Opposition Brief — David Kelsey Sparre, Petitioner v. Florida
Supreme Court briefMay 26, 2026
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No. 25-7292
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAVID KELSEY SPARRE,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
JAMES UTHMEIER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA
Office of the Attorney General
3507 E. Frontage Rd., Ste. 200
Tampa, Florida 33607
Telephone: (813) 287-7900
scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
SCOTT A. BROWNE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
CHARMAINE MILLSAPS
SPECIAL COUNSEL, ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
OUNSEL
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
QUESTION 1
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the Florida
Supreme Court affirming the denial of a successive postconviction
Eighth Amendment claim based on a study of jury selection in capital
cases which was denied, in part, based on two different adequate and
independent state law grounds.
QUESTION 2
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the Florida
Supreme Court rejecting a claim that a capital defendant has a federal
due process right to oral argument on the issue of whether an
evidentiary hearing should be held on the claims raised in the successive
postconviction motion.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................................................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii
OPINION BELOW ......................................................................................................... 1
JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED........................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................... 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............................................................ 14
QUESTION 1 .................................................................................................... 14
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the Florida Supreme
Court affirming the denial of a successive postconviction Eighth Amendment
claim based on a study of jury selection in capital cases which was denied, in
part, based on two different adequate and independent state law grounds. . 14
QUESTION 2 .................................................................................................... 24
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the Florida Supreme
Court rejecting a claim that a capital defendant has a federal due process
right to oral argument on the issue of whether an evidentiary hearing should
be held on the claims raised in the successive postconviction motion. ........... 24
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 32
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bates v. State,
3 So. 3d 1091 (Fla. 2009) .......................................................................................... 17
Berger v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp.,
765 Fed. Appx. 699 (3d Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 32
Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971) ................................................................................................... 29
Boyd v. State,
324 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 2021) .......................................................................................... 9
Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) ....................................................................................................... 7
Braxton v. United States,
500 U.S. 344 (1991) ............................................................................................. 23, 31
Christeson v. Roper,
574 U.S. 373 (2015) ..................................................................................................... 6
City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson,
603 U.S. 520 (2024) ................................................................................................... 21
Court from doing so. Sparre,
426 So. 3d .................................................................................................................. 18
Craft v. State,
427 So. 3d 486 (Fla. 2024) ........................................................................................ 26
Dillbeck v. State,
357 So. 3d 94 (Fla. 2023) .......................................................................................... 17
Dist. Att’ys Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne,
557 U.S. 52 (2009) ..................................................................................................... 30
Duren v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 357 (1979) ....................................................................................... 20, 21, 22
Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387 (1985) ................................................................................................... 29
Fed. Communications Comm'n v. WJR, The Goodwill Station,
337 U.S. 265 (1949) ............................................................................................. 28, 32
Ford v. State,
402 So. 3d 973 (Fla.) ................................................................................................. 18
iii
Foster v. Chatman,
578 U.S. 488 (2016) ................................................................................................... 18
George W. Bennett Bryson & Co., Ltd. v. Norton Lilly & Co., Inc.,
502 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1974) ................................................................................... 32
Glossip v. Oklahoma,
604 U.S. 226 (2025) ................................................................................................... 18
Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989) ................................................................................................... 24
Hamblen v. State,
527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988) .......................................................................................... 4
Harris v. Reed,
489 U.S. 255 (1989) ................................................................................................... 18
Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474 (1990) ............................................................................................. 20, 22
Huff v. State,
622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993) .............................................................................. 9, 26, 27
Hurst v. Florida,
577 U.S. 92 (2016) ....................................................................................................... 7
Hurst v. State,
202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) ............................................................................................ 5
Hutchinson v. State,
408 So. 3d 752 (Fla.) ........................................................................................... 16, 17
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.,
510 U.S. 27 (1993) ..................................................................................................... 24
Johnson v. Williams,
568 U.S. 289 .............................................................................................................. 30
Klein v. Martin,
146 S. Ct. 589 (2026) ................................................................................................. 28
Koon v. Dugger,
619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993) .......................................................................................... 2
Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162 (1986) ....................................................................................... 20, 21, 22
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982) ................................................................................................... 29
Martinez v. Ryan,
566 U.S. 1 (2012) ......................................................................................................... 6
iv
McCoy v. Louisiana,
584 U.S. 414 (2018) ..................................................................................................... 7
Medina v. California,
505 U.S. 437 (1992) ................................................................................................... 30
Melton v. State,
367 So. 3d 1175 (Fla. 2023) ...................................................................................... 17
Melton v. State,
949 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2006) ........................................................................................ 17
Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ................................................................................................. 18
Muhammad v. State,
782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001) .......................................................................................... 4
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950) ................................................................................................... 28
Poole v. USCIS Pittsburgh Field Off.,
2024 WL 3439777 (3d Cir. July 17, 2024) ................................................................ 32
Raulerson v. Warden,
928 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2019) ................................................................................... 24
Rhines v. Weber,
544 U.S. 269 (2005) ..................................................................................................... 8
Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002) ..................................................................................................... 4
Rivera v. State,
260 So. 3d 920 (Fla. 2018) ........................................................................................ 27
Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue,
482 U.S. 182 (1987) ............................................................................................. 23, 32
Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) ..................................................................................................... 5
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania,
537 U.S. 101 (2003) ................................................................................................... 24
Shinn v. Ramirez,
596 U.S. 366 (2022) ..................................................................................................... 6
Sliney v. State,
362 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 2023) ........................................................................................ 17
Sparre v. Florida,
577 U.S. 961 (2015) ..................................................................................................... 5
v
Sparre v. State,
164 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2015) ................................................................................ 2, 3, 4
Sparre v. State,
289 So. 3d 839 (Fla. 2019) .................................................................................. 2, 5, 6
Sparre v. State,
391 So. 3d 404 (Fla. 2024) .................................................................................. 10, 13
Sparre v. State,
426 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 2025) ............................ 1, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 28
Spencer v. State,
615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993) .......................................................................................... 3
Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975) ....................................................................................... 20, 21, 22
Taylor v. State,
260 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 2018) ........................................................................................ 26
Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) ..................................................................................................... 15
Truehill v. State,
358 So. 3d 1167 (Fla. 2022) ...................................................................................... 17
United States v. Sanders,
133 F.4th 341 (5th Cir. 2025) ............................................................................. 18, 23
Walker v. Martin,
562 U.S. 307 (2011) ................................................................................................... 19
Williams v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI,
45 F.4th 713 (3d Cir. 2022) ......................................................................................... 6
Wolf v. Weinstein,
372 U.S. 633 (1963) ................................................................................................... 30
Yee v. Escondido,
503 U.S. 519 (1992) ................................................................................................... 24
Zaluski v. I.N.S.,
37 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1994) .......................................................................................... 32
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1257 ..................................................................................................... 30, 31
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ........................................................................................................ 1
28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) ......................................................................................................... 1
Article I, § 16(a), of the Florida Constitution ............................................................. 11
vi
Rules
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 ............................................................................................ 16, 26
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A)..................................................................................... 16
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2) .............................................................................. 17, 19, 26
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B) ..................................................................... 9, 26, 27, 29
Other Authorities
Covid-19, Zoom, and Appellate Oral Argument: Is the Future Virtual?,
21 J. App. Prac. & Process 193 (2021) ..................................................................... 28
vii
OPINION BELOW
The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion is reported at Sparre v. State, 426 So. 3d
1247 (Fla. 2025) (SC2024-1512).
JURISDICTION
On December 4, 2025, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the state
postconviction court’s summary denial of the second successive state postconviction
motion. On January 27, 2026, the Florida Supreme Court denied the motion for
rehearing. On April 27, 2026, Sparre, represented by Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel – North (CCRC-N), filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court seeking
review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision. The petition was timely. Sup. Ct. R.
13.3; 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). Typically, this Court has jurisdiction over a “final”
judgment issued by the “highest court of a State” under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). But this
Court lacks jurisdiction over both questions raised in the petition.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The State accepts Petitioner’s statement of the constitutional provisions
involved.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts and procedural history of the case spans over 15 years.
Facts of the crime
Sometime between July 8 and July 12, 2010, Sparre stabbed to death Tiara
Pool, a woman he had met through a personal ad on Craigslist. He stabbed her over
80 times. He then stole her 2003 Chevrolet Malibu, a PlayStation 3 game console, a
1
DVD, and a wireless modem. Sparre confessed to the murder to two Jacksonville
Sheriff’s Office detectives, Detective Patrick Bodine and Detective James Childers, in
a videotaped interview. Sparre murdered the victim for the “rush” of killing someone.
Sparre v. State, 164 So. 3d 1183, 1186-87 (Fla. 2015); Sparre v. State, 289 So. 3d 839,
844-45 (Fla. 2019).
The jury convicted Sparre by special verdict for both premeditated murder and
felony murder with burglary as the underlying felony. Sparre, 164 So. 3d at 1189.
At the penalty phase, Sparre waived the presentation of mitigation. Sparre,
164 So. 3d at 1189. The trial court conducted an inquiry with Sparre to confirm that
his waiver was knowing and voluntary, as required by Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246
(Fla. 1993). Sparre, 164 So. 3d at 1190. Defense counsel assured the trial court that
there was substantial mitigation they were prepared to present, developed by two
mitigation specialists, David Douglas and Dan Roberts, who had traveled to Georgia
to investigate mitigation, as well as mental health mitigation. Id. Sparre’s defense
team proffered that it was prepared to present the following mitigation evidence: (1)
Sparre has no significant criminal history as mitigation; (2) four mental health
experts that would testify as to mental health mitigation; (3) Dr. Harry Krop was
prepared to testify that Sparre had five diagnoses of ADHD, posttraumatic stress
disorder (PSTD), substance abuse, intermittent explosive disorder, and bipolar
schizoid-affective disorder; (4) Dr. Buffington was prepared to testify that Sparre’s
continued use of hydrocodone, possibly powder cocaine, alcohol, and other drugs could
cause blackouts, and memory loss; (5) both Dr. Alligood and Dr. Greenberg were
2
prepared to testify regarding Sparre’s PTSD from the time he was in the Tara Hall
School for Boys in South Carolina when he was 11, 12, or 13 years old; (6) Shannon
Bullock, a missionary and counselor at Tara Hall would testify as to Sparre’s
dysfunctional family, his mother's neglect of him, and Sparre's belief in God; (7)
several of Sparre's family members were prepared to testify about his dysfunctional
family background and personal history; and (8) James Dunn, the director of Tara
Hall, would testify as to the little family contact Sparre had while he was at the
school. Id. at 1189, n.3. Defense counsel informed the trial court that it did not believe
Sparre was incompetent. Id. at 1190. The trial court found Sparre’s waiver of his right
to present mitigation to be knowingly and voluntarily entered and that Sparre was
“lucid during its inquiry.” Id. at 1190. The penalty phase jury unanimously
recommended death. Id. at 1191. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation
report (PSI). Id. at 1191.
Sparre also waived the presentation of mitigation at the Spencer hearing.1
Sparre, 164 So. 3d at 1191. Defense counsel raised no objections to the PSI at the
Spencer hearing. Id. at 1191.
On March 30, 2012, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court
found two aggravating factors both of which it assigned great weight: (1) heinous,
atrocious, and cruel (HAC aggravator); and (2) the murder was committed during the
1 Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
3
course of a burglary (felony-murder aggravator). Sparre, 164 So. 3d at 1192. The trial
court found the statutory mitigating circumstance of age of 19 years-old and gave it
moderate weight. Id. at 1192. The trial court also found thirteen non-statutory
mitigating factors, including prior abuse and military service. Id. at 1192-93. The
trial court then sentenced Sparre to death. Id. at 1193.
Procedural History
Direct Appeal
In the direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Sparre raised three issues.
Sparre v. State, 164 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2015) (SC2012-0891).2 The Florida Supreme
Court rejected the three issues. Id. at 1185. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction for first-degree murder finding there was competent, substantial evidence
in the record to support the first-degree murder conviction. Id. at 1186. The Court
also affirmed the death sentence, after concluding the death sentence to be
proportional. Id. at 1202.
Sparre filed a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court raising a question of
whether the Eighth Amendment requires the trial court to call mitigation witnesses
as court witnesses, including mental health experts, in capital cases in which the
defendant waives the presentation of mitigation. On November 2, 2015, this Court
2 The three issues were: (1) the trial court erred in not calling mitigation witnesses
as court witnesses when the defendant waived the presentation of mitigation relying
on Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001); (2) the Florida Supreme Court
should recede from its holding in Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988); and
(3) his death sentence violated the Sixth Amendment right-to-a-jury trial announced
in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
4
denied review. Sparre v. Florida, 577 U.S. 961 (2015) (No. 15-5858). Sparre’s
conviction and sentence became final the next day on Tuesday, November 3, 2015.
State Initial Postconviction Litigation
On October 26, 2016, Sparre, represented by Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel – North (CCRC-N), filed an initial postconviction motion raising 30 claims.
On March 13, 2017, the State filed an answer. The state postconviction court granted
an evidentiary hearing on most of the claims. The state postconviction court
conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing on March 15, 16, and 19, in 2018. The
state postconviction court denied postconviction relief.
In the postconviction appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Sparre,
represented by CCRC-N, raised ten issues. Sparre v. State, 289 So. 3d 839, 846 (Fla.
2019) (SC2018-1192). Sparre raised six claims of ineffectiveness with subclaims and
a claim of cumulative error. Sparre, 289 So. 3d 846 (listing the six claims of
ineffectiveness). Sparre also raised a claim that Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005), should be expanding to him because he was 19 years old at the time of the
murder. Id. at 853. He raised a claim based on Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla.
2016). He additionally raised a claim that the postconviction court erred in denying
the motion to amend the postconviction motion. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
the denial of initial postconviction relief. Id. at 857.
Sparre also filed a state habeas petition raising three claims of ineffectiveness
of appellate counsel. Sparre, 289 So. 3d at 846, 854-57. (SC2019-0389). The three
claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel were: (1) failing to supplement the
5
record on appeal with the defense sentencing memorandum; (2) failing to argue
fundamental error based on prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) failing to challenge the
admission of certain autopsy photographs. The Florida Supreme Court rejected the
three claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel and denied the state habeas
petition. Id. at 857.
Federal Habeas Litigation
On March 4, 2020, Sparre, represented by state postconviction counsel CCRCN, filed a federal habeas petition raising nine claims in federal district court. Sparre
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 3:20-cv-00216-TJC-JBT (M.D. Fla.). CCRC-N had a
potential conflict of interest under a combination of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1
(2012), and Christeson v. Roper, 574 U.S. 373 (2015) because they were both state
postconviction counsel and federal habeas counsel.3 On June 15, 2020, the federal
district court appointed the Capital Habeas Unit (CHU-N), as federal habeas cocounsel, to preemptively resolve any potential conflict. (Doc. #16).
On June 18, 2021, CHU-N filed an amended § 2254 habeas petition. (Doc. #26).
3 The possible conflict existing from the beginning of an initial habeas petition was
more of a concern before Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022). In the wake of Shinn
v. Ramirez, Martinez v. Ryan is a “dead letter.” Williams v. Superintendent Mahanoy
SCI, 45 F.4th 713, 723 (3d Cir. 2022) (noting that the decision in Shinn “makes
Martinez a dead letter in many cases . . .”). Only claims of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel that are obvious from the face of the trial court record will support a Martinez
exception to a procedural bar in federal habeas litigation after the decision in
Ramirez.
6
The operative amended § 2254 petition raised 19 grounds.4 On March 2, 2022, the
Secretary filed an answer to the amended petition. (Doc. #41). On April 15, 2022,
instead of filing a reply, CHU-N filed a motion to stay the case, pursuant to Rhines v.
Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), based on filing the first successive postconviction motion
regarding the presentence investigation report (PSI) in state court. (Doc. #43). Nearly
The 19 grounds raised in the amended habeas petition were: (1) Sparre was
incompetent when he waived the right at the penalty phase and Spencer hearing; (2)
the trial court erred by failing to inquire about Sparre’s competency and for failing to
hold a competency hearing; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to
investigate Sparre’s competency to waive mitigation and for failing to move for a
competency hearing; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present
evidence that Sparre snapped to support the defense of second-degree murder; (5)
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to argue that Sparre snapped to
support the defense of second-degree murder; (6) ineffective assistance of trial counsel
for failing to present a defense pathologist to testify that the victim’s injuries were
inconsistent with a frenzy; (7) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to
cross-examine the medical examiner, Dr. Marraccini, regarding the inconsistencies
between the trial testimony and the deposition; (8) the prosecution suppressed
evidence of the prosecutor’s letter of recommendation regarding witness Ashley
Chewning in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (9) ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for conceding to the less-included offense of second-degree
murder in violation of McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 423 (2018); (10) the trial
court violated the constitutional right to individualized sentencing in a capital case
by not calling mitigation witnesses as court witnesses; (11) Florida’s unequal
appointment of special mitigation counsel in waiver cases violates due process, equal
protection, and the Eighth Amendment; (12) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for
failing to file a defense memorandum of law in support of a life sentence; (13)
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to supplement the record on
appeal with the defense memorandum of law in support of a life sentence; (14) the
omissions in the PSI violated due process; (15) ineffective assistance of trial counsel
for failing to object to the omissions in the PSI; (16) ineffective assistance of trial
counsel for failing to object to the prosecutor’s comment regarding the defense to
premeditation during the guilt phase and prosector denigration of the mitigation in
the penalty phase; (17) the death sentence violated Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92
(2016); (18) a claim that the burglary aggravating factor is an automatic aggravator
in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (19) a claim of cumulative error across
proceedings.
4
7
a year later, on April 4, 2023, the district court denied the stay. (Doc. #57). CHU-N
filed a rehearing regarding the denial of the first Rhines stay, which the district court
ultimately denied in 2024. (Docs. #58, #64). A month later, on April 19, 2024, CHUN filed a second motion for a Rhines stay of the federal habeas proceedings based on
the second successive postconviction motion that was filed in state court regarding
the Gau study of jury selections in capital cases in Duval County. (Doc. #65). Five
days later, Respondent filed an objection to the second Rhines stay. (Doc. #66). On
August 26, 2024, the district court denied the second Rhines stay. (Doc. #74).
On May 15, 2024, Sparre filed a reply to the answer to the amended petition.
(Doc. #67). n August 14, 2024, CHU-N moved to amend the amended petition with
the claims regarding the PSI contained in the first successive postconviction motion
that had been exhausted in state court. (Doc. #72). The next day, Respondent opposed
the motion to amend. (Doc. #73). The district court permitted supplemental briefing
regarding the PSI claims. (Doc. #74). On September 23, 2024, CHU-N filed a
supplemental brief on ground 14 regarding the PSI. (Doc. #75). The next day, on
September 24, 2024, Respondent filed their supplemental answer on ground 14
regarding the PSI asserting that the ground was waived, procedurally defaulted,
meritless under the AEDPA, and harmless. (Doc. #76). Over four months later, on
January 27, 2025, the district court “reopened” the case. (Doc. #77). The initial habeas
litigation remains pending in federal district court as of May 5, 2026.
State Successive Postconviction Litigation
On April 14, 2022, Sparre, represented by state postconviction counsel CCRC-
8
N, filed a first successive rule 3.851 postconviction motion raising three claims
regarding the completeness and accuracy of the Presentence Investigation report
(PSI) in state trial court. (1st succ. PC at 1-46). On May 2, 2022, the State filed an
answer to the first successive postconviction motion asserting that all three claims
regarding the PSI were waived by Sparre’s waiver of mitigation at the penalty phase
and Spencer hearing and therefore, the successive postconviction motion should be
summarily denied. (1st succ. PC at 47-72). On June 23, 2022, the postconviction court
summarily denied the first successive postconviction motion. (1st succ. PC at 73-90).
On July 1, 2022, Sparre filed a motion for rehearing asserting that the trial
court violated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(B) by not conducting a
case management conference, commonly referred to as a Huff hearing. Huff v. State,
622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). The State filed a response to the rehearing noting that it
is not reversible error to fail to conduct a Huff hearing in successive postconviction
litigation, under Florida Supreme Court precedent. (1st succ. PC at 95-105 citing
Boyd v. State, 324 So. 3d 908, 913 (Fla. 2021)). The postconviction court granted the
rehearing and conducted a Huff hearing on July 13, 2022. (1st succ. PC at 110-111).
At the Huff hearing, opposing counsel clarified that the alleged inaccuracy in
the PSI was that former Probation Officer Dale Carney, who prepared the PSI in this
case, wrote that Sparre seemed normal during their conversation. On December 6,
2022, the postconviction court again summarily denied the successive postconviction
motion relying on the same grounds as the original order. (1st succ. PC at 112-129).
CCRC-N filed another motion for rehearing arguing the law-of-the-case doctrine did
9
not apply due to the “material change in the evidence” based on former probation
officer Carney’s statements about the PSI. (1st succ. PC at 130-135). On January 5,
2023, the postconviction court denied rehearing. (1st succ. PC at 136-37).
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the summary denial of the first
successive postconviction motion regarding the PSI as untimely and procedurally
barred. Sparre v. State, 391 So. 3d 404 (Fla. 2024) (SC2023-0163). The Florida
Supreme Court found the motion to be untimely because the PSI, which was the basis
for the motion, had “been available since it was filed with the trial court in 2012.
Sparre, 391 So. 3d at 406. Sparre offered “no coherent explanation, either here or
below, why trial counsel or postconviction counsel could not have discovered the
alleged deficiencies” in the PSI “years earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Id.
(citing cases). The Florida Supreme Court also found the claims raised in the motion
to be procedurally barred because Sparre had “raised numerous issues related to his
PSI in prior appeals.” Id. (citing cases)).
Current Second Successive Postconviction Litigation in State Court
On February 16, 2023, Sparre, represented by CCRC–N, filed a second
successive postconviction motion in the state trial court. (2nd Succ. PC at 17-80). The
second successive postconviction motion raised three claims relating to jury selection,
based on a study and a letter: (1) newly discovered evidence of a violation of the Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section requirement; (2) newly discovered evidence of a
violation of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment provision; and (3)
newly discovered evidence of a violation of the state constitutional provision, Article
10
I, § 16(a), of the Florida Constitution guaranteeing an impartial jury. The study that
was the basis for the claims was Jacinta M. Gau, Racialized Impacts of Death
Disqualification in Duval County, Florida. The letter was from Retired Professor
Michael Radelet of the University of Colorado at Boulder.
The background of the study was that, in November of 2020, Brian W. Stull of
the American Civil Liberties Union commissioned Professor Jacinta M. Gau of the
University of Central Florida to conduct a study of jury selections in capital cases in
Duval County, Florida, which included Sparre’s case. (2nd Succ. PC at 39). The 12
Duval capital cases studied were from the time span of 2010 until 2018 and involved
1,042 prospective jurors. The 12 Duval capital jury selections analyzed in the study
were: (1) Rasheem Dubose in 2010; (2) Justin McMillian in 2010; (3) Thomas Brown
in 2011; (4) David Sparre in 2011; (5) Terrance Philips in 2012; (6) Billy Sheppard in
2012; (7) Dennis Glover in 2013; (8) Kim Jackson in 2013; (9) Rodney Newberry in
2014; (10) Raymond Bright in 2017; (11) Keith Collins in 2018; and (12) James
Jackson in 2018. (2nd Succ. PC at 40). The study concluded that death
disqualification keeps a “sizable proportion of citizens of color off capital juries.”
Racialized Impacts at 8. The study also concluded that “people of color are
systematically removed” from the venire due to the “cumulative effects” of death
disqualification, for-cause challenges, and peremptory challenges. The study also
considered disqualification of capital prospective jurors based on gender. The study
stated that two-thirds of black women were excluded due to the combination of death
disqualification and peremptory challenges.
11
Retired Professor Radelet of the University of Colorado at Boulder reviewed
Professor Gau’s study in a letter dated January 22, 2023, at the request of the federal
Capital Habeas Unit of the Northern District of Florida (CHU-N). (2nd Succ. PC at
52-54). Professor Radelet compared the 12 jury selections in the study to Sparre’s
particular jury selection. He noted that, according to the study, whites were 65.3% of
the jury pool but 45.5% of death disqualifications in the 12 capital jury selections and
blacks were 25.8% of the jury pool but 39.3% of death disqualifications in the jury
selections. So, 33.8% of black prospective jurors were death disqualified but only
15.5% of white prospective jurors were death disqualified. (2nd Succ. PC at 53). In
Sparre’s jury selection, 26.7% of black prospective jurors were death disqualified but
only 17.7% of white prospective jurors were death disqualified. In Sparre’s case,
28.6% of black prospective jurors were peremptorily challenged by the prosecution
but only 11.8% of white prospective jurors were peremptorily challenged by the
prosecution. Professor Radelet concluded that racial difference in the prosecution’s
use of peremptory challenges was “much stronger” in Sparre's jury selection than in
the Gau study. (2nd Succ. PC at 53). Of the ten qualified black women prospective
jurors in Sparre’s case, four were death disqualified and three were peremptorily
challenged by the prosecution. So, 70% of black women prospective jurors were
ultimately removed from Sparre's petit jury. Professor Radelet concluded that
Sparre’s jury selection was “consistent” with the Gau study. (2nd Succ. PC at 54).5
5 The State, in its answer brief filed in the Florida Supreme Court, explained this
factual background of the Gau study, the findings of the Gau study, and provided a
12
On March 10, 2023, the State filed an answer to the second successive
postconviction motion asserting that the three claims were as not cognizable as newly
discovered evidence, untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless as a matter of law.
(2nd Succ. PC at 105-128). The second successive postconviction litigation was stayed
by the lower court awaiting the return of jurisdiction from the Florida Supreme Court
which was deciding the appeal of the first successive postconviction motion. (2nd
Succ. PC at 167-168). On August 9, 2024, the State filed a notice of return of
jurisdiction to the lower court. (2nd Succ. PC at 182-188). The postconviction court
lifted the stay and then summarily denied the second successive postconviction
motion. (2nd Succ. PC at 189-191).
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the summary denial of the
second successive postconviction motion regarding the Gua study. Sparre v. State,
426 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 2025) (SC2024-1512).
On April 27, 2026, Sparre, represented by CCRC-N, filed a petition for writ of
certiorari in this Court raising two questions.
description of Professor Radelet’s letter. Sparre v. State, SC2024-1512 AB at 3-5.
13
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
QUESTION 1
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the
Florida Supreme Court affirming the denial of a successive
postconviction Eighth Amendment claim based on a study of
jury selection in capital cases which was denied, in part, based
on two different adequate and independent state law grounds.
Sparre seeks review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision rejecting his
Eighth Amendment challenge to jury selection in capital cases based on a study
purporting to demonstrate that death qualification of capital juries and the
prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges disproportionally excludes nonwhite
prospective jurors. Pet. at 9. He asserts that death qualifying capital juries violates
the Eighth Amendment’s evolving standard of decency under Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958). But this Court lacks jurisdiction over this question due to the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision being based on independent and adequate state law
grounds. The Florida Supreme Court found the claim untimely based on a Florida
rule of court and also found the claim to be procedurally barred based on Florida case
law. Therefore, there are two independent and adequate state law grounds that bar
review of this question. So, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the question twice over.
Alternatively, there is no conflict with this Court’s jurisprudence. Nor is there any
conflict with the federal circuit courts or the state courts of last resort. Indeed, the
Florida Supreme Court explicitly joined the Fifth Circuit in concluding the right to
an impartial jury is grounded in the Sixth Amendment, not in the Eighth
Amendment. Therefore, review of this question should be denied.
14
The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision
The Florida Supreme Court explained that Sparre raised three constitutional
claims under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article
I of the Florida Constitution in his successive postconviction motion, relying on an
unpublished report, the Gau Study, which analyzed data from 12 capital cases in
Duval County from 2010 to 2018, including his case. Sparre v. State, 426 So. 3d 1247,
1250 & n.4 (Fla. 2025) (citing Jacinta M. Gau, Racialized Impacts of Death
Disqualification in Duval County, Florida (2021)). The Gau study purported to show
that those Duval County juries were not drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community. Sparre, 426 So. 3d at 1250. The Florida Supreme Court noted the state
postconviction court summarily denied the three claims “finding them to be untimely
and meritless.” Id. at 1250.
The Florida Supreme Court explained that it will affirm a lower court’s summary
denial of a postconviction claim when the claim is not raised within Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.851’s “one-year time limit and does not establish one of the rule’s
timeliness exceptions.” Sparre, 426 So. 3d at 1250 (citing Hutchinson v. State, 408 So.
3d 752, 754 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1980 (2025)). The Court then noted that “Sparre
filed his second successive motion well beyond rule 3.851’s one-year time limit.” Sparre,
426 So. 3d at 1251. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Sparre’s argument that the Gau
Study was newly discovered evidence under Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A), because the Court had
“repeatedly held that new reports or studies, based on previously available information,
do not meet the timeliness exception for newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 1251 (citing
15
Hutchinson, 408 So. 3d at 754; Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 99 (Fla. 2023); Sliney v.
State, 362 So. 3d 186, 189 (Fla. 2023); Melton v. State, 367 So. 3d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 2023)).
The Court noted that the Gau study was based on jury selections in capital trials
spanning from 2010 to 2018. Sparre, 426 So. 3d at 1251. So, the underlying factual basis
for the study was available “several years” before Sparre filed the Eighth Amendment
claim. Id. at 1251. The claim was “untimely” and could not be considered under Florida’s
rules of court. Id. at 1251 (citing “Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2) (barring consideration of
untimely successive claims).”).
Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court found all three successive postconviction
claims to be procedurally barred. Sparre, 426 So. 3d at 1251. The Court noted that it
had “long held” that capital defendants were barred from asserting claims that could
have been raised on direct appeal or in earlier postconviction proceedings, including
“jury-related claims.” Id. at 1251 (citing Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d 994, 1014 (Fla.
2006); Bates v. State, 3 So. 3d 1091, 1104 (Fla. 2009); Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d
1167, 1186 (Fla. 2022)). The Court saw “no reason why Sparre could not have raised
his jury-composition claims on direct appeal or in his prior postconviction motions.” Id. at
1251-52.
Alternatively, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the Eighth Amendment claim
on the merits. The Court observed that Sparre did not cite to any case “where the Eighth
Amendment has been applied in the jury-representativeness context.” Sparre, 426 So.
3d at 1252. And the Florida Supreme Court stated that it was unaware of any such case.
The Court then agreed with the Fifth Circuit that “empaneling an impartial jury is
16
grounded in the Sixth Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1252-53
(citing United States v. Sanders, 133 F.4th 341, 376 (5th Cir. 2025)). In a footnote, the
Florida Supreme Court rejected any implicit invitation to recognize a new Eighth
Amendment right to jury selection, reasoning that the state constitution’s conformity
clause prohibited the Court from doing so. Sparre, 426 So. 3d at 1253, n.8 (citing Ford v.
State, 402 So. 3d 973, 978-79 (Fla.), cert. denied, Ford v. Florida, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025).
State Law Grounds and Jurisdiction
This Court has explained that if the state court decision indicates clearly that the
decision is alternatively based on a “separate, adequate, and independent” state law
ground, this Court “will not undertake to review the decision.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1041 (1983). This Court’s jurisdiction “fails,” if the non-federal ground is
independent and adequate to support the judgment. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038, n.4; see also
Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 497 (2016) (noting this Court “lacks jurisdiction to
entertain a federal claim on review of a state court judgment “if that judgment rests on a
state law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an
‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision” quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989)).
The “independent and adequate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional.” Glossip v.
Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 242 (2025). A state court’s decision is independent if it does not
“depend on a federal holding” and is “not intertwined with questions of federal law.” Id. at
242.
Whether a successive postconviction claim regarding jury selection, filed in state
court under a state rule of court, is untimely is solely a state law ground. The Florida
17
Supreme Court found the entire motion untimely because the “underlying factual basis”
for the Gau study was available “several years” before Sparre filed the motion. Sparre,
426 So. 3d at 1251. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court’s entire timeliness analysis was
based on a subsection of the state rule of court that governed the motion. Id. at 1251 (citing
Fla. R. Crim P. 3.851(e)(2)). It was not intertwined with any federal question. The time
bar found by the Florida Supreme Court in this case is an independent and adequate state
law ground. Consequentially, this Court’s review of the first question is precluded. Walker
v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 315 (2011).
And whether a successive postconviction claim regarding jury selection, filed in
state court, under a state rule of court, is procedurally barred is also solely a state law
ground. The Florida Supreme Court cited only their own prior precedent in support of
their conclusion that the “jury-related claims” raised in the successive postconviction
motion could have been raised earlier in the direct appeal or in prior postconviction
proceedings. Sparre, 426 So. 3d at 1251. That conclusion was not intertwined with any
federal question. The procedural bar found by the Florida Supreme Court in this case is
an independent and adequate state law ground precluding this Court’s review.
There are two different independent and adequate state law grounds. So, this Court
lacks jurisdiction over this question twice over.
The Eighth Amendment and Jury Selection
The Eighth Amendment does not contain a fair cross-section requirement. It is
the Sixth Amendment that contains a fair cross-section requirement. And that
requirement only applies to the venire, not to the petit jury. As the Florida Supreme
18
Court explained, Sparre’s argument that his actual jury was required to represent a
fair cross-section of the community was “wrong” because it improperly focused on
the “composition and representativeness of the actual jury that tried him—not the
pool from which that jury was chosen.” Sparre, 426 So. 3d at 1252 (citing Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990)). This Court
has repeatedly emphasized that the fair cross-section requirement does not
guarantee that the actual jury—the petit jury—will mirror the community. Taylor,
419 U.S. at 538 (explaining that while jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires
from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in
the community, the petit juries actually chosen need not mirror the community and
reflect the various distinctive groups in the population); Holland, 493 U.S. at 482-83
(noting this Court has never invoked the fair cross-section requirement “to require
petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the
community at large” and have imposed “no requirement that petit juries actually
chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the
population).
In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986), this Court rejected a faircross-section challenge to death qualification of capital juries, noting this Court had
“never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate the use of either forcause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as
opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at
19
large.” Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). This Court explained that the “limited scope
of the fair-cross-section requirement is a direct and inevitable consequence of the
practical impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly
‘representative’ petit jury.” McCree, 476 U.S. at 173–74. The cross-section
requirement applies to the jury pool, not to the final jury and is limited to the Sixth
Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.6
The Gau study does not undermine the practice of death qualifying capital
juries. This Court has explained that studies that do not account for “nullifiers” are
“fatally flawed.” Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 172 (1986). “Nullifiers” are
prospective jurors who, “because of their deep-seated opposition to the death penalty,
would be unable to decide a capital defendant's guilt or innocence fairly and
impartially.” Id. at 172. McCree conceded that nullifiers were properly removed from
the jury. The McCree Court alternatively assumed that the studies that showed
death qualified juries were more prone to convict were sound, but then directly held
that “nonetheless, that the Constitution does not prohibit the States from death
qualifying juries in capital cases.” Id. at 173.
Sparre is asserting, based on Trop, that he is entitled to have nullifiers on his
6 It is also worth noting that Sparre’s argument, although meritless by precedent,
relies on an expansive and questionable interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment is concerned with the punishment imposed--the sentence-and not the process by which it is derived. See City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson,
603 U.S. 520, 542–43 (2024).
20
jury, if the nullifiers are persons of color. In other words, he seeks to have courts to
engage in affirmative action in the death qualification of capital juries in the name
of an evolving standard of decency. But there is no support in this Court’s
jurisprudence for his position.
No Conflict with this Court’s Jurisprudence
There is no conflict between this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence or
its fair cross-section jurisprudence and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this
case. Sup. Ct. R. l0(b) (listing conflict with this Court as a consideration in the
decision to grant review).
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision that the Eighth Amendment does not
apply to jury selection or to the death qualification of a capital jury does not conflict
with this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. This Court has never read Trop
as prohibiting death qualification of a capital jury or to be in conflict with its Sixth
Amendment right-to-an-impartial-jury jurisprudence, such as McCree.
And the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that the fair cross section
requirement does not apply to the final, petit jury is in complete accord with this
Court’s holdings. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357 (1979); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474 (1990). The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case tracks both the holding
and reasoning of this Court in McCree. There is no conflict between this Court and
the Florida Supreme Court.
21
No Conflict with Other Appellate Courts
Nor is there any conflict with either the federal circuit courts of appeals or the
state courts of last resort and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case. As
this Court has observed, a principal purpose for certiorari jurisdiction “is to resolve
conflicts among the United States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the
meaning of provisions of federal law.” Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347
(1991); see also Sup. Ct. R. l0(b) (listing conflict among federal appellate courts and
state supreme courts as a consideration in the decision to grant review). Issues that
have not divided courts or are not important questions of federal law do not merit
this Court's attention. Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182,
184, n.3 (1987).
There is no conflict identified in the petition between any decision of any
federal circuit court and the Florida Supreme Court’s merits analysis of the Eighth
Amendment question. Petitioner cites no decision from any federal appellate court
holding jury selection in a capital case where prospective jurors were removed either
for cause by the judge based on their opposition to the death penalty or peremptorily
by the prosecutor based on their reservations about the death penalty is governed by
the Eighth Amendment, much less violates the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the
Florida Supreme Court explicitly joined the Fifth Circuit in concluding that the right
to an impartial jury is grounded in the Sixth Amendment, not in the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Sparre, 426 So. 3d at
1252-53 (adopting the reasoning of United States v. Sanders, 133 F.4th 341, 376 (5th Cir.
22
2025)). So, there is agreement between the Fifth Circuit and the Florida Supreme Court,
not conflict.
Nor is there any identified conflict between any decision of any other state
court of last resort and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision. Petitioner cites no
decision from any state supreme court holding that the practice of death qualifying a
jury in a capital case, where prospective jurors were removed either for cause by the
judge based on their opposition to the death penalty or removed peremptorily by the
prosecutor based on their reservations about the death penalty, is governed by the
Eighth Amendment. Nor does he identify any state supreme court case holding that
the practice of death qualification of capital juries violates the Eighth Amendment
under Trop.
In sum, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the first question due to the two
different independent and adequate state law grounds. Alternatively, because there
is no conflict with this Court or among lower appellate courts on the issue of the
Eighth Amendment applied to jury selection, review of this question should be
denied.7
In the questions presented section of the petition, Sparre identifies only two
questions being raised in the petition. The question raised in that section regarding
jury selection is based solely on the Eighth Amendment. In the body of the petition,
however, Sparre seems to be raising an additional issue based on the Sixth
Amendment. Pet. at 16. Raising a question within a question is improper under both
this Court’s rules and case law. Sup. Ct. R. 14.1.(a) (“Only the questions set out in the
petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court”); Izumi Seimitsu
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 28 (1993) (dismissing a
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the question was not presented
in the petition nor fairly included in the one question that was presented). There is a
7
23
QUESTION 2
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the
Florida Supreme Court rejecting a claim that a capital
defendant has a federal due process right to oral argument on
the issue of whether an evidentiary hearing should be held on
the claims raised in the successive postconviction motion.
Petitioner Sparre seeks review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision
rejecting a claim that a capital defendant has a federal due process right to present
an oral argument in the state trial court in addition to his written pleadings, in state
postconviction litigation. Pet. at 16. There is no federal due process right to make an
oral presentation in addition to written submissions. This Court lacks jurisdiction
“heavy presumption” against this Court venturing beyond the question actually
presented. Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 537 (1992). This Court only considers
questions not raised in the petition “in the most exceptional cases” and doing so in
this case will encourage the capital defense bar to hide questions within their
petitions. Id. at 28.
Nor is the Sixth Amendment question fairly included in the first question. The
Sixth Amendment issue is not fairly included within an Eighth Amendment issue,
even if based on the same set of facts, because there are two separate constitutional
provisions with significantly different analytical frameworks. Cf. Raulerson v.
Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 1005 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining a “claim” consists of a
“particular legal basis wedded to a specific factual foundation”) (emphasis in original).
The Sixth Amendment addresses an impartial jury but the Eighth Amendment, in
contrast, addresses cruel and unusual punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395 (1989) (explaining that because there was an explicit textual source for the
constitutional right, that specific constitutional provision governs, not a more general
constitutional provision); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 116 (2003)
(explaining the general Due Process Clause does not provide greater protection than
the explicit Double Jeopardy Clause does).
The State declines to address the Sixth Amendment question for that reason,
except to point out that the Sixth Amendment question is also untimely and
procedurally barred, according to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision. Sparre, 426
So. 3d at 1250-52. Like the Eighth Amendment question, there are two adequate and
independent bars to the Sixth Amendment question. This Court would lack
jurisdiction over the Sixth Amendment question, if it had been properly presented.
24
because the issue is solely a matter of state law. There is no conflict between this
Court’s due process jurisprudence and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this
case. There is also no conflict between the federal appellate courts or the state courts
of last resort and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case. Review of this
question should be denied.
The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue of the failure to hear
arguments on the postconviction motion in a footnote. Sparre v. State, 426 So. 3d
1247, 1250, n. 6 (Fla. 2025). The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that because the
meaning of the text of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(B) is clear, it
was error for the circuit court to sidestep the requirement of a hearing. Id. at n.6.
But the Court concluded the error was harmless. Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 260 So.
3d 151, 157-58 (Fla. 2018)).
Motion Hearings in
Florida Capital Postconviction Litigation
Florida has a specific rule of court governing postconviction litigation in capital
cases. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. The rule requires a state postconviction court to conduct
a case management conference shortly after the State files an answer to the
successive postconviction motion. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). Basically, Florida’s
rule of court provides for an oral presentation in the postconviction court in capital
cases to assist the judge in deciding which of the postconviction claims warrant an
evidentiary hearing. Such oral presentations are commonly referred to as Huff
hearings. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993); see, e.g., Craft v. State, 427 So. 3d
25
486, 491 (Fla. 2024) (noting “the circuit court conducted a Huff hearing to determine
whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary to address any of the claims raised in
Craft’s motion”). The Florida Supreme Court in Huff held that because of the
“severity of punishment,” a state postconviction court “must allow the attorneys the
opportunity to appear before the court and be heard” for “the purpose of determining
whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to
the motion.” Huff, 622 So. 2d at 983. Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) is codification of the holding
of Huff.8
The Florida Supreme Court, however, has routinely held that the failure to
hold a Huff hearing in successive postconviction litigation is harmless error. Rivera
v. State, 260 So. 3d 920, 926 (Fla. 2018) (noting the Court has “repeatedly emphasized
that the failure to hold a Huff hearing on legally insufficient or meritless successive
postconviction motions is harmless error”). The Florida Supreme Court in this case
8 Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B), provides:
Successive Postconviction Motion. Within 30 days after the state files its
answer to a successive motion for postconviction relief, the trial court
must hold a case management conference. At the case management
conference, the trial court also must determine whether an evidentiary
hearing should be held and hear argument on any purely legal claims
not based on disputed facts. If the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, the motion
may be denied without an evidentiary hearing. If the trial court
determines that an evidentiary hearing should be held, the court must
schedule the hearing to be held within 90 days. If a death warrant has
been signed, the trial court must expedite these time periods in
accordance with subdivision (h) of this rule.
26
once again held the error in failing to hold a Huff hearing was harmless. Sparre, 426
So. 3d at 1250, n. 6. But the requirement of holding an oral argument in capital
postconviction litigation is purely a matter of state law, not a federal due process
issue.
Federal Due Process and Oral Arguments
The essence of due process is fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (stating
that Due Process requires notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case). But being heard solely in writing fully comports with federal due
process. This Court stated long ago that the “Constitution does not require oral
argument in all cases.” Fed. Communications Comm'n v. WJR, The Goodwill
Station, 337 U.S. 265, 276 (1949). Indeed, on occasion, this Court decides cases
without oral argument. See, e.g., Klein v. Martin, 146 S. Ct. 589 (2026) (reversing
the grant of habeas relief without benefit of an oral argument).
The Due Process Clause does not mandate oral presentations in addition to
written submissions. Most state and federal courts decide the majority of direct
criminal appeals without conducting any oral argument. Pierre H Bergeron, Covid19, Zoom, and Appellate Oral Argument: Is the Future Virtual?, 21 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 193, 196, n.8 (2021) (noting that oral arguments are conducted in only 20%
of the cases in the federal appellate courts). The vast majority of appeals are decided
based on the written briefs alone.
Sparre was permitted to raise his successive postconviction claims in writing
27
which is sufficient to satisfy due process. Opposing counsel had numerous
opportunities to be heard in writing in the state postconviction court regarding the
three claims raised in the second successive postconviction motion. Sparre was not
denied due process by not being able to make an additional oral presentation.
In his brief to the Florida Supreme Court, Sparre asserted that the state trial
court violated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(B) by not conducting a
hearing to allow him to make an oral presentation on the issue of whether an
evidentiary hearing should be held on any of the claims raised in his successive
postconviction motion. Sparre, No. 2024-1514 IB at 6-13. He, alternatively, and
merely in passing, asserted a violation of his “state and federal due process rights”
not to have the opportunity to argue the claims in person citing Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30 (1982), and Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985).
IB at 6, 11-12. Sparre again relies on Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
429-30 (1982), and Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985), in his petition to this
Court. Pet. at 19.
Neither case, however, stands for the proposition that oral presentations are
mandated by the Due Process Clause. Logan was an employment law case that
observed that the Due Process Clause prevents States from denying litigants use of
established adjudicatory procedures, when it amounts to a denial of an opportunity
to be heard. Logan, 455 U.S. at 429–30 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
380 (1971)). Under Logan, even viewing a Huff hearing as part of Florida’s
“established adjudicatory procedures” in successive postconviction motions in capital
28
cases, Sparre was not denied the “opportunity to be heard” in writing. And Lucey
held a criminal defendant who has a federal due process right to effective assistance
of appellate counsel. While both Logan and Lucey were due process cases, neither
concerned the right to make oral presentations in addition to filing written
pleadings. Neither Logan nor Lucey overruled, or even mentioned in passing, this
Court’s decision in Goodwill Station.
There is no federal due process right to an oral argument and certainly no right
to one in state successive postconviction proceedings. Cf. Dist. Att’ys Office for Third
Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009) (explaining state postconviction
procedures are only required to comport with fundamental fairness under Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448 (1992)). It is not a violation of Medina for a state
to limit successive postconviction litigation to written presentations.
Solely a Matter of State Law
The requirement of holding a Huff hearing in Florida capital postconviction
litigation is purely a matter of state law, not a federal due process issue. Because
there is no federal due process right to an oral argument, the issue is solely a matter
of state law. This Court does not review matters of state law. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372
U.S. 633, 636 (1963) (dismissing as improvidently granted a writ of certiorari because
several of the questions were questions of Pennsylvania law, not questions of federal
law).
This Court lacks jurisdiction over issues that do not present a federal question.
28 U.S.C. § 1257; Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 309 (Scalia, J., concurring)
29
(noting § 1257 imposes a federal question requirement as a condition of this Court’s
appellate jurisdiction). There is no federal question being raised and therefore, this
Court lacks jurisdiction over the second question.
No Conflict with this Court’s Jurisprudence
There is no conflict between this Court’s Due Process jurisprudence and the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case. Sup. Ct. R. l0(c) (listing conflict with
this Court as a consideration in the decision to grant review). Sparre does not
identify any decision from this Court even hinting, much less holding, that the
federal due process clause mandates oral argument or oral presentations. Sparre
certainly cannot point to any decision from this Court that requires an oral
presentation be held in state successive postconviction litigation in the trial court
regarding whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted to further develop the
successive postconviction claim. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not
conflict with any due process decision from this Court. There is no conflict between
this Court’s due process jurisprudence and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in
this case.
No Conflict with Other Appellate Courts
There is also no conflict with either the federal circuit courts or the state courts
of last resort and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case. As this Court
has observed, a principal purpose for certiorari jurisdiction “is to resolve conflicts
among the United States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the meaning
of provisions of federal law.” Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991); see
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also Sup. Ct. R. l0(b) (listing conflict among federal appellate courts and state
supreme courts as a consideration in the decision to grant review). Issues that have
not divided courts or are not important questions of federal law do not merit this
Court's attention. Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182, 184,
n.3 (1987).
The federal circuit courts simply follow Goodwill Station and hold that due
process does not require an oral presentation in addition to the written pleadings.9
Petitioner cites no decision from any federal appellate court holding the federal due
process clause requires an oral argument be held, even in the context of a direct
appeal, much less in the context of a successive postconviction motion. There is no
identified conflict between any decision of any federal circuit court and the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the federal due process challenge to the summary
9 See, e.g., Poole v. USCIS Pittsburgh Field Off., 2024 WL 3439777, at *1 (3d Cir. July
17, 2024) (explaining that because the plaintiff had the opportunity to present his
claims in his complaint in the lower court, the lack of oral argument did not deny him
due process quoting Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. at 276), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 598
(Nov. 25, 2024); Zaluski v. I.N.S., 37 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the denial
of an oral argument in an immigration appeal is not a denial of due process citing
Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. at 276); George W. Bennett Bryson & Co., Ltd. v. Norton
Lilly & Co., Inc., 502 F.2d 1045, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting an argument that
deciding an appeal without holding an oral argument is a violation of due process
citing Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. at 275, noting the determination as to whether to
have oral argument is made only after the panel has received the briefs and observing
that oral argument is “not always helpful”). That is also true of oral presentations in
the federal district courts. Berger v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., 765 Fed. Appx. 699,
703 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding the District Court violated his due process rights by
dismissing his complaint without oral argument, explaining that the right to be heard
in the context of a motion to dismiss is satisfied where the plaintiff receives the
“opportunity to present legal arguments either orally, in writing, or both” citing
Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. at 276).
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denial of his successive postconviction motion without permitting an oral
presentation first. There is no conflict between the federal circuit courts and the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision.
There is also no identified conflict between any decision of any other state court
of last resort and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision. Petitioner cites no decision
from any state supreme court holding the federal due process clause requires an oral
argument be held regarding a successive postconviction motion. There is no conflict
between the other state supreme courts and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.
In sum, because the question involves an inadequate and independent state
law ground regarding Florida’s rules of court over which this Court lacks jurisdiction
and because there is no conflict among the courts on the question, review of the
second question should also be denied.
Accordingly, the petition should be denied.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
JAMES UTHMEIER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA
/S/ SCOTT A. BROWNE
SCOTT A. BROWNE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
Office of the Attorney General
3507 E. Frontage Rd., Ste. 200
Tampa, Florida 33607
Telephone: (813) 287-7900
scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
CHARMAINE MILLSAPS
Special Counsel, Asst. Attorney General
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.