Amicus Curiae Brief — Moreland Properties LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability Company, Petitioner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, an Ohio Corporation, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 28, 2026

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No. 25-758

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

MORELAND PROPERTIES LLC,

Petitioner,

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

AND GOODYEAR FARMS, INC.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE

ARIZONA LEGISLATURE AND 18 STATES

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Additional Counsel Listed

After Signature Page

Justin D. Smith

Counsel of Record

Michael C. Martinich-Sauter

Kenneth C. Capps

Daniel C. Carter

JAMES OTIS LAW GROUP, LLC

530 Maryville Centre Drive

Suite 230

St. Louis, Missouri 63141

(816) 678-2103

Justin.Smith@james-otis.com

January 28, 2026

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Arizona Legislature

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................ 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

I. CERCLA relies on cooperative federalism. ........... 3

A. CERCLA seeks prompt cleanups paid by

responsible parties. ........................................... 3

B. CERCLA provides a robust role for the States.

........................................................................... 4

C. States are needed to carry out prompt

cleanups. ........................................................... 5

II. States carry out robust cleanup programs that

depend on voluntary cooperation. ....................... 10

A. States are effectively cleaning properties. ..... 10

B. Private parties voluntarily cooperate in

exchange for certain protections. ................... 14

III. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling threatens State-led

cleanups. ............................................................. 16

A. Petitioner’s cost recovery action denied despite

State oversight. ............................................... 16

B. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling deepens a

significant circuit split.................................... 18

C. The Ninth Circuit’s decision will make

voluntary compliance more difficult. ............. 19

D. The Ninth Circuit’s decision diminishes State

cleanup programs. .......................................... 21

E. Fewer cleaned properties will harm the States

and our citizens............................................... 22

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Arizona v. City of Tucson,

761 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2014) ........... 5, 9-10, 14, 19

Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian,

590 U.S. 1 (2020) ............................... 3-6, 14-15, 21

Broward Gardens Tenants Ass’n v. EPA,

311 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2002) .............................. 4

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States,

556 U.S. 599 (2009) ................................................ 3

California Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v.

Hearthside Residential Corp.,

613 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................ 14

City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc’ns Co.,

532 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 2008) .................................. 18

Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp.,

215 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2000) ................................... 4

Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. UGI Utilities, Inc.,

423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005) ................................... 20

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc.,

543 U.S. 157 (2004) .............................................. 16

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,

573 U.S. 1 (2014) .................................................... 3

E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States,

460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006) ................................. 20

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States,

508 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2007) ................................. 20

Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,

475 U.S. 355 (1986) ........................................ 4, 6, 9

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi,

302 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................ 15

iii

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,

No. 2:20-CV-6347, 2022 WL 22401182 (S.D. Ohio

Mar. 18, 2022) ...................................................... 19

Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,

511 U.S. 809 (1994) ................................................ 3

Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v.

N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc.,

473 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007) ............................ 3, 20

Moreland Props. LLC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

No. 24-2451, 2025 WL 2452372 (9th Cir. Aug. 26,

2025) ..................................................................... 17

Moreland Props. LLC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

No. CV-20-02297-PHX-SRB, 2023 WL 11963448

(D. Ariz. July 27, 2023) ...................................16-17

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A.,

Inc.,

596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010) .......................... 4-5, 18

Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co.,

966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992) ................................ 21

NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Eng’g Co.,

227 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2000) ...........................18-19

Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Gates Rubber Co.,

175 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) ............................ 16

Syms v. Olin Corp.,

408 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2005) ................................... 21

Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.,

735 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2013) ................................... 5

United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc.,

949 F.2d 1409 (6th Cir. 1991) ................................ 5

United States v. Bestfoods,

524 U.S. 51 (1998) .................................................. 4

Statutory and Regulatory Authorities

40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(ii) ...................................... 21

40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2004) ............................................ 16

42 U.S.C. § 9605(h)...................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) ................................................ 15

42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(1) .................................................. 5

42 U.S.C. § 9622(c)(1) ................................................ 15

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-175(A) ..................................... 12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-177 .......................................... 12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-179(B) ..................................... 12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-180 .......................................... 12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-181(B) ..................................... 12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-292(B) ..................................... 12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-292(C) ..................................... 12

H.R.Rep. No. 99–253, pt. 5, at 58 (1985) .................. 20

National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution

Contingency Plan, 53 FED. REG. 51,394 (Dec. 21,

1988) ..................................................................... 16

S.Rep. No. 96–848, p. 6119 (1980) .............................. 4

Other Authorities

Ariz. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Voluntary Remediation

Program (revised Feb. 18, 2025), at

https://azdeq.gov/VRP (last visited Jan. 19, 2026)

.........................................................................11-12

Ass’n of State and Territorial Solid Wast Mgmt.

Officials, 2020 State Brownfields Program

Analysis (Feb. 2021), at

https://astswmo.org/files/Resources/CERCLA_and

_Brownfields/2020-State-Brownfields-ProgramAnalysis.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2026) ............. 13

Betsy Marshall, A Landowner Walks into A Bar:

Using State Common Law to Encourage Efficient

CERCLA Cleanups, 48 ECOLOGY L.Q. 477 (2021)

................................................................................ 8

Christopher J. Redd, The Adversarial Relationship

Between the States and EPA: Conflict over State

Authority Under CERCLA, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. &

POL’Y 101 (1993) ................................................... 22

Cleaning Up and Restoring Communities for

Economic Revitalization Before Subcomm. on

Superfund, Toxics & Envtl. Health of the S.

Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 113th Cong. 11,

13 (2013) (statement of Mathy Stanislaus,

Assistant Adm’r, Office of Solid Waste &

Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency)

.............................................................................. 10

Cleaning Up the Past, Building the Future: The

Brownfields Program Before Subcomm. on Water

Res. & Env’t of H. Comm. on Transp. &

Infrastructure, 119th Cong. 12-13 (2025)

(statement of Lisa Shook, Ass’t Chief, Division of

Envtl. Response & Remediation, Ohio Envtl. Prot.

Agency) ................................................................. 13

Cleaning Up the Past, Building the Future: The

Brownfields Program Before Subcomm. on Water

Res. & Env’t of H. Comm. on Transp. &

Infrastructure, 119th Cong. 18 (2025) (statement

of Michael Goldstein) ........................................... 13

Danielle Kaeding, Study finds Great Lakes cleanup

funding increases property values, WIS. PUB.

RADIO (Oct. 19, 2023), at

https://www.wpr.org/environment/study-greatlakes-cleanup-funding-increases-property-values

(last visited Jan. 19, 2026)................................... 24

Doc. 106, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. ConAgra

Foods, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-6347 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13,

2021) ..................................................................... 19

EPA, Accomplishments (last updated Jan. 5, 2026),

https://www.epa.gov/brownfields/accomplishment

s (last visited Jan. 19, 2026) ................................ 11

EPA, Deleted National Priorities List (NPL) Sites –

by State, at

https://www.epa.gov/superfund/deleted-nationalpriorities-list-npl-sites-state (last visited Jan. 19,

2026) ................................................................. 7, 12

EPA, Environmental Benefits of Brownfields

Redevelopment—A Nationwide Assessment, EPA

560-R-20-001 (May 2020), at

https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/202404/environmental_benefits_of_brownfields_redeve

lopment.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2026) .............. 23

EPA, Population Surrounding 1,881 Superfund Sites

(July 2023), at

https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/202308/FY22%20Population%20Estimates%20Superfu

nd%20Final.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2026) ......... 6

EPA, Proposed National Priorities List (NPL) Sites –

by State, at

https://www.epa.gov/superfund/proposednational-priorities-list-npl-sites-state (last visited

Jan. 19, 2026) ......................................................... 7

EPA, Pub. No. 9375.5–01/FS, State and Local

Involvement In the Superfund Program (1989) .. 10

EPA, Reuse Possibilities for Brownfield Sites (Sept.

2019), at

https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201909/documents/reuse_possibilities_for_brownfield_

sites.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2026) .................... 23

EPA, State Response Programs (last updated on May

29, 2025), at

vii

https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/state-responseprograms (last visited Jan. 19, 2026) .................. 10

EPA, Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL), at

https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfundnational-priorities-list-npl (last visited Jan. 19,

2026) ....................................................................6-8

James P. Young, Expanding State Initiation and

Enforcement Under Superfund, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.

985 (1990) ........................................................21-22

Karen A. Sullivan, Brownfields Remediation: Impact

on Local Residential Property Tax Revenue, 19 J.

Envtl. Assessment Policy Mgmt. 1750013 (2017),

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S

1464333217500132 (last visited Jan. 19, 2026) .. 24

Kevin Haninger et al., The Value of Brownfield

Remediation, Nat’l Bureau of Economic Research

Working Paper 20296 (July 2014), at

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers

/w20296/w20296.pdf............................................. 23

Laura O. Taylor et al., Disentangling property value

impacts of environmental contamination from

locally undesirable land uses: Implications for

measuring post-cleanup stigma, 93 J. URBAN

ECON. 85 (2016), at

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/

pii/S0094119016000243 ....................................... 24

Laurel Berman et al., An Overview of Brownfields

Redevelopment in the United States Through

Regulatory, Public Health, and Sustainability

Lens, J. Environ Health author manuscript (May

2022), at

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC101911

73/pdf/nihms-1847505.pdf (last visited Jan. 19,

2026) ..................................................................... 22

viii

Modernizing the Superfund Cleanup Program Before

Subcomm. on the Env’t of the H. Comm. on

Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. 11 (2018)

(statement of Stephen Cobb, Chief of Land

Division, Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. & PastPresident of Ass’n of State and Territorial Solid

Waste Mgmt. Officials) ...................................10-11

Office of Superfund Remediation & Tech. Innovation,

U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EP W-07-037, Beneficial

Effects of the Superfund Program 4 (2011) ........ 15

Rachel D. Guthrie, The Silent Strength of CERCLA:

Private Party Cleanups-and the Judicial

Decisions Jeopardizing Them, 36 GEO. ENVTL. L.

REV. 165 (2024)..................................................... 14

Remarks On Signing the Small Business Liability

Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act In

Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, 1 PUB. PAPERS 53

(Jan. 11, 2002) (Remarks of President George W.

Bush) .................................................................... 13

Ronald G. Aronovsky, A Preemption Paradox:

Preserving the Role of State Law in Private

Cleanup Cost Disputes, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225

(2008) ...................................................................... 6

Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA:

Rethinking the Role of Federal Law in Private

Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2006)

.......................................................................... 6, 10

U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., GAO/RCED-94-256,

SUPERFUND: Status, Cost, and Timeliness of

Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups, at 2 (1994), at

https://www.gao.gov/assets/rced-94-256.pdf (last

visited Jan. 19, 2026) ............................................. 8

U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., GAO/RCED-97-20,

SUPERFUND: Times to Complete the Assessment

and Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites, at 8

(1997), at https://www.gao.gov/assets/rced-9720.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2026) ......................... 8

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-09-656,

Superfund: Litigation Has Decreased and EPA

Needs Better Information on Site Cleanup and

Cost Issues to Estimate Future Program Funding

Requirements 70 tbl.15 (2009) ............................... 9

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-25-108408,

Testimony Before the Committee on Environment

and Public Works, U.S. Senate, SUPERFUND:

Many Factors Can Affect Cleanup of Sites Across

the U.S., at 9 (Apr. 9, 2025), at

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108408.pdf

(last visited Jan. 19, 2026)..................................... 9

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The Arizona Legislature and the States of

Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Iowa,

Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,

North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas,

Utah, and West Virginia submit this brief in support

of Petitioner.1 Amici Arizona Legislature and the

States have a strong interest in supporting State-led

cleanup efforts and protecting the principles of

cooperative federalism.

Because EPA cannot oversee cleanup efforts at

every contaminated property in the country, State-led

programs by Amici States fill an important need and

enable prompt cleanups by private parties. These

State-led programs protect human health and the

environment, restore property to productive use, and

increase property values and tax revenue, which

benefit the States, state budgets, and our citizens.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision to not presume

substantial

compliance

with

the

National

Contingency Plan (“NCP”) based on State oversight—

and the similar decisions by the Sixth, Eighth, and

Tenth Circuits—undermines State-led cleanup

programs and threatens the benefits that States and

our citizens receive from them. Private parties will

hesitate to voluntarily participate in a State-led

program if they may be unable to recover costs from

other responsible parties. The States are interested

in resolving the split in the circuits in line with the

Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, no counsel for any party authored

this brief in whole or in part, and no party or counsel for a party,

or any other person, other than amici curiae or their counsel,

made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation

or submission of this brief. Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.2, counsel

of record received timely notice of the intent to file this brief.

decisions by the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits,

which have presumed that State-approved cleanups

substantially comply with the NCP.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

CERCLA relies on cooperative federalism to

ensure prompt cleanups of contaminated properties.

Because of this country’s large number of

contaminated properties and EPA’s limited resources,

States play a critical role in overseeing cleanup

efforts. State cleanup programs have resulted in

hundreds of thousands of cleaned properties that may

once again enjoy productive use.

Neither EPA nor the States could clean all

contaminated properties on their own. Instead, they

depend on voluntary cooperation by private parties.

Private parties are incentivized to clean contaminated

properties through liability protection and cost

predictability. Compliance with the NCP is a key

factor in cost predictability.

The Ninth Circuit ruled that cleanups under State

oversight are not presumptively compliant with the

NCP. This ruling threatens State cleanup programs

because it discourages the voluntary cooperation on

which they rely. Under this ruling, parties are

incentivized to sit on their hands to avoid being stuck

with all cleanup costs, or to cooperate only with EPA.

As a result, States will spend more resources

pursuing responsible parties, fewer properties will be

cleaned, and States and our citizens will be deprived

of the jobs, housing value increases, and tax revenue

generated by cleaned properties. The Court should

grant the Petition to resolve the circuit split on this

important issue.

ARGUMENT

I. CERCLA relies on cooperative federalism.

A. CERCLA seeks prompt cleanups paid by

responsible parties.

“In the 1970s and 80s, a number of high-profile

environmental disasters, including the ‘Love Canal’

dumping at Niagara Falls, New York, drew the

public’s attention to the environmental risks and

health hazards posed by improper hazardous waste

disposal.” Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater

Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473

F.3d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 2007). These environmental

disasters led to legislative action. “In 1980, Congress

enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Act) …

in response to the serious environmental and health

risks posed by industrial pollution.” Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602

(2009) (internal citations omitted). “The Act seeks ‘to

promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites

and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts

[are] borne by those responsible for the

contamination.’” Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590

U.S. 1, 6 (2020) (citation omitted).

Cleaning contaminated property is not cheap.

Cleanup actions under CERCLA “typically require

private parties to incur substantial costs in removing

hazardous wastes and responding to hazardous

conditions.” Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511

U.S. 809, 814 (1994). To incentivize parties to carry

out these expensive cleanups, “[t]he Act provided a

federal cause of action to recover costs of cleanup from

culpable entities.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S.

1, 4 (2014). The goal was so that “those actually

‘responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or

injury from chemical poisons [may be tagged with] the

cost of their actions.’” United States v. Bestfoods, 524

U.S. 51, 55-56 (1998) (quoting S.Rep. No. 96–848, p.

6119 (1980)). “The scheme envisioned by Congress

protects taxpayers generally from bearing the costs of

nationwide cleanup.” Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo

Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2000).

B. CERCLA provides a robust role for the

States.

As this Court has recognized, “the ‘spirit of

cooperative federalism … run[s] throughout CERCLA

and its regulations.’” Atl. Richfield Co., 590 U.S. at

24 (citation omitted).

In that spirit, Congress

“assigned the states a role in the enforcement of the

substantive standards established for remedial

actions.” Broward Gardens Tenants Ass’n v. EPA, 311

F.3d 1066, 1076 (11th Cir. 2002). When private

parties are unwilling to conduct cleanups, “CERCLA

empowers the federal government and the states to

initiate comprehensive cleanups and to seek recovery

of expenses associated with those cleanups.” Niagara

Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d

112, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).

Congress also allowed the federal government to

delegate authority to the States. “Section 104 of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604, which sets out procedures

for governmental response to hazardous substance

releases, provides that state and local governments,

as well as the Federal Government, may be delegated

by the President to undertake appropriate measures

and receive reimbursement from Superfund.” Exxon

Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 360 n.3 (1986). Nor does

a State need such delegation to act. “A state may also

independently engage in CERCLA remediation

efforts, so long as those efforts are not inconsistent

with the EPA’s National Contingency Plan.” Arizona

v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014).

In short, “CERCLA views the states as independent

entities that do not require the EPA’s express

authorization before they can act.” Niagara Mohawk

Power Corp., 596 F.3d at 127.

Throughout its text, “CERCLA promotes state

participation.” Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge

& Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2013). For

example, when EPA is cleaning a site, States “must be

afforded

opportunities

for

‘substantial

and

meaningful involvement’ in initiating, developing,

and selecting cleanup plans.” Atl. Richfield Co., 590

U.S. at 24 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(1)). And in

those situations when a State starts the cleanup

process, “EPA usually must defer initiating a cleanup

at a contaminated site that a State is already

remediating.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9605(h)).

Time and time again, CERCLA empowers States

to carry out its mission of timely cleaning

contaminated property.

C. States are needed to carry out prompt

cleanups.

“[S]tates play a critical role in effectuating the

purposes of CERCLA.” Niagara Mohawk Power

Corp., 596 F.3d at 126 (citation omitted). “As a

practical matter, state participation in CERCLA

enforcement is absolutely necessary because there are

more contaminated sites than the EPA is capable of

addressing on its own.” City of Tucson, 761 F.3d at

1019 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).

State participation is necessary because Congress

“grossly underestimated the number of sites requiring

cleanup and the monies necessary to remedy the

problem.” United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc.,

949 F.2d 1409, 1417 (6th Cir. 1991). EPA estimates

that more than 450,000 contaminated sites exist in

the United States. See Ronald G. Aronovsky, A

Preemption Paradox: Preserving the Role of State Law

in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL.

L.J. 225, 232 (2008). This dwarfs estimates made at

the time of CERCLA’s passage. “Congress enacted

CERCLA in 1980 after receiving estimates that there

were approximately 30,000-50,000 contaminated sites

across the country.”

Ronald G. Aronovsky,

Federalism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of

Federal Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33

ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 7 (2006).

EPA has addressed only a fraction of these

contaminated sites. CERCLA “directs EPA to compile

and annually revise a prioritized list of contaminated

sites for cleanup, commonly known as Superfund

sites.” Atl. Richfield Co., 590 U.S. at 6. This is “now

known as the National Priorities List.” Exxon Corp.,

475 U.S. at 374.

The National Priorities List

currently contains 1,343 sites and 38 proposed sites.

EPA, Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL). 2

Addressing these sites is important. Almost onequarter of the U.S. population (78 million people) live

within three miles of a final, deleted, or proposed

National Priorities List site.

EPA, Population

Surrounding 1,881 Superfund Sites (July 2023). 3

Available at https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfundnational-priorities-list-npl (last visited Jan. 19, 2026).

Available at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/202308/FY22%20Population%20Estimates%20Superfund%20Final.p

df (last visited Jan. 19, 2026).

Despite the importance of cleaning these

prioritized sites, EPA has completed work and deleted

just 459 sites from the National Priorities List in the

45 years since CERCLA became law. See EPA,

Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL). 4

Arizona, EPA has deleted only three sites from the

National Priorities List during that time. EPA,

Deleted National Priorities List (NPL) Sites – by

State. 5 No sites have been deleted from the National

Priorities List in two States—Montana and Nevada—

and only one site has been deleted in four States—

Hawaii, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Rhode

Island. See id. Compared to the four total sites

deleted in these six States, 72 sites remain on the

National Priorities List, EPA, Superfund: National

Priorities List (NPL), 6 and three more sites have been

proposed, EPA, Proposed National Priorities List

(NPL) Sites – by State. 7

Action on National Priorities List sites often moves

at a snail’s pace. Eight of Arizona’s 10 sites on the

National Priorities List have been listed since 1990 or

earlier. EPA, Superfund: National Priorities List

See note 2, supra.

Available at https://www.epa.gov/superfund/deleted-nationalpriorities-list-npl-sites-state (last visited Jan. 19, 2026).

Hawaii (three sites); Montana (18 sites); Nebraska (18 sites);

Nevada (1 site); New Hampshire (20 sites); and Rhode Island (12

sites). See note 2, supra.

Available at https://www.epa.gov/superfund/proposed-nationalpriorities-list-npl-sites-state (last visited Jan. 19, 2026)

(proposing one site each for Montana, Nevada, and New

Hampshire).

(NPL). 8 Arizona is not unique. EPA listed more than

half of the sites on the National Priorities List—683

sites, totaling more than 27,000 acres—in the 1980s.

See id.

Part of this delay is attributable to the time that it

takes for EPA to decide the type of cleanup needed at

a site. At one point, this phase lasted an average of

eight years for non-federal sites. See U.S. Gen.

Accounting Off., GAO/RCED-97-20, SUPERFUND:

Times to Complete the Assessment and Cleanup of

Hazardous Waste Sites, at 8 (1997). 9 This was a

consistent issue. More than a decade after CERCLA

became law, “18 percent (150) of the sites that have

been in the Superfund program for at least 8 years

have not progressed beyond the initial study phase

(that is, decisions on the type of cleanup to perform

have not yet been completed).” U.S. Gen. Accounting

Off., GAO/RCED-94-256, SUPERFUND: Status, Cost,

and Timeliness of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups, at

2 (1994). 10 Amazingly, “[a]t 9 of these 150 sites, the

study phase ha[d] not yet begun.” Id.

Implementation of the cleanup is another source of

delay. “For Superfund sites expected to cost $50

million or more to complete (‘mega sites’), the median

duration is 14.8 years to reach the ‘construction

complete’ phase. For non-mega sites, the average

duration of cleanup activities is 10.1 years.” Betsy

Marshall, A Landowner Walks into A Bar: Using State

See note 2, supra.

Available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/rced-97-20.pdf (last

visited Jan. 19, 2026).

Available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/rced-94-256.pdf (last

visited Jan. 19, 2026).

Common Law to Encourage Efficient CERCLA

Cleanups, 48 ECOLOGY L.Q. 477, 478 n.1 (2021) (citing

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-09-656,

Superfund: Litigation Has Decreased and EPA Needs

Better Information on Site Cleanup and Cost Issues to

Estimate Future Program Funding Requirements 70

tbl.15 (2009)). Together, as these reports show, the

study and cleanup phases for EPA-led cleanups can

last decades.

EPA has cited its limited resources as a factor

affecting timely cleanup of National Priorities List

sites. According to EPA officials interviewed by the

GAO, shortages in “regional staff available to perform

the cleanup can cause delays.”

U.S. Gov’t

Accountability Off., GAO-25-108408, Testimony

Before the Committee on Environment and Public

Works, U.S. Senate, SUPERFUND: Many Factors

Can Affect Cleanup of Sites Across the U.S., at 9 (Apr.

9, 2025). 11 EPA has identified funding as another

factor affecting timeliness. See id. Insufficient

funding is not surprising. “Congress was well aware

that the funding level of Superfund was and is

insufficient to clean up more than a few of the most

dangerous hazardous waste disposal sites.” Exxon

Corp., 475 U.S. at 371.

These well-documented resource constraints make

clear that “without state participation, most

contaminated sites will remain polluted.” City of

Tucson, 761 F.3d at 1019 (Callahan, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). As a

result, EPA has long recognized that “State and local

governments play an important role in ensuring

Available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108408.pdf

(last visited Jan. 19, 2026).

effective, efficient and well-coordinated cleanups.” Id.

(quoting EPA, Pub. No. 9375.5–01/FS, State and Local

Involvement In the Superfund Program (1989)).

Indeed, “[a]t most sites, state or local government

agencies serve as the lead regulatory entity.”

Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA, 33 ECOLOGY

L.Q. at 7-8.

States “play a significant role in assessing and

cleaning up” contaminated properties. EPA, State

Response Programs (last updated on May 29, 2025).12

“Many States have the resources, expertise and desire

to play a greater role in the Superfund process.”

Modernizing the Superfund Cleanup Program Before

Subcomm. on the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy &

Commerce, 115th Cong. 11 (2018) (statement of

Stephen Cobb, Chief of Land Division, Ala. Dep’t of

Envtl. Mgmt. & Past-President of Ass’n of State and

Territorial Solid Waste Mgmt. Officials) (“Cobb

Statement”). “When willing and able, those States

should be encouraged . . . to do so.” Id.

II. States carry out robust cleanup programs

that depend on voluntary cooperation.

A. States are effectively cleaning properties.

States “are at the forefront” of property cleanup

efforts. Cleaning Up and Restoring Communities for

Economic Revitalization Before Subcomm. on

Superfund, Toxics & Envtl. Health of the S. Comm. on

Env’t & Pub. Works, 113th Cong. 11, 13 (2013)

(statement of Mathy Stanislaus, Assistant Adm’r,

Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, U.S.

Available at https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/state-responseprograms (last visited Jan. 19, 2026).

Envtl. Prot. Agency). Under state programs, 13 States

have completed more than 230,000 cleanups and

annually enroll more than 33,000 properties in

cleanup programs.

EPA, Accomplishments (last

updated Jan. 5, 2026). 14 These State efforts have

made approximately 3.9 million acres ready for

anticipated use. Id. By contrast, in 30 years under

the comparable federal program, EPA has made

approximately 13,000 properties totaling 184,000

acres ready for anticipated reuse. Id.

State programs oversee effective cleanups. In

Arizona, for example, private parties may clean

properties under the Arizona Department of

Environmental Quality’s (“ADEQ”) supervision

through an administrative settlement agreement or

the state’s Voluntary Remediation Program, which

“encourages property owners and other interested

parties to invest resources voluntarily in recovering

contaminated sites as quickly as possible to healthful

standards.” Ariz. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Voluntary

Remediation Program (revised Feb. 18, 2025). 15

Administrative settlements set forth the expectations

for property cleanup in exchange for a covenant not to

“[S]tates assess the vast majority of contaminated sites

evaluated under the Superfund Cleanup Program, with fewer

than 10% of these sites ultimately requiring listing on the

[National Priorities List]. The balance of those sites requiring

remediation are addressed under State cleanup authorities,

under voluntary cleanup authorities, or under Brownfields

cleanup authorities with State oversight.” See Cobb Statement.

Available at

https://www.epa.gov/brownfields/accomplishments (last visited

Jan. 19, 2026).

Available at https://azdeq.gov/VRP (last visited Jan. 19, 2026).

sue and liability protection. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49292(B), (C). Codified in state law, the Voluntary

Remediation Program includes a work plan that

describes how the cleanup will comply with state law.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-175(A). ADEQ reviews and

approves the work plan, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-177,

oversees the project at the private party’s expense,

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-179(B), and reviews cleanup

progress reports, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-180. Parties

that complete the Voluntary Remediation Program to

ADEQ’s satisfaction may receive a “no further action”

letter. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-181(B).

Arizona’s program has been successful. “Since its

inception by statute in the 1990s, [the Arizona

Department of Environmental Quality’s Voluntary

Remediation Program] has overseen the cleanup and

closure of more than 200 sites around Arizona.” Ariz.

Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Voluntary Remediation

Program. 16 In addition, “more than 60 active sites

[are] in various stages of completion, including some

that are implementing long-term groundwater

remediation — a vital concern in [the] arid, droughtprone state.” Id. Many more sites have been

addressed through administrative settlements.

Recall that EPA has deleted just three Arizona sites

from the National Priorities List during the past 45

years. EPA, Deleted National Priorities List (NPL)

Sites – by State. 17

Other State programs also have experienced

success.

By February 2025, Florida’s cleanup

program had cleaned 235 sites, entered 530 voluntary

See note 15, supra.

See note 5, supra.

cleanup agreements, and “sparked the creation of

90,000 indirect and direct jobs and the investment of

over $3.18 billion.” Cleaning Up the Past, Building

the Future: The Brownfields Program Before

Subcomm. on Water Res. & Env’t of H. Comm. on

Transp. & Infrastructure, 119th Cong. 18 (2025)

(statement of Michael Goldstein). As of 2025, Ohio’s

voluntary cleanup program had cleaned 750 sites.

Cleaning Up the Past, Building the Future: The

Brownfields Program Before Subcomm. on Water Res.

& Env’t of H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure,

119th Cong. 12-13 (2025) (statement of Lisa Shook,

Ass’t Chief, Division of Envtl. Response &

Remediation, Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency). This has

allowed more than 17,000 acres to be reused in Ohio,

including “brand-new metro parks in areas that were

otherwise industrial histories.” Id. at 45.

Almost every State has a voluntary cleanup

program. Ass’n of State and Territorial Solid Wast

Mgmt. Officials, 2020 State Brownfields Program

Analysis (Feb. 2021), 2. 18 Those few States that do not

“report[] a variety of alternatives.”

Id.

Not

surprisingly given the State’s successes, the federal

political branches have responded by passing

legislation to “help strengthen State cleanup

programs, with more Federal funding and less

Federal meddling.” Remarks On Signing the Small

Business

Liability

Relief

and

Brownfields

Revitalization Act In Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, 1

Available at

https://astswmo.org/files/Resources/CERCLA_and_Brownfields/

2020-State-Brownfields-Program-Analysis.pdf (last visited Jan.

19, 2026).

PUB. PAPERS 53, 55 (Jan. 11, 2002) (Remarks of

President George W. Bush).

B. Private parties voluntarily cooperate in

exchange for certain protections.

“Private party cleanups have become the backbone

of CERCLA.” Rachel D. Guthrie, The Silent Strength

of CERCLA: Private Party Cleanups-and the Judicial

Decisions Jeopardizing Them, 36 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV.

165, 205 (2024). This is because “the vast majority of

cleanups are privately funded, often at enormous—if

not always disclosed—expense.” Id. at 183. Thus,

both EPA and the States need private party

involvement to clean contaminated sites.

Private party cleanups often stem from

settlements

with

government

regulators.

“Settlements are the heart of the Superfund statute.”

Atl. Richfield Co., 590 U.S. at 22; see also California

Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Hearthside

Residential Corp., 613 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2010)

(an “important purpose of CERCLA is to encourage

early settlement between potentially responsible

parties and environmental regulators”).

At the

federal level, “EPA’s efforts to negotiate settlement

agreements and issue orders for cleanups account for

approximately 69% of all cleanup work currently

underway.” Id. (citation omitted). EPA “prefers to

reach an agreement with a potentially responsible

party (PRP) to clean up a Superfund site instead of

issuing an order or paying for it and recovering the

cleanup costs later.” Id. “Congress also envisioned

that states would play a central role by enforcing

CERCLA through early settlements.” City of Tucson,

761 F.3d at 1018 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). Early settlements “allow[] energy

and resources to be directed at site cleanup rather

than protracted litigation.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.

v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 948 (9th Cir. 2002).

CERCLA “encourages potentially responsible

parties to enter into such agreements by authorizing

EPA to include a ‘covenant not to sue,’ which caps the

parties’ liability to the Government.” Atl. Richfield

Co., 590 U.S. at 22 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c)(1)).

CERCLA “also protects settling parties from

contribution claims by other potentially responsible

parties.” Id. at 22-23 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2)).

“[T]he liability and compliance provisions in CERCLA

have provided impetus for many property owners to

enroll in state voluntary and other cleanup

programs. Sites managed under state programs tend

to have roughly the same types of hazardous

substances and resulting benefits as those in the

federal Superfund program, but are generally, though

not always, less complex.” Office of Superfund

Remediation & Tech. Innovation, U.S. Envtl. Prot.

Agency, EP W-07-037, Beneficial Effects of the

Superfund Program 4 (2011).

Cost predictability is another important driver of

private party settlements. “Potential purchasers of

abandoned or underutilized contaminated properties

are often deterred from purchasing and cleaning up

these properties by exposure to unbounded and

uncertain liability.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 302

F.3d at 948. Cleanups under federal or state law

“have come to achieve some level of predictability,

thus allowing for a reasonable estimate of exposure to

liability and of the costs involved in taking on a

cleanup.” Id. “Such certainty, to the extent that it is

available, greatly encourages prospective purchasers

to rehabilitate contaminated property and put it back

into productive use.” Id.

The National Contingency Plan was intended to

provide this cost predictability. “The NCP is EPA’s

regulatory template for a ‘CERCLA quality cleanup.’”

Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Gates Rubber Co., 175

F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999). The NCP “specifies

procedures for preparing and responding to

contaminations ... .” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall

Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161, n.2 (2004) (citing 40

C.F.R. pt. 300 (2004)). When EPA proposed the NCP

regulations, “EPA intend[ed] that providing a list of

requirements to be complied with in order to be

consistent with the NCP will enhance the probability

of a successful cost recovery action, thus providing an

incentive to other persons to undertake response

actions.” See National Oil and Hazardous Substances

Pollution Contingency Plan, 53 FED. REG. 51,394,

51,462 (Dec. 21, 1988). Providing cost predictability

under the NCP is an important incentive for property

cleanups.

III. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling threatens Stateled cleanups.

A. Petitioner’s cost recovery action denied

despite State oversight.

In 2010, Moreland Properties LLC purchased a

parcel of land, “intending to resell it to a commercial

developer.” Moreland Props. LLC v. Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co., No. CV-20-02297-PHX-SRB, 2023 WL

11963448, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 27, 2023). As part of a

purchase and sale contract in 2014, Moreland hired

an environmental consultant to conduct soil sampling

on the property. Id. Eighteen of 26 samples tested for

arsenic exceeded Arizona’s Soil Remediation Levels

(“SRLs”). Id. At the time, Arizona’s SRLs for both

residential and non-residential land uses were 10

mg/kg for arsenic. Id. at *2 n.3. The arsenic

concentrations on Moreland’s property reached 550

mg/kg. Id. at *3 n.6. Based on this discovery, the

prospective buyer of the property “withdrew from the

sale.” Moreland Props. LLC v. Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co., No. 24-2451, 2025 WL 2452372, at *1 (9th

Cir. Aug. 26, 2025).

In 2019, Moreland entered into an Administrative

Settlement Agreement with the Arizona Department

of Environmental Quality that required Moreland to

“prepare and implement a remedial action plan [to]

address the soil contamination” at the property.

Moreland Props. LLC, 2023 WL 11963448, at *4.

Under ADEQ oversight, Moreland implemented an

ADEQ-approved work plan that reduced the arsenic

“below the current residential SRLs” and “‘fully

eliminate[d] the public health threat’ posed by the

contamination.” Moreland Props. LLC, 2025 WL

2452372, at *3. Moreland then brought this action

under CERCLA to recover its costs from Goodyear, a

prior property owner whose aviation crop-dusting

lessee released arsenic and other pesticides onto the

property decades earlier. Moreland Props. LLC, 2023

WL 11963448, at *1.

To recover its cleanup costs, the Ninth Circuit

required Moreland “to show that its response action

was ‘consistent with’ the National Contingency Plan.”

Moreland Props. LLC, 2025 WL 2452372, at *2. The

Ninth Circuit did not credit Moreland with acting

pursuant to an ADEQ administrative settlement,

implementing an ADEQ-approved work plan, and

operating under ADEQ oversight. See id. at *3.

Because it concluded that Moreland should have

evaluated other alternatives before it cleaned the

property, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Moreland

“did not substantially comply” with an NCP

requirement, rendering the remediation “inconsistent

with the NCP.” Id.

B. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling deepens a

significant circuit split.

As Moreland details in its petition, the circuits are

divided on whether a private party that cleans a

property under the oversight and approval of State

officials is presumptively compliant with the NCP.

See Pet. at 13-29. In three circuits, State oversight

and approval has created a presumption of NCP

compliance.

When the Illinois Environmental

Protection Agency approved a private party’s cleanup

plan and monitored the cleanup’s progress, the

Seventh Circuit concluded that the private party

satisfied the NCP. NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Eng’g Co.,

227 F.3d 776, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). When the Maine

Department of Environmental Protection entered a

consent decree with a private party that required

“extensive involvement” by the State, the First Circuit

determined that consistency with the NCP is often

“met if the remediation work is carried out under the

approval and monitoring of the appropriate state

environmental agency.” City of Bangor v. Citizens

Commc’ns Co., 532 F.3d 70, 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2008). And

when the New York Department of Environmental

Conservation entered a consent order with a private

party and directed and approved cleanup plans, the

Second Circuit ruled that “[o]ne way of establishing

compliance with the national [contingency] plan is to

conduct a response under the monitoring, and with

the ultimate approval, of the state’s environmental

agency.” Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 596 F.3d at

137.

The Ninth Circuit, joined by the Sixth, Eighth, and

Tenth Circuits, reached the opposite conclusion. See

Pet. at 19-28. In these circuits, the courts found that

private parties did not substantially comply with the

NCP even though they operated under State

agreements, oversight, and approval. See id. The

Ninth Circuit’s decision, and the other decisions on

that side of the split, “will ultimately make it more

difficult for states to play the role that Congress

envisioned for them in remediating the numerous

polluted sites that blight our nation.” City of Tucson,

761 F.3d at 1016 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

Some private parties wield this circuit split as a

sword to recover cleanup costs and a shield to defend

against them. For example, Respondent below argued

that ADEQ’s oversight did not establish substantial

compliance with the NCP. Doc. 20, Moreland Props.

LLC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 24-2451 (9th

Cir. Oct. 9, 2024). But in Ohio just two years earlier,

“Goodyear argue[d] that the fact that it has incurred

costs in compliance with the Ohio EPA’s orders

creates a presumption that the costs are necessary

and consistent with the NCP.” Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-6347,

2022 WL 22401182, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2022).

Like Moreland here, Respondent argued in Ohio that,

“[w]here, as here, a cleanup plan is approved by a

state agency and the state monitors the progress of

the remedial activities, response costs incurred by a

private party pursuant to a state led plan are

consistent with the NCP.” Doc. 106, Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-6347

(S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2021) (citing NutraSweet Co., 227

F.3d 776)). The Court should grant the Petition to

resolve the split and ensure that all cost recovery

actions are subject to the same rules.

C. The Ninth Circuit’s decision will make

voluntary compliance more difficult.

Declining to find NCP compliance based on State

oversight and approval will make private parties more

reluctant to voluntarily cooperate. As Congress

recognized 40 years ago, “[v]oluntary cleanups are

essential to a successful program for clean up of the

Nation’s hazardous substance pollution problem.”

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 508

F.3d 126, 135 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99–

253, pt. 5, at 58 (1985), as reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3181). Put simply, “[v]oluntary

cleanups are vital to fulfilling CERCLA's purpose.”

Id.

In other CERCLA contexts, circuit courts have

expressed concern that “prohibiting suit by a

voluntary plaintiff … may undermine CERCLA’s twin

aims of encouraging expeditious, voluntary

environmental cleanups while holding responsible

parties accountable for the response costs that their

past activities induced.” Metro. Water Reclamation

Dist. of Greater Chicago, 473 F.3d at 836. Without the

ability to recover cleanup costs, “such parties would

likely wait until they are sued to commence cleaning

up any site for which they are not exclusively

responsible because of their inability to be reimbursed

for cleanup expenditures in the absence of a suit.”

Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. UGI Utilities, Inc.,

423 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). Private parties have

confirmed this prediction: “If PRPs engaged in

voluntary cleanups may not seek contribution,

DuPont and amici argue, ‘companies would resist

undertaking new cleanup obligations, and would

rarely do so voluntarily,’ thus frustrating core

purposes of CERCLA.” E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.

v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 533 (3d Cir. 2006), cert.

granted, judgment vacated sub nom. E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co. v. United States, 551 U.S. 1129 (2007).

Courts have thus avoided interpretations of CERCLA

that “create a perverse incentive for PRPs to wait

until they are sued before incurring response costs.”

Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95, 106 n.8 (2d Cir.

2005).

States will enjoy fewer cleaned properties if

private parties do not voluntarily cooperate to avoid

assuming sole responsibility for cleanup costs. States

also will need to spend more resources on pursuing

recalcitrant parties if those parties believe that it is

no longer in their interests to voluntarily cooperate.

“A CERCLA regime which rewards indifference to

environmental hazards and discourages voluntary

efforts at waste cleanup cannot be what Congress had

in mind.” Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons

Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845–46 (4th Cir. 1992). The Court

should grant the Petition to correct this result.

D. The Ninth Circuit’s decision diminishes

State cleanup programs.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision incentivizes private

parties to work with EPA instead of States if only

EPA-led cleanups receive a presumption of NCP

compliance. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(ii). But “the

federal government ‘cannot do everything’; nor was it

intended to do everything.”

James P. Young,

Expanding State Initiation and Enforcement Under

Superfund, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 1006 (1990)

(citation omitted).

Under CERCLA’s “spirit of

cooperative federalism,” Atl. Richfield Co., 590 U.S.

at 24, States have completed more cleanups than

EPA. See Argument § II.A., supra. Yet the Ninth

Circuit’s decision “effectively bottles up state

resources while the EPA plods through the National

Priorities List.” Young, Expanding State Initiation

and Enforcement Under Superfund, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.

at 999.

This harms both the States and our citizens.

“State governments are likely to be more responsive,

and the EPA is too far removed from the affected

people in many instances to effectively meet the needs

of a particular situation. Young, Expanding State

Initiation and Enforcement Under Superfund, 57 U.

CHI. L. REV. at 1004–05.

“In the context of

environmental regulation, self-determination and

local control over local matters are important

principles.” Id. at 1006. “State governments are

certainly more politically accountable to their citizens

than EPA. Christopher J. Redd, The Adversarial

Relationship Between the States and EPA: Conflict

over State Authority Under CERCLA, 3 DICK. J.

ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 101, 112 (1993).

The Ninth Circuit’s decision diminishes State

cleanup programs by reducing cost predictability

under the NCP for private parties who voluntarily

cooperate with States. The Court should grant the

Petition so that parties have that predictability.

E. Fewer cleaned properties will harm the

States and our citizens.

Reducing voluntary cooperation, and thereby

cleaning fewer properties, will harm the States in

numerous ways. Contaminated properties “can pose

environmental exposure risks to community members

via access to the sites or contamination of soil, air,

and/or water at the site.” Laurel Berman et al., An

Overview of Brownfields Redevelopment in the United

States Through Regulatory, Public Health, and

Sustainability Lens, J. Environ Health author

manuscript (May 2022), 4. 19 Protecting human health

and the environment is the chief benefit of cleaning

properties.

States and our citizens receive additional,

important benefits from clean properties. Once clean,

the property itself may be reused by businesses to

create jobs; by builders to supply needed housing; and

by the public to enjoy as green space. EPA, Reuse

Possibilities for Brownfield Sites (Sept. 2019). 20 EPA

estimates that cleaned sites in 50 metro areas “could

potentially accommodate as many as 640,000 new

housing units and 1.39 million new jobs,” or 13% and

11% of total expected growth, respectively, between

2013 and 2030. EPA, Environmental Benefits of

Brownfields

Redevelopment—A

Nationwide

Assessment, EPA 560-R-20-001 (May 2020), 45. 21

Property neighbors benefit as well.

Cleaner

properties increase prices for nearby houses by as

much as 15%. See Kevin Haninger et al., The Value of

Brownfield Remediation, Nat’l Bureau of Economic

Research Working Paper 20296 (July 2014), 25

(“cleanup leads to housing price increases between

Available at

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10191173/pdf/nihms1847505.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2026).

Available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201909/documents/reuse_possibilities_for_brownfield_sites.pdf (last

visited Jan. 19, 2026).

Available at

https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/202404/environmental_benefits_of_brownfields_redevelopment.pdf

(last visited Jan. 19, 2026).

5.0% and 15.2%”); 22 see also Laura O. Taylor et al.,

Disentangling

property

value

impacts

environmental

contamination

from

locally

undesirable land uses: Implications for measuring

post-cleanup stigma, 93 J. URBAN ECON. 85 (2016)

(“we find that remediation increases property values

as much as 5%”). 23 In one study, property values

increased above their original value after the federal

government awarded grants for cleanup. See Danielle

Kaeding, Study finds Great Lakes cleanup funding

increases property values, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 19,

2023) (“the initial listing of sites decreased property

values by 15.8 percent or an average of $25,700 per

home. After awarding federal money for cleanup,

property values went up by an average of $27,000 per

home.”). 24

Cleaned properties also generate additional tax

revenue. Businesses on cleaned properties generate

tax revenue through jobs, sales, and property taxes.

Likewise, housing on cleaned properties generates

property taxes.

And the increased value of

neighboring

residential

properties

generates

additional property tax revenue. See Karen A.

Sullivan, Brownfields Remediation: Impact on Local

Residential Property Tax Revenue, 19 J. Envtl.

Available at

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w20296/w20

296.pdf.

Available at

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S00941190

16000243.

Available at https://www.wpr.org/environment/study-greatlakes-cleanup-funding-increases-property-values (last visited

Jan. 19, 2026).

Assessment Policy Mgmt. 1750013, 1750013-17

(2017) (“the increase in residential property tax

revenue from the cleanup of 48 brownfields ranged

from $29 million to $97 million in a single year after

cleanup when nearby residential properties were

reassessed”). 25

These significant benefits are threatened by the

Ninth Circuit’s decision. The Court should grant the

Petition.

CONCLUSION

The Arizona Legislature and the States of

Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Iowa,

Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,

North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas,

Utah, and West Virginia respectfully request that the

Court grant the Petition.

January 28, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

Justin D. Smith

Counsel of Record

Michael C. Martinich-Sauter

Kenneth C. Capps

Daniel C. Carter

JAMES OTIS LAW GROUP, LLC

530 Maryville Centre Drive

Suite 230

St. Louis, Missouri 63141

(816) 678-2103

Justin.Smith@james-otis.com

Additional Counsel

Listed Below

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Arizona Legislature

Available at

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S146433321750

0132 (last visited Jan. 19, 2026).

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General

State of Alabama

STEPHEN J. COX

Attorney General

State of Alaska

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General

State of Florida

RAÚL R. LABRADOR

Attorney General

State of Idaho

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

KRIS W. KOBACH

Attorney General

State of Kansas

LIZ MURRILL

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

CATHERINE L.

HANAWAY

Attorney General

State of Missouri

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General

State of Montana

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

DREW H. WRIGLEY

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

DAVE YOST

Attorney General

State of Ohio

GENTNER DRUMMOND

Attorney General

State of Oklahoma

MARTY J. JACKLEY

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General

State of Texas

DEREK BROWN

Attorney General

State of Utah

JOHN B. MCCUSKEY

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.