Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ian Freeman, fka Ian Bernard, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefDec 22, 2025
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No. 25In the
Supreme Court of the United States
IAN FREEMAN, F/K/A IAN BERNARD,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of A ppeals for the First Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Richard Guerriero
Counsel of Record
Oliver Bloom
Lothstein Guerriero, PLLC
Chamberlain Block Building
39 Central Square, Suite 202
Keene, NH 03431
(603) 352-5000
richard@nhdefender.com
Attorneys for Petitioner
131741
A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Did the federal agency FinCEN exceed the authority
granted in 2001 by Congress in 31 U.S.C. § 5330 to regulate
money transmitting businesses when FinCEN interpreted
one word in that statute – “funds” – as authority to require
sellers of bitcoin and other virtual currencies prior to 2021
to register with FinCEN, when virtual currency was not
invented until 2008 and when Congress did not amend
the statute to capture virtual currencies until 2021, after
they had become financial instruments of great political
and economic significance?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner, Ian Freeman, was the defendant in the
District Court for New Hampshire and appellant in the
First Circuit.
Respondent, the United States, was plaintiff in the
District Court for New Hampshire and appellee in the
First Circuit.
iii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
This case arises from the following proceedings:
• United States v. Freeman, No. 23-1839, 147 F.4th 1
(1st Cir. 2025) (affirming district court’s judgment).
• United States v. Freeman, No. 23-1839 (1st Cir.
Sept. 22, 2025) (denying petition for rehearing).
• United States v. Freeman, No. 21-cr-41-JL (D.N.H.
Feb. 9, 2024) (amended district court judgment).
• United States v. Freeman, 688 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.N.H.
2023) (denying motion to dismiss).
There are no other proceedings in state or federal trial or
appellate courts, or in this Court, directly related to this
case within the meaning of this Court’s Rule 14.1(b)(iii).
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . . . 1
OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . 2
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . . 8
I.
FinCEN’s Assertion of Authority to
Regulate Virtual Currency Is Based
on One Word Written by Congress
Before Virtual Currency Was Invented . . . . . . 8
v
Table of Contents
Page
II.
The Major Questions Doctrine Applies
to this Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
III.
Virtual Currency Is a New and Unique
Financial Instrument of Great Social and
Political Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
IV.
The Requirement of a License to Sell Virtual
Currency Has a Major Impact on the
National and World Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
V.
A Colorable Tex tual A rg ument Is
Not Enough to Overcome the Major
Questions Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
VI.
If Virtual Currency Was Already Captured
by the 2001 Version of Section 5330,
Congress Would Not Have Needed to
Add Language in 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
VII.
FinCEN Admitted that It Had to
Expand Its Author ity Beyond the
Statutory Language to Capture Virtual
Currency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
VIII. The First Circuit Made Other Significant
Errors in Its Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A. Bitcoin is Not Like Hawala . . . . . . . . . . . 32
vi
Table of Contents
Page
B. Bostock Does Not Support the First
Circuit’s Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
vii
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 29, 2025 . . . . . . . 1a
APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST
CIRCUIT, FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2025 . . . . . 74a
APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
FILED AUGUST 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76a
APPENDIX D — AMENDED JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115a
APPENDIX E — EXCERPTS OF THE TRANSCRIPT
FOR THE MOTION HEA RING, DATED
SEPTEMBER 1, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134a
APPENDIX F — EXCERPTS OF THE TRANSCRIPT
FOR THE SENTENCING HEARING, DATED
SEPTEMBER 11, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142a
APPENDIX G — RELEVANT STATUTORY
PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156a
viii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton,
581 U.S. 468 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc.,
87 F.4th 1003 (9th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Bostock v. Clayton County,
590 U.S. 644 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 35
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,
562 U.S. 223 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Burdon Cent. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Payne,
167 U.S. 127 (1897) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CFTC v. McDonnell,
287 F. Supp. 3d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . 15, 19
City of Chicago v. Fulton,
592 U.S. 154 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Coinbase, Inc. v. SEC,
126 F.4th 175 (3d Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Doe v. Chao,
540 U.S. 614 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
ix
Cited Authorities
Page
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 23, 28-29
Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17
Kansas v. United States Dep’t of Educ.,
739 F. Supp. 3d 902 (D. Kan. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Kansas v. United States Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 24-4041-JWB, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116479
(D. Kan. July 2, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
King v. Burwell,
576 U.S. 473 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 27
Kleiman v. Wright,
No. 18-CV-80176, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216417
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Kovac v. Wray,
660 F. Supp. 3d 555 (N.D. Tex. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Kungys v. United States,
485 U.S. 759 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Louisiana v. EEOC,
784 F. Supp. 3d 886 (W.D. La. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
x
Cited Authorities
Page
Luvian v. Bondi,
No. 25-cv-04035-TLT, 2025 LX 191488
(N.D. Cal. June 7, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137 (1803) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649 (1892) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
512 U.S. 218 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,
583 U.S. 109 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 27
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Parlane Sportswear Co. v. Weinberger,
513 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Pulsifer v. United States,
601 U.S. 124 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Purl v. United States HHS,
787 F. Supp. 3d 284 (N.D. Tex. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
xi
Cited Authorities
Page
Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
SEC v.
Trendon T. Shavers & Bitcoin Sav. & Trust,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194382
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Solid Waste Agency v.
United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,
585 U.S. 162 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Stone v. INS,
514 U.S. 386 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Sullivan v. Finkelstein,
496 U.S. 617 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
TikTok Inc. v. Garland,
604 U.S. 56 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
United States v. Faiella,
39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
United States v. Harmon,
474 F. Supp. 3d 76 (D.D.C. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 23
xii
Cited Authorities
Page
United States v. Lord,
915 F.3d 1009 (5th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
United States v. Murgio,
209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
United States v. Sterlingov,
719 F. Supp. 3d 65 (D.C.C. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
United States v. Ulbricht,
858 F.3d 71 (9th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A.,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 22, 24, 28
Van Loon v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury,
122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. 1 (1825) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
West Virginia v. E.P.A.,
597 U.S. 697 (2022) . . . . . . . . . 12, 13, 16, 18, 23, 24, 28
Whitman v. American Trucking Assns, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 24
Zietzke v. United States,
426 F. Supp. 3d 758 (W.D. Wash. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . 21
xiii
Cited Authorities
Page
Statutes, Rules and Regulations
18 U.S.C. § 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
18 U.S.C. §1960(b)(1)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 8
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
31 U.S.C. § 5330 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5, 8-12, 18, 24-26, 29, 34
31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 11
31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Other Authorities
Bitcoin to USD Chart, https://coinmarketcap.
c o m /c u r r e n c i e s / bit c oi n / ( l a s t v i s it e d
Dec. 17, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households
in 2021 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing,
and Counterfeiting Act of 2019, S. 1883,
116th Cong. (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
xiv
Cited Authorities
Page
Crypto Crime in Context: Breaking Down the
Illicit Activity in Digital Assets: Hearing before
the House Subcommittee on Digital Assets,
Financial Technology and Inclusion, 118th
Cong. 11 (2023) (statement of Jane Khodarkovsky),
https://perma.cc/9Y9H-3QGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31-32
Himamauli Das, Prepared Remarks of FinCEN
Acting Director Him Das, Delivered Virtually
at the Amer ican Bankers Association/
American Bar Association Financial Crimes
Enforcement Conference, FinCen (2022),
https://perma.cc/VL3M-4GM9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Depa r t ment of Just ice: Bin an ce an d
CEO Pl e a d G ui l ty t o Fe d e r a l
C h a r g e s i n $ 4 B R e s o l u t i o n ( 2 0 2 3) ,
https://perma.cc/6PJ5-3726 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-20
Exec. Order No. 14178, 90 Fed. Reg. 8647 (2025) . . . . . 16
Exec. Order No. 14331, 90 Fed. Reg. 38925 (2025) . . . 22
FinCEN Advisory 33, Informal Value Transfer
Systems (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
FinCEN, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to
Certain Business Models Involving Convertible
Virtual Currencies, FIN–2019–G001 (2019) . . . . . . 30
xv
Cited Authorities
Page
FinCEN, FIN–2013–G001, Application of FinCEN’s
Reg ulations to Persons Administering,
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies
(2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
FinCEN Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 6411,
115th Cong. (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
FinCEN Improvement Act of 2019, H.R. 1414,
116th Cong. (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
H.R. Rep. No. 107-250 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 33
Illicit Use of Virtual Currency and the Law
Enforcement Response: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Terrorism and Illicit Fin. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs. 115th Cong. 9 (2018) . . . . . . 30
Improving Laundering Laws and Increasing
Comprehensive Information Tracking of
Criminal Activity in Shell Holdings Act, S. 2563,
116th Cong. (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Kimberly Kruesi, Trump calls for US to be ‘crypto
capital of the planet’ in appeal to Nashville
bitcoin conference, Associated Press (2024),
https://perma.cc/7NSA-Y2FQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Gideon Lewis-Kraus, Has Bitcoin’s Elusive Creator
Finally Been Unmasked? New Yorker (2024),
https://perma.cc/7ACM-2XFK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 21
xvi
Cited Authorities
Page
David W. Perkins, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45427,
Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money
and Selected Policy Issues (2020) . . . . . . . . 10, 14, 18
The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ.
Pol’y and Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Trade
and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.,
and Urban Affs., 113th Cong. 8 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Staff of H. Comm. On Fin. Services, Operation Choke
Point 2.0: Biden’s Debanking of Digital Assets
(2025), https://perma.cc/8CTW-MRA2 . . . . . . . . . . 22
Terrorism and Digit. Fin.: How Tech. is Changing
the Threat Before H. Subcomm. on Intelligence
and Counter ter ror ism, 117th Cong. 14
(2021) (statement of John Eisert, Assistant
Director, Department of Homeland Security),
https://perma.cc/TGW2-VUJE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub.
L. No. 116–283 § 6102(a)(3), § 6102(d)(2)(A),
134 Stat. 3388 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Today’s Cryptocurrency Prices by Market
Cap, https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited
Dec. 17, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
xvii
Cited Authorities
Page
United States Census Bureau, CB21-208, New
Vintage 2021 Population Estimates Available for
the Nation, States and Puerto Rico (2021) . . . . . 18-19
Un it i ng a nd St r eng t hen i ng A me r ic a by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act Of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56
§ 359(b), 115 Stat. 272 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, Ian Freeman, respectfully requests a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals is available at
147 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025). Pet. App.1a-73a.1 The court
of appeals’ order denying rehearing is unreported. Pet.
App.74a-75a. The opinion of the district court denying
the motion to dismiss is available at 688 F. Supp. 3d 1
(D.N.H. 2023). Pet.App.76a-114a. The district court’s oral
judgments denying the motion to dismiss are unreported.
Pet.App.134a-41a, 142a-55a. The district court’s amended
judgment of conviction and sentence is unreported. Pet.
App.115a-33a.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on July 29,
2025, and denied rehearing on September 22, 2025. This
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
1. “C.A.App.#” refers to the Appendix filed in United States
v. Freeman, 23-1839 (July 29, 2025). “Pet.App.#a” refers to the
Appendix filed with this petition. “App.Reply.Br.#” and “Gov.
Br.#” refer to petitioner’s reply brief and the government’s brief
in United States v. Freeman, 23-1839 (July 29, 2025). “D.Ct.Dkt.#”
refers to the district court docket.
2
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant versions of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and 31 U.S.C.
§ 5330 are reproduced in the appendix to this petition.
Pet.App.156a-62a.
INTRODUCTION
A federal criminal statute, 18 USC § 1960(b)(1)(B),
makes it a crime to fail to register a money transmitting
business with the Department of the Treasury. “Money
transmitting business” is defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)
(1)(A). The version of that statute that Congress enacted
in 2001, and which was effective until 2021, included
within the definition of a “money transmitting business”
businesses which engaged in the “transmission of funds.”
In 2021, Congress expanded the statute beyond “funds”
to capture businesses engaged in the transmission of
“currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency.”
Between 2016 and 2021, Ian Freeman sold bitcoin
for profit. He did not register as a money transmitting
business with FinCEN, a regulatory agency within
Treasury. The government charged Freeman with
the crimes of conspiring to and failing to register as a
money transmitting business. Everyone agreed that the
2001 version of 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) applied to the
prosecution. Freeman moved to dismiss the charges on
the grounds that the word “funds” in the 2001 statute did
not give FinCEN the regulatory authority to require him
to register as a money transmitting business. The district
court denied Freeman’s motion and the First Circuit
affirmed the district court.
3
The Court should grant this petition for a writ of
certiorari. Regulatory agencies only have the power
granted to them by Congress. Moreover, when an
agency’s assertion of authority affects important political
or social issues or vast areas of the economy, the major
questions doctrine requires a clear showing that Congress
intended to grant that authority. Here, FinCEN’s claim
of regulatory authority to license sellers of virtual
currency is not supported by clear statutory authority
from Congress. Virtual currency did not exist when
Congress passed the applicable version of 31 U.S.C. § 5330.
Virtual currency came about because of revolutionary
new technology which created financial instruments
free from the involvement of any government. And it has
become a multi-trillion-dollar part of the global economy.
This Court’s cases regarding major questions and other
principles of statutory interpretation require reversal
of the First Circuit’s decision. Congress did not, when it
wrote the word “funds” in 2001, foresee the invention of
virtual currency, its importance, and its massive growth,
and intend to prospectively authorize FinCEN to regulate
sellers of virtual currency like Freeman.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2002, Ian Freeman created a libertarian radio
talk show called “Free Talk Live.” C.A.App.1907, 1913.
Freeman created the show for political and philosophical
reasons—because he thought other talk shows were too
controlling and did not allow callers or guests to speak
freely and disagree with each other. Id. at 1908. See also
Pet.App.1a-2a. Beginning in 2006, Freeman and others
broadcast the show on the internet from Keene, New
Hampshire. The show was eventually syndicated on 180
radio stations. C.A.App.1907.
4
When Freeman learned about bitcoin in 2010-2011, he
realized that it could help promote his views on freedom.
In his words, bitcoin allows “individuals to control their
own finances without the involvement of some centralized
so-called authority.” Id. at 1911. In 2014, to promote his
views, Freeman began selling bitcoin, first via bitcoin
vending machines, and subsequently on LocalBitcoins.
com and via Telegram. Id. at 1916-20, 1925, 1972; Pet.
App.2a, 5a.
The FBI and other government agencies began
investigating Freeman in 2017. C.A.App.609. The
government monitored Freeman’s comments on Free Talk
Live. Id. at 2027-29, 2055-57. It also installed telephone
pole cameras and surveilled the home in Keene, where
Freeman lived with his girlfriend and friends. Id. at
652-55. The government investigated Freeman’s sales
of bitcoin. Id. at 364-407, 418-30, 434-76, 482-505, 610.
The government discovered that Freeman, by his own
account, was selling bitcoin without having registered
with the Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network
(FinCEN), the Treasury bureau that claimed authority to
regulate sales of bitcoin as a money transmitting business
under 31 U.S.C. § 5330. The government also discovered
that some purchasers of bitcoin from Freeman were the
victims of romance scams or other fraudulent activities
perpetrated not by Freeman, but by third parties. Pet.
App.81a; C.A.App.1453-54.
On March 15, 2021, the government indicted Freeman
and others for conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money
transmitting business, operation of an unlicensed money
transmitting business, conspiracy to commit wire fraud,
six counts of wire fraud, continuing financial crimes
5
enterprise, and money laundering. C.A.App 61-69. The
next day, the government obtained a search warrant and
raided Freeman’s home at 6:00 a.m. Id. at 658, 664, 1990.
Approximately twenty-five government agents, including
a SWAT team, participated. Id. at 696. The agents were
armed with tactical gear, assault rifles, two Bearcat
armored vehicles (one armed with a battering ram), and at
least one “flash bang” grenade. Id. at 657-58, 697, 1542-45.
Freeman and those in his home, including his girlfriend,
were asleep and surprised by the raid. Id. at 1989-91.
They exited the home at gunpoint, in night clothes, some
carrying their pets. Id. at 1991-92. There were firearms
in the home, but there was no resistance or violence by
Freeman or the others. Id. at 667, 670, 678, 1575.
Over the following months, all the defendants except
Freeman and one co-defendant made plea bargains. Id.
at 26-27. When Freeman and the other co-defendant
did not make plea bargains, the government brought a
superseding indictment. Id. at 70-88. That indictment
dropped the wire fraud counts and the continuing criminal
enterprise count. However, the superseding indictment
repeated the charges of operating, and conspiring to
operate, an unlicensed money transmitting business. Id.
at 89-111. The superseding indictment also charged one
count of money laundering, one count of money laundering
conspiracy, and several tax evasion counts. Id.
Freeman moved to dismiss the unlicensed money
transmitting business counts on the grounds that, during
the relevant time frame in the superseding indictment,
Congress had not authorized any federal agency to require
the registration of bitcoin sellers under 31 U.S.C. § 5330.
Pet.App.8a, 76a-77a; C.A.App.89-113. The government
6
objected to the motion. C.A.App.114-34. The district court
sided with the government and denied the motion. Pet.
App.134a-41a. See also id. at 76a-114a; 142a-55a.
Freeman’s jury trial lasted eleven days. Much of the
government’s evidence focused on proving that Freeman
sold bitcoin, a fact he did not deny. C.A.App.1916-19,
1925. Similar testimony documented that Freeman had
not registered as a money transmitting business with
FinCEN, which Freeman also admitted. Id. at 565-66,
572-78, 874, 911, 1563.
In support of the money laundering charges, the
government asserted that Freeman knew some of the
bitcoin he sold was being purchased by scam victims at
the behest of scammers. Pet.App.5a-6a. The government
had some alleged victims testify to being duped by
scammers into purchasing bitcoin. See, e.g., Pet.App.81a;
C.A.App.1140-57. The government claimed that Freeman
was willfully blind and was, as a result, helping scammers
launder money and defraud victims. C.A.App.2101-02. The
government claimed that alleged victims were especially
vulnerable because of their age and lack of familiarity with
the internet or virtual currency. See, e.g., id. at 320, 2096.
In support of the tax evasion charges, the government
claimed that Freeman owed but did not pay taxes on the
money he made selling bitcoin. Pet.App.56a-57a.
In his defense, Freeman pointed out that only one
percent of his bitcoin sales were questioned by the
government. C.A.App.1527, 1942-44, 2061. He showed
that he operated under his own name, not anonymously
or under a fake name. C.A.App.365, 515, 527, 538. He also
showed that he went to great lengths to document his
7
bitcoin sales and the identities of the buyers, preserving
that information for later inspection. C.A.App.1386-1453.
Freeman noted that, despite his efforts, it was the alleged
scam victims who sometimes lied to him, C.A.App.509-10,
1194-95, 1324, 1487-88, 1599, 1663-64, and who continued
their activities after having been warned of the risk of
fraud. C.A.App.1227-29, 1305-06.
At the conclusion of the trial, the district court’s jury
instructions included that the jury should find Freeman
guilty on the unlicensed money transmitting charges
if he knowingly operated a business which sold bitcoin,
and conspired with others to do so, while failing to
register with FinCEN as a money transmitting business.
C.A.App.2184-91. This instruction was the natural
consequence of the judge having rejected Freeman’s
pretrial argument that Congress had not authorized
licensing bitcoin sellers by FinCEN.
Freeman was convicted on all counts. C.A.App.2234-36.
He had moved orally under Rule 29 for a judgment of
acquittal as to each count at the end of the prosecution’s
case-in-chief, and he renewed the motion at the end of the
defense’s case. Id. at 1793, 1801-03, 1815-20, 2091. The
district court granted Freeman’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal under Rule 29 with respect to money laundering
but denied the motion as to the other counts. Pet.App.113a.
Freeman was sentenced to a total of 96 months in prison.
Id. at 118a.
Freeman appealed to the First Circuit. He focused
his attack on the money transmitting charges, arguing
spillover prejudice and insufficient evidence as to the other
charges. The First Circuit rejected Freeman’s arguments
8
and affirmed his convictions. Freeman now seeks review
by this Court.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The First Circuit decided an important question
of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled
by this Court, and the First Circuit did so in a manner
which conflicts with principles of law stated by the Court
in other relevant cases. As he had in the district court,
Freeman argued to the First Circuit that the 2001 version
of 31 U.S.C. § 5330 did not authorize any federal agency
to require the registration of businesses selling bitcoin.
Freeman explained that Congress could not have, by
the use of the single word “funds” in the 2001 version of
section 5330, anticipated the invention of, and authorized
the regulation of, virtual currency sellers by a federal
agency many years later. To the contrary, this Court’s
major questions doctrine, the history of virtual currency,
the history of section 5330, and principles of statutory
interpretation, all show that FinCEN unilaterally
expanded its authority to require registration of virtual
currency sellers without authorization from Congress.
I.
FinCEN’s Assertion of Authority to Regulate
Virtual Currency Is Based on One Word Written
by Congress Before Virtual Currency Was
Invented.
Freeman was convicted of operating and conspiring
to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B). Pet.App.116a. That
statute prohibits the operation of a money transmitting
business that “fails to comply with the money transmitting
9
business registration requirements under section 5330
of title 31, United States Code, or regulations prescribed
under such section.” Id. at 156a. Thirty-one U.S.C. § 5330
requires the “registration” of “money transmitting
businesses” with the Secretary of the Treasury. Pet.
App.158a.
Congress has changed the definition of a “money
transmitting business” over time. In 2001, the USA
PATRIOT Act amended 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) to
provide that “money transmitting business” means any
business which,
…provides check cashing, currency exchange,
or money transmitting or remittance services,
or issues or redeems money orders, travelers’
checks, and other similar instruments or any
other person who engages as a business in the
transmission of funds, including any person who
engages as a business in an informal money
transfer system or any network of people who
engage as a business in facilitating the transfer
of money domestically or internationally outside
of the conventional financial institutions system;
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act Of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756 § 359(b), 115 Stat. 272, 328 (2001) (underline added).
See also Pet.App.12a, 24a. The 2001 definition of a “money
transmitting business,” was in effect for nearly twenty
years. Pet.App.12a-13a.
10
Virtual currency did not exist when Congress
adopted the 2001 version of 31 U.S.C. § 5330. The first
virtual currency, bitcoin, was invented in 2008. David
W. Perkins, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45427, Cryptocurrency:
The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues
1 (2020); Pet.App.3a- 4a n. 2. FinCEN only began
attempting to regulate virtual currency sellers as
money transmitting businesses in 2013. Pet.App.25a. See
generally, Registration of money service businesses, 31
C.F.R. § 1022.380, and https://www.fincen.gov.
In Public Law 116–283, effective January 1, 2021,
Congress for the first time acted to bring sellers of virtual
currencies within the scope of the registration requirement
of 31 U.S.C. § 5330. Congress found that “although the use
and trading of virtual currencies are legal practices, some
terrorists and criminals, including transnational criminal
organizations, seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the global
financial system and increasingly rely on substitutes for
currency, including emerging payment methods (such
as virtual currencies), to move illicit funds.” William M.
(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116–283 § 6102(a)(3), 134
Stat. 3388, 4552 (2021). Pet.App.12a. Based on this finding,
Congress added language to include money transmitting
businesses which deal in virtual currency. Subsection
6102(d)(2)(A) replaced the word “funds” with the words
“currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency”
so that the statute now reads:
(1) Money transmitting business. The term
“money transmitting business” means
any business other than the United States
Postal Service which—
11
(A) provides check cashing, currency
exchange, or money transmitting or
remittance services, or issues or redeems
money orders, travelers’ checks, and
other similar instruments or any other
person who engages as a business in the
transmission of currency, funds, or value
that substitutes for currency, including
any person who engages as a business in
an informal money transfer system or any
network of people who engage as a business
in facilitating the transfer of money
domestically or internationally outside
of the conventional financial institutions
system;
31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) (underline added). The
emphasized language in this version—“or value that
substitutes for currency”—which became effective in 2021,
was not in any prior version of the statute.
The applicable time frame for Freeman’s charges of
operating and conspiring to operate an unlicensed money
transmitting business is from 2016 to 2021. Pet.App.8a.
By all accounts, the version of 31 U.S.C. § 5330 that was
in effect from 2001 until January 1, 2021, applies to this
case. Id. at 12a-13a n.8. That version refers to “funds”
and does not include the expansive phrase “or value that
substitutes for currency.”
The lower courts concluded that FinCEN had
authority, based solely on the word “funds” in section
5330, to require the registration of sellers of bitcoin and
other virtual currencies after it was invented in 2008.
12
Pet.App.14a-15a, 85a-87a. The government and the lower
courts are wrong. A fair reading of the statute consistent
with the Court’s major questions doctrine and other
principles of statutory interpretation require a finding
that FinCEN reached beyond the power granted to it in
the 2001 version of section 5330.
II.
The Major Questions Doctrine Applies to this
Case.
“Agencies have only those powers given to them by
Congress[.]” West Virginia v. E.P.A., 597 U.S. 697, 723
(2022). Moreover, when an agency claims great power, this
Court’s rules of statutory interpretation require a clear
indication in the law that Congress intended to grant the
agency that power. As explained by the Court:
[T]here are “extraordinary cases” that call
for a different approach—cases in which the
“history and the breadth of the authority that
[the agency] has asserted,” and the “economic
and political significance” of that assertion,
provide a “reason to hesitate before concluding
that Congress” meant to confer such authority.
Id. at 721 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000)). See also Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 405 (2024); Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (“We
expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign
to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political
significance.’”) (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
160); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485-86 (2015). In such
cases, this Court has adopted a “major questions” doctrine
to rein in “agencies asserting highly consequential power
13
beyond what Congress could reasonably be understood to
have granted.” W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724.
As explained by Justice Gorsuch, the major questions
doctrine protects the Constitution’s separation of
powers. W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 737 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). Justice Gorsuch noted that “in Article
I, the People vested all federal legislative powers in
a Congress.” Id. (cleaned up). Therefore, “‘important
subjects…must be entirely regulated by the legislature
itself,’ even if Congress may leave the Executive ‘to act
under such general provisions to fill up the details.’” Id.
(quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825)). Ensuring
that legislation comes from Congress and not from
agencies of the Executive branch “is ‘vital to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained
by the Constitution.’” W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 737
(quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692
(1892)) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
This is a major questions case. An examination of
the history and the breadth of the regulatory authority
asserted, and the economic and political significance
of that assertion, provide a “reason to hesitate” before
concluding that Congress intended to authorize FinCEN
to require registration of virtual currency sellers before
virtual currency was ever invented.
III.
Virtual Currency Is a New and Unique Financial
Instrument of Great Social and Political
Importance.
There was never a financial instrument like bitcoin
before its invention in 2008. It was the first virtual
14
currency. Perkins, supra, at 1. Like other virtual
currencies, bitcoin is “a decentralized form of electronic or
digital currency that exists only on the [i]nternet.” United
States v. Harmon, 474 F. Supp. 3d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Lord, 915 F.3d 1009, 1013 n.1 (5th
Cir. 2019) and collecting cases). Bitcoin depends on public
ledgers and blockchain technology to validate changes
to the ledgers and prevent improper manipulation of the
ledgers. Perkins, supra, at 7; Pet.App.4a; see generally
Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc., 87 F.4th 1003, 1007 (9th Cir.
2023). Each transaction “is publicly viewable forever.”
Van Loon v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 122
F.4th 549, 554 (5th Cir. 2024). Bitcoin and other virtual
currencies are “pseudonymous—but at the same time, all
transactions are completely transparent.” United States v.
Sterlingov, 719 F. Supp. 3d 65, 70 (D.C.C. 2024) (quotation
and citation omitted).
Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are not issued
by any government or bank. Pet.App.3a; Bielski, 87 F.4th
at 1007. In addition, while money historically has either
“intrinsic value or derived value from government decree,”
virtual currencies like bitcoin “employ user agreement, a
network of users, and cryptographic protocols to achieve
valid transfers of value.” Perkins, supra, at i.
The First Circuit wrongly discounted Freeman’s
arguments about the political significance of virtual
currency. Pet.App.23a n.15, 49a, 54a. Bitcoin exists on
the internet by virtue of new technology and its users,
not by the blessing of a government or some other central
authority. Transactions are secured and verified on the
blockchain and are publicly visible to any person online.
Cryptographic protocols and user agreement provide a
15
new kind of value that is not dependent on government
decree or intrinsic worth. Thus, bitcoin gives its users the
freedom and security to conduct financial transactions
without the involvement of a government or any other
entity. For many people, including Mr. Freeman, whose
life had been dedicated to promoting his views of freedom,
the invention of virtual currency has been uniquely
empowering and liberating.
Lower courts have recognized the view that virtual
currency is a new technology with transformative
capabilities. Virtual currency proponents believe the
technology “will serve to enhance future economic
efficiency and have a broad and lasting impact on global
financial markets in payments, banking, securities
settlement, title recording, cyber security, and trade
reporting and analysis.” CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp.
3d 313, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (cleaned up). See also Coinbase,
Inc. v. SEC, 126 F.4th 175, 207-09 (3d Cir. 2025) (Bibas,
J., concurring) (discussing the various uses of virtual
currencies). People of certain political ideologies are
drawn to “a completely decentralized currency, operating
free of nation states or central banks.” United States v.
Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 83 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017).
Even the President has recognized the significance
of virtual currency and touted it as a path to economic
liberty. President Trump said he wants to make the United
States the “crypto capital of the planet.” Kimberly Kruesi,
Trump calls for US to be ‘crypto capital of the planet’ in
appeal to Nashville bitcoin conference, Associated Press
(2024), https://perma.cc/7NSA-Y2FQ. Soon after taking
office, President Trump issued an executive order “to
promote United States leadership in digital assets and
16
financial technology while protecting economic liberty[.]”
Exec. Order No. 14178, 90 Fed. Reg. 8647 (2025). That
order explained that the “digital asset industry plays a
crucial role in innovation and economic development in the
United States[.]” Id. It is therefore the policy of the Trump
Administration “to support the responsible growth and
use of digital assets, blockchain technology, and related
technologies across all sectors of the economy, including
by… protecting and promoting the ability of individual
citizens and private-sector entities alike to access and
use for lawful purposes open public blockchain networks
without persecution[.]” Id.
If these are the views of the President of the United
States, that virtual currency is “crucial” to economic
development and liberty, how can the question of whether
FinCEN was authorized to require registration of sellers
of virtual currency not be a question of great social and
political importance?
This Court has never said that the measure of whether
a case presents a major question is purely quantitative in
the sense of the number of people affected or the dollar
value of the financial interests affected. To the contrary,
there is no one factor by which the Court measures
political and social concerns to determine whether a
“major question” is presented. As this Court has said,
major questions cases “have arisen from all corners of
the administrative state” W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721.
For example, in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006),
the focus was not on the number of people affected
or the implications for some part of the economy, but
rather on an important and often debated social issue.
The question was whether the Attorney General of the
17
United States could rescind the license of any physician
who prescribed drugs for assisted suicide. Id. at 248-49.
The only proffered basis for that claim of authority was a
statute passed by Congress permitting the revocation of
licenses “inconsistent with the public interest.” Id. at 261.
The Court found that the “idea that Congress gave [the
AG] such broad and unusual authority through an implicit
delegation…is not sustainable.” Id. at 267. Furthermore,
the Court said that a “claimed delegation” is “all the more
suspect” when it relates to issues of “earnest and profound
debate.” Id.
Similarly, the principles set forth by this Court have
led lower courts to find that major questions of political
significance include “student loan cancellation, pandemic
eviction moratoriums, the disposal of nuclear waste, and
diversity requirements on corporate boards.” Purl v.
United States HHS, 787 F. Supp. 3d 284, 322 (N.D. Tex.
2025) (collecting cases). Reproductive health care has
been said to be a matter of great significance. Id. at 323;
Louisiana v. EEOC, 784 F. Supp. 3d 886 (W.D. La. 2025).
So too have been questions related to gender identity. See,
e.g., Kansas v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 739 F. Supp.
3d 902 (D. Kan. 2024). As well as immigration status.
Luvian v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-04035-TLT, 2025 LX 191488,
at *10-14 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2025). And the TSA terrorist
watchlist. Kovac v. Wray, 660 F. Supp. 3d 555, 565 (N.D.
Tex. 2023).
Just this year, the Court noted that “new technologies
with transformative capabilities…counsel[] caution on
our part.” TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U.S. 56, 62 (2025)
(per curiam). That warning applies here. The political
and social significance of a new technology in the form
18
of bitcoin and other virtual currencies require the Court
to exercise caution, consistent with the major questions
doctrine. FinCEN should not have presumed that one word
written in 2001 gave it the authority years later to regulate
a unique, new financial instrument which gives its users
unprecedented financial freedom. FinCEN’s presumption
is an example of the “recurring problem” described in W.
Virginia v. EPA. 597 U.S. at 724, wherein a federal agency
claims for itself “a highly consequential power beyond
what Congress could reasonably be understood to have
granted.” Id. This Court should step in, when the lower
courts have not, to rein in the unauthorized assertion of
regulatory authority.
IV.
The Requirement of a License to Sell Virtual
Currency Has a Major Impact on the National
and World Economies.
While the determination of whether this is a major
questions case does not depend on any quantitative
measure, the economic impact of requiring virtual
currency sellers to be licensed cannot be ignored. Virtual
currency is now a huge part of the national and world
economies. “Since 2009, cryptocurrencies have gone from
little-known, niche technological curiosities to rapidly
proliferating financial instruments that are the subject
of intense public interest.” Perkins, supra, at 1. By 2020,
the year before Congress amended section 5330, according
to a 2021 Federal Reserve analysis, approximately 12
percent of U.S. adults (roughly 31 million Americans)
“held or used cryptocurrencies in the prior year.” Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Economic
Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2021 45 (2022); United
States Census Bureau, CB21-208, New Vintage 2021
19
Population Estimates Available for the Nation, States
and Puerto Rico (2021).
The value of the virtual currency sector of the
economy has also grown tremendously. Between July 2010
(the earliest date for available data) and the filing of the
motion to dismiss, July 29, 2022, the price of one bitcoin
grew from approximately 6 cents to nearly $24,000, and
the overall market capitalization grew from less than
$200,000 to approximately $450 billion. Bitcoin to USD
Chart, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/
(last visited Dec. 17, 2025). See generally McDonnell,
287 F. Supp. 3d at 218-19. The total market capitalization
for all virtual currencies is now close to $3 trillion.
Today’s Cryptocurrency Prices by Market Cap, https://
coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2025). Thus, in
a little over fifteen years, virtual currencies went from
not existing to being a multi-trillion-dollar part of the
economy. As a 2024 news story explained, bitcoin is now
“the world’s tenth most valuable asset” and its “market
capitalization, about $1.2 trillion, ranks between those of
Meta and Berkshire Hathaway.” Gideon Lewis-Kraus,
Has Bitcoin’s Elusive Creator Finally Been Unmasked?
New Yorker (2024), https://perma.cc/7ACM-2XFK.
The government has recognized, in other contexts,
the economic significance of virtual currency exchanges.
In the Binance case, the government touted a virtual
currency exchange’s guilty plea to money laundering
and unlicensed money transmitting charges, pointing
out how “U.S. consumers… conducted trillions of dollars
in transactions on the platform, generating over $1.6
billion in profit” for the exchange. Department of Justice:
Binance and CEO Plead Guilty to Federal Charges in $4B
20
Resolution (2023), https://perma.cc/6PJ5-3726. Since the
economic impact of that conviction for unlicensed money
transmitting was of great significance to the Department
of Justice, it must also recognize the economic significance
of the same licensing requirement in this case.
The First Circuit did not accept Freeman’s arguments
about the economic significance of virtual currency. It
said that the measure of the economic impact is not the
virtual currency market in general but rather only the
“cost of compliance” with the registration requirement.
According to the First Circuit, the “relevant question…is
whether the cost of complying with FinCEN’s regulation
is so high that we should hesitate before assuming that
FinCEN was permitted to enact such a regulation.”
Pet.App.52a. The First Circuit also said that “FinCEN
has not banned all transactions in virtual currency or
attempted to regulate all users of virtual currency…[i]
nstead, it is simply requiring businesses that transmit
virtual currencies to register.” Id. Thus, the First Circuit
concluded, “FinCEN’s regulation placed no meaningful
economic burden on the industry.” Id. at 53a.
The First Circuit’s conclusions are wrong. In the
first instance, it failed to recognize, as detailed above,
that a primary aim of virtual currency is to give users
the economic freedom to conduct their financial affairs
without the interference of a government or third party.
FinCEN’s unauthorized attempt at regulation has a
significant economic impact because, regardless of cost,
it interferes with the economic freedom of citizens.
Furthermore, the First Circuit’s analysis fails to
recognize the differences between virtual currency and
21
other currencies and the unique role exchanges play in
the circulation and adoption of virtual currency. App.
Reply.Br.16-17. Virtual currency is not acquired in the
same manner as other traditional currency. The only ways
to acquire it are to either receive it from someone or to
“mine it.” Kleiman v. Wright, No. 18-CV-80176, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 216417, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2018). See
also SEC v. Trendon T. Shavers & Bitcoin Sav. & Trust,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194382, *16 n.4 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
26, 2014) (describing three ways to obtain bitcoin: mining,
purchasing, or selling something and accepting payment
in bitcoin). The government acknowledges that, since
virtual currencies lack a central authority (like a central
bank) for creation and distribution, the only way to obtain
virtual currencies besides “mining” is to purchase or trade
with someone who already has them, whether through an
exchange, a kiosk, or directly via trade. See Gov.Br.3-4.
As a result of its unique nature, access to the virtual
currency largely depends on exchanges. See Lewis-Kraus,
supra. One government official testified before Congress
in 2021 that “[w]henever monetary exchanges are made,
a chokepoint is created,” before proceeding to discuss
FinCEN’s 2013 guidance and how the government used
that regulatory authority to go after exchanges. Terrorism
and Digit. Fin.: How Tech. is Changing the Threat Before
H. Subcomm. on Intelligence and Counterterrorism,
117th Cong. 14 (2021) (statement of John Eisert, Assistant
Director, Department of Homeland Security), https://
perma.cc/TGW2-VUJE. Cf. Zietzke v. United States,
426 F. Supp. 3d 758, 762 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“Although
cryptocurrency transactions can occur directly between
individuals, those transactions are often handled through
digital currency exchanges.”). Since purchasing virtual
22
currency almost always requires the use of an exchange,
almost all virtual currency transactions are directly
impacted by the regulations unilaterally promulgated
by FinCEN. Moreover, FinCEN’s regulations targeted
not only major exchanges, but also much smaller peerto-peer sellers and businesses, who, as this Court has
recognized in other contexts, are less capable of bearing
the compliance costs. See, e.g., Utility Air, 573 U.S. at
331 n.2; South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. 162, 178
(2018); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 520 n.37 (1981).
Finally, treating virtual currency exchanges as a
“chokepoint” is part of what the United States House
Committee on Financial Services recently identified
as a “pattern of…prudential regulators abusing their
regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement authorities to
push entities involved in the digital asset ecosystem out
of the U.S. financial system.” Staff of H. Comm. On Fin.
Services, Operation Choke Point 2.0: Biden’s Debanking
of Digital Assets (2025), https://perma.cc/8CTW-MRA2.
A White House Executive Order described “Operation
Choke Point” as “a well-documented and systemic means
by which Federal regulators pushed banks to minimize
their involvement with individuals and companies engaged
in lawful activities and industries disfavored by regulators
based on factors other than individualized, objective, riskbased standards.” Exec. Order No. 14331, 90 Fed. Reg.
38925 (2025).
V.
A Colorable Textual Argument Is Not Enough to
Overcome the Major Questions Issue.
That the ordinary meaning of “funds” now would
include virtual currency does not address Freeman’s
23
objections. From the beginning of his challenge to the
prosecution, Freeman acknowledged that courts have
found that bitcoin falls within the ordinary meaning of
“funds.” Freeman cited those cases for the lower courts.
Pet.App.17a. See, e.g., United States v. Harmon, 474 F.
Supp. 3d 76, 80, 90 (D.D.C. 2020) (collecting cases); United
States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 707 (S.D.N.Y.
2016); United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). Freeman’s argument was never that, in
a dictionary or in common usage, virtual currency would
now fall outside the dictionary definition of “funds.”
Rather, Freeman’s argument is that virtual currency is so
important that courts cannot assume the 2001 Congress
granted regulatory authority based on one word written
before virtual currency was invented.
The Court’s major questions cases directly address
this issue. The West Virginia v. EPA majority noted that,
in each of the major questions cases, there was a “colorable
textual basis” for the assertion of the power to regulate.
597 U.S. at 722. However, merely a colorable textual
basis is insufficient where a major question is involved.
It is simple “common sense” that Congress would not
give an agency great power without detailed and explicit
authorization. Id. at 722-23 (quoting Brown & Williamson,
529 U.S. at 133).
Extraordinary grants of regulatory authority
are rarely accomplished through “modest
words,” “vague terms,” or “subtle devices.”
Whitman v. American Trucking Assns, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457, 468, (2001). Nor does Congress
typically use oblique or elliptical language
to empower an agency to make a “radical or
24
fundamental change” to a statutory scheme.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229
(1994).
W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723 (cleaned up).
Thus, “separation of powers principles and a practical
understanding of legislative intent,” id., counsel against
interpreting a single word to convey vast power, effectively
finding “elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at
468. A regulatory agency must show “something more
than a merely plausible textual basis.… The agency
instead must point to ‘clear congressional authorization’
for the power it claims.” W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723
(quoting Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 324). Here, such clear
congressional authorization did not come until 2021.
VI.
If Virtual Currency Was Already Captured by the
2001 Version of Section 5330, Congress Would Not
Have Needed to Add Language in 2021.
Congress’s decision to amend 31 U.S.C. § 5330 in 2021
is a good reason to doubt the government’s and the First
Circuit’s reading of the 2001 version of the statute. Both
the amendment and how it happened support Freeman’s
position.
The reaction of Congress to the tremendous growth
of virtual currencies after 2008 was not to assume that
they were already covered by section 5330. Rather,
Congress struggled with deciding how to classify and
regulate virtual currencies. Even after virtual currencies
had become well known, Congress considered and failed
25
to adopt legislation granting regulatory authority to
agencies like FinCEN. For instance, in September 2018,
the House passed H.R. 6411, the “FinCEN Improvement
Act of 2018.” That act would have added the “value that
substitutes for currency.” However, the Senate failed to
pass that legislation in 2018. FinCEN Improvement Act
of 2018, H.R. 6411, 115th Cong. (2018).
In 2019, Congress tried again. The House passed
H.R. 1414, the “FinCEN Improvement Act of 2019,”
but again, it died in the Senate. FinCEN Improvement
Act of 2019, H.R. 1414, 116th Cong. (2019). In the same
year, the Senate tried its own version, S. 1883, the
Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing,
and Counterfeiting Act of 2019, and although it made it
out of committee, it went no further. Combating Money
Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Counterfeiting Act
of 2019, S. 1883, 116th Cong. (2019). Another attempt, S.
2563, the Improving Laundering Laws and Increasing
Comprehensive Information Tracking of Criminal Activity
in Shell Holdings Act, which would have “[e]nsure[d] the
inclusion of currency and future payment systems in the
AML-CFT regime by updating the definition of ‘coins and
currency’ to include digital currency” failed to even make
it out of committee, although its text formed the basis
for the AML provisions of the 2021 NDAA. Improving
Laundering Laws and Increasing Comprehensive
Information Tracking of Criminal Activity in Shell
Holdings Act, S. 2563, 116th Cong. (2019). Only in late
2020 did Congress finally add the language “value that
substitutes for currency” to the law. Pet.App.12a-13a. 2
2. The First Circuit found Congressional acquiescence
from silence to FinCEN’s interpretation of section 5330. Pet.
26
This history shows that, for years, Congress was
aware of the growth of virtual currencies, and that
Congress considered but repeatedly failed to amend the
statute to grant FinCEN regulatory authority over money
transmitters who were selling financial instruments that
qualified as “value that substitutes for currency,” that is,
virtual currency. If the word “funds” in the 2001 version
of section 5330 had already captured virtual currencies
like bitcoin, Congress would not have needed to spend
years deciding whether and how to expand the scope of
the statute.
Drawing this conclusion from the history of virtual
currencies and Congress’s efforts to amend section 5330
is entirely consistent with rules of statutory construction
recognized by the Court. We should presume that the
law was amended in 2021 because Congress thought
the word “funds” did not capture virtual currencies,
and that the additional phrase “or value that substitutes
for currency” was necessary to achieve that goal. As
explained by the Court, “[w]hen Congress acts to amend
a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have
real and substantial effect.” Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397
(1995). The statutory interpretation adopted by the First
Circuit should be rejected because, “[w]hen a statutory
construction thus ‘render[s] an entire subparagraph
meaningless,’ this Court has noted, the canon against
surplusage applies with special force.” Pulsifer v. United
States, 601 U.S. 124, 143 (2024) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.
App.33a-36a. But Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs cautions that, “[a]lthough we have recognized
congressional acquiescence to administrative interpretations of
a statute in some situations, we have done so with extreme care.”
531 U.S. 159, 169 (2001).
27
v. Dep’t of Def., 583 U.S. 109, 128 (2018) and citing City
of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U. S. 154, 159 (2021)). Reading
the statute as having already captured virtual currency
in the word “funds” deprives the 2021 amendment of any
real and substantive effect. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 57-58
(2006) (“We refuse to interpret the Solomon Amendment
in a way that negates its recent revision, and indeed would
render it a largely meaningless exercise.”).
The “surplusage canon” reflects “the presumption
that each word Congress uses is there for a reason.”
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 581 U.S.
468, 477 (2017) (citing A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174-79 (2012)). “As
this Court has noted time and time again, the Court is
‘obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used.’” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 583 U.S. at 128-29 (quoting
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)). See
also Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)
(plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (“the cardinal rule of
statutory interpretation [is] that no provision should be
construed to be entirely redundant”); Burdon Cent. Sugar
Ref. Co. v. Payne, 167 U.S. 127, 142 (1897); Scalia & Garner
174 (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be
given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda). None
should be ignored.”). Congress does not “tend to use terms
that ‘have no operation at all.’” Burwell, 576 U.S. at 502
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 174 (1803)).
The First Circuit criticized Freeman’s argument as
relying on subsequent legislative history, Pet.App.31a34a, but the usual basis for such criticisms, see, e.g.,
28
West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 778-79 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring)), is not present here. In this case,
the reference to subsequent legislative history concerns an
agency’s reliance on a prior statute to regulate something
that did not exist at the time of the statute’s passage. The
cases cited by the First Circuit criticizing subsequent
legislative history all concerned problems that existed
at the time Congress passed the statute; none concerned
an agency’s application of a statute to new technology.
Pet.App.31a-32a; Parlane Sportswear Co. v. Weinberger,
513 F.2d 835, 837 (1st Cir. 1975) (involving relocation
assistance under a federal statute where petitioner
challenged the agency’s contemporaneous construction
of the statute); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223
(2011) (determining the scope of a pre-emption provision
for product defects claims against vaccine manufacturers);
Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004) (considering whether
a federal agency’s violation of the Privacy Act of 1974
required a showing of actual damages). It would fly in
the face of reason to credit the intent of legislators—the
2001 Congress—who had no inkling of how an agency
would later use the grant of authority, while ignoring the
Congresses between 2011 and 2021 who were aware of
the new issue.
VII. FinCEN Admitted that It Had to Expand Its
Authority Beyond the Statutory Language to
Capture Virtual Currency.
As recognized by the First Circuit, in prior major
questions cases, this Court has looked to an agency’s
admissions of a lack of regulatory authority. Pet.App.41a.
See Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 321; Brown &
29
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 146. Where the First Circuit
erred was in rejecting statements by FinCEN officials
as persuasive evidence in this case.
A former acting director of FinCEN, Himamauli
Das, stated that the 2021 updates to the USA PATRIOT
Act, including the amendment to section 5330, were
necessary because the 2001 law “never anticipated the
challenges of the 2020s: digital assets…”. Himamauli
Das, Prepared Remarks of FinCEN Acting Director
Him Das, Delivered Virtually at the American Bankers
Association/American Bar Association Financial
Crimes Enforcement Conference, FinCen (2022), https://
perma.cc/VL3M-4GM9 (underline added). See also id.
(“[a]s the digital world increasingly becomes the financial
world – and vice versa – we need a regulatory regime
to match, one that accounts for crypto and other digital
assets…”) (italics in original, underline added).
Moreover, FinCEN has acknowledged that its
regulation of virtual currency arose from its own initiative
rather than from a directive from Congress. FinCEN
did not purport to regulate virtual currency until after
the invention of bitcoin in 2008. Pet.App.30a. The agency
issued a regulation in 2011 followed by guidance in 2013
stating FinCEN was claiming authority to regulate virtual
currency. Id. at 25-26a. In that 2013 guidance, FinCEN
wrote that “‘virtual’ currency is a medium of exchange
that operates like a currency in some environments, but
does not have all the attributes of real currency.” FinCEN,
FIN–2013–G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations
to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual
Currencies, at 1 (2013). Later, FinCEN recognized that
the word “funds” in the 2001 version of section 5330 did
30
not capture virtual currency. FinCEN stated that it had
to go beyond the regulation of “funds” to regulate virtual
currency:
The term “other value that substitutes for
currency” encompasses situations in which the
transmission does not involve currency [defined
as the coin or paper money of a country], or funds,
but instead involves something that the parties
to a transaction recognize has value that is
equivalent to or can substitute for currency.
FinCEN, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to
Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual
Currencies, FIN–2019–G001, at 4 (2019) (underline added).
Back in 2013, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, then-director of
FinCEN, explained to Congress that FinCEN was adding
language to bring virtual currency within the scope of
FinCEN’s authority, saying “[t]he updated definitions…
accommodate the development of new payment systems,
including virtual currency.” The Present and Future
Impact of Virtual Currency: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Econ. Pol’y and Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec.
and Int’l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affs., 113th Cong. 8, 36 (2013).
FinCEN provided similar information to Congress in
2018. See Illicit Use of Virtual Currency and the Law
Enforcement Response: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Terrorism and Illicit Fin. of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs. 115th Cong. 9, 25 (2018) (statement of Thomas Ott,
Associate Director, FinCEN Enf’t Division) (testifying
that “value that substitutes for currency” is “sufficient to
cover virtual currency”).
31
The First Circuit found these statements unpersuasive
because FinCEN’s assertion of regulatory authority
in 2013 predated the statements quoted by Freeman.
Pet.App.33a-44a. In the First Circuit’s reasoning, the
quoted FinCEN officials could not have been disclaiming
authority to regulate because FinCEN had already
asserted the authority to regulate. The First Circuit saw
the statements quoted by Freeman as an effort to “inform
Congress of how FinCEN had updated its definitions to
be in sync with Congress’s statutory intent.” Pet.App.42a.
The First Circuit’s analysis has things backwards.
Regulatory agencies do not have the power to expand
their own authority by reading a single word as broadly
as the agency desires and then telling Congress how
the agency expanded the law. Under our Constitution,
the regulation comes after the grant of authority by
Congress. Yet, that is not what happened regarding the
requirement that bitcoin sellers register with FinCEN.
Here, the agency recognized that the statute did not
authorize the regulation, but nonetheless believed there
was a need for the regulation. To that end, FinCEN
expanded its authority to regulate the transmission or
exchange of “value that substitutes as currency” for the
purpose of including virtual currency. As acknowledged
by one former trial attorney with the Department of
Justice’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section
in testimony before Congress, the 2021 revision of section
5330 “codified FinCEN’s previous position that the
definition of a financial institution and money transmission
business included businesses involved in the transmission
or exchange of ‘value that substitutes for currency.’”
Crypto Crime in Context: Breaking Down the Illicit
Activity in Digital Assets: Hearing before the House
32
Subcommittee on Digital Assets, Financial Technology
and Inclusion, 118th Cong. 11 (2023) (statement of Jane
Khodarkovsky), https://perma.cc/9Y9H-3QGP. In other
words, FinCEN expanded its authority and then lobbied
for years before it finally persuaded Congress to grant
the authority which had already been asserted. That is
not how our Constitution works, especially regarding an
agency’s claim of regulatory authority directly affecting
the economic freedom of citizens and a major part of the
economy.
VIII. The First Circuit Made Other Significant Errors
in Its Analysis.
A. Bitcoin is Not Like Hawala
The First Circuit misapprehended legislative history
when it analogized virtual currency to informal methods of
transfer such as hawala. The court found that Freeman’s
reading of the language from the 2001 USA PATRIOT
Act as concerned with hawala-like transfer systems,
was “strained” and that a “more natural reading” was
that “Congress was more generally concerned about
‘underground black market banking systems,’ whatever
the form.” Pet.App.27a (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 107-250
at 33). The First Circuit said that bitcoin is similar to
those informal systems because “such systems frequently
operated through ‘messages relating to receipt or
disbursement of funds’ rather than transfer of physical
funds themselves” and because “they were preferred
by criminals because of ‘the lack of record-keeping and
opportunity for anonymity.’” Pet.App.28a (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 107-250 at 34). The court reasoned that “[b]
itcoin and virtual currencies seem to fall within this broad
33
definition of [an informal money transfer] system that
allows users to transfer money without the participation
of banks or other traditional money movers.” Pet.App.27a.
Here again, the First Circuit was mistaken. Hawala
and similar informal money transfer systems referenced
in H.R. Rep. No. 107-250 and targeted by the statute are
nothing like virtual currencies based on the blockchain.
Hawala is “an ancient South Asian money exchange
system which consists of an international network of nonbank financial agents, often built on trusted family or
cultural relationships.” Pet.App.27a n.19 (quotations and
citation omitted). A FinCEN Advisory explained in March
2003 that hawala “pre-date western banking systems and
existed as far back as 5800 BC.” FinCEN Advisory 33,
Informal Value Transfer Systems at 1 (2003).
Virtual currency is nothing like hawala. Virtual
currency is not backed by any person or group of persons.
Pet.App.3a. Its transfers are “accounted for on a public,
cryptographic ledger called the blockchain.” Id. at 4a.
Hawala is a human system which relies on intangible
personal relationships. The transactions are unrecorded
except for what is in the minds of the people involved.
Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are the exact
opposite. Virtual currency is not informal; it is formal. It is
based on the immutable blockchain where all transactions
are recorded on the internet for anyone to see. It relies
on the hard and fast rules of computer programming
and technology, not the vagaries of human relationships.
In 2001 Congress was considering informal, unrecorded
systems of human interactions, not a formal computer
network of publicly documented transactions which had
not yet been invented.
34
B. Bostock Does Not Support the First Circuit’s
Decision
The First Circuit also reasoned that its decision was
supported by Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644
(2020), which the First Circuit cited for the idea that
“Courts routinely enforce ‘plain statutory commands’
even where Congress may not have expected the statute
to apply to certain factual situations at the time of
passage.” Pet.App.47a (quoting Bostock, 590 U.S. at 683).
This conclusion is not correct. Bostock “proceed[ed] on
the assumption that ‘sex’…refer[ed] only to biological
distinctions between male and female,” 590 U.S. at
655, but nonetheless found discrimination in violation
of Title VII because for “an employer to discriminate
against employees for being homosexual or transgender,
the employer must intentionally discriminate against
individual men and women in part because of sex.” Id.
at 662. The Court relied on a definition of “sex” known
and understood at the time Title VII was adopted. Id. at
654-56. But here, blockchain-based virtual currencies
did not exist at the time the anti-money laundering laws
were revised in 2001. In other words, Title VII applies
to all sexual discrimination because sexual differences
existed at the time the law was passed; the 2001 version
of 31 U.S.C. § 5330 does not apply to virtual currency
because virtual currency did not exist at the time that
the law was passed. 3
3. Furthermore, the “major questions doctrine could not
have been raised in Bostock because that case involved a claim of
individual discrimination under Title VII; it was not a challenge
to agency action.” Kansas v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No.
24-4041-JWB, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116479, at *39-40 (D. Kan.
July 2, 2024).
35
Lastly, Bostock instructs courts to “interpret a statute
in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms
at the time of its enactment.” 590 U.S. at 654 (underline
added). It further warns, if “judges could add to, remodel,
update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired
only by extratextual sources and our own imaginations,
we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative
process reserved for the people’s representatives” and “we
would deny the people the right to continue relying on the
original meaning of the law they have counted on to settle
their rights and obligations.” Id. at 644-45. As Freeman
has consistently emphasized, whether one looks to when
the Bank Secrecy Act was amended in 1992, 1994, or
2001, no one could have possibly imagined or interpreted
the word “funds” to include blockchain-based virtual
currency. Thus, Bostock bolsters rather than undermines
Freeman’s arguments.
36
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Freeman respectfully
requests that the Court grant his petition for a writ of
certiorari, reverse the First Circuit, vacate the money
transmitting business convictions, and remand the case
back to the lower courts for reconsideration of Freeman’s
spillover prejudice and sentencing arguments, and grant
any other appropriate relief.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard Guerriero
Counsel of Record
Oliver Bloom
Lothstein Guerriero, PLLC
Chamberlain Block Building
39 Central Square, Suite 202
Keene, NH 03431
(603) 352-5000
richard@nhdefender.com
Attorneys for Petitioner
December 22, 2025
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 29, 2025 . . . . . . . 1a
APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST
CIRCUIT, FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2025 . . . . . 74a
APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
FILED AUGUST 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76a
APPENDIX D — AMENDED JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115a
APPENDIX E — EXCERPTS OF THE TRANSCRIPT
FOR THE MOTION HEA RING, DATED
SEPTEMBER 1, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134a
APPENDIX F — EXCERPTS OF THE TRANSCRIPT
FOR THE SENTENCING HEARING, DATED
SEPTEMBER 11, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142a
APPENDIX G — RELEVANT STATUTORY
PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156a
1a
Appendix
A
APPENDIX A — OPINION
OF THE
UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT,
FILED JULY 29, 2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 23–1839
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
IAN FREEMAN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Lipez, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
July 29, 2025
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Ian Freeman (“Freeman”)
is, by his own description, a radio talk show host and church
2a
Appendix A
founder promoting peace, liberty, individual freedom, and
morality. Freeman began selling bitcoin in 2014 as part
of his mission to promote peace. The government, which
launched an investigation into his bitcoin sales, took a
different view of Freeman’s conduct and convinced a jury
to convict Freeman on counts of conspiracy to operate
an unlicensed money transmitting business, operation of
an unlicensed money transmitting business, conspiracy
to commit money laundering, money laundering, and
tax evasion. Post–verdict, the district court acquitted
Freeman on the substantive money laundering count
based on the insufficiency of the evidence. On appeal,
Freeman argues that the district court should never have
allowed the money–transmitting–business charges to
reach trial, because something called the “major questions
doctrine”—which governs how we read statutes that
convey regulatory authority to administrative agencies—
requires us to interpret the relevant statutes as not
permitting agency regulation of virtual currencies like
bitcoin. He also claims that the district court should have
acquitted him based on the insufficiency of the evidence
on his tax evasion charge and granted him a new trial on
the remaining money laundering conspiracy count due to
prejudicial evidentiary spillover. Finally, he claims that
even if his convictions stand, the district court’s imposition
of a 96–month sentence is substantively unreasonable.
Having carefully considered all Freeman’s arguments,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Freeman’s trial was an 11–day affair at which more
than thirty witnesses testified. This appeal does not
3a
Appendix A
require us to recount every in–and–out of the evidence
presented at trial, but to better orient the reader, we start
with a brief overview of the events leading to Freeman’s
arrest. From there, we’ll dive into the merits of each of
Freeman’s arguments on appeal, filling in the necessary
factual details and announcing our standard of review as
we go.1
Freeman’s Bitcoin Business
Courts throughout the country have offered thorough
descriptions of what bitcoin is and how it works. All that
a reader need understand for today’s opinion is that
bitcoin is a virtual currency, with no physical coinage
or government backing. 2 Instead bitcoin is stored in
1. Because Freeman raises a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge to his tax evasion count, we’ll present the facts relevant
to that count in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict once
we get there. See United States v. Paz–Alvarez, 799 F.3d 12, 18
(1st Cir. 2015). For the overview of Freeman’s bitcoin sales that
follows, however, we summarize the trial record in a “balanced”
fashion, because the manner in which we relate these background
facts does not impact our analysis of Freeman’s remaining claims
of error. See United States v. Burgos–Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 99 (1st
Cir. 2015).
2. In everyday speech, the phrase virtual currency would
seemingly capture any currency that exists on a computer in a
non–physical form (for instance, currency used in video games
to buy items in that game). See David W. Perkins, Cong. Rsch.
Serv., R45427, Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and
Selected Policy Issues 1 n.2 (2020) (distinguishing between
cryptocurrencies and other “digital representations of value”).
For the purposes of today’s opinion, unless we note otherwise, we
4a
Appendix A
a software program referred to as a “wallet.” When
bitcoin is moved from one wallet to another, the transfer
is accounted for on a public, cryptographic ledger called
the blockchain. Perkins, supra, at 1, 7. But although the
ledger is public and each wallet uniquely identifiable from
other wallets, bitcoin offers relative anonymity compared
to traditional bank transactions, because there is no
information associated with a wallet that can identify
who owns the wallet. (By contrast, a bank customer must
provide personal information to a bank to open an account
and conduct transactions.) And unlike electronic payments
sent through banks, which can sometimes be cancelled or
reversed, there is no way for a sender to claw back bitcoin
once it has been sent. 3
To run his bitcoin business, Freeman acquired bitcoin
from large virtual currency exchanges for relatively small
commissions (0.16% in one example) and then resold it
to his customers while charging higher commissions
(upwards of 10% in many cases). Freeman conducted sales
use the phrase virtual currency to refer to cryptocurrencies like
bitcoin, which can act as an alternative to traditional government–
issued currency (we’ll refer to this as “fiat currency”) and which
use cryptographic protocols (i.e., methods of sending information
through codes) to ensure that transactions are accurately
recorded. Id. at 1 n.2, 3–4, 7–8.
3. This opinion is not meant to be a comprehensive or
authoritative account of bitcoin or cryptocurrencies, or of any
advancements made in this arena since this case was appealed.
Our recitation of the history, function, and value of bitcoin is drawn
from the parties’ presentation to the district court and jury below
and in their briefs to us.
5a
Appendix A
through three platforms. First, he used bitcoin “kiosks”
or “ATMs,” physical machines in which a customer could
deposit “fiat currency,” scan a QR code associated with
a bitcoin wallet, and receive a corresponding amount of
bitcoin in their wallet. Second, he posted advertisements
and communicated with customers on a website called
localbitcoins.com, which allowed users to buy and sell
bitcoin from each other, much as other websites allow
users to buy and sell goods. Finally, Freeman engaged in
direct negotiations with buyers on the messaging software
Telegram.
Freeman had what he called a Know Your Customer
procedure for buyers who were purchasing through
localbitcoins.com or Telegram. He asked prospective
customers to send him a photograph of their driver’s license
and a photograph of themselves holding a handwritten
note indicating that they intended to purchase bitcoin.
Sometimes, he would also ask for customers’ phone
numbers to confirm that they intended to buy bitcoin.
These procedures did not apply to purchases made at
Freeman’s bitcoin kiosks, which did not require any form
of personal verification, even though kiosk operators can
and do impose various verification requirements.4 Across
all three of his platforms, Freeman instituted another
policy—one which eschewed any inquiries into why his
customers were purchasing bitcoin. But it is questionable,
4. For instance, a government investigator testified at
trial that other bitcoin kiosks required him to scan a piece of
government–issued identification (like a driver’s license), enter a
non–prepaid phone number, provide his name, and communicate
with the owner or operator of the kiosk to verify his purchases.
6a
Appendix A
as we’ll explain, that such a no–ask policy truly insulated
Freeman from the knowledge that his services were being
used by customers who were, in fact, scammers and money
launderers.
The government sought to show that even when
Freeman implemented his K now Your Customer
procedures, he ignored multiple red flags that would
have suggested money laundering or scams. For instance,
Freeman permitted individuals to execute transactions
for hundreds of thousands of dollars within the course of
a week, and worked with individuals seeking to exchange
hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash. He also conducted
transactions in which he accepted payment from one
person but delivered bitcoin to another—something the
government calls a “third–party trade.” In consummating
these third–party transactions, Freeman sent individuals,
whom the evidence strongly suggested were scam artists,
bitcoin paid for by individuals over the age of 50, despite
finding out in many cases that the elderly individuals
paying for the bitcoin were geographically distant both
from the recipient of the bitcoin and from others paying to
send bitcoin to the same recipient. And Freeman continued
to trade with individuals after encountering signs that
they were not who they claimed to be.
To establish money laundering, the government
called an undercover agent who had made multiple bitcoin
purchases from Freeman through Telegram and at a kiosk
in New Hampshire. After building a rapport with Freeman
through Telegram messages, the agent joined Freeman
at a social gathering in New Hampshire and explained
7a
Appendix A
to Freeman that he was buying bitcoin with money he
earned selling drugs. After this disclosure, Freeman
wrote to the agent that he could not “KNOWINGLY sell
bitcoin” to the agent and refused to conduct business
with him over Telegram. He nevertheless invited the
agent to continue socializing with him. At a gathering
in Keene, New Hampshire less than a month later, the
agent asked Freeman if the kiosk he had previously used
was still available. Freeman responded that the kiosk
was still there and said, “I can’t tell you that you can
use it.” The agent went to the kiosk, located in a bar, and
purchased nearly $20,000 in bitcoin. That same night, the
agent also taped Freeman saying in a conversation with
friends (including the agent) over drinks that “if you fall
in love with a guy from Africa, I can’t talk you out of it”
and describing his kiosks as a way for smitten victims to
“take the money that they have and send it to the person
they’ve fallen in love with.”
In the summer of 2018, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) of the United States
Treasury Department sent correspondence to an email
address associated with Freeman stating that “Shire
Cryptocoin,” purportedly one of Freeman’s businesses,
must register with FinCEN as a money transmitting
business and comply with other anti–money–laundering
regulations. 5 Ignoring this directive, Freeman never
5. It’s not clear whether Freeman himself used the name
“Shire Cryptocoin” in connection with any of his businesses.
Also, to be exact, FinCEN wrote that Shire Cryptocoin was a
money services business. Under FinCEN’s regulations, money
transmitting businesses are a subcategory of money services
8a
Appendix A
registered this entity or any of his businesses with
FinCEN. He also did not file tax returns from 2016
through 2019.
Procedural History
The indictment alleged that Freeman (as well as
several co–defendants) exchanged more than $10 million
worth of government–backed currency for bitcoin
between May 25, 2016 and March 15, 2021. In relevant
part, the indictment charged Freeman with operation of
an unlicensed money transmitting business, conspiracy
to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business,
money laundering, and conspiracy to commit money
laundering, based on this conduct. It also charged
Freeman with several counts of tax evasion for not
paying taxes on income he received from his bitcoin sales.
Freeman joined a motion to dismiss filed by one of his
co–defendants regarding the counts related to operation
of an unlicensed money transmitting business, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1960, which invoked the major questions doctrine and
argued that businesses dealing in virtual currency do not
come within the statutory definition of money transmitting
businesses (more on the statutory scheme and relevant
businesses (which are all required to register). 31 C.F.R.
§ 1010.100(ff)(5) (defining money transmitter as type of money
services business); id. § 1022.380(a)(1) (requiring registration of
money services businesses). For the sake of simplicity, this opinion
will primarily use the term “money transmitting business” or
“money transmitter” as resolution of this case does not require us
to make fine distinctions between money transmitting businesses
and other categories of money services businesses.
9a
Appendix A
definition to come in our analysis). The district court
denied the motion to dismiss in an oral ruling from the
bench, and Freeman proceeded to trial. At the end of an
11–day trial, a jury convicted Freeman on all counts.
Freeman had moved for a judgment of acquittal after
the close of the government’s evidence, and renewed that
motion after trial, arguing that insufficient evidence
supported each count. The district court partially granted
that motion, ruling that there was insufficient evidence
that Freeman knowingly laundered money, but upheld
the remaining convictions (including the conspiracy to
commit money laundering count). In the same written
order, the district court recognized that Freeman had
incorporated by reference his earlier motion to dismiss
arguments regarding the major questions doctrine and
rejected those arguments anew. Thereafter, Freeman
moved for a new trial based on spillover prejudice from
the evidence related to the money laundering count. He
also moved for reconsideration of the court’s ruling on the
motion to dismiss. The district court denied both motions,
ruling that they were untimely and unmeritorious.
At sentencing, the district court calculated the
recommended range under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines as 210 to 262 months. It then granted
Freeman’s motion for a variance and sentenced Freeman
to 96 months in prison.6
6. More precisely, the district court sentenced Freeman to
60 months of imprisonment on tax evasion and the counts related
to operation of a money transmitting business to be served
concurrently with a 96–month sentence for conspiracy to commit
money laundering.
10a
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DISCUSSION
Motion to Dismiss Counts Related to Operation of an
Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business
Freeman’s appeal largely centers on the major
questions doctrine, a jurisprudential principle fleshed out
in a line of cases emanating from the Supreme Court. The
doctrine’s purpose is to prevent administrative agencies
from expanding their regulatory powers beyond that which
Congress has granted. See, e.g., Biden v. Nebraska, 600
U.S. 477, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 216 L. Ed. 2d 1063 (2023); West
Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 213 L. Ed.
2d 896 (2022); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 189 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2014). To understand
why cases about the scope of an agency’s regulatory power
are relevant to Freeman’s prosecution for operation of an
unlicensed money transmitting business and his defense
thereto, we need to take a closer look at the statute under
which Freeman was prosecuted.
The indictment charged Freeman with violating 18
U.S.C. § 1960 (“Section 1960”). In relevant part, that
statute punishes anyone who “knowingly conducts,
controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or
part of an unlicensed money transmitting business.”
Id. § 1960(a). “[M]oney transmitting,” according to the
statute, “includes transferring funds on behalf of the
public by any and all means.” Id. § 1960(b)(2). And an
“unlicensed money transmitting business” means one that
“fails to comply with the money transmitting business
registration requirements under section 5330 of title 31,
11a
Appendix A
United States Code, or regulations prescribed under such
section.” Id. § 1960(b)(1)(B).
Thus, to understand what it means for a money
transmitting business to be unlicensed, we must flip
to 31 U.S.C § 5330 (“Section 5330”), which requires
“[a]ny person who owns or controls a money transmitting
business” to register that business “with the Secretary
of the Treasury.” How can someone tell if they need
to register? Section 5330 defines “money transmitting
business” to include one “who engages as a business in the
transmission of currency, funds, or value that substitutes
for currency, including any person who engages as a
business in an informal money transfer system.” Id.
§ 5330(d)(1).
Because the government has deemed his financial
endeavors to be money transmitting businesses, the
Section 1960 crime Freeman is charged with is triggered
by his failure to comply w ith Section 5330(a)(1)’s
requirement that such money transmitting businesses
must register with FinCEN (which is a subdivision of
the Treasury Department).7 However, if, as Freeman
7. Eagle–eyed readers will have remembered that Section
5330(a)(1) referred to registration with the Secretary of the
Treasury and never mentioned FinCEN. The Secretary of the
Treasury delegated regulatory responsibilities under Section
5330 (which is part of the Bank Secrecy Act) to FinCEN. See
generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO/GGD–98–18, Money
Laundering: FinCEN Needs to Better Communicate Regulatory
Priorities and Time Lines 1 (1998). For simplicity’s sake, any
time Section 5330 gives certain responsibilities to the Secretary
12a
Appendix A
contends, Section 5330 does not cover businesses such as
his that trade bitcoin (i.e., if he does not operate a money
transmitting business with registration requirements),
he was not violating Section 5330, and by extension no
criminal liability under Section 1960 would attach to him.
Of significance to Freeman’s argument is one
particular feature of Section 5330. As Freeman points out,
when the indictment against him was filed, the definition
in Section 5330(d)(1) looked a little different: it did not
include the word “currency” or the phrase “value that
substitutes for currency.” Instead, the only noun in the
list of items being transmitted was “funds.” Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA
PATRIOT Act”) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56 § 359(b), 115
Stat. 272, 328 (2001) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 5330(d)(1)). In this language difference lies the rub of
Freeman’s grievance.
For simplicity’s sake, we’ll refer to the definition
of money transmitting business in effect during the
existence of Freeman’s bitcoin business as the “effective
definition” and the new definition, which was enacted in
2021 (more on this legislative history in a moment), as the
“current definition.” See William M. (Mac) Thornberry
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
(“NDAA”), Pub. L. No. 116–283 § 6102(d)(2)(A)(i), 134 Stat.
3388, 4552–53 (2021) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
of the Treasury, we will substitute in FinCEN as the office of the
Treasury Department that carries out that work.
13a
Appendix A
§ 5330(d)). 8 Unless we specify otherwise, our analysis (and
the cases we cite) refers to the effective definition of money
transmitting business in Section 5330(d)(1).9
An attentive reader may now be wondering what any of
this has to do with the power of an administrative agency.
And, as we’ll see, the government says we shouldn’t take
up the major questions doctrine at all because agency
authority is not implicated in these proceedings. This
is how Freeman contends the doctrine factors into this
8. For those tracking the dates, it may seem strange that
we’re saying the current version of Section 5330 was not effective
for the purposes of this prosecution, even though the indictment
alleges that violations of Section 1960 continued until the date of
Freeman’s arrest, March 15, 2021, which was more than three
months after the current definition became law on January 1, 2021.
NDAA § 6102(d)(2)(A)(i), 134 Stat. at 4552–53. Freeman points
out that under Section 5330(a)(1), any person who owns or controls
a money transmitting business has 180 days to register, and so
his time to register under the updated definition had not expired
by the time the government put a stop to his business. 31 U.S.C.
§ 5330(a)(1). The government does not dispute this explanation of
why the current version of Section 5330 is ineffective and has not
argued that we should analyze the post–amendment conduct any
differently from the pre–amendment conduct. And we thus focus
our attention on the prior, effective definition.
9. Section 1960 had not been amended since Freeman’s
offending conduct began, and neither party asserts that any prior
amendments to Section 1960 are relevant to our resolution of this
case. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–162 § 1171(a)(2),
119 Stat. 2960, 3123 (2006) (striking surplus words from Section
1960(b)(1)(C)).
14a
Appendix A
dispute. According to Freeman, Section 5330’s effective
definition of “money transmitting business” cannot be
properly understood to cover businesses dealing in virtual
currencies like bitcoin, because (and here’s where the
link to an administrative agency arises) Section 5330(a)
(2) instructs FinCEN to “prescribe, by regulation, the
form and manner for registering a money transmitting
business.” 31 U.S.C. § 5330(a)(2). Thus, the 2001 effective
definition of money transmitting business, which refers
to the transmission of “funds,” seemingly applies to both
the statutory registration requirement in Section 5330(a)
(1) and to the scope of FinCEN’s regulatory authority
under Section 5330(a)(2). The major questions doctrine
arises, says Freeman, because we should not conclude
that Congress intended to grant FinCEN regulatory
authority over virtual currencies that did not exist in
2001, solely by virtue of Congress’s use of the word
“funds” in the effective definition in Section 5330(d)(1).
And how we interpret the effective definition necessarily
circumscribes the scope of the statutory registration
requirement in Section 5330(a)(1). In other words, the
statutory assumption underlying Freeman’s prosecution
(i.e., that Congress’s use of the word “funds” in Section
5330(d)(1) covers virtual currencies) fails under the major
questions doctrine, because, according to Freeman, such
an interpretation runs contrary to congressional intent.
Ultimately then, Freeman’s appeal poses the following
question for us: does the effective definition of “money
transmitting business” in Section 5330 capture businesses
that transmit virtual currency? In our opinion, the usual
principles of statutory construction say, resoundingly, yes,
15a
Appendix A
and we’ll take a step back to briefly explain why. We’ll then
dive into the heart of Freeman’s appeal and assess whether
the major questions doctrine nonetheless “provide[s] a
reason to hesitate” before definitively saying yes and
adopting that construction. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Because this is a
matter of statutory construction, our standard of review
is de novo. See United States v. McGlashan, 78 F.4th 1, 6
(1st Cir. 2023).
Traditional Plain Meaning Analysis
We start by analyzing Sections 1960 and 5330 without
reference to the major questions doctrine. In interpreting
a statute, we strive “to effectuate congressional intent.”
City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir.
2020). Our usual starting place for such an inquiry is the
statutory text itself. Id. “[W]e interpret a statute’s words
based on their plain and ordinary meaning at the time of
the statute’s enactment.” United States v. Abreu, 106 F.4th
1, 12 (1st Cir.) (citing Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S.
644, 654, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020)), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 425, 220 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2024); City of
Providence, 954 F.3d at 31 (“When Congress uses a term
in a statute and does not define it, we generally assume
that the term carries its plain and ordinary meaning.”).
In this case, the parties ask us to define a specific
word, “funds,” in Sections 1960 and 5330.10 Other courts
10. The parties analyze the meaning of the word “funds”
under both statutes, and neither suggests that the term “funds”
16a
Appendix A
have been asked to respond to this same query and those
who have done so have concluded this: that the plain
meaning of “funds” is “money” or “ something generally
accepted as a medium of exchange, a measure of value,
or a means of payment.” United States v. Murgio, 209
F. Supp. 3d 698, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 921 (2002)); see also
United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (citing Merriam Webster Online). Premised on this
definition, with which the government agrees, other courts
have found that bitcoin falls within the plain meaning of
“funds” and that Sections 1960 and 5330 therefore capture
businesses that sell bitcoin to customers in exchange
for government–issued currency. See, e.g., United
States v. Stetkiw, No. 18–20579, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16607, 2019 WL 417404, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 1, 2019)
(concluding that bitcoin transactions constitute “money
transmitting” within the meaning of Section 1960); United
States v. Mansy, No. 2:15–cr–198–GZS, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71786, 2017 WL 9672554, at *1 (D. Me. May 11,
2017) (same) (collecting cases); Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d
at 707–11, 714 (concluding that bitcoin are funds within
the plain meaning of Section 1960 and that indictment
sufficiently alleged failure to comply with Section 5330’s
registration requirements). We agree with this judicial
reasoning because bitcoin can be and is used as a currency
to make sales and purchases and, therefore, nicely fits the
should be interpreted differently between Sections 1960 and
5330. Thus, we discuss the meaning of the term “funds” under
both statutes.
17a
Appendix A
definition of “funds.”11 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 707; see
also United States v. Iossifov, 45 F.4th 899, 913–14 (6th
Cir. 2022) (concluding that bitcoin is a medium of exchange
and qualifies as “funds” within the meaning of the federal
money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956); United States
v. Harmon, 474 F. Supp. 3d 76, 88–94, 100–09 (D.D.C.
2020) (concluding that for similar reasons bitcoin is
“money” within the meaning of the District of Columbia’s
Money Transmitters Act and separately concluding that
defendant operated an “unlicensed money transmitting
business” within the meaning of Section 1960 where its
“core business was receiving bitcoin and transmitting that
bitcoin to another location or person”).
Within our ordinary interpretive framework, our
inquiry into whether the word “funds” covers bitcoin
would usually end here, as there is no reason to look past
the statutory text itself if that text is unambiguous and
consistent with a coherent statutory scheme. Penobscot
Nation v. Frey, 3 F.4th 484, 490 (1st Cir. 2021); City of
Providence, 954 F.3d at 31–32 (“Other tools of statutory
interpretation, such as legislative history, customarily
carry significant weight only when the text is ambiguous
or its plain meaning leads to an absurd result.”). Indeed
Freeman admits that he has “never argued” that “the
ordinary meaning of ‘funds’” does not “encompass[]
bitcoin.” But as we’ve already alluded to, Freeman insists
that we cannot stop here because his is “an exceptional
case” wherein ordinary rules of statutory construction
11. For instance, the evidence at trial showed that the bar
where one of Freeman’s kiosks was located accepted bitcoin in
exchange for food.
18a
Appendix A
cannot be relied upon to answer the question of whether
bitcoin qualifies as “funds.” Rather, only an examination
of the major questions doctrine (which takes a deeper
dive into congressional intent) can do that, so we turn to
it now. A heads–up here to the gentle reader: Freeman
offers us a slew of arguments as to why he should prevail
on this issue, so we beg your patience as we work our way
through his various contentions.
Major Questions Doctrine
Before we delve into the details of the major questions
doctrine, we pause to address the government’s threshold
assertion that we “need not indulge” Freeman’s invocation
of the doctrine at all because his criminal prosecution
involved no “regulatory assertions” whatsoever by
the Department of Treasury. Rather, it argues “the
indictment neither depended on nor referenced the
FinCEN guidance” and as such, the major questions
doctrine “is not triggered” here. However, we think the
government’s position oversimplifies Freeman’s argument
and here’s why.
As our preface noted, the “major questions doctrine” can
arise in cases where we are asked to interpret a legislative
enactment that “confers authority upon an administrative
agency” in the executive branch to implement its terms.
West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721. Here, Freeman’s argument
centers on the effective definition of money transmitting
business in Section 5330(d)(1). That statutory definition
governs the scope of what businesses are required to
register under Section 5330(a)(1), and in consequence,
19a
Appendix A
what businesses might be subject to criminal penalties
under Section 1960(b)(1)(B) for failure to comply with that
registration requirement.12 See United States v. Budovsky,
No. 13–cr–00368, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127717, 2015 WL
5602853, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015) (“[C]riminal liability
under § 1960(b)(1)(B) rests in part on a failure to comply
with registration requirements, including those set forth
in § 5330 or in § 5330’s regulations.”). Simultaneously, the
effective definition (what constitutes a money transmitting
business) governs the scope of the regulations FinCEN can
promulgate in the next subsection, Section 5330(a)(2). See,
e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141–43, 114 S.
Ct. 655, 126 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1994) (explaining that willful
violation has same meaning under some provisions of the
Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322, 5324, as it does in other
provisions, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314, 5316); United States v. Abbas,
12. While summarizing the nature of Freeman’s convictions
in its brief, the government claims that Freeman was also
convicted under Section 1960(b)(1)(C). Section 1960(b)(1)(C)
defines an unlicensed money transmitting business seemingly
independently from Section 5330. See 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(C)
(defining term to mean a money transmitting business “otherwise
involv[ing] the transportation or transmission of funds that are
known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal
offense or are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful
activity”). The government does not argue, however, that we can
ignore Section 5330 because the jury convicted Freeman under
Section 1960(b)(1)(C), presumably because the verdict form did not
ask the jury to indicate which of the two subsections Freeman had
violated. Even if the record could support such an argument, we
would treat it as waived given the government’s failure to brief
the issue. See Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Menashes, 127 F.4th
398, 403 n.2 (1st Cir. 2025).
20a
Appendix A
100 F.4th 267, 284 (1st Cir.) (concluding that “proceeds” has
same meaning in different subsections of criminal money
laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.
319, 220 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2024). This statutory scheme makes
clear that the legislation’s substantive provisions work hand
in hand with those provisions granting regulatory authority
to FinCEN to implement the terms of the statute itself.
Given the necessary interplay between the statutory and
regulatory provisions, we agree with Freeman that skirting
the major questions doctrine would incorrectly treat the
statutory registration requirement as completely divorced
from any of FinCEN’s regulatory authority. Indeed, as
Freeman pointed out during oral argument, requiring a
business to register by statute means very little without a
corresponding mechanism by which said business can, in
fact, register. For the registration requirement in Section
5330(a)(1), the regulations FinCEN promulgates under
Section 5330(a)(2) appear to be that mechanism. And
although the government would like us to conclude the
major questions doctrine has no place here, it offers no
direct response to this point. All this to say, Freeman steps
over the threshold of identifying a statute which, at least in
part, confers regulatory authority upon an administrative
agency, a power Freeman insists Congress never intended
to delegate.13
13. We acknowledge that this is a somewhat unusual case for
the invocation of the major questions doctrine: FinCEN is not a
party and Freeman is seeking to overturn his conviction, not to
enjoin FinCEN’s regulatory act. Nevertheless, the heart of this
appeal is the effective definition of money transmitting business in
Section 5330(d)(1), a definition that applies both to Sections 5330(a)
(1) and (a)(2). Blinding ourselves (as the government requests) to
21a
Appendix A
Having explained the relationship between this
case and FinCEN’s regulation of money transmitting
businesses, we must now determine “whether Congress in
fact meant to confer the power the agency has asserted”
as the major questions doctrine requires us to do. West
Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721 (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159, 120 S. Ct.
1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000)). “In the ordinary case,”
this consideration “has no great effect on the appropriate
analysis.” Id. But the Supreme Court has recognized the
existence of “extraordinary cases.” Id. In such instances,
we cannot conclude that Congress granted an agency
authority “to exercise powers of vast economic and political
significance” unless the statutory text “speaks clearly” of
such a grant. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., 594 U.S. 758, 764, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 210 L. Ed.
2d 856 (2021) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Util. Air
Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324). In basic terms, the major
the reality that our interpretation of Section 5330(d)(1) impacts not
only Freeman’s criminal liability, but also the scope of FinCEN’s
regulatory authority, undermines the coherency and consistency of
the statutory scheme. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S.
214, 222, 128 S. Ct. 831, 169 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2008). Our sister circuits
too have seen fit to consider the application of the major questions
doctrine in cases where the relevant administrative agency is
not a party and is not actively making “regulatory assertions”
in that litigation. See United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532, 540
(7th Cir.) (considering major questions challenge to Sentencing
Commission’s authority in a criminal case), cert. denied, 145 S.
Ct. 293, 220 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2024); N.C. Coastal Fisheries Reform
Grp. v. Capt. Gaston LLC, 76 F.4th 291, 296–301 (4th Cir. 2023)
(applying major questions doctrine in suit between environmental
advocacy group and shrimp trawlers).
22a
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questions doctrine tells us that when an administrative
agency in the executive branch wants to do something that
is an extraordinarily big deal, it must show that Congress
clearly gave it permission to do so in the statutory text.
See Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 514 (Barrett, J., concurring)
(analogizing major questions doctrine to expectation that
a parent authorizing a babysitter to take the children on
an overnight trip would provide “much more clarity than
a general instruction to ‘make sure the kids have fun’”).
What, then, makes for an extraordinary case? The
Supreme Court defines it in broad strokes as one “in
which the ‘history and the breadth of the authority that
[the agency] has asserted,’ and the ‘economic and political
significance’ of that assertion, provide a ‘reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such
authority.” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721 (quoting Brown
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60). Within this rather
wide framework, our sister circuits, in carefully examining
what the Supreme Court has said about the breadth
of an agency’s authority to regulate, have zeroed in on
certain “hallmarks that should send us searching for clear
authorization from Congress.”14 N.C. Coastal Fisheries,
76 F.4th at 297 (recognizing that doctrine is more likely to
apply where the agency’s asserted powers are inconsistent
with congressional intent, conflict with a distinct and
existing statutory scheme, raise federalism concerns, “fall[]
14. Our circuit has addressed the major questions doctrine
only in passing since the doctrine was formalized in West Virginia.
See Hornof v. United States, 107 F.4th 46, 59 n.14 (2024) (noting
that statute enabling Coast Guard to regulate oil tankers “speak[s]
clearly”).
23a
Appendix A
outside the agency’s traditional expertise,” are rooted in
“an ancillary provision” of a statute, or are drawn from
“old statutes against a backdrop of an agency failing to
invoke them previously”); see also Bradford v. U.S. Dep’t
of Lab., 101 F.4th 707, 725–28 (10th Cir. 2024) (rejecting
application of major questions doctrine where agency did
not “locate expansive authority in modest words, vague
terms or ancillary provisions,” was not regulating private
industry, did not “discover regulatory authority for the first
time in a long–extant statute,” and did not “lack[] expertise
in the relevant area of policymaking” (citation modified)),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1047, 220 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2025). Our
review of the Supreme Court’s precedent and of our sister
circuits’ helpful interpretation of it convinces us that this
case lacks the hallmarks of a major questions case. We’ll
explain our thinking below around the two organizing
principles identified by the Supreme Court, starting with
“the history and the breadth” of FinCEN’s assertion of
authority and follow that with addressing its “economic and
political significance.”15 West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721; see
Nebraska v. Su, 121 F.4th 1, 14 (9th Cir. 2024) (identifying
a “two–prong framework”).
15. In so doing, we acknowledge that the major questions
doctrine has been an area of dynamic development in the last
few years, and it is not always clear what factors fall under which
prong. For instance, a discussion of the wider statutory scheme
and legislative history might well be introduced as a relevant
piece of the agency’s regulatory history or as indicative of the
political significance of the regulatory assertion. In today’s
decision, we place less importance on categorizing the relevant
characteristics and focus on whether the facts of this case, stripped
of Freeman’s rhetorical flourishes, actually fit into the major
questions precedent.
24a
Appendix A
History and Breadth of FinCEN’s Assertion
History
To understand the “history and breadth” of FinCEN’s
regulation as is relevant here, a short history of Section
5330 is in order.16 As part of a statutory scheme (the
Bank Secrecy Act) designed to combat money laundering,
Congress has long required “money transmitting
businesses” to register with the Treasury Department.
Riegle Community Development and Reg ulator y
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–325 § 408, 108
Stat. 2160, 2249–51 (1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5330).
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
Congress that year amended the definition of “money
transmitting business” in Section 5330 to include “any
other person who engages as a business in the transmission
of funds, including any person who engages as a business
in an informal money transfer system or any network
of people who engage as a business in facilitating the
transfer of money domestically or internationally outside
of the conventional financial institutions system.” USA
PATRIOT Act § 359(b), 115 Stat. at 328 (emphases added).
According to the report of the Committee on Financial
Services, the amendment did not expand the definition of
money transmitting business, but instead clarified that
16. Our focus is on the legislative history of Section 5330
rather than Section 1960, because (1) that is what the parties
briefed and (2) Section 5330, which enables agency regulation, is
more squarely implicated by the major questions doctrine than
Section 1960, which focuses on the circumstances of criminal
liability.
25a
Appendix A
the existing definition reached black market, non–bank
money exchangers—what the Committee referred to as
“informal value transfer banking systems”—which helped
to fund terrorist and criminal organizations. H.R. Rep.
No. 107–250, at 34, 63–64 (2001).
This was the effective version of Section 5330 when
bitcoin came into being in 2008. Perkins, supra, at 2. In
Freeman’s telling though, FinCEN’s first step towards the
regulation of bitcoin didn’t occur until 2011, when FinCEN
updated its regulatory definition of “money transmission
services” to require the “acceptance of currency, funds,
or other value that substitutes for currency from one
person.” Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions
and Other Regulations Relating to Money Services
Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43585, 43596 (July 21, 2011)
(codified at 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)) (emphasis added).
Such a theory, he argues, is consistent with the guidance
FinCEN issued in 2013 which, for the first time, stated
that “value that substitutes for currency” includes virtual
currencies. Specifically, the guidance said, “[t]he definition
of a money transmitter does not differentiate between real
currencies and convertible virtual currencies. Accepting
and transmitting anything of value that substitutes for
currency makes a person a money transmitter under
the regulations implementing the [Bank Secrecy Act].”17
17. FinCEN laid out precise definitions for “real currency,”
“convertible currency,” and “virtual currency” in its 2013
guidance. FIN–2013–G001, at 3. For the purposes of this opinion,
it suffices to say that “real currency” is equivalent to what we
have been calling “fiat currency” and that bitcoin is a form of
“convertible virtual currency.” The guidance clarified that the fact
26a
Appendix A
FinCEN, FIN–2013–G001, Application of FinCEN’s
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or
Using Virtual Currencies, at 3 (2013). Freeman says
the fact that FinCEN never sought to regulate bitcoin
before 2013 demonstrates the agency’s understanding
of its statutory inability to do so. Needless to say, the
government takes issue with Freeman’s historical
interpretation,18 but neither party has pointed to any
evidence that FinCEN engaged in any enforcement
activities against businesses transmitting bitcoin which
sought to compel them to register (or comply with other
regulations) prior to issuance of the 2013 guidance. And
for the purposes of this opinion, we’ll operate with the
understanding that FinCEN, at least, first began to
regulate businesses that transmit virtual currencies in
2013. Doing so lets us focus on the parties’ key dispute:
whether FinCEN, nonetheless, had statutory authority
to regulate virtual currencies when it issued the 2013
guidance.
that a business exchanged bitcoin instead of fiat currency would
not exempt it from registration as a money transmitter. Id. at 2
(explaining that “a person engaged as a business in the exchange
of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other virtual
currency” is a money transmitter under FinCEN’s regulation).
18. Freeman takes the view that FinCEN did not begin
regulating bitcoin until “long after the invention of bitcoin” in 2008,
when it added the phrase “value that substitutes for currency” into
its regulations and then interpreted that phrase to refer to virtual
currencies. The government claims that FinCEN was regulating
virtual currencies all along and that FinCEN’s actions in 2011 and
2013 merely “confirmed” its existing regulatory scheme.
27a
Appendix A
Freeman would like us to conclude it “inconceivable”
(as he tells it) that the single word “funds” as contained in
the effective version could refer to virtual currency, but
we believe his focus on that single word is misplaced and
here’s why. In full, the effective definition (when bitcoin
was created) specified that businesses engaged in the
“transmission of funds” could include an “informal money
transfer system . . . outside of the conventional financial
institutions system.” USA PATRIOT Act § 359(b), 115
Stat. at 328. Bitcoin and virtual currencies seem to fall
within this broad definition of a system that allows users
to transfer money without the participation of banks or
other traditional money movers. Freeman argues that in
utilizing this language in the 2001 amendment, Congress
intended to target a different informal money system –
“the ancient South Asian money exchange system called
hawala” and other “hawala–type systems.”19 But we find
this to be a strained reading of the Committee Report
accompanying the 2001 legislation. A more natural
reading is that Congress was more generally concerned
about “underground black market banking systems,”
whatever the form, H.R. Rep. No. 107–250, at 33, and
19. According to the findings of the House Committee on
Financial Services, “hawala” is the word for an “ancient South
Asian money exchange system” which “consists of an international
network of non–bank financial agents, often built on trusted
family or cultural relationships.” H.R. Rep. No. 107–250, at 34.
These trusted relationships permit value to be transferred based
on messages rather than the physical movement of funds from
one party to another. Id. Presumably, when Freeman refers to
“hawala–type systems,” he refers to value transfer systems that
function in a similar manner.
28a
Appendix A
described hawalas as simply one example of the “informal
value transfer banking systems” on which FinCEN
should focus attention, id. at 63–64. Moreover, Congress
highlighted particular characteristics of “value transfer
systems” that are equally true of today’s bitcoin use,
including that such systems frequently operated through
“messages relating to receipt or disbursement of funds”
rather than transfer of physical funds themselves, and
that they were preferred by criminals because of “the
lack of record–keeping and opportunity for anonymity.”
Id. at 34. Importantly, Congress believed that these sorts
of alternative transfer systems were “already adequately
covered” by the pre–2001 version of Section 5330. Id. at
63–64. The Committee Report gives us no reason to think
that a non–bank system allowing people to transfer value
using messages between trusted parties should be treated
differently than one which accomplishes the same purpose
using cryptographic protocols between strangers.
And even if we adopted Freeman’s approach and
looked at the word “funds” in isolation, we’d be hard–
pressed to think it “inconceivable” that Congress would
have intended “funds” to reach cryptocurrency given
that judicial decisions dating back to 2008 had already
interpreted “funds” expansively to capture non–physical
currency. See, e.g., United States v. E–Gold, Ltd., 550
F. Supp. 2d 82, 85, 94–97 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that
Section 5330’s definition of money transmitting business
included internet service which allowed users to exchange
fiat currency for digital currency). 20
20. We are mindful, as Freeman points out, that the virtual
currency at issue in E–Gold is not a “cryptocurrency” like
29a
Appendix A
Nor does Freeman, relative to his historical argument,
make a showing that FinCEN has engaged in the sort
of about–face agency behavior typically found in the
major questions cases. That is significant because the
Supreme Court, in applying the doctrine, has particularly
scrutinized with suspicion when an agency reverses course
on its long–standing decision not to regulate in a particular
field or in a particular manner. See West Virginia, 597
U.S. at 710–11, 713, 724 (striking regulation requiring
electricity generators to undergo sector–wide switch to
sources that produced less carbon dioxide, where EPA
had previously only exercised power under Section 111
of the Clean Air Act to set emissions limits for individual
plants). FinCEN had no history of explicitly disclaiming
its authority to regulate virtual currency (or any other
type of “informal transfer banking system”) prior to its
2011 and 2013 updates to its regulatory regime. Cf. Brown
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143–48 (concluding that the
Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) decades–long
bitcoin. See 550 F. Supp. 2d at 85; FIN–2013–G001, at 3 & n.13
(describing e–currencies and e–precious metals as a system where
a broker or dealer electronically distributes digital certificates of
ownership of fiat currency or precious metals); see also supra note
2. But the fact that e–gold was backed by precious metals while
bitcoin transactions are recorded on a cryptographic ledger is
not a difference–maker in our current analysis because FinCEN
views and treats both “e–precious metals” and cryptocurrencies
as convertible virtual currencies. 2013 Guidance at 3. Nor do we
understand why Freeman highlights that “the e–Gold indictment
explicitly relied on FinCEN’s implementing regulations” as a point
of distinction. After all, Freeman similarly claims his prosecution
relies on FinCEN’s implementing regulations (which is the
premise for applying the major questions doctrine).
30a
Appendix A
position that it had no jurisdiction over tobacco products
and Congress’s implicit ratification of that position in
subsequent tobacco–specific legislation demonstrated a
lack of legislative intent to delegate authority over tobacco
products to the FDA).
And simply because FinCEN declined to exercise
such authority prior to issuance of the 2013 guidance can
hardly, by our lights, be held against it; by Freeman’s
count, the agency acted only five years after bitcoin was
invented. 21 The five–year delay—if we can call it such—
is understandable because the money laundering risk
posed by bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies (and thus
the need for targeted regulation) may not have been
instantly apparent upon bitcoin’s invention. Cf. Ocean State
Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island, 95 F.4th 38, 50 (1st Cir.
2024) (“Law advances more slowly than the technology it
regulates, but must nonetheless be able to respond when
the ramifications of a technological development become
more apparent over time.”). Plus five years is a far cry
from the decades of regulatory inaction emphasized in
the Supreme Court’s major questions cases. See, e.g.,
West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 734 (noting that “it is pertinent
to our analysis that EPA has acted consistent with such
a limitation [on its regulatory power] for the first four
decades of the statute’s existence”); Ala. Ass’n of Realtors,
21. In fact, FinCEN proposed the addition of the phrase
“value that substitutes for currency” as early as 2009, the year
following bitcoin’s invention. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act
Regulations–Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Money
Services Businesses, 74 Fed. Reg. 22129, 22137, 22142 (proposed
May 12, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
31a
Appendix A
594 U.S. at 761 (explaining that 1944 statutory provision
had “rarely been invoked—and never before to justify an
eviction moratorium”; instead “[r]egulations under this
authority have generally been limited to quarantining
infected individuals and prohibiting the import or
sale of animals known to transmit disease”). In 2008,
cryptocurrencies were an emerging technology whose
significance within the money transfer marketplace was
less than clear. Freeman’s own brief indicates that the
market capitalization of bitcoin in July 2010, roughly two
years after its invention, was only $200,000, a pittance
in the nation’s overall financial scheme, and perhaps one
not yet worthy of an expenditure of the limited resources
Congress appropriates to FinCEN.
“Subsequent” History
Unable to find a firm foothold in the history leading
up to FinCEN’s exercise of regulatory authority over
bitcoin, Freeman points to events that occurred after
FinCEN’s issuance of the 2013 guidance. Reliance on this
sort of “subsequent” history is rather unorthodox. As the
government notes, we’ve previously warned against using
the views of a later Congress to interpret “the meaning of
statutes enacted by an earlier Congress” when conducting
traditional statutory interpretation. Parlane Sportswear
Co. v. Weinberger, 513 F.2d 835, 837 n.2 (1st Cir. 1975); see
also Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 242, 131 S. Ct.
1068, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2011) (“Post–enactment legislative
history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool
of statutory interpretation.”); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614,
626–27, 124 S. Ct. 1204, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1122 (2004) (“[W]e
32a
Appendix A
have said repeatedly that subsequent legislative history
will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute
that can be gleaned from its language and legislative
history prior to its enactment.” (citation and quotation
marks omitted)). Tellingly, Freeman does not cite to a
single major questions case when arguing that these
subsequent events call for an alternative interpretation
of Section 5330. But as best we can glean, he believes that
certain events post–dating the 2013 guidance amount to
noteworthy hallmarks of the major questions cases.
First, Freeman discusses subsequent legislative
activity related to the regulation of virtual currencies,
including failed legislation and the 2021 amendment that
enacted the current definition of “money transmitting
business” in Section 5330, and concludes that Congress
“considered and repeatedly rejected legislation” that
would have expressly empowered FinCEN to regulate
virtual currencies. Second, Freeman identifies statements
that FinCEN made regarding virtual currencies after
issuing the 2013 guidance and claims the statements
reveal that “the agency recognized that the statute
did not authorize the regulation” but nevertheless
“expanded” its authority “before the authorization from
Congress.” Accepting Freeman’s characterization of these
occurrences, we see there may be some facial resemblance
between these facts and a major questions case. See
Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 321 (explaining that
“EPA itself has repeatedly acknowledged” that proposed
regulation “would overthrow” the “structure and design”
of the enabling act); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144
(explaining that “Congress has acted against the backdrop
33a
Appendix A
of the FDA’s consistent and repeated statements that it
lacked authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco” and
“considered and rejected bills that would have granted the
FDA such jurisdiction”). But given the Supreme Court’s
eschewal of the importance of post–enactment legislative
history outside the major questions context, we express
skepticism of these events’ relevance. See Bruesewitz, 562
U.S. at 242; Chao, 540 U.S. at 626–27. That said, despite
our skepticism, in the absence of a clear statement by the
Supreme Court that subsequent history has no bearing
on the major questions determination, 22 and given the
presence of thorough briefing from both parties on the
point, we will consider whether what happened after
FinCEN issued its 2013 guidance influences our analysis
of Freeman’s argument.
In our view, the subsequent history only confirms that
FinCEN’s interpretation of the breadth of its authority to
regulate was consistent with congressional intent. That
is because “when Congress revisits a statute giving rise
to a longstanding administrative interpretation without
pertinent change, the ‘congressional failure to revise or
repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence
22. In some instances, the Court’s major questions cases have
referenced congressional acts or omissions that post–date the
agency’s challenged regulatory assertion, but without relying on
them to resolve the major questions determination. See Ala. Ass’n
of Realtors, 594 U.S. at 760, 766 (recounting Congress’s failure to
enact multiple extensions of CDC’s challenged eviction moratorium
and noting that “Congress was on notice that a further extension
would almost surely require new legislation, yet it failed to act
in the several weeks leading up to the moratorium’s expiration”).
34a
Appendix A
that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.’”
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 845–46, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 92 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1986)
(citation omitted) (concluding that deference to agency’s
interpretation was warranted where Congress had twice
amended the statute without overruling the agency’s
assertion of jurisdiction); see Am. Forest Res. Council v.
United States, 77 F.4th 787, 801 n.16, 462 U.S. App. D.C.
121 (D.C. Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1110, 218
L. Ed. 2d 348 (2024); Strickland v. Me. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 96 F.3d 542, 547 (1st Cir. 1996). Typically, courts
invoke this principle of statutory interpretation to infer
legislative approval from Congress’s silence and inaction,
such as when Congress re–enacts a statute without
amendment to the portion on which the agency has relied.
See Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d
12, 20 (1st Cir. 1998); Strickland, 96 F.3d at 547. We think
it applies with even more force when, as here, an agency
informs Congress of its interpretation of its statutory
authority and Congress affirmatively revises the relevant
statute to codify that interpretation. See Altman v. SEC,
666 F.3d 1322, 1326, 399 U.S. App. D.C. 55 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(upholding SEC’s interpretation of enabling statute and
explaining that SEC’s rules of practice were codified in
2002); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 537–38, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 192 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2015) (explaining that Congress
“presupposed” the existence of disparate impact claims
under the Fair Housing Act when it subsequently added
exemptions from disparate impact claims into the statute).
And to repeat, that’s exactly what happened here.
35a
Appendix A
In the years following FinCEN’s issuance of the
2013 guidance, FinCEN informed Congress on multiple
occasions that it had been regulating virtual currency
exchangers as businesses that transmit “value that
substitutes for currency.” Illicit Use of Virtual Currency
and the Law Enforcement Response: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Terrorism and Illicit Fin. of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs. 9, 25 (2018) (statement of Thomas Ott,
Associate Director, FinCEN Enf’t Division) (testifying
that “value that substitutes for currency” is “sufficient to
cover virtual currency”) [hereinafter H. Hrg. 115–102];
The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Pol’y
and Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Trade and Fin.
of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affs.,
113th Cong. 8, 11 (2013) (statement of Jennifer Shasky
Calvery, Director, FinCEN) (testifying that FinCEN
was “able to cover [virtual currency] under our pre–
existing definitions and regulations, which include the
concept of other value that substitutes for currency”)
[hereinafter S. Hrg. 113–210]. Indeed FinCEN wrote
to a Senate committee that FinCEN “would not object
to Congress considering codifying elements of money
transmission to involve the transmission of currency, as
well as value that substitutes for currency.” Combatting
Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance:
Regulator and Law Enforcement Perspective on Reform:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urb. Affs., 115th Cong. 59, 62 (2018) (written statement of
Kenneth A. Blanco, Director, FinCEN). As we previewed
earlier, Congress subsequently added “currency” and
“value that substitutes for currency” into the definition
36a
Appendix A
of “money transmitting business” in Section 5330(d)(1).
NDAA § 6102(d)(1)(2), 134 Stat. at 4553. In our view,
that Congress not only declined to criticize or correct
FinCEN’s approach (despite having been informed of it
on more than one occasion), but instead chose to codify
it, strongly suggests that FinCEN’s interpretation was
consistent with Congress’s intent.
Freeman takes an alternative view of the same
sequence of events, arguing that we should treat the
2021 amendment instead as evidence that the effective
definition could not have supported FinCEN’s earlier
reading. This view relies on a principle of statutory
interpretation that tells us to give meaning to the words
of a statute in a manner that avoids redundancies. See
City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 43. (We usually call
this principle the canon against superfluities or canon
against surplusage.) To follow Freeman’s logic, if “funds”
pre–2021 already captured virtual currencies, it would
be unnecessary to add language to the statute that also
refers to virtual currencies. Because it is undisputed that
Congress intended the addition of the phrase “value that
substitutes for currency” to refer to virtual currencies,
see NDAA § 6102(a) 134 Stat. at 4552, we should presume
that the previous formulation of the statute did not capture
this meaning.
But we have previously warned that the canon
against superfluities “is not a straitjacket” and “should
not, therefore, be employed inflexibly to rule out every
interpretation of a statute that treats certain language
as illustrative or clarifying.” City of Providence, 954 F.3d
37a
Appendix A
at 43 (concluding that amendment “appears calculated to
remove any doubt” that executive officer could exercise
particular power consistent with pre–existing statutory
authority). The prefatory language to the 2021 amendment,
NDAA § 6102(a), 134 Stat. at 4552, supports reading
the addition of “value that substitutes for currency” as
stressing that regulation of virtual currencies should
be a FinCEN priority, rather than as giving FinCEN
permission to regulate virtual currencies for the first
time. NDAA § 6102(a)(4), 134 Stat. at 4552 (explaining
that FinCEN should “mak[e] sure that steps to address
emerging methods of such illicit financing [like virtual
currencies] are high priorities”); see Jerman v. Carlisle,
McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 592,
130 S. Ct. 1605, 176 L. Ed. 2d 519 (2010) (explaining that
“Congress may simply have intended to codify existing
judicial interpretations to remove any potential for doubt
in jurisdictions where courts had not yet addressed the
issue”).
And it’s worth noting that Congress also has a
history of revising the Section 5330 definition of “money
transmitting businesses” for the purpose of clarification,
rather than substantive expansion. H.R. Rep. No. 107–250,
at 63–64 (“Although the Committee believes that informal
value transfer banking systems like hawalas are already
adequately covered by references to money transmitting
businesses in certain provisions of existing law, this
section makes that understanding explicit.”). Under
these circumstances, we need not blindly apply the canon
against surplusage to invalidate an agency regulation
that Congress deemed worthy of codification. See Bufkin
38a
Appendix A
v. Collins, 145 S. Ct. 728, 742, 221 L. Ed. 2d 192 (2025)
(“[S]ometimes the better overall reading of the statute
contains some redundancy.” (citation omitted)); City of
Providence, 954 F.3d at 43.
Freeman nevertheless insists that “Cong ress
struggled with deciding how to classify and regulate
virtual currencies” and “considered and repeatedly
rejected legislation to assign regulatory authority to
agencies like FinCEN.” See West Virginia, 597 U.S. at
731. But his position does not hold up to scrutiny. To begin
with, the legislative record simply doesn’t show the sort
of “struggle” that Freeman claims exists. In support
of his contention, Freeman first points to the FinCEN
Improvement Acts of 2018 and 2019, two bills that passed
in the House of Representatives but failed in the Senate.
H.R. 6411, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 1414, 116th Cong.
(2019). In relevant portion, these bills would have revised
FinCEN’s duty and power to “[c]oordinate with financial
intelligence units in other countries on anti–terrorism and
anti–money laundering initiatives,” 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2)
(H), to specifically “includ[e] matters involving emerging
technologies or value that substitutes for currency.” H.R.
6411, § 3; H.R. 1414, § 3. But those bills did not address
the definition of money transmitting business. Freeman
also points us to the Improving Laundering Laws and
Increasing Comprehensive Information Tracking of
Criminal Activity in Shell Holdings Act (“ILLICIT Cash
Act”), S. 2563 § 308, 116th Cong. (2019), which would have
revised the definition of “money transmitting business”
in Section 5330 to include “value that substitutes for
currency.” Freeman emphasizes that this bill “failed
39a
Appendix A
to even make it out of committee.” Yet he concedes that
the text of this bill eventually “formed the basis for the
[anti–money laundering] provisions of the 2021 NDAA.” In
other words, while Congress did fail to pass the ILLICIT
Cash Act, it adopted the relevant language from this bill
two terms later as part of the 2021 amendment. NDAA
§ 6102, 134 Stat. at 4552–53. Let us further explain.
In a major questions case, an agency’s assertion
that it can regulate in a manner in which Congress has
refused to legislate might give us reason to question
whether the agency is contravening congressional intent.
See West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 731 (applying major
questions doctrine where EPA enacted program to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions despite Congress’s rejection
of similar proposals); Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 594 U.S. at
760 (explaining that Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”)
“decided to do what Congress had not” by imposing
administrative eviction moratorium after Congress
declined to extend its own statutory moratorium). But
what we’ve chronicled as per Freeman’s argument is
hardly the sort of history that calls for application of the
major questions doctrine. FinCEN did not watch Congress
reject a proposal to regulate virtual currency exchanges
as money transmitting businesses, only to sua sponte
take up the same proposal itself. Instead, the bills that
Freeman identifies were all introduced after FinCEN
started regulating virtual currencies in 2013, and each
bill would have codified FinCEN’s “value that substitutes
for currency” formulation, rather than curtailing any
perceived administrative overreach. The bill containing
the broadest amendment ultimately was incorporated
40a
Appendix A
into leg islation that passed, codify ing FinCEN’s
interpretation. See NDAA § 6102, 134 Stat. at 4552–53;
ILLICIT Cash Act S. 2563 § 308. None of the Supreme
Court’s major questions cases have overturned agency
action when a Congress takes the agency interpretation
being challenged and chooses to enact it into law. 23
Finally, Freeman claims that “FinCEN admitted
that it had to expand its authority beyond the statutory
language to capture virtual currency.” He seemingly
23. The Supreme Court came closest to doing so in Alabama
Association of Realtors, 594 U.S. 758. That case involved a
challenge to an eviction moratorium issued by the CDC after
Congress had allowed a legislative eviction moratorium to expire.
Id. at 760. When the CDC’s administrative moratorium was set to
expire for the first time, Congress passed legislation extending
the CDC’s moratorium for one month, but subsequently declined
to extend the moratorium any further. Id. The CDC nevertheless
renewed the moratorium several times. Id. The Court’s analysis
in its per curiam opinion focused on the political and economic
significance of the eviction moratorium rather than on whether
Congress’s subsequent legislative activity (and inactivity)
amounted to tacit approval (or disapproval) of the moratorium.
Id. at 764–65. In any event, Congress’s one–month extension
of the eviction moratorium did not amount to a word–for–word
codification of the agency’s interpretation of its statutory authority
into the enabling statute, as occurred in this case. See Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116–260, § 502, 134 Stat.
1182, 2078–2079 (2020) (stating simply that CDC’s order “is
extended through January 31, 2021” without amending enabling
statute). And, moreover, Freeman does not attempt to argue
that Alabama Association of Realtors stands for the proposition
that the major questions doctrine applies even when Congress
expressly approves of the agency’s decision.
41a
Appendix A
raises this argument because at times, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that the agency’s express disclaimer of
its authority to regulate a particular industry or in a
particular manner shows that a later attempt to assert
the same authority exceeds the bounds of the governing
statute. See Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 321 (“EPA
itself has repeatedly acknowledged that applying the PSD
and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse gases
would be inconsistent with—in fact, would overthrow—the
Act’s structure and design.”); Brown & Williamson, 529
U.S. at 146 (noting FDA’s “disavowal of jurisdiction” over
tobacco products). But we see no such history of disclaimer
here. The supposed agency admissions Freeman refers to
in support of his argument are various statements made
by FinCEN officials in testimony before Congress and in a
bar association speech. See, e.g., Crypto Crime in Context:
Breaking Down the Illicit Activity in Digital Assets:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Digit. Assets, Fin.
Tech. and Inclusion of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 118th
Cong. (2023) (witness statement of Jane Khodarkovsky,
Former Trial Att’y and Hum. Trafficking Fin. Specialist,
Dep’t of Justice) (no official transcript of hearing available)
(quoted material appears on page 11 of written witness
statement), https://perma.cc/7RBZ–CPWX [hereinafter
Khodarkovsky Statement]; H. Hrg. 115–102, supra, at 9,
25 (statement of Thomas Ott, Associate Director, FinCEN
Enf’t Division); S. Hrg. 113–210, supra, at 5, 36 (statement
of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, FinCEN); FinCEN,
Prepared Remarks of FinCEN Acting Dir. Him Das
Delivered Virtually at the American Bankers Association/
American Bar Association Financial Crimes Enforcement
Conference (Jan. 13, 2022), https://perma.cc/JXQ9–BLNR.
42a
Appendix A
In Freeman’s telling, these statements acknowledge that
FinCEN lacked statutory authorization to regulate virtual
currency.
As an initial matter, we note that Freeman’s argument
appears to be an odd fit with the major questions cases,
where a later assertion of authority contradicts an earlier
disclaimer. That is so because each of the statements
Freeman references post–date FinCEN’s assertion in
2013, that virtual currency exchangers were subject to
its regulations. And when we take a closer look at the
statements Freeman has identified, we do not see FinCEN
acknowledging any discrepancy between its statutory
authority and its regulatory assertion (as Freeman
claims it has). Most of these statements express
FinCEN’s concerns that virtual currencies might not be
adequately addressed by the pre–existing regulatory
framework (rather than concerns about any gap in the
statutory scheme) and inform Congress of how FinCEN
had updated its definitions to be in sync with Congress’s
statutory intent. See, e.g., S. Hrg. 113–210, supra, at
5, 36 (warning that virtual currencies are preferred
by “[i]llicit actors” in part because they “provide[] a
loophole from the [anti–money laundering and combatting
the financing of terrorism] regulatory safeguards in
most countries around the world” and explaining that
FinCEN’s regulatory guidance, rulings, and updates
“have been able to accommodate the development of
new payment systems, including virtual currency”); H.
Hrg. 115–102, supra, at 9, 25 (statement of Thomas Ott,
Associate Director, FinCEN Enf’t Division) (recounting
regulatory acts intended to address virtual currencies and
43a
Appendix A
testifying that the “regulatory regime right now, that we
have in place, is sufficient to cover virtual currency . . .
whether or not . . . a money transmitter is located within
the continental United States”); Das, supra (“[W]e need a
regulatory regime to match, one that accounts for crypto
and other digital assets, evolution in the payments space,
and other innovations that are driving the creation of new
products, services, and delivery channels.”). 24 Another
simply acknowledges the codification of FinCEN’s existing
interpretation in 2021. Khodarkovsky Statement, supra,
at 11. None of these statements amounts to an admission
that FinCEN lacked statutory authority to regulate
virtual currency exchangers as money transmitting
businesses.
Freeman also latches onto the following sentence from
a 2019 guidance document issued by FinCEN stating,
“The term ‘other value that substitutes for currency’
encompasses situations in which the transmission does not
involve currency, or funds, but instead involves something
that the parties to a transaction recognize has value that
24. Freeman also claims that “[a] former acting director of
FinCEN, Himamauli Das, stated that the 2021 updates to the
Patriot Act, including the amendment to § 5330, were necessary
because the 2001 law ‘never anticipated the challenges of the
2020s: digital assets . . . .” Appellant’s Br. 49 (alterations in
original) (quoting Das, supra). But of course, Congress did not
need to “anticipate” the application of Section 5330 to virtual
currencies in order for FinCEN to apply the statute’s plain terms.
See Bostock, 590 U.S. at 683. Nor does a high–level remark on the
need to modernize the anti–money laundering legal framework
amount to an admission that FinCEN had no statutory authority
over virtual currencies until passage of the 2021 law.
44a
Appendix A
is equivalent to or can substitute for currency.” FinCEN,
Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business
Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies, FIN–
2019–G001, at 4 (2019). 25 According to Freeman, this
sentence shows that FinCEN recognized that “funds” are
different from “value that substitutes for currency” and
“that the word ‘funds’ in the 2001 version of § 5330 did
not capture virtual currency.” We note, however, that the
2019 guidance does not mention Section 5330 at all and
does not attempt to define the meaning of “funds,” even
within the limited universe of the guidance document.
Elsewhere in the same document, the word “funds” is
used when referring to convertible virtual currencies.
FIN–2019–G001, at 15, 19 (referring to “funds” held
in virtual currency wallets and “funds” accepted and
retransmitted by service providers that anonymize virtual
currency transactions). To read FinCEN’s use of “funds”
in this guidance document as a disclaimer of its statutory
authority to regulate virtual currency under Section 5330
would simply blink reality.
Breadth
With the relevant history in mind, we examine the
breadth of the power FinCEN has asserted, another
factor the Supreme Court has directed us to consider as
we decide if “hesitation” is called for before we affirm an
agency’s claim of regulatory authority. See West Virginia,
597 U.S. at 721. To begin, we do not buy Freeman’s
25. Freeman’s brief incorrectly identifies the source of this
sentence as the 2013 guidance. The language Freeman quotes
actually appears in a separate document. FIN–2019–G001, at 4.
45a
Appendix A
argument that FinCEN “claim[ed] to discover in a long–
extant statute an unheralded power.” Util. Air Regul.
Grp., 573 U.S. at 324. In requiring virtual currency
transmitters to register, FinCEN was not regulating in an
“unheralded” or “unprecedented” manner, West Virginia,
597 U.S. at 724–25, 728 (citations omitted) (explaining
that EPA had never before attempted to systemically
reduce emissions by “‘shifting’ polluting activity ‘from
dirtier to cleaner sources’“ (citations omitted)), nor was
FinCEN relying on an obscure, “ancillary” or “gap filler”
statutory provision, id. at 724. To the contrary, that agency
has continuously relied on Section 5330 as authority
to regulate money transmitters since 1994. See Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–325 § 408, 108 Stat. 2160,
2249–51 (1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5330). All it did in
2013 was explicitly specify that businesses transmitting
virtual currency would be treated the same as those
transmitting physical currency. In short, this “unheralded
power” argument is doomed because FinCEN’s regulation
of bitcoin is not the kind of “unprecedented” program, one
so unlike FinCEN’s historical approach to regulation, that
would call for application of the major questions doctrine.
See Biden v. Missouri, 595 U.S. 87, 90–91, 94, 142 S. Ct. 647,
211 L. Ed. 2d 433 (2022) (holding that Secretary of Health
and Human Services did not exceed statutory authority
in promulgating rule conditioning receipt of Medicaid and
Medicare funds on vaccination of healthcare providers
where “the Secretary routinely imposes conditions of
participation that relate to the qualifications and duties
of healthcare workers”); cf. Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 501
(reversing program by Secretary of Education to cancel
46a
Appendix A
loan obligations where “Secretary has never previously
claimed powers of this magnitude under the HEROES
Act” and “past waivers and modifications issued under the
Act have been extremely modest and narrow in scope”);
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 594 U.S. at 765 (concluding that
CDC could not impose eviction moratorium in counties
experiencing substantial or high levels of COVID–19
transmission where since the enactment of the claimed
statutory authority in 1944, “no regulation premised on
it has even begun to approach the size or scope of the
eviction moratorium”).
Nor in challenging FinCEN’s breadth of reach does
Freeman attempt to argue that FinCEN’s exercise of
regulatory authority over virtual currency transmitters
somehow falls outside its “sphere of expertise.” See Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, 117–18, 142
S. Ct. 661, 211 L. Ed. 2d 448 (2022) (explaining that a
“broad public health measure[],” like a vaccine mandate,
was “outside of OSHA’s sphere of expertise” and was not
authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)). FinCEN’s enumerated
statutory duties and powers specifically include analysis of
“emerging trends and methods in money laundering and
other financial crimes” and the identification of “emerging
threats” and “emerging technology” to assist in federal
investigations and in countering money laundering and
terrorism. See 31 U.S.C. 310(b)(2)(C)(v), (b)(2)(M)–(N); cf.
Missouri, 595 U.S. at 93 (affirming vaccine mandate for
healthcare workers promulgated under the Secretary of
Health and Human Services’ authority to pass regulation
“necessary in the interest of the health and safety of
individuals who are furnished services”).
47a
Appendix A
Ultimately, and in the absence of facts suggesting
FinCEN tried to wield unheralded power, or regulate in
an area beyond its expertise, what Freeman’s case seems
to boil down to is this: Congress, in amending Section
5330 in 2001, simply could not have intended to regulate
something that did not yet exist. But there is nothing
compelling about this timing–of–events argument. Taken
to its logical conclusion, Freeman’s argument more or
less advocates for a principle of statutory construction
that exempts new technologies from existing statutory
schemes unless Congress had somehow foreseen the
course of technological innovation and had expressly
accounted for it ahead of time. But no such legal principle
exists that we are aware of. Cf. Steele v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 51 F.4th 1059, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022) (certifying
questions related to whether a child conceived via in vitro
fertilization with cryo–preserved sperm after father’s
death was entitled to benefits as father’s child under the
Social Security Act and Florida law), certified question
answered, 385 So. 3d 587 (Fla. 2024); Application of
Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“Congress
cannot be expected to foresee, or to annually amend [the
Patent Act] to incorporate, every future breakthrough
onto entirely new technological terrain.”). Courts
routinely enforce “plain statutory commands” even where
Congress may not have expected the statute to apply
to certain factual situations at the time of passage. See
Bostock, 590 U.S. at 683.
The only case Freeman cites in support of his timing
theory is National Federation of Independent Business
v. OSHA. 595 U.S. at 114–19. According to Freeman,
48a
Appendix A
the Supreme Court rightly rejected the Occupational
Health and Safety Administration’s (“OSHA”) “attempt
to impose a COVID vaccine mandate based on a statutory
provision adopted 50 years before the pandemic,” and, says
Freeman, “[t]he same principles [should] apply here.” Yet
nothing in the decision suggests that the Court based its
opinion on the fact that COVID–19 was a “new” virus that
did not exist when Congress enacted the Occupational
Safety and Health Act in 1970. See id. at 114. Instead,
the Court’s focus was the unprecedented nature of
OSHA’s action in mandating universal vaccination and the
apparent disconnect between such a vaccine mandate and
OSHA’s actual sphere of expertise. Id. at 119 (“OSHA, in
its half century of existence, has never before adopted a
broad public health regulation of this kind—addressing
a threat that is untethered, in any causal sense, from
the workplace.”). Giving some credence to Freeman’s
assertion, the reasoning in National Federation might
resonate with us if, say, FinCEN decided to regulate
materials used to manufacture illegal drugs on the
basis that fewer illegal drug sales would reduce money
laundering. Freeman’s view of National Federation’s
holding appears to be an alternate reality in which OSHA
had long exercised statutory authority to issue vaccine
mandates to address viral spread, only for the Supreme
Court to strike down its COVID–19 vaccine mandate on
the basis that COVID–19 was a new type of virus with
an extraordinary and unforeseen impact on the United
States. That simply is not what National Federation
is about, and there is no coherent analogy between the
unprecedented nature of OSHA’s regulatory assertion in
that case and what happened here.
49a
Appendix A
Put differently, under Freeman’s characterization of
National Federation, the major questions doctrine would
apply any time an agency relied on a long extant statute
to regulate an impactful new technology. This would
transform a legal doctrine meant for extraordinary cases
into a commonplace principle of statutory interpretation.
Because nothing in the history or breadth of FinCEN’s
regulation of money transmitting businesses calls for
application of the major questions doctrine, we turn now
to the political and economic significance of the regulation
to see if those considerations are difference–makers.
Political and Economic Significance
Political Significance
Freeman asserts that virtual currencies have
“provoked much political debate” (though he identifies no
specific example of it), and by this assertion seems to suggest
that political debate equates to political significance. As
best we can tell, he relies on his account of the legislative
history of Section 5330 (which we’ve just explained only
shows Congress’s approval of FinCEN’s regulation of
virtual currencies) rather than on any meaningful or
controversial legislative flashpoint that might call into
question Congress’s intent to regulate virtual currencies.
To his nebulous “provoked much political debate” political
significance contention, Freeman, in his reply brief, adds a
federalism concern—that FinCEN’s regulation of virtual
currencies “intrudes into an area that is the particular
domain of state law.” See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 594 U.S.
at 764. We think this after–thought argument is likely
50a
Appendix A
waived, given that he had every reason to make it in his
opening brief. 26 United States v. Tosi, 897 F.3d 12, 15 (1st
Cir. 2018) (“[A]rguments available at the outset but raised
for the first time in a reply brief need not be considered.”).
Even if we were to give him the courtesy of the doubt, his
only support for this federalism proposition is a single
sentence from a Congressional Research Service report
indicating that “[m]oney transmitters are regulated and
licensed at the state level.” See Andrew P. Scott, Cong.
Rsch. Serv., R46486, Telegraphs, Steamships, and Virtual
Currency: An Analysis of Money Transmitter Regulation
1 n.1 (2020). That federal and state anti–money laundering
regulatory regimes might co–exist hardly demonstrates
that the registration requirement is “significantly
alter[ing] the balance between federal and state power
and the power of the Government over private property”
in the same manner as an eviction moratorium. See Ala.
Ass’n of Realtors, 594 U.S. at 764 (reasoning that “the
landlord–tenant relationship” is a “particular domain
of state law” upon which eviction moratorium intrudes).
Accordingly, we see no indication that when FinCEN
began regulating virtual currencies in 2013, it was acting
on a question of vast political significance.
26. Freeman claims that this argument properly responds to
the government’s assertion that he had not made any showing of
an intrusion into the particular domain of state law and is thus a
proper subject for a reply brief. See Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d
20, 27 (1st Cir
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