Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Frederick Siou Beaufort, Petitioner v. United States

No. __________

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

FREDERICK SIOU BEAUFORT,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Taylor D. Gilliam

Assistant Federal Public Defender

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE

1901 Assembly Street, Suite 200

Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Telephone: 803-765-5085

Email: Taylor_Gilliam@fd.org

Counsel of Record for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Is the lifetime ban on possession of firearms by all felons, codified at 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1), plainly unconstitutional on its face under New York State Rifle & Pistol

Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)?

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The Petitioner is Frederick Siou Beaufort. The Respondent is the United

States of America.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States v. Beaufort, No. 3:24-cr-00406-MGL, United States District

Court for the District of South Carolina. Judgment entered June 16, 2025.

United States v. Beaufort, No. 25-4358, United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered January 26, 2026.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ............................................................................ ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS.......................................................................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... v

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................................................................ 1

OPINION BELOW......................................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED .......................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ............................................................ 3

I.

Simple application of Bruen’s historical-tradition test makes clear that

§ 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on possession of firearms for all felons does not

withstand constitutional scrutiny...................................................................... 4

A.

Bruen represented a fundamental shift in Second Amendment analysis. .. 4

B.

The government cannot show a historical tradition of categorically

disarming felons. ............................................................................................ 6

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 16

APPENDIX:

Unpublished Opinion of

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Entered January 26, 2026 ................................................................................A1

Judgment of

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Entered January 26, 2026 ................................................................................A5

iii

Judgment in a Criminal Case of

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina

Entered June 16, 2025 ......................................................................................A6

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).................................................. 4, 7, 9

Jennings v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1878) ...................................... 13

Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) ......................................................... 3, 10

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) ........................................................ 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) ................................................... 4, 6

United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) ............................................... 5

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) ........................................ 4, 8, 11, 13, 14

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) ............................................................. 4

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)............................................ 7

Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442

(2008) .......................................................................................................................... 4

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ............................................................................................... i, 2, 4

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) ...................................................................................................... 8

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................................................................ 1

Act of Feb. 16, 1787, ch. VI, 1787 Mass. Acts 555 ...................................................... 12

1 Wm. & Mary c. 15 (1688) .......................................................................................... 11

U.S. Const. amend. II .................................................... 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14

Other Authorities

Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1551 (2009) ......................... 10

C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub.

Policy 695 (2009) ...................................................................................................... 11

v

Dru Stevenson, In Defense of Felon-in-Possession Laws, 43 Cardozo L. Rev. 1573

(2022) ........................................................................................................................ 14

Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Historical Justification for Prohibiting Dangerous

Persons from Possessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249 (2020) ............................ 11, 12

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Garland v. Range, 144 S. Ct. 2706 (2024) (No. 23374) ........................................................................................................................... 15

Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms

in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 Law & Hist.

Rev. 139 (2007) ......................................................................................................... 12

Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People

with Felony Records in the United States, 1948-2010, 54 Demography 1795 (2017)

................................................................................................................................... 14

Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 28 Op. O.L.C. 126

(2004) ........................................................................................................................ 13

vi

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Frederick Siou Beaufort, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari

issues to review the opinion and judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit in Case No. 25-4358, entered on January 26, 2026.

OPINION BELOW

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished per curiam opinion can be found at United

States v. Beaufort, No. 25-4358 (January 26, 2026), ECF No. 31, and is set forth at

App. A5.

JURISDICTION

The Fourth Circuit issued its opinion and entered its judgment on January 26,

2026. Mr. Beaufort did not seek rehearing. Jurisdiction of this Court is pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,

the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 922(g)(1), states in relevant part:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; …

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or

affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any

firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in

interstate or foreign commerce.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 12, 2025, Frederick Beaufort pleaded guilty to one count of possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). As part of his

guilty plea, Mr. Beaufort admitted that on September 3, 2023, he possessed a

handgun, and that at that time, he knew he had previously been convicted of a

qualifying felony offense.

The district court sentenced Mr. Beaufort to 27 months’ imprisonment and

three years of supervised release. A written judgment was entered on July 16, 2025,

and Mr. Beaufort filed a timely notice of appeal on June 26, 2025.

On appeal, Mr. Beaufort challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1)—both facially and as-applied—after Bruen. He also assigned error, both

procedural and substantive, to his sentence.

On January 26, 2026, the Fourth Circuit issued an unpublished opinion

affirming. This petition follows.

2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court should grant a writ of certiorari in Mr. Beaufort’s case, or

alternatively, grant certiorari in another case raising the same issues and hold Mr.

Beaufort’s petition pending a resolution of the important question regarding the

facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

In Bruen, this Court established a new framework for determining whether a

firearm regulation is constitutional under the Second Amendment, eliminating the

two-step history and means-end scrutiny test that the Fourth and other Circuits had

previously used to analyze Second Amendment challenges.

Specifically, Bruen

abolished the second step, as “a constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’

assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.” Bruen, 597 U.S.

at 23 (quotations omitted).

Under Bruen, the government must prove that § 922(g)(1) is consistent with

this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. As one Justice has noted,

there is no relevantly similar historical tradition of a lifelong prohibition on the

possession of firearms by felons. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 458 (7th Cir. 2019)

(Barrett, J., dissenting), abrogated by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1.

Thus, § 922(g)(1) is

unconstitutional on its face. This result is dictated by the application of Bruen. The

Fourth Circuit was wrong to hold that Bruen does not compel this straightforward

result. Therefore, Mr. Beaufort’s § 922(g)(1) conviction should be reversed.

3

I.

Simple application of Bruen’s historical-tradition test makes clear

that § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on possession of firearms for all felons

does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Beaufort challenges the facial validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in the “still-

developing” area of Second Amendment jurisprudence, a field that remains “in the

relatively early innings.”

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 736 (2024)

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

A statute is facially unconstitutional when the

challenger has “‘establish[ed] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act

would be valid,’ i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.”

Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449

(2008) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).

A.

Bruen represented a fundamental shift in Second Amendment

analysis.

The Second Amendment to the Constitution mandates that a “well-regulated

militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep

and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II.

The Second

Amendment codifies an individual right to possess and carry weapons, as the

inherent right of self-defense is central to its protections. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767

(2010) (“individual self-defense is the central component of the Second Amendment

right”).

Following Heller, the Fourth Circuit and others used a two-step test to analyze

Second Amendment challenges. For example, the Fourth Circuit first looked to

“whether the challenged law impose[d] a burden on conduct falling within . . . the

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Second Amendment’s guarantee,” and, if it did, then applied means-end scrutiny.

See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation

omitted).

In Bruen, this Court expressly abrogated this two-step inquiry and announced

a new framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges. A two-part test was

expounded for courts to use to determine the constitutionality of laws regulating

Second Amendment conduct:

When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's

conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The

government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is

consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Only then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls

outside the Second Amendment's unqualified command.

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24 (cleaned up).

As in Heller, this test “requires courts to assess whether modern firearms

regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment's text and historical

understanding.” Id. at 26. Courts are to “consider whether historical precedent . . .

evinces a comparable tradition of regulation.” Id. at 27 (cleaned up). If “no such

tradition” exists, the challenged statute is unconstitutional. Id.

Bruen recognized that the historical comparison is sometimes straightforward,

but, at other times, requires “a more nuanced approach.” Id. at 27. Bruen identified

at least two features from the Supreme Court’s prior case law “that render

regulations relevantly similar under the Second Amendment.” Id. at 29. The how and

why of regulations burdening “a law-abiding citizen's right to armed self-defense” are

central considerations. Id. “[W]hether modern and historical regulations impose a

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comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is

comparably justified are central considerations when engaging in an analogical

inquiry.” Id. (cleaned up).

While the Court reasoned that “[s]tep one of the predominant framework is

broadly consistent with Heller,” “Heller and McDonald do not support applying

means-end scrutiny in the Second Amendment context.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19.

“[W]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the

Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. at 17. Upon such a finding,

the government must justify its regulation by “demonstrating that it is consistent

with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 24. Only if the

government makes such a showing may a court “conclude that the individual’s

conduct falls outside of the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’” Id. (citation

omitted).

In other words, for a firearm regulation to be constitutional, “the

government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the

historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.”

Id. at 19.

B.

The government cannot show

categorically disarming felons.

a

historical

tradition

of

Straightforward application of Bruen’s test establishes that § 922(g)(1) is not

constitutional on its face. The Fourth Circuit was wrong to hold otherwise.

1.

The text of the Second Amendment covers Mr. Beaufort’s

conduct, as he is among “the people” the Amendment

protects.

6

The plain text of the Second Amendment protects the right to possess and carry

weapons for self-defense. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 583-92. Bruen reiterated that this

right extends outside of the home. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 8. Because § 922(g)(1) is a

permanent and complete ban on any firearm possession by felons in any context, the

statute regulates conduct that is presumptively protected under the plain text of the

Second Amendment. As a result, § 922(g)(1) is presumptively unconstitutional under

Bruen. Id. at 24.

The plain text of the Second Amendment and this Court’s precedent establish

that a person’s status as a “felon” does not exclude that person from Second

Amendment protections. In Heller, this Court rejected the theory that “the people”

protected by the Second Amendment was limited to a specific subset of individuals—

i.e., those in a militia. 554 U.S. at 579-81. When the Constitution refers to “‘the

people,’ the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community,”

and there is a “strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised

individually and belongs to all Americans.” Id. at 580-81 (emphasis added). None of

the amendments which reference “the people” discussed in Heller make exceptions

therefrom, including for a subgroup of “felons.” If a person with a felony conviction

is one of “the people” protected by the First and Fourth Amendments, Heller teaches

that he must also be one of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. See

Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,

265 (1990)).

7

This view is confirmed in this Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602

U.S. 680 (2024). There, the Court analyzed historical laws dealing with certain

dangerous persons to find that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is consistent with historical

tradition and therefore constitutional. Id. at 694-98. The Court never suggested

Rahimi was not one of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. Accordingly,

Mr. Beaufort must also be among “the people” to whom the Second Amendment

applies.

2.

There is no relevantly similar historical regulation that

bans firearm possession for life.

Bruen provided guidance for conducting historical analyses of regulations

relating to the Second Amendment.

Courts must examine “whether ‘historical

precedent’ from before, during, and even after the founding evinces a comparable

tradition of regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27. Importantly, “not all history is created

equal.” Id. at 34. That is because “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope

they were understood to have when the people adopted them.” Id. (quotations

omitted). Historical evidence pre-dating the ratification of the Second Amendment

“may not illuminate the scope of the right if linguistic or legal conventions changed

in the intervening years.” Id. Similarly, post-ratification laws that “are inconsistent

with the original meaning of the constitutional text obviously cannot overcome or

alter that text.” Id. at 36 (quotations and emphasis omitted).

Additionally, “[a] court must ascertain whether the new law is ‘relevantly

similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, ‘apply[ing] faithfully the

balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.’” Rahimi, 602

8

U.S. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29).

In doing so, “[w]hy and how the

regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry.” Id. Thus, “if laws at the

founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong

indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons

fall within a permissible category of regulations.” Id. However, “[e]ven when a law

regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, . . . it may not be compatible with

the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding.” Id. The

burden thus falls squarely on the government to “affirmatively prove that its firearms

regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right

to keep and bear arms.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19. If the government cannot do so, the

regulation is unconstitutional.

In Heller, this Court confirmed an individual’s right to keep and bear arms but

cautioned that this right is “not unlimited.” 554 U.S. at 626. As an example, the

Court provided, in dicta, a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful regulatory

measures” which had not yet undergone a full historical analysis. Id. at 627 n.26

(emphasis added). This list included laws restricting firearm possession by felons

and the mentally ill and the carrying of firearms in “sensitive places.” Id. at 626.

However, Heller indicated there would be “time enough to expound upon the

historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those

exceptions come before us.” Id.

9

That time is now for § 922(g)(1). Simply put, there is no “relevantly similar”

historical tradition in the United States of the total and permanent disarmament of

individuals simply based upon a felony conviction.

Under Bruen’s test, a court must examine relevant historical periods to

determine whether there is an “historical analogue” to the total, permanent

disarmament of felons contained in § 922(g)(1). As established in Bruen, the relevant

historical period for examination would be “(1) . . . early modern England; (2) the

American Colonies and the early Republic; (3) antebellum America; [and] (4)

Reconstruction.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 34.

A fulsome review of these historical periods evinces a lack of relevant evidence

of any analogue to the total, permanent disarmament contained in § 922(g)(1).

Notably, neither the federal government nor a single state barred all people convicted

of felonies from possessing firearms until the twentieth century. See, e.g., Adam

Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1551, 1563 (2009). The modern

version of § 922(g)(1) was adopted 147 years after the ratification of the Second

Amendment. Congress’s twentieth amendment decision to pass § 922(g)(1) therefore

fails to offer support for the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). Bruen, 597 U.S. at 66

n.28 (“[L]ate-19th-century evidence” and any “20th-century evidence . . . does not

provide insight into the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts

earlier evidence.”).

English law, before the founding, did not impose lifetime bans on felons from

ever again possessing a firearm. See Kanter, 919 F.3d at 457 (Barrett, J., dissenting);

10

C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub.

Policy 695, 717 (2009); Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Historical Justification for

Prohibiting Dangerous Persons from Possessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249, 260

(2020). To the extent that England sought to disarm individuals, those regulations

usually required a more culpable mental state and made exceptions for self-defense.

Indeed, Rahimi discussed at length these types of regulations, found in surety laws

and laws against affray or going armed against the king’s subjects. See Rahimi, 602

U.S. at 694-98.

To the extent that England sought to disarm whole classes of subjects, it

permitted those targeted to keep arms for self-defense and individuals could cure the

disarmament. For example, in the age of William and Mary (both Protestants),

Catholics were presumed loyal to James II (a Catholic trying to retake the throne)

and treasonous. Thus, Catholics could keep “Arms, Weapons, Gunpowder, [and]

Ammunition,” if they declared allegiance to the crown and renounced key parts of

their faith. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 45 n.12 (quoting 1 Wm. & Mary c. 15, § 4, in 3

Eng. Stat. at Large 399 (1688)). In short, the English never sought to disarm all

felons. Rather, they limited the use of firearms by individuals deemed to be violent

and rebellious. And even those individuals could keep arms for self-defense. This is

not “relevantly similar” to the wholesale and permanent prohibition contained in

§ 922(g)(1).

To the extent the new nation sought to disarm people, the regulatory approach

in the Colonial and Founding era was much more limited than that contained in

11

§ 922(g)(1). For example, the Virginia colony (like the English) disarmed Catholics,

who were still viewed as traitors to the crown. Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation,

the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context

of the Second Amendment, 25 Law & Hist. Rev. 139, 157 (2007) (citation omitted).

But there was an exception for weapons allowed “for the defense of his house and

person[,]” and a person could absolve himself of the prohibition by taking an oath of

“undivided loyalty to the sovereign.” Id. Similarly, following the Declaration of

Independence, Pennsylvania ordered that those who did not pledge allegiance to the

Commonwealth and renounce British authority be disarmed. Id. at 159. Thus, to the

extent that either regulation would comport with the Second Amendment, as

understood today, they required a specific finding that a person posed a risk of

violence to the state, and these regulations provided an avenue for relief from the

prohibition.

Committing a serious crime at that time also did not result in permanent

disarmament.

For example, leaders of the Massachusetts Bay colony disarmed

supporters of a banished seditionist. Greenlee, supra, at 263 (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, “[s]ome supporters who confessed their sins were welcomed back into

the community and able to retain their arms.” Id. And in 1787, after participants in

Shay’s Rebellion attacked courthouses, a federal arsenal, and the Massachusetts

militia, they were barred from bearing arms, but for only three years. Id. at 268-67.

In fact, Massachusetts law required the Commonwealth to hold and then return the

rebels’ arms after that period. See Act of Feb. 16, 1787, ch. VI, 1787 Mass. Acts 555.

12

American gun regulation during the nineteenth century—before and after the

Civil War—also confirms that § 922(g)(1) does not comport with the “Nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 34. The United States

continued to regulate—but not ban—firearm possession by those feared to be violent.

See id. at 55 (nineteenth century surety laws allowed people likely to breach peace to

keep guns for self-defense or if posted bond). Again, this regulation is not similar to

§ 922(g)(1).

There are also at least two documented instances where attempts to disarm a

class of offenders were rejected as inconsistent with the right to bear arms. First, as

with Shay’s Rebellion, Congress declined to fully disarm individuals who were part

of militias in the former Confederacy, instead choosing simply to disband those

militias. See Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 28 Op.

O.L.C. 126, 226 (2004). This declination was based in part on the fear of some

lawmakers that “disarm[ing] the citizens from whom the militia was drawn . . . would

violate the Second Amendment.” Id.

Second, when a Texas law ordered the

disarmament of people convicted of unlawfully using a pistol, it was struck down as

unconstitutional under the Texas constitution. Jennings v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. App.

298, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1878).

In sum, § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime bar burdens the right to an extent beyond any

regulation of the founding era. Rahimi stressed that the disarmament provision

there at issue was “temporary,” lasting only “so long as the defendant ‘is’ subject to a

restraining order,” and thus burdening the right in a manner analogous to historical

13

“surety bonds of limited duration.” 602 U.S. at 699. The Court “conclude[d] only this:

An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of

another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” Id.

at 702 (emphasis added).

Again, “[w]hy and how the regulation burdens the right are central to the

inquiry.” Id. at 692. Section 922(g)(1) contains a lifetime prohibition on possession

of firearms by all convicted felons, without an individualized determination of

ongoing dangerousness.

Under Bruen’s required analysis, § 922(g)(1)’s total,

permanent disarmament of all felons is not constitutional

This issue is squarely preserved in Mr. Beaufort’s case, and there is no doubt

of the question’s magnitude: recent estimates of the number of individuals with felony

convictions range from 19 million to 24 million. See Dru Stevenson, In Defense of

Felon-in-Possession Laws, 43 Cardozo L. Rev. 1573, 1591 (2022); Sarah K.S. Shannon

et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony Records in

the United States, 1948-2010, 54 Demography 1795, 1807 (2017).

This Court should hear Mr. Beaufort’s case. Alternatively, this Court should

hold Mr. Beaufort’s petition pending consideration of one of the many other petitions

that will place these same issues before this Court.

Courts “are currently at sea when it comes to evaluating firearms legislation[,]”

and are in “need [of] a solid anchor for grounding their constitutional

pronouncements.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 747 (Jackson, J., concurring). Despite serious

concerns as to § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality, the statute continues to result in the

14

imprisonment of thousands of American citizens each year. See Petition for Writ of

Certiorari at 22-24, Garland v. Range, 144 S. Ct. 2706 (2024) (No. 23-374) (citing

statistics demonstrating that § 922(g)(1) is the most frequently applied provision of

Section 922(g)). Only this Court can definitively settle this question.

15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari. In the alternative, Mr. Beaufort’s petition should be held pending other

petitions if this Court anticipates that it may grant a writ of certiorari on the issues

raised herein.

Respectfully submitted,

s/Taylor D. Gilliam

Taylor D. Gilliam

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Federal Public Defender’s Office

1901 Assembly Street, Suite 200

Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Telephone: 803.765.5085

Email: Taylor_Gilliam@fd.org

Counsel of Record for Petitioner

Columbia, South Carolina

April 24, 2026

16