Amicus Curiae Brief — New York Football Giants, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Brian Flores

No. 25-790

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

NEW YORK FOOTBALL GIANTS, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

BRIAN FLORES,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit

BRIEF OF ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION

& WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Lawrence S. Ebner

Counsel of Record

Atlantic Legal Foundation

1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 729-6337

lawrence.ebner@atlanticlegal.org

Grant W. Hollingsworth

Brett S. Covington

Hollingsworth LLP

1350 I Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 898-5800

Cory L. A ndrews

Washington Legal Foundation

2009 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 588-0302

candrews@wlf.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae

120879

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ...................................... ii

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE........................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 6

A.

Federal statutory claims may be adjudicated through

arbitration ............................................................ 6

B.

The effective-vindication exception to the FAA is

limited to arbitrations that would preclude

enforcement of federal statutory rights ................. 7

C.

Neither the federal statute nor the arbitration

provision at issue precludes arbitration of

Respondent’s statutory claims ................................ 8

D.

The effective-vindication exception forbids

speculation about the arbitration proceeding,

including about the impartiality of the

arbitrator .......................................................... 10

E.

The Court should grant certiorari to prevent

reviewing courts from speculating about

arbitration proceedings in violation of this

Court’s precedents and the fundamental

purpose of the FAA ........................................... 13

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,

556 U.S. 247 (2009) ............................................. 3

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,

570 U.S. 228 (2013) ..................... 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 14

Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.,

413 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts,

C.J.) .................................................................... 13

Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski,

599 U.S. 736 (2023) ............................................. 1

Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski,

602 U.S. 143 (2024) ............................................. 1

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,

565 U.S. 95 (2012) ............................................. 10

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,

470 U.S. 213 (1985) ........................................... 14

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,

584 U.S. 497 (2018) ......................................... 2, 7

Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock,

No. 24-935 (U.S. 2025) ........................................ 1

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,

500 U.S. 20 (1991) ........................................... 8, 9

iii

Green Tree Fin. Corp.- Ala. v. Randolph,

531 U.S. 79 (2000) ......................... 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 13

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler

Plymouth, Inc.,

473 U.S. 614 (1985) ............................... 3, 7, 8, 11

Morgan v. Sundance,

596 U.S. 411 (2022) ............................................. 2

PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book,

538 U.S. 401 (2003) ..................................... 12, 13

Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson,

561 U.S. 63 (2010) ....................................... 2, 8, 9

Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,

482 U.S. 220 (1987) ........................... 2, 5, 8, 9, 11

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana,

596 U.S. 639 (2022) ............................................. 2

Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V

Sky Reefer,

515 U.S. 528 (1995) ..................................... 12, 13

Statutes

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)................................................... 11

42 U.S.C. § 1981 ................................. 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10

42 U.S.C. § 1981 note to 1991 amendment ......... 5, 9

1

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 1

Established in 1977, the Atlantic Legal Foundation

(ALF) (atlanticlegal.org) is a national, nonprofit,

nonpartisan, public interest law firm. ALF’s mission

is to advance the rule of law and civil justice by

advocating for individual liberty, free enterprise,

property rights, limited and responsible government,

sound science in judicial and regulatory proceedings,

and effective education, including parental rights and

school choice. With the benefit of guidance from the

distinguished legal scholars, corporate legal officers,

private practitioners, business executives, and

prominent scientists who serve on its Board of

Directors and Advisory Council, ALF pursues its

mission by participating as amicus curiae in carefully

selected appeals before the Supreme Court, federal

courts of appeals, and state supreme courts. These

include cases involving the primacy of the Federal

Arbitration Act (FAA) and the enforceability of

contractual arbitration provisions. See, e.g., Flowers

Foods, Inc. v. Brock, No. 24-935 (U.S. 2025); Coinbase,

Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. 143 (2024); Coinbase, Inc. v.

Bielski, 599 U.S. 736 (2023).

Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) (wlf.org) is a

nonprofit, public-interest law firm and policy center

with supporters nationwide. WLF promotes free

enterprise, individual rights, limited government, and

1 Petitioners’ and Respondent’s counsel were provided timely

notice of this brief in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.2.

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or part, and

no party, counsel for a party, or person other than amici curiae

and their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund

preparation or submission of this brief.

2

the rule of law. WLF often appears as an amicus

curiae in important arbitration cases. See, e.g., Viking

River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639 (2022);

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (2018). WLF’s

Legal Studies Division also regularly publishes papers

by outside experts on arbitration. See, e.g., John F.

Querio, Courts in California Enable End-Run of

Federal Arbitration Act by Expanding Obscure State

Labor Law, Wash. Legal Found. (June 16, 2017).

***

The FAA “establishes a federal policy favoring

arbitration[.]” Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.

McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). This means that

“a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract

just as the court would to any other kind” of contract.

Morgan v. Sundance, 596 U.S. 411, 418 (2022). The

Second Circuit’s flawed decision—including its

improper expansion of the narrow effectivevindication exception to the FAA—renders a valid

arbitration provision unenforceable whenever a judge

speculates that certain arbitral procedures, which the

parties agreed to follow, might be “unfair.”

This Court should grant certiorari and reverse the

Second Circuit’s opinion to prevent district courts

from deciding for themselves—in violation of the FAA

and the Court’s precedents—whether contracting

parties’ agreements to arbitrate are fair.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court has long recognized that “federal

statutory claims can be appropriately resolved

through arbitration and has enforced agreements

involving such claims.” Green Tree Fin. Corp.- Ala. v.

Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 80 (2000); see also Rent-A-Ctr.,

3

W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (sending to

arbitration claims brought under Section 1981 of the

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981). In this

case, Respondent Flores, a coach with the National

Football League (“NFL”), filed an employment

discrimination lawsuit asserting claims under Section

1981. The Second Circuit’s decision affirming the

district court’s order denying in part the motion to

compel arbitration as to the NFL and certain NFL

teams was based, in part, upon its improper expansion

of the “judge-made exception” to the FAA known as the

“effective vindication” exception. Am. Express Co. v.

Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013).

Under this narrow exception, which is the focus of

this amicus brief, a court can refuse to enforce an

arbitration provision if it would preclude the litigant

from effectively vindicating his federal statutory

rights. See id. at 235-36 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors

Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,

637 (1985)) (“The ‘effective vindication’ exception to

which respondents allude originated as . . . a

willingness to invalidate, on ‘public policy’ grounds,

arbitration agreements that ‘operat[e] . . . as a

prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue

statutory remedies.’”). This Court, however, has never

invalidated an arbitration provision based on this

exception. See, e.g., id. (holding that effectivevindication exception did not apply to claims brought

under federal antitrust statute); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.

Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273 (2009) (effective-vindication

exception did not apply to claims brought under the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Green Tree

Fin., 531 U.S. at 82 (effective-vindication exception

4

did not apply to claims brought under the Truth in

Lending Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act).

Although the Second Circuit panel claimed that it

applied the effective-vindication exception “for the

same reasons that the alleged arbitration provision

lacks FAA protection,” Pet. App. 24a, it did not

meaningfully consider this Court’s precedents that

clearly establish the extremely narrow scope of the

exception. 2

More specifically, the Court has limited the

potential application of the effective-vindication

exception to two possible circumstances where federal

statutory rights are at issue: (1) where an arbitration

provision “forbid[s] the assertion of certain statutory

rights,” or (2) where the exception “would perhaps

cover filing and administrative fees attached to

arbitration that are so high as to make access to the

forum impracticable.’” Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 236.

Although neither circumstance is present here, see

Pet. at 5-6, the panel completely disregarded these

express limitations as to when the effectivevindication exception may apply.

In its most glaring error, the panel ignored this

Court’s guidance requiring courts to analyze the

federal statute and arbitration provision to determine

whether either forbids adjudication of the federal

statutory claims in arbitration. See, e.g., Italian

Colors, 570 U.S. at 236 (examining whether “a

provision in an arbitration agreement forbid[s] the

2 The Second Circuit erred as to whether the NFL Constitution

provides for arbitration “in name only,” see Pet. at 11, but the

focus of this brief is on the effective-vindication exception.

5

assertion of certain statutory rights”). Nowhere in its

opinion did the Second Circuit examine the text and

history of Section 1981; the specific relief that

Respondent seeks under that federal statute; whether

that federal statute prohibits arbitration of claims

brought under that law; or whether the arbitration

provision expressly prohibited or would have the effect

of preventing Respondent from adjudicating his

Section 1981 claims in arbitration. Had the court of

appeals done so, it would have been compelled to

conclude that none of these concerns is present.

The Second Circuit’s errors are made obvious by

the text of Section 1981, which expressly recognizes

that “arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes

arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law

amended by this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note to 1991

amendment

(Alternative

Means

of

Dispute

Resolution). Untethered to any textual or historical

underpinnings to the relevant statute or arbitration

provision, the Second Circuit wielded the narrow

effective-vindication exception as a trump card to

invalidate an agreed-to arbitration provision in a way

that this Court never has done before.

The Second Circuit’s improper expansion of the

effective-vindication exception also fails to consider

this Court’s precedents on which party bears the

burden of proof. The Court has repeatedly instructed

that “[t]he burden is on the party opposing arbitration

. . . to show that Congress intended to preclude a

waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at

issue.” McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. The Second

Circuit’s opinion provides no such discussion, and the

6

plain text of Section 1981 and the arbitration

provision provide evidence to the contrary.

Finally, in speculating about what might happen

during an arbitration proceeding, the Second Circuit’s

approach encourages other courts to disfavor, or

reject, the enforcement of arbitration provisions. This

type of subjective and arbitrary decision-making is

forbidden by this Court’s effective-vindication

precedents and undoubtedly would lead to

inconsistent results among courts when ruling on

motions to compel arbitration.

The Court should grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari and honor the FAA’s fundamental purpose

of honoring arbitration agreements by reaffirming the

narrow scope of the effective-vindication exception.

ARGUMENT

A. Federal statutory claims may be adjudicated

through arbitration

Congress “enacted the FAA in response to

widespread judicial hostility to arbitration.” Italian

Colors, 570 U.S. at 232 (citation omitted). Under the

FAA, “courts must rigorously enforce arbitration

agreements according to their terms, including terms

that specify with whom the parties choose to arbitrate

their disputes, and the rules under which that

arbitration will be conducted.” Id. at 233 (citation

modified). This “holds true for claims that allege a

violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA’s

mandate has been overridden by a contrary

congressional command.” Id. (citation modified).

The Court has consistently rejected the notion that

federal statutory claims cannot be adjudicated in

7

arbitration. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S.

497, 516 (2018) (recognizing “this Court has rejected

every such effort to date”). As the Court stated in Green

Tree Financial, “[i]n light of the FAA’s purpose to

reverse longstanding hostility to arbitration

agreements and to place them on the same footing as

other contracts,” the “Court has recognized that

federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved

through arbitration and has enforced agreements

involving such claims.” 531 U.S. at 80 (citation

modified).

B. The effective-vindication exception to the

FAA is limited to arbitrations that would

preclude enforcement of federal statutory

rights

The effective-vindication exception “originated as

dictum in Mitsubishi Motors,” where this Court

“expressed a willingness to invalidate, on ‘public

policy’ grounds, arbitration agreements that ‘operat[e]

… as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue

statutory remedies.’” Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 235

(quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (1985)).

To determine whether a party’s right to pursue

federal statutory remedies would be precluded if

adjudicated in arbitration, courts must examine both

the text of the arbitration provision and the federal

statute at issue. For example, if there is “a provision

in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion

of certain statutory rights,” then the effectivevindication exception may apply. Italian Colors, 570

U.S. at 236. The exception also may apply if the

federal statute prohibits the arbitration of claims

brought thereunder. See id. at 228-29 (quoting

8

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (Sherman and Clayton

antitrust laws do not “evince[] an intention to

preclude” resolution of those federal statutory rights

in arbitration).

The effective-vindication exception should not be

applied to invalidate the arbitration provision unless

there is explicit evidence of Congress’ intent to

preclude arbitration of claims protected by that

federal statute. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238

(“[T]here is nothing in the text of the RICO statute

that even arguably evinces congressional intent to

exclude civil RICO claims from the dictates of the

Arbitration Act.”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane

Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (“Having made the

bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it

unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to

preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory

rights at issue.”) (citation modified).

Claims brought under federal anti-discrimination

statutes receive no different treatment. See, e.g.,

Jackson, 561 U.S. at 65, 67–68 (Section 1981 antidiscrimination claims subject to arbitration); Gilmer,

500 U.S. at 26 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act

claims can be adjudicated through arbitration). This

Court’s precedent undeniably confirms Respondent’s

Section 1981 claims may be subject to arbitration.

C. Neither the federal statute nor the arbitration

provision at issue precludes arbitration of

Respondent’s statutory claims

The Court has repeatedly held that “the party

resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that

Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the

statutory claims at issue.” Green Tree Fin., 531 U.S. at

9

81 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26); see also McMahon,

482 U.S. at 227. Respondent bears this burden

because to “invalidate the agreement would

undermine the liberal federal policy favoring

arbitration agreements.” Green Tree Fin., 531 U.S. at

91 (citation modified).

The Second Circuit’s opinion includes no discussion

of whether Section 1981 or the arbitration provision at

issue precludes Respondent from adjudicating his

Section 1981 claims through arbitration. The plain

text of Section 1981 and the arbitration provision

provide evidence to the contrary. Section 1981 forbids

racial discrimination in the making and enforcement

of contracts. The Second Circuit was required to

examine that statute along with the arbitration

provision to determine whether either precludes him

from pursuing his federal statutory claims by

arbitration. The Second Circuit did not undertake this

analysis.

Had the Second Circuit conducted the required

analysis, it would have found that there is nothing in

the text of Section 1981 evincing an intent to prohibit

adjudication of Section 1981 claims in arbitration, as

this Court previously held. See Jackson, 561 U.S. at

65, 67–68 (sending Section 1981 claim to arbitration).

Instead, a review of the law supports adjudicating

Section 1981 claims by arbitration. The 1991

amendments to Section 1981 state: “Where

appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the

use of alternative means of dispute resolution,

including . . . arbitration, is encouraged to resolve

disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of

Federal law amended by this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981

10

note to 1991 amendment (Alternative Means of

Dispute Resolution) (emphasis added).

Where neither the text nor the legislative history

of a federal statute establishes an intent to preclude

arbitration of claims, this Court is loath to find a

conflict with the FAA. For example, in CompuCredit

Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98, 103-05 (2012), the

Court refused to find a conflict with enforcing a

contractual arbitration provision even though the

federal statute, the Credit Repair Organizations Act,

provides a “right to sue,” repeatedly uses the words

“action and court,” and even declares that “[a]ny

waiver by any consumer of any protection provided by

or any right of the consumer under this subchapter

. . . shall be treated as void.”

There is nothing in the arbitration provision at

issue here that forbids or otherwise precludes

Respondent from seeking to adjudicate his Section

1981 claims in arbitration. See App. 5a. The FAA and

this Court’s precedents preclude a court from negating

the parties’ agreement to arbitrate where, as here, the

statute and arbitration provision both allow

arbitration of the statutory claims. See Italian Colors,

570 U.S. at 236.

D. The effective-vindication exception forbids

speculation about the arbitration proceeding,

including about the impartiality of the

arbitrator

The Second Circuit’s holding partially denying the

motion to compel arbitration rested entirely upon its

subjective view that the NFL Commissioner

categorically could not be an impartial arbitrator and

thus that Respondent would be unable to effectively

11

vindicate his claims in arbitration. See Pet. App. 55a

(holding that submitting Respondent’s claims “to the

unilateral substantive and procedural discretion of

the NFL Commissioner – the principal executive of

one of Flores’s adverse parties – provides for

arbitration in name only . . . .”). But each time this

Court has discussed the effective-vindication

exception, it has cautioned courts against this very

type of speculation about the potential impartiality of

an arbitrator. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634

(“We decline to indulge the presumption that the

parties and the arbitral body conducting a proceeding

will be unable or unwilling to retain competent,

conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.”). The

Second Circuit disregarded this precedent.

A court considering a motion to compel arbitration

should not make presumptions about the impartiality

of arbitrators before the arbitration proceeds. See

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232 (“We have indicated that

there is no reason to assume at the outset that

arbitrators will not follow the law . . .”). Instead, the

appropriate method of challenging allegations of

arbitrator bias is to pursue the underlying claims

through arbitration and then seek judicial review

challenging the arbitration award under Section 10 of

the FAA. See id. (“[A]lthough judicial scrutiny of

arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review

is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the

requirements of the statute.”); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (“In

any of the following cases the United States court in

and for the district wherein the award was made may

make an order vacating the award upon the

application of any party to the arbitration where there

12

was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,

or either of them.”) (citation modified).

Speculation of any kind about what might happen

during arbitration has no place in deciding whether

the effective-vindication exception applies.

For example, in PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v.

Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003), this Court refused to

determine whether the arbitration provision’s bar on

punitive damages prohibited awarding the treble

damages available under the RICO statute. As this

Court stated, “we should not, on the basis of ‘mere

speculation’ that an arbitrator might interpret these

ambiguous agreements in a manner that casts their

enforceability into doubt, take upon ourselves the

antecedent question of how the ambiguity is to be

resolved.” Id. at 406-07. Similarly, in Vimar Seguros y

Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, this Court

enforced an arbitration clause after holding that

“mere speculation” that the foreign arbitrator “might”

apply foreign law that “might” be less favorable than

a federal statute did not provide a basis for declaring

the relevant arbitration agreement unenforceable. 515

U.S. 528, 540 (1995).

Chief Justice Roberts, while on the D.C. Circuit,

said it best when summarizing “two basic

propositions” from this Court’s precedents on the

effective-vindication exception:

[F]irst, that the party resisting arbitration

on the ground that the terms of an

arbitration agreement interfere with the

effective vindication of statutory rights

bears the burden of showing the likelihood

of such interference, and second, that this

13

burden cannot be carried by “mere

speculation” about how an arbitrator

“might” interpret or apply the agreement.

Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (refusing to

apply

effective-vindication

exception

where

arbitration provision gave arbitrator broad discretion

over scope and method of discovery).

Discussing this Court’s precedents, then-Circuit

Judge Roberts reasoned that “[u]nder the approach set

forth in PacifiCare, Green Tree Finance, and Vimar,

such speculation about what might happen in the

arbitral forum is plainly insufficient to render the

agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.” Id. The Second

Circuit’s decision, which rests entirely on speculation

and circular reasoning, see Pet. App. 59a, violates

these “basic propositions.” Booker, 413 F.3d at 81.

In short, the Second Circuit assumed too much in

speculating that Respondent might have prospectively

waived his federal statutory rights by agreeing to the

arbitration requirement in the NFL’s constitution

before any actions indicating ineffective vindication

could arise.

E. The Court should grant certiorari to prevent

reviewing courts from speculating about

arbitration proceedings in violation of this

Court’s precedents and the fundamental

purpose of the FAA

By conjuring a parade of horribles that might

happen during an arbitration proceeding, the Second

Circuit’s decision risks encouraging other courts to

disfavor or reject the enforcement of contractual

14

arbitration provisions. Fundamentally, the Second

Circuit’s decision is contrary to the FAA’s

“overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of

contract,” Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 233, and that

courts must “rigorously enforce” an arbitration

provision according to its terms. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). To

allow courts to address premature or speculative

questions about arbitration procedures would deny

the parties their agreement to arbitrate claims and

disputes. See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 233. Such an

approach results in the type of “preliminary litigating

hurdle [that] would undoubtedly destroy the prospect

of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and

bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to

secure.” Id. at 239. The FAA does “not sanction such a

judicially created superstructure,” id., which is

precisely what the Second Circuit’s decision imposes.

If left standing, the Second Circuit’s decision will

pry wide open a narrow exception created by this

Court without providing a workable standard or

meaningful guidelines for lower courts to follow in

determining whether federal statutory rights can be

effectively vindicated in arbitration. This would

promote inconsistent results among the courts, often

in direct conflict with the purpose of the FAA. Courts

would be substituting their own subjective beliefs

about what arbitration should look like instead of

following this Court’s precedents and honoring the

parties’ contractual bargains in this case and in the

host of industrial, commercial, professional, and

entrepreneurial communities standing to be adversely

impacted by such an unprecedented decision.

15

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

LAWRENCE S. EBNER

Counsel of Record

ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION

1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 729-6337

lawrence.ebner@atlanticlegal.org

CORY L. ANDREWS

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

2009 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 588-0302

candrews@wlf.org

GRANT W. HOLLINGSWORTH

BRETT S. COVINGTON

HOLLINGSWORTH LLP

1350 I Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 898-5800

ghollingsworth@hollingsworthllp.com

bcovington@hollingsworthllp.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

February 2026