Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alex Antonio Bynes, Petitioner v. Florida

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ALEX ANTONIO BYNES, PETITIONER,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

_____________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

_____________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DANIEL EISINGER

Public Defender

Gary Lee Caldwell

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421Third Street

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

(561) 355–7600

gcaldwel@pd15.org

lmattocks@pd15.org

appeals@pd15.org

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a statute imposing on all convicted felons a lifetime

ban on possession of a firearm or ammunition with no

individualized finding of dangerousness violates the Second

Amendment?

2. Whether a person charged with a felony in state court has

the right to trial by a twelve-member of jury under the Sixth

Amendment?

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW

In the court whose judgment is sought be reviewed, the parties

were:

Alex Antonio Bynes

State of Florida

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida:

State v. Bynes, 50-2023-CF-000860-AXXX-MB (April 9,

2024)

Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida:

Bynes v. State, 4D2024–2983 (January 8, 2026)

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............................................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW ....................................... ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS .............................................................. ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...............................................................iv

OPINION BELOW ........................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ............................................................................... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND RULES PROVISIONS .......... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................... 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..................................... 8

I. Florida’s broad felon-in-possession statute violates the Second

Amendment. ................................................................................ 8

II. Williams v. Florida should be overruled and the Sixth

Amendment right to a jury of twelve should be restored. ........... 11

CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 20

INDEX TO APPENDICES

A. District court’s decision............................................................ 1a

B. Order denying rehearing .......................................................... 2a

C. Initial brief excerpts ................................................................. 3a

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Blair v. State, 698 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1997) ...................................... 6

Brown v. State, 359 So. 3d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) ..................... 18

Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) ....................................... 17

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Cmty. Fin. Services Ass'n of Am., Ltd.,

601 U.S. 416 (2024)................................................................... 12

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) .......................... 8

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022) ........ 12

Drinkard v. State, No. 1D2024-1844 (Fla. 1st DCA May 6, 2026) .. 19

Edenfield v. State, 379 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)....................... 5

Florida Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v. Boswell, 34 So. 241 (Fla. 1903) ...... 15

Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678 (2019) ............................... 13

Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291 (1877) ......................................... 15, 16

Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022),

rev. denied SC2022-1597 (Fla. June 6, 2023),

cert. denied 144 S. Ct. 2595 (2024). .......................................... 18

Jackson v. State, 926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006) ................................ 2

Kain v. State, 393 So. 3d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) ......................... 18

Khorrami v. Arizona, 598 U.S. ____ (2022)............................... 16, 17

Mallet v. State, 280 So. 3d 1091 (Fla. 2019) .................................... 2

McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010) ................... 12

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)....... 8

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) .................................... 12

Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992) .................................... 19

Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020)........................................ 16

iv

Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904)................................... 14

Serrano-Delgado v. State, 392 So. 3d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) ....... 18

Simpson v. State, 368 So. 3d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) .................. 19

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard

Coll., 600 U.S. 181 (2023) .................................................... 12, 13

Thompson v. State of Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) ........................... 15

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) ................ 9, 10, 11, 13

United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936) .................................. 14

Wallace v. State, 722 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) ...................... 6

Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016)....... 11

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) ................................. passim

Statutes

§ 790.23, Fla. Stat. ................................................................. 4, 5, 8

§ 913.10, Fla. Stat. ................................................................... 3, 11

§ 913.10, Fla. Stat. (2018) ............................................................ 19

Ch. 3010, § 6, Laws of Fla. (1877) ................................................ 15

Other Authorities

Jerrell H. Shofner, Reconstruction and Renewal, 1865–1877, in The

History of Florida 273 (Michael Gannon, ed., first paperback

edition 2018) ............................................................................. 16

Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Laws of England (1768)

.................................................................................................. 15

Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1836 ed.) ................................ 15

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769) 15

Constitutional Provisions

Fla. Const. art. I, § 22 .............................................................. 3, 19

U.S. Const. amend II. ................................................................. 2, 3

v

U.S. Const. amend. VI ................................................ 11, 16, 17, 18

U.S. Const. amend. XIV .................................................................. 3

vi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_____________

N O.

ALEX ANTONIO BYNES, PETITIONER,

V.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

_____________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

_____________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_____________

Alex Antonio Bynes respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari

to review the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeal of

Florida in this case.

OPINION BELOW

The decision of Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal and

the denial of rehearing, issuance of written opinion, and

certification are reported together as Bynes v. State, 428 So. 3d

134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). They are reprinted in the appendix. 1a,

2a.

1

JURISDICTION

The petition seeks review of the decision of Florida’s Fourth

District Court of Appeal affirming Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences without written opinion on January 8, 2026, 1a, for

which a timely motion for rehearing, issuance of written opinion

and stay of mandate was denied on February 16, 2026. 2a.

The Florida Supreme Court is “a court of limited jurisdiction,”

Mallet v. State, 280 So. 3d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 2019) (citation omitted),

Specifically, it has no jurisdiction to review district court of appeal

decisions entered without written opinion. Jackson v. State, 926 So.

2d 1262, 1266 (Fla. 2006). Hence, Petitioner could not seek review

in that court. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND RULES

PROVISIONS

The Second Amendment

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a

free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not

be infringed.” U.S. Const. Amend. II.

The Sixth Amendment

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

2

to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury … .” U.S. Const.

Amend. VI.

The Fourteenth Amendment

Section 1

… . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.

Article I, section 22 of the Florida Constitution

Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall be secure to

all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the

number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by

law.

Art. I, § 22, Fla. Const.

Section 913.10, Florida Statutes

Number of jurors.—Twelve persons shall constitute a jury

to try all capital cases, and six persons shall constitute a

jury to try all other criminal cases.

§ 913.10, Fla. Stat.

Section 790.23, Florida Statutes

(1) It is unlawful for any person to own or to have in his

or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm,

ammunition, or electric weapon or device, or to carry a

concealed weapon, including a tear gas gun or chemical

3

weapon or device, if that person has been:

(a) Convicted of a felony in the courts of this state;

…

(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4), any

person who violates this section commits a felony of the

second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.

775.083, or s. 775.084.

§ 790.23, Fla. Stat.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 2024, Petitioner Alex Antonio Bynes was charged by

amended information in Florida’s Fifteenth Judicial Circuit with

possession of a firearm or ammunition by a convicted felon contrary

to section 790.23, Florida Statutes. R 74.

At trial, a six-member jury convicted Petitioner as charged. R

89.The court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to five years

in prison with a three-year mandatory minimum term for actual

possession of the firearm. R 90, 120–23.

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. He argued

that section 790.23 violates the Second Amendment. 3a–9a.

Although the issue had not been raised at trial, the facial

constitutionality of a statute may be raised for the first time on

appeal. See Edenfield v. State, 379 So. 3d 5, 7 n. (Fla. 1st DCA

2023) (“The facial constitutional challenge to section 790.23(1)(a)

was not made in the trial court. Nonetheless, we can consider this

unpreserved issue because ‘a conviction for the violation of a

facially invalid statute would constitute fundamental error.’

Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 105 (Fla. 2002) (quoting

Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1982)); see also Davis

5

v. Gilchrist Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 280 So. 3d 524, 531 (Fla. 1st DCA

2019).”).

Petitioner also argued that he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to trial by a twelve-member jury. 9a–13a. He

acknowledged that this Court had held in Williams v. Florida, 399

U.S. 78 (1970), that state court juries as small as six are

constitutionally permissible under the Sixth Amendment. 9a–10a.

Petitioner also acknowledged that the issue had not been

raised in the trial court, but pointed out that waiver of the

constitutional right of trial by the proper number of jurors must be

made personally by the defendant under Blair v. State, 698 So. 2d

1210, 1217 (Fla. 1997) (finding valid defendant’s agreement to

verdict by five-member jury valid only because made “in a colloquy

at issue here, including a personal on-the-record waiver,” and

sufficient to pass muster under the federal and state constitutions,”

and his decision was made “toward the end of his trial, after having

ample time to analyze the jury and assess the prosecution's case

against him,” and he “affirmatively chose to proceed with a reduced

jury”), and Wallace v. State, 722 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)

(reversing on grounds of fundamental error where appellant was

6

tried by five-member jury and judge did not inform the defendant of

his right to six-person jury). 9a–13a.

As already noted, the Fourth District affirmed the conviction

and sentence without a written opinion, and denied Petitioner’s

motion for rehearing, issuance of written opinion and stay of

mandate. 1a, 2a.

7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. FLORIDA’S BROAD FELON-IN-POSSESSION STATUTE

VIOLATES THE SECOND AMENDMENT.

Petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon, a second degree felony under section

790.23, Florida Statutes. R 74, 89, 90. He contended on appeal that

the statute violates the Second Amendment. 3a–9a.

Section 790.23 operates as a life-long ban on possession of a

firearm or ammunition by convicted felons regardless of why the

firearm is possessed or how remote the felony conviction may be.

In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)], the

Court wrote that at the time of the Founding the right to keep arms

was “a common way of referring to possessing arms, for militiamen

and everyone else.” Id. at 583 (emphasis in original).

In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1

(2022), the Court wrote that, to justify a regulation on the right to

bear arms, “the government may not simply posit that the

regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government

must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 17. The

8

Court emphasized this rule by repeating it at page 24 of Bruen.

The Court shed light on the rule’s application in United States

v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

In Rahimi, the Court noted the historical evolution of surety

laws allowing for the limitation of a persons’ right to bear arms

based on an individualized determination that the person presented

a physical threat to a person seeking the surety. Id. at 695–97. It

also noted the parallel development of “going armed” laws”

forbidding arming oneself “to the Terror of the people.” Id. at 697.

Based on these developments, the Court wrote: “Taken

together, the surety and going armed laws confirm what common

sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical

violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.” Id.

at 698 (emphasis added).

Rahimi involved a statute providing that a person could be

deprived of the right to possess a firearm based on an individualized

judicial determination that he or she presented a “a credible threat

to the physical safety” of a specific person. Id. at 688–89. The Court

determined that the law’s “prohibition on the possession of firearms

by those found by a court to present a threat to others fits neatly

9

within the tradition the surety and going armed laws represent.” Id.

at 688.

Unlike the narrow statute in Rahimi with its individualized

determination of dangerousness, section 790.23(1) has broad

application, covering almost 10% of the adult population of Florida.

In 2023, the Census Bureau put the total population of Florida at

22.6 million (an estimated 5% growth since 2020), of which 19.4%

was under the age of 18, for a total adult population of over 18

million in 2023. 1 As of 2020, there were an estimated 1.6 million

non-incarcerated convicted felons in Florida.2

And unlike the statute in Rahimi, the Florida statute imposes

a lifetime ban on possession of a firearm.

The statute could not be judicially rewritten by a Florida court

to produce an entirely different statute that comported with the

Second Amendment. See Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So.

1

https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/FL/PST045223

(last visited December 5, 2024).

2 ABC News, “Florida convicted felons allowed to vote for 1st

time in presidential election after completing sentences” (Oct. 25,

2020). https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/convicted-florida-felonsallowed-vote-1st-time-presidential/story?id=73822173 (last visited

December 5, 20204).

10

3d 311, 313–14 (Fla. 2016) (“The judiciary, however, is without

power to rewrite a plainly written statute, even if it is to avoid an

unconstitutional result.”).

Florida’s broad statute does not comport with the historical

restrictions on the right to bear arms allowed by the Second

Amendment. The Court should grant review to determine whether

section 790.23(1) is constitutionally viable in light of Rahimi.

II. WILLIAMS v. FLORIDA SHOULD BE OVERRULED AND

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY OF

TWELVE SHOULD BE RESTORED.

Petitioner was charged with a second degree felony. Pursuant

to section 913.10, Florida Statutes, the case was tried by a sixmember jury. He contended on his appeal that he was deprived of

his right to a twelve-member jury under the Sixth Amendment. 9a–

13a.

The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury … .”

On its face, it does not define what is meant by a jury. It does

not prescribe the number of jurors. It does not say their verdict

must be unanimous, or even that a majority must concur in the

11

verdict. It does not say jurors must be laymen.

Given the Amendment’s spare wording and absolute silence

about these and similar questions, we have no option but to look to

“the most likely public understanding of [this] particular provision

at the time it was adopted.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561

U.S. 742, 828 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (interpreting

Second Amendment). Such “an approach grounded in history

imposes limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any

based on [an] abstract formula.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644,

698 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted). See also Dobbs v. Jackson Women's

Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 239 (2022) (opinion of Alito, J., for the

Court) (“Historical inquiries … are essential whenever we are asked

to recognize a new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due

Process Clause because the term ‘liberty’ alone provides little

guidance.”); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows

of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 321–27 (2023) (Sotomayor, J.,

dissenting) (surveying understanding of Fourteenth Amendment at

the time of adoption); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Cmty. Fin.

Services Ass'n of Am., Ltd., 601 U.S. 416, 442 (2024) (Kagan, J.,

12

concurring) (“Long settled and established practice may have great

weight in interpreting constitutional provisions about the operation

of government.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);

Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 741 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,

dissenting) (surveying how term “same offence” in Double Jeopardy

Clause was understood at time of adoption); United States v.

Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 715 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The

first and most important rule in constitutional interpretation is to

heed the text—that is, the actual words of the Constitution—and to

interpret that text according to its ordinary meaning as originally

understood.”); id. at 737 (Barrett, J., concurring) (stating that to

identify the scope of the Second Amendment “as it was originally

understood … courts must examine the historical tradition of

firearm regulation.”) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of

Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 319–29, text and n.3 (2023) (Jackson,

J., dissenting) (interpreting Fourteenth Amendment in accordance

with understanding that, when adopted, it “was intended to undo

the effects of a world where laws systematically subordinated Black

people and created a racial caste system”).

13

As to the understanding of the jury trial right at the time of its

adoption, we are on safe ground.

Throughout the Founding Era it was understood that a

criminal conviction required a verdict by a unanimous twelve-man

jury.

The Framers looked to the common law as set out by

Blacksone. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 138 (1936)

(“Undoubtedly, as we have frequently said, the framers of the

Constitution were familiar with Blackstone’s Commentaries. Many

copies of the work had been sold here and it was generally regarded

as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of

England.”); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904).

Blackstone wrote:

Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong and twofold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury, between

the liberties of the people, and the prerogative of the

crown. . . . [T]he founders of the English law have, with

excellent forecast, contrived, that . . . the truth of every

accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment,

information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed

by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and

neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all

suspicion.

14

4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343 (1769)

(emphasis added). See also 3 Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgment of

the Laws of England 234 (1768) (stating petit jury must consist “of

twelve, and can be neither more nor less”); 1 Matthew Hale, Pleas of

the Crown 33 (1836 ed.). See generally Thompson v. State of Utah,

170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898) (discussing historical background of Jury

Trial Clause). The only constitutional alteration is that, via the

Equal Protection Clause, eligibility has broadened, so that, for

instance, women may also serve as jurors.

So far so good.

In 1875, as Reconstruction was drawing to an end, the Jury

Clause of Florida’s 1868 constitution was amended to provide that

the number of jurors “may be fixed by law.” See Florida Fertilizer &

Mfg. Co. v. Boswell, 34 So. 241, 241 (Fla. 1903). The common law

rule of a jury of twelve continued in Florida until the Legislature

enacted a law specifying a jury of six in Chapter 3010, section 6,

Laws of Florida (1877). See Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 297–98

(1877); Florida Fertilizer, 34 So. at 241.

This jury-of-six provision was enacted on February 17, 1877

— less than a month after the last federal troops were withdrawn

15

from Florida in January 1877. See Gibson, 16 Fla. 294 (1877), and

Jerrell H. Shofner, Reconstruction and Renewal, 1865–1877, in The

History of Florida 273 (Michael Gannon, ed., first paperback edition

2018) (“there were [no federal troops] in Florida after 23 January

1877”).

This law was consistent with a common effort in the former

Confederate states as they “restricted the size of juries and

abandoned the demand for a unanimous verdict as part of a

deliberate and systematic effort to suppress minority voices in

public affairs.” Khorrami v. Arizona, 598 U.S. ____ (2022) (Gorsuch,

J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Cf. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590

U.S. 83, 126–27 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (non-unanimity

was enacted “as one pillar of a comprehensive and brutal program

of racist Jim Crow measures against African-Americans, especially

in voting and jury service.”). Florida’s jury of six is the child of the

same historical context.

This offspring of the benighted Jim Crow era was upheld in

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), holding that trial by a jury

of six does not violate the Sixth Amendment.

Williams recognized that the Framers “may well” have had “the

16

usual expectation” in drafting the Sixth Amendment “that the jury

would consist of 12” members. Id., 399 U.S. at 98–99. But it

concluded that such “purely historical considerations” were not

dispositive. Id. at 99. Rather, it focused on the “function” that the

jury plays in the Constitution, concluding that the “essential

feature” of a jury is it leaves justice to the “commonsense judgment

of a group of laymen” and thus allows “guilt or innocence” to be

determined via “community participation and [with] shared

responsibility.” Id. at 100–01. It wrote that “currently available

evidence [and] theory” suggested that function could just as easily

be performed with six jurors as with twelve. Id. at 101–102 & n.48;

cf. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979) (acknowledging

that Williams and its progeny “departed from the strictly historical

requirements of jury trial”).

Petitioner respectfully submits that the ahistorical,

functionalist social science approach of Williams was erroneous as

it is contrary to the understanding of the Founding Era that

criminal defendants have the right to the unanimous verdict of a

jury of twelve. See, Khorrami 598 U.S. at ____ (“Williams was wrong

the day it was decided, it remains wrong today, and it impairs both

17

the integrity of the American criminal justice system and the

liberties of those who come before our Nation’s courts.”) (Gorsuch,

J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

Due to this erroneous ruling, Florida courts have uniformly

rejected arguments that Florida’s practice of trial by six-member

juries violates the Sixth Amendment, and the state supreme court

has refused to consider the matter. See Brown v. State, 359 So. 3d

408, 410 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (rejecting as “nearly frivolous”

claim that defendant charged with armed robbery and kidnapping

was entitled to trial by jury of twelve); Serrano-Delgado v. State, 392

So. 3d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (citing Williams and holding

defendant was not entitled to jury of twelve on charge of sexual

battery on a child under age of twelve); Kain v. State, 393 So. 3d

786, 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“Affirmed. See Williams v. Florida, 399

U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (holding Florida’s

use of six-member jury in non-capital cases does not violate the

Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury).”); Guzman v. State, 350 So.

3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citing Williams and holding defendant

was not entitled to twelve-member jury at trial for sexual battery on

a child under age of twelve), rev. denied SC2022–1597 (Fla. June 6,

18

2023), cert. denied 144 S. Ct. 2595 (2024); Simpson v. State, 368

So. 3d 513, 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (noting that panel was

rejecting claim that defendant charged with attempted murder was

entitled to trial by a jury of twelve persons).

These decisions are binding on the trial courts of Florida. See

Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (“in the absence of

interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial

courts”). Further, the state constitution and state law specifically

authorize six-member juries in noncapital criminal cases. Fla.

Const., art. I, § 22 (“The qualifications and the number of jurors,

not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law.”; § 913.10, Fla. Stat.

(“Twelve persons shall constitute a jury to try all capital cases, and

six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases.”).

So only this Court can right the dilution of the Sixth

Amendment wrought in Williams. See Drinkard v. State, No.

1D2024-1844 (Fla. 1st DCA May 6, 2026) (“unless the United States

Supreme Court chooses to reconsider Williams, in Florida criminal

trials a twelve-person jury is only required for capital cases”)

(Bilbrey, J., concurring in part and in result).

Petitioner calls upon this Court to grant this petition, recede

19

from Williams, restore the ancient right to a twelve-member jury,

and reverse Petitioner’s convictions.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL EISINGER

Public Defender

GARY LEE CALDWELL

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421Third Street

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

(561) 355–7600

gcaldwel@pd15.org

lmattocks@pd15.org

appeals@pd15.org

20