney asked

for these witnesses to be heard as experts before the

6 Temporary shelter care orders are like interim custody orders

that are also not final orders subject to appeal due to their

temporary nature. See, e.g., K.D. v. E.D., 267 A.3d 1215, 1222

(Pa. Super. 2021) (‘As we stated in J.M. v. K.W., 164 A.3d

1260, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc), ‘until the trial court has

rendered its best-interest determination on the merits, an

interim custody order is ephemeral and subject to further

modification upon petition.’ Thus, an order that is intended to

determine the parties’ temporary status during ongoing custody

litigation, and is not entered following a full evidentiary

hearing, is not a final order.”) (citation omitted). Shelter care

orders are ultimately subsumed in the final order of

adjudication of dependency and disposition. Therefore, they are

not subject to appellate review, and appeal properly lies with

the final dispositional order. See Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d

645, 650-51 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

App-18

juvenile court. See Mother’s Brief at 56. Mother is

mistaken. Father’s attorney arguing for these

witnesses to be classified as experts does not

preserve the issue for Mother’s appeal. Our review

of the record indicates that Mother minimally

participated in the discussion regarding

classification of these witnesses; she only spoke in

support of classifying one of the witnesses as an

expert and did not offer a position about the other

witness. See N.T., 4/16/24, at 3-7, 11- 12, 36. Mother

also did not specifically object to the juvenile court’s

ultimate classification of these witnesses. See id. at

7, 12-18, 23-24, 36-37. Issues not raised before the

juvenile court are waived and cannot be raised for

the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). As

such, Mother has waived this issue.

Even if Mother had not waived this issue,

determination of expert witnesses is within the

sound discretion of the juvenile court. See

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 718

(Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). Thus, our standard of

review is limited to whether the juvenile court abused

that discretion. See id. “An abuse of discretion may

not be found merely because an appellate court might

have reached a different conclusion, but requires a

result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as

to be clearly erroneous.” Interest of M.R., 247 A.3d

1113, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting Grady v.

Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1046 (Pa. 2003)).

Our review of the record reveals that the

juvenile court engaged in a lengthy voir dire process

for both witnesses. The court allowed one witness to

testify as an expert on confinement but not on

App-19

tethering, and the court allowed the other witness to

testify as a lay person. Both witnesses testified

extensively. We discern no abuse of discretion

regarding the classification of the witnesses as

expert or not, and the record supports the juvenile

court’s decision. Thus, Mother’s third issue would

merit no relief.

Mother’s fourth issue alleges, in part, that the

juvenile court “fail[ed] to ensure meaningful exercise

of a pro se litigant’s constitutional right to equal

access to the courts.” Mother’s Brief at 5. This issue

includes extensive detail in the Statement of

Questions Presented section of Mothers Brief.

However, Mother framed the issue on the summary

page of her 1925(b) statement as “The Trial Court

did not ensure meaningful exercise of a litigant’s

constitutional right to access to the courts, so that

the pro se litigant would be afforded the right to be

fairly heard.” Amended Rule 1925(b) Statement at 3.

Mother then provided over 30 pages of lengthy

explanation of her issues. The juvenile court properly

declined to review those pages, as they violated Rule

1925 by including argument and explanation. See

T.C.O. at 8; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv), (vii).

The juvenile court found Mother’s issue to be

“incredibly vague, and the court does not have

enough information to discern which specific actions

or inactions Mother argues impeded her right to

access the court.” T.C.O. at 15. We agree with the

juvenile court. A Rule 1925(b) statement “must be

specific enough for the trial court to identify and

address the issue an appellant wishes to raise on

appeal.” In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa. Super.

2018) (citation omitted). “When a court has to guess

App-20

what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not

enough for meaningful review.” S.S. vu. T.J., 212

A.3d 1026, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting Com.

v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-87 (Pa. Super. 2001)).

Further, when a Rule 1925(b) statement is so vague

that it prevents a trial court from identifying and

addressing the issue to be raised on appeal, appellate

review is hampered. See id. at 1031-32. Here, the

juvenile court was unable to address this claim

because it was too vague. Therefore, Mother has

waived this issue.

Even if Mother had not waived this issue, we

would find none of the due process claims in her brief

to have merit. Mother argues that the juvenile court

had no “standard of submission of evidence to allow it

to be heard or to submit into evidence,” and that

Mother did not have access to PACFile so she was

unable to submit evidence. Mother’s Brief at 72-73.

However, as noted above, Mother’s pro se status

conferred on her no special benefit, and she was

required to follow the juvenile court’s procedures.

See Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1037-38 (citations

omitted). The record also reflects that Mother

successfully submitted evidence and asked questions

at the hearing, and the juvenile court provided her

with leeway. See N.T., 4/2/24, at 49, 108, 110, 122,

158; see also N.T., 4/16/24, at 98, 101-02; see also

N.T., 4/24/24, at 21-23, 25, 27. Moreover, the court

gave Mother the option of having someone else

PACFile documents for her. See N.T., 4/16/24, at

101-02.

Additionally, Mother argues that the juvenile

court violated the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure

by not conducting a colloquy when Mother decided to

App-21

proceed pro se.? Although she mentions the failure

to conduct a colloquy in her brief, Mother never

mentioned the colloquy in her voluminous Rule

1925(b) statement. Because Mother is raising this

error for the first time on appeal, it is waived. See

generally, Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

7 The applicable Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure provides, in

relevant part, “B. Other parties. Except as provided in

paragraph (A), a party may waive the right to counsel if: (1) the

waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; and (2)

the court conducts a colloquy with the party on the record.”

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1152.

8 We note that Mother cites to a transcript from an

“Audiotaped Motion to Withdraw” in which she chose to proceed

pro se after firing her court- appointed counsel. See Mother's

Brief at 73; see also Motion to Withdraw Appearance as

Counsel, 2/23/24, at 3. Mother included this transcript in her

reproduced record and asserts that there was not a proper

colloquy because “the entire hearing was only two minutes and

the only questions asked were if [Mother] wanted to proceed pro

se and if she knew the next trial date.” Mother’s Brief at 73. The

transcript indicates that the juvenile court confirmed with

Mother that she was going to represent herself and told her

that she could hire a private attorney. The court also let Mother

know that representing herself could be procedurally

challenging, but that the judge would help Mother through it

the best he could. We do not see this transcript included in the

certified record we received from the juvenile court, and thus

we do not consider it attempted to provide evidence of the very

thing she asserts did not occur—a colloquy on the record. On

the first day of the adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court

noted on the record that Mother was not represented and

confirmed that she wanted to represent herself. N.T., 4/2/24, at

8. Mother was also aware of her right to representation, as she

was represented by counsel at the Shelter Care Hearing. See

N.T., 1/31/24, at 2 (noting that Mother’s counsel entered an

appearance on her behalf).

App-22

Turning to the merits of Mother’s remaining

issues, her fifth and sixth issues relate to the two

prongs of the dependency analysis — i.e., the Child’s

dependency adjudication and_ disposition. 9

Specifically, in her fifth issue, for its merits.

However, we find it curious that Mother has Mother

challenges the juvenile court’s determination that

the Agency proved the Child was dependent by clear

and convincing evidence.

To adjudicate a child dependent, the court must

determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

child:

® As discussed in Footnote 2, the party’s briefs indicate that the

Child’s dependency case has been closed and the Child reunited

with the parents. The juvenile court’s findings and order to that

effect are not part of the certified record, and, thus, we do not

consider that information for its merits. Nevertheless, closure of

the dependency case and reunification would arguably make

Mother’s fifth and sixth issues moot. This Court has previously

recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine when

reviewing a dependency adjudication in which the underlying

dependency case had been closed. See In re D.A., A Minor,

801 A.2d 614, 616-17 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc). An

exception applied in that case because the mother could have

been detrimentally affected in future proceedings by the court

declaring her child dependent. See id. at 617. Thus, Mother's

fifth issue here regarding the Child’s dependency adjudication

is appropriate for our review. However, it is unclear whether

Mother’s sixth issue challenging the Agency's reasonable efforts

before the Child’s removal would fit within an exception to the

mootness doctrine. Because the parties indicate in their briefs

that the Child has been returned to Mother, we question

whether the Child’s removal could detrimentally affect Mother

in future proceedings in the same way as the Child’s

dependency adjudication. However, we decline to find Mother’s

sixth issue moot because the Child’s return is not verified in the

certified record.

App-23

is without proper parental care or

control, subsistence, education as

required by law, or other care or

control necessary for his physical,

mental, or emotional health, or

morals. A determination that

there is a lack of proper parental

care or control may be based upon

evidence of conduct by the parent,

guardian or other custodian that

places the health, safety or

welfare of the child at risk.

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6302(1).

“Clear and convincing evidence” is defined as

testimony that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and

convincing as to enable the trier of facts to come to a

clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Interest of L.V., 209 A.3d

399, 416 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted).

In accordance with the

overarching purpose of the

Juvenile Act “[t]o preserves the

unity of the family wherever

possible,” see 42 Pa.CS.A. §

6301(b)(1), “a child will only be

declared dependent when he is

presently without proper parental

care and when such care is not

immediately available.” This

Court has defined “proper

App-24

parental care” as “that care which

(1) is geared to the particularized

needs of the child and (2) at a

minimum, is likely to prevent

serious injury to the child.”

Id. Gnternal citations and citation omitted).

The standard of review in dependency cases

requires an appellate court to accept the findings of

fact and credibility determinations of the juvenile

court if they are supported by the record; but it does

not require the appellate court to accept the juvenile

court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Interest of

LR.-R., 208 A.3d 514, 519 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)). As such,

we review for an abuse of discretion. Id.

Instantly, the juvenile court determined the

Agency met its burden of showing that the Child was

without proper parental care. The juvenile court

noted that the parents tethered the Child to a

makeshift bed at various times, including at night,

which caused the court to have serious concerns for

the Child’s safety. See T.C.O. at 11-13. The parents

also continued using the tether after explicitly being

told to stop. See id. at 9. The court concluded:

The parent's’ insistence on

tethering their [C]hild to a

makeshift bed for fear that he

might sneak food, watch

pornography on a cell phone,

have an angry outburst, or throw

objects, places his health, safety,

App-25

and welfare at risk. For these

reasons, the court found that [the

Agency] has proven that the

[C]hild was without proper

parental care and control and

that such care and control was

not immediately available.

Id. at 13.

Mother’s argument largely revolves around

the alleged legality of the tether. Mother cites

numerous statutes in support of her argument, and

ultimately asserts:

[T]he Trial Court erred in finding

of [the Child] dependent based on

the use of the tether system and

should have allowed continued

use of the tethering system based on

the law and the fact that it was part

of a licensed therapist’s

treatment plan and agreed to by

[the Child] who was of age to

agree to his own mental health

treatment.

Mother’s Brief at 56 (citation omitted).

Mother’s argument fails to appreciate the

posture of the civil case before us. The juvenile court

did not determine whether Mother acted criminally.

Instead, it determined that Mother did not provide

the care necessary for the Child’s physical, mental,

App-26

and emotional health. Our review is focused on

whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in

reaching its conclusions. In this proceeding, the

courts are not focused on the legality of the tether.

Whether the tether was legal is irrelevant to our

analysis, as the juvenile court could have found the

Child dependent regardless of the legality of the

tether.

After review we conclude that juvenile court’s

dependency determination was supported by the

record. The family tethered the Child at various

times, including overnight. The juvenile court had

serious concerns for the Child’s safety because the

tether could prevent the Child from getting help or

removing himself in the case of an emergency or

fire in the home. See T.C.O. at 12. Regardless of

Mother’s insistence that using the tether was legal,

the court acted within its discretion when it found

that restraining the child placed his health, safety,

and welfare at risk; that the Child was without

proper parental care and control; and that such care

and control was not immediately available, given

that the family continued tethering the Child after

being told to stop. See id. at 9. In addition to the

improper use of the tether, the Child’s mental health

was not being properly addressed. See id. at 11-18.

Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

dependency adjudication. Mother’s fifth issue merits

no relief.

Mother’s sixth issue relates to the second prong

of the dependency analysis — ie. the Child’s

disposition post-adjudication. Mother argues that

the juvenile court erred in finding that the Agency

made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the

App-27

Child, and the court failed to “ensure that the Agency

provided adequate services and help to the family to

eliminate the need for continued removal.” Mother’s

Brief at 37 (citation omitted).

In In re D.A., A Minor, 801 A.2d 614 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (en banc), this Court explained:

If the court finds that the child is

dependent, then the court may

make an appropriate disposition

of the child to protect the child’s

physical, mental and moral

welfare, including allowing the

child to remain with the parents

subject to supervision,

transferring temporary legal

custody to a relative or a private

or public agency, or transferring

custody to the juvenile court of

another state. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

635 1(a).

Id. at 617 (citation omitted); see also In re M.L., 757

A.2d 849, 850-51 (Pa. 2000).

However, even after adjudicating a child

dependent, a court may not separate that child from

the parent unless it finds that the separation is

clearly necessary. Interest of N.S., 237 A.3d 546,

551 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations omitted). Such

necessity is implicated where the welfare of the child

demands that they be taken from their parents’

custody. Id. (citation omitted). “Clear necessity” is

established when the court determines that

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