Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Elta Gelin Lannis, Petitioner v. Florida

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ELTA GELIN LANNIS, PETITIONER,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

_____________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

_____________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DANIEL EISINGER

Public Defender

Benjamin Nathaniel Paley

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Ethan R. Goldberg

Assistant Public Defender

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 355–7600

Bpaley@pd15.org

Egoldberg@pd15.org

Lmattocks@pd15.org

Appeals@pd15.org

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), should be

overturned. There is another petition raising the same question

presented. See Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623. This case should be held

until the Court decides whether to grant or deny that petition.

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to the proceeding before the Court are as follows:

Elta Gelin Lannis, Petitioner.

State of Florida, Respondent.

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida:

State v. Lannis, 19-1578CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.

Apr. 29, 2024)

Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida:

Lannis v. State, 4D2024-2024, 2026 WL 772382 (Fla. 4th

DCA Mar. 19, 2026)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ................................................................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .................................................... ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ............................................................. iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................... v

OPINION BELOW ........................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ............................................................................... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ........................ 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................... 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..................................... 5

a. Williams marked a departure from well-established precedent. ... 6

b. Williams relied on the functionalist approach, which the Court has

since backed away from. .............................................................. 10

c. Six-person jury laws, like Florida’s, can be traced to the Jim Crowera, and contributed to a systematic effort to exclude AfricanAmericans from jury service. ........................................................ 15

d. Williams is bad precedent and should be overturned by the Court.

.................................................................................................... 20

CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 24

INDEX TO APPENDICES

A. District Court’s Decision .............................................Appendix A

B. Relevant Portions of Initial Brief …………………………..Appendix B

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978) ........................................ 11

Brown v. State, 359 So. 3d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) ..................... 21

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008) ......................... 6

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U. S. 215 (2022) . 21, 22

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968).................................. 8, 9

Florida Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v. Boswell, 34 So. 241 (Fla. 1903) ...... 16

Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291 (1877) ............................................... 16

Jackson v. State, 926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006) ................................ 2

Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S. Ct. 22 (2022) ....................................... 8

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369 (2024)................. 23

Mallet v. State, 280 So. 3d 1091 (Fla. 2019) .................................... 2

Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900) ............................................. 9

Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778 (2009).................................... 22

Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992) .................................... 21

Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1930) .................................. 9

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223 (2009) .................................... 22

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 415 (1991) .................................... 19

Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83 (2020) ................................. 12, 22

Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) ................................................ 23

United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716 (1931) ............................... 6

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254 (1986) ....................................... 21

Statutes

28 U. S. C. § 1257 ........................................................................... 2

v

Ch. 3010, § 6, Laws of Fla. (1877) ................................................ 16

Fla. Stat. § 913.10 .......................................................................... 3

Other Authorities

Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the

Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. of Empirical Legal Stud. 425 (Sept.

2009) ......................................................................................... 13

Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment

as a Prohibition against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76

Corn. L. Rev. 1 (1990) ................................................................ 18

Higginbotham et al., Better by the Dozen: Bringing Back the TwelvePerson Civil Jury, 104 Judicature 47 (Summer 2020) ................ 14

Jerrell H. Shofner, Reconstruction and Renewal, 1865–1877, in The

History of Florida 273 (Michael Gannon, ed., first paperback edition

2018) ................................................................................... 16, 17

John Gastil & Phillip J. Weiser, Jury Service as an Invitation to

Citizenship: Assessing the Civic Values of Institutionalized

Deliberation, 34 Pol'y Stud. J. 605 (2006) .................................. 20

Richard L. Hume, Membership of the Florida Constitutional

Convention of 1868: A Case Study of Republican Factionalism in the

Reconstruction South, 51 Fla. Hist. Q. 1 (1972) .......................... 17

Robert H. Miller, Comment, Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other: A

Reexamination of Williams v. Florida and the Size of State Criminal

Juries, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621 (1998) ........................................... 8

Shamena Anwar, et al., The Impact of Jury Race In Criminal Trials,

127 Q.J. Of Econ. 1017 (2012) .................................................. 13

Smith & Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the

Six-Person Jury, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 441 (2008) ................................ 14

United

States

Courts,

Juror

Experiences,

available

at

https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/learnabout-jury-service/juror-experiences ......................................... 19

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769) 7,

15

vi

Constitutional Provisions

U. S. Const., Amdt. 6. ............................................................ passim

vii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_____________

N O.

ELTA GELIN LANNIS, PETITIONER,

V.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

_____________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

_____________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_____________

Petitioner (Elta Gelin Lannis) respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment in this case of Florida’s Fourth

District Court of Appeal.

OPINION BELOW

The decision of Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal has not

yet been published in the Southern Reporter. It is reported as Lannis

v. State, 4D2024-2024, 2026 WL 772382 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 19,

2026). A copy is provided in the appendix. See 1a.

1

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments or decrees

“rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be

had.” 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence on March 19, 2026. 1a. Although the Florida

Supreme Court is the highest court in Florida in which a decision

could have been had, the Florida Supreme Court has held that it does

not have jurisdiction to review a district court of appeal decision

entered without a written opinion—a per curiam affirmance (PCA).

See Jackson v. State, 926 So. 2d 1262, 1266 (Fla. 2006); Mallet v.

State, 280 So. 3d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 2019) (holding that the Florida

Supreme Court is “a court of limited jurisdiction”). Petitioner could

thus not seek higher review at the Florida Supreme Court, meaning

the Fourth District Court of Appeal was the highest court in the State

of Florida where Petitioner could seek a decision. The Court has

jurisdiction.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Sixth Amendment

The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury.”

Section 913.10, Florida Statutes

Twelve persons shall constitute a jury to try all capital

cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all

other criminal cases.

Fla. Stat. § 913.10.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent (the State) charged Petitioner (Elta Gelin Lannis)

with Burglary with a Battery—a non-capital felony. Under Florida

law, a non-capital felony is tried before a six-person jury.

Nevertheless, Petitioner moved for a twelve-person jury, objecting to

the use of a six-person jury in any felony trial, and arguing that the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

guaranteed her a trial by a twelve-person jury. The trial court denied

the motion due to binding Supreme Court precedent, and the case

proceeded to trial. The six-person jury found Petitioner guilty as

charged.

On appeal, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion. 1a.

4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), the Court held that

a criminal defendant charged with a felony is not entitled to a twelveperson jury.

The Court’s holding in Williams should be overturned for three

reasons.

First, the Williams Court ignored a centuries-old tradition—one

that the Framers were very familiar with, and one that the Framers

would have intended to be included amongst the protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Second, the Williams Court relied on the functionalist approach

to interpreting the Constitution. Such an approach has produced results that are contrary to the plain-and-ordinary meaning of the Sixth

Amendment. Indeed, the Court has cast doubt on the functionalist

approach in subsequent cases—such as Ramos.

And finally, Florida’s six-person-jury law was enacted for a racist purpose. After the collapse of Reconstruction, and once federal

troops had left the state, Florida immediately attempted to circum-

5

vent all of the progress made to guarantee equality to African Americans. Williams has thus allowed a law that the legislature intended

to continue an unequal justice system to continue.

The Court should grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari, overturn Williams, end the functionalist approach, and hold

Florida’s six-person-jury law unconstitutional.

a. Williams marked a departure from well-established

precedent.

When the Framers adopted the words and phrases in the Constitution, they intended that those words and phrases should be understood “in their normal and ordinary[,] as distinguished from technical[,] meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731

(1931); see New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1,

34 (2022) (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they

were understood to have when the people adopted them.” (quoting

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 634–35 (2008))). So to

properly interpret the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, the

Court must look at the understanding of that phrase when the Framers adopted the Sixth Amendment.

6

“For almost all of this Nation’s history[,] and centuries before

that, the right to [a] trial by jury for serious criminal offenses meant

the right to a trial before [twelve] members of the community.”

Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S. Ct. 22, 27 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting

from the denial of certiorari). In fact, William Blackstone wrote that

the right to a twelve-person jury is an ancient right that goes all the

way back to the feudal system of trial. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 349 (1769) (“a tribunal composed

of twelve good men and true”). According to Blackstone, being tried

by a twelve-person jury “is the most transcendent privilege which any

subject can be enjoy or wish for, that he cannot be affected in his

property, his liberty or his person, but by the unanimous consent of

twelve of his neighbours and equals.” Id., at 379.

So at the time the Framers drafted, voted on, and adopted the

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the ordinary

meaning of “trial by jury” would have been that a criminal defendant

charged with a felony was entitled to a trial by a twelve-person jury.1

1 Later, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment applied the

jury-trial right (and the right to a twelve-person jury in a felony trial)

to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because

7

Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 349–50 (1898); Khorrami v. Arizona,

143 S. Ct. 22, 27 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting from the denial of

certiorari); accord Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 300 (1877) (holding

that historically, the right to a jury trial meant “a jury, according to

the common law, to be composed of twelve persons”); Robert H. Miller, Comment, Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other: A Reexamination

of Williams v. Florida and the Size of State Criminal Juries, 146 U. Pa.

L. Rev. 621, 633 (1998) (discussing twelve-member juries in ancient

Greek and Roman trials (myth and real)).

Because that understanding had been accepted at the time the

Framers adopted the Sixth Amendment, the Court reasoned that “[i]t

must” have been “that the word ‘jury’” in the Sixth Amendment referred to a twelve-person jury. Thompson, 170 U. S., at 350. For the

most part, the Court’s precedents adhered to the Sixth Amendment’s

plain and ordinary meaning, holding in several cases that the Sixth

Amendment guaranteed a criminal defendant charged with a felony

we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the

American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment

guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they

to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”).

8

a twelve-person jury. In 1900, the Court explained that “there [could]

be no doubt” that the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial clause protected

“a jury composed, as at common law, of twelve jurors.” Maxwell v.

Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 586 (1900). Thirty years later, the Court reiterated that “the phrase ‘trial by jury’” in the Constitution incorporated

the “essential elements” of juries that “were recognized in this country and England,” including the requirement that they “consist of

twelve men.” Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 288 (1930). And

as recently as 1968, the Court remarked that “by the time our Constitution was written, [trial by jury] in criminal cases had been in

existence for several centuries and carried impressive credentials

traced by many to Magna Carta,” such as the necessary inclusion of

twelve members. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 151–52 (1968).

Nevertheless, the Williams Court held that a criminal defendant

charged with a felony is not entitled to a twelve-person jury. By doing

so, the Court ignored a centuries-old tradition—one that the Framers

were very familiar with.

9

That departure from well-established precedent was wrong

then, and it is wrong now. The Court should grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari, overturn Williams, and restore the Sixth

Amendment right to a twelve-person jury.

b. Williams relied on the functionalist approach, which the

Court has since backed away from.

Even more troubling than the fact that the Court went against

a well-established historical tradition in Williams, was the fact that

the Court did not rely on the plain-and-ordinary meaning of the Sixth

Amendment to make that decision. Instead, the Court relied on a

“functionalist approach.”

Under that approach, the common understanding of juries at

the time the Constitution was adopted no longer matters. Instead,

the relevant question now is whether the “function” served by a jury

is furthered by a jury of twelve people. According to the Court in Williams, although it recognized that the Framers “may well” have had

“the usual expectation” when drafting the Sixth Amendment that jury

trials would have twelve-person juries, Williams, 399 U. S., at 98–99,

such “purely historical considerations” were not dispositive. Id., at

99. Rather, the Court concluded that the “essential feature” of a jury

10

is it leaves justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of laymen” and thus allows “guilt or innocence” to be determined via “community participation and [with] shared responsibility.” Id., at 100–

01. That function could be served just as easily with a six-person

jury. Id., at 101–102 & n.48.

Since Williams, not only has the theory undergirding the

functionalist approach been heavily criticized, see Burch v. Louisiana,

441 U. S. 130, 137 (1979) (acknowledging that Williams and its

progeny “departed from the strictly historical requirements of jury

trial”), the functionalist approach itself has been revealed to not be a

workable approach to constitutional interpretation. In Ballew v.

Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), for example, the Court—in holding

that the core “function” of the Sixth Amendment was disturbed by a

five-person jury, id., at 245—admit[ted]” that it “d[id] not pretend to

discern a clear line between six members and five,” id., at 239; see

also id., at 245–46 (POWELL, J.) (agreeing that five-member juries are

unconstitutional, while acknowledging that “the line between fiveand six-member juries is difficult to justify”).

Although Ballew did not overturn Williams, it revealed issues

with the approach, noting that recent research has shown that (1)

11

“smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group deliberation,”

id., at 233, (2) smaller juries may be less accurate and cause

“increasing inconsistency” in verdict results, id., at 234, (3) the

chance

for

hung

juries

decreases

with

smaller

juries,

disproportionally harming the defendant, id., at 236; and (4)

decreasing jury sizes “foretell[] problems . . . for the representation of

minority groups in the community,” undermining a jury’s likelihood

of being “truly representative of the community,” id., at 236–37.

Indeed, the Court later acknowledged the impracticability of the

functionalist approach. In Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83 (2020), the

Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s “trial by an impartial jury”

requirement encompasses what the term “meant at the time of the

Sixth Amendment’s adoption.” Id., at 90. Crucially, the Court noted

that it is not its job to “distinguish between the historic features of

common law jury trials that [it thinks] serve ‘important enough

functions to migrate silently into the Sixth Amendment and those

that don’t.’” 590 U. S., at 98.

The same reasoning applies to the historical right to a jury of

twelve people: When the People enshrined the jury trial right in the

12

Constitution, they did not attach a rider that future judges could

adapt it based on latter-day social science views.

Williams itself identified the “function” of the Sixth Amendment

as leaving justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of

laymen” and thus allowing “guilt or innocence” to be determined via

“community participation and [with] shared responsibility.” 399

U. S., at 100–01. That function is thwarted by reducing the number

of jurors to six.

Smaller juries are less representative of the community, and

they are less consistent than larger juries. See, e.g., Shamena Anwar,

et al., The Impact of Jury Race In Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. Of Econ.

1017, 1049 (2012) (finding that “increasing the number of jurors on

the seated jury would substantially reduce the variability of the trial

outcomes, increase black representation in the jury pool and on

seated juries, and make trial outcomes more equal for white and

black defendants”); Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury:

Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. of Empirical Legal Stud.

425, 427 (Sept. 2009) (“reducing jury size inevitably has a drastic

effect on the representation of minority group members on the jury”);

Higginbotham et al., Better by the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve13

Person Civil Jury, 104 Judicature 47, 52 (Summer 2020) (“Larger

juries are also more inclusive and more representative of the

community. . . . In reality, cutting the size of the jury dramatically

increases the chance of excluding minorities.”).

Other important considerations also weigh in favor of the

twelve-person jury. Twelve-person juries deliberate longer, recall

evidence

better,

and

rely

less

on

irrelevant

factors

during

deliberation. See Smith & Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams v.

Florida and the Six-Person Jury, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 441, 465 (2008).

Minority views are also more likely to be thoroughly expressed

in a larger jury, as “having a large minority helps make the minority

subgroup more influential,” and, unsurprisingly, “the chance of

minority members having allies is greater on a twelve-person jury.”

Id., at 466. Finally, larger juries deliver more predictable results. In

the civil context, for example, “[s]ix-person juries are four times more

likely to return extremely high or low damage awards compared to

the average.” Higginbotham et al., supra, at 52.

Blackstone wrote:

[A] competent number of sensible and upright jurymen,

chosen by lot from among those of the middle rank, will be

found the best investigators of truth, and the surest

14

guardians of public justice. For the most powerful

individual in the state will be cautious of committing any

flagrant invasion of another’s right, when he knows that

the fact of his oppression must be examined and decided

by twelve indifferent men . . . .

Blackstone, supra, at 380. The Court should grant Petiitoner’s

petition for a writ of certiorari, overturn Williams, end the

functionalist approach, and hold that the Sixth Amendment entitles

a criminal defendant charged with a felony to a twelve-person jury.

c. Six-person jury laws, like Florida’s, can be traced to the

Jim Crow-era, and contributed to a systematic effort to

exclude African-Americans from jury service.

“Florida does what the Constitution forbids.” Cunningham v.

Florida, 144 S. Ct. 1287, 1287 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from

the denial of certiorari). In addition to overturning a well-understood

right, as well as relying on a mode of constitutional interpretation

that produced results counter to the Sixth Amendment’s purpose,

the Court’s Williams decision also allowed Florida to continue the use

of a system that promotes racism.

In Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S. Ct. 22 (2022), Justice Gorsuch

observed that “[d]uring the Jim Crow[-]era, some States restricted the

size of juries and abandoned the demand for a unanimous verdict as

part of a deliberate and systematic effort to suppress minority voices

15

in public affairs.” Id., at 27 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari) (citations omitted). Florida’s six-person-jury law arose in

that context. The common law rule of a jury of twelve was still kept

in Florida while federal troops remained in the state.

In 1875, the Jury Clause of the 1868 constitution was amended

to provide that the number of jurors “for the trial of causes in any

court may be fixed by law.” See Florida Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v. Boswell,

34 So. 241, 241 (Fla. 1903). Subsequently, the Florida Legislature

enacted a provision specifying a jury of six in . See

The Florida Legislature enacted chapter 3010, section 6, Laws

of Florida (1877) (which contained the jury-of-six provision) on

February 17, 1877—which was less than a month after the last

federal troops were withdrawn from Florida in January 1877. Gibson

v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 294, 297–98 (1877); see Jerrell H. Shofner,

Reconstruction and Renewal, 1865–1877, in The History of Florida

273 (Michael Gannon, ed., first paperback edition 2018) (stating that

“there were [no federal troops] in Florida after 23 January 1877”). The

jury-of-six thus first saw light at the birth of the Jim Crow-era as

former Confederates regained power in southern states and state

prosecutors made a concerted effort to prevent blacks from serving

16

as jurors.

On its face, the 1868 Florida Constitution extended the

franchise to black men. But the historical context shows that that it

was part of the overall resistance to Reconstruction efforts to protect

the rights of black citizens. The 1868 Florida Constitution was the

product of a remarkable series of events including a coup in which

leaders of the white southern (or native) faction took possession of

the assembly hall in the middle of the night, excluding Radical

Republican delegates from the proceedings. See Richard L. Hume,

Membership of the Florida Constitutional Convention of 1868: A Case

Study of Republican Factionalism in the Reconstruction South, 51 Fla.

Hist. Q. 1, 5–6 (1972); Shofner, supra, at 266. A reconciliation was

effected as the “outside” whites “united with the majority of the body’s

native whites to frame a constitution designed to continue white

dominance.” Hume, supra, at 15.

The purpose of the resulting constitution was spelled out by

Harrison Reed, a leader of the prevailing faction and the first governor

elected under the 1868 constitution, who wrote to Senator Yulee that

the new constitution was constructed to bar blacks from legislative

office: “Under our Constitution the Judiciary & State officers will be

17

appointed & the apportionment will prevent a negro legislature.” Id.,

at 15–16.

Furthermore, when the Florida Legislature reduced the size of

juries from twelve to six in 1877, it also re-established the “integrity,

fair character, sound judgment and intelligence” test for jury service.

See ch. 3010, Laws of Fla. (1877). This discretionary standard was

“used to eliminate almost every black citizen from the southern trial

venire.” Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth

Amendment as a Prohibition against the Racial Use of Peremptory

Challenges, 76 Corn. L. Rev. 1, 89-90 (1990). And it worked. In fact,

after the enactment of Florida’s six-person jury law, it was so rare for

an African American to serve on a jury that it was worthy of a news

article:

• “It is strange that the presence of a negro on the jury should not

have attracted sufficient attention to have caused an inquiry

into his eligibility as a jury man.” That Federal Jury, Panama

City Pilot, Nov. 27, 1924, at 1.

• “At one point it looked as though the first negro juror in Monroe

County was to be selected.” Child Molesting Trial Jury Chosen,

Key West Citizen, Dec. 11, 1952, at 1, 3.

18

• “A negro juror was picked today to try Felix Combs, a negro

roustabout, for raping a Clearwater woman. Selection of Henry

Davis of Tarpon Springs marked one of the few times a negro

has been selected for jury duty.” Negro Juror, Sanford Herald,

Oct. 4, 1948, at 1.

• “The names of several Negroes were included in the 1950 jury

list. Last fall, the county’s first Negro juror served when Calvin

Smith was named on the venire which heard a cattle rustling

case in Circuit Court.” First Two Women are Picked for Possible

Jury Duty in County, Citrus Cnty. Chron., Feb. 16, 1950, at 1.

This sad history brings into view another negative consequence

of smaller juries: it denies a great number of citizens the “duty, honor,

and privilege of jury service.” See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 415

(1991). Many consider jury service an “amazing and powerful

opportunity and experience—one that will strengthen your sense of

humanity and your own responsibility.” United States Courts, Juror

Experiences,

https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-

service/learn-about-jury-service/juror-experiences (last visited Jan.

6, 2026). Jury service, like civic deliberation in general, “not only

resolves conflicts in a way that yields improved policy outcomes, it

19

also transforms the participants in the deliberation in important

ways—altering how they think of themselves and their fellow

citizens.” John Gastil & Phillip J. Weiser, Jury Service as an Invitation

to Citizenship: Assessing the Civic Values of Institutionalized

Deliberation, 34 Pol’y Stud. J. 605, 606 (2006). Jury service is a

“means of affording every citizen the chance to step into the state’s

shoes, to see the inner workings of the justice system, and to feel

first-hand the power of self-government.” Id., at 619. “In other words,

the jury is a sacred, institutionalized opportunity for citizens to

experience the transformative power of public deliberation.” Ibid.

In Williams, the defendant attempted to correct Florida’s blatant

workaround of the Reconstruction Amendments, but the Court

refused to do so. Instead, the Court held that section 913.10 is

constitutional. In view of the foregoing, the Court should take the

opportunity to grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari,

recede from Williams, and restore the ancient right to a jury of twelve.

d. Williams is bad precedent and should be overturned by

the Court.

The Court is thus Petitioner’s last and only hope to overturn

Williams. Florida’s appellate courts have uniformly refused to hold

20

that a defendant charged with a felony is constitutionally entitled to

a twelve-person jury. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 359 So. 3d 408, 410

n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023). Those decisions are binding on Florida’s trial

courts. See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (“[I]n the

absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all

Florida trial courts.”).

Although Williams has been on the books for several decades,

precedent that is contrary to the plain-and-ordinary meaning of the

text of the Constitution must be overturned.

Stare decisis is “the means by which [the Court] ensure[s] that

the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265

(1986). “That doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional

system of government, both in appearance and in fact.” Id., at 265–

66.

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S.

215 (2022), however, the Court noted that “stare decisis is not an

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inexorable command” and “is at its weakest when [the Court] interpret[s] the Constitution.” Id., at 264. “[W]hen it comes to the interpretation of the Constitution—the ‘great charter of our liberties,’

which was meant to endure through the long lapse of the ages—[the

Court] place[s] a high value on having the matter settled right.” Ibid.

(cleaned up). And, “when one of [the Court’s] constitutional decisions

goes astray, the country is usually stuck with the bad decision unless

[the Court] correct[s] [the] mistake.” Ibid. “Therefore, in appropriate

circumstances [the Court] must be willing to reconsider, and if necessary, overrule constitutional decisions.” Ibid. “All Justices now on

this Court agree that it is sometimes appropriate for the Court to

overrule erroneous decisions.” Ramos, 590 U. S., at 116.

Among the factors the Court considers when considering

whether to overrule constitutional decisions are “the antiquity of the

precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the

decision was well reasoned.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778,

792–93 (2009). In addition, the Court also considers whether “experience has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 233 (2009). Relying on those principles, the

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Court in Dobbs overturned Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), which

had been the law of the land for nearly fifty years.

As has already been stated, Williams has proven to be “fundamentally misguided.” See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603

U. S. 369, 407 (2024). Primarily, Williams does not comport with an

originalist interpretation of the Constitution. Up until Williams was

decided, the Court had long recognized that a criminal defendant

charged with a felony had a Sixth Amendment right to a twelve-person jury. Williams, for the first time in American jurisprudence, held

otherwise.

Even more egregious, was the fact that the Court based its decision on a functionalist approach. Ramos called into question the

Court’s earlier reliance on the functionalist approach.

Finally, the Court’s decision in Williams allowed Florida to continue to use a law that was steeped in racism.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted, and Williams should be revisited. Upon revisiting Williams, the Court should

overturn it and return to an originalist interpretation of the Sixth

Amendment.

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CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted or held

pending the disposition of Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL EISINGER

Public Defender

Benjamin Nathaniel Paley

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Ethan R. Goldberg

Assistant Public Defender

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 355–7600

Bpaley@pd15.org

Egoldberg@pd15.org

Lmattocks@pd15.org

Appeals@pd15.org

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