Amicus Curiae Brief — Stephen Foote, Individually and as Guardian and Next Friend of B. F. and G. F., Minors, et al., Petitioners v. Ludlow School Committee, et al.

No. 25-77

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

STEPHEN FOOTE, INDIVIDUALLY AND

AS GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND OF

B. F. AND G. F., MINORS, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

LUDLOW SCHOOL COMMITTEE, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the First Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

PARENTAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION

AND THE WAGNER CENTER

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

William A. Estrada

One Patrick Henry Circle

Purcellville, VA 20132

William Wagner

Counsel of Record

Great Lakes Justice Center

5600 West Mount Hope Hwy.

Lansing, MI 48917

(517) 643-1765

prof.wwjd@gmail.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

July 24, 2025

131321

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a public school violates parents’ constitutional

rights when, without parental knowledge or consent, the

school encourages a student to transition to a new gender

or assists in that process.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

T H E C ONS T I T U T IONA L L I BERT Y

INTEREST OF PARENTS TO DIRECT

AND CONTROL THE UPBRINGING OF

THEIR CHILDREN IS AN INALIENABLE

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT THAT REQUIRES

STRICT SCRUTINY OF GOVERNMENT

ACTION INFRINGING ON THIS RIGHT . . . . . . . 3

A. Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

B. Fundamental Liberty, Strict Scrutiny,

and the Deeply Rooted Legal History and

Tradition of a Parent’s Right to Direct

and Control the Upbringing of Their

Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

iii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist.,

401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.,

430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,

508 U.S. 520 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,

414 U.S. 632 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Crowley v. McKinney,

400 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Org.,

597 U.S. 215 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6

Foote v. Ludlow,

No. 23-1069 (1st Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4, 5

Fulton v. Philadelphia,

593 U.S. 522 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Gruenke v. Seip,

225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

Mahmoud v. Taylor,

No. 24-297, slip op. (U.S. June 27, 2025) . . . . 11, 12, 13, 15

Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 6, 7

Moore v. East Cleveland,

431 U.S. 494 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Parents for Priv. v. Barr,

949 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Parham v. J. R.,

442 U.S. 584 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,

268 U.S. 510 (1925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 7, 13

Prince v. Massachusetts,

321 U.S. 158 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8

Quilloin v. Walcott,

434 U.S. 246 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Reno v. Flores,

507 U.S. 292 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

v

Cited Authorities

Page

Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,

431 U.S. 816 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Stanley v. Illinois,

405 U.S. 645 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 10, 11, 13

Washington v. Glucksberg,

521 U.S. 702 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 11, 12, 15

U.S. Const. amend. XIV . . . . . . . 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15

Rules

Supreme Court Rule 37(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Supreme Court Rule 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

Other Authorities

1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Est r a d a , Ho m e s ch o olin g in t h e Uni t e d

States: A Seismic Parental Rights Victory,

18 Liberty L. Rev. 865 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law . . . . . . . . . . 2

John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government,

1690 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Phillips, Liberating Liberty: How the Glucksberg

Test Can Solve the Supreme Court’s Confusing

Jur ispr udence on Parental Rights , 16

Liberty L. Rev 347 (2022), available at https://

digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.

cgi?article=1319&context=lu_law_review

(last visited July 15, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Wagner, Revisiting Divine, Natural, and Common

Law Foundations Underlying Parental

Liberty to Direct and Control the Upbringing

of Children, 5 W. Australian Jurist 1 (2014) . . . . 6, 10

1

STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, Amici Curiae,

Parental Rights Foundation and the Wagner Center

submit this brief.1

The Parental Rights Foundation (PRF) is a national,

nonprofit, nonpartisan advocacy organization with

supporters in all fifty states. The PRF is concerned

about the erosion of the legal protection of loving and

fit parents to raise, nurture, and educate their children

without undue state interference. The PRF is committed

to protecting children by preserving the liberty of their

parents. It advances this mission by educating public

officials and the broader public about the urgent need to

reverse intrusive state policies that have, in many cases,

caused more harm than benefit to children. The PRF also

works to strengthen fundamental parental rights at all

levels of government.

Housed on the campus of Spring Arbor University,

the Wagner Center serves as a national academic voice

for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Most

importantly for this case, the Wagner Center works to

preserve the freedom of parents to direct and control

the upbringing of their children and is a leading voice in

this area.

1. Pursuant to Rule 37(2), Amici curiae gave 10-days’ notice of

its intent to file this brief to all counsel. Amici Curiae further state

that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended

to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person or

entity, other than Amici curiae, its members or its counsel, made a

monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

Amici Curiae hold a significant interest in the

preservation of parental rights. Amici Curiae have special

knowledge helpful to this Court in this case, about the

inalienable fundamental nature of a parent’s right to direct

and control the upbringing of their children.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court should grant the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari because significant confusion exists among the

federal courts as to how much protection the Constitution

affords parents when government substantially infringes

on their liberty to direct and control the upbringing of

their children. The instant case provides an opportunity to

resolve the jurisprudential confusion created by the Circuit

splits. This Court ought to do so now since predictability in

the law is necessary for good governance under the Rule of

Law, especially during times of cultural discord. In doing

so, this Court should confirm that because the liberty

of parents to direct and control the upbringing of their

children is deeply rooted in the legal traditions and history

of this nation, that it is a fundamental inalienable liberty

interest protected under the Fourteenth amendment.

Government conduct substantially infringing on this

liberty, therefore, ought to receive strict scrutiny—where

government must demonstrate that its policy advances

interests of the highest order and is narrowly tailored to

achieve those interests.

3

ARGUMENT

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY INTEREST

OF PARENTS TO DIRECT AND CONTROL

THE UPBRINGING OF THEIR CHILDREN IS

AN INALIENABLE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

THAT REQUIRES STRICT SCRUTINY OF

GOVERNMENT ACTION INFRINGING ON

THIS RIGHT

This Court should grant the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari because significant confusion exists among the

federal courts as to how much protection the Constitution

affords parents when government substantially infringes

on their liberty to direct and control the upbringing of

their children.

A.

Context

Here parents challenged a government school mandate

that its staff use biologically false gender pronouns

preferred by their child at school. Foote v. Ludlow, No. 231069 at 9-12 (1st Cir. 2024). The parents further challenged

the government’s teachers “discussing gender identity”

with their child, “providing gender-identity resources” to

their child, and authorizing their female child to use the

boys’ bathroom. Id. at 20. The parents further challenged

the government’s mandate requiring staff not to notify

them of their daughter’s social transition from female to

male.

Parents maintain the government action here

“interferes with their parental rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution.” Foote v. Ludlow, No.

23-1069 (1st Cir. 2024).

4

The appellate court cursorily recognized the

fundamental right of a parent to direct and control the

upbringing of their child. Foote, at 15-24 citing, Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion); Pierce

v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) and Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The appellate court

thereafter held, though, that the government did not

engage in conduct that infringed upon this inalienable

fundamental right. Foote, at 24-41. Because the appellate

court found no infringement of a fundamental right, it

refused to apply strict scrutiny to the government action

here. Foote, at 41. Applying mere rational basis review, the

appellate court upheld the government action as rationally

related to a legitimate government interest. Id. at 41-45.

The appellate court’s holding adds to the significant

confusion in the federal courts over how much protection

the Constitution affords parents when government

substantially infringes on their liberty to direct and

control the upbringing of their children. Contrast, Foote v.

Ludlow, No. 23-1069 (1st Cir. 2024); Blau v. Fort Thomas

Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005); Crowley v.

McKinney, 400 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2005); Parents for Priv.

v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2020) (stripping parental

rights at the schoolhouse door), with C.N. v. Ridgewood

Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005); and Gruenke v.

Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding “that ‘in

loco parentis’ does not mean ‘displace parents’”)

This case provides this Court with an opportunity

to dispel the confusion among the federal courts by

confirming that the right of parents to direct and control

the upbringing of their children is a fundamental,

inalienable right—and that government conduct infringing

5

on this liberty ought to receive strict scrutiny—where

government must demonstrate that its policy advances

interests of the highest order and is narrowly tailored to

achieve those interests.

The appellate court presupposed that the level of

scrutiny varies depending on which branch of government

is infringing upon a citizen’s constitutionally protected

liberty. The appellate court further presupposed that

the government’s conduct did not infringe on the parent’s

constitutionally protected liberty. Operating under such

erroneous presuppositions, the appellate court failed

to apply the scrutiny required when the government

interferes with a fundamental inalienable constitutional

right. Thus, instead of properly applying strict scrutiny

to the State’s action, the lower court erroneously applied

mere rational basis review.

B. Fundamental Liberty, Strict Scrutiny, and the

Deeply Rooted Legal History and Tradition

of a Parent’s Right to Direct and Control the

Upbringing of Their Children

This Court looks to “history and tradition” in

determining Fourteenth Amendment liberty limits on the

exercise of government power. See, e.g., Dobbs v Jackson

Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 240 n.22 (2022). The

liberty of parents to direct and control the upbringing of

their children is deeply rooted in the legal history and

traditions of this nation. This Court first examined the

issue of parental rights over a century ago in Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the State made

it unlawful to teach any subject in languages other than

English. Id. Prior to the government’s action in that

6

case, no conflict existed between the state and parents.

The reason no conflict existed is because deeply rooted

historical and legal traditions of the nation properly

recognized the family as the backbone of society. See

e.g., John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government,

1690, Sec. 56, Sec. 63. (authority “to govern the minority

of their children” rests with parents); 1 W. Blackstone,

Commentaries * 447; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on

American Law * 190 (recognizing that natural bonds of

affection lead parents to act in the best interest of the

children). The deeply rooted historical and legal traditions

were well in place before the founding of our nation and

existed in the common law at the time we ratified our

Constitution. Wagner, Revisiting Divine, Natural, and

Common Law Foundations Underlying Parental Liberty

to Direct and Control the Upbringing of Children, 5 W.

Australian Jurist 1 (2014); Estrada, Homeschooling in

the United States: A Seismic Parental Rights Victory,

18 Liberty L. Rev. 865 (2024). And see, Dobbs v Jackson

Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 240 n.22 (2022)

(looking to our “history and tradition” in determining

Fourteenth Amendment liberty limits on the exercise of

government power)

Political and social activism in the early 20th century

sought to alter those deeply rooted historic views on

family and government. The Meyer Court responded by

holding that “it is the natural duty of the parent to give

his children education suitable to their station in life.”

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. The Court explained that “[t]he

individual has certain fundamental rights which must

be respected. . . . [The individual] cannot be coerced by

methods which conflict with the Constitution — a desirable

end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.” Id. at 401.

7

Meyer recognized the family as the building block of

society—rejecting Plato’s musing that “children are to

be common” as contrary to our nation’s founding. Id. at

402. Meyer conclusively held that parental rights are a

constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 398.

Two years later the Court unanimously reaffirmed

that parental rights are a constitutional right under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

(striking down an Oregon law requiring children between

8 and 16 to attend only public schools). Building upon the

foundation laid in Meyer, the Pierce Court confirmed that

“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those

who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,

coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him

for additional obligations.” Pierce, 268 U.S at 535.

Later, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court

again recognized parental rights stating:

[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody,

care and nurture of the child reside first in the

parents, whose primary function and freedom

include preparation for obligations the state can

neither supply nor hinder. . . . It is in recognition

of this that these decisions have respected the

private realm of family life which the state

cannot enter.

321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

Thereafter, this Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder,

decisively reaffirmed the fundamental nature of parental

8

rights under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

406 U.S. 205 (1972) (confirming “the fundamental interest

of parents” in overturning convictions of Amish citizens

convicted of violating a State’s compulsory attendance

statute). The Court reasoned,

“[t]he values of parental direction of the

religious upbringing and education of their

children in their early and formative years

have a high place in our society. … Even more

markedly than in Prince, therefore, this case

involves the fundamental interest of parents,

as contrasted with that of the State, to guide

the religious future and education of their

children. The history and culture of Western

civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental

concern for the nurture and upbringing of their

children. This primary role of the parents in the

upbringing of their children is now established

beyond debate as an enduring American

tradition.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-214, 232.

After affirming the inalienable nature of the parental

rights, Yoder made clear that government actions

infringing on this constitutional liberty must face strict

scrutiny:

The essence of all that has been said and

written on the subject is that only those interests

of the highest order and those not otherwise

served can overbalance legitimate claims to

the free exercise of religion. We can accept

it as settled, therefore, that, however strong

the State’s interest in universal compulsory

9

education, it is by no means absolute to the

exclusion or subordination of all other interests.

Id. at 215.

In Washington v. Glucksberg, this Court upheld

Washington’s law banning assisted suicide. 521 U.S. 702

(1997). The Court in that case held that the Fourteenth

Amendment did not include a fundamental right to

physician-assisted suicide, while reaffirming that parental

rights were a fundamental right—and that courts must

use strict scrutiny in reviewing governmental actions

infringing upon parental rights:

In a long line of cases, we have held that,

in addition to the specific freedoms protected

by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially

protected by the Due Process Clause includes

the rights . . . to direct the education and

upbringing of one’s children. . . . The Fourteenth

Amendment forbids the government to infringe

‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no

matter what process is provided, unless the

infringement is narrowly tailored to serve

a compelling state interest. Id. at 720-721

(cleaned up).

While physician-assisted suicide killing was not

deeply rooted in the legal history or traditions of the

nation, the right of parents to direct the upbringing and

education of their children was—and was part of our

common law at the founding of our Constitution, as later

amended by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, for the

same reason the Court found no fundamental right for

physician-assisted suicide in the Constitution under the

10

Due Process Clause, it found there a fundamental right

for parents to direct the education and upbringing of

their children. See Phillips, Liberating Liberty: How

the Glucksberg Test Can Solve the Supreme Court’s

Confusing Jurisprudence on Parental Rights, 16 Liberty

L. Rev 347 (2022). https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/

viewcontent.cgi?article=1319&context=lu_law_review

(last visited July 15, 2025); Wagner, Revisiting Divine,

Natural, and Common Law Foundations Underlying

Parental Liberty to Direct and Control the Upbringing

of Children, 5 W. Australian Jurist 1 (2014).

In the grandparent visitation case of Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), this Court summed up

almost a century’s worth of precedence, stating,

“[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case—

the interest of parents in the care, custody,

and control of their children—is perhaps the

oldest of the fundamental liberty interests

recognized by this Court. … In light of this

extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted

that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment protects the fundamental right of

parents to make decisions concerning the care,

custody, and control of their children. … The

Due Process Clause does not permit a State to

infringe on the fundamental right of parents

to make childrearing decisions simply because

a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could

be made.” Id. at 65-66, 72-73.

Recognizing that the Fourteenth A mendment

“provides heightened protection against government

11

interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty

interests,” a plurality of the Court in Troxel reaffirmed the

fundamental nature of parental rights and found that the

State’s nonparental visitation statute “unconstitutionally

infringe[d] on that fundamental parental right” Troxel,

530 U.S. at 65, 67. While Troxel strongly reaffirmed a

parent’s right to direct and control the upbringing of

their children as a fundamental liberty interest under

the Fourteenth Amendment, the lack of consensus

among the Justices on the appropriate level of scrutiny

to apply to government interference created a catalysis

for jurisprudential confusion. 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J.,

concurring).

In Mahmoud v. Taylor, No. 24-297, slip op. (U.S.

June 27, 2025)) this Court recently helped to clarify

some of the jurisprudential confusion. The Court did so

by reaffirming the longstanding recognition of parental

rights as fundamental, and by applying strict scrutiny to

government actions infringing on this inalienable liberty.

Focusing this time on the First A mendment,

Mahmoud reasserted the lesson in Yoder that:

A government burdens the [fundamental

right] of parents when it requires them to

submit their children to instruction that poses

“a very real threat of undermining” the . . .

beliefs and practices that the parents wish to

instill. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 218

(1972). And a government cannot condition the

benefit of free public education on parents’

acceptance of such instruction. Mahmoud, No.

24-297, slip op. at 1-2

12

In Mahmoud, the State of Maryland “introduced

a variety of LGBTQ+ inclusive storybooks into the

elementary school curriculum.” Id. The government

sought to “disrupt children’s thinking about sexuality

and gender” and to that end the government mandated

attendance of children and refused to notify parents.

Id. Relying on Yoder, the parents here contended the

government’s no parental notification / no opt out policy

“infringed on their right as parents to the free exercise

of their religion” in violation of the First Amendment. Id

at 14.

Based on the record before it, the Court agreed:

We hold that the Board’s introduction of the

“LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—combined

with its decision to withhold notice to parents

and to forbid opt outs—substantially interferes

with the religious development of their children

and imposes the kind of burden on religious

exercise that Yoder found unacceptable. Id. at

21-22

Relying on Yoder, the Mahmoud Court stated:

Here, the Board requires teachers to

instruct young children using storybooks that

explicitly contradict their parents’ religious

views, and it encourages the teachers to

correct the children and accuse them of being

“hurtful” when they express a degree of

religious confusion. Such instruction “carries

with it precisely the kind of objective danger

to the free exercise of religion that the First

Amendment was designed to prevent.” Yoder,

13

406 U. S., at 218. (cleaned up) Mahmoud, No.

24-297, slip op. at 26

Mahmoud confirmed that “when a law imposes a

burden of the same character as that in Yoder, strict

scrutiny is appropriate” even if the “law is neutral or

generally applicable.” Id. at 36 In Mahmoud,

the board’s policies, like the compulsoryattendance requirement in Yoder, substantially

interfered with the religious development of the

parents’ children. And those policies pose “a

very real threat of undermining” the religious

beliefs and practices that the parents wish to

instill in their children. Id. at 37

Because the burden in Mahmoud was “of the exact

same character as the burden in Yoder,” the Court

applied strict scrutiny to the government action. Id.

The Court then reaffirmed that “[t]o survive strict

scrutiny, a government must demonstrate that its policy

advances interests of the highest order and is narrowly

tailored to achieve those interests.” Id., citing, Fulton v.

Philadelphia, 593 U. S. 522, 541 (2021) (quoting Church of

Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546

(1993)). (cleaned up) Under this standard of review, the

Court found Maryland’s action unconstitutional.

The appellate court’s decision cannot be reconciled

with this Court’s decisions in Meyer, Pierce, Troxel, Yoder,

and Mahmoud. If school officials knowingly contradict

parents and hide vital information from them, no way

exists for the parents to guide the future, education, or

healthcare, of their children. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232. There

is also no way that the parents can exercise “parental

14

concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.”

Id.

Indeed, the appellate court’s reasoning undermines

the core teaching of this Court’s decision in Yoder,

and the Supreme Court’s recognition that parents, not

government officials (even public-school teachers) are the

ones with the “primary role … in the upbringing of their

children…” Id. See also, Cleveland Board of Education

v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974) (confirming

“freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage

and family life” as constitutionally protected liberties);

Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-504 (1977)

(holding that “the institution of the family is deeply

rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”; Smith v.

Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977)

(documenting the fundamental nature of liberty associated

with family matters as deeply rooted in history and

tradition of the American nation, predating even the Bill

of Rights); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)

(confirming that “the relationship between parent and

child is constitutionally protected”); Stanley v. Illinois,

405 U.S. 645, 651 (1978) (reaffirming the fundamental

nature of parental rights); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584,

602-604 (1979) (reaffirming the fundamental nature of

parental rights, rejecting “any notion that a child is the

mere creature of the State”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455

U.S. 745, 753, 760 (1982) (reaffirming “[t]he fundamental

liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and

management of their child); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,

303-304 (1993) (confirming that parental rights must be

respected as a constitutional limit on the exercise of state

power, even if nonparents think they would do a better

job making decisions for a child than the child’s parents).

15

A century of U.S. Supreme Court precedents firmly

establishes that the Constitution protects the right of

a parent to direct and control the upbringing of their

children as a fundamental right. As such, government

infringement of such inalienable liberty requires judicial

review using a strict scrutiny analysis where government

must demonstrate that its policy advances interests of the

highest order and is narrowly tailored to achieve those

interests.

Notwithstanding the deeply rooted legal history

and tradition affirming parental rights as fundamental,

significant jurisprudential confusion exists among the

federal courts. Reflecting this division, federal appellate

courts, as outlined in the Petition, continue to split over

how to decide these kinds of issues. This case provides

an opportunity for this Court to resolve the significant

jurisprudential disagreement evident in these Circuit

splits. It should do so now, since predictability in the law

is necessary for good governance under the Rule of Law,

especially during times of cultural discord.

Consistent judicial decisions, grounded in honest

interpretation, give government officials and others

notice of what is prohibited. When it comes to judicial

review of government action and constitutional provisions,

consistent decisions provide predictability for officials

seeking to act in accordance with constitutional standards.

Inconsistent judicial precedents lead to unpredictability in

the law, providing no beneficial guidance for government

officials or others trying to act within the law. Mahmoud

helped by confirming the fundamental nature of parental

rights in the context of the First Amendment. Amici

requests this Court finish the jurisprudential task by

doing the same here under the Fourteenth Amendment.

16

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amici Curiae urge this

Court to grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

William A. Estrada

One Patrick Henry Circle

Purcellville, VA 20132

William Wagner

Counsel of Record

Great Lakes Justice Center

5600 West Mount Hope Hwy.

Lansing, MI 48917

(517) 643-1765

prof.wwjd@gmail.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

July 24, 2025