Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ian Freeman, fka Ian Bernard, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefDec 22, 2025

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No. 25In the

Supreme Court of the United States

IAN FREEMAN, F/K/A IAN BERNARD,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the First Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Richard Guerriero

Counsel of Record

Oliver Bloom

Lothstein Guerriero, PLLC

Chamberlain Block Building

39 Central Square, Suite 202

Keene, NH 03431

(603) 352-5000

richard@nhdefender.com

Attorneys for Petitioner

131741

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the federal agency FinCEN exceed the authority

granted in 2001 by Congress in 31 U.S.C. § 5330 to regulate

money transmitting businesses when FinCEN interpreted

one word in that statute – “funds” – as authority to require

sellers of bitcoin and other virtual currencies prior to 2021

to register with FinCEN, when virtual currency was not

invented until 2008 and when Congress did not amend

the statute to capture virtual currencies until 2021, after

they had become financial instruments of great political

and economic significance?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner, Ian Freeman, was the defendant in the

District Court for New Hampshire and appellant in the

First Circuit.

Respondent, the United States, was plaintiff in the

District Court for New Hampshire and appellee in the

First Circuit.

iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from the following proceedings:

• United States v. Freeman, No. 23-1839, 147 F.4th 1

(1st Cir. 2025) (affirming district court’s judgment).

• United States v. Freeman, No. 23-1839 (1st Cir.

Sept. 22, 2025) (denying petition for rehearing).

• United States v. Freeman, No. 21-cr-41-JL (D.N.H.

Feb. 9, 2024) (amended district court judgment).

• United States v. Freeman, 688 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.N.H.

2023) (denying motion to dismiss).

There are no other proceedings in state or federal trial or

appellate courts, or in this Court, directly related to this

case within the meaning of this Court’s Rule 14.1(b)(iii).

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . 2

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . . 8

I.

FinCEN’s Assertion of Authority to

Regulate Virtual Currency Is Based

on One Word Written by Congress

Before Virtual Currency Was Invented . . . . . . 8

v

Table of Contents

Page

II.

The Major Questions Doctrine Applies

to this Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

III.

Virtual Currency Is a New and Unique

Financial Instrument of Great Social and

Political Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

IV.

The Requirement of a License to Sell Virtual

Currency Has a Major Impact on the

National and World Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

V.

A Colorable Tex tual A rg ument Is

Not Enough to Overcome the Major

Questions Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

VI.

If Virtual Currency Was Already Captured

by the 2001 Version of Section 5330,

Congress Would Not Have Needed to

Add Language in 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

VII.

FinCEN Admitted that It Had to

Expand Its Author ity Beyond the

Statutory Language to Capture Virtual

Currency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

VIII. The First Circuit Made Other Significant

Errors in Its Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

A. Bitcoin is Not Like Hawala . . . . . . . . . . . 32

vi

Table of Contents

Page

B. Bostock Does Not Support the First

Circuit’s Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

vii

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 29, 2025 . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST

CIRCUIT, FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2025 . . . . . 74a

APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,

FILED AUGUST 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76a

APPENDIX D — AMENDED JUDGMENT OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,

FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115a

APPENDIX E — EXCERPTS OF THE TRANSCRIPT

FOR THE MOTION HEA RING, DATED

SEPTEMBER 1, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134a

APPENDIX F — EXCERPTS OF THE TRANSCRIPT

FOR THE SENTENCING HEARING, DATED

SEPTEMBER 11, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142a

APPENDIX G — RELEVANT STATUTORY

PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156a

viii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton,

581 U.S. 468 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan,

452 U.S. 490 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc.,

87 F.4th 1003 (9th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Bostock v. Clayton County,

590 U.S. 644 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 35

Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,

562 U.S. 223 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Burdon Cent. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Payne,

167 U.S. 127 (1897) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

CFTC v. McDonnell,

287 F. Supp. 3d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . 15, 19

City of Chicago v. Fulton,

592 U.S. 154 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Coinbase, Inc. v. SEC,

126 F.4th 175 (3d Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Doe v. Chao,

540 U.S. 614 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 23, 28-29

Gonzales v. Oregon,

546 U.S. 243 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17

Kansas v. United States Dep’t of Educ.,

739 F. Supp. 3d 902 (D. Kan. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Kansas v. United States Dep’t of Educ.,

No. 24-4041-JWB, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116479

(D. Kan. July 2, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

King v. Burwell,

576 U.S. 473 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 27

Kleiman v. Wright,

No. 18-CV-80176, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216417

(S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Kovac v. Wray,

660 F. Supp. 3d 555 (N.D. Tex. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Kungys v. United States,

485 U.S. 759 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Louisiana v. EEOC,

784 F. Supp. 3d 886 (W.D. La. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

x

Cited Authorities

Page

Luvian v. Bondi,

No. 25-cv-04035-TLT, 2025 LX 191488

(N.D. Cal. June 7, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,

143 U.S. 649 (1892) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.

American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,

512 U.S. 218 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,

583 U.S. 109 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 27

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,

442 U.S. 330 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Parlane Sportswear Co. v. Weinberger,

513 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Pulsifer v. United States,

601 U.S. 124 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Purl v. United States HHS,

787 F. Supp. 3d 284 (N.D. Tex. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

xi

Cited Authorities

Page

Rumsfeld v.

Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc.,

547 U.S. 47 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

SEC v.

Trendon T. Shavers & Bitcoin Sav. & Trust,

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194382

(E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Solid Waste Agency v.

United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,

531 U.S. 159 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,

585 U.S. 162 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Stone v. INS,

514 U.S. 386 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Sullivan v. Finkelstein,

496 U.S. 617 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

TikTok Inc. v. Garland,

604 U.S. 56 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

United States v. Faiella,

39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

United States v. Harmon,

474 F. Supp. 3d 76 (D.D.C. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 23

xii

Cited Authorities

Page

United States v. Lord,

915 F.3d 1009 (5th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

United States v. Murgio,

209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

United States v. Sterlingov,

719 F. Supp. 3d 65 (D.C.C. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

United States v. Ulbricht,

858 F.3d 71 (9th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A.,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 22, 24, 28

Van Loon v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury,

122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Wayman v. Southard,

23 U.S. 1 (1825) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

West Virginia v. E.P.A.,

597 U.S. 697 (2022) . . . . . . . . . 12, 13, 16, 18, 23, 24, 28

Whitman v. American Trucking Assns, Inc.,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 24

Zietzke v. United States,

426 F. Supp. 3d 758 (W.D. Wash. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . 21

xiii

Cited Authorities

Page

Statutes, Rules and Regulations

18 U.S.C. § 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

18 U.S.C. §1960(b)(1)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 8

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

31 U.S.C. § 5330 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5, 8-12, 18, 24-26, 29, 34

31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 11

31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Other Authorities

Bitcoin to USD Chart, https://coinmarketcap.

c o m /c u r r e n c i e s / bit c oi n / ( l a s t v i s it e d

Dec. 17, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,

Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households

in 2021 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing,

and Counterfeiting Act of 2019, S. 1883,

116th Cong. (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

xiv

Cited Authorities

Page

Crypto Crime in Context: Breaking Down the

Illicit Activity in Digital Assets: Hearing before

the House Subcommittee on Digital Assets,

Financial Technology and Inclusion, 118th

Cong. 11 (2023) (statement of Jane Khodarkovsky),

https://perma.cc/9Y9H-3QGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31-32

Himamauli Das, Prepared Remarks of FinCEN

Acting Director Him Das, Delivered Virtually

at the Amer ican Bankers Association/

American Bar Association Financial Crimes

Enforcement Conference, FinCen (2022),

https://perma.cc/VL3M-4GM9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Depa r t ment of Just ice: Bin an ce an d

CEO Pl e a d G ui l ty t o Fe d e r a l

C h a r g e s i n $ 4 B R e s o l u t i o n ( 2 0 2 3) ,

https://perma.cc/6PJ5-3726 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-20

Exec. Order No. 14178, 90 Fed. Reg. 8647 (2025) . . . . . 16

Exec. Order No. 14331, 90 Fed. Reg. 38925 (2025) . . . 22

FinCEN Advisory 33, Informal Value Transfer

Systems (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

FinCEN, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to

Certain Business Models Involving Convertible

Virtual Currencies, FIN–2019–G001 (2019) . . . . . . 30

xv

Cited Authorities

Page

FinCEN, FIN–2013–G001, Application of FinCEN’s

Reg ulations to Persons Administering,

Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies

(2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

FinCEN Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 6411,

115th Cong. (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

FinCEN Improvement Act of 2019, H.R. 1414,

116th Cong. (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

H.R. Rep. No. 107-250 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 33

Illicit Use of Virtual Currency and the Law

Enforcement Response: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Terrorism and Illicit Fin. of the H.

Comm. on Fin. Servs. 115th Cong. 9 (2018) . . . . . . 30

Improving Laundering Laws and Increasing

Comprehensive Information Tracking of

Criminal Activity in Shell Holdings Act, S. 2563,

116th Cong. (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Kimberly Kruesi, Trump calls for US to be ‘crypto

capital of the planet’ in appeal to Nashville

bitcoin conference, Associated Press (2024),

https://perma.cc/7NSA-Y2FQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Gideon Lewis-Kraus, Has Bitcoin’s Elusive Creator

Finally Been Unmasked? New Yorker (2024),

https://perma.cc/7ACM-2XFK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 21

xvi

Cited Authorities

Page

David W. Perkins, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45427,

Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money

and Selected Policy Issues (2020) . . . . . . . . 10, 14, 18

The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency:

Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ.

Pol’y and Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Trade

and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.,

and Urban Affs., 113th Cong. 8 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . 30

A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Staff of H. Comm. On Fin. Services, Operation Choke

Point 2.0: Biden’s Debanking of Digital Assets

(2025), https://perma.cc/8CTW-MRA2 . . . . . . . . . . 22

Terrorism and Digit. Fin.: How Tech. is Changing

the Threat Before H. Subcomm. on Intelligence

and Counter ter ror ism, 117th Cong. 14

(2021) (statement of John Eisert, Assistant

Director, Department of Homeland Security),

https://perma.cc/TGW2-VUJE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub.

L. No. 116–283 § 6102(a)(3), § 6102(d)(2)(A),

134 Stat. 3388 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Today’s Cryptocurrency Prices by Market

Cap, https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited

Dec. 17, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

xvii

Cited Authorities

Page

United States Census Bureau, CB21-208, New

Vintage 2021 Population Estimates Available for

the Nation, States and Puerto Rico (2021) . . . . . 18-19

Un it i ng a nd St r eng t hen i ng A me r ic a by

Providing Appropriate Tools Required to

Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA

PATRIOT) Act Of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56

§ 359(b), 115 Stat. 272 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Ian Freeman, respectfully requests a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is available at

147 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025). Pet. App.1a-73a.1 The court

of appeals’ order denying rehearing is unreported. Pet.

App.74a-75a. The opinion of the district court denying

the motion to dismiss is available at 688 F. Supp. 3d 1

(D.N.H. 2023). Pet.App.76a-114a. The district court’s oral

judgments denying the motion to dismiss are unreported.

Pet.App.134a-41a, 142a-55a. The district court’s amended

judgment of conviction and sentence is unreported. Pet.

App.115a-33a.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on July 29,

2025, and denied rehearing on September 22, 2025. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

1. “C.A.App.#” refers to the Appendix filed in United States

v. Freeman, 23-1839 (July 29, 2025). “Pet.App.#a” refers to the

Appendix filed with this petition. “App.Reply.Br.#” and “Gov.

Br.#” refer to petitioner’s reply brief and the government’s brief

in United States v. Freeman, 23-1839 (July 29, 2025). “D.Ct.Dkt.#”

refers to the district court docket.

2

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The relevant versions of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and 31 U.S.C.

§ 5330 are reproduced in the appendix to this petition.

Pet.App.156a-62a.

INTRODUCTION

A federal criminal statute, 18 USC § 1960(b)(1)(B),

makes it a crime to fail to register a money transmitting

business with the Department of the Treasury. “Money

transmitting business” is defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)

(1)(A). The version of that statute that Congress enacted

in 2001, and which was effective until 2021, included

within the definition of a “money transmitting business”

businesses which engaged in the “transmission of funds.”

In 2021, Congress expanded the statute beyond “funds”

to capture businesses engaged in the transmission of

“currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency.”

Between 2016 and 2021, Ian Freeman sold bitcoin

for profit. He did not register as a money transmitting

business with FinCEN, a regulatory agency within

Treasury. The government charged Freeman with

the crimes of conspiring to and failing to register as a

money transmitting business. Everyone agreed that the

2001 version of 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) applied to the

prosecution. Freeman moved to dismiss the charges on

the grounds that the word “funds” in the 2001 statute did

not give FinCEN the regulatory authority to require him

to register as a money transmitting business. The district

court denied Freeman’s motion and the First Circuit

affirmed the district court.

3

The Court should grant this petition for a writ of

certiorari. Regulatory agencies only have the power

granted to them by Congress. Moreover, when an

agency’s assertion of authority affects important political

or social issues or vast areas of the economy, the major

questions doctrine requires a clear showing that Congress

intended to grant that authority. Here, FinCEN’s claim

of regulatory authority to license sellers of virtual

currency is not supported by clear statutory authority

from Congress. Virtual currency did not exist when

Congress passed the applicable version of 31 U.S.C. § 5330.

Virtual currency came about because of revolutionary

new technology which created financial instruments

free from the involvement of any government. And it has

become a multi-trillion-dollar part of the global economy.

This Court’s cases regarding major questions and other

principles of statutory interpretation require reversal

of the First Circuit’s decision. Congress did not, when it

wrote the word “funds” in 2001, foresee the invention of

virtual currency, its importance, and its massive growth,

and intend to prospectively authorize FinCEN to regulate

sellers of virtual currency like Freeman.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 2002, Ian Freeman created a libertarian radio

talk show called “Free Talk Live.” C.A.App.1907, 1913.

Freeman created the show for political and philosophical

reasons—because he thought other talk shows were too

controlling and did not allow callers or guests to speak

freely and disagree with each other. Id. at 1908. See also

Pet.App.1a-2a. Beginning in 2006, Freeman and others

broadcast the show on the internet from Keene, New

Hampshire. The show was eventually syndicated on 180

radio stations. C.A.App.1907.

4

When Freeman learned about bitcoin in 2010-2011, he

realized that it could help promote his views on freedom.

In his words, bitcoin allows “individuals to control their

own finances without the involvement of some centralized

so-called authority.” Id. at 1911. In 2014, to promote his

views, Freeman began selling bitcoin, first via bitcoin

vending machines, and subsequently on LocalBitcoins.

com and via Telegram. Id. at 1916-20, 1925, 1972; Pet.

App.2a, 5a.

The FBI and other government agencies began

investigating Freeman in 2017. C.A.App.609. The

government monitored Freeman’s comments on Free Talk

Live. Id. at 2027-29, 2055-57. It also installed telephone

pole cameras and surveilled the home in Keene, where

Freeman lived with his girlfriend and friends. Id. at

652-55. The government investigated Freeman’s sales

of bitcoin. Id. at 364-407, 418-30, 434-76, 482-505, 610.

The government discovered that Freeman, by his own

account, was selling bitcoin without having registered

with the Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network

(FinCEN), the Treasury bureau that claimed authority to

regulate sales of bitcoin as a money transmitting business

under 31 U.S.C. § 5330. The government also discovered

that some purchasers of bitcoin from Freeman were the

victims of romance scams or other fraudulent activities

perpetrated not by Freeman, but by third parties. Pet.

App.81a; C.A.App.1453-54.

On March 15, 2021, the government indicted Freeman

and others for conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money

transmitting business, operation of an unlicensed money

transmitting business, conspiracy to commit wire fraud,

six counts of wire fraud, continuing financial crimes

5

enterprise, and money laundering. C.A.App 61-69. The

next day, the government obtained a search warrant and

raided Freeman’s home at 6:00 a.m. Id. at 658, 664, 1990.

Approximately twenty-five government agents, including

a SWAT team, participated. Id. at 696. The agents were

armed with tactical gear, assault rifles, two Bearcat

armored vehicles (one armed with a battering ram), and at

least one “flash bang” grenade. Id. at 657-58, 697, 1542-45.

Freeman and those in his home, including his girlfriend,

were asleep and surprised by the raid. Id. at 1989-91.

They exited the home at gunpoint, in night clothes, some

carrying their pets. Id. at 1991-92. There were firearms

in the home, but there was no resistance or violence by

Freeman or the others. Id. at 667, 670, 678, 1575.

Over the following months, all the defendants except

Freeman and one co-defendant made plea bargains. Id.

at 26-27. When Freeman and the other co-defendant

did not make plea bargains, the government brought a

superseding indictment. Id. at 70-88. That indictment

dropped the wire fraud counts and the continuing criminal

enterprise count. However, the superseding indictment

repeated the charges of operating, and conspiring to

operate, an unlicensed money transmitting business. Id.

at 89-111. The superseding indictment also charged one

count of money laundering, one count of money laundering

conspiracy, and several tax evasion counts. Id.

Freeman moved to dismiss the unlicensed money

transmitting business counts on the grounds that, during

the relevant time frame in the superseding indictment,

Congress had not authorized any federal agency to require

the registration of bitcoin sellers under 31 U.S.C. § 5330.

Pet.App.8a, 76a-77a; C.A.App.89-113. The government

6

objected to the motion. C.A.App.114-34. The district court

sided with the government and denied the motion. Pet.

App.134a-41a. See also id. at 76a-114a; 142a-55a.

Freeman’s jury trial lasted eleven days. Much of the

government’s evidence focused on proving that Freeman

sold bitcoin, a fact he did not deny. C.A.App.1916-19,

1925. Similar testimony documented that Freeman had

not registered as a money transmitting business with

FinCEN, which Freeman also admitted. Id. at 565-66,

572-78, 874, 911, 1563.

In support of the money laundering charges, the

government asserted that Freeman knew some of the

bitcoin he sold was being purchased by scam victims at

the behest of scammers. Pet.App.5a-6a. The government

had some alleged victims testify to being duped by

scammers into purchasing bitcoin. See, e.g., Pet.App.81a;

C.A.App.1140-57. The government claimed that Freeman

was willfully blind and was, as a result, helping scammers

launder money and defraud victims. C.A.App.2101-02. The

government claimed that alleged victims were especially

vulnerable because of their age and lack of familiarity with

the internet or virtual currency. See, e.g., id. at 320, 2096.

In support of the tax evasion charges, the government

claimed that Freeman owed but did not pay taxes on the

money he made selling bitcoin. Pet.App.56a-57a.

In his defense, Freeman pointed out that only one

percent of his bitcoin sales were questioned by the

government. C.A.App.1527, 1942-44, 2061. He showed

that he operated under his own name, not anonymously

or under a fake name. C.A.App.365, 515, 527, 538. He also

showed that he went to great lengths to document his

7

bitcoin sales and the identities of the buyers, preserving

that information for later inspection. C.A.App.1386-1453.

Freeman noted that, despite his efforts, it was the alleged

scam victims who sometimes lied to him, C.A.App.509-10,

1194-95, 1324, 1487-88, 1599, 1663-64, and who continued

their activities after having been warned of the risk of

fraud. C.A.App.1227-29, 1305-06.

At the conclusion of the trial, the district court’s jury

instructions included that the jury should find Freeman

guilty on the unlicensed money transmitting charges

if he knowingly operated a business which sold bitcoin,

and conspired with others to do so, while failing to

register with FinCEN as a money transmitting business.

C.A.App.2184-91. This instruction was the natural

consequence of the judge having rejected Freeman’s

pretrial argument that Congress had not authorized

licensing bitcoin sellers by FinCEN.

Freeman was convicted on all counts. C.A.App.2234-36.

He had moved orally under Rule 29 for a judgment of

acquittal as to each count at the end of the prosecution’s

case-in-chief, and he renewed the motion at the end of the

defense’s case. Id. at 1793, 1801-03, 1815-20, 2091. The

district court granted Freeman’s motion for a judgment of

acquittal under Rule 29 with respect to money laundering

but denied the motion as to the other counts. Pet.App.113a.

Freeman was sentenced to a total of 96 months in prison.

Id. at 118a.

Freeman appealed to the First Circuit. He focused

his attack on the money transmitting charges, arguing

spillover prejudice and insufficient evidence as to the other

charges. The First Circuit rejected Freeman’s arguments

8

and affirmed his convictions. Freeman now seeks review

by this Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The First Circuit decided an important question

of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled

by this Court, and the First Circuit did so in a manner

which conflicts with principles of law stated by the Court

in other relevant cases. As he had in the district court,

Freeman argued to the First Circuit that the 2001 version

of 31 U.S.C. § 5330 did not authorize any federal agency

to require the registration of businesses selling bitcoin.

Freeman explained that Congress could not have, by

the use of the single word “funds” in the 2001 version of

section 5330, anticipated the invention of, and authorized

the regulation of, virtual currency sellers by a federal

agency many years later. To the contrary, this Court’s

major questions doctrine, the history of virtual currency,

the history of section 5330, and principles of statutory

interpretation, all show that FinCEN unilaterally

expanded its authority to require registration of virtual

currency sellers without authorization from Congress.

I.

FinCEN’s Assertion of Authority to Regulate

Virtual Currency Is Based on One Word Written

by Congress Before Virtual Currency Was

Invented.

Freeman was convicted of operating and conspiring

to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B). Pet.App.116a. That

statute prohibits the operation of a money transmitting

business that “fails to comply with the money transmitting

9

business registration requirements under section 5330

of title 31, United States Code, or regulations prescribed

under such section.” Id. at 156a. Thirty-one U.S.C. § 5330

requires the “registration” of “money transmitting

businesses” with the Secretary of the Treasury. Pet.

App.158a.

Congress has changed the definition of a “money

transmitting business” over time. In 2001, the USA

PATRIOT Act amended 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) to

provide that “money transmitting business” means any

business which,

…provides check cashing, currency exchange,

or money transmitting or remittance services,

or issues or redeems money orders, travelers’

checks, and other similar instruments or any

other person who engages as a business in the

transmission of funds, including any person who

engages as a business in an informal money

transfer system or any network of people who

engage as a business in facilitating the transfer

of money domestically or internationally outside

of the conventional financial institutions system;

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct

Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act Of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756 § 359(b), 115 Stat. 272, 328 (2001) (underline added).

See also Pet.App.12a, 24a. The 2001 definition of a “money

transmitting business,” was in effect for nearly twenty

years. Pet.App.12a-13a.

10

Virtual currency did not exist when Congress

adopted the 2001 version of 31 U.S.C. § 5330. The first

virtual currency, bitcoin, was invented in 2008. David

W. Perkins, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45427, Cryptocurrency:

The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues

1 (2020); Pet.App.3a- 4a n. 2. FinCEN only began

attempting to regulate virtual currency sellers as

money transmitting businesses in 2013. Pet.App.25a. See

generally, Registration of money service businesses, 31

C.F.R. § 1022.380, and https://www.fincen.gov.

In Public Law 116–283, effective January 1, 2021,

Congress for the first time acted to bring sellers of virtual

currencies within the scope of the registration requirement

of 31 U.S.C. § 5330. Congress found that “although the use

and trading of virtual currencies are legal practices, some

terrorists and criminals, including transnational criminal

organizations, seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the global

financial system and increasingly rely on substitutes for

currency, including emerging payment methods (such

as virtual currencies), to move illicit funds.” William M.

(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116–283 § 6102(a)(3), 134

Stat. 3388, 4552 (2021). Pet.App.12a. Based on this finding,

Congress added language to include money transmitting

businesses which deal in virtual currency. Subsection

6102(d)(2)(A) replaced the word “funds” with the words

“currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency”

so that the statute now reads:

(1) Money transmitting business. The term

“money transmitting business” means

any business other than the United States

Postal Service which—

11

(A) provides check cashing, currency

exchange, or money transmitting or

remittance services, or issues or redeems

money orders, travelers’ checks, and

other similar instruments or any other

person who engages as a business in the

transmission of currency, funds, or value

that substitutes for currency, including

any person who engages as a business in

an informal money transfer system or any

network of people who engage as a business

in facilitating the transfer of money

domestically or internationally outside

of the conventional financial institutions

system;

31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) (underline added). The

emphasized language in this version—“or value that

substitutes for currency”—which became effective in 2021,

was not in any prior version of the statute.

The applicable time frame for Freeman’s charges of

operating and conspiring to operate an unlicensed money

transmitting business is from 2016 to 2021. Pet.App.8a.

By all accounts, the version of 31 U.S.C. § 5330 that was

in effect from 2001 until January 1, 2021, applies to this

case. Id. at 12a-13a n.8. That version refers to “funds”

and does not include the expansive phrase “or value that

substitutes for currency.”

The lower courts concluded that FinCEN had

authority, based solely on the word “funds” in section

5330, to require the registration of sellers of bitcoin and

other virtual currencies after it was invented in 2008.

12

Pet.App.14a-15a, 85a-87a. The government and the lower

courts are wrong. A fair reading of the statute consistent

with the Court’s major questions doctrine and other

principles of statutory interpretation require a finding

that FinCEN reached beyond the power granted to it in

the 2001 version of section 5330.

II.

The Major Questions Doctrine Applies to this

Case.

“Agencies have only those powers given to them by

Congress[.]” West Virginia v. E.P.A., 597 U.S. 697, 723

(2022). Moreover, when an agency claims great power, this

Court’s rules of statutory interpretation require a clear

indication in the law that Congress intended to grant the

agency that power. As explained by the Court:

[T]here are “extraordinary cases” that call

for a different approach—cases in which the

“history and the breadth of the authority that

[the agency] has asserted,” and the “economic

and political significance” of that assertion,

provide a “reason to hesitate before concluding

that Congress” meant to confer such authority.

Id. at 721 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000)). See also Loper Bright

Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 405 (2024); Utility Air

Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (“We

expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign

to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political

significance.’”) (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at

160); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485-86 (2015). In such

cases, this Court has adopted a “major questions” doctrine

to rein in “agencies asserting highly consequential power

13

beyond what Congress could reasonably be understood to

have granted.” W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724.

As explained by Justice Gorsuch, the major questions

doctrine protects the Constitution’s separation of

powers. W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 737 (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring). Justice Gorsuch noted that “in Article

I, the People vested all federal legislative powers in

a Congress.” Id. (cleaned up). Therefore, “‘important

subjects…must be entirely regulated by the legislature

itself,’ even if Congress may leave the Executive ‘to act

under such general provisions to fill up the details.’” Id.

(quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825)). Ensuring

that legislation comes from Congress and not from

agencies of the Executive branch “is ‘vital to the integrity

and maintenance of the system of government ordained

by the Constitution.’” W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 737

(quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692

(1892)) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

This is a major questions case. An examination of

the history and the breadth of the regulatory authority

asserted, and the economic and political significance

of that assertion, provide a “reason to hesitate” before

concluding that Congress intended to authorize FinCEN

to require registration of virtual currency sellers before

virtual currency was ever invented.

III.

Virtual Currency Is a New and Unique Financial

Instrument of Great Social and Political

Importance.

There was never a financial instrument like bitcoin

before its invention in 2008. It was the first virtual

14

currency. Perkins, supra, at 1. Like other virtual

currencies, bitcoin is “a decentralized form of electronic or

digital currency that exists only on the [i]nternet.” United

States v. Harmon, 474 F. Supp. 3d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2020)

(quoting United States v. Lord, 915 F.3d 1009, 1013 n.1 (5th

Cir. 2019) and collecting cases). Bitcoin depends on public

ledgers and blockchain technology to validate changes

to the ledgers and prevent improper manipulation of the

ledgers. Perkins, supra, at 7; Pet.App.4a; see generally

Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc., 87 F.4th 1003, 1007 (9th Cir.

2023). Each transaction “is publicly viewable forever.”

Van Loon v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 122

F.4th 549, 554 (5th Cir. 2024). Bitcoin and other virtual

currencies are “pseudonymous—but at the same time, all

transactions are completely transparent.” United States v.

Sterlingov, 719 F. Supp. 3d 65, 70 (D.C.C. 2024) (quotation

and citation omitted).

Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are not issued

by any government or bank. Pet.App.3a; Bielski, 87 F.4th

at 1007. In addition, while money historically has either

“intrinsic value or derived value from government decree,”

virtual currencies like bitcoin “employ user agreement, a

network of users, and cryptographic protocols to achieve

valid transfers of value.” Perkins, supra, at i.

The First Circuit wrongly discounted Freeman’s

arguments about the political significance of virtual

currency. Pet.App.23a n.15, 49a, 54a. Bitcoin exists on

the internet by virtue of new technology and its users,

not by the blessing of a government or some other central

authority. Transactions are secured and verified on the

blockchain and are publicly visible to any person online.

Cryptographic protocols and user agreement provide a

15

new kind of value that is not dependent on government

decree or intrinsic worth. Thus, bitcoin gives its users the

freedom and security to conduct financial transactions

without the involvement of a government or any other

entity. For many people, including Mr. Freeman, whose

life had been dedicated to promoting his views of freedom,

the invention of virtual currency has been uniquely

empowering and liberating.

Lower courts have recognized the view that virtual

currency is a new technology with transformative

capabilities. Virtual currency proponents believe the

technology “will serve to enhance future economic

efficiency and have a broad and lasting impact on global

financial markets in payments, banking, securities

settlement, title recording, cyber security, and trade

reporting and analysis.” CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp.

3d 313, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (cleaned up). See also Coinbase,

Inc. v. SEC, 126 F.4th 175, 207-09 (3d Cir. 2025) (Bibas,

J., concurring) (discussing the various uses of virtual

currencies). People of certain political ideologies are

drawn to “a completely decentralized currency, operating

free of nation states or central banks.” United States v.

Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 83 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017).

Even the President has recognized the significance

of virtual currency and touted it as a path to economic

liberty. President Trump said he wants to make the United

States the “crypto capital of the planet.” Kimberly Kruesi,

Trump calls for US to be ‘crypto capital of the planet’ in

appeal to Nashville bitcoin conference, Associated Press

(2024), https://perma.cc/7NSA-Y2FQ. Soon after taking

office, President Trump issued an executive order “to

promote United States leadership in digital assets and

16

financial technology while protecting economic liberty[.]”

Exec. Order No. 14178, 90 Fed. Reg. 8647 (2025). That

order explained that the “digital asset industry plays a

crucial role in innovation and economic development in the

United States[.]” Id. It is therefore the policy of the Trump

Administration “to support the responsible growth and

use of digital assets, blockchain technology, and related

technologies across all sectors of the economy, including

by… protecting and promoting the ability of individual

citizens and private-sector entities alike to access and

use for lawful purposes open public blockchain networks

without persecution[.]” Id.

If these are the views of the President of the United

States, that virtual currency is “crucial” to economic

development and liberty, how can the question of whether

FinCEN was authorized to require registration of sellers

of virtual currency not be a question of great social and

political importance?

This Court has never said that the measure of whether

a case presents a major question is purely quantitative in

the sense of the number of people affected or the dollar

value of the financial interests affected. To the contrary,

there is no one factor by which the Court measures

political and social concerns to determine whether a

“major question” is presented. As this Court has said,

major questions cases “have arisen from all corners of

the administrative state” W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721.

For example, in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006),

the focus was not on the number of people affected

or the implications for some part of the economy, but

rather on an important and often debated social issue.

The question was whether the Attorney General of the

17

United States could rescind the license of any physician

who prescribed drugs for assisted suicide. Id. at 248-49.

The only proffered basis for that claim of authority was a

statute passed by Congress permitting the revocation of

licenses “inconsistent with the public interest.” Id. at 261.

The Court found that the “idea that Congress gave [the

AG] such broad and unusual authority through an implicit

delegation…is not sustainable.” Id. at 267. Furthermore,

the Court said that a “claimed delegation” is “all the more

suspect” when it relates to issues of “earnest and profound

debate.” Id.

Similarly, the principles set forth by this Court have

led lower courts to find that major questions of political

significance include “student loan cancellation, pandemic

eviction moratoriums, the disposal of nuclear waste, and

diversity requirements on corporate boards.” Purl v.

United States HHS, 787 F. Supp. 3d 284, 322 (N.D. Tex.

2025) (collecting cases). Reproductive health care has

been said to be a matter of great significance. Id. at 323;

Louisiana v. EEOC, 784 F. Supp. 3d 886 (W.D. La. 2025).

So too have been questions related to gender identity. See,

e.g., Kansas v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 739 F. Supp.

3d 902 (D. Kan. 2024). As well as immigration status.

Luvian v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-04035-TLT, 2025 LX 191488,

at *10-14 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2025). And the TSA terrorist

watchlist. Kovac v. Wray, 660 F. Supp. 3d 555, 565 (N.D.

Tex. 2023).

Just this year, the Court noted that “new technologies

with transformative capabilities…counsel[] caution on

our part.” TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U.S. 56, 62 (2025)

(per curiam). That warning applies here. The political

and social significance of a new technology in the form

18

of bitcoin and other virtual currencies require the Court

to exercise caution, consistent with the major questions

doctrine. FinCEN should not have presumed that one word

written in 2001 gave it the authority years later to regulate

a unique, new financial instrument which gives its users

unprecedented financial freedom. FinCEN’s presumption

is an example of the “recurring problem” described in W.

Virginia v. EPA. 597 U.S. at 724, wherein a federal agency

claims for itself “a highly consequential power beyond

what Congress could reasonably be understood to have

granted.” Id. This Court should step in, when the lower

courts have not, to rein in the unauthorized assertion of

regulatory authority.

IV.

The Requirement of a License to Sell Virtual

Currency Has a Major Impact on the National

and World Economies.

While the determination of whether this is a major

questions case does not depend on any quantitative

measure, the economic impact of requiring virtual

currency sellers to be licensed cannot be ignored. Virtual

currency is now a huge part of the national and world

economies. “Since 2009, cryptocurrencies have gone from

little-known, niche technological curiosities to rapidly

proliferating financial instruments that are the subject

of intense public interest.” Perkins, supra, at 1. By 2020,

the year before Congress amended section 5330, according

to a 2021 Federal Reserve analysis, approximately 12

percent of U.S. adults (roughly 31 million Americans)

“held or used cryptocurrencies in the prior year.” Board

of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Economic

Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2021 45 (2022); United

States Census Bureau, CB21-208, New Vintage 2021

19

Population Estimates Available for the Nation, States

and Puerto Rico (2021).

The value of the virtual currency sector of the

economy has also grown tremendously. Between July 2010

(the earliest date for available data) and the filing of the

motion to dismiss, July 29, 2022, the price of one bitcoin

grew from approximately 6 cents to nearly $24,000, and

the overall market capitalization grew from less than

$200,000 to approximately $450 billion. Bitcoin to USD

Chart, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/

(last visited Dec. 17, 2025). See generally McDonnell,

287 F. Supp. 3d at 218-19. The total market capitalization

for all virtual currencies is now close to $3 trillion.

Today’s Cryptocurrency Prices by Market Cap, https://

coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2025). Thus, in

a little over fifteen years, virtual currencies went from

not existing to being a multi-trillion-dollar part of the

economy. As a 2024 news story explained, bitcoin is now

“the world’s tenth most valuable asset” and its “market

capitalization, about $1.2 trillion, ranks between those of

Meta and Berkshire Hathaway.” Gideon Lewis-Kraus,

Has Bitcoin’s Elusive Creator Finally Been Unmasked?

New Yorker (2024), https://perma.cc/7ACM-2XFK.

The government has recognized, in other contexts,

the economic significance of virtual currency exchanges.

In the Binance case, the government touted a virtual

currency exchange’s guilty plea to money laundering

and unlicensed money transmitting charges, pointing

out how “U.S. consumers… conducted trillions of dollars

in transactions on the platform, generating over $1.6

billion in profit” for the exchange. Department of Justice:

Binance and CEO Plead Guilty to Federal Charges in $4B

20

Resolution (2023), https://perma.cc/6PJ5-3726. Since the

economic impact of that conviction for unlicensed money

transmitting was of great significance to the Department

of Justice, it must also recognize the economic significance

of the same licensing requirement in this case.

The First Circuit did not accept Freeman’s arguments

about the economic significance of virtual currency. It

said that the measure of the economic impact is not the

virtual currency market in general but rather only the

“cost of compliance” with the registration requirement.

According to the First Circuit, the “relevant question…is

whether the cost of complying with FinCEN’s regulation

is so high that we should hesitate before assuming that

FinCEN was permitted to enact such a regulation.”

Pet.App.52a. The First Circuit also said that “FinCEN

has not banned all transactions in virtual currency or

attempted to regulate all users of virtual currency…[i]

nstead, it is simply requiring businesses that transmit

virtual currencies to register.” Id. Thus, the First Circuit

concluded, “FinCEN’s regulation placed no meaningful

economic burden on the industry.” Id. at 53a.

The First Circuit’s conclusions are wrong. In the

first instance, it failed to recognize, as detailed above,

that a primary aim of virtual currency is to give users

the economic freedom to conduct their financial affairs

without the interference of a government or third party.

FinCEN’s unauthorized attempt at regulation has a

significant economic impact because, regardless of cost,

it interferes with the economic freedom of citizens.

Furthermore, the First Circuit’s analysis fails to

recognize the differences between virtual currency and

21

other currencies and the unique role exchanges play in

the circulation and adoption of virtual currency. App.

Reply.Br.16-17. Virtual currency is not acquired in the

same manner as other traditional currency. The only ways

to acquire it are to either receive it from someone or to

“mine it.” Kleiman v. Wright, No. 18-CV-80176, 2018 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 216417, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2018). See

also SEC v. Trendon T. Shavers & Bitcoin Sav. & Trust,

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194382, *16 n.4 (E.D. Tex. Aug.

26, 2014) (describing three ways to obtain bitcoin: mining,

purchasing, or selling something and accepting payment

in bitcoin). The government acknowledges that, since

virtual currencies lack a central authority (like a central

bank) for creation and distribution, the only way to obtain

virtual currencies besides “mining” is to purchase or trade

with someone who already has them, whether through an

exchange, a kiosk, or directly via trade. See Gov.Br.3-4.

As a result of its unique nature, access to the virtual

currency largely depends on exchanges. See Lewis-Kraus,

supra. One government official testified before Congress

in 2021 that “[w]henever monetary exchanges are made,

a chokepoint is created,” before proceeding to discuss

FinCEN’s 2013 guidance and how the government used

that regulatory authority to go after exchanges. Terrorism

and Digit. Fin.: How Tech. is Changing the Threat Before

H. Subcomm. on Intelligence and Counterterrorism,

117th Cong. 14 (2021) (statement of John Eisert, Assistant

Director, Department of Homeland Security), https://

perma.cc/TGW2-VUJE. Cf. Zietzke v. United States,

426 F. Supp. 3d 758, 762 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“Although

cryptocurrency transactions can occur directly between

individuals, those transactions are often handled through

digital currency exchanges.”). Since purchasing virtual

22

currency almost always requires the use of an exchange,

almost all virtual currency transactions are directly

impacted by the regulations unilaterally promulgated

by FinCEN. Moreover, FinCEN’s regulations targeted

not only major exchanges, but also much smaller peerto-peer sellers and businesses, who, as this Court has

recognized in other contexts, are less capable of bearing

the compliance costs. See, e.g., Utility Air, 573 U.S. at

331 n.2; South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. 162, 178

(2018); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.

490, 520 n.37 (1981).

Finally, treating virtual currency exchanges as a

“chokepoint” is part of what the United States House

Committee on Financial Services recently identified

as a “pattern of…prudential regulators abusing their

regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement authorities to

push entities involved in the digital asset ecosystem out

of the U.S. financial system.” Staff of H. Comm. On Fin.

Services, Operation Choke Point 2.0: Biden’s Debanking

of Digital Assets (2025), https://perma.cc/8CTW-MRA2.

A White House Executive Order described “Operation

Choke Point” as “a well-documented and systemic means

by which Federal regulators pushed banks to minimize

their involvement with individuals and companies engaged

in lawful activities and industries disfavored by regulators

based on factors other than individualized, objective, riskbased standards.” Exec. Order No. 14331, 90 Fed. Reg.

38925 (2025).

V.

A Colorable Textual Argument Is Not Enough to

Overcome the Major Questions Issue.

That the ordinary meaning of “funds” now would

include virtual currency does not address Freeman’s

23

objections. From the beginning of his challenge to the

prosecution, Freeman acknowledged that courts have

found that bitcoin falls within the ordinary meaning of

“funds.” Freeman cited those cases for the lower courts.

Pet.App.17a. See, e.g., United States v. Harmon, 474 F.

Supp. 3d 76, 80, 90 (D.D.C. 2020) (collecting cases); United

States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 707 (S.D.N.Y.

2016); United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545

(S.D.N.Y. 2014). Freeman’s argument was never that, in

a dictionary or in common usage, virtual currency would

now fall outside the dictionary definition of “funds.”

Rather, Freeman’s argument is that virtual currency is so

important that courts cannot assume the 2001 Congress

granted regulatory authority based on one word written

before virtual currency was invented.

The Court’s major questions cases directly address

this issue. The West Virginia v. EPA majority noted that,

in each of the major questions cases, there was a “colorable

textual basis” for the assertion of the power to regulate.

597 U.S. at 722. However, merely a colorable textual

basis is insufficient where a major question is involved.

It is simple “common sense” that Congress would not

give an agency great power without detailed and explicit

authorization. Id. at 722-23 (quoting Brown & Williamson,

529 U.S. at 133).

Extraordinary grants of regulatory authority

are rarely accomplished through “modest

words,” “vague terms,” or “subtle devices.”

Whitman v. American Trucking Assns, Inc.,

531 U.S. 457, 468, (2001). Nor does Congress

typically use oblique or elliptical language

to empower an agency to make a “radical or

24

fundamental change” to a statutory scheme.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American

Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229

(1994).

W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723 (cleaned up).

Thus, “separation of powers principles and a practical

understanding of legislative intent,” id., counsel against

interpreting a single word to convey vast power, effectively

finding “elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at

468. A regulatory agency must show “something more

than a merely plausible textual basis.… The agency

instead must point to ‘clear congressional authorization’

for the power it claims.” W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723

(quoting Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 324). Here, such clear

congressional authorization did not come until 2021.

VI.

If Virtual Currency Was Already Captured by the

2001 Version of Section 5330, Congress Would Not

Have Needed to Add Language in 2021.

Congress’s decision to amend 31 U.S.C. § 5330 in 2021

is a good reason to doubt the government’s and the First

Circuit’s reading of the 2001 version of the statute. Both

the amendment and how it happened support Freeman’s

position.

The reaction of Congress to the tremendous growth

of virtual currencies after 2008 was not to assume that

they were already covered by section 5330. Rather,

Congress struggled with deciding how to classify and

regulate virtual currencies. Even after virtual currencies

had become well known, Congress considered and failed

25

to adopt legislation granting regulatory authority to

agencies like FinCEN. For instance, in September 2018,

the House passed H.R. 6411, the “FinCEN Improvement

Act of 2018.” That act would have added the “value that

substitutes for currency.” However, the Senate failed to

pass that legislation in 2018. FinCEN Improvement Act

of 2018, H.R. 6411, 115th Cong. (2018).

In 2019, Congress tried again. The House passed

H.R. 1414, the “FinCEN Improvement Act of 2019,”

but again, it died in the Senate. FinCEN Improvement

Act of 2019, H.R. 1414, 116th Cong. (2019). In the same

year, the Senate tried its own version, S. 1883, the

Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing,

and Counterfeiting Act of 2019, and although it made it

out of committee, it went no further. Combating Money

Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Counterfeiting Act

of 2019, S. 1883, 116th Cong. (2019). Another attempt, S.

2563, the Improving Laundering Laws and Increasing

Comprehensive Information Tracking of Criminal Activity

in Shell Holdings Act, which would have “[e]nsure[d] the

inclusion of currency and future payment systems in the

AML-CFT regime by updating the definition of ‘coins and

currency’ to include digital currency” failed to even make

it out of committee, although its text formed the basis

for the AML provisions of the 2021 NDAA. Improving

Laundering Laws and Increasing Comprehensive

Information Tracking of Criminal Activity in Shell

Holdings Act, S. 2563, 116th Cong. (2019). Only in late

2020 did Congress finally add the language “value that

substitutes for currency” to the law. Pet.App.12a-13a. 2

2. The First Circuit found Congressional acquiescence

from silence to FinCEN’s interpretation of section 5330. Pet.

26

This history shows that, for years, Congress was

aware of the growth of virtual currencies, and that

Congress considered but repeatedly failed to amend the

statute to grant FinCEN regulatory authority over money

transmitters who were selling financial instruments that

qualified as “value that substitutes for currency,” that is,

virtual currency. If the word “funds” in the 2001 version

of section 5330 had already captured virtual currencies

like bitcoin, Congress would not have needed to spend

years deciding whether and how to expand the scope of

the statute.

Drawing this conclusion from the history of virtual

currencies and Congress’s efforts to amend section 5330

is entirely consistent with rules of statutory construction

recognized by the Court. We should presume that the

law was amended in 2021 because Congress thought

the word “funds” did not capture virtual currencies,

and that the additional phrase “or value that substitutes

for currency” was necessary to achieve that goal. As

explained by the Court, “[w]hen Congress acts to amend

a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have

real and substantial effect.” Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397

(1995). The statutory interpretation adopted by the First

Circuit should be rejected because, “[w]hen a statutory

construction thus ‘render[s] an entire subparagraph

meaningless,’ this Court has noted, the canon against

surplusage applies with special force.” Pulsifer v. United

States, 601 U.S. 124, 143 (2024) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.

App.33a-36a. But Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army

Corps of Eng’rs cautions that, “[a]lthough we have recognized

congressional acquiescence to administrative interpretations of

a statute in some situations, we have done so with extreme care.”

531 U.S. 159, 169 (2001).

27

v. Dep’t of Def., 583 U.S. 109, 128 (2018) and citing City

of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U. S. 154, 159 (2021)). Reading

the statute as having already captured virtual currency

in the word “funds” deprives the 2021 amendment of any

real and substantive effect. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for

Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 57-58

(2006) (“We refuse to interpret the Solomon Amendment

in a way that negates its recent revision, and indeed would

render it a largely meaningless exercise.”).

The “surplusage canon” reflects “the presumption

that each word Congress uses is there for a reason.”

Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 581 U.S.

468, 477 (2017) (citing A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174-79 (2012)). “As

this Court has noted time and time again, the Court is

‘obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress

used.’” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 583 U.S. at 128-29 (quoting

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)). See

also Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)

(plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (“the cardinal rule of

statutory interpretation [is] that no provision should be

construed to be entirely redundant”); Burdon Cent. Sugar

Ref. Co. v. Payne, 167 U.S. 127, 142 (1897); Scalia & Garner

174 (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be

given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda). None

should be ignored.”). Congress does not “tend to use terms

that ‘have no operation at all.’” Burwell, 576 U.S. at 502

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5

U.S. 137, 174 (1803)).

The First Circuit criticized Freeman’s argument as

relying on subsequent legislative history, Pet.App.31a34a, but the usual basis for such criticisms, see, e.g.,

28

West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 778-79 (Kagan, J., dissenting)

(quoting Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990)

(Scalia, J., concurring)), is not present here. In this case,

the reference to subsequent legislative history concerns an

agency’s reliance on a prior statute to regulate something

that did not exist at the time of the statute’s passage. The

cases cited by the First Circuit criticizing subsequent

legislative history all concerned problems that existed

at the time Congress passed the statute; none concerned

an agency’s application of a statute to new technology.

Pet.App.31a-32a; Parlane Sportswear Co. v. Weinberger,

513 F.2d 835, 837 (1st Cir. 1975) (involving relocation

assistance under a federal statute where petitioner

challenged the agency’s contemporaneous construction

of the statute); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223

(2011) (determining the scope of a pre-emption provision

for product defects claims against vaccine manufacturers);

Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004) (considering whether

a federal agency’s violation of the Privacy Act of 1974

required a showing of actual damages). It would fly in

the face of reason to credit the intent of legislators—the

2001 Congress—who had no inkling of how an agency

would later use the grant of authority, while ignoring the

Congresses between 2011 and 2021 who were aware of

the new issue.

VII. FinCEN Admitted that It Had to Expand Its

Authority Beyond the Statutory Language to

Capture Virtual Currency.

As recognized by the First Circuit, in prior major

questions cases, this Court has looked to an agency’s

admissions of a lack of regulatory authority. Pet.App.41a.

See Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 321; Brown &

29

Williamson, 529 U.S. at 146. Where the First Circuit

erred was in rejecting statements by FinCEN officials

as persuasive evidence in this case.

A former acting director of FinCEN, Himamauli

Das, stated that the 2021 updates to the USA PATRIOT

Act, including the amendment to section 5330, were

necessary because the 2001 law “never anticipated the

challenges of the 2020s: digital assets…”. Himamauli

Das, Prepared Remarks of FinCEN Acting Director

Him Das, Delivered Virtually at the American Bankers

Association/American Bar Association Financial

Crimes Enforcement Conference, FinCen (2022), https://

perma.cc/VL3M-4GM9 (underline added). See also id.

(“[a]s the digital world increasingly becomes the financial

world – and vice versa – we need a regulatory regime

to match, one that accounts for crypto and other digital

assets…”) (italics in original, underline added).

Moreover, FinCEN has acknowledged that its

regulation of virtual currency arose from its own initiative

rather than from a directive from Congress. FinCEN

did not purport to regulate virtual currency until after

the invention of bitcoin in 2008. Pet.App.30a. The agency

issued a regulation in 2011 followed by guidance in 2013

stating FinCEN was claiming authority to regulate virtual

currency. Id. at 25-26a. In that 2013 guidance, FinCEN

wrote that “‘virtual’ currency is a medium of exchange

that operates like a currency in some environments, but

does not have all the attributes of real currency.” FinCEN,

FIN–2013–G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations

to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual

Currencies, at 1 (2013). Later, FinCEN recognized that

the word “funds” in the 2001 version of section 5330 did

30

not capture virtual currency. FinCEN stated that it had

to go beyond the regulation of “funds” to regulate virtual

currency:

The term “other value that substitutes for

currency” encompasses situations in which the

transmission does not involve currency [defined

as the coin or paper money of a country], or funds,

but instead involves something that the parties

to a transaction recognize has value that is

equivalent to or can substitute for currency.

FinCEN, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to

Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual

Currencies, FIN–2019–G001, at 4 (2019) (underline added).

Back in 2013, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, then-director of

FinCEN, explained to Congress that FinCEN was adding

language to bring virtual currency within the scope of

FinCEN’s authority, saying “[t]he updated definitions…

accommodate the development of new payment systems,

including virtual currency.” The Present and Future

Impact of Virtual Currency: Joint Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Econ. Pol’y and Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec.

and Int’l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking,

Hous., and Urban Affs., 113th Cong. 8, 36 (2013).

FinCEN provided similar information to Congress in

2018. See Illicit Use of Virtual Currency and the Law

Enforcement Response: Hearing Before the Subcomm.

on Terrorism and Illicit Fin. of the H. Comm. on Fin.

Servs. 115th Cong. 9, 25 (2018) (statement of Thomas Ott,

Associate Director, FinCEN Enf’t Division) (testifying

that “value that substitutes for currency” is “sufficient to

cover virtual currency”).

31

The First Circuit found these statements unpersuasive

because FinCEN’s assertion of regulatory authority

in 2013 predated the statements quoted by Freeman.

Pet.App.33a-44a. In the First Circuit’s reasoning, the

quoted FinCEN officials could not have been disclaiming

authority to regulate because FinCEN had already

asserted the authority to regulate. The First Circuit saw

the statements quoted by Freeman as an effort to “inform

Congress of how FinCEN had updated its definitions to

be in sync with Congress’s statutory intent.” Pet.App.42a.

The First Circuit’s analysis has things backwards.

Regulatory agencies do not have the power to expand

their own authority by reading a single word as broadly

as the agency desires and then telling Congress how

the agency expanded the law. Under our Constitution,

the regulation comes after the grant of authority by

Congress. Yet, that is not what happened regarding the

requirement that bitcoin sellers register with FinCEN.

Here, the agency recognized that the statute did not

authorize the regulation, but nonetheless believed there

was a need for the regulation. To that end, FinCEN

expanded its authority to regulate the transmission or

exchange of “value that substitutes as currency” for the

purpose of including virtual currency. As acknowledged

by one former trial attorney with the Department of

Justice’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section

in testimony before Congress, the 2021 revision of section

5330 “codified FinCEN’s previous position that the

definition of a financial institution and money transmission

business included businesses involved in the transmission

or exchange of ‘value that substitutes for currency.’”

Crypto Crime in Context: Breaking Down the Illicit

Activity in Digital Assets: Hearing before the House

32

Subcommittee on Digital Assets, Financial Technology

and Inclusion, 118th Cong. 11 (2023) (statement of Jane

Khodarkovsky), https://perma.cc/9Y9H-3QGP. In other

words, FinCEN expanded its authority and then lobbied

for years before it finally persuaded Congress to grant

the authority which had already been asserted. That is

not how our Constitution works, especially regarding an

agency’s claim of regulatory authority directly affecting

the economic freedom of citizens and a major part of the

economy.

VIII. The First Circuit Made Other Significant Errors

in Its Analysis.

A. Bitcoin is Not Like Hawala

The First Circuit misapprehended legislative history

when it analogized virtual currency to informal methods of

transfer such as hawala. The court found that Freeman’s

reading of the language from the 2001 USA PATRIOT

Act as concerned with hawala-like transfer systems,

was “strained” and that a “more natural reading” was

that “Congress was more generally concerned about

‘underground black market banking systems,’ whatever

the form.” Pet.App.27a (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 107-250

at 33). The First Circuit said that bitcoin is similar to

those informal systems because “such systems frequently

operated through ‘messages relating to receipt or

disbursement of funds’ rather than transfer of physical

funds themselves” and because “they were preferred

by criminals because of ‘the lack of record-keeping and

opportunity for anonymity.’” Pet.App.28a (quoting H.R.

Rep. No. 107-250 at 34). The court reasoned that “[b]

itcoin and virtual currencies seem to fall within this broad

33

definition of [an informal money transfer] system that

allows users to transfer money without the participation

of banks or other traditional money movers.” Pet.App.27a.

Here again, the First Circuit was mistaken. Hawala

and similar informal money transfer systems referenced

in H.R. Rep. No. 107-250 and targeted by the statute are

nothing like virtual currencies based on the blockchain.

Hawala is “an ancient South Asian money exchange

system which consists of an international network of nonbank financial agents, often built on trusted family or

cultural relationships.” Pet.App.27a n.19 (quotations and

citation omitted). A FinCEN Advisory explained in March

2003 that hawala “pre-date western banking systems and

existed as far back as 5800 BC.” FinCEN Advisory 33,

Informal Value Transfer Systems at 1 (2003).

Virtual currency is nothing like hawala. Virtual

currency is not backed by any person or group of persons.

Pet.App.3a. Its transfers are “accounted for on a public,

cryptographic ledger called the blockchain.” Id. at 4a.

Hawala is a human system which relies on intangible

personal relationships. The transactions are unrecorded

except for what is in the minds of the people involved.

Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are the exact

opposite. Virtual currency is not informal; it is formal. It is

based on the immutable blockchain where all transactions

are recorded on the internet for anyone to see. It relies

on the hard and fast rules of computer programming

and technology, not the vagaries of human relationships.

In 2001 Congress was considering informal, unrecorded

systems of human interactions, not a formal computer

network of publicly documented transactions which had

not yet been invented.

34

B. Bostock Does Not Support the First Circuit’s

Decision

The First Circuit also reasoned that its decision was

supported by Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644

(2020), which the First Circuit cited for the idea that

“Courts routinely enforce ‘plain statutory commands’

even where Congress may not have expected the statute

to apply to certain factual situations at the time of

passage.” Pet.App.47a (quoting Bostock, 590 U.S. at 683).

This conclusion is not correct. Bostock “proceed[ed] on

the assumption that ‘sex’…refer[ed] only to biological

distinctions between male and female,” 590 U.S. at

655, but nonetheless found discrimination in violation

of Title VII because for “an employer to discriminate

against employees for being homosexual or transgender,

the employer must intentionally discriminate against

individual men and women in part because of sex.” Id.

at 662. The Court relied on a definition of “sex” known

and understood at the time Title VII was adopted. Id. at

654-56. But here, blockchain-based virtual currencies

did not exist at the time the anti-money laundering laws

were revised in 2001. In other words, Title VII applies

to all sexual discrimination because sexual differences

existed at the time the law was passed; the 2001 version

of 31 U.S.C. § 5330 does not apply to virtual currency

because virtual currency did not exist at the time that

the law was passed. 3

3. Furthermore, the “major questions doctrine could not

have been raised in Bostock because that case involved a claim of

individual discrimination under Title VII; it was not a challenge

to agency action.” Kansas v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No.

24-4041-JWB, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116479, at *39-40 (D. Kan.

July 2, 2024).

35

Lastly, Bostock instructs courts to “interpret a statute

in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms

at the time of its enactment.” 590 U.S. at 654 (underline

added). It further warns, if “judges could add to, remodel,

update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired

only by extratextual sources and our own imaginations,

we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative

process reserved for the people’s representatives” and “we

would deny the people the right to continue relying on the

original meaning of the law they have counted on to settle

their rights and obligations.” Id. at 644-45. As Freeman

has consistently emphasized, whether one looks to when

the Bank Secrecy Act was amended in 1992, 1994, or

2001, no one could have possibly imagined or interpreted

the word “funds” to include blockchain-based virtual

currency. Thus, Bostock bolsters rather than undermines

Freeman’s arguments.

36

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Freeman respectfully

requests that the Court grant his petition for a writ of

certiorari, reverse the First Circuit, vacate the money

transmitting business convictions, and remand the case

back to the lower courts for reconsideration of Freeman’s

spillover prejudice and sentencing arguments, and grant

any other appropriate relief.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard Guerriero

Counsel of Record

Oliver Bloom

Lothstein Guerriero, PLLC

Chamberlain Block Building

39 Central Square, Suite 202

Keene, NH 03431

(603) 352-5000

richard@nhdefender.com

Attorneys for Petitioner

December 22, 2025

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 29, 2025 . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST

CIRCUIT, FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2025 . . . . . 74a

APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,

FILED AUGUST 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76a

APPENDIX D — AMENDED JUDGMENT OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,

FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115a

APPENDIX E — EXCERPTS OF THE TRANSCRIPT

FOR THE MOTION HEA RING, DATED

SEPTEMBER 1, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134a

APPENDIX F — EXCERPTS OF THE TRANSCRIPT

FOR THE SENTENCING HEARING, DATED

SEPTEMBER 11, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142a

APPENDIX G — RELEVANT STATUTORY

PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156a

1a

Appendix

A

APPENDIX A — OPINION

OF THE

UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT,

FILED JULY 29, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 23–1839

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

IAN FREEMAN,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Lipez, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.

July 29, 2025

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Ian Freeman (“Freeman”)

is, by his own description, a radio talk show host and church

2a

Appendix A

founder promoting peace, liberty, individual freedom, and

morality. Freeman began selling bitcoin in 2014 as part

of his mission to promote peace. The government, which

launched an investigation into his bitcoin sales, took a

different view of Freeman’s conduct and convinced a jury

to convict Freeman on counts of conspiracy to operate

an unlicensed money transmitting business, operation of

an unlicensed money transmitting business, conspiracy

to commit money laundering, money laundering, and

tax evasion. Post–verdict, the district court acquitted

Freeman on the substantive money laundering count

based on the insufficiency of the evidence. On appeal,

Freeman argues that the district court should never have

allowed the money–transmitting–business charges to

reach trial, because something called the “major questions

doctrine”—which governs how we read statutes that

convey regulatory authority to administrative agencies—

requires us to interpret the relevant statutes as not

permitting agency regulation of virtual currencies like

bitcoin. He also claims that the district court should have

acquitted him based on the insufficiency of the evidence

on his tax evasion charge and granted him a new trial on

the remaining money laundering conspiracy count due to

prejudicial evidentiary spillover. Finally, he claims that

even if his convictions stand, the district court’s imposition

of a 96–month sentence is substantively unreasonable.

Having carefully considered all Freeman’s arguments,

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Freeman’s trial was an 11–day affair at which more

than thirty witnesses testified. This appeal does not

3a

Appendix A

require us to recount every in–and–out of the evidence

presented at trial, but to better orient the reader, we start

with a brief overview of the events leading to Freeman’s

arrest. From there, we’ll dive into the merits of each of

Freeman’s arguments on appeal, filling in the necessary

factual details and announcing our standard of review as

we go.1

Freeman’s Bitcoin Business

Courts throughout the country have offered thorough

descriptions of what bitcoin is and how it works. All that

a reader need understand for today’s opinion is that

bitcoin is a virtual currency, with no physical coinage

or government backing. 2 Instead bitcoin is stored in

1. Because Freeman raises a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge to his tax evasion count, we’ll present the facts relevant

to that count in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict once

we get there. See United States v. Paz–Alvarez, 799 F.3d 12, 18

(1st Cir. 2015). For the overview of Freeman’s bitcoin sales that

follows, however, we summarize the trial record in a “balanced”

fashion, because the manner in which we relate these background

facts does not impact our analysis of Freeman’s remaining claims

of error. See United States v. Burgos–Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 99 (1st

Cir. 2015).

2. In everyday speech, the phrase virtual currency would

seemingly capture any currency that exists on a computer in a

non–physical form (for instance, currency used in video games

to buy items in that game). See David W. Perkins, Cong. Rsch.

Serv., R45427, Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and

Selected Policy Issues 1 n.2 (2020) (distinguishing between

cryptocurrencies and other “digital representations of value”).

For the purposes of today’s opinion, unless we note otherwise, we

4a

Appendix A

a software program referred to as a “wallet.” When

bitcoin is moved from one wallet to another, the transfer

is accounted for on a public, cryptographic ledger called

the blockchain. Perkins, supra, at 1, 7. But although the

ledger is public and each wallet uniquely identifiable from

other wallets, bitcoin offers relative anonymity compared

to traditional bank transactions, because there is no

information associated with a wallet that can identify

who owns the wallet. (By contrast, a bank customer must

provide personal information to a bank to open an account

and conduct transactions.) And unlike electronic payments

sent through banks, which can sometimes be cancelled or

reversed, there is no way for a sender to claw back bitcoin

once it has been sent. 3

To run his bitcoin business, Freeman acquired bitcoin

from large virtual currency exchanges for relatively small

commissions (0.16% in one example) and then resold it

to his customers while charging higher commissions

(upwards of 10% in many cases). Freeman conducted sales

use the phrase virtual currency to refer to cryptocurrencies like

bitcoin, which can act as an alternative to traditional government–

issued currency (we’ll refer to this as “fiat currency”) and which

use cryptographic protocols (i.e., methods of sending information

through codes) to ensure that transactions are accurately

recorded. Id. at 1 n.2, 3–4, 7–8.

3. This opinion is not meant to be a comprehensive or

authoritative account of bitcoin or cryptocurrencies, or of any

advancements made in this arena since this case was appealed.

Our recitation of the history, function, and value of bitcoin is drawn

from the parties’ presentation to the district court and jury below

and in their briefs to us.

5a

Appendix A

through three platforms. First, he used bitcoin “kiosks”

or “ATMs,” physical machines in which a customer could

deposit “fiat currency,” scan a QR code associated with

a bitcoin wallet, and receive a corresponding amount of

bitcoin in their wallet. Second, he posted advertisements

and communicated with customers on a website called

localbitcoins.com, which allowed users to buy and sell

bitcoin from each other, much as other websites allow

users to buy and sell goods. Finally, Freeman engaged in

direct negotiations with buyers on the messaging software

Telegram.

Freeman had what he called a Know Your Customer

procedure for buyers who were purchasing through

localbitcoins.com or Telegram. He asked prospective

customers to send him a photograph of their driver’s license

and a photograph of themselves holding a handwritten

note indicating that they intended to purchase bitcoin.

Sometimes, he would also ask for customers’ phone

numbers to confirm that they intended to buy bitcoin.

These procedures did not apply to purchases made at

Freeman’s bitcoin kiosks, which did not require any form

of personal verification, even though kiosk operators can

and do impose various verification requirements.4 Across

all three of his platforms, Freeman instituted another

policy—one which eschewed any inquiries into why his

customers were purchasing bitcoin. But it is questionable,

4. For instance, a government investigator testified at

trial that other bitcoin kiosks required him to scan a piece of

government–issued identification (like a driver’s license), enter a

non–prepaid phone number, provide his name, and communicate

with the owner or operator of the kiosk to verify his purchases.

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as we’ll explain, that such a no–ask policy truly insulated

Freeman from the knowledge that his services were being

used by customers who were, in fact, scammers and money

launderers.

The government sought to show that even when

Freeman implemented his K now Your Customer

procedures, he ignored multiple red flags that would

have suggested money laundering or scams. For instance,

Freeman permitted individuals to execute transactions

for hundreds of thousands of dollars within the course of

a week, and worked with individuals seeking to exchange

hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash. He also conducted

transactions in which he accepted payment from one

person but delivered bitcoin to another—something the

government calls a “third–party trade.” In consummating

these third–party transactions, Freeman sent individuals,

whom the evidence strongly suggested were scam artists,

bitcoin paid for by individuals over the age of 50, despite

finding out in many cases that the elderly individuals

paying for the bitcoin were geographically distant both

from the recipient of the bitcoin and from others paying to

send bitcoin to the same recipient. And Freeman continued

to trade with individuals after encountering signs that

they were not who they claimed to be.

To establish money laundering, the government

called an undercover agent who had made multiple bitcoin

purchases from Freeman through Telegram and at a kiosk

in New Hampshire. After building a rapport with Freeman

through Telegram messages, the agent joined Freeman

at a social gathering in New Hampshire and explained

7a

Appendix A

to Freeman that he was buying bitcoin with money he

earned selling drugs. After this disclosure, Freeman

wrote to the agent that he could not “KNOWINGLY sell

bitcoin” to the agent and refused to conduct business

with him over Telegram. He nevertheless invited the

agent to continue socializing with him. At a gathering

in Keene, New Hampshire less than a month later, the

agent asked Freeman if the kiosk he had previously used

was still available. Freeman responded that the kiosk

was still there and said, “I can’t tell you that you can

use it.” The agent went to the kiosk, located in a bar, and

purchased nearly $20,000 in bitcoin. That same night, the

agent also taped Freeman saying in a conversation with

friends (including the agent) over drinks that “if you fall

in love with a guy from Africa, I can’t talk you out of it”

and describing his kiosks as a way for smitten victims to

“take the money that they have and send it to the person

they’ve fallen in love with.”

In the summer of 2018, the Financial Crimes

Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) of the United States

Treasury Department sent correspondence to an email

address associated with Freeman stating that “Shire

Cryptocoin,” purportedly one of Freeman’s businesses,

must register with FinCEN as a money transmitting

business and comply with other anti–money–laundering

regulations. 5 Ignoring this directive, Freeman never

5. It’s not clear whether Freeman himself used the name

“Shire Cryptocoin” in connection with any of his businesses.

Also, to be exact, FinCEN wrote that Shire Cryptocoin was a

money services business. Under FinCEN’s regulations, money

transmitting businesses are a subcategory of money services

8a

Appendix A

registered this entity or any of his businesses with

FinCEN. He also did not file tax returns from 2016

through 2019.

Procedural History

The indictment alleged that Freeman (as well as

several co–defendants) exchanged more than $10 million

worth of government–backed currency for bitcoin

between May 25, 2016 and March 15, 2021. In relevant

part, the indictment charged Freeman with operation of

an unlicensed money transmitting business, conspiracy

to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business,

money laundering, and conspiracy to commit money

laundering, based on this conduct. It also charged

Freeman with several counts of tax evasion for not

paying taxes on income he received from his bitcoin sales.

Freeman joined a motion to dismiss filed by one of his

co–defendants regarding the counts related to operation

of an unlicensed money transmitting business, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1960, which invoked the major questions doctrine and

argued that businesses dealing in virtual currency do not

come within the statutory definition of money transmitting

businesses (more on the statutory scheme and relevant

businesses (which are all required to register). 31 C.F.R.

§ 1010.100(ff)(5) (defining money transmitter as type of money

services business); id. § 1022.380(a)(1) (requiring registration of

money services businesses). For the sake of simplicity, this opinion

will primarily use the term “money transmitting business” or

“money transmitter” as resolution of this case does not require us

to make fine distinctions between money transmitting businesses

and other categories of money services businesses.

9a

Appendix A

definition to come in our analysis). The district court

denied the motion to dismiss in an oral ruling from the

bench, and Freeman proceeded to trial. At the end of an

11–day trial, a jury convicted Freeman on all counts.

Freeman had moved for a judgment of acquittal after

the close of the government’s evidence, and renewed that

motion after trial, arguing that insufficient evidence

supported each count. The district court partially granted

that motion, ruling that there was insufficient evidence

that Freeman knowingly laundered money, but upheld

the remaining convictions (including the conspiracy to

commit money laundering count). In the same written

order, the district court recognized that Freeman had

incorporated by reference his earlier motion to dismiss

arguments regarding the major questions doctrine and

rejected those arguments anew. Thereafter, Freeman

moved for a new trial based on spillover prejudice from

the evidence related to the money laundering count. He

also moved for reconsideration of the court’s ruling on the

motion to dismiss. The district court denied both motions,

ruling that they were untimely and unmeritorious.

At sentencing, the district court calculated the

recommended range under the United States Sentencing

Guidelines as 210 to 262 months. It then granted

Freeman’s motion for a variance and sentenced Freeman

to 96 months in prison.6

6. More precisely, the district court sentenced Freeman to

60 months of imprisonment on tax evasion and the counts related

to operation of a money transmitting business to be served

concurrently with a 96–month sentence for conspiracy to commit

money laundering.

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DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss Counts Related to Operation of an

Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business

Freeman’s appeal largely centers on the major

questions doctrine, a jurisprudential principle fleshed out

in a line of cases emanating from the Supreme Court. The

doctrine’s purpose is to prevent administrative agencies

from expanding their regulatory powers beyond that which

Congress has granted. See, e.g., Biden v. Nebraska, 600

U.S. 477, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 216 L. Ed. 2d 1063 (2023); West

Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 213 L. Ed.

2d 896 (2022); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302,

134 S. Ct. 2427, 189 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2014). To understand

why cases about the scope of an agency’s regulatory power

are relevant to Freeman’s prosecution for operation of an

unlicensed money transmitting business and his defense

thereto, we need to take a closer look at the statute under

which Freeman was prosecuted.

The indictment charged Freeman with violating 18

U.S.C. § 1960 (“Section 1960”). In relevant part, that

statute punishes anyone who “knowingly conducts,

controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or

part of an unlicensed money transmitting business.”

Id. § 1960(a). “[M]oney transmitting,” according to the

statute, “includes transferring funds on behalf of the

public by any and all means.” Id. § 1960(b)(2). And an

“unlicensed money transmitting business” means one that

“fails to comply with the money transmitting business

registration requirements under section 5330 of title 31,

11a

Appendix A

United States Code, or regulations prescribed under such

section.” Id. § 1960(b)(1)(B).

Thus, to understand what it means for a money

transmitting business to be unlicensed, we must flip

to 31 U.S.C § 5330 (“Section 5330”), which requires

“[a]ny person who owns or controls a money transmitting

business” to register that business “with the Secretary

of the Treasury.” How can someone tell if they need

to register? Section 5330 defines “money transmitting

business” to include one “who engages as a business in the

transmission of currency, funds, or value that substitutes

for currency, including any person who engages as a

business in an informal money transfer system.” Id.

§ 5330(d)(1).

Because the government has deemed his financial

endeavors to be money transmitting businesses, the

Section 1960 crime Freeman is charged with is triggered

by his failure to comply w ith Section 5330(a)(1)’s

requirement that such money transmitting businesses

must register with FinCEN (which is a subdivision of

the Treasury Department).7 However, if, as Freeman

7. Eagle–eyed readers will have remembered that Section

5330(a)(1) referred to registration with the Secretary of the

Treasury and never mentioned FinCEN. The Secretary of the

Treasury delegated regulatory responsibilities under Section

5330 (which is part of the Bank Secrecy Act) to FinCEN. See

generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO/GGD–98–18, Money

Laundering: FinCEN Needs to Better Communicate Regulatory

Priorities and Time Lines 1 (1998). For simplicity’s sake, any

time Section 5330 gives certain responsibilities to the Secretary

12a

Appendix A

contends, Section 5330 does not cover businesses such as

his that trade bitcoin (i.e., if he does not operate a money

transmitting business with registration requirements),

he was not violating Section 5330, and by extension no

criminal liability under Section 1960 would attach to him.

Of significance to Freeman’s argument is one

particular feature of Section 5330. As Freeman points out,

when the indictment against him was filed, the definition

in Section 5330(d)(1) looked a little different: it did not

include the word “currency” or the phrase “value that

substitutes for currency.” Instead, the only noun in the

list of items being transmitted was “funds.” Uniting and

Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA

PATRIOT Act”) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56 § 359(b), 115

Stat. 272, 328 (2001) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.

§ 5330(d)(1)). In this language difference lies the rub of

Freeman’s grievance.

For simplicity’s sake, we’ll refer to the definition

of money transmitting business in effect during the

existence of Freeman’s bitcoin business as the “effective

definition” and the new definition, which was enacted in

2021 (more on this legislative history in a moment), as the

“current definition.” See William M. (Mac) Thornberry

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021

(“NDAA”), Pub. L. No. 116–283 § 6102(d)(2)(A)(i), 134 Stat.

3388, 4552–53 (2021) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.

of the Treasury, we will substitute in FinCEN as the office of the

Treasury Department that carries out that work.

13a

Appendix A

§ 5330(d)). 8 Unless we specify otherwise, our analysis (and

the cases we cite) refers to the effective definition of money

transmitting business in Section 5330(d)(1).9

An attentive reader may now be wondering what any of

this has to do with the power of an administrative agency.

And, as we’ll see, the government says we shouldn’t take

up the major questions doctrine at all because agency

authority is not implicated in these proceedings. This

is how Freeman contends the doctrine factors into this

8. For those tracking the dates, it may seem strange that

we’re saying the current version of Section 5330 was not effective

for the purposes of this prosecution, even though the indictment

alleges that violations of Section 1960 continued until the date of

Freeman’s arrest, March 15, 2021, which was more than three

months after the current definition became law on January 1, 2021.

NDAA § 6102(d)(2)(A)(i), 134 Stat. at 4552–53. Freeman points

out that under Section 5330(a)(1), any person who owns or controls

a money transmitting business has 180 days to register, and so

his time to register under the updated definition had not expired

by the time the government put a stop to his business. 31 U.S.C.

§ 5330(a)(1). The government does not dispute this explanation of

why the current version of Section 5330 is ineffective and has not

argued that we should analyze the post–amendment conduct any

differently from the pre–amendment conduct. And we thus focus

our attention on the prior, effective definition.

9. Section 1960 had not been amended since Freeman’s

offending conduct began, and neither party asserts that any prior

amendments to Section 1960 are relevant to our resolution of this

case. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice

Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–162 § 1171(a)(2),

119 Stat. 2960, 3123 (2006) (striking surplus words from Section

1960(b)(1)(C)).

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dispute. According to Freeman, Section 5330’s effective

definition of “money transmitting business” cannot be

properly understood to cover businesses dealing in virtual

currencies like bitcoin, because (and here’s where the

link to an administrative agency arises) Section 5330(a)

(2) instructs FinCEN to “prescribe, by regulation, the

form and manner for registering a money transmitting

business.” 31 U.S.C. § 5330(a)(2). Thus, the 2001 effective

definition of money transmitting business, which refers

to the transmission of “funds,” seemingly applies to both

the statutory registration requirement in Section 5330(a)

(1) and to the scope of FinCEN’s regulatory authority

under Section 5330(a)(2). The major questions doctrine

arises, says Freeman, because we should not conclude

that Congress intended to grant FinCEN regulatory

authority over virtual currencies that did not exist in

2001, solely by virtue of Congress’s use of the word

“funds” in the effective definition in Section 5330(d)(1).

And how we interpret the effective definition necessarily

circumscribes the scope of the statutory registration

requirement in Section 5330(a)(1). In other words, the

statutory assumption underlying Freeman’s prosecution

(i.e., that Congress’s use of the word “funds” in Section

5330(d)(1) covers virtual currencies) fails under the major

questions doctrine, because, according to Freeman, such

an interpretation runs contrary to congressional intent.

Ultimately then, Freeman’s appeal poses the following

question for us: does the effective definition of “money

transmitting business” in Section 5330 capture businesses

that transmit virtual currency? In our opinion, the usual

principles of statutory construction say, resoundingly, yes,

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Appendix A

and we’ll take a step back to briefly explain why. We’ll then

dive into the heart of Freeman’s appeal and assess whether

the major questions doctrine nonetheless “provide[s] a

reason to hesitate” before definitively saying yes and

adopting that construction. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Because this is a

matter of statutory construction, our standard of review

is de novo. See United States v. McGlashan, 78 F.4th 1, 6

(1st Cir. 2023).

Traditional Plain Meaning Analysis

We start by analyzing Sections 1960 and 5330 without

reference to the major questions doctrine. In interpreting

a statute, we strive “to effectuate congressional intent.”

City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir.

2020). Our usual starting place for such an inquiry is the

statutory text itself. Id. “[W]e interpret a statute’s words

based on their plain and ordinary meaning at the time of

the statute’s enactment.” United States v. Abreu, 106 F.4th

1, 12 (1st Cir.) (citing Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S.

644, 654, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020)), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 425, 220 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2024); City of

Providence, 954 F.3d at 31 (“When Congress uses a term

in a statute and does not define it, we generally assume

that the term carries its plain and ordinary meaning.”).

In this case, the parties ask us to define a specific

word, “funds,” in Sections 1960 and 5330.10 Other courts

10. The parties analyze the meaning of the word “funds”

under both statutes, and neither suggests that the term “funds”

16a

Appendix A

have been asked to respond to this same query and those

who have done so have concluded this: that the plain

meaning of “funds” is “money” or “ something generally

accepted as a medium of exchange, a measure of value,

or a means of payment.” United States v. Murgio, 209

F. Supp. 3d 698, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary 921 (2002)); see also

United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y.

2014) (citing Merriam Webster Online). Premised on this

definition, with which the government agrees, other courts

have found that bitcoin falls within the plain meaning of

“funds” and that Sections 1960 and 5330 therefore capture

businesses that sell bitcoin to customers in exchange

for government–issued currency. See, e.g., United

States v. Stetkiw, No. 18–20579, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

16607, 2019 WL 417404, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 1, 2019)

(concluding that bitcoin transactions constitute “money

transmitting” within the meaning of Section 1960); United

States v. Mansy, No. 2:15–cr–198–GZS, 2017 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 71786, 2017 WL 9672554, at *1 (D. Me. May 11,

2017) (same) (collecting cases); Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d

at 707–11, 714 (concluding that bitcoin are funds within

the plain meaning of Section 1960 and that indictment

sufficiently alleged failure to comply with Section 5330’s

registration requirements). We agree with this judicial

reasoning because bitcoin can be and is used as a currency

to make sales and purchases and, therefore, nicely fits the

should be interpreted differently between Sections 1960 and

5330. Thus, we discuss the meaning of the term “funds” under

both statutes.

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definition of “funds.”11 Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 707; see

also United States v. Iossifov, 45 F.4th 899, 913–14 (6th

Cir. 2022) (concluding that bitcoin is a medium of exchange

and qualifies as “funds” within the meaning of the federal

money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956); United States

v. Harmon, 474 F. Supp. 3d 76, 88–94, 100–09 (D.D.C.

2020) (concluding that for similar reasons bitcoin is

“money” within the meaning of the District of Columbia’s

Money Transmitters Act and separately concluding that

defendant operated an “unlicensed money transmitting

business” within the meaning of Section 1960 where its

“core business was receiving bitcoin and transmitting that

bitcoin to another location or person”).

Within our ordinary interpretive framework, our

inquiry into whether the word “funds” covers bitcoin

would usually end here, as there is no reason to look past

the statutory text itself if that text is unambiguous and

consistent with a coherent statutory scheme. Penobscot

Nation v. Frey, 3 F.4th 484, 490 (1st Cir. 2021); City of

Providence, 954 F.3d at 31–32 (“Other tools of statutory

interpretation, such as legislative history, customarily

carry significant weight only when the text is ambiguous

or its plain meaning leads to an absurd result.”). Indeed

Freeman admits that he has “never argued” that “the

ordinary meaning of ‘funds’” does not “encompass[]

bitcoin.” But as we’ve already alluded to, Freeman insists

that we cannot stop here because his is “an exceptional

case” wherein ordinary rules of statutory construction

11. For instance, the evidence at trial showed that the bar

where one of Freeman’s kiosks was located accepted bitcoin in

exchange for food.

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cannot be relied upon to answer the question of whether

bitcoin qualifies as “funds.” Rather, only an examination

of the major questions doctrine (which takes a deeper

dive into congressional intent) can do that, so we turn to

it now. A heads–up here to the gentle reader: Freeman

offers us a slew of arguments as to why he should prevail

on this issue, so we beg your patience as we work our way

through his various contentions.

Major Questions Doctrine

Before we delve into the details of the major questions

doctrine, we pause to address the government’s threshold

assertion that we “need not indulge” Freeman’s invocation

of the doctrine at all because his criminal prosecution

involved no “regulatory assertions” whatsoever by

the Department of Treasury. Rather, it argues “the

indictment neither depended on nor referenced the

FinCEN guidance” and as such, the major questions

doctrine “is not triggered” here. However, we think the

government’s position oversimplifies Freeman’s argument

and here’s why.

As our preface noted, the “major questions doctrine” can

arise in cases where we are asked to interpret a legislative

enactment that “confers authority upon an administrative

agency” in the executive branch to implement its terms.

West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721. Here, Freeman’s argument

centers on the effective definition of money transmitting

business in Section 5330(d)(1). That statutory definition

governs the scope of what businesses are required to

register under Section 5330(a)(1), and in consequence,

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Appendix A

what businesses might be subject to criminal penalties

under Section 1960(b)(1)(B) for failure to comply with that

registration requirement.12 See United States v. Budovsky,

No. 13–cr–00368, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127717, 2015 WL

5602853, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015) (“[C]riminal liability

under § 1960(b)(1)(B) rests in part on a failure to comply

with registration requirements, including those set forth

in § 5330 or in § 5330’s regulations.”). Simultaneously, the

effective definition (what constitutes a money transmitting

business) governs the scope of the regulations FinCEN can

promulgate in the next subsection, Section 5330(a)(2). See,

e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141–43, 114 S.

Ct. 655, 126 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1994) (explaining that willful

violation has same meaning under some provisions of the

Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322, 5324, as it does in other

provisions, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314, 5316); United States v. Abbas,

12. While summarizing the nature of Freeman’s convictions

in its brief, the government claims that Freeman was also

convicted under Section 1960(b)(1)(C). Section 1960(b)(1)(C)

defines an unlicensed money transmitting business seemingly

independently from Section 5330. See 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(C)

(defining term to mean a money transmitting business “otherwise

involv[ing] the transportation or transmission of funds that are

known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal

offense or are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful

activity”). The government does not argue, however, that we can

ignore Section 5330 because the jury convicted Freeman under

Section 1960(b)(1)(C), presumably because the verdict form did not

ask the jury to indicate which of the two subsections Freeman had

violated. Even if the record could support such an argument, we

would treat it as waived given the government’s failure to brief

the issue. See Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Menashes, 127 F.4th

398, 403 n.2 (1st Cir. 2025).

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100 F.4th 267, 284 (1st Cir.) (concluding that “proceeds” has

same meaning in different subsections of criminal money

laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.

319, 220 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2024). This statutory scheme makes

clear that the legislation’s substantive provisions work hand

in hand with those provisions granting regulatory authority

to FinCEN to implement the terms of the statute itself.

Given the necessary interplay between the statutory and

regulatory provisions, we agree with Freeman that skirting

the major questions doctrine would incorrectly treat the

statutory registration requirement as completely divorced

from any of FinCEN’s regulatory authority. Indeed, as

Freeman pointed out during oral argument, requiring a

business to register by statute means very little without a

corresponding mechanism by which said business can, in

fact, register. For the registration requirement in Section

5330(a)(1), the regulations FinCEN promulgates under

Section 5330(a)(2) appear to be that mechanism. And

although the government would like us to conclude the

major questions doctrine has no place here, it offers no

direct response to this point. All this to say, Freeman steps

over the threshold of identifying a statute which, at least in

part, confers regulatory authority upon an administrative

agency, a power Freeman insists Congress never intended

to delegate.13

13. We acknowledge that this is a somewhat unusual case for

the invocation of the major questions doctrine: FinCEN is not a

party and Freeman is seeking to overturn his conviction, not to

enjoin FinCEN’s regulatory act. Nevertheless, the heart of this

appeal is the effective definition of money transmitting business in

Section 5330(d)(1), a definition that applies both to Sections 5330(a)

(1) and (a)(2). Blinding ourselves (as the government requests) to

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Having explained the relationship between this

case and FinCEN’s regulation of money transmitting

businesses, we must now determine “whether Congress in

fact meant to confer the power the agency has asserted”

as the major questions doctrine requires us to do. West

Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721 (quoting FDA v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159, 120 S. Ct.

1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000)). “In the ordinary case,”

this consideration “has no great effect on the appropriate

analysis.” Id. But the Supreme Court has recognized the

existence of “extraordinary cases.” Id. In such instances,

we cannot conclude that Congress granted an agency

authority “to exercise powers of vast economic and political

significance” unless the statutory text “speaks clearly” of

such a grant. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health &

Hum. Servs., 594 U.S. 758, 764, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 210 L. Ed.

2d 856 (2021) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Util. Air

Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324). In basic terms, the major

the reality that our interpretation of Section 5330(d)(1) impacts not

only Freeman’s criminal liability, but also the scope of FinCEN’s

regulatory authority, undermines the coherency and consistency of

the statutory scheme. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S.

214, 222, 128 S. Ct. 831, 169 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2008). Our sister circuits

too have seen fit to consider the application of the major questions

doctrine in cases where the relevant administrative agency is

not a party and is not actively making “regulatory assertions”

in that litigation. See United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532, 540

(7th Cir.) (considering major questions challenge to Sentencing

Commission’s authority in a criminal case), cert. denied, 145 S.

Ct. 293, 220 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2024); N.C. Coastal Fisheries Reform

Grp. v. Capt. Gaston LLC, 76 F.4th 291, 296–301 (4th Cir. 2023)

(applying major questions doctrine in suit between environmental

advocacy group and shrimp trawlers).

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questions doctrine tells us that when an administrative

agency in the executive branch wants to do something that

is an extraordinarily big deal, it must show that Congress

clearly gave it permission to do so in the statutory text.

See Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 514 (Barrett, J., concurring)

(analogizing major questions doctrine to expectation that

a parent authorizing a babysitter to take the children on

an overnight trip would provide “much more clarity than

a general instruction to ‘make sure the kids have fun’”).

What, then, makes for an extraordinary case? The

Supreme Court defines it in broad strokes as one “in

which the ‘history and the breadth of the authority that

[the agency] has asserted,’ and the ‘economic and political

significance’ of that assertion, provide a ‘reason to hesitate

before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such

authority.” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721 (quoting Brown

& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60). Within this rather

wide framework, our sister circuits, in carefully examining

what the Supreme Court has said about the breadth

of an agency’s authority to regulate, have zeroed in on

certain “hallmarks that should send us searching for clear

authorization from Congress.”14 N.C. Coastal Fisheries,

76 F.4th at 297 (recognizing that doctrine is more likely to

apply where the agency’s asserted powers are inconsistent

with congressional intent, conflict with a distinct and

existing statutory scheme, raise federalism concerns, “fall[]

14. Our circuit has addressed the major questions doctrine

only in passing since the doctrine was formalized in West Virginia.

See Hornof v. United States, 107 F.4th 46, 59 n.14 (2024) (noting

that statute enabling Coast Guard to regulate oil tankers “speak[s]

clearly”).

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Appendix A

outside the agency’s traditional expertise,” are rooted in

“an ancillary provision” of a statute, or are drawn from

“old statutes against a backdrop of an agency failing to

invoke them previously”); see also Bradford v. U.S. Dep’t

of Lab., 101 F.4th 707, 725–28 (10th Cir. 2024) (rejecting

application of major questions doctrine where agency did

not “locate expansive authority in modest words, vague

terms or ancillary provisions,” was not regulating private

industry, did not “discover regulatory authority for the first

time in a long–extant statute,” and did not “lack[] expertise

in the relevant area of policymaking” (citation modified)),

cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1047, 220 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2025). Our

review of the Supreme Court’s precedent and of our sister

circuits’ helpful interpretation of it convinces us that this

case lacks the hallmarks of a major questions case. We’ll

explain our thinking below around the two organizing

principles identified by the Supreme Court, starting with

“the history and the breadth” of FinCEN’s assertion of

authority and follow that with addressing its “economic and

political significance.”15 West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721; see

Nebraska v. Su, 121 F.4th 1, 14 (9th Cir. 2024) (identifying

a “two–prong framework”).

15. In so doing, we acknowledge that the major questions

doctrine has been an area of dynamic development in the last

few years, and it is not always clear what factors fall under which

prong. For instance, a discussion of the wider statutory scheme

and legislative history might well be introduced as a relevant

piece of the agency’s regulatory history or as indicative of the

political significance of the regulatory assertion. In today’s

decision, we place less importance on categorizing the relevant

characteristics and focus on whether the facts of this case, stripped

of Freeman’s rhetorical flourishes, actually fit into the major

questions precedent.

24a

Appendix A

History and Breadth of FinCEN’s Assertion

History

To understand the “history and breadth” of FinCEN’s

regulation as is relevant here, a short history of Section

5330 is in order.16 As part of a statutory scheme (the

Bank Secrecy Act) designed to combat money laundering,

Congress has long required “money transmitting

businesses” to register with the Treasury Department.

Riegle Community Development and Reg ulator y

Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–325 § 408, 108

Stat. 2160, 2249–51 (1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5330).

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,

Congress that year amended the definition of “money

transmitting business” in Section 5330 to include “any

other person who engages as a business in the transmission

of funds, including any person who engages as a business

in an informal money transfer system or any network

of people who engage as a business in facilitating the

transfer of money domestically or internationally outside

of the conventional financial institutions system.” USA

PATRIOT Act § 359(b), 115 Stat. at 328 (emphases added).

According to the report of the Committee on Financial

Services, the amendment did not expand the definition of

money transmitting business, but instead clarified that

16. Our focus is on the legislative history of Section 5330

rather than Section 1960, because (1) that is what the parties

briefed and (2) Section 5330, which enables agency regulation, is

more squarely implicated by the major questions doctrine than

Section 1960, which focuses on the circumstances of criminal

liability.

25a

Appendix A

the existing definition reached black market, non–bank

money exchangers—what the Committee referred to as

“informal value transfer banking systems”—which helped

to fund terrorist and criminal organizations. H.R. Rep.

No. 107–250, at 34, 63–64 (2001).

This was the effective version of Section 5330 when

bitcoin came into being in 2008. Perkins, supra, at 2. In

Freeman’s telling though, FinCEN’s first step towards the

regulation of bitcoin didn’t occur until 2011, when FinCEN

updated its regulatory definition of “money transmission

services” to require the “acceptance of currency, funds,

or other value that substitutes for currency from one

person.” Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions

and Other Regulations Relating to Money Services

Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43585, 43596 (July 21, 2011)

(codified at 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)) (emphasis added).

Such a theory, he argues, is consistent with the guidance

FinCEN issued in 2013 which, for the first time, stated

that “value that substitutes for currency” includes virtual

currencies. Specifically, the guidance said, “[t]he definition

of a money transmitter does not differentiate between real

currencies and convertible virtual currencies. Accepting

and transmitting anything of value that substitutes for

currency makes a person a money transmitter under

the regulations implementing the [Bank Secrecy Act].”17

17. FinCEN laid out precise definitions for “real currency,”

“convertible currency,” and “virtual currency” in its 2013

guidance. FIN–2013–G001, at 3. For the purposes of this opinion,

it suffices to say that “real currency” is equivalent to what we

have been calling “fiat currency” and that bitcoin is a form of

“convertible virtual currency.” The guidance clarified that the fact

26a

Appendix A

FinCEN, FIN–2013–G001, Application of FinCEN’s

Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or

Using Virtual Currencies, at 3 (2013). Freeman says

the fact that FinCEN never sought to regulate bitcoin

before 2013 demonstrates the agency’s understanding

of its statutory inability to do so. Needless to say, the

government takes issue with Freeman’s historical

interpretation,18 but neither party has pointed to any

evidence that FinCEN engaged in any enforcement

activities against businesses transmitting bitcoin which

sought to compel them to register (or comply with other

regulations) prior to issuance of the 2013 guidance. And

for the purposes of this opinion, we’ll operate with the

understanding that FinCEN, at least, first began to

regulate businesses that transmit virtual currencies in

2013. Doing so lets us focus on the parties’ key dispute:

whether FinCEN, nonetheless, had statutory authority

to regulate virtual currencies when it issued the 2013

guidance.

that a business exchanged bitcoin instead of fiat currency would

not exempt it from registration as a money transmitter. Id. at 2

(explaining that “a person engaged as a business in the exchange

of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other virtual

currency” is a money transmitter under FinCEN’s regulation).

18. Freeman takes the view that FinCEN did not begin

regulating bitcoin until “long after the invention of bitcoin” in 2008,

when it added the phrase “value that substitutes for currency” into

its regulations and then interpreted that phrase to refer to virtual

currencies. The government claims that FinCEN was regulating

virtual currencies all along and that FinCEN’s actions in 2011 and

2013 merely “confirmed” its existing regulatory scheme.

27a

Appendix A

Freeman would like us to conclude it “inconceivable”

(as he tells it) that the single word “funds” as contained in

the effective version could refer to virtual currency, but

we believe his focus on that single word is misplaced and

here’s why. In full, the effective definition (when bitcoin

was created) specified that businesses engaged in the

“transmission of funds” could include an “informal money

transfer system . . . outside of the conventional financial

institutions system.” USA PATRIOT Act § 359(b), 115

Stat. at 328. Bitcoin and virtual currencies seem to fall

within this broad definition of a system that allows users

to transfer money without the participation of banks or

other traditional money movers. Freeman argues that in

utilizing this language in the 2001 amendment, Congress

intended to target a different informal money system –

“the ancient South Asian money exchange system called

hawala” and other “hawala–type systems.”19 But we find

this to be a strained reading of the Committee Report

accompanying the 2001 legislation. A more natural

reading is that Congress was more generally concerned

about “underground black market banking systems,”

whatever the form, H.R. Rep. No. 107–250, at 33, and

19. According to the findings of the House Committee on

Financial Services, “hawala” is the word for an “ancient South

Asian money exchange system” which “consists of an international

network of non–bank financial agents, often built on trusted

family or cultural relationships.” H.R. Rep. No. 107–250, at 34.

These trusted relationships permit value to be transferred based

on messages rather than the physical movement of funds from

one party to another. Id. Presumably, when Freeman refers to

“hawala–type systems,” he refers to value transfer systems that

function in a similar manner.

28a

Appendix A

described hawalas as simply one example of the “informal

value transfer banking systems” on which FinCEN

should focus attention, id. at 63–64. Moreover, Congress

highlighted particular characteristics of “value transfer

systems” that are equally true of today’s bitcoin use,

including that such systems frequently operated through

“messages relating to receipt or disbursement of funds”

rather than transfer of physical funds themselves, and

that they were preferred by criminals because of “the

lack of record–keeping and opportunity for anonymity.”

Id. at 34. Importantly, Congress believed that these sorts

of alternative transfer systems were “already adequately

covered” by the pre–2001 version of Section 5330. Id. at

63–64. The Committee Report gives us no reason to think

that a non–bank system allowing people to transfer value

using messages between trusted parties should be treated

differently than one which accomplishes the same purpose

using cryptographic protocols between strangers.

And even if we adopted Freeman’s approach and

looked at the word “funds” in isolation, we’d be hard–

pressed to think it “inconceivable” that Congress would

have intended “funds” to reach cryptocurrency given

that judicial decisions dating back to 2008 had already

interpreted “funds” expansively to capture non–physical

currency. See, e.g., United States v. E–Gold, Ltd., 550

F. Supp. 2d 82, 85, 94–97 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that

Section 5330’s definition of money transmitting business

included internet service which allowed users to exchange

fiat currency for digital currency). 20

20. We are mindful, as Freeman points out, that the virtual

currency at issue in E–Gold is not a “cryptocurrency” like

29a

Appendix A

Nor does Freeman, relative to his historical argument,

make a showing that FinCEN has engaged in the sort

of about–face agency behavior typically found in the

major questions cases. That is significant because the

Supreme Court, in applying the doctrine, has particularly

scrutinized with suspicion when an agency reverses course

on its long–standing decision not to regulate in a particular

field or in a particular manner. See West Virginia, 597

U.S. at 710–11, 713, 724 (striking regulation requiring

electricity generators to undergo sector–wide switch to

sources that produced less carbon dioxide, where EPA

had previously only exercised power under Section 111

of the Clean Air Act to set emissions limits for individual

plants). FinCEN had no history of explicitly disclaiming

its authority to regulate virtual currency (or any other

type of “informal transfer banking system”) prior to its

2011 and 2013 updates to its regulatory regime. Cf. Brown

& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143–48 (concluding that the

Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) decades–long

bitcoin. See 550 F. Supp. 2d at 85; FIN–2013–G001, at 3 & n.13

(describing e–currencies and e–precious metals as a system where

a broker or dealer electronically distributes digital certificates of

ownership of fiat currency or precious metals); see also supra note

2. But the fact that e–gold was backed by precious metals while

bitcoin transactions are recorded on a cryptographic ledger is

not a difference–maker in our current analysis because FinCEN

views and treats both “e–precious metals” and cryptocurrencies

as convertible virtual currencies. 2013 Guidance at 3. Nor do we

understand why Freeman highlights that “the e–Gold indictment

explicitly relied on FinCEN’s implementing regulations” as a point

of distinction. After all, Freeman similarly claims his prosecution

relies on FinCEN’s implementing regulations (which is the

premise for applying the major questions doctrine).

30a

Appendix A

position that it had no jurisdiction over tobacco products

and Congress’s implicit ratification of that position in

subsequent tobacco–specific legislation demonstrated a

lack of legislative intent to delegate authority over tobacco

products to the FDA).

And simply because FinCEN declined to exercise

such authority prior to issuance of the 2013 guidance can

hardly, by our lights, be held against it; by Freeman’s

count, the agency acted only five years after bitcoin was

invented. 21 The five–year delay—if we can call it such—

is understandable because the money laundering risk

posed by bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies (and thus

the need for targeted regulation) may not have been

instantly apparent upon bitcoin’s invention. Cf. Ocean State

Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island, 95 F.4th 38, 50 (1st Cir.

2024) (“Law advances more slowly than the technology it

regulates, but must nonetheless be able to respond when

the ramifications of a technological development become

more apparent over time.”). Plus five years is a far cry

from the decades of regulatory inaction emphasized in

the Supreme Court’s major questions cases. See, e.g.,

West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 734 (noting that “it is pertinent

to our analysis that EPA has acted consistent with such

a limitation [on its regulatory power] for the first four

decades of the statute’s existence”); Ala. Ass’n of Realtors,

21. In fact, FinCEN proposed the addition of the phrase

“value that substitutes for currency” as early as 2009, the year

following bitcoin’s invention. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act

Regulations–Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Money

Services Businesses, 74 Fed. Reg. 22129, 22137, 22142 (proposed

May 12, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).

31a

Appendix A

594 U.S. at 761 (explaining that 1944 statutory provision

had “rarely been invoked—and never before to justify an

eviction moratorium”; instead “[r]egulations under this

authority have generally been limited to quarantining

infected individuals and prohibiting the import or

sale of animals known to transmit disease”). In 2008,

cryptocurrencies were an emerging technology whose

significance within the money transfer marketplace was

less than clear. Freeman’s own brief indicates that the

market capitalization of bitcoin in July 2010, roughly two

years after its invention, was only $200,000, a pittance

in the nation’s overall financial scheme, and perhaps one

not yet worthy of an expenditure of the limited resources

Congress appropriates to FinCEN.

“Subsequent” History

Unable to find a firm foothold in the history leading

up to FinCEN’s exercise of regulatory authority over

bitcoin, Freeman points to events that occurred after

FinCEN’s issuance of the 2013 guidance. Reliance on this

sort of “subsequent” history is rather unorthodox. As the

government notes, we’ve previously warned against using

the views of a later Congress to interpret “the meaning of

statutes enacted by an earlier Congress” when conducting

traditional statutory interpretation. Parlane Sportswear

Co. v. Weinberger, 513 F.2d 835, 837 n.2 (1st Cir. 1975); see

also Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 242, 131 S. Ct.

1068, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2011) (“Post–enactment legislative

history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool

of statutory interpretation.”); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614,

626–27, 124 S. Ct. 1204, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1122 (2004) (“[W]e

32a

Appendix A

have said repeatedly that subsequent legislative history

will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute

that can be gleaned from its language and legislative

history prior to its enactment.” (citation and quotation

marks omitted)). Tellingly, Freeman does not cite to a

single major questions case when arguing that these

subsequent events call for an alternative interpretation

of Section 5330. But as best we can glean, he believes that

certain events post–dating the 2013 guidance amount to

noteworthy hallmarks of the major questions cases.

First, Freeman discusses subsequent legislative

activity related to the regulation of virtual currencies,

including failed legislation and the 2021 amendment that

enacted the current definition of “money transmitting

business” in Section 5330, and concludes that Congress

“considered and repeatedly rejected legislation” that

would have expressly empowered FinCEN to regulate

virtual currencies. Second, Freeman identifies statements

that FinCEN made regarding virtual currencies after

issuing the 2013 guidance and claims the statements

reveal that “the agency recognized that the statute

did not authorize the regulation” but nevertheless

“expanded” its authority “before the authorization from

Congress.” Accepting Freeman’s characterization of these

occurrences, we see there may be some facial resemblance

between these facts and a major questions case. See

Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 321 (explaining that

“EPA itself has repeatedly acknowledged” that proposed

regulation “would overthrow” the “structure and design”

of the enabling act); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144

(explaining that “Congress has acted against the backdrop

33a

Appendix A

of the FDA’s consistent and repeated statements that it

lacked authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco” and

“considered and rejected bills that would have granted the

FDA such jurisdiction”). But given the Supreme Court’s

eschewal of the importance of post–enactment legislative

history outside the major questions context, we express

skepticism of these events’ relevance. See Bruesewitz, 562

U.S. at 242; Chao, 540 U.S. at 626–27. That said, despite

our skepticism, in the absence of a clear statement by the

Supreme Court that subsequent history has no bearing

on the major questions determination, 22 and given the

presence of thorough briefing from both parties on the

point, we will consider whether what happened after

FinCEN issued its 2013 guidance influences our analysis

of Freeman’s argument.

In our view, the subsequent history only confirms that

FinCEN’s interpretation of the breadth of its authority to

regulate was consistent with congressional intent. That

is because “when Congress revisits a statute giving rise

to a longstanding administrative interpretation without

pertinent change, the ‘congressional failure to revise or

repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence

22. In some instances, the Court’s major questions cases have

referenced congressional acts or omissions that post–date the

agency’s challenged regulatory assertion, but without relying on

them to resolve the major questions determination. See Ala. Ass’n

of Realtors, 594 U.S. at 760, 766 (recounting Congress’s failure to

enact multiple extensions of CDC’s challenged eviction moratorium

and noting that “Congress was on notice that a further extension

would almost surely require new legislation, yet it failed to act

in the several weeks leading up to the moratorium’s expiration”).

34a

Appendix A

that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.’”

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S.

833, 845–46, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 92 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1986)

(citation omitted) (concluding that deference to agency’s

interpretation was warranted where Congress had twice

amended the statute without overruling the agency’s

assertion of jurisdiction); see Am. Forest Res. Council v.

United States, 77 F.4th 787, 801 n.16, 462 U.S. App. D.C.

121 (D.C. Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1110, 218

L. Ed. 2d 348 (2024); Strickland v. Me. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 96 F.3d 542, 547 (1st Cir. 1996). Typically, courts

invoke this principle of statutory interpretation to infer

legislative approval from Congress’s silence and inaction,

such as when Congress re–enacts a statute without

amendment to the portion on which the agency has relied.

See Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d

12, 20 (1st Cir. 1998); Strickland, 96 F.3d at 547. We think

it applies with even more force when, as here, an agency

informs Congress of its interpretation of its statutory

authority and Congress affirmatively revises the relevant

statute to codify that interpretation. See Altman v. SEC,

666 F.3d 1322, 1326, 399 U.S. App. D.C. 55 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(upholding SEC’s interpretation of enabling statute and

explaining that SEC’s rules of practice were codified in

2002); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive

Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 537–38, 135 S. Ct.

2507, 192 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2015) (explaining that Congress

“presupposed” the existence of disparate impact claims

under the Fair Housing Act when it subsequently added

exemptions from disparate impact claims into the statute).

And to repeat, that’s exactly what happened here.

35a

Appendix A

In the years following FinCEN’s issuance of the

2013 guidance, FinCEN informed Congress on multiple

occasions that it had been regulating virtual currency

exchangers as businesses that transmit “value that

substitutes for currency.” Illicit Use of Virtual Currency

and the Law Enforcement Response: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Terrorism and Illicit Fin. of the H. Comm.

on Fin. Servs. 9, 25 (2018) (statement of Thomas Ott,

Associate Director, FinCEN Enf’t Division) (testifying

that “value that substitutes for currency” is “sufficient to

cover virtual currency”) [hereinafter H. Hrg. 115–102];

The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency:

Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Pol’y

and Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Trade and Fin.

of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affs.,

113th Cong. 8, 11 (2013) (statement of Jennifer Shasky

Calvery, Director, FinCEN) (testifying that FinCEN

was “able to cover [virtual currency] under our pre–

existing definitions and regulations, which include the

concept of other value that substitutes for currency”)

[hereinafter S. Hrg. 113–210]. Indeed FinCEN wrote

to a Senate committee that FinCEN “would not object

to Congress considering codifying elements of money

transmission to involve the transmission of currency, as

well as value that substitutes for currency.” Combatting

Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance:

Regulator and Law Enforcement Perspective on Reform:

Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and

Urb. Affs., 115th Cong. 59, 62 (2018) (written statement of

Kenneth A. Blanco, Director, FinCEN). As we previewed

earlier, Congress subsequently added “currency” and

“value that substitutes for currency” into the definition

36a

Appendix A

of “money transmitting business” in Section 5330(d)(1).

NDAA § 6102(d)(1)(2), 134 Stat. at 4553. In our view,

that Congress not only declined to criticize or correct

FinCEN’s approach (despite having been informed of it

on more than one occasion), but instead chose to codify

it, strongly suggests that FinCEN’s interpretation was

consistent with Congress’s intent.

Freeman takes an alternative view of the same

sequence of events, arguing that we should treat the

2021 amendment instead as evidence that the effective

definition could not have supported FinCEN’s earlier

reading. This view relies on a principle of statutory

interpretation that tells us to give meaning to the words

of a statute in a manner that avoids redundancies. See

City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 43. (We usually call

this principle the canon against superfluities or canon

against surplusage.) To follow Freeman’s logic, if “funds”

pre–2021 already captured virtual currencies, it would

be unnecessary to add language to the statute that also

refers to virtual currencies. Because it is undisputed that

Congress intended the addition of the phrase “value that

substitutes for currency” to refer to virtual currencies,

see NDAA § 6102(a) 134 Stat. at 4552, we should presume

that the previous formulation of the statute did not capture

this meaning.

But we have previously warned that the canon

against superfluities “is not a straitjacket” and “should

not, therefore, be employed inflexibly to rule out every

interpretation of a statute that treats certain language

as illustrative or clarifying.” City of Providence, 954 F.3d

37a

Appendix A

at 43 (concluding that amendment “appears calculated to

remove any doubt” that executive officer could exercise

particular power consistent with pre–existing statutory

authority). The prefatory language to the 2021 amendment,

NDAA § 6102(a), 134 Stat. at 4552, supports reading

the addition of “value that substitutes for currency” as

stressing that regulation of virtual currencies should

be a FinCEN priority, rather than as giving FinCEN

permission to regulate virtual currencies for the first

time. NDAA § 6102(a)(4), 134 Stat. at 4552 (explaining

that FinCEN should “mak[e] sure that steps to address

emerging methods of such illicit financing [like virtual

currencies] are high priorities”); see Jerman v. Carlisle,

McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 592,

130 S. Ct. 1605, 176 L. Ed. 2d 519 (2010) (explaining that

“Congress may simply have intended to codify existing

judicial interpretations to remove any potential for doubt

in jurisdictions where courts had not yet addressed the

issue”).

And it’s worth noting that Congress also has a

history of revising the Section 5330 definition of “money

transmitting businesses” for the purpose of clarification,

rather than substantive expansion. H.R. Rep. No. 107–250,

at 63–64 (“Although the Committee believes that informal

value transfer banking systems like hawalas are already

adequately covered by references to money transmitting

businesses in certain provisions of existing law, this

section makes that understanding explicit.”). Under

these circumstances, we need not blindly apply the canon

against surplusage to invalidate an agency regulation

that Congress deemed worthy of codification. See Bufkin

38a

Appendix A

v. Collins, 145 S. Ct. 728, 742, 221 L. Ed. 2d 192 (2025)

(“[S]ometimes the better overall reading of the statute

contains some redundancy.” (citation omitted)); City of

Providence, 954 F.3d at 43.

Freeman nevertheless insists that “Cong ress

struggled with deciding how to classify and regulate

virtual currencies” and “considered and repeatedly

rejected legislation to assign regulatory authority to

agencies like FinCEN.” See West Virginia, 597 U.S. at

731. But his position does not hold up to scrutiny. To begin

with, the legislative record simply doesn’t show the sort

of “struggle” that Freeman claims exists. In support

of his contention, Freeman first points to the FinCEN

Improvement Acts of 2018 and 2019, two bills that passed

in the House of Representatives but failed in the Senate.

H.R. 6411, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 1414, 116th Cong.

(2019). In relevant portion, these bills would have revised

FinCEN’s duty and power to “[c]oordinate with financial

intelligence units in other countries on anti–terrorism and

anti–money laundering initiatives,” 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2)

(H), to specifically “includ[e] matters involving emerging

technologies or value that substitutes for currency.” H.R.

6411, § 3; H.R. 1414, § 3. But those bills did not address

the definition of money transmitting business. Freeman

also points us to the Improving Laundering Laws and

Increasing Comprehensive Information Tracking of

Criminal Activity in Shell Holdings Act (“ILLICIT Cash

Act”), S. 2563 § 308, 116th Cong. (2019), which would have

revised the definition of “money transmitting business”

in Section 5330 to include “value that substitutes for

currency.” Freeman emphasizes that this bill “failed

39a

Appendix A

to even make it out of committee.” Yet he concedes that

the text of this bill eventually “formed the basis for the

[anti–money laundering] provisions of the 2021 NDAA.” In

other words, while Congress did fail to pass the ILLICIT

Cash Act, it adopted the relevant language from this bill

two terms later as part of the 2021 amendment. NDAA

§ 6102, 134 Stat. at 4552–53. Let us further explain.

In a major questions case, an agency’s assertion

that it can regulate in a manner in which Congress has

refused to legislate might give us reason to question

whether the agency is contravening congressional intent.

See West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 731 (applying major

questions doctrine where EPA enacted program to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions despite Congress’s rejection

of similar proposals); Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 594 U.S. at

760 (explaining that Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”)

“decided to do what Congress had not” by imposing

administrative eviction moratorium after Congress

declined to extend its own statutory moratorium). But

what we’ve chronicled as per Freeman’s argument is

hardly the sort of history that calls for application of the

major questions doctrine. FinCEN did not watch Congress

reject a proposal to regulate virtual currency exchanges

as money transmitting businesses, only to sua sponte

take up the same proposal itself. Instead, the bills that

Freeman identifies were all introduced after FinCEN

started regulating virtual currencies in 2013, and each

bill would have codified FinCEN’s “value that substitutes

for currency” formulation, rather than curtailing any

perceived administrative overreach. The bill containing

the broadest amendment ultimately was incorporated

40a

Appendix A

into leg islation that passed, codify ing FinCEN’s

interpretation. See NDAA § 6102, 134 Stat. at 4552–53;

ILLICIT Cash Act S. 2563 § 308. None of the Supreme

Court’s major questions cases have overturned agency

action when a Congress takes the agency interpretation

being challenged and chooses to enact it into law. 23

Finally, Freeman claims that “FinCEN admitted

that it had to expand its authority beyond the statutory

language to capture virtual currency.” He seemingly

23. The Supreme Court came closest to doing so in Alabama

Association of Realtors, 594 U.S. 758. That case involved a

challenge to an eviction moratorium issued by the CDC after

Congress had allowed a legislative eviction moratorium to expire.

Id. at 760. When the CDC’s administrative moratorium was set to

expire for the first time, Congress passed legislation extending

the CDC’s moratorium for one month, but subsequently declined

to extend the moratorium any further. Id. The CDC nevertheless

renewed the moratorium several times. Id. The Court’s analysis

in its per curiam opinion focused on the political and economic

significance of the eviction moratorium rather than on whether

Congress’s subsequent legislative activity (and inactivity)

amounted to tacit approval (or disapproval) of the moratorium.

Id. at 764–65. In any event, Congress’s one–month extension

of the eviction moratorium did not amount to a word–for–word

codification of the agency’s interpretation of its statutory authority

into the enabling statute, as occurred in this case. See Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116–260, § 502, 134 Stat.

1182, 2078–2079 (2020) (stating simply that CDC’s order “is

extended through January 31, 2021” without amending enabling

statute). And, moreover, Freeman does not attempt to argue

that Alabama Association of Realtors stands for the proposition

that the major questions doctrine applies even when Congress

expressly approves of the agency’s decision.

41a

Appendix A

raises this argument because at times, the Supreme Court

has emphasized that the agency’s express disclaimer of

its authority to regulate a particular industry or in a

particular manner shows that a later attempt to assert

the same authority exceeds the bounds of the governing

statute. See Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 321 (“EPA

itself has repeatedly acknowledged that applying the PSD

and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse gases

would be inconsistent with—in fact, would overthrow—the

Act’s structure and design.”); Brown & Williamson, 529

U.S. at 146 (noting FDA’s “disavowal of jurisdiction” over

tobacco products). But we see no such history of disclaimer

here. The supposed agency admissions Freeman refers to

in support of his argument are various statements made

by FinCEN officials in testimony before Congress and in a

bar association speech. See, e.g., Crypto Crime in Context:

Breaking Down the Illicit Activity in Digital Assets:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Digit. Assets, Fin.

Tech. and Inclusion of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 118th

Cong. (2023) (witness statement of Jane Khodarkovsky,

Former Trial Att’y and Hum. Trafficking Fin. Specialist,

Dep’t of Justice) (no official transcript of hearing available)

(quoted material appears on page 11 of written witness

statement), https://perma.cc/7RBZ–CPWX [hereinafter

Khodarkovsky Statement]; H. Hrg. 115–102, supra, at 9,

25 (statement of Thomas Ott, Associate Director, FinCEN

Enf’t Division); S. Hrg. 113–210, supra, at 5, 36 (statement

of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, FinCEN); FinCEN,

Prepared Remarks of FinCEN Acting Dir. Him Das

Delivered Virtually at the American Bankers Association/

American Bar Association Financial Crimes Enforcement

Conference (Jan. 13, 2022), https://perma.cc/JXQ9–BLNR.

42a

Appendix A

In Freeman’s telling, these statements acknowledge that

FinCEN lacked statutory authorization to regulate virtual

currency.

As an initial matter, we note that Freeman’s argument

appears to be an odd fit with the major questions cases,

where a later assertion of authority contradicts an earlier

disclaimer. That is so because each of the statements

Freeman references post–date FinCEN’s assertion in

2013, that virtual currency exchangers were subject to

its regulations. And when we take a closer look at the

statements Freeman has identified, we do not see FinCEN

acknowledging any discrepancy between its statutory

authority and its regulatory assertion (as Freeman

claims it has). Most of these statements express

FinCEN’s concerns that virtual currencies might not be

adequately addressed by the pre–existing regulatory

framework (rather than concerns about any gap in the

statutory scheme) and inform Congress of how FinCEN

had updated its definitions to be in sync with Congress’s

statutory intent. See, e.g., S. Hrg. 113–210, supra, at

5, 36 (warning that virtual currencies are preferred

by “[i]llicit actors” in part because they “provide[] a

loophole from the [anti–money laundering and combatting

the financing of terrorism] regulatory safeguards in

most countries around the world” and explaining that

FinCEN’s regulatory guidance, rulings, and updates

“have been able to accommodate the development of

new payment systems, including virtual currency”); H.

Hrg. 115–102, supra, at 9, 25 (statement of Thomas Ott,

Associate Director, FinCEN Enf’t Division) (recounting

regulatory acts intended to address virtual currencies and

43a

Appendix A

testifying that the “regulatory regime right now, that we

have in place, is sufficient to cover virtual currency . . .

whether or not . . . a money transmitter is located within

the continental United States”); Das, supra (“[W]e need a

regulatory regime to match, one that accounts for crypto

and other digital assets, evolution in the payments space,

and other innovations that are driving the creation of new

products, services, and delivery channels.”). 24 Another

simply acknowledges the codification of FinCEN’s existing

interpretation in 2021. Khodarkovsky Statement, supra,

at 11. None of these statements amounts to an admission

that FinCEN lacked statutory authority to regulate

virtual currency exchangers as money transmitting

businesses.

Freeman also latches onto the following sentence from

a 2019 guidance document issued by FinCEN stating,

“The term ‘other value that substitutes for currency’

encompasses situations in which the transmission does not

involve currency, or funds, but instead involves something

that the parties to a transaction recognize has value that

24. Freeman also claims that “[a] former acting director of

FinCEN, Himamauli Das, stated that the 2021 updates to the

Patriot Act, including the amendment to § 5330, were necessary

because the 2001 law ‘never anticipated the challenges of the

2020s: digital assets . . . .” Appellant’s Br. 49 (alterations in

original) (quoting Das, supra). But of course, Congress did not

need to “anticipate” the application of Section 5330 to virtual

currencies in order for FinCEN to apply the statute’s plain terms.

See Bostock, 590 U.S. at 683. Nor does a high–level remark on the

need to modernize the anti–money laundering legal framework

amount to an admission that FinCEN had no statutory authority

over virtual currencies until passage of the 2021 law.

44a

Appendix A

is equivalent to or can substitute for currency.” FinCEN,

Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business

Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies, FIN–

2019–G001, at 4 (2019). 25 According to Freeman, this

sentence shows that FinCEN recognized that “funds” are

different from “value that substitutes for currency” and

“that the word ‘funds’ in the 2001 version of § 5330 did

not capture virtual currency.” We note, however, that the

2019 guidance does not mention Section 5330 at all and

does not attempt to define the meaning of “funds,” even

within the limited universe of the guidance document.

Elsewhere in the same document, the word “funds” is

used when referring to convertible virtual currencies.

FIN–2019–G001, at 15, 19 (referring to “funds” held

in virtual currency wallets and “funds” accepted and

retransmitted by service providers that anonymize virtual

currency transactions). To read FinCEN’s use of “funds”

in this guidance document as a disclaimer of its statutory

authority to regulate virtual currency under Section 5330

would simply blink reality.

Breadth

With the relevant history in mind, we examine the

breadth of the power FinCEN has asserted, another

factor the Supreme Court has directed us to consider as

we decide if “hesitation” is called for before we affirm an

agency’s claim of regulatory authority. See West Virginia,

597 U.S. at 721. To begin, we do not buy Freeman’s

25. Freeman’s brief incorrectly identifies the source of this

sentence as the 2013 guidance. The language Freeman quotes

actually appears in a separate document. FIN–2019–G001, at 4.

45a

Appendix A

argument that FinCEN “claim[ed] to discover in a long–

extant statute an unheralded power.” Util. Air Regul.

Grp., 573 U.S. at 324. In requiring virtual currency

transmitters to register, FinCEN was not regulating in an

“unheralded” or “unprecedented” manner, West Virginia,

597 U.S. at 724–25, 728 (citations omitted) (explaining

that EPA had never before attempted to systemically

reduce emissions by “‘shifting’ polluting activity ‘from

dirtier to cleaner sources’“ (citations omitted)), nor was

FinCEN relying on an obscure, “ancillary” or “gap filler”

statutory provision, id. at 724. To the contrary, that agency

has continuously relied on Section 5330 as authority

to regulate money transmitters since 1994. See Riegle

Community Development and Regulatory Improvement

Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–325 § 408, 108 Stat. 2160,

2249–51 (1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5330). All it did in

2013 was explicitly specify that businesses transmitting

virtual currency would be treated the same as those

transmitting physical currency. In short, this “unheralded

power” argument is doomed because FinCEN’s regulation

of bitcoin is not the kind of “unprecedented” program, one

so unlike FinCEN’s historical approach to regulation, that

would call for application of the major questions doctrine.

See Biden v. Missouri, 595 U.S. 87, 90–91, 94, 142 S. Ct. 647,

211 L. Ed. 2d 433 (2022) (holding that Secretary of Health

and Human Services did not exceed statutory authority

in promulgating rule conditioning receipt of Medicaid and

Medicare funds on vaccination of healthcare providers

where “the Secretary routinely imposes conditions of

participation that relate to the qualifications and duties

of healthcare workers”); cf. Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 501

(reversing program by Secretary of Education to cancel

46a

Appendix A

loan obligations where “Secretary has never previously

claimed powers of this magnitude under the HEROES

Act” and “past waivers and modifications issued under the

Act have been extremely modest and narrow in scope”);

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 594 U.S. at 765 (concluding that

CDC could not impose eviction moratorium in counties

experiencing substantial or high levels of COVID–19

transmission where since the enactment of the claimed

statutory authority in 1944, “no regulation premised on

it has even begun to approach the size or scope of the

eviction moratorium”).

Nor in challenging FinCEN’s breadth of reach does

Freeman attempt to argue that FinCEN’s exercise of

regulatory authority over virtual currency transmitters

somehow falls outside its “sphere of expertise.” See Nat’l

Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, 117–18, 142

S. Ct. 661, 211 L. Ed. 2d 448 (2022) (explaining that a

“broad public health measure[],” like a vaccine mandate,

was “outside of OSHA’s sphere of expertise” and was not

authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)). FinCEN’s enumerated

statutory duties and powers specifically include analysis of

“emerging trends and methods in money laundering and

other financial crimes” and the identification of “emerging

threats” and “emerging technology” to assist in federal

investigations and in countering money laundering and

terrorism. See 31 U.S.C. 310(b)(2)(C)(v), (b)(2)(M)–(N); cf.

Missouri, 595 U.S. at 93 (affirming vaccine mandate for

healthcare workers promulgated under the Secretary of

Health and Human Services’ authority to pass regulation

“necessary in the interest of the health and safety of

individuals who are furnished services”).

47a

Appendix A

Ultimately, and in the absence of facts suggesting

FinCEN tried to wield unheralded power, or regulate in

an area beyond its expertise, what Freeman’s case seems

to boil down to is this: Congress, in amending Section

5330 in 2001, simply could not have intended to regulate

something that did not yet exist. But there is nothing

compelling about this timing–of–events argument. Taken

to its logical conclusion, Freeman’s argument more or

less advocates for a principle of statutory construction

that exempts new technologies from existing statutory

schemes unless Congress had somehow foreseen the

course of technological innovation and had expressly

accounted for it ahead of time. But no such legal principle

exists that we are aware of. Cf. Steele v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 51 F.4th 1059, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022) (certifying

questions related to whether a child conceived via in vitro

fertilization with cryo–preserved sperm after father’s

death was entitled to benefits as father’s child under the

Social Security Act and Florida law), certified question

answered, 385 So. 3d 587 (Fla. 2024); Application of

Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“Congress

cannot be expected to foresee, or to annually amend [the

Patent Act] to incorporate, every future breakthrough

onto entirely new technological terrain.”). Courts

routinely enforce “plain statutory commands” even where

Congress may not have expected the statute to apply

to certain factual situations at the time of passage. See

Bostock, 590 U.S. at 683.

The only case Freeman cites in support of his timing

theory is National Federation of Independent Business

v. OSHA. 595 U.S. at 114–19. According to Freeman,

48a

Appendix A

the Supreme Court rightly rejected the Occupational

Health and Safety Administration’s (“OSHA”) “attempt

to impose a COVID vaccine mandate based on a statutory

provision adopted 50 years before the pandemic,” and, says

Freeman, “[t]he same principles [should] apply here.” Yet

nothing in the decision suggests that the Court based its

opinion on the fact that COVID–19 was a “new” virus that

did not exist when Congress enacted the Occupational

Safety and Health Act in 1970. See id. at 114. Instead,

the Court’s focus was the unprecedented nature of

OSHA’s action in mandating universal vaccination and the

apparent disconnect between such a vaccine mandate and

OSHA’s actual sphere of expertise. Id. at 119 (“OSHA, in

its half century of existence, has never before adopted a

broad public health regulation of this kind—addressing

a threat that is untethered, in any causal sense, from

the workplace.”). Giving some credence to Freeman’s

assertion, the reasoning in National Federation might

resonate with us if, say, FinCEN decided to regulate

materials used to manufacture illegal drugs on the

basis that fewer illegal drug sales would reduce money

laundering. Freeman’s view of National Federation’s

holding appears to be an alternate reality in which OSHA

had long exercised statutory authority to issue vaccine

mandates to address viral spread, only for the Supreme

Court to strike down its COVID–19 vaccine mandate on

the basis that COVID–19 was a new type of virus with

an extraordinary and unforeseen impact on the United

States. That simply is not what National Federation

is about, and there is no coherent analogy between the

unprecedented nature of OSHA’s regulatory assertion in

that case and what happened here.

49a

Appendix A

Put differently, under Freeman’s characterization of

National Federation, the major questions doctrine would

apply any time an agency relied on a long extant statute

to regulate an impactful new technology. This would

transform a legal doctrine meant for extraordinary cases

into a commonplace principle of statutory interpretation.

Because nothing in the history or breadth of FinCEN’s

regulation of money transmitting businesses calls for

application of the major questions doctrine, we turn now

to the political and economic significance of the regulation

to see if those considerations are difference–makers.

Political and Economic Significance

Political Significance

Freeman asserts that virtual currencies have

“provoked much political debate” (though he identifies no

specific example of it), and by this assertion seems to suggest

that political debate equates to political significance. As

best we can tell, he relies on his account of the legislative

history of Section 5330 (which we’ve just explained only

shows Congress’s approval of FinCEN’s regulation of

virtual currencies) rather than on any meaningful or

controversial legislative flashpoint that might call into

question Congress’s intent to regulate virtual currencies.

To his nebulous “provoked much political debate” political

significance contention, Freeman, in his reply brief, adds a

federalism concern—that FinCEN’s regulation of virtual

currencies “intrudes into an area that is the particular

domain of state law.” See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 594 U.S.

at 764. We think this after–thought argument is likely

50a

Appendix A

waived, given that he had every reason to make it in his

opening brief. 26 United States v. Tosi, 897 F.3d 12, 15 (1st

Cir. 2018) (“[A]rguments available at the outset but raised

for the first time in a reply brief need not be considered.”).

Even if we were to give him the courtesy of the doubt, his

only support for this federalism proposition is a single

sentence from a Congressional Research Service report

indicating that “[m]oney transmitters are regulated and

licensed at the state level.” See Andrew P. Scott, Cong.

Rsch. Serv., R46486, Telegraphs, Steamships, and Virtual

Currency: An Analysis of Money Transmitter Regulation

1 n.1 (2020). That federal and state anti–money laundering

regulatory regimes might co–exist hardly demonstrates

that the registration requirement is “significantly

alter[ing] the balance between federal and state power

and the power of the Government over private property”

in the same manner as an eviction moratorium. See Ala.

Ass’n of Realtors, 594 U.S. at 764 (reasoning that “the

landlord–tenant relationship” is a “particular domain

of state law” upon which eviction moratorium intrudes).

Accordingly, we see no indication that when FinCEN

began regulating virtual currencies in 2013, it was acting

on a question of vast political significance.

26. Freeman claims that this argument properly responds to

the government’s assertion that he had not made any showing of

an intrusion into the particular domain of state law and is thus a

proper subject for a reply brief. See Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d

20, 27 (1st Cir

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