Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ioan Lela, Petitioner v. Thomas J. Dart, et al.

■ XI

APPENDIX WITH LIST OF ATTACHED SUPPORTING EXHIBITS

(1) Totally baseless Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit/ EXHIBIT "NN"

(2) Decision of the U.S. District Court granting Respondents' Motion to Strike Petitioner's Rule

26 (a)(2) Expert Disclosures/ EXHIBIT "XX" ( Dated 2/20/2024)

(3) Memorandum Opinion and Order of the U.S. District Court granting the Respondents' Motion

for Summary Judgment / EXHIBIT " YY" ( Dated 7/8/2024)

(4) Memorandum Opinion and Order of the U.S District Court denying Petitioner's FRCP Rule 60 (b)

Motion and Motion for Judicial Disqualification / EXHIBIT "ZZ" ( Dated 8/2/2024)

(5) Petitioner's invaluable LOCAL RULE 56.1 STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS/EXHIBIT

"LL"

(6) Respondents' IDOC Compilation of 200 plus Division #11 inmates' grievances concerning the

subject ventilation problems/ EXHIBIT" FF"

(7) The Respondents' IDOC falsified Cook County Jail Inspection Checklists for several years/

GROUP EXHBIT "AA"

(8) The New York Times News Article " Cook County Jail is the TOP U.S. HOT SPOT AS VIRUS

SPREADS BEHIND BARS "/ EXHIBIT " GG"

(9) The News Article " Extreme Heat Excerbates Dire Prison Conditions with Few Paths to Relief "

/EXHIBIT "EE".

(10) The News Article " Clearing the Air: Why Indoor Air Quality matters for Correctional Officers'

Health :/ EXHIBIT "TT".

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

Idtriidr JBtafcs (Knurl uf Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 9,2025*

Decided July 9,2025

♦>

Before

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge

No. 24-2544

IOAN LELA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

v.

No. 18 C 4058

THOMAS J. DART, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Matthew F. Kennelly,

Judge.

ORDER

Ioan Leia, a pretrial detainee, appeals the district court's summary judgment

rejecting his claims that jail officials subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement by maintaining an inadequate air-ventilation system in his housing unit.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

No. 24-2544

Page 2

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Leia has not presented any evidence from which a

reasonable jury could find that the jail officials acted unreasonably, we affirm

Leia was detained at Cook County Jail from 2015 to 2021. He maintains that,

during this time, inadequate air ventilation in his housing unit triggered or exacerbated

multiple ailments, including mild sporadic allergic rhinitis, upper respiratory infection,

and headaches. In 2018, he filed an internal grievance complaining that the

air-ventilation system in his housing unit was not adequately cleaned. He complained

that one to two inches of "human dead skin" and "dust mite particles" accumulated on

the air-conditioning covers. Within two weeks, an employee at the jail responded to the

grievance by cleaning the air vents in Leia's housing unit.

Leia then sued several jail officials, alleging that they maintained an inadequate

air-ventilation system in his housing unit, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

rights. Further proceedings ensued, and the district court eventually granted summary

judgment for the jail officials. The court concluded that Leia failed to offer evidence

from which a reasonable jury could infer that the officials' actions were objectively

unreasonable.

Leia moved to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, contending that the court ignored evidence showing that the jail's

inadequate air-ventilation system caused his medical ailments. He also moved to

disqualify the judge based on the allegedly selective manner in which the judge

credited certain evidence. The court denied both motions. Regarding the Rule 60(b)

motion, the court concluded that Leia rehashed the arguments that it had rejected in its

order entering summary judgment for the officials. As for the motion to disqualify, the

court explained that adverse rulings were not grounds for disqualification.

On appeal, Leia first contests the summary judgment decision, arguing that the

district court overlooked evidence supporting his claim that the defendants subjected

him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. He points to grievances filed by

other detainees at the jail, a 2010 consent decree, and a 2017 district court order—all of

which, in his view, show that the defendants maintained objectively unreasonable

conditions of confinement and knew that these conditions were unconstitutional.

To get past summary judgment, however, Leia needed to—but did not—furnish

evidence that the defendants purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly created conditions

that were objectively unreasonable. See Kemp v. Fulton Cnty., 27 F.4th 491,495 (7th Cir.

No. 24-2544

Page 3

2022) (citations omitted); Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019). The

documents he cites say nothing about his conditions of confinement, let alone that the

defendants responded or failed to respond in a manner that was objectively

unreasonable. Indeed, the uncontroverted evidence reflects that jail officials took

reasonable steps to maintain an adequate air-ventilation system and reasonably

responded to Leia's grievance about the air-ventilation system by cleaning the air vents

in his housing unit. The court's entry of summary judgment was proper.

Leia next argues that the district court erred in excluding his proposed expert

witness—a retired trial lawyer—as not qualified. The court explained that a lawyer's

experience litigating matters on a particular subject did not render him a specialist on

that subject. The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579

(1993). Such testimony is permitted if the witness is "an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education" and his opinion is "the product of reliable principles

and methods" that have been applied to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. We agree

with the district court that Leia's proposed witness did not satisfy these standards. The

trial lawyer's experience in litigating prison conditions of confinement did not qualify

him to opine on causal relationships between air ventilation and medical ailments.

See, e.g., Goodwin v. MTD Prods., Inc., 232 F.3d 600, 609 (7th Cir. 2000) (an individual

with a degree in mechanical engineering does not make him qualified to give expert

opinion on the causation of an injury).

Lastly, Leia rehashes his argument that the district judge was biased against

him and should have disqualified himself. He says that the court ignored certain

documents when ruling against him at summary judgment. But adverse judicial rulings

generally do not constitute a valid basis for disqualification, especially as here where

there is no suggestion of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism" that makes fair

judgment impossible. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,555 (1994).

AFFIRMED

!N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

IOAN LELA,

)

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

Case No. 18 C 4058

)

THOMAS J. DART, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

The Court granted summary judgment against plaintiff loan Leia on July 8, 2024

and dismissed his claims, which arise from his incarceration at the Cook County Jail.

Mr. Leia, who is proceeding pro se in this case, has moved to vacate the judgment

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). But before addressing that motion, the

Court must address another motion Mr. Leia has filed, in which he asks to disqualify the

undersigned judge under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455.

Section 144 states that if a party "makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit

that the judge before whom the matteris-pending has a personal bias or prejudice either ~

against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein,

but another judge shall be assigned" to decide the disqualification issue. 28 U.S.C.

§144. Section 144 also requires, however, that a party's motion under that provision

"shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that [the

disqualification motion] is made in good faith." Id. Mr. Leia has not provided a

and thus assignment of a separate judge to decide the motion is not required. See

Watford v. LaFond, 725 F. App'x 412, 414 (7th Cir. 2018).

The grounds for Mr. Leia's disqualification motion essentially boil down to the

proposition that the Court committed gross error in various rulings in this case. That is

almost never an appropriate basis for disqualification of a judge, see Liteky v. United

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); Watford, 725 F. App'x at 414; Rolle v. Creedon, No.

22-1720, 2023 WL 2185657, at *3 (Feb. 23, 2023), and it is not in this case. The Court's

rulings are certainly subject to appeal by Mr. Leia, and it is clear that he vehemently

disagrees with those rulings, but they do not provide a basis for disqualification of the

undersigned judge. Rather, Mr. Leia's remedy is to appeal to a higher court. The Court

therefore denies Mr. Leia's motion for disqualification.

Turning to Mr. Leia's motion under Rule 60(b) to vacate the judgment, the motion

consists in its entirety of a repeat of arguments that Mr. Leia made in connection with

the defendants' motion to strike his expert's report, the defendants' summary judgment

motion, and various other matters. This is not a proper basis to seek reconsideration.

See, e.g., Vesely v. ArmslistLLC, 7Q2 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014) (a motion to

reconsider "is not to be used to 'rehash' previously rejected arguments"); O'Grady v.

City of Portage, Nos. 21-1529 & 21-1530, 2022 WL 205435, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 24,

2022). The Court overrules these arguments for the reasons it stated in its prior orders.

On one specific point, Mr. Leia takes great umbrage at the Court's determination

that he did not comply with Local Rule 56.1. See Dkt. no. 187

36-37. The most

important point on that is this: the Court expressly "determined to overlook Leia's

noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1 and . .. considered all the materials he has

2

ij- ■ X.

referenced in opposing the defendants' motion

" Summary Judgment Decision at

2. So even if the Court erred regarding Local Rule 56.1 compliance, Mr. Leia was in no

way harmed by that, because the Court considered everything he submitted.

In sum, Mr. Leia does not identify in his motion anything that he submitted in

connection with the challenged rulings that the Court misunderstood or overlooked.

Rather, he argues that the Court got it wrong. This is not a basis to ask this Court for a

redo; rather it is a basis to appeal. Mr. Leia has offered no proper basis for

reconsideration. The Court denies his motion to vacate the judgment.

Conclusion

The Court denies plaintiffs motion for disqualification [185] and his motion for

relief under Rule 60(b) [187] for the reasons stated in this order.

Date: August 2, 2024

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY

United States District Judge

3

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.