Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Michael Wood, Petitioner v. Deanna Williamson

Supreme Court briefSep 15, 2025

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APPENDIX

la-20a

Wood v. Williamson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 20897

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

August 15, 2025, Filed

No. 25-3096

Reporter

2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 20897 * | 2025 LX 385763

MICHAEL WOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEANNA WILLIAMSON, Individual and Official Capacity,

Defendant-Appellee.

Core Terms

petition for rehearing, en banc

Counsel: [* 1] MICHAEL WOOD, Plaintiff - Appellant, Pro se, London, OH.

Judges: BEFORE: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

ORDER

The court received a petition for rehearing en banc. The original panel has reviewed the

petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered

upon the original submission and decision of the case. The petition then was circulated to the

full court. No judge has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

App. la

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

/-------------------------------

No. 25-3096

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Jun 30, 2025

KELLY L STEPHENS, Clerk

MICHAEL WOOD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

DEANNA WILLIAMSON, Individual and Official

Capacity,

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF

OHIO

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER

Before: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

Michael Wood, a pro se Ohio prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action for failure to state a claim. This case has been referred to a

panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). For the following reasons, we affirm.

Wood sued Deanna Williamson, a “mental health and addiction services clinician” at the

London Correctional Institution, where Wood is incarcerated. According to the complaint, despite

not being required to participate in any recovery services, Wood voluntarily attended an Alcoholics

Anonymous (AA) meeting at the facility. Upon arrival, he placed his name on a “General

Population” attendance sheet as directed by an AA worker. Before the meeting began, Wood

attempted to leave the room to retrieve some legal materials from his dorm when Williamson

stopped and questioned him. Wood told her that he was “going to get something from the dorm.”

but Williamson told him that he was not permitted to leave because he had signed in. When Wood

told Williamson that he was not required to be there, she “became almost frantic” and blocked his

App. 2a

No. 25-3096

-2-

exit, again telling him that “once you are in the building you are not allowed to leave.” Wood

offered to remove his name from the attendance sheet, and Williamson told him, “[F]ine.”

While Wood was in line to remove his name, he “calmly” told Williamson, “You’re being

ridiculous.” Williamson “immediately approached” Wood “from behind” and demanded.his

identification. As Wood left, Williamson again demanded Wood’s identification. Wood told her

that he did not have his identification and left the building. Williamson filed a misconduct report

against Wood, alleging that he violated two prison regulations: refusal to carry out an assignment

and disrespecting an officer or staff member, which Wood alleges was “in retaliation” for his

telling her she was “being ridiculous.” In a hearing on the misconduct report, Wood was found

guilty of the violations of the facility rules and received a 30-day restriction of commissary and

package privileges.

Wood asserted three claims: (1) Williamson’s conduct constituted retaliation in violation

of the First Amendment; (2) her conduct amounted to malicious prosecution; and (3) the prison

regulation prohibiting disrespect was facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to

him. Wood sought the reversal of the disciplinary finding of guilt and expungement of the offense

from his institutional record, monetary damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief.

Upon initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a magistrate judge recommended

dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.

The district court accepted the

recommendation over Wood’s objections.

We review a dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint for failure to state a claim de novo. Grinter

v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 571 (6th Cir. 2008). We must “construe[] the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and accept[] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations.” Prince v. Hicks,

198 F.3d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1999). A complaint sufficiently states a claim if it contains “sufficient

factual matter” that, when taken as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009)).

Though we construe pro se litigants’ complaints liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (per curiam), the allegations must nonetheless be sufficient to enable “the court to draw the

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-3reasonable inference that the defendant is Hable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678.

I. First Amendment Retaliation

First, Wood claims that Williamson violated his First Amendment rights by filing a

misconduct report in retaliation for his comment that she was “being ridiculous.” To state a claim

of retaliation for exercising one’s First Amendment rights, “a plaintiff must show that (1) he

engaged in protected conduct; (2) the defendant took an adverse action against him ‘that would

deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct’; and (3) ... the

adverse action was taken (at least in part) because of the protected conduct.” Thomas v. Eby, 481

F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)

(en banc)). Wood argues that his comment was protected speech because it amounted to filing an

oral grievance. Although a prisoner “has an undisputed First Amendment right to file grievances

against prison officials” and may do so orally or in writing, Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 26465 (6th Cir. 2018), expressing a grievance in a way that “violates a legitimate prison regulation”

is not protected conduct, Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 395.

A prison regulation may curb a prisoner’s speech, rendering the speech unprotected under

the First Amendment, when the prohibition is “reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In determining whether a regulation meets

this standard, courts consider such factors as (1) the rationality of the connection “between the

prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest,” (2) whether the prisoner has an

alternative means of exercising the right,” (3) the impact of accommodating the right on guards,

other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources, and (4) “‘the absence of ready alternatives’

to the regulation for prison officials.” Bethel v. Jenkins, 988 F.3d 931, 939 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90). The “internal security within the corrections facilities” is a legitimate

penological objective, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974), and we afford “wide-ranging

deference” to a prison official’s “adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their

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judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional

security,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).

The regulation at issue here prohibited “[disrespect to an officer, staff member, visitor or

other inmate,” a prohibition.that is; reasonably related to maintaining security, and. order within the

facility. See Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 2015) (reasoning that “insubordinate

speech” and “backtalk” by prisoners is not protected by the First Amendment). Because Wood’s

comment to Williamson violated the legitimate—and as we will discuss below, constitutional

regulation, his conduct was not protected speech, and thus he failed to plead sufficient facts to

establish a claim of First Amendment retaliation.

II. Malicious Prosecution

Next, Wood argues that Williamson’s filing an allegedly false misconduct report against

him constituted malicious prosecution. A claim of malicious prosecution arises under the Fourth

Amendment and

“encompasses wrongful

investigation, prosecution,

conviction,

and

incarceration.” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Barnes v. Wright,

449 F.3d 709,715-16 (6th Cir. 2006)). To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must

allege facts showing that (1) “a criminal prosecution was initiated against [him] and that the

defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute,” (2) “there was a lack of

probable cause for the criminal prosecution,” (3) “as a consequence of a legal proceeding ... [he]

suffered a deprivation of liberty,” and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in his favor. Id. at

308-09 (cleaned up). Even if we assume that a prison disciplinary proceeding constitutes a

criminal prosecution” m this context, the disciplinary proceeding here was not resolved in

Wood’s favor. Consequently, he has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible malicious-

prosecution claim.

III. Constitutionality of Prison Regulation

Next, Wood challenges the constitutionality of the prison regulation that prohibits

disrespect toward an officer or staff member both facially and as applied to him. When challenging

a regulation as facially unconstitutional, a plaintiff must show that it either “reach[es]

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No. 25-3096

-5constitutionally protected conduct” or “is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Belle

Maer Harbor v. Charter Township of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553,557 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Village

of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)). Because, as we

explained above, Wood’s comment was not protected speech under the First Amendment, he must

show that the regulation was impermissibly vague. Although “due process prohibits excessively

vague laws, ... the degree of specificity required in prison regulations is not the same as that

required in other circumstances.” Wolfel v. Morris, 972 F.2d 712, 717 (6th Cir. 1992). A

regulation is not impermissibly vague if it gives a “person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable

opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” Groyned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see also Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391

(1926).

Wood argues that the word “disrespect,” being undefined by the regulation, is

unconstitutionally vague, but in citing the dictionary definition of the word, Wood implicitly

acknowledges that the word should be understood in its common and ordinary meaning. See

Groyned, 408 U.S. at 108; see also Belle Maer Harbor, 170 F.3d at 558 (“[A] failure to define a

term withm a statute or ordinance does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague, where the

common meaning of the word provides both adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and of the

standards for enforcement.”). Wood also identifies comments from other cases that he believes

would amount to disrespect, again reinforcing that the word can be reasonably understood. Also,

in reciting a litany of cases involving what Wood implies is disrespectful speech, he implicitly

acknowledges that the prohibition is not “impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Belle

Maer Harbor, 170 F.3d at 557 (emphasis added). Consequently, Wood has failed to establish that

the regulation is facially unconstitutional.

As to Wood’s as-applied challenge, “the proper inquiry is whether the actions of the prison

officials are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241

F.3d475,483 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Skelton y. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100,103 (6th Cir. 1991)).

As stated above, the regulation at issue was reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest

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No. 25-3096

-6-

of maintaining security and order within the prison facility under the analysis outlined in Turner.

See 482 U.S. at 89-91.

Consequently, Wood has failed to show that the regulation is

unconstitutional as applied to him.

Because Wood has not pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim, the di strict court properly

dismissed the action, and we need not address whether his disciplinary record should be vacated

or expunged.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Kelly L. S^hens, Clerk

App. 7a

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL WOOD,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:24-cv-4096

JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

DEANNA WILLIAMSON,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation issued by the

Magistrate Judge on December 20, 2024. (R&R, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff Michael Wood is an inmate

who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel. {Id. PagelD 49.) After conducting an initial

screen of Mr. Wood’s Complaint, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss his

Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. {Id.) Mr. Wood

timely filed an Objection to the R&R. (Obj., ECF No. 10.)

A litigant who is the subject of an adverse report and recommendation from a magistrate

judge is entitled to de novo review of those portions of the report to which proper objections are

made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Mr. Wood raises four objections to the R&R. He objects to the finding that (1) “[he] failed

to state a First Amendment violation,” (2) “as a prisoner, [he] do[es] not have the right to be free

from a false conduct report,” (3) his “as applied and facial challenges fail due to an extremely

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narrowed review and inadequate analysis,” and (4) he is “not entitled to reversal and expungement

of the finding of guilt.” (Obj., PagelD 57.)

Mr. Wood’s Complaint advances five counts: (1) First Amendment retaliation, (2)

malicious prosecution, (3) facial challenge to several inmate rules of conduct prohibiting

disrespectful behavior, (4) as-applied challenge to the same rules of conduct, and (5) reversal and

expungement of the finding of guilt from a prison misconduct hearing. (See CompL, ECF No. 1.)

The Magistrate Judge explained that Mr. Wood’s First Amendment retaliation claim failed

because his statement to “Defendant [Deanna Williamson] that she was being ridiculous and his

refusal to comply with her directions did not constitute protected conduct.” (R&R, PagelD 52.) To

successfully plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, an inmate must allege that (1) the inmate

engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the inmate that would deter

a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) that adverse action

was motivated, at least in part, by the inmate’s protected conduct. Thaddeus-Xv. Blatter, 175 F.3d

378,394 (6th Cir. 1999). Often it is difficult for an inmate to establish the first prong of the analysis

because prison regulations may infringe on an inmate’s rights so long as they are rationally related

to a legitimate penological interest. Id. at 395 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).

Therefore, if an inmate violates a legitimate prison regulation, that inmate has not engaged in

protected conduct. Id.

Mr. Wood correctly states that a prison inmate retains First Amendment rights that are not

inconsistent with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. (Obj., PagelD

58.) The right to criticize public officials, Mr. Wood argues, is not inconsistent with the

penological objectives of the corrections system. (Id. PagelD 59.) According to Mr. Wood, this

includes the right to file grievances. (Id.} He reasons that by telling Ms. Williamson that she was

App. 9a

being ridiculous, he “expressed a legitimate and meritorious grievance.” (Id. PagelD 60.) Her

conduct report was thus retaliation for his expression of criticism against a public official. (Id.)

Mr. Wood is correct the “prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from

the protections of the Constitution,” (Obj., PagelD 61), but as the Magistrate Judge elucidated, the

Constitution does not protect a prisoner’s right to argue with a prison official or to engage in

disrespectful conduct. (R&R, PagelD 52-53; citing Cooper v. Chambers-Smith, No. 1:23-CV-

1793, 2024 WL 519846, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2024) (“Plaintiff does not have a constitutional

right to argue with a prison officer and the officer’s action in not entertaining the argument did not

violate Plaintiffs right to free speech.”); Williams v. Deputy Crystal Crafton, No. 1:22-CV-P86-

GNS, 2023 WL 121992, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 6,2023) (a “disrespectful/harassing” statement “does

not constitute protected conduct”); Banks v. Turner, No. 3:17-CV-2659,2018 WL 4680439, at * 12 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2018) (Prisoners do not have “a First Amendment right to express

grievances against prison officials” “in a manner that is confrontational or insubordinate, in

violation of a legitimate prison regulation.”).) Thus, although Mr. Woods’ objection is wellargued, it does not change the fact that he did not have a right to be disrespectful, confrontational,

or insubordinate towards Ms. Williamson. Therefore, he did not engage in protected conduct and

cannot succeed on his claim for retaliation.

Next, Mr. Wood argues that because the Court “failed to recognize the First Amendment

retaliation, the court err[]ed by dismissing the malicious prosecution claim.” (Obj., PagelD 61.)

Although Mr. Wood captions Count 2 as a “Malicious Prosecution” claim, the allegations

underlying this count relate to the false conduct report allegedly issued by Ms. Williamson. Mr.

Wood does not address the Magistrate Judge’s legal analysis explaining that “a prisoner has no

constitutional right to be free from false accusations of misconduct.” (R&R, PagelD 53 (collecting

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cases); see also Jackson v. Hamlin, 61 F. App’x 131, 132 (6th Cir. 2003).) And significantly, as

the Magistrate Judge explained, there is no material difference between Mr. Wood’s or Ms.

Williamson’s allegations. {Id. PagelD 54.) Thus, Mr. Wood also failed to allege that there was

anything false about Ms. Williamson’s conduct. Accordingly, Mr. Wood’s second objection is

overruled.

Mr. Wood’s third objection addresses the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that his asapplied and facial challenges fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. In his Complaint,

Mr. Wood challenged the regulations as “void-for-vagueness” {see Compl., PagelD 13), and the

Magistrate Judge addressed this argument in the R&R. (R&R, PagelD 54 (“[T]o the extent that

Plaintiff contends those rules are void for vagueness because the term “disrespect” is vague or

unambiguous, the undersigned disagrees.”).) But in his objection, Mr. Wood contends that the

Magistrate Judge failed to apply the four-factor test set forth in Turner v. Safley to determine

whether the challenged prison regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests. (Obj., PagelD 62; citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987).)

The first factor in the Turner v. Safley test requires a Court to determine whether there is a

valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest.

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The final three factors are balanced together and include: (1) whether there

are other ways to exercise the right that remain open to prison inmates; (2) the impact

accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards and other inmates; and (3) the lack of

ready alternatives. Id. at 90. This is not a “least restrictive alternative test,” but if an inmate can

point to an alternative that accommodates their rights at de minimis cost to a valid penological

interest, a court can consider that evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation. Id. at 90-91.

App. 11a

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Applying this framework, this Court has held that penalizing inmates for disrespecting

prison personnel is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest in ensuring safety and

respect in the prison system. See e.g., Tate v. Williams, No. 2:06-cv-0047, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

17767, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2007) (Smith, J.) Further, Mr. Wood puts forth no alternative

that would fully accommodate his right at de minimis cost to the penological interest of ensuring

safety and respect in the prison system. Accommodating his asserted right to disrespect prison

officials would have a disruptive effect on guards and other inmates. The remaining cases relied

upon by Mr. Wood in his objection address regulations on speech outside the prison context, which

are inapplicable. (See Obj., PagelD 63-65.) Therefore, Mr. Wood’s third objection is overruled.

Last, Mr. Wood challenges the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Count 5 of his

Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. (Obj., PagelD 64-65.) After Mr.

Wood allegedly told Ms. Williamson that she was being ridiculous, she filed a conduct report

against him for trying to leave the recovery services building after signing into a 12-step meeting.

(R&R, PagelD 50.) Mr. Wood was charged with violating Inmate Rules of Conduct 22 (refusal to

carry out work or other institutional assignment) and 26 (disrespect to an officer, staff member,

visitor, or other inmate), (Id. citing Ohio Admin Code § 5120-09-06(C)(22) and (26).) After a

hearing, Mr. Wood was found guilty of violating Rules 22 and 26. (Id.) He seeks to reverse and

expunge the finding of guilt. (See Compl.; Obj., PagelD 64-65.)

But Mr. Wood devotes most of his objection related to Count 5 to arguing that the finding

of guilt at his prison misconduct hearing cannot act as an absolute bar to his First Amendment

retaliation claim. (Obj., PagelD 64—65; citing Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 262 (6th Cir. 2018)

(explaining that a finding of guilt cannot “checkmate” an inmate’s retaliation claim).) Neither the

allegations in his Complaint, nor the arguments raised in his objection show that Mr. Wood was

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incorrectly or unconstitutionally found guilty of violating the prison rules. Therefore, reversal or

expungement is unwarranted and Mr. Wood’s fourth objection is overruled.

In conclusion, the Court OVERRULES Mr. Wood’s Objection (ECF No. 10), ADOPTS

the R&R (ECF No. 9), and DISMISSES the case with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and

1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The Clerk is DIRECTED

to ENTER JUDGMENT and terminate this case from the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1/15/2025

DATE

s/Edmund A. Sargms, Jr.

EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

App. 13a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL WOOD,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:24-cv-4096

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascwa

DEANNA WILLIAMSON,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Michael Wood, a state inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deanna Williamson, an employee at

London Correctional Institution, alleging that Defendant’s false conduct report constituted

retaliation for his exercise of free speech under the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution. (CompL, ECF No. 1.) This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of

Plaintiffs Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend

dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d

601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, the undersigned RECOMMENDS

that the Court DISMISS Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted.

App. 14a

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on November 8, 2022, Plaintiff entered the recovery services

building at London Correctional Institution at 5:40pm to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous

meeting scheduled to begin at 6:00pm. Shortly after arriving, Plaintiff tried to leave the recovery

services building to retrieve an item from his dorm. He was prevented from doing so by

Defendant Deanna Williamson, who told him that he was not permitted to leave because he had

signed in for the meeting. Plaintiff stated he was not required to be at this meeting and therefore

did not need to sign in, and that he would cross his name off the list and leave. As he was in line

to cross his name off the sign-in sheet, Plaintiff said to Defendant, “you’re being ridiculous.” On

his way out of the recovery services building, Defendant asked Plaintiff for his ID, which he did

not have with him. (Compl. fl 7-33, ECF No. 1.)

That same day, Defendant issued a conduct report against Plaintiff. (Conduct Report,

ECF No. 1, PAGEID #21.) The Conduct Report states that Plaintiff tried to leave the recovery

services building after signing in for a 12-step meeting; that Defendant showed him the posted

rule that once you were in the building, you could not leave; that Plaintiff stated he would cross

his name off and leave; that Defendant asked Plaintiff for his ID badge and Plaintiff stated he did

not have it; that Plaintiff refused to give Defendant his name; that Plaintiff stated that Defendant

was being ridiculous; and that Plaintiff then walked out of the building. (Id.) Plaintiff was

charged with violating Inmate Rules of Conduct 22 (refusal to carry out work or other

institutional assignments) and 26 (disrespect to an officer, staff member, visitor, or other inmate).

(Id.)-, see also Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-09-06(C)(22) and (26) in effect on November 8,2022.

Sergeant C. King held a hearing on Plaintiff’s conduct report on November 9,2022.

Sergeant King found Plaintiff guilty of violating Rules 22 and 26 and imposed a 30-day

restriction on Plaintiff’s commissary and package privileges. (Compl. 49, ECF No. 1.)

App. 15a

Plaintiffs Complaint advances five counts: (1) First Amendment Retaliation,

(2) Malicious Prosecution, (3) Facial Challenge to several inmate rules of conduct prohibiting

disrespectful behavior, (4) As-Applied Challenge to Rule 26, and (5) Reversal and Expungement

of the finding of guilt. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory

and injunctive relief. (Compl. 1, 19-20, ECF No. 1.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

APP. 16a

(citations omitted). Further, when considering a pro se plaintiff’s Complaint, a Court “must read

[the allegations] with less stringency ... and accept the pro se plaintiffs allegations as true,

unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible.” Reynosa v. Schultz, 282 F. App’x 386,

389 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)) (internal citation

omitted).

HI.

ANALYSIS

All of Plaintiff s claims must be dismissed. First, Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation

claim in Count 1 requires a showing that:

(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken

against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing

to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements

one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the

plaintiff’s protected conduct.

Thaddeus—X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs retaliation claim fails on the

first element, because his statement to Defendant that she was being ridiculous and his refusal to

comply with her directions did not constitute protected conduct. Although prisoners “retain some

constitutional protections while incarcerated, including rights provided by the First

Amendment,” a prisoner’s constitutional rights are “necessarily limit[ed] while in prison.” Bethel

v. Jenkins, 988 F.3d 931, 938 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)).

That is, “a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his

status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Id.

(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). Courts within the Sixth Circuit have

consistently held that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to engage in the kind of

disrespectful conduct alleged by Plaintiff. See, e.g., Cooper v. Chambers-Smith, No. 1:23-CV-

1793,2024 WL 519846, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2024) (“Plaintiff does not have a constitutional

right to argue with a prison officer and the officer’s action in not entertaining the argument did

App. 17a

not violate Plaintiffs right to free speech.”); Williams v. Deputy Crystal Crafton, No. 1:22-CV-

P86-GNS, 2023 WL 121992, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2023) (a “disrespectful/harassing ”

statement “does not constitute protected conduct”); Banks v. Turner, No. 3:17-CV-2659, 2018

WL 4680439, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2018) (prisoners do not have “the First Amendment

right to express grievances against prison officials” “in a manner that is confrontational or

insubordinate, in violation of a valid prison regulation”) (citing Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d

1032 (6th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot succeed on his claim for retaliation.

Although Plaintiff captions his Count 2 as “Malicious Prosecution,” the allegations

underlying this count relate to the false conduct report allegedly issued by Defendant. But “a

prisoner has no constitutional right to be free from false accusations of misconduct.” Jackson v.

Hamlin, 61 F. App’x 131, 132 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d

Cir. 1986)); see also Jones v. McKinney, No. 97-6424, 1998 WL 940242, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 23,

1998) (district court properly dismissed a complaint alleging that prison officials “deliberately

issued a false disciplinary report” against the plaintiff as frivolous because “even if the

disciplinary report was false,... a prisoner has no constitutionally protected immunity from

being wrongly accused”); Lee v. Pauldine,No. l:12-cv-077, 2013 WL 65111, at *8 (S.D. Ohio

Jan. 4,2013) (“Accepting as true plaintiffs allegation that defendant... filed a false conduct

report against him, s[t]he act of filing false disciplinary charges does not itself violate a

prisoner’s constitutional rights.’” (quoting Spencer v. Wilson, No. 6:ll-00128-KSI, 2012 WL

2069658, at *6 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2012))), adopted, 2013 WL 646775 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21,

2013)); Reeves v. Mohr, No. 4:1 l-cv-2062,2012 WL 275166, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31,2012)

(“Erroneous allegations of misconduct by an inmate do not constitute a deprivation of a

constitutional right.”). And having reviewed both Plaintiff's allegations and Defendant’s conduct

APP- 18a

report, the undersigned finds no material difference between the facts described by each party.

Plaintiff has thus failed to allege that there was anything “false” about Defendant’s conduct

report. For these reasons, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for issuance of a false conduct report.

As to Count 3 and 4, Plaintiff s facial and as-applied challenges to rules prohibiting

disrespectful behavior, Plaintiff must again show that these rules reach conduct protected by the

First Amendment. See Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Twp. ofHarrison, 170 F.3d 553, 557 (6th

Cir. 1999) (quoting City ofHouston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,458 (1987)). As noted above,

rules prohibiting disrespectful conduct do not infringe on conduct protected by the First

Amendment. And to the extent that Plaintiff contends those rules are void for vagueness because

the term “disrespect” is vague or ambiguous, the undersigned disagrees. “[A] failure to define a

term within a statute or ordinance does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague, where the

common meaning of the word provides both adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and of the

standards for enforcement.” Belle Maer Harbor, 170 F.3d at 558 (6th Cir. 1999). The ordinary

meaning of “disrespect” (“to show or express disrespect or contempt for”) provides adequate

notice to prisoners. Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, L-.ct.c-s:/.webstci.Cvm. dictfona;Jisrfcsi-eii (last visited December 18, 2024). And by telling Defendant

that she was being “ridiculous,” Plaintiff expressed clearly that he did not respect the instructions

given to him by Defendant. See Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, biksknw. .utrdait:-v.cbster.20111 Jie?.!Cbaiv/>idn'Uk'.is (last visited December 18, 2024) (defining “ridiculous” as

“arousing or deserving of ridicule; extremely silly or unreasonable”). As a result, Plaintiff has

not stated a claim for either a facial or as-applied challenge.

Finally, Plaintiffs Count 5 seeking reversal or expungement of the finding of guilt must

also necessarily fail. Plaintiffs allegations do not demonstrate that he was incorrectly or

APP.

19a

unconstitutionally found guilty of violating rules as stated in the conduct report; Plaintiff’ s

allegations therefore do not demonstrate that reversal or expungement of the finding of guilt is

warranted.

IV.

DISPOSITION

For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiffs

Complaint under § 1915 A for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

App. 20a

Case: 2:24-cv-04096-EAS-CMV Doc #: 9 Filed: 12/20/24 Page: 1 of 8 PAGEID #: 49

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL WOOD,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:24-cv-4096

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

DEANNA WILLIAMSON,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Michael Wood, a state inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deanna Williamson, an employee at

London Correctional Institution, alleging that Defendant’s false conduct report constituted

retaliation for his exercise of free speech under the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of

Plaintiffs Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend

dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d

601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, the undersigned RECOMMENDS

that the Court DISMISS Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted.

Case: 2:24-cv-04096-EAS-CMV Doc #: 9 Filed: 12/20/24 Page: 2 of 8 PAGEID #: 50

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on November 8,2022, Plaintiff entered the recovery services