Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jennesis V. Dominguez-Garcia, Petitioner v. United States

No. ______

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

JENNESIS V. DOMINGUEZ-GARCIA; CHANSON A.

JOHNSON; TAYARI S. VANZANT,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

__________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces

__________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________

SAMANTHA M. CASTANIEN

Counsel of Record

NICOLE J. HERBERS

United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Division

1500 West Perimeter Road

Suite 1100

Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762

(240) 612-4770

samantha.castanien.1@us.af.mil

Counsel for Petitioners

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

In military courts-martial, the Entry of Judgment

(EoJ) is the final judgment marking the end of trial

and the beginning of the post-trial process. In the

Department of the Air Force, a memorandum called a

“First Indorsement” memorializes receipt of the EoJ.

The First Indorsement summarizes criminal indexing

requirements, including indexing for the National

Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).

On the First Indorsement, one lawyer—a judge

advocate—makes a legal determination about

whether 18 U.S.C. § 922 applies to a convicted

servicemember, thereby effectuating a restriction of

that servicemember’s Second Amendment rights. If

that legal determination is made in error, the Air

Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) has

statutory authority under Article 66(d)(2), Uniform

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.

§ 866(d)(2), to provide relief. Despite this clear

statutory authority, the Court of Appeals of the Armed

Forces (CAAF) decided that no military appellate

court has the authority to correct an erroneous

firearm prohibition made during post-trial processing.

The question presented is:

Whether the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals

has authority under 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) to correct an

unconstitutional firearms ban annotated after entry

of judgment.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

This Rule 12.4 petition consolidates direct appeals

from three servicemembers convicted at special

courts-martial. Petitioners are Airman First Class

Jennesis V. Dominguez-Garcia, Master Sergeant

Chanson A. Johnson, and Staff Sergeant Tayari S.

Vanzant. Respondent in each case is the United

States.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No nongovernmental corporations are parties to

this proceeding.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Other than the direct appeals that form the basis

for this petition, there are no related proceedings for

purposes of S. CT. R. 14.1(b)(iii).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .................................................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ...................................... ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.......................... ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ............................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................... vi

INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 1

OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................... 2

JURISDICTION ............................................................... 3

CONSTITUTIONAL

AND

STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

INVOLVED ..................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..................... 11

I.

The CAAF misinterpreted the plain

language of Articles 60c and 66(d)(2),

UCMJ, the R.C.M., and Air Force

regulations to find that the AFCCA did not

have authority to correct the firearm

prohibition. ........................................................ 12

A. The CAAF’s decision in Johnson misreads the

plain text of the statute and singles out the

Air Force for unique treatment under the

UCMJ. .......................................................... 12

B. The CAAF’s holding is contrary to the plain

text of the controlling rules and Air Force

regulations. .................................................. 16

C. The CAAF’s conclusion eliminated possible

relief under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ. ........... 20

iv

II. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on its face and by

regulation does not apply to Petitioners.

Any indexing of Petitioners in the First

Indorsement is error. ........................................ 21

III. Correcting the First Indorsement would

restore Petitioners’ Second Amendment

rights. ................................................................ 24

CONCLUSION .............................................................. 25

APPENDIX

Dominguez-Garcia

CAAF

Order,

United

States

v.

Dominguez-Garcia, No. 24-0183 (July

22, 2025) ................................................................ 1a

Air Force Court Opinion, United States v.

Dominguez-Garcia, No. ACM S32694

(f rev) (May 31, 2024) ............................................ 2a

CAAF

Order,

United

States

v.

Dominguez-Garcia, No. 23-0057 (Jan.

11, 2023) ................................................................ 5a

Air Force Court Opinion, United States v.

Dominguez-Garcia, No. ACM S32694

(Oct. 11, 2022) ....................................................... 7a

Johnson

CAAF Order, United States v. Johnson,

No. 25-0115 (July 22, 2025) ................................ 26a

Air Force Court Opinion, United States v.

Johnson, No. ACM S32782 (Jan. 16,

2025) .................................................................... 27a

v

Vanzant

CAAF Order, United States v. Vanzant,

No. 25-0182 (Oct. 1, 2025)................................... 30a

Air Force Court Opinion, United States v.

Vanzant, No. ACM 22004 (May 28,

2024) .................................................................... 31a

Department of the Air Force Regulations

Department of the Air Force Instruction

51-201, Administration of Military

Justice (Apr. 14, 2022) ........................................ 56a

Department of the Air Force Instruction

51-201, Administration of Military

Justice (Apr. 14, 2022) (incorporating

Guidance Memorandum (Sep. 28,

2023)) ................................................................... 69a

Department of the Air Force Instruction

51-201, Administration of Military

Justice (Jan. 24, 2024) ........................................ 84a

Air Force Manual 71-102, Air Force

Criminal Indexing (July 21, 2020) ..................... 98a

Entry of Judgment Template ............................... 106a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Babbitt v. UFW Nat’l Union,

442 U.S. 289 (1979) ............................................... 25

Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249 (1992) ............................................... 13

Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury,

489 U.S. 803 (1989) ............................................... 15

Doe v. Bolton,

410 U.S. 179 (1973) ............................................... 25

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................... 24

Riley v. Bondi,

145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025) ........................................... 15

United States v. Briggs,

592 U.S. 69 (2020) ........................................... 21, 22

United States v. Hemani,

No. 24-1234, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 4005

(Oct. 20, 2025) ....................................................... 23

United States v. Johnson,

2025 CAAF LEXIS 499 (C.A.A.F. Jun.

24,

2025) ....................................... 2, 11-16, 18-20

United States v. Macias,

No. 202200005, 2022 CCA LEXIS 580

(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2022) ..................... 23

United States v. Moreldelossantos,

ARMY 20210167, 2022 CCA LEXIS

164 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 17,

2022) ...................................................................... 23

vii

United

States

v.

Shaffer,

ARMY 20200551, 2021 CCA LEXIS

682 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 15,

2021) ...................................................................... 23

United States v. Williams,

85 M.J. 121 (C.A.A.F. 2024) ...................... 12, 17, 23

United States v. Williams,

ARMY 20230048, 2023 CCA LEXIS

377 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug 30, 2023) ................... 23

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

10 U.S.C. § 819 .............................................. 1, 4, 7, 22

10 U.S.C. § 860c ................... 1, 2, 4-6, 12-14, 16-18, 20

10 U.S.C. § 866 ...................... i, 2-3, 5, 11-14, 20, 23-26

18 U.S.C. § 922 ..................................... i, 1, 5-10, 21-25

28 C.F.R. § 25.6 ..................................................... 5, 24

James M. Inhofe National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 544, 136

Stat. 2395 (2022) ................................................. 3, 6

U.S. CONST. amend. II .......................................... 4, 21

William M. (Mac) Thornberry National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283,

§ 542(b), 134 Stat. 3388 (2021) ........................... 3, 6

Other Authorities

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5TH ED. 1979) ................. 22

FED. R. CRIM. P. 36 .................................................... 20

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed.

1989) ...................................................................... 21

viii

Random House Dictionary of the English

Language (1966) .................................................... 22

R.C.M. 1111 ..................................... 1, 6, 12, 14, 16, 20

R.C.M. 1112 ............................................................... 20

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY (1986) ................................................. 22

1

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners are three United States Air Force

servicemembers who were convicted of non-domestic

violence offenses at special courts-martial (the

equivalent of a misdemeanor conviction). Contrary to

the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Air

Force regulations, a single lawyer, known as a judge

advocate, checked a box on a post-trial document to

permanently deprive Petitioners of their Second

Amendment rights. The AFCCA has statutory

authority to provide relief for this constitutional

violation. But the CAAF determined that neither it

nor the AFCCA had statutory authority to act on the

firearm prohibition and declined to provide relief.

Final judgment in military courts-martial is

complete when the military judge signs the EoJ. 10

U.S.C. § 860c; Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.)

1111(a)(2). The Air Force requires that a memo, called

a “First Indorsement,” be attached to the EoJ.

Pet.App. 58a. Part of the First Indorsement is the

criminal indexing portion. Id. The Government

erroneously indexed Petitioners under 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1), wrongly believing their convictions at a

special court-martial were “punishable” by over a year

in jail. But, under

10 U.S.C. § 819(a), no

servicemember can be punished by over a year of

confinement at a special-court marital, regardless of

the offense. The plain language of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) dictates that none of the Petitioners should

be prohibited from owning or purchasing firearms.

Pet.App. 60a. Nevertheless, each Petitioner was

criminally indexed into NICS because of the erroneous

EoJ and First Indorsement. Pet.App. 68a.

2

Under 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2), the AFCCA “may

provide appropriate relief if the accused demonstrates

error . . . in the processing of the court-martial after

the judgment was entered into the record.” The Air

Force’s unique post-trial processing renders the

firearm prohibition an “error” that occurs after the

entry of judgment for which the AFCCA could provide

appropriate relief.

Despite clear statutory language, the CAAF held

that the AFCCA lacks authority to provide relief for

erroneous indexing. United States v. Johnson, __ M.J.

__, No. 24-0004/SF, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 499, 2025 WL

1762856 (C.A.A.F. June 24, 2025).1 The CAAF’s

holding is inconsistent with the text of 10 U.S.C.

§ 860c and the statutory and regulatory scheme of the

UCMJ and R.C.M. This Court should grant review to

overrule the CAAF’s erroneous interpretation of the

statute and authorize the AFCCA to restore

Petitioners’ right to bear arms. Johnson, __ M.J. __,

No. 24-0004/SF, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 499 at *10-13.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Airman First Class (A1C) Jennesis V. DominguezGarcia, Master Sergeant (MSgt) Chanson A. Johnson,

and Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Tayari S. Vanzant, United

States Air Force, respectfully petition for a writ of

certiorari to review the decision of the CAAF.

OPINIONS BELOW

In A1C Dominguez-Garcia’s case, the AFCCA

decisions are unreported. The first decision is

available at 2022 CCA LEXIS 582, 2022 WL 7970556,

1 While Petitioner Chanson Johnson shares the same last name

as the appellant in Johnson, Petitioner Chanson Johnson is a

different servicemember.

3

and is reproduced at pages 7a-25a. The second

decision is available at 2024 CCA LEXIS 218, 2024

WL 2799240, and is reproduced at pages 2a-4a. The

CAAF’s first decision is published and available at 83

M.J. 172. It is reproduced at page 5a. The CAAF’s

second decision is pending publication in West’s

Military Justice Reporter. It is available at 2025 CAAF

LEXIS 586, 2025 WL 2305221, and reproduced at

page 1a.

In MSgt Johnson’s case, the AFCCA decision is

unpublished. It is available at 2025 CCA LEXIS 12

and is reproduced at pages 27a-29a. The CAAF’s

decision is pending publication in West’s Military

Justice Reporter. It is available at 2025 CAAF LEXIS

582, 2025 WL 2305419, and reproduced at page 26a.

In SSgt Vanzant’s case, the AFCCA decision is

published. It is available at 84 M.J. 671 and is

reproduced at pages 31a-55a. The CAAF’s decision is

pending publication in West’s Military Justice

Reporter. It is available at 2025 CAAF LEXIS 830,

2025 WL 3110516, and reproduced at page 30a.

JURISDICTION

Each Petitioner was convicted at a special courtmartial. Pet.App. 2a, 27a, 31a. The AFCCA had

jurisdiction to review each of Petitioner’s cases

pursuant to either 10 U.S.C. §§ 866(b)(1)(A)2 or (b)(3).

The CAAF had jurisdiction pursuant to 10 U.S.C.

§ 867(a)(3).

As amended by the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L.

No. 116-283, § 542(b), 134 Stat. 3388, 3611 (2021) and the James

M. Inhofe NDAA for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 544,

136 Stat. 2395, 2582 (2022).

2

4

In A1C Dominguez-Garcia’s case, the CAAF issued

its decision on July 22, 2025. The Chief Justice

extended the time for filing a petition for writ of

certiorari to, and including, December 19, 2025. In

MSgt Johnson’s case, the CAAF also issued its

decision on July 22, 2025. The Chief Justice also

extended the time for filing a petition for writ of

certiorari to, and including, December 19, 2025. In

SSgt Vanzant’s case, CAAF issued its decision on

October 1, 2025. No extension request was filed in

SSgt Vanzant’s case. For all cases, this Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

The Second Amendment, in pertinent part,

provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to

the security of a free State, the right of the people to

keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.

CONST. amend. II.

In relevant part, 10 U.S.C. § 819(a) provides:

“Special courts-martial may . . . adjudge any

punishment not forbidden by this chapter except

death, dishonorable discharge, dismissal, confinement

for more than one year . . . .”

In relevant part, 10 U.S.C. § 860c(a) (2018), Entry

of judgment, provides:

(1) In accordance with rules prescribed by the

President, in a general or special courtmartial, the military judge shall enter into

the record of trial the judgment of the court.

The judgment of the court shall consist of

the following:

5

(A) The Statement of Trial Results under

section 860 of this title (article 60).

(B) Any modifications of, or supplements to,

the Statement of Trial Results by reason

of—

(i) any post-trial action by the convening

authority; or

(ii) any

ruling,

order,

or

other

determination of the military judge

that affects a plea, a finding, or the

sentence.

In relevant part, 28 C.F.R. § 25.6(c)(1) provides:

The FBI NICS Operations Center, upon

receiving an [Federal Firearm Licensee (FFL)]

telephone or electronic dial-up request for a

background check, will . . . . Provide the

following NICS responses based upon the

consolidated NICS search results . . .

(A) “Proceed” response, if no disqualifying

information was found in the NICS

Index . . . .

....

(C) “Denied’’ response, when at least one

matching record is found in . . . the

NICS Index . . . that provides

information demonstrating that receipt

of a firearm . . . would violate 18 U.S.C.

922 . . . .

In relevant part, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) (2018),

provides: “In any case before the Court of Criminal

Appeals under subsection (b), the Court may provide

appropriate relief if the accused demonstrates error or

6

excessive delay in the processing of the court-martial

after the judgment was entered into the record under

section 860c of this title (article 60c).”3

In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) states that

it is unlawful for any person “who has been convicted

in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or

affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to

receive any firearm or ammunition which has been

shipped or transported in interstate or foreign

commerce.”

In relevant part, R.C.M. 1111, Entry of judgment,

provides:

(a) In general.

(1) Scope. Under regulations prescribed by

the Secretary concerned, the military

judge of a general or special courtmartial shall enter into the record of trial

the judgment of the court. . . .

(2) Purpose. The judgment reflects the

result of the court-martial, as modified

by any post-trial actions, rulings, or

orders.

The

entry

of

judgment

terminates the trial proceedings and

initiates the appellate process.

....

3 As codified in the 2018 edition of United States Code and as

amended by the William M. (Mac) Thornberry NDAA for Fiscal

Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 542(b), 134 Stat. 3388, 3611

(2021), and the James M. Inhofe NDAA for Fiscal Year 2023,

Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 544, 136 Stat. 2395, 2582 (2022).

7

(b) Contents. The judgment of the court shall be

signed and dated by the military judge and

shall consist of—

....

(3) Additional information.

....

(F) Other information. Any additional

information that the Secretary

concerned may require by regulation.

Pertinent text of the following authorities are

reproduced in the Appendix: Department of the Air

Force Manual (DAFMAN) 71-102, Air Force Criminal

Indexing (July 21, 2020), Department of the Air Force

Instruction (DAFI) 51-201, Administration of Military

Justice (Apr. 14, 2022), DAFI 51-201, Administration

of Military Justice (Apr. 14, 2022) (incorporating

Guidance Memorandum (Sep. 28, 2023)), and DAFI

51-201, Administration of Military Justice (Jan. 24,

2024).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Each Petitioner was convicted at a special courtmartial; none were convicted of domestic violence.

Pet.App. 7a-25a, 28a, 34a. The maximum confinement

at a special court-martial is one year. 10 U.S.C.

§ 819(a). Furthermore, a dishonorable discharge is not

authorized. Id. Nevertheless, the Department of the

Air Force (Air Force) reported each Petitioner for

indexing under 18 U.S.C. § 922 after the military

judge signed their respective EoJs. Pet.App. 4a, 28a,

32a-33a; see also Pet.App. 106a-108a (showing an

example EoJ and First Indorsement).

8

Petitioners challenged the firearm prohibitions in

their cases, arguing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) could not

permanently deprive them of their Second

Amendment rights. Pet.App. 4a, 28a, 32a-33a. During

each appeal, the Government asserted that 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) applied to Petitioners because their

offenses, if taken to a general court-martial, could

have been punishable by over a year in confinement.

Ans. to Assignment of Error at 3-5, United States v.

Dominguez-Garcia, No. ACM S32694 (f rev), 2024

CCA LEXIS 218 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 31, 2024)

(per curiam); U.S. Ans. to Assignments of Error at 7,

United States v. Johnson, No. ACM S32782, 2025 CCA

LEXIS 12 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2025) (per

curiam); U.S. Ans. to Assignments of Error at 2-3, 6,

United States v. Vanzant, 84 M.J. 671 (A.F. Ct. Crim.

App. 2024).

A. A1C

Dominguez-Garcia’s

Prohibition

Firearm

A1C Dominguez-Garcia pleaded guilty at a special

court-martial for pointing an unloaded firearm at a

friend on a military installation. Pet.App. 9a-12a. In

her initial post-trial processing paperwork, she was

not indexed because no firearm prohibition was

indicated. First Indorsement, EoJ, Apr. 30, 2021.

According to the Air Force’s own regulations, this was

correct. Pet.App. 60a-61a, 75a-76a, 89a. The

prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does “not apply

to convictions in a special court-martial because

confinement for more than one year cannot be

adjudged in that forum.” Id.

During her first appeal to the AFCCA, A1C

Dominguez-Garcia challenged whether her guilty plea

was lawful. Pet.App. 13a-14a. While finding that her

9

guilty plea was lawful, the AFCCA determined a new

sentencing hearing was necessary and her case was

remanded. Pet.App. 14a-15a, 25a. However, a

rehearing did not occur, and A1C Dominguez-Garica

received a sentence of “no punishment.” Pet.App. 3a.

During the second post-trial process, the Air Force

reported A1C Dominguez-Garcia should be indexed

under 18 U.S.C. § 922. First Indorsement, EoJ, Sep.

14, 2023. Nothing had changed about her convictions,

and, now, she had no sentence. Pet.App. 3a-4a. But a

single judge advocate decided that A1C DominguezGarcia should be prohibited from possessing firearms

and indicated so on the First Indorsement. First

Indorsement, EoJ, Sep. 14, 2023.

A1C Dominguez-Garcia challenged whether she

was lawfully indexed and constitutionally deprived of

her right to bear arms before the AFCCA, which

rejected the challenge as being “beyond [the AFCCA’s]

authority to review.” Pet.App. 4a.

B. MSgt Johnson’s Firearm Prohibition

MSgt Johnson was prosecuted at a special courtmartial for drug use. Pet.App. 28a. The Air Force

reported he should be indexed under 18 U.S.C. § 922.

First Indorsement, EoJ, Apr. 29, 2024. At that time,

the Air Force did not identify which subsection of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g) applied. First Indorsement, EoJ, Apr.

29, 2024.

On appeal to the AFCCA, MSgt Johnson asserted

that any firearm prohibition, whether under 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) or (g)(3), was invalid as applied to him. Br.

on Behalf of Appellant at 7-10, United States v.

Johnson, No. ACM S32782, 2025 CCA LEXIS 12 (A.F.

Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2025) (per curiam). Only then

did the Government state “Regardless of whether 18

10

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) applied to Appellant’s case, 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) applied . . . .” U.S. Ans. to

Assignments of Error at 7, Johnson, No. ACM S32782,

2025 CCA LEXIS 12.

The AFCCA rejected MSgt Johnson’s challenge to

the firearm prohibition. Pet.App. 28a-29a.

C. SSgt Vanzant’s Firearm Prohibition

SSgt Vanzant’s case is similar to MSgt Johnson’s.

SSgt Vanzant was convicted of drug use at a specialcourt martial. Pet.App. 32a. Following his conviction,

the Air Force indexed him under 18 U.S.C. § 922.

Pet.App. 51a. As with MSgt Johnson, the Air Force did

not indicate which subsection applied to SSgt

Vanzant. Id. It was only on appeal to the AFCCA,

when SSgt Vanzant challenged the firearm

prohibition as unconstitutional, that the Government

asserted he was barred under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

U.S. Ans. to Assignments of Error at 2-3, 6, Vanzant,

84 M.J. 671.

The AFCCA rejected SSgt Vanzant’s challenge to

the firearm prohibition finding the “firearms

prohibition remains a collateral consequence of the

conviction, rather than an element of the findings or

sentence, and is therefore beyond our authority to

review.” Pet.App. 53a.

D. Petitioners’ Appeals to the CAAF

All three Petitioners appealed to the CAAF. See

Pet.App. 1a, 26a, 30a (showing each case was

granted). The CAAF granted review of all three cases,

which became trailers to another appellant’s case:

Specialist 3 Devin W. Johnson, United States Space

Force. See id. (declining to grant relief “in view of

United States v. Johnson, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2025”).

11

In Johnson, the CAAF identified two issues for

briefing: whether military courts had the authority to

direct modification of the First Indorsement to the EoJ

and whether Specialist 3 Johnson had standing to

challenge the firearm prohibition. Johnson, __ M.J. __,

No. 24-0004/SF, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 499, at *7-8. The

CAAF resolved only the first issue, finding that

neither it nor the AFCCA had authority to act on the

EoJ. Id. at *8.

After granting all three of Petitioners’ cases on the

firearm prohibition issue, the CAAF denied

Petitioners any form of relief on their unconstitutional

firearm prohibitions, citing Johnson. Pet.App. 1a, 26a,

30a; see Johnson, __ M.J. __, No. 24-0004/SF, 2025

CAAF LEXIS 499 at *10-13.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The First Indorsement indexed Petitioners in

NICS, barring them from possessing firearms. This

was error because it violates the Second Amendment,

applicable statutes, and Air Force regulations.

Because there was an error in the First

Indorsement, which occurred after the entry of

judgment by the military judge, the AFCCA had

authority under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ, to provide

relief for that error. Despite the plain text, the CAAF

held that the AFCCA did not have that authority. The

CAAF’s decision is antithetical to the plain text of the

statute and results in the deprivation of

servicemembers’ Second Amendment rights. This

Court should grant review to clarify the meaning of 10

U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) and explain that the CAAF’s

interpretation is inconsistent with the statute’s

language and context.

12

I. The CAAF misinterpreted the plain language

of Articles 60c and 66(d)(2), UCMJ, the

R.C.M., and Air Force regulations to find that

the AFCCA did not have authority to correct

the firearm prohibition.

The CAAF incorrectly interpreted Articles 60c and

66(d)(2), UCMJ, stripping the AFCCA of its statutory

authority to correct errors in post-trial processing.

The EoJ ends the court-martial and begins the posttrial process. 10 U.S.C. § 860c; R.C.M. 1111(a)(2). The

First Indorsement—which indexed Petitioners—

comes after the EoJ, making it part of the post-trial

process. Pet.App. 58a, 73a, 86a. Article 66(d)(2),

UCMJ, authorizes the AFCCA to provide relief for

post-trial errors. Therefore, the AFCCA can provide

relief for an error in the First Indorsement. The

CAAF’s contrary conclusion misconstrues the plain

text of applicable statutes, rules, and regulations, and

conflicts with the overall statutory scheme.

A. The CAAF’s decision in Johnson misreads

the plain text of the statute and singles out

the Air Force for unique treatment under

the UCMJ.

The CAAF assessed whether it or the AFCCA had

jurisdiction to review the firearm prohibition in the

First Indorsement. Johnson, __ M.J. __, No. 240004/SF, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 499. It found that neither

court had jurisdiction. Id. at *2. The CAAF

determined that the firearm prohibition fell outside of

the CAAF’s jurisdiction because the firearm indexing

was “not part of the findings or sentence,” a term of

art. Johnson, __ M.J. __, No. 24-0004/SF, 2025 CAAF

LEXIS 499, at *9-10; see United States v. Williams, 85

M.J. 121, 125-26 (C.A.A.F. 2024) (analyzing “findings”

13

and “sentence” as “terms of art”). But Specialist 3

Johnson argued that regardless of whether the CAAF

had jurisdiction, the AFCCA had independent

jurisdiction based on the plain language of Article

66(d)(2). Johnson, __ M.J. __, No. 24-0004/SF, 2025

CAAF LEXIS 499, at *10; compare 10 U.S.C. §

866(d)(1)(A) (limiting the AFCCA’s jurisdiction to

acting upon the “findings and sentence” entered into

the record), with 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) (authorizing

the AFCCA to correct errors after judgment is entered

into the record).

“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in

a statute what it means and means in a statute what

it says there. When the words of a statute are

unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last:

judicial inquiry is complete.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank

v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations

omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). Here,

the statute is clear. Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ, provides

the AFCCA with the authority to “provide appropriate

relief if the accused demonstrates error . . . in the

processing of the court-martial after the judgment

was entered into the record under section 860c.” 10

U.S.C. § 866(d)(2). “Section 860c” refers to Article 60c,

UCMJ, which provides that “the military judge shall

enter into the record of trial the judgment of the

court.” 10 U.S.C. § 860c(a)(1). The text of Articles 60c

and 66(d)(2), UCMJ, is unambiguous: after the

military judge signs the EoJ, any post-trial error

thereafter would fall into the AFCCA’s “errorcorrection” jurisdiction under 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2).

Since the First Indorsement is completed and

attached to the record after the military judge signs

the EoJ, the plain text of the statute dictates the

AFCCA had jurisdiction. See Pet.App. 58a, 73a, 86a

14

(showing that “after the EoJ is signed by the military

judge,” the First Indorsement is signed and attached).

But the CAAF rejected this interpretation because

it found that the “entry of judgment” included the

“First Indorsement.” Johnson, __ M.J. __, No. 240004/SF, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 499, at *11-12. This

meant that the First Indorsement was part of the

judgment and, therefore, did not occur “after,” during

post-trial processing. But this holding is confusing

and violates the canons of statutory interpretation.

The CAAF’s decision means that a judge advocate

signing the First Indorsement “enters judgment,”

instead of a military judge, contrary to the text of

Article 60c, UCMJ. Id. at *11-13.

Consistent with the statutory text, the concurrence

correctly determined entry of judgment occurs when

the military judge signs the EoJ, not when a judge

advocate signs the First Indorsement. Id. at *15

(Johnson, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).

The concurrence noted that the “military judge makes

any final ‘ruling, order or other determination’ under

Article 60c(a)(1)(B)(ii).” Id. This is the “entry of

judgment,” as referred to under 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2).

“Then, R.C.M. 1111(b) requires that the judgment of

the court be ‘signed and dated by the military judge.’”

Id. The concurrence emphasized that “[t]his is

important because Article 60c(a)(1), UCMJ, requires

that ‘the military judge shall enter into the record of

trial the judgment of the court.’ Therefore, the

judgment is entered into the record when the military

judge signs it.” Id.

The concurrence pointed out the pitfalls of the

majority’s logic, noting that “[t]he determination of

when the EoJ is entered into the record is not just an

15

academic exercise,” but has real world consequences.

Id. at *15. Citing multiple statutory and R.C.M.

provisions, the concurrence highlighted how entry of

judgment effects numerous actions in the military

justice system. Id. at *14-16. If this “date-certain”

event can be manipulated by a judge advocate after

the military judge signs a document, then that would

affect these other actions, rendering the “uniform”

code different for the Air Force than any other service.

Id. at *15.

By eliminating the uniform application of the

Uniform Code of Military Justice, the CAAF violated

another

“fundamental

canon

of

statutory

construction:” “the words of a statute must be read in

their context and with a view to their place in the

overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of

Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Under the

majority’s approach, the Air Force has someone other

than the military judge enter judgment. The military

judge’s signature is no longer “some kind of terminal

event” that “leave[s] nothing to be looked for or

expected and leave[s] no further chance for action,

discussion, or change.” Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190,

2211 (2025) (cleaned up) (reviewing the statutory

definition of “final” for final judicial orders in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(1)). Rather, the CAAF’s holding leaves a

single military service waiting for action, discussion,

or change by a judge advocate after a military judge

has already entered judgment into the record. The Air

Force is now uniquely situated from the other services

in all matters that turn on the timing of the EoJ,

contrary to the overall purpose of the UCMJ. This is

inconsistent with the statute’s text and the overall

statutory scheme.

16

B. The CAAF’s holding is contrary to the

plain text of the controlling rules and Air

Force regulations.

The concurring opinion in Johnson accurately

interpreted the plain language of the statute to find

that “[t]here is a basis in the text of Article 60c and

the R.C.M. to equate the military judge’s signature

with entering the judgment of the court into the

record.” Johnson, __ M.J. __, No. 24-0004/SF, 2025

CAAF LEXIS 499, at *15 (Johnson, J., concurring in

part and in the judgment). The Air Force’s

regulations, issued pursuant to the Secretary of the

Air Force’s authority under the R.C.M., further

support this textualist interpretation.

The President, pursuant to Article 60c(a), UCMJ,

prescribes rules for the preparation and distribution

of the EoJ. The President has directed that “the EOJ

‘shall consist of’—among other things—‘[a]ny

additional information that the Secretary concerned

may require by regulation.’” Johnson, __ M.J. __, No.

24-0004/SF, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 499, at *11-12 (citing

R.C.M. 1111(b)(3)(F)) (alteration in original).

Pursuant to R.C.M. 1111(b)(3)(F), the Secretary of

the Air Force outlines the “additional information” to

the EoJ through Department of the Air Force

Instruction (DAFI) 51-201. See, e.g., Pet.App. 56a-59a

(outlining the processing requirements). Under the

applicable versions of DAFI 51-201, “[t]he EoJ reflects

the results of the court-martial after all post-trial

actions, rulings, or orders, and serves to terminate

trial proceedings and initiate appellate proceedings.”

Pet.App. 57a, 72a, 85a. The “[m]inimum contents” of

the EoJ “must include the contents listed in R.C.M.

1111(b), and the [Statement of Trial Results] must be

17

included as an attachment.” Pet.App. 57a, 72a, 85a.

Notably, the “additional information that the

Secretary concerned may require by regulation” does

not include the First Indorsement. Pet.App. at 59a,

74a, 87a.

This makes sense considering the contents and

purpose of the First Indorsement. The First

Indorsement only indicates whether certain criminal

indexing is required. Pet.App. 58a, 73a, 86a. After the

First Indorsement is complete, it is sent to the

Department of the Air Force Criminal Justice

Information Center (DAF-CJIC) to criminally index

the convicted servicemember into NICS, which

records the restrictions. Pet.App 67a-68a, 82a-83a,

96a, 100a. Indexing is not a “personnel or

administrative function,” but a law enforcement

function that occurs “after all post-trial actions,

rulings, or orders,” and the termination of trial

proceedings. Pet.App. 57a. Thus, the purpose of the

First Indorsement is to effectuate post-trial

processing and does not operate as part of the

judgment of the court. See Williams, 85 M.J. at 126

(holding criminal indexing is not part of the “findings”

or “sentence” entered into the record under Article

60c, UCMJ).

If the Secretary of the Air Force intended to

include the 18 U.S.C. § 922 designator in the EoJ,

they could have done so. See, e.g., id. at 122-23

(explaining how the Army does its indexing before the

entry of judgment).4 Instead, the Secretary of the Air

4 The Air Force is the only service that accomplishes its firearm

prohibition reporting this way; the other services complete

criminal indexing prior to the military judge signing the EoJ. See,

e.g., id. at 122 (describing how in the Army, the military judge

18

Force specifically delineated the EoJ from the First

Indorsement, making them distinct. Pet.App. 58a

(showing the First Indorsement is “sign[ed] and

attach[ed] to the EoJ” and “distributed with the EoJ”);

see also Pet.App. 73a, 86a (showing other versions of

the DAFI with the same language). The overall

regulatory scheme prescribed by the Secretary of the

Air Force is contrary to the CAAF’s holding: the EoJ

and First Indorsement are not the same.

The EoJ itself confirms this reading, stating

directly above the military judge’s signature: “[t]his

judgment reflects the result of the court-martial, as

modified by any post-trial actions, rulings, or orders,

if any, and is hereby entered into the record on (date).”

Pet.App. 107a. Moreover, the First Indorsement is

clear in its single sentence: “The following criminal

indexing is required, following Entry of Judgment.”

Pet.App. 108a (emphasis added). The First

Indorsement “follows,” “accompanies,” and “attaches

to” the EoJ; it is not the entry of judgment under

Article 60c, UCMJ.

In holding otherwise, the CAAF read the Air

Force’s regulations in a way that further undermines

uniformity in the UCMJ. Johnson, __ M.J. __, No. 240004/SF, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 499, at *16 n.3 (Johnson,

J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Under the

CAAF’s reading of the regulations, the Secretary of

the Air Force can alter the application of the MCM,

which allows the uniform execution of military justice

to falter. Id. at *15-16 (“[T]he Court’s decision . . .

could potentially set the Air Force and Space Force

apart from the other services for every provision of the

makes the firearm prohibition determination before entering the

judgment into the record).

19

UCMJ and the R.C.M. that turns on the timing of the

EOJ.”). This “fractur[es] the very uniformity the

[UCMJ] sought to create.” Id. at *16.

The CAAF arrived at this inconsistent outcome by

confusing the contents included in the Air Force

record of trial with the processing of military courtsmartial after judgment is entered into the record. To

support its conclusion the CAAF said any other

interpretation would not make clear “what

authority—if any—would authorize [a judge advocate]

to supplement the record of trial with an additional

document after the entry of the EOJ into the record.”

Id. at *12. While the CAAF is correct that it is not

clear what authority allows a judge advocate to

supplement the record of trial, hierarchy of laws

dictates that the statute and R.C.M. trump the DAFI.

But rather than finding the Air Force’s regulations

unlawful, the CAAF equated the First Indorsement to

the entry of judgment, contrary to the overall

statutory and regulatory scheme.

The statute, canons of constructions, and overall

regulatory scheme confirm the opposite of CAAF’s

holding: the EoJ and First Indorsement cannot be the

same. The CAAF confused entry of judgment into the

record with the document included in the record of

trial. Merely because the documents are attached to

each other does not mean that they are legally

interchangeable, serve the same purpose, or justify

deviation from uniform application of military justice.

The overall context and scheme of the applicable

statutes, rules, and regulations confirm the CAAF

was wrong; the First Indorsement has no bearing on

when judgment is entered into the record.

20

C. The

CAAF’s

conclusion

eliminated

possible relief under Article 66(d)(2),

UCMJ.

By transforming the First Indorsement into the

“additional information” from R.C.M. 1111(b)(3)(F),

the CAAF twisted the plain language of the statute to

avoid error-correction in straightforward cases like

Petitioners’. Johnson, __ M.J. __, No. 24-0004/SF,

2025 CAAF LEXIS 499, at *12-13. Under the plain

language of 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2), the AFCCA would

have been able to address this post-trial processing

error.

Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ, authorizes “the service

courts to correct errors that occur ‘after the judgment

was entered into the record under [Article 60c, UCMJ,

10 U.S.C. § 860c(a)].’” Johnson, __ M.J. __, No. 240004/SF, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 499, at *11 (alteration in

original). The First Indorsement occurs after the

military judge signs the entry of judgment under

Article 60c, UCMJ, thus falling into the plain

jurisdictional authority of Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ. See

id. at *15 n.1 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and in

the judgment) (discussing the “civilian analogue,”

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(k)(1), which Article 60c, UCMJ,

was modeled upon, to show it is the judge’s signature

that enters the EoJ into the record).

Due to the Air Force’s unique post-trial processing

requirements, the AFCCA could provide relief to

Petitioners under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ. The AFCCA

could review the unconstitutional firearm prohibition

and order a correction of the record of trial. See R.C.M.

1112(d)(2) (permitting “a superior competent

authority to return a record of trial to the military

judge for correction”); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 36

21

(authorizing a court to correct a “clerical error” in the

record). The CAAF’s holding in Johnson, though,

barred this resolution.

II. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on its face and by

regulation does not apply to Petitioners. Any

indexing of Petitioners in the First

Indorsement is error.

Petitioners were unconstitutionally denied their

fundamental rights to bear arms. U.S. CONST. amend.

II. Each Petitioner’s First Indorsement reflected that

they should be indexed in NICS under 18 U.S.C. § 922.

None of the First Indorsements indicate which section

of 18 U.S.C. § 922 apply to them, but the Government

averred, on appeal, that Petitioners have qualifying

convictions under subsection (g)(1). Ans. to

Assignment of Error at 3-5, Dominguez-Garcia, No.

ACM S32694 (f rev), 2024 CCA LEXIS 218; U.S. Ans.

to Assignments of Error at 7, Johnson, No. ACM

S32782, 2025 CCA LEXIS 12; U.S. Ans. to

Assignments of Error at 2-3, 6, Vanzant, 84 M.J. 671.

This is wrong. Petitioners’ convictions do not fall

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because Petitioners were

not “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” The

definition of a “[c]rime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding 1 year” is any offense “for which

the maximum penalty, whether or not imposed, is

capital punishment or imprisonment in excess of 1

year.” 27 C.F.R. 478.11. This definition is predicated

on the meaning of “punishable,” i.e., whether the

crime can be punished in excess of a year. See United

States v. Briggs, 592 U.S. 69, 72 (2020) (first citing 12

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 845 (2d ed. 1989)

(“Liable to punishment; capable of being punished. . .

22

. . Of an offence: Entailing punishment”); then citing

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

1843 (1986) (“[D]eserving of, or liable to, punishment:

capable of being punished by law or right.”); then

citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (5th ed. 1979)

(“Deserving of or capable or liable to punishment;

capable of being punished by law or right”); and then

citing Random House Dictionary of the English

Language 1165 (1966) (“liable to or deserving

punishment”))

(analyzing

the

meaning

of

“punishable” in context of the UCMJ).

Petitioners were convicted at special courtsmartial. The jurisdictional maximum for confinement

at a special court-martial for any offense is one year.

10 U.S.C. § 819(a). Thus, it is impossible to impose

over one year of confinement. Id. Therefore, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) does not apply when considering the

particular context and provisions of the UCMJ. See

Briggs, 592 U.S. at 72-78 (assessing the meaning of

“punishable by death” in the context of the UCMJ).

Air Force regulations also provide that 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) does not apply to non-domestic-violence,

special court-martial convictions, contrary to the

Government’s position. The Air Force indexes

servicemembers convicted at general courts-martial

for crimes with “maximum punishments” of over a

year of confinement, whether or not “adjudged or

approved.” Pet.App. 60a-61a, 75a-76a (referencing 18

U.S.C. § 922(g) and 27 C.F.R. 478.11). But then the

Air Force regulation notes, “This category of

prohibition would not apply to convictions in a special

court-martial because confinement for more than one

year cannot be adjudged in that forum.” Pet.App. 60a61a, 75a-76a (emphasis added). The Air Force’s

23

interpretation is repeated in its criminal indexing

regulation as well. Pet.App. 89a.

Here, at minimum, the Government failed to follow

its own directives when it completed the First

Indorsement.5 This determination was in violation of

statute, Air Force regulations, and case law.

The Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) and

the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals

agree that the jurisdictional limits of a special courtmartial prevent application of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Macias, No. 202200005, 2022 CCA

LEXIS 580, at *2 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2022);

see United States v. Williams, ARMY 20230048, 2023

CCA LEXIS 377 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 30, 2023)

(modifying the firearm prohibition to be correct under

18 U.S.C. § 922), vacated, 85 M.J. 121 (holding the

firearm prohibition was not part of the findings and

the sentence that the lower court could act upon under

10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)); United States v.

Moreldelossantos, ARMY 20210167, 2022 CCA LEXIS

164, at *1 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2022); United

States v. Shaffer, ARMY 20200551, 2021 CCA LEXIS

682, at *1 n.2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2021).

This Court has not answered the question of

whether military members who are convicted at

special courts-martial can be prosecuted under 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm or whether

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) could lawfully apply to them if

5 For MSgt Johnson and SSgt Vanzant, they may have originally

qualified under subsection (g)(3) due to their drug convictions,

although this is subject to challenge. See Pet.App. 61a (indexing

servicemembers who have been convicted of a drug offense

within the past year); United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234,

2025 U.S. LEXIS 4005 (Oct. 20, 2025).

24

they were. But the plain language of the statute

dictates the answer is no, just as the plain language

10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) should allow the CCAs to correct

any erroneous determination to the contrary. This

Court should grant review to answer these important

questions.

III.

Correcting the First Indorsement would

restore Petitioners’ Second Amendment

rights.

Correcting the First Indorsement would redress

the constitutional deprivation of rights caused by the

erroneous indexing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (outlining the requirements

for standing: injury, causation, redressability). As the

Air Force regulations state: “Reporting of persons

qualifying for NICS prohibition is an immediate

denial of the individual’s right to exercise his or her

constitutional right to possess a firearm.” Pet.App.

99a-100a. The injury is Petitioners’ loss of Second

Amendment rights. The cause is due to the Air Force’s

indexing on the First Indorsement. And the remedy is

“appropriate relief” for this post-entry-of-judgment

error. 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2).

If Petitioners want to purchase a firearm, a seller

must run an NICS background check. 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(s), (t)(1)(A). NICS determines whether the

seller may proceed with the transaction. 28 C.F.R.

§ 25.6(c). As relevant here, a “proceed” response will

occur if no disqualifying information is found in the

NICS. 28 C.F.R. § 25.6(c)(1)(iv)(A). Because sellers

must run an NICS background check before lawfully

transferring a firearm, erroneous reporting during the

25

Air Force post-trial processing deprives an individual

of their right to bear arms.6

Here, the DAF-CJIC is responsible for Air Force

criminal indexing. Pet.App. 100a. DAF-CJIC oversees

all Air Force NICS entries and removals. Id. To

effectuate reporting, the firearm prohibition is noted

on the First Indorsement to the EoJ which is

distributed to “DAF-CJIC to ensure reporting

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922 is appropriately

handled.” Pet.App. 67a, 82a. By indexing Petitioners

under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the Air Force entered

Petitioners into NICS. Any attempt to obtain a

firearm would trigger the required background check

and a denial of Petitioners’ rights.

Relief under 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) is available to

Petitioners. This is because the error—the erroneous

indexing—happened after entry of judgement. 10

U.S.C. § 866(d)(2). Correcting the First Indorsement

would resolve the firearm prohibition because the Air

Force transmits “[a]ny actions taken as the result of

appellate review . . . to DAF-CJIC.” Pet.App. 100a.

Thus, any amended First Indorsement would be

transmitted to NICS. Removal from NICS would then

restore Petitioners’ ability to possess firearms.

CONCLUSION

The CAAF’s holding in Johnson prevents the

AFCCA from correcting errors in post-trial processing

which, for Petitioners, unconstitutionally deprives

Petitioners do not have to expose themselves to criminal

liability before challenging this error. See Babbitt v. UFW Nat’l

Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (noting that a plaintiff “should

not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as

the sole means of seeking relief”) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.

179, 188 (1973)).

6

26

them of their right to bear arms. The CAAF’s holding

misunderstands the plain text of 10 U.S.C. §§ 860c

and 866(d)(2) and the relevant rules and regulations.

The CAAF’s holding conflicts with the overall

statutory and regulatory scheme that relies on a

uniform application of entry of judgment in courtsmartial. The AFCCA has the power and authority to

correct Petitioners’ records and ensure constitutional

post-trial processing. Therefore, this Court should

reverse the CAAF’s holding in Johnson and remand

these cases to the AFCCA to provide appropriate relief

through correction of the First Indorsement.

Respectfully submitted,

SAMANTHA M. CASTANIEN

Counsel of Record

NICOLE J. HERBERS

United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Division

1500 West Perimeter Road

Suite 1100

Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762

(240) 612-4770

samantha.castanien.1@us.af.mil

Counsel for Petitioners