Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Chicago Wine Company, et al., Petitioners v. Mike Braun, Governor of Indiana, et al.

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CHICAGO WINE COMPANY, LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

MIKE BRAUN, GOVERNOR OF INDIANA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ZAYN SIDDIQUE

LOUIS A. MURRAY

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

JAMES A. TANFORD

ROBERT D. EPSTEIN

EPSTEIN SEIF

PORTER & BEUTEL, LLP

50 South Meridian Street,

Suite 505

Indianapolis, IN 46204

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Counsel of Record

MASHA G. HANSFORD

ABIGAIL FRISCH VICE

KRISTA A. STAPLEFORD

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a physical-presence requirement that forbids out-of-state retailers from shipping alcohol directly

to in-state consumers unless they establish an in-state

physical presence is constitutional under the Commerce

Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioners are Chicago Wine Company, LLC; Dennis

Neary; Cynthia Springer; Stan Springer; and Devin

Warner. Petitioner Chicago Wine Company, LLC, has no

parent corporation, and no public company holds 10% or

more of its stock.

Respondents are Mike Braun, Governor of Indiana;

Theodore Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana; Jessica

Allen, Chairwoman of the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco

Commission; and Wine & Spirits Distributors of Indiana.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (S.D. Ind.):

Chicago Wine Co. v. Holcomb, Civ. No. 19-2785 (Mar.

30, 2021)

United States Court of Appeals (7th Cir.):

Chicago Wine Co. v. Braun, No. 21-2068 (Aug. 5, 2025)

(II)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below ................................................................................ 1

Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 1

Constitutional and statutory provisions involved....................... 2

Statement ......................................................................................... 2

A. Background ........................................................................ 3

B. Facts and procedural history ........................................... 6

Argument ......................................................................................... 9

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 10

Appendix A .................................................................................... 1a

Appendix B .................................................................................. 37a

Appendix C .................................................................................. 61a

Appendix D .................................................................................. 63a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

B-21 Wines, Inc. v. Bauer,

36 F.4th 214 (4th Cir. 2022),

cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 567 (2023) ................................. 8, 9

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005)................... 4, 5, 6, 9

North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) ........... 5

Sarasota Wine Market, LLC v. Schmitt,

987 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 335 (2021) ..................................... 9

Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association

v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504 (2019) ..................... 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9

Constitution and statutes:

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ............................................. 2-7, 9

U.S. Const. Amend. XXI, § 2 ..........................2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9

28 U.S.C. 1254(1) ...................................................................... 2

42 U.S.C. 1983 ........................................................................... 7

Ind. Code § 7.1-3-15-3(d) ..................................................... 2, 7

(III)

IV

Page

Statute—continued:

Ind. Code § 7.1-5-11-1.5(a) ...................................................... 7

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No.

CHICAGO WINE COMPANY, LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

MIKE BRAUN, GOVERNOR OF INDIANA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Chicago Wine Company, LLC; Dennis Neary; Cynthia Springer; Stan Springer; and Devin Warner respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a36a) is reported at 148 F.4th 530. The opinion of the district court (App., infra, 37a-60a) is reported at 532 F.

Supp. 3d 702.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

August 5, 2025. A petition for rehearing was denied on

(1)

2

August 29, 2025 (App., infra, 61a-62a). On November 20,

2025, Justice Barrett extended the time within which to

file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including January 12, 2026. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides:

The Congress shall have Power * * * [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among

the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.

Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment to the

United States Constitution provides:

The transportation or importation into any State,

Territory, or possession of the United States for

delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

Section 7.1-3-15-3(d) of the Indiana Code provides:

A wine delivery may only be performed by the permit holder or an employee who holds an employee

permit.

STATEMENT

This case presents a question closely related to the important question pending before this Court in Day v.

Henry, No. 25-788: whether the Commerce Clause and

the Twenty-first Amendment permit a State to impose a

physical-presence requirement that discriminates against

out-of-state alcohol retailers.

Petitioners are an Illinois-based wine retailer that

wishes to ship directly to Indiana consumers without

maintaining physical premises in Indiana; the retailer’s

3

owner; and Indiana consumers who wish to receive shipments from that retailer. As in Day, petitioners brought

a Commerce Clause challenge to the state physical-presence requirement that prohibits those shipments. The

Seventh Circuit upheld Indiana’s physical-presence requirement in an unusual two-judge decision based on two

incompatible lines of reasoning. One judge determined

that Indiana’s requirement did not discriminate between

in-state and out-of-state commerce in the first place, while

indicating that if it were discriminatory, it would be unconstitutional. The other judge determined that Indiana’s

requirement was discriminatory but nonetheless permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment.

If this Court were to grant review in Day, which presents a related question about the circumstances under

which the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first

Amendment permit a State to impose a physical-presence

requirement that discriminates against out-of-state alcohol retailers, its decision in that case would provide substantial guidance for the proper resolution of this one. Accordingly, the petition should be held pending the disposition of Day and then disposed of as appropriate.

A. Background

1. a. The Commerce Clause provides that “[t]he

Congress shall have Power * * * [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several

States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. Art. I,

§ 8, cl. 3. “Although the Clause is framed as a positive

grant of power to Congress, [this Court] ha[s] long held

that this Clause also prohibits state laws that unduly restrict interstate commerce.” Tennessee Wine & Spirits

Retailers Association v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504, 514 (2019)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That

principle—the “negative” or “dormant” “aspect of the

4

Commerce Clause”—“prevents the States from adopting

protectionist measures and thus preserves a national

market for goods and services.” Ibid. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment prohibits

the “transportation or importation into any State * * *

for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the” State’s laws. U.S. Const. Amend. XXI, § 2. As

this Court has explained, that provision authorizes States

to “maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, importation,

and use.” Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005).

b. The Court’s most recent decisions addressing the

relationship between the Commerce Clause and the

Twenty-first Amendment are Granholm v. Heald, 544

U.S. 460 (2005), and Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers

Association v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504 (2019).

In Granholm, the Court analyzed Michigan and New

York laws permitting in-state wineries to sell and ship directly to consumers while prohibiting out-of-state wineries from doing so (or making direct sales economically impracticable). 544 U.S. at 465-466. The Court held that the

laws “discriminate[d] against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause” and that the discrimination was “neither authorized nor permitted by the

Twenty-first Amendment.” Id. at 466. Addressing the relationship between the Commerce Clause and Twentyfirst Amendment, the Court explained that “the Twentyfirst Amendment does not supersede other provisions of

the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the

rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference

to their own producers.” Id. at 486.

Many States use a three-tier system of licensing as the

basic framework of state alcohol regulation. That system

5

first developed in response to an uptick in “tied-house” arrangements in the post-Civil War period, in which a producer of alcohol also ran the saloon hosting its purchase

and consumption—incentivizing irresponsible consumption and causing social problems. See Tennessee Wine,

588 U.S. at 521 & n.7. To combat those arrangements,

States often adopted a “three-tier” system of licensing,

which separates producers, wholesalers, and retailers.

See id. at 535. The defendant States in Granholm had

urged that invalidating their direct-shipment restrictions

would “call into question the constitutionality of the threetier system” that the Court had previously approved. 544

U.S. at 488-489. But the Court rejected that argument. It

observed that the three-tier system separating producers,

wholesalers, and retailers is “unquestionably legitimate.”

Id. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495

U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion)). And it proceeded

to distinguish the state laws at issue in that case, which

allowed only in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers, as “straightforward attempts to discriminate” against

interstate commerce. Ibid. The Court reaffirmed that

“state regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause,” and it ultimately invalidated the discriminatory regulations. Id. at

487, 493.

In Tennessee Wine, the Court considered a law that

required an individual to reside in Tennessee for two

years before seeking a license to operate a liquor store in

the State. See 588 U.S. at 510. The Court reiterated that

state alcohol regulation violates the dormant Commerce

Clause when it is “aimed at giving a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.” Id. at 531. The Court explained that a State’s regulation of in-state alcohol distribution will survive constitutional scrutiny only if it “can be

justified as a public health or safety measure or on some

6

other legitimate nonprotectionist ground.” Id. at 539.

“[M]ere pretences” would not suffice, the Court emphasized, id. at 522-523 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); States were not permitted “to impose protectionist measures clothed as police-power regulations,” id.

at 528.

Applying those principles, the Court concluded that

the Tennessee law could not be sustained. The Court first

determined that Tennessee’s durational-residency requirement “discriminate[d] on its face against nonresidents.” Tennessee Wine, 588 U.S. at 539. The Court next

analyzed whether the durational-residency requirement

was justified on nonprotectionist grounds under the

Twenty-first Amendment. The Court rejected an argument that “Granholm’s discussion of the three-tiered

model” supported the State. Id. at 535. The Court explained that what was at issue was not “the basic threetiered model of separating producers, wholesalers, and

retailers,” but rather a specific durational-residency requirement that Tennessee had imposed on applicants for

liquor store licenses. Ibid. That requirement, the Court

explained, was “not an essential feature of a three-tiered

scheme.” Ibid. Assessing the record, the Court identified

no “concrete evidence” showing that the durational-residency requirement promoted legitimate state interests or

that nondiscriminatory alternatives would be insufficient.

Id. at 540 (quoting Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490). Accordingly, the Court held that Tennessee’s durational-residency requirement “violate[d] the Commerce Clause and

[was] not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.” Id. at

543.

B. Facts And Procedural History

1. Indiana, like many other States, regulates the importation and distribution of alcohol through a three-tier

7

system. App., infra, 8a-9a. A three-tier system separates

the sale and distribution of alcohol among producers,

wholesalers, and retailers. Producers may generally sell

alcohol only to licensed wholesalers, which in turn must

sell to licensed retailers. Generally, only licensed retailers

may sell alcohol to consumers (although certain wineries

may sell directly to consumers as well). Of particular relevance here, Indiana allows retailers to deliver alcohol to

a customer’s residence only if they have a permit. See

Ind. Code § 7.1-3-15-3(d) (2025); see also Ind. Code § 7.15-11-1.5(a) (2024) (prohibiting retailers that lack a permit

from shipping alcohol directly to consumers). While the

text of the Indiana law does not limit permits to in-state

retailers, the State has conceded that, in practice, it issues

those permits only to retailers that have a physical presence in Indiana. App., infra, 9a-10a.

2. Petitioner Chicago Wine Company, LLC, is a retailer of fine wines licensed in Illinois that ships to customers in Illinois and other States. It is owned and operated

by petitioner Devin Warner. Chicago Wine seeks to ship

wine to customers in Indiana, but Indiana law prohibits it

from doing so. App., infra, 38a-39a. The remaining individual petitioners are Indiana consumers who wish to order wine from Chicago Wine to their Indiana addresses,

but cannot do so under Indiana law. Id. at 39a-40a.

On July 8, 2019, petitioners sued various Indiana officials, respondents here, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Indiana. App., infra, 38a. Petitioners alleged that Indiana’s physical-presence requirement discriminated

against out-of-state retailers in violation of the Commerce

Clause and could not be saved by the Twenty-first

Amendment. Id. at 41a.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor

of respondents on the physical-presence requirement.

8

App., infra, 59a. The court reasoned that Indiana law

“treats in-state and out-of-state wine retailers identically”

by requiring them both to have in-state presences to ship

to consumers. Id. at 55a. And it concluded that, regardless, the State could justify the restriction on nonprotectionist grounds as a legitimate health and safety measure.

Id. at 57a.

3. The court of appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion after Judge Kanne, a member of the panel at the time

of argument, died. App., infra, 1a-2a. The two remaining

judges on the panel agreed that the regulations were constitutional, but based “on two different lines of reasoning.”

Id. at 2a.

a. Judge Easterbrook wrote one opinion, concluding

that Indiana’s physical-presence requirement did not discriminate against out-of-state citizens or products because the requirements applied “equally” to in-state and

out-of-state retailers. App., infra, 5a-6a. Judge Easterbrook acknowledged contrary authority from the Fourth

Circuit on that question. Id. at 7a (citing B-21 Wines, Inc.

v. Bauer, 36 F.4th 214 (4th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S.

Ct. 567 (2023)). But he expressed “skeptic[ism]” about the

Fourth Circuit’s decision because it upheld the challenged

physical-presence provision despite finding it was discriminatory. Ibid. That could not be correct, Judge

Easterbrook reasoned, because “a trans-border delivery

rule that discriminates against interstate commerce is

forbidden” after Tennessee Wine. Ibid.

b. Judge Scudder wrote a separate opinion, determining (contrary to Judge Easterbrook) that Indiana’s

physical-presence requirement was discriminatory. App.,

infra, 14a-16a. Having so determined, Judge Scudder

proceeded to consider whether Section 2 of the Twentyfirst Amendment justified Indiana’s law. Id. at 18a.

Judge Scudder observed that other circuits had upheld

9

physical-presence requirements simply because they

were an “essential feature of a three-tiered scheme.” Id.

at 20a (citing B-21 Wines, 36 F.4th at 227-229, and Sarasota Wine Market, LLC v. Schmitt, 987 F.3d 1171, 11831184 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 335 (2021)). In

Judge Scudder’s view, however, those decisions could not

be reconciled with Tennessee Wine because they “read[]

far too much into Granholm’s discussion of the threetiered model.” Ibid. (quoting Tennessee Wine, 588 U.S. at

535). Judge Scudder instead reasoned that it was “necessary * * * to look at the specific regulation at issue and

the State’s evidentiary showing to support it.” Id. at 19a.

After considering that evidence, Judge Scudder ultimately concluded that Indiana’s law was constitutional because, in his view, Indiana had offered sufficient evidence

that its regulation’s main effect was maintaining public

health and safety. App., infra, 21a-26a.

4. The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing. App., infra, 61a-62a.

ARGUMENT

This petition presents a question closely related to the

question in Day v. Henry, No. 25-788: whether a State

may require an out-of-state alcohol retailer to have an instate physical presence in order to ship directly to consumers within that State. Both opinions below recognized

that the constitutionality of physical-presence requirements has divided the circuits. And both opinions invoked

Day in upholding Indiana’s physical-presence requirement. App., infra, 6a, 19a.

As the petition in Day explains, review is warranted in

that case to resolve an acknowledged circuit conflict on an

important question about the intersection of the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment. See Pet.

at 15-34, Day v. Henry, No. 25-788 (filed Dec. 30, 2025). If

10

this Court grants review in Day, its decision would provide substantial guidance as to how courts should evaluate

the constitutionality of physical-presence requirements.

This petition should thus be held pending the disposition

of the petition in Day and then disposed of as appropriate.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be held

pending this Court’s disposition of the petition in Day v.

Henry, No. 25-788, and then disposed of accordingly.

Respectfully submitted.

ZAYN SIDDIQUE

LOUIS A. MURRAY

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

JAMES A. TANFORD

ROBERT D. EPSTEIN

EPSTEIN SEIF

PORTER & BEUTEL, LLP

50 South Meridian Street,

Suite 505

Indianapolis, IN 46204

JANUARY 2026

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

MASHA G. HANSFORD

ABIGAIL FRISCH VICE

KRISTA A. STAPLEFORD

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com