Amicus Curiae Brief — Hamdi A. Mohamud, Petitioner v. Heather Weyker, St. Paul Police Officer

No. 25-760

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_________________________

HAMDI A. MOHAMUD,

Petitioner,

v.

HEATHER WEYKER, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS A

ST. PAUL POLICE OFFICER,

Respondent.

_________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Casey Norman

Counsel of Record

Christian Clase

Markham Chenoweth

NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE

4250 N. Fairfax Dr., Ste. 300

Arlington, VA 22203

Phone: (202) 869-5210

Casey.Norman@NCLA.legal

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE............................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 3

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 7

I.

THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 ............................................................ 7

II.

POST-EGBERT, § 1983 IS A VITAL TOOL FOR

HOLDING CROSS-DEPUTIZED LAW

ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ACCOUNTABLE ..... 11

III. CROSS-DEPUTIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT

OFFICERS ARE PLAINLY STATE ACTORS

UNDER THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE.......... 18

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 24

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ahmed v. Weyker,

984 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2020) ............................ 23, 24

Askew v. Bloemker,

548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976) .................................. 12

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971) ................................................ 12

Bond v. United States,

572 U.S. 844 (2014) ................................................ 15

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,

365 U.S. 715 (1961) ................................................ 20

Cain v. Rinehart,

No. 22-1893, 2023 WL 6439438 (6th Cir. July 25,

2023) ....................................................................... 16

Challenger v. Bassolino,

No. 18-15240, 2023 WL 4287204 (D.N.J. June 30,

2023) ....................................................................... 17

Couden v. Duffy,

446 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2006) ................................... 12

David v. City and Cnty. of Denver,

101 F.3d 1344 (10th Cir. 1996) .............................. 20

Dennis v. Sparks,

449 U.S. 24 (1980) .................................................. 19

Egbert v. Boule,

596 U.S. 482 (2022) ........................................ 2, 5, 13

iii

Farah v. Weyker,

926 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2019) .................................. 11

Guerrero v. Scarazzini,

274 F. App’x 11 (2d Cir. 2008) ............................... 12

Jakuttis v. Town of Dracut,

95 F.4th 22 (1st Cir. 2024) ..................................... 12

King v. United States,

917 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2019) .................................. 12

Lake Country Ests., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,

440 U.S. 391 (1979) .................................. 7, 9, 10, 14

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922 (1982) ...................... 7, 8, 10, 18, 19, 20

Mayor of New York v. Miln,

36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) ................................... 15

Mohamud v. Weyker,

144 F.4th 1099 (8th Cir. 2025) ...... 18, 20, 21, 22, 23

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York,

436 U.S. 658 (1978) .............................................. 8, 9

Monroe v. Pape,

365 U.S. 167 (1961) .................................................. 8

Owen v. City of Independence,

445 U.S. 622 (1980) .............................................. 8, 9

Smith v. Arrowood,

No. 6:21-CV-6318, 2023 WL 6065027 (W.D.N.Y.

Sept. 18, 2023) ........................................................ 16

United States v. Adan,

No. 3:10-CR-260 (M.D. Tenn.) ............................... 24

iv

United States v. Fahra,

643 F. App’x 480 (6th Cir. 2016)............................ 24

West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42 (1988) ............................................ 19, 22

Wyatt v. Cole,

504 U.S. 158 (1992) ........................................ 3, 8, 19

Ziglar v. Abbasi,

582 U.S. 120 (2017) .......................................... 13, 14

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .................................................... 9, 18

Other Authorities

Hassan Kanu,

Police Empowered to Lie About Investigations After

Federal Appeals Court Ruling, REUTERS (July 20,

2022, 5:00 PM).......................................................... 4

Heather Weyker L, GOVSALARIES (last visited Jan. 22,

2026) .........................................................................4

Regulations

28 C.F.R. § 0.112 ....................................................... 10

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

The New Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA) is a

nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights organization and

public-interest law firm devoted to defending

constitutional freedoms from the administrative

state’s depredations. Professor Philip Hamburger

founded NCLA to challenge multiple constitutional

defects in the modern administrative state through

original litigation, amicus curiae briefs, and other

advocacy.

The “civil liberties” of the organization’s name

include rights at least as old as the U.S. Constitution

itself, such as due process of law and the right to be

tried in front of impartial judges who provide their

independent judgments on the meaning of the law.

Yet these selfsame civil rights are also very

contemporary—and in dire need of renewed

vindication—precisely because Congress, executive

branch officials, administrative agencies, and even

some courts have neglected them for so long.

NCLA aims to defend civil liberties—primarily

by asserting constitutional constraints on the modern

administrative state. Although Americans still enjoy

the shell of their Republic, a very different sort of

government has developed within it—a type that the

Constitution was designed to prevent.

This

1 No party’s counsel authored any portion of this brief, and no

party, party counsel, or person other than amicus curiae made a

monetary contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation

or submission. All parties received timely notice of intent to file

this brief.

2

unconstitutional state within the Constitution’s

United States is the focus of NCLA’s concern.

NCLA urges the Court to clarify and reaffirm

that Congress’s express remedy in 42 U.S.C. § 1983

remains available to victims of government

wrongdoing when state or local law enforcement

officers violate constitutional rights under color of

state law—even if those officers have also been crossdeputized with limited federal power. NCLA is deeply

disturbed by the increasingly commonplace practice of

task force cross-deputization throughout the country,

which poses significant risks to Americans’

constitutional rights, as this case illustrates. Crossdeputized state and local officials—in most cases,

police and other members of law enforcement—are

deputized by the federal government to operate under

the color of state and federal law. Such officers are

imbued with limited federal authority to fulfill specific

duties on joint federal-state task forces, while

simultaneously maintaining the full authority of their

state or local positions. Although they plainly operate

under the authority of both state and federal law, in

many cases, they cannot be held liable under either.

Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in

Egbert v. Boule, the availability of Bivens relief for

claims against federal officials was virtually

extinguished for most plaintiffs. 596 U.S. 482 (2022).

As a result, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 often remains a

plaintiff’s only viable vehicle for recovering damages

for constitutional violations committed by crossdeputized officers, whether operating under state law

or a combination of state and federal law.

3

In an alarming trend, however, courts across

the country—including the district and circuit courts

in this case—have categorically rejected plaintiffs’

§ 1983 claims against cross-deputized officers, ruling

that such officers act exclusively under the authority

of federal law regardless of the specific facts

presented. This practice turns a blind eye to the

realities of the dual-pronged authority wielded by

cross-deputized officers, and it substitutes courtcreated immunity for Congress’s statutorily crafted

remedy in § 1983. It thus renders cross-deputized

state and local officers effectively immune per se from

liability, depriving even the most egregiously harmed

plaintiffs of any meaningful remedy or legal recourse.

It also eliminates any deterrent effect that § 1983 has

on officers who might be inclined to abuse their

authority and flout the constitutional rights of

Americans. This harmful approach serves no valid

interest, and it is inconsistent with Congressional

design and judicial precedent. As a staunch defender

of Americans’ constitutional rights, including the

right to be governed by laws written by elected

officials—rather than judicially crafted doctrines—

NCLA has an interest in the outcome of this case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

For over 150 years, § 1983 of the Civil Rights

Act of 1871 has served “to deter state actors from

using the badge of their authority to deprive

individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to

provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey

v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–57 (1978)). This case—

where Respondent framed Petitioner, causing

4

Petitioner to be incarcerated for over two years—

illustrates the abuse of state power against which

§ 1983 protects. The case also exemplifies the dangers

posed by the unconstitutional practice of granting

blanket immunity to cross-deputized law enforcement

officers like Respondent Officer Weyker.

Several courts have already found that Weyker

abused her authority as a law enforcement officer to

fabricate allegations against Ms. Mohamud and at

least 30 other individuals to advance her own career.

Despite her conduct, available information indicates

that Respondent remains employed as a police officer

and has suffered no material consequences for her

actions.2

In addition to evading any professional

consequences from her state employer, Respondent

has also managed to avoid liability in court. This

results from the circuit court’s ruling that

Respondent—a state police officer who has remained

a state officer at all times relevant to this appeal—

could not be held liable as a state actor under § 1983.

Why? Because Respondent was also a cross-deputized

member of a federal joint task force—temporarily

imbued with limited federal authority—and therefore,

Heather

Weyker

L,

GOVSALARIES,

https://govsalaries.com/weyker-heather-l-202099900

(last

visited Jan. 22, 2026); Hassan Kanu, Police Empowered to Lie

About Investigations After Federal Appeals Court Ruling,

REUTERS

(July

20,

2022,

5:00

PM),

https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/police-empoweredlie-about-investigations-after-federal-appeals-court-ruling2022-07-20/.

2

5

according to the court, she could only act under color

of federal law.

Cross-deputized officers possess limited federal

authority to fulfill discrete duties on joint task forces,

while simultaneously maintaining the full authority

of their state or local positions. Although such officers

operate under the authority of both state and federal

law, in many cases, they cannot be held liable under

either. This Court’s ruling in Egbert v. Boule all but

extinguished any remaining availability of Bivens

claims against federal officials for most plaintiffs. 596

U.S. 482 (2022). As a result, § 1983 often remains a

plaintiff’s only viable vehicle for recovering damages

for constitutional violations committed by crossdeputized officers.

In contrast to § 1983, an express statutory right

of action empowering plaintiffs to seek damages

against state officials, Congress has not authorized

damages against federal officials for running afoul of

individuals’ constitutional rights. Rather, Bivens is a

judicially crafted doctrine providing an implied cause

of action for damages against federal actors.3 With

Egbert’s erosion of the doctrine’s already shaky

Although damages actions against federal officers for

constitutional violations are today referred to as “Bivens claims,”

the underlying cause of action is not simply a free-standing,

judge-made remedy. Rather, Bivens is best understood as a

“lineal descendant of [] longstanding constitutional practice,”

rooted in common law. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in

Support of Petitioner at 4.

3

6

footing, lower courts have grown increasingly hesitant

to recognize causes of action for Bivens relief.

And with the virtual elimination of Bivens

relief for most plaintiffs, the availability of § 1983 as

a potential remedy is crucial for plaintiffs who have

been wronged by cross-deputized law enforcement

officers. When courts, including the circuit court in

this case, effectively refuse to subject cross-deputized

officers to § 1983 liability, they not only cut plaintiffs

off from any meaningful form of relief, but also send a

message to state and local officers that they may

commit unconstitutional acts with impunity, so long

as the acts are undertaken while the officers are

members of a joint task force.

The circuit court is not alone in its tenuous,

categorical

approach

to

cross-deputization.

Numerous courts nationwide have effectively treated

the conferral of even limited federal authority on a

state or local officer as dispositive of the § 1983

inquiry, presuming that cross-deputization alone

renders all challenged conduct federal in nature.

Under this approach, the presence and exercise of

state authority—no matter how substantial—drops

out of the analysis entirely. The result is a wholesale

foreclosure of § 1983 relief for victims of constitutional

violations by cross-deputized officers, based not on

any fact-specific assessment of the officer’s conduct or

authority, but on a status-based presumption that an

officer’s cross-deputization defeats any indicia of state

action.

This Court, however, has made clear that the

lodestar for determining whether an officer acts under

7

color of state law is whether the officer’s “conduct

is … chargeable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson

Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (there is state action

where a violation is caused “by a person for whom the

State is responsible” and “who may fairly be said to be

a state actor”). Section 1983 is not limited to actions

performed “under the exclusive color” of state law nor

“under the primary color” of state law. Rather, as this

Court has instructed, § 1983 “must be given a liberal

construction” with the “largest latitude consistent

with the words employed.” Lake Country Ests., Inc. v.

Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 399–400 &

n.17 (1979). That is because § 1983 is a remedial

statute, which Congress enacted “in aid of the

preservation of human liberty and human rights.” Id.

The categorical rule of absolute immunity

embraced by many lower courts today defies

voluminous Supreme Court precedent and turns

§ 1983 on its head. The courts that have adopted this

presumption

ignore

fundamental

§ 1983

jurisprudence and subvert the statute’s design—and,

in doing so, deprive Americans of a remedy to protect

their constitutional rights.

ARGUMENT

I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983

Congress passed § 1983 as a part of the Civil

Rights Act of 1871 “for the express purpose of

‘enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth

Amendment.’” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 934 (alteration in

original) (citing Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405

8

U.S. 538, 545 (1972)). Indeed, the history of the Act is

“replete with statements indicating that Congress

thought it was creating a remedy as broad as the

protection that the Fourteenth Amendment affords

the individual.” Id. Although § 1983 was initially

wielded primarily as a remedy against state officials

who were “unable or unwilling” to enforce state law to

protect Black citizens from the violence of the Ku Klux

Klan, as reflected by Congress’s expansive language

in the provision, its purposes were much broader than

that. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961),

overruled in part, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New

York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that Congress

intended for municipalities and other government

units to be included among those persons to whom

§ 1983 applies).

According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he central

aim of the Civil Rights Act was to provide protection

to those persons wronged by the misuse of power,

possessed by virtue of state law and made possible

only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the

authority of state law.” Owen v. City of Independence,

445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (cleaned up); see also Wyatt

v. Cole, 504 U.S. at 161 (“[t]he purpose of § 1983 is to

deter state actors from using the badge of their

authority to deprive individuals of their federally

guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if

such deterrence fails.”) (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 254–

57).

Section 1983 provides a direct cause of action:

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

9

or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws

shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

As anticipated by Congress, for over a century,

§ 1983 served as a critical tool for American citizens

to combat and seek compensation for governmental

abuse of constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at

666–690 (holding that Congress intended for

municipalities and other government units to be

included among those persons to whom § 1983

applies); see also Owen, 445 U.S. at 651 (explaining

that the purpose of § 1983 is to hold state officials

accountable for violations of constitutional rights

“whether they act in accordance with their authority

or misuse it.” (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172)).

The text of the statute does not limit its

application to acts “under the exclusive color” of state

law nor even “under the primary color” of state law.

Nor has this Court ever read that restriction into the

statute. This Court has instead instructed that § 1983

“must be given a liberal construction” and the “largest

latitude consistent with the words employed.” Lake

Country Ests., 440 U.S. at 399–400 & n.17. That is

because § 1983 is a remedial statute, which Congress

10

enacted “in [the] aid of the preservation of human

liberty and human rights.” Id. Moreover, to read the

“under color of any statute” language of § 1983 in such

a way “as to impose a limit on those Fourteenth

Amendment violations that may be redressed by the

§ 1983 cause of action would be wholly inconsistent”

with the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.

Lugar, 457 U.S. at 934.

Section 1983 also provides no carveout or

insulation from liability for state or local officers who

also happen to simultaneously assist federal joint task

forces—also known as “cross-deputized” officers.

Cross-deputization is a practice where state or local

law enforcement officials are “deputized” with

temporary authority to perform federal law

enforcement functions. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 0.112

(authorizing Director of United States Marshals

Service to deputize, inter alia, state and local law

enforcement officers to “perform the functions of a

Deputy U.S. Marshal” for a limited time period).

Cross-deputized officers retain their state or local

positions while serving on joint task forces to assist

federal agencies with law enforcement investigations

within a particular state.

Special deputation

regulations, including 28 C.F.R. § 0.112—under

which Respondent Officer Weyker was crossdeputized—do not provide for immunity from lawsuits

brought under § 1983. Weyker nevertheless contends,

and apparently the lower courts agreed, that she is

absolved from liability for her numerous4

4 As the Eighth Circuit has already concluded, Defendant Officer

Weyker is not entitled to qualified immunity, as “a reasonable

officer would know that deliberately misleading another officer

11

unconstitutional acts executed under color of state

law simply by virtue of being a cross-deputized officer

at the time that she committed them, wielding both

federal and state authority. In so arguing, Weyker

ignores fundamental § 1983 jurisprudence, as

described above, and subverts the statute’s purpose.

At a minimum, Respondent was not operating under

exclusive federal authority when she relied on her

state law enforcement position and authority to

convince (under false pretenses) a fellow state law

enforcement officer to arrest Mohamud for a state

crime. It is, in fact, doubtful whether the enabling

statute or Weyker’s cross-deputization supports any

federal authority for her actions. Indeed, as specified

by Weyker’s deputization form, her federal authority

was limited to “seek[ing] and execut[ing] arrest and

search warrants supporting a federal task force.” Pet.

App. 386a. Officer Weyker’s actions in framing

Mohamud and other adolescents for state-law crimes

fell well beyond the limits of any reasonable

conception of the federal authority granted to her.

II. POST-EGBERT, § 1983 IS A VITAL TOOL FOR

HOLDING CROSS-DEPUTIZED LAW

ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ACCOUNTABLE

The dual federal-state authorities under which

cross-deputized officers operate have rendered it

difficult for plaintiffs and courts alike to determine

whether a particular officer’s actions were performed

into arresting an innocent individual to protect a sham

investigation is unlawful.” Farah v. Weyker, 926 F.3d 492, 503

(8th Cir. 2019) (leaving lower court’s denial of qualified

immunity untouched).

12

under color of state law, federal law, or both. While

some circuit courts have ruled that cross-deputized

task force officers may be held liable under § 1983 for

acts carried out under color of state law, others have

adopted a categorical presumption that such officers

act exclusively under color of federal law, without

respect to the facts of the case (and in some circuits,

the question remains undecided).5 As a result, those

whose constitutional rights have been violated by

joint task force officers are forced to guess whether to

bring damages claims under § 1983 (for violations

committed under color of state law) or Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971) (for violations committed under

color of federal law)—or both.

The answer of many lower courts appears to be

none of the above. This leaves plaintiffs with no

pathway to recovery, while empowering crossdeputized officers to abuse their authority. That is a

result of this Court’s recent ruling in Egbert v. Boule,

which all but eliminated the availability of Bivens

relief to plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were

violated by federal law enforcement officers, and left

§ 1983 as a plaintiff’s only remedy for relief against an

5 Compare Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2006); Askew

v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976), with Jakuttis v. Town

of Dracut, 95 F.4th 22, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2024) (shielding officer

from liability because conduct was “related to” task force duties);

King v. United States, 917 F.3d 409, 433 (6th Cir. 2019), rev’d on

other grounds sub nom. Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021);

Guerrero v. Scarazzini, 274 F. App’x 11, 12 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008)

(summary order) (“[B]ecause Scarazzini and McAllister were

federally deputized for their Task Force work, this claim was

properly brought … as a Bivens action”).

13

officer committing unconstitutional acts under color of

both state and federal law. Yet the lower courts’

categorical presumption that cross-deputized officers

operate exclusively under federal authority forecloses

that route to recovery as well.

Although NCLA maintains that Egbert is

inconsistent with the Constitution, this Court’s

rationale in that case was not antithetical to explicit

congressional legislation, which cannot be said of the

circuit court’s approach below. Indeed, although

Congress expressly authorized actions for damages

against state officers for constitutional violations

through § 1983, it has not done the same for suits

against federal officials. Bivens and its progeny

represent the few implied causes of action that this

Court has recognized by which plaintiffs may seek

damages for violations of their constitutional rights by

federal officials. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120,

140 (2017) (only three narrow contexts in which

Bivens right of action recognized: “a claim against FBI

agents for handcuffing a man in his own home without

a warrant; a claim against a Congressman for firing

his female secretary; and a claim against prison

officials for failure to treat an inmate’s asthma”).

In Egbert, this Court disavowed its ruling in

Bivens and all but eliminated the possibility of

applying Bivens to any new context beyond the three

specific sets of facts that it had already recognized.

596 U.S. at 492 (“If there is a rational reason to think

that the answer is ‘Congress’—as it will be in most

every case—no Bivens action may lie.”) (internal

citation omitted).

14

Notably, while § 1983 has historically been

“liberally and beneficially construed” and afforded

“the largest latitude consistent with the words

employed,” even prior to Egbert, lower courts applied

Bivens cautiously. Lake Country Ests., 440 U.S. at

399–400 n.17; see also Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 135

(describing Bivens remedy as a “‘disfavored’ judicial

activity”). That is because, in contrast to § 1983, an

express statutory right of action authorizing damages

against state officials, Congress has not authorized

damages against federal officials for running afoul of

individuals’ constitutional rights. Rather, Bivens is a

judicially crafted doctrine providing an implied cause

of action for damages against federal actors. With

Egbert’s erosion of the doctrine’s already shaky

footing, lower courts have grown increasingly hesitant

to recognize causes of action for Bivens relief.

With the virtual elimination of Bivens relief for

most plaintiffs, the availability of § 1983 as a potential

remedy has become indispensable for individuals who

have been wronged by cross-deputized law

enforcement officers.

Yet many courts have

effectively closed that avenue, as well, refusing to

subject cross-deputized officers to § 1983 liability.

The resulting regime permits state and local officers

to commit unconstitutional acts with impunity, so

long as the acts are committed while the officers are

members of a joint task force. Indeed, the practice of

cross-deputization expands the federal government’s

15

law enforcement power beyond its constitutional

limits, with significant consequences. 6

Consider these recent examples:

 Example 1: Plaintiff brought action against

cross-deputized local police officer serving on

joint federal task force, alleging cross-deputized

officer and other task force members forcefully

entered plaintiff’s home with no probable cause.

The state warrant turned out to have been

issued for a different address, yet the officers

rushed at plaintiff with weapons drawn,

assaulted plaintiff while his hands were in the

air, threw plaintiff to the ground, handcuffed

him, and proceeded to search his home.

6 It is no wonder, then, that the federal government fights for

joint task force officers to evade § 1983 liability so that it may

expand the scope of federal power. Under our Constitution, the

police power “unquestionably remains and ought to remain” in

the states—not the federal government. Mayor of New York v.

Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 128 (1837). Indeed, the federal

government “has no such authority and can exercise only the

powers granted to it.” Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854

(2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, in

the context of law enforcement, the federal government’s reach

is limited to criminal acts related to “the execution of a power of

Congress” or to a matter “within the jurisdiction of the United

States,” such as terrorism or human trafficking. Id. However,

without § 1983 to serve as a bulwark against the

unconstitutional conduct of cross-deputized law enforcement

officers, joint task forces offer the federal government an easy

workaround to the constitutional strictures precluding federal

police power.

16

Outcome: No liability. Bivens relief unavailable;

§ 1983 unavailable because the “source and

implementation of authority for the task force”

was the U.S. Marshals Service and, therefore,

cross-deputized local officer “was not acting

under color of state law,” even though the

warrant was issued by a state judge. Cain v.

Rinehart, No. 22-1893, 2023 WL 6439438, at *2

(6th Cir. July 25, 2023).

 Example 2: Plaintiff brought action against

federal

and

cross-deputized

local

law

enforcement officers who were members of

federal task force. He alleged the officers

shouted at him as they approached his home

without uniforms and failed to advise plaintiff

that they were officers. Without a warrant, they

forcibly entered unarmed plaintiff’s home and

shot him multiple times at point-blank range,

causing broken bones, collapsed lung, nerve

damage, and other serious injuries, after which

they proceeded to drag plaintiff outside into the

yard.

Outcome: No liability. Bivens relief unavailable;

motion to dismiss granted without discussion of

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because officers were

cross-deputized members of a federal joint task

force. Smith v. Arrowood, No. 6:21-CV-6318,

2023 WL 6065027 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2023).

 Example 3: Plaintiff brought action against

Deputy U.S. Marshal and cross-deputized local

law enforcement officer who was member of

federal task force, alleging that, in executing a

17

state arrest warrant, defendants placed plaintiff

in handcuffs, punched him in the face, lifted him

up and slammed him to the ground, and

continued to punch him as he lay on the ground,

causing broken teeth and numerous lacerations.

The officers then refused to take plaintiff to

hospital and instead brought him to jail for

intake.

Outcome: No liability. Bivens relief unavailable;

§ 1983 unavailable because “state officers are

considered federal actors when carrying out

their duties as part of a federal task force.”

Challenger v. Bassolino, No. 18-15240, 2023 WL

4287204, at *4 (D.N.J. June 30, 2023).

The decisions in these cases resulted from the

lower courts’ adoption of an unconstitutional blanket

rule or presumption that cross-deputized task force

officers act exclusively under color of federal law—and

thus enjoy absolute immunity. Rather than assessing

the officers’ actions and the circumstances

surrounding those actions, as required under § 1983

and this Court’s precedent, they focused instead on

the source of authority for the officers’ crossdeputization.

In effect, what was once a confusing shell game

has morphed into a futile game of “heads I win, tails

you lose” for plaintiffs faced with filing suits seeking

damages in one of the circuits employing the

presumption that cross-deputized officers act

exclusively under federal authority. Whether an

officer is deemed to have acted under federal

18

authority or state authority while cross-deputized, the

result is the same: no remedy.

III. CROSS-DEPUTIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT

OFFICERS ARE PLAINLY STATE ACTORS

UNDER THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

Any categorical rule or presumption that a

cross-deputized law enforcement officer is immune

from § 1983 liability contradicts Congress’s purpose

and design in enacting the Civil Rights Act. Though

it purported to engage in the relevant factual analysis,

the circuit court adopted just such a presumption.

The court appeared to believe that, because

Respondent was cross-deputized—in other words,

because she had also been granted limited authority

as a federal task force officer—she could evade

responsibility for violating Petitioner’s constitutional

rights under color of state law. See Mohamud v.

Weyker, 144 F.4th 1099, 1103 (8th Cir. 2025). Not so.

This Court has plainly held that the crucial

question is not whether the defendant is a private

individual, a federal employee, or a state employee,

but whether he or she was acting under color of state

law when engaging in rights-violative conduct. See

Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)

(holding that petitioner could pursue § 1983 claim

against private individual who acted jointly with state

officers to deprive him of property rights). That

precedent is consistent with Congress’s stated aim in

passing § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any

statute …”) (emphasis added); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Accordingly, the circuit court’s holding must be

reversed.

19

As discussed in Part I, Congress passed the

Civil Rights Act to ensure that state and local law

enforcement officers may be held accountable when

they violate an individual’s constitutional rights. See

supra at 7. As this Court has recognized, the purpose

of § 1983 is both (1) “to deter state actors from using

the badge of their authority” to commit such

violations, and (2) “to provide relief to victims if such

deterrence fails.” See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161.

Thus, at a minimum, any § 1983 inquiry into

the acts of a cross-deputized officer should be factspecific and focused on whether the defendant was

acting—to any extent—under the color of state law.

See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937–38; West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (“the defendant in a § 1983 action

[must] have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of

state law and made possible only because the

wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”)

(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326

(1941)).

Indeed, this Court has unequivocally held that

“under-color-of-state-law” is effectively an identical

concept to “state action” when assessing the viability

of § 1983 actions. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 (“If the

challenged conduct of respondents constitutes state

action as delimited by our prior decisions, then that

conduct was also action under color of state law and

will support a suit under § 1983”); Dennis v. Sparks,

449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980) (“Private persons, jointly

engaged with state officials in the challenged action,

are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of § 1983

actions”); see also David v. City and Cnty. of Denver,

20

101 F.3d 1344, 1354 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that

plaintiff may have been able to establish that her

police officer colleagues “acted under color of law”

when they sexually harassed her).

That assessment reflects a proper conception of

Congress’s purpose and design in enacting § 1983.

And if private actors can be subject to § 1983 lawsuits

when they are operating under color of state law, it is

logically incoherent to absolve cross-deputized officers

from responsibility simply because they are also

granted authority under federal law. See Lugar, 457

U.S. at 934 (explaining that § 1983 “was passed for

the express purpose of [enforcing] the Provisions of

the Fourteenth Amendment” as “the history of [the

Civil Rights Act] is replete with statements indicating

that Congress thought it was creating a remedy as

broad as the protection that the Fourteenth

Amendment affords the individual.”) (cleaned up).

The question always must be whether the individual

is—to some extent—acting under color of state law or

jointly with the state. See Burton v. Wilmington

Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (courts must look

to totality of the circumstances to determine if person

acts under color of state law).

Here, rather than meaningfully evaluate

whether Respondent’s framing of Petitioner for

witness-tampering occurred, to any extent, “under

color of state law,” the court below woodenly applied

circuit precedent dictating that, because Weyker was

cross-deputized at the time of her misconduct, she

acted under color of federal authority, and “[s]tate law

had nothing to do with it.” Weyker, 144 F.4th at 1104

21

(quoting Yassin v. Weyker, 39 F.4th 1086 (8th Cir.

2022)).

Although the court acknowledged Rule

8(a)(2)’s generous pleading standard—that all wellpleaded allegations must be accepted as true and that

a plaintiff need only state a claim that is “plausible on

its face,” see id. at 1103—it failed to apply that

standard. Instead, the court treated the fact of Officer

Weyker’s cross-deputization as dispositive of the

“under color of what law” inquiry, regardless of

Petitioner’s factual allegations to the contrary.

Indeed, Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that

Weyker’s cross-deputization conferred only limited

federal authority—namely, seeking and executing

arrest warrants in support of the federal task force—

authority that Weyker did not exercise in connection

with the framing of Ms. Mohamud and her friends for

a state-law crime.

Petitioner also alleged that

Respondent at all relevant times remained a St. Paul

Police Department (SPPD) officer; continued to report

to a St. Paul sergeant as her direct supervisor;

remained on SPPD’s payroll; and carried out the

investigation and framing of Petitioner through

numerous actions undertaken pursuant to her statelaw authority. See Pet. at 10-13.

Petitioner further alleged the existence of joint

agreements between the St. Paul Police Department,

Weyker’s employer, and federal law enforcement

agencies that govern operating procedures for crossdeputization. These memos state that:

Liability for violations of federal

constitutional law rests with the

individual federal agent or officer

22

pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) or

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for State

and local officers or cross-deputized

federal officers.

Pet. App. 282a; see also Pet. App. 351a (similar). In

other words, by entering into such joint agreements,

cross-deputized SPPD officers are recognized both by

their employers and the federal agencies that crossdeputize them as acting under color of state law. The

agreement also reflects the parties’ understanding

that, accordingly, cross-deputized officers’ “violations

of federal constitutional law” lead to liability under

§ 1983. That was at least a fact that the courts below

ought to have considered. See West, 487 U.S. at 51

(referring to manual governing prison health care in

North Carolina to determine whether defendant, a

private physician employed by the state to provide

medical services to incarcerated individuals, could be

held liable under § 1983).

Yet the court below dismissed these allegations

in a footnote, asserting that the joint agreements “just

state what we already know: officers can be liable

under § 1983 or Bivens depending on the

circumstances.” Weyker, 144 F.4th at 1104 n.2. But

that blithe assertion cannot be squared with the

court’s own analysis. Indeed, under the Eighth

Circuit’s approach, the mere fact of cross-deputization

forecloses § 1983 liability of cross-deputized state or

local officers altogether. See id. at 1104. The court

likewise rejected Petitioner’s allegation that a cross-

23

deputized officer can ever exercise state and federal

authority simultaneously, reasoning that such a

possibility “would give plaintiffs a choice between

Bivens and § 1983 in cases like this one.” Id. But even

putting to one side whether Bivens is ever really an

available source of relief, that observation exposes the

flaw in the court’s reasoning, rather than justifying it.

Where an officer plausibly exercises both state and

federal authority, the availability of alternative

remedial paths is not anomalous—it is a necessary

consequence of the distinct constitutional and

statutory regimes that govern those exercises of

power. And eliminating those alternatives leaves

plaintiffs without any remedy at all.

As in all cases, the court was obliged to conduct

an independent analysis of the specific facts presented

in this case. The court’s approach instead had the

effect of presuming that any cross-deputized officer

may simply enjoy immunity from § 1983, which is

entirely at odds with the statute’s aims—and,

apparently, the understanding memorialized in joint

agreements entered into by the St. Paul Police

Department. See supra at 21-22.

If any case illustrates why the district court’s

approach was wrongheaded, it is this one. Officer

Weyker has a documented history of framing at least

30 innocent people, many of whom have spent time in

pretrial detention; Petitioner’s friend even gave birth

in custody due to Weyker’s misuse of her authority as

a law enforcement officer. See Ahmed v. Weyker, 984

F.3d 564, 566 (8th Cir. 2020). Petitioner spent over

two years behind bars as a teenager before being

24

released without charges. These shocking allegations

are not pulled out of thin air: courts have recognized

that Weyker simply manufactured allegations to

bolster her career and reputation. See, e.g., United

States v. Adan, No. 3:10-CR-260 (M.D. Tenn.) (the

“Adan” cases); Ahmed, 984 F.3d at 565; United States

v. Fahra, 643 F. App’x 480, 481–84 (6th Cir. 2016).

Yet, without this Court’s intervention, Weyker will

suffer no consequences for her abominable conduct.

That failing would convey a troubling message to

police officers and other members of law enforcement

that they can get away with the most egregious abuses

of authority if they simply first ensure that they are

cross-deputized.

That malicious message is not one that the

courts should want to send, and it is certainly not the

message that Congress conveyed when it passed

§ 1983. To the extent that an apparent trend in favor

of the Eighth Circuit’s practice is emerging among the

lower courts in this country, that provides all the more

reason why that pernicious development must

immediately be halted and reversed in the interests of

justice and to preserve Americans’ most fundamental

constitutional rights.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge

the Court to grant Ms. Mohamud’s petition.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Casey Norman

Casey Norman

25

Counsel of Record

Christian Clase

Markham Chenoweth

NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE

4250 N. Fairfax Dr., Suite 300

Arlington, VA 22203

Phone: (202) 869-5210

Casey.Norman@NCLA.legal

Counsel for Amicus Curiae