Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jeffrey Henry Williamson, Petitioner v. United States

No. ___-_______

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JEFFREY HENRY WILLIAMSON,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Petitioner,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

A. J. KRAMER

Federal Public Defender

625 Indiana Avenue, NW

Suite 550

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 208-7500

Counsel for Petitioner

June 4, 2026

QUESTION PRESENTED

Congress, in a comprehensive set of statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4248, provided

procedures and standards for examinations and detention of federal defendants

suffering from various mental health issues. In § 4246(a), Congress provided for the

civil commitment of certain persons, including those such as petitioner. The statute

sets forth the procedures for determining whether the person should be committed,

which are triggered when the “director of a facility in which a person is hospitalized

certifies that a person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons”:

against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for

reasons related to the mental condition of the person, is presently

suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release

would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or

serious damage to property of another, and that suitable arrangements

for State custody and care of the person are not available.

That certification is sent to the clerk of the district court “for the district in which the

person is confined” for commitment proceedings. The filing of a certificate “stay[s] the

release of the person pending the completion of procedures contained in this section.”

No certificate was filed in the present case, yet the district court presiding over

Mr. Williamson’s criminal case ordered his commitment for an examination to allow

the director of the BOP facility to determine whether to issue a certificate to initiate

commitment proceedings.

That order raises the question presented:

Whether the district court can, contrary to the plain language of the statute,

order an examination of a person under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 where the director of the

facility in which the person is confined has not filed any certificate to commence

§ 4246 proceedings.

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Jeffrey Henry Williamson.

Respondent is the United States of America.

No corporate parties are involved in this case.

RELATED CASES

This case arises from the following proceedings in the District Court for the

District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

United States v. Williamson

No. 24-3014 (D.C. Cir.); and

United States v. Williamson

No. 20-cr-195-RBW (D.D.C.)

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .............................................................................. ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iv

OPINIONS BELOW ...................................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 1

STATUTES INVOLVED ............................................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ............................................................ 4

I.

The Court of Appeals Opinion Conflicts with this Court’s Decisions

Regarding Statutory Interpretation ................................................................... 5

II. The Court of Appeals Opinion Conflicts with the Decisions

of Other Circuits ................................................................................................. 7

III. The Court of Appeals Relied Upon Cases That Do Not Address

the Plain Language of the Statute ................................................................... 10

IV. Judge Rao’s Jurisdictional Argument is Incorrect .......................................... 12

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 13

APPENDIX

Appendix A: Opinion and Dissent, United States v. Williamson, No. 24-3014

(D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2025)

Appendix B: Order Granting Government’s Motion for An Evaluation, United

States v. Williamson, No. 20-cr-195 (D.D.C. February 5, 2024)

Appendix C: Order Denying Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Williamson,

No. 24-3014 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 2026)

Appendix D: Order Denying Rehearing, United States v. Williamson, No. 243014 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 2026)

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Bowe v. United States,

607 U.S. 13 (2026) ................................................................................................. 6-7

Fischer v. United States,

603 U.S. 480 (2024) .................................................................................................. 5

Hampton v. Hobbs,

106 F.3d 1281 (6th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................. 8

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta,

597 U.S. 629 (2022) ................................................................................................ 11

Rico v. United States,

146 S. Ct. 947 (2026) ................................................................................................ 7

United States v. Baker,

807 F.2d 1315 (6th Cir. 1986) ......................................................................... 7-8, 10

United States v. Berry,

142 F.4th 184 (4th Cir. 2005) ................................................................................. 10

United States v. Bonin,

541 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................... 8

United States v. Cruz-Ruiz,

585 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.P.R. 2022) ........................................................................... 9

United States v. Godinez-Ortiz

63 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................. 10-13

United States v. Perkins,

67 F.4th 583 (4th Cir. 2023) ..................................................................................... 9

United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,

489 U.S. 235 (1989) ................................................................................................ 10

United States v. Weissberger,

951 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ................................................................................ 12

iv

United States v. Williamson,

161 F.4th 803 (D.C. Cir.) ............................................................................ ii, 1, 4, 12

United States v. Williamson,

No. 20-cr-195-RBW (D.D.C.) .................................................................................... ii

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 17 ................................................................................................................. 3

18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) ........................................................................................................ 5

18 U.S.C. § 4242(a) ........................................................................................................ 5

18 U.S.C. § 4242(b) ........................................................................................................ 5

18 U.S.C. § 4244(b) ........................................................................................................ 5

18 U.S.C. § 4245(b) ........................................................................................................ 5

18 U.S.C. § 4246 ................................................................................................. i, 2, 4-12

18 U.S.C. § 4247 ......................................................................................................... 3, 7

v

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JEFFREY HENRY WILLIAMSON,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Jeffrey Henry Williamson respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the D.C. Circuit appears in the Appendix at A1-23 and is

reported at 161 F.4th 803. The district court’s order appears in the Appendix at B1-2

and is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

The D.C. Circuit decided the appeal on December 12, 2025. Timely petitions

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for rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied by the D.C. Circuit on March 10,

2026.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) & (b) provide in relevant part:

§ 4246. Hospitalization of a person due for release but suffering

from mental disease or defect

(a) Institution of proceeding.—If the director of a facility in which

a person is hospitalized certifies that a person in the custody of the

Bureau of Prisons whose sentence is about to expire, or who has been

committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section

4241(d), or against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed

solely for reasons related to the mental condition of the person, is

presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which

his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another

person or serious damage to property of another, and the suitable

arrangements for State custody and care of the person are not available,

he shall transmit the certificate to the clerk of court for the district in

which the person is confined. The clerk shall send a copy of the

certificate to the person, and to the attorney for the Government, and if

the person was committed pursuant to section 4241(d), to the clerk of

the court that ordered the commitment. The court shall order a hearing

to determine whether the person is presently suffering from a mental

disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a

substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to

property of another. A certificate filed under this subsection shall stay

the release of the person pending completion of procedures contained in

this section.

(b) Psychiatric or psychological examination and report.—

Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order that a psychiatric

or psychological examination of the defendant may be conducted, and

that a psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court,

pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(b) and (c).

2

18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) provides in relevant part:

(b) Psychiatric or psychological examination.—A psychiatric or

psychological examination ordered pursuant to this chapter shall be

conducted by a licensed or certified psychiatrist or psychologist, or, if the

court finds it appropriate, by more than one such examiner. Each

examiner shall be designated by the court, except that if the

examination is ordered under section 4245, 4246, or 4248, upon the

request of the defendant an additional examiner may be selected by the

defendant. For the purposes of an examination pursuant to an order

under section 4241, 4244, or 4245, the court may commit the person to

be examined for a reasonable period, but not to exceed thirty days, and

under section 4242, 4243, 4246, or 4248, for a reasonable period, but not

to exceed forty-five days, to the custody of the Attorney General for

placement in a suitable facility. Unless impracticable, the psychiatric or

psychological examination shall be conducted in the suitable facility

closest to the court. The director of the facility may apply for a

reasonable extension, but not to exceed fifteen days under section 4241,

4244, or 4245, and not to exceed thirty days under section 4242, 4243,

4246, or 4248, upon a showing of good cause that the additional time is

necessary to observe and evaluate the defendant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. Williamson was serving a federal sentence for making threats to an FBI

agent when he was charged with writing threatening letters to the prosecutor and

FBI agent in that case. During the pretrial proceedings, the district court ordered an

examination for sanity at the time of the offense and present competency. The

government doctor found that Mr. Williamson was competent but had a valid insanity

defense, as he did “not have the mental capacity to conform his conduct to the

requirements of the law.” 18 U.S.C. § 17. After receiving this report, the government

moved to dismiss the charges but asked the district court to stay the order to allow

the director of FCI Butner, where Mr. Wiliamson was in custody, to conduct an

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examination to determine whether to file a certificate to begin proceedings to civilly

commit Mr. Williamson for dangerousness under § 4246. Over Mr. Williamson’s

objection, the district court granted the motion but stayed it pending appeal. 1

On appeal, Mr. Williamson argued that under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, the district

court’s order was improper because the director of Butner, where Mr. Williamson was

confined, had not filed a certificate to commence § 4246 proceedings. Mr. Williamson

filed an interlocutory appeal of the order. The government agreed that the order was

immediately appealable.

Both the court of appeals panel majority and the district court acknowledged

that § 4246 did not provide for the procedure the district court adopted. Nonetheless,

the panel majority affirmed the district court order. 2 The panel majority believed the

district court’s order made § 4246(a) “administratively workable” and that it did not

“contradict the statute.” 164 F.4th at 808. Judge Rao dissented on the ground that

the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 106 F.4th at 811.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The panel majority opinion conflicts with the plain language of the statute, and

thus with numerous opinions of this Court regarding the rules of statutory

interpretation. In addition, the opinion conflicts with decisions of other courts of

appeals.

1 The district court has subsequently further stayed its order pending the filing and disposition of

this petition.

4

I.

The Court of Appeals Opinion Conflicts with this Court’s Decisions

Regarding Statutory Interpretation.

The statutes dealing with mental health issues among federal defendants

provide for psychological examinations in certain specific circumstances. See 18

U.S.C. § 4241(b) (examination to determine competency); § 4242(a) (examination to

determine insanity at the time of the offense); § 4242(b) (examination of person found

not guilty by reason of insanity); § 4244(b) (examination before sentencing of person

found guilty); § 4245(b) (examination of person serving a sentence requiring transfer

to a facility for treatment); § 4246(b) (examination prior to a dangerousness hearing,

but only after issuance of a dangerousness certificate). Congress did not provide for

an examination or evaluation in connection with the decision whether to issue a

dangerousness certificate—it authorized an examination only after a certificate is

filed. This Court’s case law is clear that in such a situation:

[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do

not appear on its face. And [w]here Congress includes particular

language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the

same Act, we generally presume that Congress did so intentionally.

Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480, 508 (2024) (citations omitted).

Congress obviously knew how to provide that a psychological examination

could be conducted, as it did so in several provisions of the statute. And, in § 4246(a)

itself, it provided for an examination, but only after the director of the facility issued

a certificate. Congress provided no such provision with respect to the director’s

5

preliminary decision whether to issue a certificate. That alone should resolve this

case. “A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation teaches that when we’re engaged in

the business of interpreting statutes, we presume differences in language like this

convey differences in meaning.” Bowe v. United States, 607 U.S. 13, 36-37 (2026). By

reading words into § 4246 that are simply not there, the panel opinion directly

conflicts with this Court’s cases.

The director of the facility in which a defendant is held—in Mr. Williamson’s

case, FCI Butner—may file a certificate of dangerousness under § 4246(a). The court

in North Carolina is then required to hold a hearing on the issue. Prior to the hearing,

an exam of the defendant may be ordered, but that takes place only after a certificate

has been issued. And, if an exam is ordered, under § 4247(b), the defendant is

statutorily entitled to select an additional examiner, an entitlement that was

foreclosed by the district court’s order that manufactured a whole new type of

examination. The district court’s order bypasses the carefully crafted statutory

procedure and starts at the last step of the straightforward process. The panel

majority’s decision to affirm that procedure was error.

In Mr. Williamson’s case, the district court did not follow the statutory

procedures but instead grafted on an additional step—an examination to determine

whether to request an examination.

The district court’s order granted the

government’s motion for an “Evaluation Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246” and ordered

that Mr. Williamson “be examined to determine whether the director of FCI Butner

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should file a certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.” That is not what Congress

provided. If the government believes the statute needs this additional provision, the

courts are not “the proper place to register that complaint”—the proper place to do so

“is with those who drafted it.” Rico v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 947, 957 (2026). “This

Court is not free to rewrite the directions Congress has provided.” Id.

The panel majority makes no mention of the rules of statutory construction in

its opinion and is contrary to a number of them. Instead, the majority claims its ruling

makes “§ 4246(a) administratively workable,” and acknowledges that it has to rely

upon the court’s “inherent power.” 164 F.4th at 808. That simply “cannot be squared

with the statutory text.” Bowe, 607 U.S. at 56 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). So, “[i]f not

from thin air, where could [the majority’s] rule possibly come from?” Id. at 58.

Moreover, the notion that the statute is somehow not “administratively

workable” is incorrect. People subject to the statute, such as Mr. Williamson, have

been in BOP custody for some time and have had examinations, treatment, and

observation while in confinement. Indeed, Mr. Williamson has spent over a decade at

Butner, including the last few years of his prior sentence at Butner and the six years

of pretrial proceedings in this case.

II.

The Court of Appeals Opinion Conflicts with the Decisions of Other

Circuits.

The panel majority’s decision also conflicts with the opinions of other circuits.

The Sixth Circuit has addressed § 4246 in several opinions. As the court explained in

United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 1315, 1323 (6th Cir. 1986):

7

The most significant provision of section 4246 for the purposes of this

appeal is subsection (a). That provision specifies the procedures which

are to be followed before a section 4246 commitment hearing is held.

Specifically, the director of the mental health facility has the

responsibility “to determine preliminarily whether the defendant should

be released.” Id. at 3433. The director must certify three things: (1) that

the individual is suffering from a mental disease or defect; (2) that his

release would pose a substantial risk of bodily injury to another or

serious damage to property of another; and (3) that suitable state

arrangements for his care are not available. A certificate to this effect is

to be transmitted to the clerk of the court for the district in which the

individual is confined, and copies are to be mailed to the individual and

the attorney for the government. “Upon receipt of the certificate,” id.,

the district court must schedule and hold a hearing which complies with

due process requirements to determine whether the individual is

suffering from a mental disease or defect and whether his release would

pose a threat of bodily injury or property damage.

The court in Baker further stated that:

A section 4246 hearing cannot be conducted and a section 4246

commitment order cannot be issued until it has been certified to the

court that the state will not accept the individual.

Id. at 1324 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The court in Baker also found

that the statue specifically provided that:

a certificate must be filed in, and a section 4246 hearing must be held

in, the district in which the individual is confined, not the district in

which he had initially been charged with an offense.

Id. In Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1288 (6th Cir. 1997), the court stated:

The responsibility for filing a certificate under § 4246(a) lies with the

director of the facility in which the convicted person is hospitalized, and

it is not within the statutory authority either of the Government or of

the district court to initiate § 4246 proceedings.

Likewise, in United States v. Bonin, 541 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2008), the court

held that the “director’s certification” is a “necessary prerequisite to the

8

dangerousness hearing” and that “without the certification, a court ordinarily lacks

statutory authority to conduct the hearing.” Id. at 401 (footnote omitted).

Perhaps one of the most comprehensive discussions of §§ 4241-48, appears in

United States v. Perkins, 67 F.4th 583 (4th Cir. 2023). With respect to § 4246, the

court in Perkins set forth the statutory procedures, which are straightforward.

First, the director of a facility files the certification of dangerousness, which

“must be preceded by the facility director’s finding ‘that suitable arrangements for

state custody and care of the person are not available.’ 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a).” Id. at

590.

Second, the filing of the “dangerousness certification triggers a hearing,” at

which the defendant has certain rights. Id. One of those rights is to have an additional

examiner selected by the defendant.

Third, “the district court is authorized” to order that an examination of the

defendant may be conducted before the hearing. Id. The report of the examination,

containing a number of specific items, “is then filed.” Id.

Finally, “[f]ollowing receipt of the examination report[s], the hearing

convenes.” Id.

In United States v. Cruz-Ruiz, 585 F. Supp. 3d 167, 168 (D.P.R. 2022), the court

also carefully reviewed the § 4246 procedures. The court found that a dangerousness

hearing may be held only if the director of the institution issues a certificate that the

9

defendant’s release would be dangerous and “suitable arrangements for state custody

and care are unavailable.” Id. at 170. The court reasoned:

The statute plainly states that Section 4246 proceedings are only

triggered following a proper certification by the director of the

facility in which Defendant is hospitalized. It is a well-established

principle of statutory interpretation that “where, as here, the statute’s

language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according

to its terms.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235,

241 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While

Section 4246(b) allows the court to order an examination of the

defendant, a court only has authority to do so “[p]rior to the date of the

hearing.” Because the Court may not order the requisite hearing without

a compliant certification, it follows that the Court may not order a prehearing evaluation without such a certification. Therefore, without a

certification in this case, the Court cannot order a dangerousness

assessment. See United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 1315, 1323-24 (6th

Cir. 1986) (stating that, in the absence of a certification and by failing

to strictly adhere to the procedures outlined in Section 4246(a), the

district court “lacked statutory authority” to commit the defendant).

Id. (bolded in original).

III.

The Court of Appeals Relied Upon Cases That Do Not Address the

Plain Language of the Statute.

The panel majority relied primarily on United States v. Berry, 142 F.4th 184,

190 (4th Cir. 2005), as support for its conclusion that the district court’s order was

proper. In Berry, however, the defendant did not challenge whether there could be an

evaluation before the filing of a certificate by the director. Therefore, the decision

contains no discussion of the validity of such a procedure, which is the primary issue

in Williamson’s appeal. Nor did the defendant in Berry challenge the authority of the

district court that issued the order for the § 4246 evaluation. Thus, there was likewise

no discussion of whether there was such authority. Berry is therefore inapposite.

10

The majority also relied on United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022 (9th

Cir. 2009), in affirming the precertification § 4246 exam. In that case, the defendant

had been found incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 1025. After the government moved

to dismiss the case, the district court dismissed the charges without prejudice, stayed

that dismissal, and ordered the defendant returned to Butner for 45 days to give the

director an opportunity to determine whether to file a dangerousness certificate. Id.

at 1026. The court in Godinez-Ortiz, without addressing the specific language of §

4246, stated that § 4246 “necessarily contemplates” the temporary commitment of

that person before a certificate is filed so that the director can conduct the evaluation

necessary to make the certification decision. Id. at 1031.

In Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629 (2022), this Court rejected an

almost identical argument:

The fundamental problem with Castro-Huerta's implicit intent

argument is that the text of the General Crimes Act says no such thing.

. . . As this Court has repeatedly stated, the text of a law controls over

purported legislative intentions unmoored from any statutory text. The

Court may not “replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress'

intent.” Rather, the Court “will presume more modestly” that “the

legislature says what it means and means what it says.”

Id. at 642 (citations omitted). Thus, Godinez-Ortiz cannot support the panel

majority’s decision.

The majority’s claim that the district court’s order “did not prescribe a

‘psychiatric examination’—under § 4246 or otherwise” is flatly wrong. 161 F.4th at

808. In fact, a licensed clinical psychologist at Butner sent a letter to the parties after

11

the court of appeals decision stating that Wiliamson “has been ordered to undergo a

forensic evaluation pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 4246.” The

letter does not even mention a certificate, but instead refers to a “comprehensive

initial risk assessment” and to the “timely completion of the examination.”

In the end, the majority contends that the “inherent powers” of the district

court allow it to “respond to specific problems when doing so does not contradict any

express rule or statute.” Williamson, 161 F.4th at 809. But authorizing an evaluation

nowhere authorized by Congress in a comprehensive statutory scheme is not an

inherent power, it is a rewriting of the statute to provide a procedure that Congress

did not provide, apparently to “respond to” what the majority perceives “as specific

problems” in the statute. Id.

IV.

Judge Rao’s Jurisdictional Argument is Incorrect.

Judge Rao’s dissent on jurisdictional grounds, which was rejected by the

majority, is incorrect both factually and legally. It also omits mention of the fact that

the government agreed in both the court of appeals and the district court that the

order was properly appealable. The attempt to distinguish United States v.

Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1991), is unavailing. The district court’s order

does not “simply leave [ ] Williamson in pretrial detention.” 161 F.4th at 813. The

district court dismissed the indictment, but stayed that dismissal, putting Mr.

Wiliamson in a strange status of custody after dismissal. Judge Rao also erred in

claiming that the order “does not mandate a psychiatric examination,” but simply

12

permits the § 4246 evaluation for dangerousness. Id. This overlooks both the fact that

the statute permits no such pre-certificate evaluation and that an examination is

exactly what the district court ordered, as discussed above. Moreover, Judge Rao

points to no case involving the claim raised by Mr. Williamson that found an

interlocutory appeal was improper—in fact, in addition to Weissberger, in GodinezOrtiz, the court extensively reviewed whether such an interlocutory appeal was

proper and concluded it was, as it satisfied “each requirement of the collateral order

doctrine.” 563 F.3d at 1029.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

A. J. KRAMER,

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

625 Indiana Avenue, NW

Suite 550

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 208-7500

June 4, 2026

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