Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Michael Wood, Petitioner v. Deanna Williamson

Supreme Court briefSep 15, 2025

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Michael Wood,

Petitioner,

DEANNA WILLIAMSON,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Michael Wood, 805-984

Southeastern Correctional Institution

5900 B.LS Road

Lancaster, Ohio 43130

Petitioner, pro se

QUESTION PRESENTED

Is the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's (ODRC) Inmate Rules of Conduct

proscribing "Disrespect" unconstitutional, as applied and facially, as violative of the First, Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The Petitioner, pro se, is Michael Wood, 805-984, a prisoner incarcerated by the Ohio

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC). The Respondent is DEANNA WILLIAMSON,

a mental health and addiction services counselor for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction (ODRC) employed at London Correctional Institution (LoCI).

RELATED CASES

•

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Wood v Williams, No. 2025-3096,

2025 US App LEXIS 20897 (6th Cir), Order issued August 15, 2025 (denying Motion for en

banc review)

•

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Wood v Williams, No. 2025-3096,

2025 US App LEXIS 16159 (6th Cir), Order issued June 30, 2025 (affirming District Court

decision)

•

United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Wood v Williamson, 2:24-

cv-04096, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 7884, Order issued on January 15, 2025 (adopting

Magistrate's Report and Recommendations dismissing action, with prejudice, for failure

to state a claim of First Amendment retaliation).

•

United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Magistrate's Report and

Recommendations to dismiss Wood v Williamson, 2:24-cv- 04096, 2024 US Dist LEXIS

230701, issued on December 20, 2024 (failure to state a claim of First Amendment

retaliation).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented

Parties to the Proceeding

Related Cases

Table of Contents

Petition Appendix Table of Contents................................................

Table of Authorities

Opinions Below

Jurisdiction

Constitutional and Statutory Provision Involved

Introduction

Statement of the case

Reasons for Granting the Petition

This Court's review is necessary to determine if the

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's

(ODRC) Inmate Rule of Conduct proscribing the

constitutionally protected free expression of Ohio

prisoners Is unconstitutional as applied and facially

A. Prisoners retain all First Amendment rights

1. Speech

Petition

B. Prison rules chill a substantial amount of protected expression

1. As applied Challenge

Facial challenge

C. Public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights

Conclusion

Certificate of Service

2.1

.........................................................

................................................................................... unenumerated

iii

PETITION APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

United States Court of Appeals

For the Sixth Circuit

Decision in 2025-3096

Denying En Banc review

Issued August 15, 2025.............................................................................

United States Court of Appeals

For the Sixth Circuit

Decision in 2025-3096

Affirming District Court Opinion

Issued June 30, 2025......................................................................................................................... 2a-8a

United States District Court

Southern District of Ohio •

Case No. 2:24-cv-4096

Order adopting Report and Recommendation

Dismissing action with prejudice

Issued January 14, 2025................................................................................................................. 9a-13a

United States District Court

Southern District of Ohio

Case No. 2:24-cv-4096

Magistrate's Report and Recommendation

Issued December 20, 2024............

.-................. 14a-20a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000)...................................................................... 13

Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v City of Cleveland, 502 F 3d 545, 551 (6th Cir 2007)...................... 10

Bambach v Moegel, 92 F 4 th 615, 622-23 (6th Cir 2024)..................................................................... 20

Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,70 (1963)........................................................................ 19

Baraldini v Thornburgh, 280 US App DC 176,884 F 2d 615, 620 (DC Cir 1989)................................ 22

Bench Billboard Co v City of Toledo, 690 F Supp 2d 651 (ND Ohio 2010).......................................... 15

Bethel v Jenkins, 988 F 3d 931, 939 (6th Cir 2021).................................................................................. 8

Boutilierv INS., 387 US 118,123 (1967)............................................................................................... 21

Brodenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 368 (1979).................................................................................. 13

Brown v Bott, 2022 US App LEXIS 17393 at *6 (6th Cir).............................................................7, H, 12

Brown v Mahlman, 2022 US Dist LEXIS 228343 at (SD Ohio).............................................................. 12

Capital City Media, Inc. v Toole, 463 US 1303,1305 (1983)....................................................

Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568 (1942)............................................................................................... 18

City of Cincinnati v. Karlan, 39 Ohio St. 2d 107 (Ohio 1974)................................................................ 18

Cortiss v City of Roswell, 2022 US App LEXIS 17941 at *17 (11th Cir)................................................. 19

Counterman v Colorado, 600 US 66 (2023).......................................................................................... 14

Dahl v Bd ofTrs of Western Michigan Univ., 15 F 4 th 728, 736 (6th Cir 2021).............................

DDvScheeler, 645 Fed Appx 418, 425 (6th Cir 2016).................................................................... 14,18

Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc v Metro Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County,

274 F 3d 377, 391 (6th Cir 2001)............................................................................................................. 19

Dorce v Wolf, 506 F Supp 3d 142,145 (D Mass)

............................................................ 21

Eknes-Tuckerv Governor, 114 F 4 th 1241,1261 (11th Cir 2024).............................

Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347, 373 (1976)................................................................................................. 21

Entler v Gregoire, 872 F 3d 1031,1039 (9th Cir 2017).............................................................................7

FCC v Fox TV Stations, Inc., 567 US 239, 253 (2012)..................................................................... 10,11

Flagner v Wilkinson, 241 F 3d at 486 (6th Cir 2001)............................................................................... 8

Free Speech Coal., In. vSkrmetti, 2025 US App LEXIS 771 (6th Cir)...................................................... 20

Freedman v Maryland, 380 US 51,57-58 (1965)................................................................................. 22

Fugate v Erdos, 2022 US App LEXIS 23208 at *29 (6th Cir).................................................................... 7

Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 270 (1970)............................................................................................. 20

Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104,108 (1972).................................................................... 10,11

Griffin v Condon, 744 Fed Appx 925, 929 (6th Cir 2018)...................................................................... 23

Hanrahan v Mohr, 905 F 3d 947, 956-57 (6th Cir 2018).................................................................. 8, 22

Hoffman v Crites, 2023 US Dist LEXIS 230917 at *17 (ED Mich).......................................................... 6

Hoffman v Liberty, 905 F 2d 229, 233 (8th Cir 1990).............................................................................. 9

Iswed v Caruso, 2009 US App LEXIS 29222 (6th Cir)....................................................... ?....................... 8

Jenkins v Rock Hill Loc. Sch. Dist., 513 F 3d 580, 587 (6th Cir 2016).............................................. 9,12

Johnson v Raemisch, 557 F Supp 2d 964, 965 (WD Wis 2009).................................................... 19, 22

Johnson v United States, 576 US 591, 602-03 (2015)......................................................................... 17

Jones v Caruso, 569 F 3d 258, 276 (6th Cir 2009)...........................................................................6, 21

Jones v District of Columbia, 2024 US Dist LEXIS 55844 at *43 (DC Cir)........................................... 14

Josephson v Ganzel, 115 F 4 th 771, 785 (6th Cir 2024)...................................................................... 20

Kruse v Rillema, 2024 US App LEXIS 19382 at *5 (6th Cir).................................................................. 12

Lee V City of San Diego, 492 F Supp 1088,1103 (SD Cal 2020)..................................

Loper Bright Enters v Raimondo, 603 US 369 (2024).......................................................................... 23

Lozman v City of Riviera, 585 US 87,101 (2018)................................................................................. 9

Lumumba v. Kiser, 116 F.4th 269 (4th Cir 2024).................................................................................. 13

Maben v Thelen, 887 F 3d 252, 264 (6th Cir 2018)................................................................ 7, 8,11,13

Mahanoy Area Sch Dist. vB.L., 594 US 180,193 (2021)...................................................................... 20

McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316,407 (1819).................................................................................... 23

McDaniel v Woods, 2022 US Dist LEXIS 238120 at *14 (ED Mich)....................................................... 9

McDonald v Smith, 472 US 479,482 (1985).......................................................................................... 9

McElhaney v Williams, 81 F 4 th 550,557 (6th Cir 2023)..................................................................... 15

McGlone v Bell, 681 F 3d 718, 733 (6th Cir 2012)............................................................................... 19

McGlone v Cheek, 534 Fed Appx 293, 297 (6th Cir 2013)................................................................... 10

McIntosh v Clous, 69 F 4 th 309, 318 (6th Cir 2023)............................................................................. 8

Meadows v Coppick, 2024 US Dist LEXIS 211549 (SD Ohio)............................................................... 8

Meriwether v Hartop, 922 F 3d 492, 511 (6th Cir 2021).......................................................................20

Midwest Media Prop, LLC., vSymmes, Twp., 503 F 3d 456,478 (6th Cir 2017).................................. 19

Nearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)............................................................................................... 19

Nebraska Press Association v Stuart, 427 US 539, 559 (1976)........................................................... 23

New York Times Co. v United States, 403 US 713,714 (1971)............................................................ 19

Organization fora Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).................................................. 19

Parks v. Finan, 385 F.3d 694, 699 (6th Cir. 2004)................................................................................ 15

Pell v Procunier, 417 US 817,822 (1974).......................................................................................... 5,19

Perttu v. Richards (2025), 145 S. Ct. 1793, 222 L. Ed. 2d 108............................................................. 21

Procunier v Martinez, 416 US 396,415 (1974).............................................................................. 22, 23

Richards v Perttu, 96 F 4 th 911,918 (6th Cir 2024).............................................................................. 10

Richey v. Dahne, 733 Fed. Appx. 881, 883 (9th Cir 2018)........................................................... 6, 7,14

Sallier v Brooks, 343 F 3d 873-74 (6th Cir 2003)....................................................................................13

Schneckloth v Bustamante, 412 US 218, 229 (1973)........................................................................... 20

Scott v Churchill, 377 F 3d 565,572 (6th Cir 2004)................................................................................ 12

Shaw v Murphy, 523 US 223, 229 (2001)...................................

Shuti v Lynch, 828 F 3d 440, 445 (6th Cir 2016)....................................................

Shuttlesworth v Birmingham, 382 US 87, 90 (1965).......................................................................... 16

Smith v Davis, 2025 US App LEXIS 16507 at *23-24 (6th Cir)............................................................. 20

Spies v Voinovich, 173 F 3d 398, 403 (6th Cir 1999)............................................................................... 5

State v. Wood, 112 Ohio App. 3d 621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)............................................................... 18

Stevens vCity of Columbus, 2022 US App LEXIS (6th Cir).............................................................. 19, 21

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989).......................................................................................... 15

Thacker v Campbell, 1998 US App LEXIS 18762 at *7 (6th Cir)....................................................... 9,12

Thaddeus-X v Blatter, 175 F 3d at *392.................................................................................................. 5

Thomas v Thomas, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 136160 at *12 (6th Cir)............................................... 9,10,12

Thornburgh v Abbott, 490 US 401,415 (1989)...................................................................................... 8

Turner v Cain, 647 Fed Appx 357, 365 (5th Cir 2016)............................................................................. 8

Turner vSafley, 482 US 78, 89 (1987)

5, 7

United States v Arthrex, Inc., 594 US 1, 24 (2021)

United States v Goodwin, 457 US 368, 372 (1982)

....................... 13

United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304 (2008)

Williams v Fox, 2017 US Dist LEXIS 34386 at *10 (D Id)

. ......... 13

Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994,998 (10th Cir. 1991)

Wilson v State Chiropractic Bd., 2019-Ohio-3243 1)36 (10th Dist)

Wirtshafter v Trs of Ind Univ., 2025 US Dist LEXIS 103935 at *29 (SD Ind)

Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 555-56 (1974)

12,14,18

Wood v Eubanks, 25 F 43 th 414, 423 (6th Cir 2022)

Woods v Smith, 60 F.3d 1161 (5th Cir 1995)

Other Authorities

Merriam-Webster Dictionary

Disrespect

Respect

Ridiculous

Constitutional and statutory Provisions

OAR 291-105-0015 (2024)

ODRC Policy 31-SEM-02

3,12

Ohio Administrative Code 5120-9-06

2,12,15,16, 20, 21

Ohio Administrative Code 5120-9-31

2,12,14

RC § 2917.11

RC § 2901.04

US Const. Amend I

....1,3, 5,6,7, 8, 9 10,11,13,14,15,17, 21, 22, 23

US Const, amend. V

1, 10,11,18,19, 21

US Const, amend. XIV

2,10,18,19

28 U.S.C. § 1254

.................. 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291

28 U.S.C. § 1915

42 U.S.C. §1983

........................................................ 1

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, App. la-7a, is reported at 2025 U.S. App.

LEXIS 16159. The opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,

App. 8a-12a, is reported at 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7884. The Magistrate's Report and

Recommendations, App. 13a-20a, is reported at 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230701.

JURISDICTION

The District Court had jurisdiction over Wood's claims under 42 USC § 1983. Petitioner is

seeking review of the order dated June 30, 2025 by the Sixth Circuit in case no. 25-3096, for which

a timely petition for rehearing was denied on August 15, 2025. The Court of Appeals had

jurisdiction to review the District Court's final judgement under 28 USC § 1291. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, US Const. Amend. I, provides:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the

people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, US Const, amend, V, provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a

presentment of an indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,

or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just

compensation.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, US Const, amend. XIV, provides:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Ohio Administrative Code 5120-9-06 (A): Inmate Rules of Conduct, provides:

The disciplinary violations defined by this rule address acts that constitute an immediate

and direct threat to the security or orderly operation of the institution, or to the safety of its staff,

visitors and inmates, (including the inmate who has violated the rule), as well as other violations

of institutional or departmental rules or regulations.

Ohio Administrative Code 5120-9-06(0(26), provides:

Disrespect to an officer, staff member, visitor or another inmate.

Ohio Administrative Code 5120-9-06, Rule 5.7, provides:

Disrespect towards another person, including instigation of, or perpetuating fighting.

Ohio Administrative Code 5120-9-31(A): The Inmate Grievance Procedure, provides:

The department of rehabilitation and correction (DRC) shall provide inmates with access

to an inmate grievance procedure. This procedure is designed to address inmate complaints

related to any aspect of institutional life that directly and personally affects the grievant. This

may include complaints regarding the application of policies, procedures, conditions of

confinement, or the actions of institutional staff.

ODRC Policy 31-SEM-02,Standards of Employee Conduct, V, POLICY, provides:

All persons employed by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC)

are expected to conduct themselves in a professional, law-abiding manner. All employees must

follow the Standards of Employee Conduct. Failure to comply with the Standards of Employee

Conduct shall result in discipline, up to and including removal.

INTRODUCTION

NOWCOMES Petitioner, Michael Wood, pro se and in good faith, requesting a merit based

review and analysis of a First Amendment retaliation claim challenging the constitutionality of

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) prison rules, as applied and facially.

The Sixth Circuit held that prisoners do not have a First Amendment right to criticize the official

actions of a public official through the free expression of speech and/or oral petition, dismissing

Wood's action for failure to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. The decision of the Sixth

Circuit was rendered without conducting a liberal, holistic review and analysis of the facial

challenge, which is integrally intertwined and fundamental in assessing the as applied challenge.

This deviation from clearly established judicial norms, its own precedent, sister circuit precedent,

and dismissal of the underlying action without a liberal, comprehensive, merit based resolution

of the facial challenge is, thus, clearly erroneous and contrary to clearly established federal law

constituting an egregious abuse of judicial discretion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Wood sued Deanna Williamson, a "mental health and addiction services clinician" at the

London Correctional Institution, where Wood was incarcerated. As clearly pleaded in the

complaint, despite not being required to participate in any recovery services, Wood voluntarily

attended an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meeting at the facility. Upon arrival, he placed his name

on a "General Population" attendance sheet as directed by an AA worker.

Before the meeting began, Wood attempted to leave the room to retrieve some legal

materials from his dorm when Williamson stopped and questioned him. Wood told her that he

was "going to get something from the dorm," but Williamson told him that he was not permitted

to leave because he had signed in. When Wood told Williamson that he was not required to be

there, she "became almost frantic" and blocked his exit, again telling him that "once you are in

the building you are not allowed to leave." Wood offered to remove his name from the

attendance sheet, and Williamson told him, "[F]ine."

While Wood was in line to remove his name, he "calmly" told Williamson, "You're being

ridiculous." Williamson "immediately approached" Wood "from behind" and demanded his

identification. As Wood left, Williamson again demanded Wood's identification. Wood told her

that he did not have his identification and left the building. Williamson filed a misconduct report

against Wood, alleging that he violated two prison regulations: refusal to carry out an assignment

and disrespecting an officer or staff member, which Wood alleges was "in retaliation" for his

telling her she was "being ridiculous." In a hearing on the misconduct report, Wood was found

guilty of the violations of the facility rules and received a 30-day restriction of commissary and

package privileges.

Wood asserted three claims: (1) Williamson's conduct constituted retaliation in violation

of the First Amendment; (2) her conduct amounted to malicious prosecution; and (3) the prison

regulation prohibiting disrespect was facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to

him. Wood sought the reversal of the disciplinary finding of guilt and expungement of the offense

from his institutional record, monetary damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief.

Upon initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 A, a magistrate judge recommended

dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court accepted the

recommendation over Wood's objections. The Sixth Circuit erroneously affirmed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court's review is necessary to determine if the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation

and Correction's (ODRC) Inmate Rules of Conduct, 5120-9-06(C)(26) and Rule 5.7, proscribing the

constitutionally protected expression of Ohio prisoners is unconstitutional as applied and facially.

A. Prisoners retain all First Amendment rights

The First Amendment prohibits the government from "abridging the freedom of speech."

US Const Amend I. Prisoners do not surrender all of their First Amendment rights when they are

in custody, but their "free speech rights are uncontrovertibly limited by virtue of their

incarceration." Thaddeus-X v Blatter, 175 F 3d at *392. "[A] corollary of this principle is that

prisoners retain all First Amendment rights not incompatible with their status as a prisoner or

with the legitimate penological objectives of the correctional system." Pell v Procunier, 417 US

817, 822 (1974). Thus, "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v Safley,

482 US 78, 89 (1987).

Under Turner, in determining the reasonableness of the regulation at issue, four factors

come into play:

(1) Whether there exists a '"valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and

the legitimate penological interest put forward to justify it,"

(2) whether there are "alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to

prison inmates,"

(3) the "impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards

and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally," and

(4) the availability of a "ready alternative ... that fully accommodates the prisoners' rights

at de minimis cost to valid penological interests."

A "trial court is not required to weigh evenly, or even consider explicitly, each of the four factors."

Spies v Voinovich, 173 F 3d 398, 403 (6th Cir 1999). See Hoffman v Crites, 2023 US Dist LEXIS

230917 at *17 (ED Mich). Rather, the four factors are "simply 'relevant' to the ultimate inquiry

a court must undertake" in "determining whether a prison regulation is 'reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.'" Id (quoting Turner, 482 US at 89).

The Supreme Court has made it clear that prisoners retain all First Amendment rights not

incompatible with their status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the

correctional system. Jones v Caruso, 569 F 3d 259. 267 (6th Cir 2009). In Richey v. Dahne, the Ninth

Circuit concisely laid the foundation for which the current jurisprudence relies when it decided

the First Amendment controversy regarding disrespectful language in a written grievance:

Under the First Amendment, speech is protected unless the speech falls under one of a few

narrowly defined categories of unprotected speech such as fighting words, defamation, or

obscenity. R.A.V. v. City of [*883] St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-84, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed.

2d 305 (1992). We have previously held that "disrespectful language in a prisoner's grievance

is itself protected activity under the First Amendment." Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262 1271

(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 1995)). But to say that a

category of speech is protected does not mean that all governmental limits on such speech

are unconstitutional. In Turner v. Safley, the United States Supreme Court held that a prison

regulation that restricts inmates' constitutional rights could be constitutionally sound if it "is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 482 U.S. 78, 89,107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L

Ed. 2d 64 (1987). The standard under Turner requires that a valid regulation must (1) be

content neutral, (2) logically advance proper goals such as institutional security and safety,

and (3) not be an exaggerated response in relation to those goals. Id. at 93. The Supreme

Court later clarified that a prison regulation is considered to be content neutral if its purpose

is unrelated to the suppression of expression." Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,415,109

S. Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S.

Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974)).

733 Fed. Appx. 881, 883 (9th Cir 2018); cert denied 2019 US LEXIS 3398 (US May, 2019). Prison

walls do not form barriers separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.

Turner v Safely, 482 US 78, 84(1989). The most fundamental of the Constitutional rights prisoners

retain are the right to file grievances and pursue civil rights litigation in federal courts, for

"Without those bedrock constitutional guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable

mechanism to remedy prison injustices." Entler v Gregoire, 872 F 3d 1031,1039 (9th Cir 2017).

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file non-frivolous grievances. Maben v Thelen,

887 F 3d 252, 264 (6th Cir 2018). Grievances may be "written or oral," Id at 265, and may take

the form of threats to file a grievance. Id; Pasely v Conerly, 345 Fed Appx 981, 984-5 (6th Cir 2009).

See Brown v Bott, 2022 US App LEXIS 17393 at *6 (6th Cir). A regulation impinging on a prisoner's

constitutional rights must be upheld if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.

But, although such standards require deference to the prison official, the court must not confuse

deference with abdication. Fugate v Erdos, 2022 US App LEXIS 23208 at *29 (6th Cir); Williams v

City of Cleveland, 771 F 3d 945,950 (6th Cir 2014). "The sanctity of a constitutional right is at least

of equal moment as a statutory right." Entler v Gregoire, 872 F 3d 1031,1042 (9th Cir 2017).

Regarding the first factor, the "logical connection between the regulation and the

asserted goal" cannot be "so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational." Turner, 482

US at* 89-90. Additionally, "the governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral one,"

and "neutrality in the First Amendment context means that it must be applied without regard

for the content of the expression." Bethel v Jenkins, 988 F 3d 931, 939 (6th Cir 2021); Hanrahan v

Mohr, 905 F 3d 947, 956-57 (6th Cir 2018)(determining that specific speech, based on its content,

carries a security risk while other speech does not and then drawing a distinction based on this

legitimate penological objective satisfies Turner's neutrality requirement); Richey v Dahne, 733

Fed Appx 881, 883 (9th Cir 2018); cert denied 2019 US LEXIS 3398 (US May, 2019); Thornburgh v

Abbott, 490 US 401, 415 (1989).

However, at this early stage of non-responsive pleading, the legitimate and rational

penological interest and/or objective is unknown and perhaps unknowable. The District Court,

without response from WILLIAMSON, dismissed Wood's complaint for failure to state a claim of

First Amendment retaliation. Prison officials must show they would have taken the same action

regardless of the protected conduct. See Meadows v Coppick, 2024 US Dist LEXIS 211549 at *66

and n. 18 (SD Ohio); McIntosh v Clous, 69 F 4 th 309, 318 (6th Cir 2023); Maben v Thelen, 887 F 3d

252, 262 (6th Cir 2018); Flagner, 241 F 3d at 486; Iswed v Caruso, 2009 US App LEXIS 29222 at *6

(6th Cir)(defendants were not served the complaint and had not yet had an opportunity to express

their basis for refusing telephone calls). Consequently, because the Sixth Circuit court decided to

dismiss this action without a full finding and knowledge of all the facts, that decision was,

therefore, clearly erroneous.

1. Speech

Speech is "protected" when the government is not permitted to restrict it. Imprisonment

does not automatically deprive a prisoner of some important constitutional protections,

including those of the First Amendment. “Instead, a prisoner's speech -like all speech- is

presumed to be protected, irrespective of its content.’' Turner v Cain, 647 Fed Appx 357, 365 (5th

Cir 2016). "Freedom to criticize public officials is at the core of First Amendment values, even if

that conduct is motivated by personal pique or resentment. Thacker v Campbell, 1998 US App

LEXIS 18762 at *7 (6th Cir). "[Government officials in general, and police in particular, may not

exercise their authority for personal motives, particularly in response to real or perceived slights

to their dignity" Thomas v Thomas, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 136160 at *12 (6th Cir). "[W]hile public

officials may resent having abusive language 'directed at them, they may not exercise the

awesome power at their disposal to punish individuals for conduct that is not merely lawful, but

protected by the First Amendment. Lee V City of San Diego, 492 F Supp 1088, 1103 (SD Cal 2020).

2. Petition

The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as other guarantees of the [First]

Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression. McDonald v Smith, 472

US 479, 482 (1985). Thus, the court need not determine if (or how) the petition clause is distinct

from the speech clause or differentiate whether my expression was an act of petition or speech;

as either it was an expression protected by the First Amendment and subjected to the same

analysis. Hoffman v Liberty, 905 F 2d 229, 233 (8th Cir 1990). Likewise, the Supreme Court has

held that private speech is protected like speech on public matters. Jenkins v Rock Hill Loc. Sch.

Dist., 513 F 3d 580, 587 (6th Cir 2016).

The primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem. McDaniel v

Woods, 2022 US Dist LEXIS 238120 at *14 (ED Mich). "[T]he right to petition [is] on of the most

precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights." Thus, my speech is "high on the

hierarchy of First Amendment values." Lozman v City of Riviera, 585 US 87, 101 (2018)(probable

cause to arrest did not preclude First Amendment retaliation claim). The fundamental basis for

the conduct report was retaliation for my expression of speech/petition to criticize the extremely

silly and/or unreasonable, unprofessional misconduct and abusive mistreatment by WILLIAMSON

as a public official acting in her official capacity. Thomas v Thomas, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 136160 at

*12 (6th Cir); see also Richards v Perttu, 96 F 4 th 911, 918 (6th Cir 2024)(complaining about sexual

harassment was grievance protected by the First Amendment).

B. Prison rules chill a substantial amount of protected expression

"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its

prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104,108 (1972). In Ass'n

of Cleveland Fire Fighters v City of Cleveland, 502 F 3d 545, 551 (6th Cir 2007), the Sixth Circuit has

previously resonated:

We have recognized that the vagueness doctrine has two primary goals: (1) to ensure fair

notice to the citizenry and (2) to provide standards for enforcement [by officials]. With

respect to the first goal, the Supreme Court has stated that "[a] statute which either

forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of ordinary

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differs as to it application,

violates the first essential of the due process law." Connally v Gen Const Co., 269 US 385,

391 (1925). With respect to the second goal, Supreme Court has stated that "if arbitrary

and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards

for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to

[officials] for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis." Grayned v City of Rockford,

408 US 104, 108-09 (1972).

See McGlone v Cheek, 534 Fed Appx 293, 297 (6th Cir 2013). A fundamental principle in our legal

system is that laws, which regulate persons or entities, must give fair notice of conduct that is

forbidden or required. FCCvFox TV Stations, Inc., 567 US 239, 253 (2012)(collecting cases). This

requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the protections provided by the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304,128 S. Ct. 1830,

170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008). it requires the invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague.

A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation

under which it is obtained "fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is

prohibited, or is so standard less that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory

enforcement. Ibid. As this Court has explained: a regulation is not vague because it may at times

be difficult to prove an incriminating fact but rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be

proved. See id., at 306, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650. When speech is involved, rigorous

adherence to those reguirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected

speech, (emphasis added). See Groyned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104,108-109,92 S. Ct. 2294,

33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972). Id at 253-54.

1. As applied challenge

After an unfortunate engagement initiated by Defendant WILLIAMSON, I exercised my

First Amendment right to free expression of speech and oral petition to criticize the official action

of a public official by stating the fact that she was "being ridiculous." Maben v Thelen, 887 F 3d

252, 264-65 (6th Cir 2018). WILLIAMSON violated numerous standards of employee conduct and

her abusive mistreatment made Wood feel extremely uncomfortable. Brown v Bott, 2022 US App

LEXIS 17393 at *8-9 (6th Cir)( Nothing indicates, moreover, that Brown filed his grievances to

abuse or manipulate the system rather than because he felt uncomfortable.).

WILLIAMSON'S conduct was contrary to and in conflict with standards of employee

conduct, fundamental precepts for the contemporary and evolving ideals of decency and dignity

in the rehabilitation of offenders. Based on my interpretation of the non-exhaustive and broad

standards of employee conduct, 31-SEM-02, Brown v Mahlman, 2022 US Dist LEXIS 228343 at

(SD Ohio)(violations of 31-SEM-02 are violations of state law), and my ability to grieve "any

aspect of institutional life that personally and directly affects [me]...," OAC 5120-9-31(A), I orally

expressed a legitimate and meritorious grievance. See Brown v Bott, 2022 US App LEXIS 17393

at *8-9 (6th Cir)(non-frivolous grievance because Brown felt uncomfortable); Maben, 887 F 3d at

264 (complaining about small food portion); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468 at summary (6th Cir 2010).

The right to criticize public officials is safely within the free speech zone. Kruse v Rillema,

2024 US App LEXIS 19382 at *5 (6th Cir); Jenkins v Rock Hill Loc. Sch. Dist., 513 F 3d 580, 588 (6th

Cir 2016); Thomas v Thomas, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 136160 at *12 (6th Cir); Thacker v Campbell, 1998

US App LEXIS 18762 at *7 (6th Cir). WILLIAMSON forged a false conduct report for “Disrespect to

an officer, staff member, visitor or another inmate," OAC 5120-9-06(C)(26), in retaliation

resulting in the restriction of privileges for thirty (30) days. The mere potential threat of

disciplinary sanctions is an adverse action. Scott v Churchill, 377 F 3d 565, 572 (6th Cir 2004).

The adage "respect is earned not given" is controlling and for good reason; no one is

entitled to be respected. I have to feel and believe that someone or something is worthy of being

respected by me.

Respect:

(1) A feeling of admiring someone or something as good, valuable, important, etc.

(2) A feeling or understanding that someone or something is important, serious and

should be treated in an appropriate manner. Merriam-Webster Dictionary

The inquiry "is aided by both 'dictionary definitions and old-fashioned common sense.'"

Lumumba v. Kiser, 116 F.4th 269 (4th Cir 2024).

At all times while exercising my fundamental First Amendment rights, I was appropriately

responsive to unnecessary, arbitrary abusive government action and expressed myself within

moderation given my status as prisoner. Compare what I said to the defendants in Wood v

Eubanks, 25 F 43 th 414, 423 (6th Cir 2022), rehearing denied by en banc, 2022 US App LEXIS 6406

(March 11, 2022), to informing WILLIAMSON that she was "being ridiculous," -/e., her conduct

while abusing the authority of the state's police powers was extremely silly and/or

unreasonable -essentially and effectively, unbecoming a professional and public official:

Ridiculous: Extremely silly or unreasonable. Merriam-Webster Dictionary

WILLIAMSON applied the "disrespect" rule in a manner that violated my First Amendment right

to spontaneous free expression of speech and oral petition.

"[0]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and

measures ..." Wood v Eubanks, 25 F 4 th 414,429 (6th Cir 2022). My rights as a prisoner are limited

in scope, Shaw v Murphy, 523 US 223, 229 (2001), not nature or cause. Prisoners just like those

on the outside have and value their First Amendment rights. Richey v Dahne, 733 Fed Appx 881,

883 (9th Cir 2018); cert denied 2019 US LEXIS 3398 (US May, 2019). It is a basic principle of due

process that "an individual cannot be punished for doing what the law plainly allows him to

do." Brodenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 368 (1979); see OAC5120-9-31 (A). "While an individual

certainly may be penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly may not be punished for

exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right." United States v Woods, 773 Fed Appx

270, 278 (6th Cir 2019) quoting United States v Goodwin, 457 US 368, 372 (1982).

The context of an inmate's exercise of free speech determines how much protection is

afforded the speech. Williams v Fox, 2017 US Dist LEXIS 34386 at *10 (D Id). It is a well-settled

principle that "(a]n action motivated by retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected

right is actionable, even if the act, when taken for a different reason, might have been

legitimate." Woods, 60 F.3d at 1165; see also Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 262-63 (6th Cir.

2018); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3rd Cir. 2000); Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994,

998 (10th Cir. 1991). In other first amendment cases, in the prison context, the Sixth Circuit has

concluded that the application of as policy, one that is "arbitrary and capricious," violatefs] a

prisoners' first amendment rights." Sallier v Brooks, 343 F 3d 868, 873-74 (6th Cir 2003).

Courts view retaliation claims in the prison context with an eye toward avoiding

"excessive judicial involvement in prison administration." Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (citing Sandin, 515

U.S. at 482). However, the broad deference afforded to corrections officers is not without limits.

We cabin that deference when failing to do so would "unfairly tempt corrections officers to

enrobe themselves and their colleagues in what would be an absolute shield against retaliation

claims.” Maben, 887 F.3d at 263 (quoting Woods, 60 F.3d at 1165).

[Public officials] are held to a higher standard than the average citizen because the First

Amendment requires them to tolerate course criticism. Jones v District of Columbia, 2024 US Dist

LEXIS 55844 at *43 (DC Cir), citing DD v Scheeler, 645 Fed Appx 418, 425 (6th Cir 2016). A

substantial understanding that my speech and oral petition would be viewed as communicating

disrespect is required. Counterman v Colorado, 600 US 66 (2023)(The state must show that the

defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed

as threatening violence). That required demonstration is completely absent here. Accordingly,

my expression of speech and oral petition should receive complete First Amendment protection.

Facial challenge

Regarding the "disrespect" rules, the courts completely ignored the definition of

"respect," "disrespect," and "ridiculous" when considering (1) whether people of common

intelligence can understand and discern what constitutes disrespect to any one person versus

another; (2) the lack of standards guiding it enforcement; (3) over breadth; and (4) the content,

view-point and speaker based restrictions on the first amendment right to free expression. For

my proposition that OAC 5120-9-06 (C)(26) and Rule 5.7 are unconstitutional on their face, start

with the settled understanding of the first amendment. "[T]he bedrock principle underlying" the

Amendment's free speech guarantee "is that states cannot prohibit speech merely because it

offends the sensibilities of others." McElhaney v Williams, 81 F 4 th 550, 557 (6th Cir 2023),

quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414,109 S. Ct. 2533,105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989).

The Sixth Circuit in Parks v. Finan, 385 F.3d 694, 699 (6th Cir. 2004), noted: "There is no

statute or regulation imaginable that does not require some degree of interpretation by the

agency charged with its enforcement." The First Amendment requires only that the regulation

give the agency sufficient standards to apply in determining... Id. See Bench Billboard Co v City

of Toledo, 690 F Supp 2d 651, 659 and n. 1 (ND Ohio 2010)( The court in Parks, supra, 385 F.3d at

701, went on to hold that the ordinance, as applied to individuals "who may be speaking, wearing

signs, and/or leafletting" was unconstitutionally overbroad as it applied to any expressive activity

and effectively banned a significant amount of spontaneous speech.) Strong ambiguity is obvious:

Rule 26: Disrespect to an officer, staff member, visitor or another inmate.

Rule 5.7: Disrespect towards another person, including instigation of, or perpetuating

fighting.

Disrespect: To say or do something that shows a lack of respect (for someone or

something). Merriam-Webster Dictionary

The Ohio prison disrespect rule is defined so impermissibly as to invite action in violation of the

First Amendment -i.e., to say something (speech) and/or do something (conduct) = expression.

Based on the plain language used to construct the definition of the word "disrespect," 5120-9-06

(26) and Rule 5.7 are explicitly and purely prohibiting content, view-point and speaker based

expression. And, there is no definition for "disrespect" provided in section (E) of 5120-9-06.

"[M]en of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning" and the rules

"differs as to its application." (emphasis added) Connally v Gen Constr Co., 269 US 385, 391

(1926). The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration. "It does not

provide for government by clearly defined laws, but rather for government by the moment-tomoment opinions of a [prison official] on his beat." Shuttlesworth v Birmingham, 382 US 87, 90

(1965). For example, compare ODRC's Rules 26 and 5.7 proscribing disrespect to Oregon's

Administrative Rule prohibiting disrespect, OAR 291-105-0015 (2024):

(g) 2.10 Disrespect I: An AIC commits Disrespect I when that AIC directs hostile, sexual,

abusive, or threatening language or gestures (verbal or written) toward or about another

person that involves racial, religious, or sexual harassment or a physical threat to the

other person.

(h) 2.11 Disrespect II: An AIC commits Disrespect II when that AIC directs hostile, sexual,

abusive, or threatening language or gestures (verbal or written) toward or about another

person, in a manner or circumstances that create a threat to the safety, security, or

orderly operation of a facility.

(i) 2.12 Disrespect III (minor violation): An AIC commits Disrespect III when that AIC

directs hostile, sexual, abusive, or threatening language or gestures (verbal or written)

toward or about another person.

In all events, although statements in some of our opinions could be read to suggest

otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional

merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp. For instance,

we have deemed a law prohibiting grocers from charging an "unjust or unreasonable rate" void

for vagueness — even though charging someone a thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would

surely be unjust and unreasonable. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89, 41 S. Ct. 298, 65 L. Ed.

516. We have similarly deemed void for vagueness a law prohibiting people on sidewalks from

"conducting] themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by" — even though spitting

in someone's face would surely be annoying. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686,

29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971). These decisions refute any suggestion that the existence of some

obviously risky expression estoblishes the ODRC's rules constitutionality , (emphasis added) See

Johnson v United States, 576 US 591, 602-03 (2015).

Relatedly, compare Ohio's prison rules prohibiting "disrespect" to Ohio's disorderly

conduct statute:

RC § 2917.11 Disorderly conduct

(A) No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by

doing any of the following:

(2) Making unreasonable noise or an offensively coarse utterance, gesture, or display or

communicating unwarranted and grossly abusive language to any person;

(3) Insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances in which that conduct

is likely to provoke a violent response;

Ohio's disorderly conduct statute and the First Amendment require more than the uttering, or

even shouting, of distasteful words. They require that the speech in question constitute "fighting

words" City of Cincinnati v. Karlan, 39 Ohio St. 2d 107, 314 N.E.2d 162, 164 (Ohio 1974). ("[N]o

matter how rude, abusive, offensive, derisive, vulgar, insulting, crude, profane or opprobrious

spoken words may seem to be, their utterance may not be made a crime unless they are fighting

words.")(emphasis added). Moreover, there can be no disorderly conduct "[w]h.ere the language

is not threatening, does not constitute 'fighting words' and is not likely by its very utterance to

inflict injury or provoke the average person to immediate retaliatory breach of peace." State v.

Wood, 112 Ohio App. 3d 621, 679 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). See

Wood v Eubanks, 25 F 4 th 414 (6th Cir 2022); DDvScheeler, 645 Fed Appx 418, 425 (6th Cir 2016).

Related provisions of statutes and administrative rules must be read in pari materia.

State ex rel. Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, 122 Ohio St.3d 234, 2009-0hio-2610, U 25, 910

N.E.2d 432. In so doing, "courtjs] must give a reasonable construction that provides the proper

effect to each." Id., citing Maxfield v. Brooks, 110 Ohio St. 566, 2 Ohio Law Abs. 116, 2 Ohio Law

Abs. 151,144 N.E. 725 (1924). "All provisions *** bearing upon the same subject matter should

be construed harmoniously unless they are irreconcilable." Id., citing Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St.

458, 461, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950). See Wilson v State Chiropractic Bd., 2019-Ohio-3243 5] 36 (10th

Dist). The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized, "where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute,

doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant." State v Young, 62 Ohio St 2d 370, 374 (1980); see

also RC 29901.04 (A)

The Sixth Circuit has explained that, since the Chaplinsky decision, its '"fighting words'

doctrine has become 'very limited.'" Wood v Eubanks, 25 F 4 th 414, 422 (6th Cir 2022). "The

freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or to challenge police action without thereby risking

[punishment] is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from

a police state." Id at 423. Even if defendants' concerns were genuine, their justifications amount

to nothing more than "because we said so," which is not enough to pass constitutional muster.

Any other conclusion would threaten the right of prisoners to criticize government officials, a

result that cannot be squared with the First Amendment. Johnson v Raemisch, 557 F Supp 2d 964,

965 (WD Wis 2009).

By the same token, it hardly requires repetition that "'[any] system of prior restraints on

expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional

validity,'" and that the State " 'carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition

of such a restraint. " (emphasis added). Capital City Media, Inc. v Toole, 463 US 1303, 1305

(1983), quoting New York Times Co. v United States, 403 US 713, 714 (1971); Pell v Procunier, 417

US 817, 832 (1974); McGlone v Bell, 681 F 3d 718, 733 (6th Cir 2012); Midwest Media Prop, LLC,

v Symmes, Twp., 503 F 3d 456, 478 (6th Cir 2017); Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc v Metro Gov't of

Nashville & Davidson County, 274 F 3d 377, 391 (6th Cir 2001); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372

U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v.

Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).

The Sixth Circuit refused to conduct a liberal, comprehensive review and analysis

regarding the facial challenge of the "disrespect" rule; the most fundamental issue for resolution

of this action. See Stevens v City of Columbus, 2022 US App LEXIS at *11 and 22 (6th Cir)(Our court

considers void-for-vagueness claims through a holistic analysis of the challenged law. The central

guestion, then, is whether the rule as a whole "provide[s] explicit standards guiding [its]

enforcement).]). Indeed, the void for vagueness doctrine encapsulates the idea that "regulated

parties should know what is required of them so they can act accordingly" and that "precision

and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or

discriminatory way." Cortiss v City of Roswell, 2022 US App LEXIS 17941 at *17 (11th Cir). Free

Speech Coal., In. vSkrmetti, 2025 US App LEXIS 771 (6th Cir)(courts should assess whether the laws

unconstitutional applications substantially outweighed the constitutional applications).

"The mere fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to

free expression.” Mahanoy Area Sch Dist. v B.L., 594 US 180, 193 (2021); Meriwether v Hartop,

922 F 3d 492, 511 (6th Cir 2021), quoting Tinker; Josephson v Ganzel, 115 F 4 th 771, 785 (6th Cir

2024)(speech on matters of public concern was protected and appellee failed to state that

appellant's speech had a significant disruptive effect on their operations). Existing law at the time

of the violation "place the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." The present legal

landscape gives the defendant notice that her actions were unconstitutional. "It is from existing

case law that that the challenged [prison rules, (OAC 5120-9-06 (C) (26) currently 5.7)] violate a

particularized and fundamental constitutional right. Bambach v Moegel, 92 F 4 th 615, 622-23

(6th Cir 2024). Consequently, the court dismiss this action without a liberal and comprehensive

analysis of the facial challenge, a decision that was contrary to clearly established federal law.

C. Public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights

It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights.

Smith v Davis, 2025 US App LEXIS 16507 at *23-24 (6th Cir). "It is the duty of the courts to be

watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachment

thereon." Schneckloth v Bustamante, 412 US 218, 229 (1973). The US Supreme Court has been

zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases,... but

in all types of cases where administrative ... actions were under scrutiny. Goldberg v Kelly, 397

US 254, 270 (1970). As the United States Supreme Court has long recognized, the Fifth

Amendment's prohibition on vague laws is "applicable to civil as well as criminal actions." Shuti

v Lynch, 828 F 3d 440, 445 (6th Cir 2016), quoting Boutilier v INS., 387 US 118,123 (1967).

These "disrespect" regulations fairly invite prison officials and contractors to apply their

own personal prejudices and opinions as standards for discriminatory enforcement on an ad hoc

and subjective basis. "Not surprisingly, some prison officials use the extraordinary latitude for

discretion authorized by the regulations to suppress unwelcome criticism." (emphasis added)

See Johnson v Raemisch, 557 F Supp 2d 964, 972-73 (WD Wis 2008) citing Procunier v Martinez,

416 US 396, 415 (1974)(striking down prison regulation that censored "statements that 'unduly

complain' or 'magnify grievances,' expression of 'inflammatory political, racial, religious or other

views,' and matter deemed 'defamatory' or 'otherwise inappropriate'") and Baraldini v

Thornburgh, 280 US App DC 176, 884 F 2d 615, 620 (DC Cir 1989)("A reviewing court must always

be careful to make certain that prison administrators are not pretext ally using alleged concerns

in order to punish an inmate for his or her political views.).

Given that the "disrespect" Rule, (C)(26) and 5.7, has already violated my rights to

expression and may continue to infringe on other prisoners' First Amendment rights,

the

injunction is in the public interest. Jones v Caruso, 569 F 3d 258, 276 (6th Cir 2009). In a case that

presents a conflict between the Constitution and a statute, we give "full effect" to the

constitution and whatever portions of the statute are "not repugnant" to the constitution,

effectively severing the unconstitutional portion of the statute. United States v Arthrex, Inc., 594

US 1, 24 (2021). Because the prison policies likely violate the First Amendment, the balance of

equities weigh in favor of preliminary injunction. WirtshaftervTrsof Ind Univ., 2025 US Dist LEXIS

103935 at *29 (SD Ind)("[!]njunctions protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the

public interest.").

Proper application of the constitution, moreover, serves the public interest as "it is always

in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights." Dahl v Bd of Trs

of Western Michigan Univ., 15 F 4 th 728, 736 (6th Cir 2021); Dorce v Wolf, 506 F Supp 3d 142,

145 (D Mass), citing Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347, 373 (1976)("[T]he deprivation of constitutional

rights 'unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.'"). The ODRC prison rules proscribing

"disrespect" is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Stevens v City of Columbus, 2022

US App LEXIS 20829 at *14 (6th Cir). Prison administrative officials are consistently unwilling to

make remedy available. Ross v Blake, 578 US 632, 643 (2016), see Perttu v. Richards (2025), 145

S. Ct. 1793, 222 L. Ed. 2d 108 (slip opinion)(affirming the continued applicability of Ross).

The reason courts cannot blindly defer to the judgement of prison administrators -or any

other official for that matter- is easily understood. Because the prison administrator's “business"

is to maintain order, "there inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive than a court

-part of an independent branch of government- to the constitutionally protected interest in free

expression. Freedman v Maryland, 380 US 51, 57-58 (1965). "[T]here is no iron curtain drawn

between the constitution and prisons in this country." Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 555-56

(1974). A policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid

constitutional claims whether in state or federal institutions. "When a prison regulation or

practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee," as it does here, "federal courts will

discharge their duty to protect the constitution." (emphasis added) Hanrahan v Mohr, 905 F 3d

947, 954 (6th Cir 2018); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974); Johnson v Avery, 393

US 484, 486 (1969).

"We must never forget," said Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316,

407 (1819), "that it is a constitution we are expounding." See Olmstead v United States, 277 US

438, 472 (1928)(Brandeis, L, dissenting); Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 174 (1803)(it cannot be

presumed that any clause of the constitution is intended to be without effect). And, "[p]recisely

because 'it is a constitution we are expounding,' we ought not take liberties with it." Eknes-Tucker

v Governer, 114 F 4 th 1241,1261 (11th Cir 2024) quoting Nat'l Mat Ins Co of DistofCol v Tidewater

Transfer Co., 337 US 582, 647 (1949). Limiting or penalizing "future speech goes by the name

'prior restraint,' and a prior restraint is the guintessential first-amendment violation." Cazares

v Frugoli, 2017 US Dist LEXIS 151676 at *31-32 (7th Cir), quoting Nebraska Press Association v

Stuart, ATI US 539, 559 (1976). "Courts must exercise independent judgement in deciding

whether [the] agency has acted within its statutory authority." Loper Bright Enters v Raimondo,

603 US 369 (2024). That principle [demands] liability here. Griffin v Condon, 744 Fed Appx 925,

929 (6th Cir 2018)(prior restraint, is the quintessential first-amendment violation) Id.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Honorable Court should grant this petition.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael Wood, 8805-984, pro se

Southeastern Corr. Inst.

5900 B.I.S. Road

Lancaster, Ohio 43130

Date

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