Opposition Brief — Alex Antonio Bynes, Petitioner v. Florida

No. 25-7465

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_______________________________________

ALEX ANTONIO BYNES,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_______________________________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH DISTRICT

_______________________________________

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

_______________________________________

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State of Florida

PL-01, The Capitol

Tallahassee, FL 32399

(850) 414-3300

jeffrey.desousa@

myfloridalegal.com

DAVID M.S. DEWHIRST

Solicitor General

JEFFREY PAUL DESOUSA

Chief Deputy Solicitor

General

Counsel of Record

NATHAN A. FORRESTER

Chief Deputy Solicitor

General

CHRISTINE K. PRATT

Deputy Solicitor General

August 17, 2025

Counsel for Respondent

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Florida Statute § 790.23, the state law

that prohibits a convicted felon from possessing firearms, facially complies with the Second Amendment.

2. Whether the Court should overrule Williams v.

Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and hold that the Sixth

Amendment requires the use of 12-person juries in serious criminal cases.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................... iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

I. The Court should deny Bynes’ petition for

review of his claim that Florida’s felon-inpossession

statute

is

facially

unconstitutional. ....................................................3

A. The decision below is correct. ........................... 4

B. Lower courts are not divided on the

question presented.......................................... 12

C. This case presents a poor vehicle. .................. 13

II. The Court should hold Bynes’ petition for

review of his 12-person jury claim pending

disposition of Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623. .......14

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 15

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Cunningham v. Florida, 144 S. Ct. 1287 (2024) ........ 3

Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570

(2008)........................................................................ 7

Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291 (1877) ............................. 1

Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) ........... 10

Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623, 2026 WL

1718018 (June 15, 2026) ........................................ 14

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024) ....... 13

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597

U.S. 1 (2022)......................................................... 4, 5

Sir John Knight’s Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87 Eng.

Rep. 75 (K.B. 1686) ............................................ 5, 11

United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir.

2024) ....................................................................... 12

United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th

Cir. 2025)............................................................ 7, 12

United States v. Gay, 98 F.4th 843 (7th Cir.

2024) ....................................................................... 12

United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762 (2023) ......... 13

United States v. Hernandez, 159 F.4th 425

(5th Cir. 2025) ........................................................ 13

United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir.

2024) ....................................................................... 12

United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th

Cir. 2024)................................................................ 12

United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th

Cir. 2025)................................................................ 11

United States v. Langston, 110 F.4th 408 (1st

Cir. 2024)................................................................ 12

United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266 (3d Cir.

2024) ....................................................................... 12

iv

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)... 2, 3, 4,

5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) ..... 5, 10

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th

Cir. 2024).................................................... 10, 12, 13

Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir.

2025) ....................................................................... 12

Wash. St. Grange v. Wash. St. Republican

Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008)..................................... 13

Waters v. State, 1 Gill 302 (Md. 1843) ........................ 7

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) ........i, 1, 3, 14

Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025) ........... 12

Statutes

12 The Colonial Records of the State of

Georgia 451 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1907) ............... 7

1790 Act of N.C., A Manual of the Laws of

North-Carolina 172 (1814) ...................................... 7

1795 Mass. Acts ch. 134, § 16, in Acts and

Resolves of Massachusetts, 1794–1795, ch.

26 (1896) ................................................................... 9

18 U.S.C. § 922 .......................................................... 11

2 The Lower Norfolk County Virginia

Antiquary, pt. 1 (1899) ............................................ 7

4 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–

1789 (Washington, D.C., Worthington

Chauncey Ford ed., Library of Congress

1906) ......................................................................... 8

A Codification of the Statute Law of Georgia

ch. 37, § 6, ¶ 45 (William A. Hotchkiss ed.,

2d ed. 1848) .............................................................. 7

Act for Disarming Papists, and Reputed

Papists, Refusing to Take the Oaths to the

v

Government, Mar. 1756, § 3, 7 Va. Stat. at

Large 35 (William Waller Hening ed., 1820) .......... 6

Act for Forming and Regulating the Militia,

Mar. 1757, 5 Pa. Stat. at Large 609 (James

T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1898) .............. 6

Act for Preventing Negroes Insurrections,

1752, 2 Va. Stat. at Large 481 (William

Waller Hening ed., 1823) ......................................... 7

Act for Regulating the Militia of the Province

of Maryland, 1756, in 52 Proceedings and

Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland,

1755–1756 (1935) ..................................................... 6

Act of 1740, 7 S.C. Stat. at Large 410 (A.S.

Johnson ed., 1840) ................................................... 7

Act of 1775, 15 The Public Records of the

Colony of Connecticut, from May 1775, to

June 1776 (Hartford, Case, Lockwood &

Brainard Co. 1890) .................................................. 8

Act of 1776, 7 R.I. Recs. 566 (John Russell

Bartlett ed., 1862) .................................................... 6

Act of 1777, ch. 6, § 9, 24 N.C. Recs. 84 (Walter

Clark ed., 1905)........................................................ 6

Act of Dec. 1775, 15 Conn. Pub. Recs., May

1775–June 1776, at 192 (Charles J. Hoadly

ed., 1890) .................................................................. 6

Act of February 17, 1877, ch. 3010, § 6, 1877

Fla. Laws 54 ............................................................. 1

Act of Mar. 31, 1779, ch. 836, § 5, 9 Pa. Stat. at

Large 346 (James T. Mitchell & Henry

Flanders eds., 1903)................................................. 6

Act of May 1, 1776, ch. 21, §§ 1–3, 5 Mass.

Acts & Resolves 479 (1886) ..................................... 6

Act of May 5, 1777, ch. 3, 9 Va. Stat. at Large

281 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823) .................. 6

vi

Act of Sept. 20, 1777, ch. 40, § 20, Acts of the

General Assembly of the State of New

Jersey, Aug. 27, 1776–Oct. 11, 1777, (1777) ........... 6

Act to Prevent and Suppress Insurrections,

1778, ch. 8, 203 Hanson’s Laws of Md.,

1763–1784 (Frederick Green ed., 1787) .................. 6

Fla. Stat. § 790.23 .................. i, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 14

Fla. Stat. § 913.10 ................................................... 1, 2

Militia Act of 1662, 14 Car. 2 c. 3, § 13 (1662) ..... 5, 11

Order of May 21, 1776, 15 Documents Relating

to the Colonial History of the State of New

York 103 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co.

1887) ..................................................................... 6, 9

Records of the Governor and Company of the

Massachusetts Bay in New England (1628–

1641) (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1853)................. 7

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. II .................................................. 4

Other Sources

Bradley Chapin, Criminal Justice in Colonial

America, 1606–1660 (1983) ..................................... 7

Charles Campbell, History of the Colony and

Ancient Dominion of Virginia (1860) ...................... 7

Fla. Comm’n on Offender Review, Rules of

Executive Clemency ................................................ 13

Joseph G.S. Greenlee, Disarming the

Dangerous: The American Tradition of

Firearm Prohibitions, 16 Drexel L. Rev. 1

(2024)........................................................................ 7

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the

Laws of England 149 (10th ed. 1787)...................... 9

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Florida law prohibits any person from “possessi[ng]” a firearm if that person has been convicted

of a felony in a Florida court. Fla. Stat. § 790.23(1)(a).

It is a second-degree felony to violate Florida’s felonin-possession law, punishable by up to fifteen years in

prison and a fine not to exceed $10,000. See id.

§ 790.23(3).

Florida also uses six-person juries to try noncapital

criminal defendants—a practice it has maintained

since 1877. See Act of February 17, 1877, ch. 3010,

§ 6, 1877 Fla. Laws 54. Both the Florida Supreme

Court and this Court have held that the use of six-person juries satisfy the jury-trial guarantees of both the

Florida and the federal constitutions, respectively.

See Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 300 (1877); see also

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). Florida therefore has continued its longstanding practice of using

six-person juries in trials of noncapital offenses. See

Fla. Stat. § 913.10.

In January 2023, Alex Antonio Bynes was arrested

and charged with possessing a firearm as a convicted

felon, in violation of section 790.23(1)(a). C.R. 97–98,

101–102. Bynes was driving at the time of his arrest

and was pulled over for a traffic stop. His girlfriend

was sitting in the passenger seat, and two men sat in

the backseat. C.R. 101. After asking Bynes’ girlfriend

to exit the car, the officer saw a firearm sitting in plain

view in the center of the passenger seat where the girlfriend had just been sitting. C.R. 101. Although

Bynes at first denied knowing about the firearm, he

later told the officer that he had been “holding it” for

2

his “cousin,” had wanted it for “protection,” and was a

convicted felon. C.R. 101, 219–21. The firearm was

later found to contain two live rounds. C.R. 251. At

trial, Bynes testified that he had lied to the officer

about possessing the firearm to protect his girlfriend.

Tr. 28.

The trial court empaneled a six-person jury as required by Florida law, as Bynes’s crime is not punishable by death. See Fla. Stat. § 913.10. Prior to his

trial, Bynes stipulated that he was a convicted felon.

C.R. 360. In fact, Bynes had been previously convicted

of at least four felonies: aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon and unlicensed carry of a concealed

weapon in 2007, possession of more than 20 grams of

marijuana with intent to sell in 2008, and grand theft

of a motor vehicle in 2011. C.R. 124–26; Tr. 99–100.

The jury convicted Bynes of possessing a firearm

as a convicted felon, in violation of section

790.23(1)(a). C.R. 89. He was sentenced to five years’

imprisonment, including a three-year mandatoryminimum term. C.R. 90, 120–23.

Bynes appealed his felon-in-possession conviction

to Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal. Among

other claims, he argued for the first time that section

790.23(1)(a) facially violates the Second Amendment

because section 790.23’s “total lifetime ban” on firearm possession “does not comport with the historical

restrictions on the right to bear arms.” Pet. App. 8a–

9a. Specifically, Bynes pointed to historical surety

laws and the domestic violence statute at issue in

United States v. Rahimi, in which a factfinder performed an individualized assessment that a person

3

poses a clear threat of physical violence before prohibiting him or her from possessing firearms or posting a

surety bond. Pet. App. 5a–7a; 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

Accordingly, Bynes argued, section 790.23(1)(a) must

do the same to facially comply with the Second

Amendment. Pet. App. 7a

At no point has Bynes raised an as-applied challenge to the felon-in-possession statute.

Bynes also claimed on appeal for the first time that

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments entitled him

to be tried by a 12-person jury because Williams was

“incorrectly decided” and does not comport with the

public’s “understanding of the Sixth Amendment at

the time of the Founding.” Pet. App. 9a–10a (citing

Cunningham v. Florida, 144 S. Ct. 1287, 1287–88

(2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed

Bynes’ conviction without discussion. Pet. App. 1a.

ARGUMENT

I. The Court should deny Bynes’ petition for review of his claim that Florida’s felon-in-possession statute is facially unconstitutional.

In the Second Amendment portion of his petition,

Bynes raises the “most difficult challenge to mount

successfully”—a facial challenge. United States v.

Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024); see Pet. 5 (“the facial constitutionality of a statute may be raised for the

first time on appeal [in Florida courts]”). Specifically,

he argues that section 790.23(1)(a) is facially unconstitutional “in light of Rahimi” because Florida’s law

4

permanently1 prohibits felons from possessing firearms without first requiring a court to determine

whether each individual felon poses a “clear threat of

physical violence to another.” Pet. 9–11 (quoting

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698).

For three reasons, the Court should decline to review the first question presented. The state court’s

decision was correct on the merits, lower courts are

not divided on the issue, and this case suffers from

several vehicle problems.

A. The decision below is correct.

The Florida appellate court correctly affirmed

Bynes’s conviction. As applied to dangerous felons

(like Bynes himself), section 790.23(1)(a) burdens the

right of armed self-defense in a manner comparable to

relevant historical analogues. See N.Y. State Rifle &

Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 29 (2022).2

1. The Second Amendment provides that “the right

of the people to keep and bear Arms[] shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In assessing a challenge to the constitutionality of a firearm restriction

under the Second Amendment, this Court looks to the

constitutional “text and history.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at

22. To succeed, the challenger must first show that

1 Florida offers a clemency process through which a felon’s

firearm rights may be “restored,” Fla. Stat. § 790.23(2)(a), so its

restriction is not necessarily “life-long,” as Bynes claims, Pet. 8.

2 In pending litigation in state court, Florida has taken the

position that a felon who is not dangerous retains his or her Second Amendment right to bear arms and cannot lawfully be dispossessed under section 790.23(1)(a).

5

the plain text of the Second Amendment applies to

him and his conduct. See id. at 24. If it does, “the

government must then justify its regulation by

demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. “Why

and how” a particular historical analogue burdens the

right to armed self-defense is “central to this inquiry.”

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692.

To succeed in a facial challenge, a litigant must

demonstrate that “no set of circumstances exist[] under which” the law would be constitutional. Id. at 693

(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745

(1987)). In other words, the State must show merely

that section 790.23(1)(a) is constitutional in “some of

its applications.” Id.

2. Applying Bruen’s test, section 790.23(1)(a) is undoubtedly constitutional in many applications. History is replete with laws disarming dangerous individuals. Take the early English examples of governments disarming individuals who “misus[e] weapons

to harm or menace others,” such as brigands, highway

men, and those “judge[d] dangerous to the Peace of the

Kingdome.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693–94 (citing Sir

John Knight’s Case, 3 Mod. 117, 118, 87 Eng. Rep. 75,

76 (K.B. 1686); Militia Act of 1662, 14 Car. 2 c. 3, § 13

(1662)). Many of these groups were thought to pose a

risk of armed insurrection.

Likewise, early American regulations targeted individuals and groups who were thought to be too dangerous to be trusted with firearms. For example, a

number of states disarmed Loyalists and others who

6

refused to swear an oath to the Union during the Revolutionary War.3 In a similar vein, some American

colonies disarmed Catholics who were thought to pose

a risk of plotting with France to impose Catholic rule

in America.4 Other colonies disarmed Protestants,

like Anne Hutchinson and her Antinomian followers,

3 See Act of Mar. 31, 1779, ch. 836, § 5, 9 Pa. Stat. at Large

346, 347–48 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1903);

Act of May 1, 1776, ch. 21, §§ 1–3, 5 Mass. Acts & Resolves 479,

479–81 (1886); Act of May 5, 1777, ch. 3, 9 Va. Stat. at Large 281,

281–82 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823); Act of 1776, 7 R.I.

Recs. 566, 567 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1862); Act of 1777, ch.

6, § 9, 24 N.C. Recs. 84, 89 (Walter Clark ed., 1905); Act to Prevent and Suppress Insurrections, 1778, ch. 8, 203 Hanson’s Laws

of Md., 1763–1784, at 193 (Frederick Green ed., 1787); Act of Dec.

1775, 15 Conn. Pub. Recs., May 1775–June 1776, at 192, 193

(Charles J. Hoadly ed., 1890); Order of May 21, 1776, in 15 Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York

102, 103 (Berthold Fernow ed., 1887); Act of Sept. 20, 1777, ch.

40, § 20, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey,

Aug. 27, 1776–Oct. 11, 1777, at 84, 90 (1777).

4 See Act for Forming and Regulating the Militia, Mar. 1757,

5 Pa. Stat. at Large 609, 610 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1898) (authorizing seizure of arms belonging to any

“papists or reputed papists”); Act for Regulating the Militia of the

Province of Maryland, 1756, in 52 Proceedings and Acts of the

General Assembly of Maryland, 1755–1756, at 454 (1935) (same);

Act for Disarming Papists, and Reputed Papists, Refusing to

Take the Oaths to the Government, Mar. 1756, § 3, 7 Va. Stat. at

Large 35, 36 (William Waller Hening ed., 1820) (“[N]o Papist, or

reputed Papist [refusing to take an oath of allegiance] shall, or

may have, or keep in his house or else-where, or in the possession

of any other person to his use, or at his disposition, any arms,

weapons, gunpowder or ammunition[.]”).

7

who were suspected of sedition,5 as well as Puritans

in Virginia who were deemed to be “Abettors to much

sedition and Munity.”6 Laws disarming slaves and

freed Blacks7 and prohibiting the sale of firearms to

Native Americans8 were also common. To be sure,

many of these categorical restrictions were built on

benighted prejudices and would be unconstitutional

5 Massachusetts Colony leadership in 1637 convicted Antinomian Anne Hutchinson of sedition. See Bradley Chapin, Criminal Justice in Colonial America, 1606–1660, at 102–04 (1983).

They banished Hutchinson and several supporters from the colony; but of those permitted to remain, they disarmed 75. See

Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay

in New England (1628–1641), at 211–12 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff

ed., 1853).

6 See 2 The Lower Norfolk County Virginia Antiquary, pt. 1,

at 15 (1899) (statement made in court in May 1648); see also

Charles Campbell, History of the Colony and Ancient Dominion

of Virginia 212 (1860).

7 See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 611–12

(2008) (citing Waters v. State, 1 Gill 302, 309 (Md. 1843) (“free

blacks were treated as a ‘dangerous population,’” leading to laws

that “ma[de] it unlawful for them to bear arms’”); see also Act for

Preventing Negroes Insurrections, 1752, 2 Va. Stat. at Large 481,

481–82 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823); A Codification of the

Statute Law of Georgia ch. 37, § 6, ¶ 45, at 813 (William A. Hotchkiss ed., 2d ed. 1848); Act of 1740, 7 S.C. Stat. at Large 410 (A.S.

Johnson ed., 1840); 1790 Act of N.C., A Manual of the Laws of

North-Carolina 172 (1814); 12 The Colonial Records of the State

of Georgia 451, 452 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1907).

8 These laws were part of “an ongoing military conflict” and

their purpose was “to limit the danger of armed encounters with

hostile Native Americans.” United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th

743, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2025) (VanDyke, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (citing Joseph G.S. Greenlee, Disarming the

Dangerous: The American Tradition of Firearm Prohibitions, 16

Drexel L. Rev. 1, 29 (2024)).

8

under the First or Fourteenth Amendments today.

See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 723 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause

“sought to reject the Nation’s history of racial discrimination, not to backdoor incorporate racially discriminatory and oppressive historical practices and laws

into the Constitution”). But courts can still extrapolate from these restrictions a valid “principle[] underlying the Second Amendment,” id. at 692, independent of the distorted application of that principle to particular historical facts. The principle is that society

disarmed persons deemed to pose a risk of violence or

to threaten the public safety, consistent with the wellrecognized general right to bear arms. That precept

is firmly a part of the original public meaning of the

Second Amendment

Laws disarming those who refused to swear loyalty

oaths speak to the same principle. Individuals who

“have not associated” and who “refuse[d] to associate,

to defend, by arms, these United Colonies”9 were dangerous or at least possessed qualities or traits indicating that their possession of firearms could threaten

the public safety. Such persons were “inimical to the

liberties of” the “United Colonies in America,”10 and

thus could not keep their firearms. Some colonies

9 4 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 205

(Washington, D.C., Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., Library of

Congress 1906).

10 Act of 1775, 15 The Public Records of the Colony of Con-

necticut, from May 1775, to June 1776, at 193 (Hartford, Case,

Lockwood & Brainard Co. 1890).

9

went so far as to order that the firearms of the “disaffected persons” be given to Revolutionary soldiers to

arm them for war.11

Similarly, surety and “going armed” laws disarmed

persons believed to pose a danger to others. See Bruen,

597 U.S. at 49–50, 56 & n.23; see also Rahimi, 602

U.S. at 695–98. Although surety laws included a judicial determination of dangerousness, such laws nevertheless support the principle that dangerous people

could be disarmed. Such laws “targeted the misuse of

firearms,” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 696, by requiring those

likely to pose a danger to others to post a bond to go

“armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon.”12 Likewise, “going

armed” laws prohibited “riding or going armed, with

dangerous or unusual weapons, [to] terrify[ ] the good

people of the land.” Id. at 697–98 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 149

(10th ed. 1787) (emphasis deleted)). Individuals who

violated going armed laws were disarmed and “imprison[ed].” Id. at 697.

This history reflects that governments may disarm

“those who have demonstrated a proclivity for violence

or whose possession of guns would otherwise threaten

11 See, e.g., Order of May 21, 1776, 15 Documents Relating to

the Colonial History of the State of New York 103 (Albany, Weed,

Parsons & Co. 1887) (ordering the supplying of its militias with

“such good Arms fit for soldiers use as they may have collected

by disarming disaffected persons”).

12 1795 Mass. Acts ch. 134, § 16, in Acts and Resolves of Mas-

sachusetts, 1794–1795, ch. 26, pp. 66–67 (1896); see also Rahimi,

602 U.S. at 696 (“At least nine other jurisdictions” passed similar

surety laws to Massachusetts’s.).

10

the public safety.” Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 454

(7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).

Florida’s felon-in-possession ban will inevitably

entail countless applications to defendants with prior

felonies evincing dangerousness. Several easy cases

come to mind. A defendant with a prior homicide conviction is dangerous. United States v. Williams, 113

F.4th 637, 663 (6th Cir. 2024) (explaining that an offender previously convicted of “murder” can be dispossessed because homicide is “a crime against the body

of another human being,” proof that the offender is

“dangerous”). Section 790.23(1)(a) could therefore be

constitutionally applied to that defendant. Same with

the defendant previously convicted of dangerous

crimes like rape, arson, terrorism, bombmaking,

armed robbery, home-invasion burglary, and the like.

See Williams, 113 F.4th at 663 (“rape,” “robbery,” “assault,” and “burglary” evince dangerousness). Those

categories of modern offenders are relevantly similar

to the categories of individuals who were routinely

dispossessed of their firearms at the Founding. The

existence of these lawful applications of section

790.23(1)(a) defeats any facial challenge under

Rahimi and Salerno.

Yet even if Bynes had brought an as-applied claim,

he would lose. Indeed, Bynes is precisely the sort of

dangerous felon who lacked Second Amendment

rights at the Founding. Of his four previous felony

convictions, Bynes’s convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in 2007 and grand theft of

a motor vehicle in 2011 are manifestly dangerous felonies. See C.R. 124–26. They are crimes of violence.

And Bynes’s aggravated assault conviction involved

11

violence against another person with a firearm. In addition, Bynes’s conviction for possession of more than

20 grams of marijuana with intent to sell in 2008 likewise constitutes a dangerous felony. A person who

possesses an amount of drugs sufficient to evince an

intent to sell those drugs has demonstrated a willingness to undertake illicit means, potentially including

violence, to maintain possession of and access to contraband. See United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308,

316 (5th Cir. 2025) (concluding that history and

tradition support disarming persons convicted of drug

trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because “drug

dealers use guns to protect their business” and selling

drugs is an “inherent[ly] violen[t]” trade).

Thus, Bynes’ own convictions demonstrate that he

poses a “clear threat of physical violence to another,”

and as a result, he can be lawfully disarmed under

section 790.23(1)(a). Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. The

early English laws disarming those who “misus[e]

weapons to harm or menace others,” such as brigands,

highway men, and those “judge[d] dangerous to the

Peace of the Kingdome,13 the laws disarming British

Loyalists and religious groups thought to pose a risk

of violence towards others, and the surety and going

armed laws—all prohibited individuals from possessing firearms who presented a special danger of

misusing them. So too does section 790.23(1)(a) as applied to Bynes.

See, e.g., Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693–94 (citing Sir John

Knight’s Case, 3 Mod. 117, 118, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K.B. 1686);

Militia Act of 1662, 14 Car. 2 c. 3, § 13 (1662)).

13

12

The state appellate court was thus quite right to

reject Bynes’ facial Second Amendment claim.

B. Lower courts are not divided on the

question presented.

Additionally, Bynes does not cite a single decision

from any court that has held a felon-in-possession

statute facially unconstitutional, nor has he pointed

to a decision holding that the Second Amendment requires an individualized determination of dangerousness. No such decisions exist.

To the contrary, every court of appeals to consider

the facial constitutionality of a felon-in-possession

statute since Bruen has held that such statutes are

constitutional in at least some of their applications.

See, e.g., United States v. Langston, 110 F.4th 408, 413

(1st Cir. 2024); Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68, 88–89

(2d Cir. 2025); United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266,

272–73 (3d Cir. 2024); United States v. Hunt, 123

F.4th 697, 705–08 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v.

Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2024); United States

v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 657 (6th Cir. 2024); United

States v. Gay, 98 F.4th 843, 846–47 (7th Cir. 2024);

United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1125–29

(8th Cir. 2024); United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th

743, 747 (9th Cir. 2025); Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th

1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2025).

And no court of appeals has held that the Second

Amendment requires courts to perform an individualized assessment of whether each felon poses a “clear

threat of physical violence to another.” Pet. 9 (emphasis removed). Rather, at the very least, courts regard

an individual’s criminal history sufficient to establish

13

whether that person is dangerous. See Williams, 113

F.4th at 659–60 (6th Cir.); United States v. Hernandez, 159 F.4th 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2025).

The absence of a circuit split regarding these issues further demonstrates that Bynes’s petition does

not merit review.

C. This case presents a poor vehicle.

Finally, Bynes’ case suffers from numerous vehicle

problems. This Court generally disfavors facial challenges. See Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707,

723 (2024); Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693; United States v.

Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 784–85 (2023); Wash. St.

Grange v. Wash. St. Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,

450–51 (2008). Bynes has offered no reason why his

facial challenge is uniquely suited for review. Were

this Court to take up the question of the legality of a

felon-in-possession ban, it should do so in a case involving an as-applied claim.

That is especially true given the nature of the

question presented. Bynes asks the Court to address

whether the Second Amendment forbids a “lifetime

ban” on firearm possession by “all convicted felons.”

Pet. 10. But Florida’s law does not impose any “lifetime ban.” Instead, it offers a clemency process14

14 See Fla. Comm’n on Offender Review, Rules of Executive

Clemency at 7, https://tinyurl.com/mryr5x4t (explaining that a

person may apply to regain firearms rights when eight years

have passed since he completed all terms of his felony sentence,

and has no outstanding detainers, criminal charges, victim restitution payments, or pecuniary penalties totaling more than

$1,000).

14

through which a felon’s firearm rights may be “restored.” Fla. Stat. § 790.23(2)(a). Indeed, the statute

under which Bynes was convicted provides that “[t]his

section shall not apply to a person . . . whose civil

rights and firearm authority have been restored.” Id.

That statute thus does not even implicate the question

presented. Nor has Bynes alleged that he petitioned

for clemency and was denied, such that the ban, as

applied to him, might be tantamount to a lifetime ban.

On top of that, the appellate opinion below contains no Second Amendment analysis, and Bynes did

not present his constitutional challenge to the trial

court. This case is thus a poor vehicle for this Court

to address the constitutionality of a felon-in-possession prohibition for the very first time.

The Court should deny certiorari as to the first

question presented.

II. The Court should hold Bynes’ petition for review of his 12-person jury claim pending disposition of Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623.

In his second question presented, Bynes also contends that this Court should review the Fourth District’s summary decision and use it as a vehicle to

overrule Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). On

June 15, 2026, this Court granted review in Kian v.

Florida, No. 25-6623, 2026 WL 1718018 (June 15,

2026), which presents the identical legal issue. Consequently, the Court should hold Bynes’s petition in

abeyance pending resolution of this same issue in

Kian and then dispose of Bynes’s petition accordingly.

15

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied as to Bynes’ Second Amendment claim and held

in abeyance pending this Court’s resolution of Kian.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State of Florida

PL-01, The Capitol

Tallahassee, FL 32399

(850) 414-3300

jeffrey.desousa@

myfloridalegal.com

DAVID M.S. DEWHIRST

Solicitor General

JEFFREY PAUL DESOUSA

Chief Deputy Solicitor

General

Counsel of Record

NATHAN A. FORRESTER

Chief Deputy Solicitor

General

CHRISTINE K. PRATT

Deputy Solicitor General

August 17, 2025

Counsel for Respondent