Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Douglas M. Folts, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefDec 17, 2025

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No. ______

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

DOUGLAS M. FOLTS; MARK A. PULLEY,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

__________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces

__________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________

TERRI R. ZIMMERMANN

Zimmermann &

Zimmermann, PLLC

PO Box 3699

Conroe, TX 77305

TREVOR N. WARD

Counsel of Record

SAMANTHA M. CASTANIEN

United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Division

1500 West Perimeter Road

Suite 1100

JB Andrews, MD 20762

(240) 612-4770

trevor.ward.1@us.af.mil

Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

The free speech guarantee of the First Amendment

applies to servicemembers. This guarantee is limited

by military law and tradition. Part of that law and

tradition is that military courts use this Court’s free

speech jurisprudence when deciding the scope of the

free speech guarantee for servicemembers. Despite

this, military courts continue to rely on an outdated,

abrogated obscenity standard that this Court has

rejected.

The question presented is:

Whether the military’s obscenity standard is

unconstitutional under Parker v. Levy and Miller v.

California.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

This Rule 12.4 petition consolidates direct appeals

from two servicemembers convicted by courts-martial.

Petitioners are Technical Sergeant Douglas M. Folts

and Staff Sergeant Mark A. Pulley. Respondent in

both cases is the United States.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No nongovernmental corporations are parties to

this proceeding.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Other than the direct appeals that form the basis

for this petition, there are no related proceedings for

the purposes of Rule 14.1(b)(iii):

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .................................................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ...................................... ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.......................... ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ............................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................... vi

INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .......................... 2

OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................... 2

JURISDICTION ............................................................... 3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED ..................................................................... 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 4

I. Technical Sergeant Folts’s Case ........................... 4

II. Staff Sergeant Pulley’s Case ................................ 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....................... 8

I.

Military law and tradition require courts

to apply this Court’s jurisprudence when

adjudicating free speech claims. ........................ 9

A. Servicemembers have free speech rights, but

those rights are limited by military law and

tradition. ........................................................ 9

B. When assessing unprotected categories of

speech, military courts rely wholly on this

Court’s jurisprudence. ................................. 11

iv

II. The CAAF’s decisions in French and

Meakin conflict with this Court’s

precedent in Miller. .......................................... 12

A. Meakin and French relied on abrogated

precedent from this Court. .......................... 12

1. Meakin reaffirmed the erroneous view

that “indecent” speech is synonymous with the

unprotected category of obscenity. ............... 12

2. Meakin’s origins demonstrate why it

conflicts with this Court’s precedence. .......... 14

B. Without Miller’s limiting principles, indecent

speech regulations—as defined by the

Manual for Courts-Martial—restrict

constitutionally protected speech. .............. 15

1. Meakin’s misinterpretation of the

obscenity doctrine permits the

unconstitutional regulation of parental

discussions with children, even when those

conversations involve sexual education. ....... 16

2. Meakin permits the restriction of purely

private speech between consenting adults.

This, too, is unconstitutional. ........................ 18

CONCLUSION .............................................................. 19

APPENDIX

CAAF Opinion, United States v. Folts,

No. 25-0043 (Aug. 18, 2025) ................................ 1a

CAAF Order, United States v. Folts,

No. 25-0043 (Sep. 24, 2025)............................... 11a

CAAF Order, United States v. Folts,

No. 25-0043 (Mar. 31, 2025) .............................. 12a

v

Air Force Court Opinion, United States v. Folts,

No. ACM 40322 (Aug. 26, 2024)........................ 13a

CAAF Order, United States v. Pulley,

No. 25-0063 (July 22, 2025) .............................. 37a

CAAF Order, United States v. Pulley,

No. 25-0063 (Mar. 31, 2025) .............................. 38a

Air Force Court Opinion, United States v. Pulley,

No. ACM 40438 (f rev) (Aug. 26, 2024) ............. 39a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Brandenburg v. Ohio,

395 U.S. 447 (1969) ............................................... 14

Burns v. Wilson,

346 U.S. 137 (1953) ................................................. 9

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,

315 U.S. 568 (1942) ............................................... 11

Cohen v. California,

403 U.S. 15 (1971) ................................................. 11

Counterman v. Colorado,

600 U.S. 66 (2023) ................................................. 14

FCC v. Pacifica Found.,

438 U.S. 726 (1978) ............................................... 18

Free Speech Coal. v. Paxton,

606 U.S. 461 (2025) ............................................... 19

Ginsberg v. New York,

390 U.S. 629 (1968) ......................................... 16, 18

Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1923) ............................................... 17

Miller v. California,

413 U.S. 15 (1973) ......................1, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18

Parker v. Levy,

417 U.S. 733 (1974) ......................................... 1, 8, 9

Pierce v. Society of Sissters,

268 U.S. 510 (1925) ............................................... 17

Reno v. ACLU,

521 U.S. 844 (1997) ................................... 16, 17, 18

vii

Renton v. Playtime Theaters,

475 U.S. 41 (1986) ................................................. 19

Roth v. United States,

354 U.S. 476 (1957) ..................................... 1, 12, 14

Standage v. Braithwaite,

526 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D. Md. 2020) ......................... 10

Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57 (2000) ................................................. 17

United States v. Brown,

45 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ........................ 9, 11, 15

United States v. Cunningham,

No. ARMY 20220140, 2025 CCA

LEXIS 519 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 4,

2025) ...................................................................... 13

United States v. French,

31 M.J. 57 (C.M.A 1990) ............................. 1, 12, 14

United States v. Grijalva,

84 M.J. 433 (C.A.A.F. 2024) .................................... 8

United States v. Hartwig,

39 M.J. 125 (C.M.A. 1994) .................................... 10

United States v. Howe,

17 C.M.A. 165 (C.M.A. 1967) ................................ 14

United States v. Meakin,

78 M.J. 396 (C.A.A.F. 2019) ........ 1, 6, 12, 14, 18, 19

United States v. Moore,

38 M.J. 490 (C.A.A.F. 1994) .................................. 14

United States v. Priest,

45 C.M.R. 338 (C.M.A. 1972) ................................ 10

United States v. Smith,

85 M.J. 283 (C.A.A.F. 2024) ............ 8, 10, 11, 14, 15

viii

United States v. Wilcox,

66 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 2008) ................ 1, 8, 9, 10, 11

Wash v. Glucksberg,

521 U.S. 702 (1997) ............................................... 17

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1)(A) .............................................. 3

10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(3) ................................................... 3

10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) ................................................... 3

10 U.S.C. § 920b .................................................... 4, 15

10 U.S.C. § 920b(c) ...................................................... 3

10 U.S.C. § 934 ...................................................... 4, 15

28 U.S.C. § 1259(3) ..................................................... 3

U.S. CONST. amend I................................................... 3

Other Authorities

Jeffrey L. Hurst, et al.,

Parents’ Attitudes Towards the

Content of Sex Education in the USA:

Associations with Religiosity and

Political Orientation, NAT. INST.

HEALTH (2025) ....................................................... 17

Manual for Courts-Martial Part IV,

Para. 104(b)(3) ......................................................... 4

Manual for Courts-Martial Part IV,

Para. 104(c)(1) ................................................... 4, 15

Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (online ed.

2024) ........................................................................ 5

Obscene, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th

ed.) ................................................................... 13, 14

1

INTRODUCTION

“No one disputes that servicemembers enjoy some

measure of the right to free speech.” United States v.

Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 447 (C.A.A.F. 2008). However,

that right is limited by military law and tradition.

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).

For decades, military law and tradition have

required the Government to satisfy a three-factor

balancing test when restricting speech. Wilcox, 66

M.J. at 446-48. The first of these factors asks whether

the speech is unprotected under this Court’s

precedent. Id. at 446-47.

Nevertheless, military courts have relied on an

abrogated, outdated obscenity standard from the

1950s for “indecent” speech cases. See United States v.

French, 31 M.J. 57, 59 (C.M.A 1990) (adopting this

Court’s standard in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.

476 (1957)); see United States v. Meakin, 78 M.J. 396,

401 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (using the same standard). This

standard equates all “indecent” speech, as defined by

statute, with unprotected obscenity. See Meakin, 78

M.J. at 401.

This standard conflicts with this Court’s precedent

in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and its

progeny. This is problematic for several reasons. First,

military law and tradition require military courts to

use this Court’s precedent when assessing free speech

cases. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 446-48. By changing the

test for obscenity, military courts have lowered the

Government’s

burden

for

restricting

a

servicemember’s free speech.

Second, this standard creates significant

normative problems. Under Meakin, any private

speech between consenting adults can be regulated,

2

regardless of whether the military has any interest in

regulating that speech. Meakin also has no exceptions

for parental speech, meaning that sexual education by

parents can be regulated as obscene.

This Court should grant review to ensure private,

consensual speech is not regulated by the Government

when it has no unique military interest in doing so. By

granting review, this Court will also ensure that

servicemember parents can educate their children on

sexual and romantic matters without fear of

prosecution and incarceration.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Technical Sergeant (TSgt) Douglas M. Folts and

Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Mark A. Pulley, United States

Air Force, respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari

to review the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces.

OPINIONS BELOW

In TSgt Folts’s case, the decision of the Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) is pending

publication. It is available at 2025 CAAF LEXIS 689,

2025 WL 2406114, and reproduced at page 2a. The

CAAF’s order denying a timely petition for

reconsideration by the is also pending publication. It

is available at 2025 CAAF LEXIS 795, 2025 WL

2912421, and reproduced at page 11a. A different

petition for reconsideration is available at 85 M.J. 413,

and reproduced at page 12a. The Air Force Court of

Criminal Appeals (Air Force Court) decision is

unpublished. It is available at 2024 CCA LEXIS 353,

2024 WL 3936827, and reproduced at page 13a.

In SSgt Pulley’s case, the decision of the CAAF is

pending publication. It is available at 2025 CAAF

3

LEXIS 584, 2025 WL 2305418, and reproduced at

page 37a. The CAAF’s order denying an untimely

petition for reconsideration is available at 85 M.J. 411,

and reproduced at page 38a. The Air Force Court

decision is unpublished. It is available at 2024 CCA

LEXIS 442, 2024 4563616, and reproduced at page

39a.

JURISDICTION

Both petitioners were tried by general courtsmartial. For TSgt Folts, the Air Force Court had

jurisdiction under 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1)(A); Pet.App.

2a-3a. For SSgt Pulley’s case, the Air Force Court had

jurisdiction under 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(3). For both of

Petitioners’ cases, the CAAF had jurisdiction under 10

U.S.C. § 867(a)(3). In TSgt Folts’s case, the CAAF

issued its decision on August 18, 2025. The CAAF

denied a timely petition for reconsideration on

September 24, 2025. In SSgt Pulley’s case, the CAAF

issued its decision on July 22, 2025. The Chief Justice

extended the time for filing a petition for writ of

certiorari to December 19, 2025. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment, in pertinent part, provides:

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the

freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend I.

10 U.S.C. § 920b(c), provides, in pertinent part:

“Any person subject to this chapter who commits a

lewd act upon a child is guilty of sexual abuse of a

child.”

A lewd act under 10 U.S.C. § 920b(c) includes:

4

[I]ntentionally

communicating

indecent

language to a child by any means . . . with an

intent . . . gratify the sexual desire of any

person; or any indecent conduct, intentionally

done with or in the presence of a child,

including via any communication technology,

that amounts to a form of immorality relating

to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar,

obscene, and repugnant to common propriety,

and tends to excite the sexual desire or deprave

morals with respect to sexual relations.

10 U.S.C. §§ 920b(g)(5)(C), (D).

10 U.S.C. § 934, indecent conduct, Manual for

Courts-Martial Part IV, Para. 104(b)(3), provides:

(1) That the accused engaged in certain

conduct; (2) That the conduct was indecent; and

(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct

of the accused was either: (i) to the prejudice of

good order and discipline in the armed forces;

(ii) was of a nature to bring discredit upon the

armed forces; or [both].”

An indecent act under 10 U.S.C. § 934, Manual

for Courts-Martial Part IV, Para. 104(c)(1), is: “[a]

form of immorality relating to sexual impurity

which is grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to

common propriety, and tends to excite sexual

desire or deprave morals with respect to sexual

relations.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Technical Sergeant Folts’s Case

TSgt Folts had a stepdaughter, OM. Pet.App. 16a.

At the time of the charged conduct, OM was in her

freshman year of high school. Pet.App. 21a.

5

TSgt Folts had a close parental relationship with

OM. Trial Tr. at 1181 (“We were really close. I’d go to

him for really anything. . . I feel like I honestly had a

better relationship with him than I did with my own

mom.”). OM would routinely confide in TSgt Folts

about romantic and sexual matters in her life.

Pet.App. 16a-17a; see Trial Tr. at 1408. Specifically,

OM talked to TSgt Folts about masturbation,

masturbatory aids, and her sexual orientation. Trial

Tr. at 1401, 1403, 1409, 1714-16. And the two would

often share jokes about OM’s romantic interests.

Trial. Tr. at 1395-37. Ultimately, TSgt Folts was

supportive of OM and told her to “be happy with who

you are.” Trial Tr. at 1401.

OM and TSgt Folts would often share memes 1 with

one another. Trial Tr. at 1395-97. In March of 2020,

TSgt Folts sent three memes to OM. Those memes

were:

(1) A woman with large breasts, wearing a tank

top with no bra underneath and going

through an airport security checkpoint, with

the caption: “Me: we’re gonna have to

perform a cavity search / Her: but the

detector didn’t even - / Me: ma’[a]m it’s just

protocol;”

(2) a collage consisting of images of a hand with

one finger extended, two fingers extended,

and a man with an amputated arm, each

paired with images of a woman who appears

to be experiencing various degrees of sexual

1 “A ‘meme’ is defined as ‘an amusing or interesting item (such as

a captioned picture or video) or genre of items that is spread

widely online especially through social media.’” Pet.App. 16a n.5

(quoting Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (online ed. 2024)).

6

pleasure, captioned: “Different levels of

adult pleasure funny adult meme;” and

(3) an image of female genitalia with the

cartoon character Piglet superimposed over

it, with the caption: “Wherever you see

Piglet, you know Pooh is only a few inches

away.”

Pet.App. 20a. The memes do not depict any sexual act,

any act of sexual violence or nonconsensual behavior,

nor any sexual acts involving children.

Months later and after an argument, OM and TSgt

Folts’s relationship soured. Trial Tr. at 1422-27. This

resulted in several allegations against TSgt Folts,

including that he inappropriately touched OM. Id.

TSgt Folts was acquitted of these charges. Trial Tr. at

2014.

However,

during

the

investigation,

the

Government found the three memes sent in March of

2020. Trial Tr. at 1643. For sending these memes to

OM, TSgt Folts was charged and convicted of

committing a lewd act with a child. Pet.App. 22a.

On appeal to the Air Force Court, TSgt Folts

challenged his conviction under the First Amendment.

Appellant’s Br. at 5, United States v. Folts, No. ACM

40322, 2024 CCA LEXIS 353, 2024 WL 3936827 (A.F.

Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2024); see Pet.App. 25a-27a

(analyzing the free speech claim). The Air Force Court

did not specifically address the free speech issue,

Pet.App. 26a-29a, but relied on Meakin to hold the

memes were unprotected because all “indecent”

speech is unprotected. See Pet.App. 25a (citing

Meakin, 78 M.J. at 401).

7

While the CAAF granted review of a jurisdictional

question, Pet.App. 2a-3a, it declined review of the

First Amendment challenge. TSgt Folts moved for

reconsideration of the CAAF’s decision not to grant

review. Petition for Reconsideration, United States v.

Folts, __ M.J.__, United States v. Folts, 85 M.J. 413

(C.A.A.F. 2025). The CAAF declined to reconsider its

decision whether to grant on this issue. Pet.App. 13a.

II. Staff Sergeant Pulley’s Case

In an online chatroom, DA began a private

conversation with SSgt Pulley. Pet.App. 42a.

Unbeknownst to SSgt Pulley, DA was an undercover

Special Agent with Homeland Security. Id. During

this private conversation, SSgt Pulley sent DA a video

of a clothed prepubescent female sucking on the toe of

an adult male. Id. This video was sent with another

message that said: “[O]ut of the blue sucked on my toe

like a pro last night.” Id. SSgt Pulley was charged with

indecent conduct for the video and accompanying

message.

At trial, SSgt Pulley moved to dismiss the charge

under the First Amendment. App. Ex. XIX. The judge

denied the motion. App. Ex. XLV. On appeal, SSgt

Pulley argued that “purely private communications

with another adult did not constitute obscenity” and

were therefore constitutionally protected. Pet.App. 7a.

The Air Force Court relied on Meakin to find that the

speech was not protected because it occurred online

and was “indecent.” Pet.App. 78a (“We find the

[CAAF’s] considerations of ‘indecent’ and ‘obscene’ in

Meakin to be controlling.”).

SSgt Pulley petitioned the CAAF for review of the

free speech issue, but the CAAF declined review.

United States v. Pulley, 85 M.J. 383 (C.A.A.F. 2025)

8

(order granting review of a Second Amendment issue,

but denying review of the First Amendment issue).

SSgt Pulley, petitioned out of time for the CAAF to

reconsider that decision. Pet.App. 38a (order denying

petition to reconsider). The CAAF denied the motion

and declined to reconsider. Id.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Servicemembers have more limited rights under

the First Amendment than civilians. Levy, 417 U.S. at

758. But these limits are guided by military “laws and

traditions,” which have “developed . . . during [the

military’s] long history.” Id. at 743.

Under military law and tradition, courts use a

three-factor balancing test to analyze free speech.

United States v. Grijalva, 84 M.J. 433, 438 (C.A.A.F.

2024) (citing Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 446-68). The first

factor of that test asks whether the speech falls within

an unprotected category as defined by this Court.

Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 449; see United States v. Smith, 85

M.J. 283, 289-90 (C.A.A.F. 2024) (declining to use the

military’s free speech jurisprudence for the first factor

and, instead, using this Court’s jurisprudence).

In Petitioners’ cases, the Air Force Court used a

military case, Meakin, to hold that the speech was

unprotected. But Meakin—and the CAAF’s earlier

decision in French—conflict with this Court’s

precedent in Miller. Because military courts must use

this Court’s precedent when deciding the first Wilcox

factor, Smith, 85 M.J. at 289-90, reliance on Meakin

was error.

This Court should grant review to either reverse

the lower courts or, alternatively, to vacate and

remand to the CAAF for review of this important

constitutional question.

9

I. Military law and tradition require courts to

apply this Court’s jurisprudence when

adjudicating free speech claims.

Servicemembers have free speech rights. Wilcox,

66 M.J. at 447. However, these rights are limited by

military law and tradition. Levy, 417 U.S. at 743.

Under the military’s law and tradition, courts must

use this Court’s free speech jurisprudence when

deciding

whether

a

speech

restriction

is

unconstitutional. Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448.

A. Servicemembers have free speech rights,

but those rights are limited by military

law and tradition.

“[T]he military is, by necessity, a specialized

society separate from civilian society.” Levy, 417 U.S.

at 743. And, just as military life is distinct from

civilian life, “military law . . . is a jurisprudence which

exists separate and apart from the law which governs

in our federal judicial establishment.” Id. at 744

(quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).

Because of this, the military has, “by necessity . . .

developed laws and traditions of its own.” Id. at 743.

While the military has its own distinct

jurisprudence, servicemembers still have free speech

rights under the First Amendment. Wilcox, 66 M.J. at

447 (“No one disputes that servicemembers enjoy

some measure of the right to free speech granted by

the First Amendment.”) “The right to express ideas is

essential to a democratic government. . . . [And, b]oth

military servicemembers and civilians have the right”

to free speech. United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389,

395 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (citation omitted)

But “the [G]overnment may place additional

burdens on a servicemember’s First Amendment free

10

speech rights due to the unique character of the

military community and environment.” Smith, 85

M.J. at 288. To balance this unique character of the

military with individuals’ free speech rights, the

CAAF created a three-factor test. Wilcox, 66 M.J. at

447-49.

The first factor asks whether the speech falls

within an unprotected category of speech as

articulated by this Court. Id. at 449; see Smith, 85

M.J. at 289-91 (discussing which categories of

unprotected speech applied to the appellant’s words).

If the speech is unprotected, then courts can stop the

analysis because the speech can be regulated. Wilcox,

66 M.J. at 449. But, if the speech is not unprotected,

courts move to the second and third factors.

The second factor asks whether there is a direct

and palpable connection between the speech and the

military mission or environment. Wilcox, 66 M.J. at

449-50. If there is no connection, military courts end

the analysis because the government has no interest

in regulating the speech. Id. at 451. However, if there

is a connection, military courts move to the third

factor, which balances “the essential needs of the

armed services and the right to speak out as a free

American.” Standage v. Braithwaite, 526 F. Supp. 3d

56, 83 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting United States v.

Hartwig, 39 M.J. 125, 129 (C.M.A. 1994)).

This balancing test is unique to the military and

takes into consideration the essential needs of the

Armed Forces. And while the second and third factors

seek to balance the needs of the military against free

speech interests, the first factor is a binary question:

whether the speech falls within an unprotected

category articulated by this Court.

11

B. When assessing unprotected categories of

speech, military courts rely wholly on this

Court’s jurisprudence.

The first Wilcox factor asks whether the speech is

unprotected. 66 M.J. at 448. In assessing this factor,

military courts rely on this Court’s free speech

jurisprudence. Id. (“[T]he right to free speech is not

absolute, and some speech . . . is not protected by the

First Amendment, regardless of the military or

civilian status of the speaker.”); see Brown, 45 M.J. at

395 (first citing Roth, 354 U.S. 476; then citing Cohen

v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); and then citing

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).

While the Wilcox Court implied that certain categories

of unprotected speech were different in the military,

66 M.J. at 448, the Smith Court rejected this just two

years ago. 85 M.J. at 289-90 (holding that an

abrogated free speech test from this Court did not

apply in the military, despite decades of military

precedent to the contrary).

Ultimately, military law and tradition permit the

Government to restrict servicemember speech to a

greater extent than civilians. However, that greater

restriction comes from the second and third Wilcox

factors, not the first. This means that military courts,

when assessing unprotected categories of speech, rely

wholly on this Court’s jurisprudence.

Despite this, military courts continue to rely on

abrogated obscenity jurisprudence from this Court

when assessing purportedly “indecent” speech. See

discussion at Part II, infra. This Court should grant

review to correct this error of constitutional

magnitude.

12

II. The CAAF’s decisions in French and Meakin

conflict with this Court’s precedent in Miller.

The CAAF’s precedents in French and Meakin rely

on abrogated precedent from this Court for obscenity

cases. French, 31 M.J. at 59 (relying on Roth, 354 U.S.

476); see Meakin, 78 M.J. at 401 (relying on another

CAAF case which, itself, relied on French). But this

Court’s decision in Roth is not the correct obscenity

standard; Miller is. 413 U.S. at 24.

“Indecent” speech in the military is broadly

defined by statute. Because Meakin contains none of

the limiting principles used by this Court in Miller but

nevertheless equates “indecent” to “obscenity,” the

Government can restrict vast amounts of

servicemember speech that would otherwise be

constitutionally protected. This includes sexual

education speech from a military parent to a child and

purely private and consensual intimate partner

speech. Because the CAAF has declined review of this

important issue, only this Court can ensure

servicemember speech is not unduly infringed.

A. Meakin and French relied on abrogated

precedent from this Court.

In both Petitioners’ cases, the Air Force Court

relied on Meakin in finding the speech unprotected.

But the Meakin standard for obscenity conflicts with

the obscenity jurisprudence of this Court.

1. Meakin reaffirmed the erroneous view

that “indecent” speech is synonymous

with the unprotected category of

obscenity.

In Meakin, the CAAF reasoned that “indecent” is

“synonymous with obscene.” 78 M.J. at 401. This

13

means that, so long as the Government proves the

speech is indecent under the applicable statute, the

speech is not protected. This conclusory analysis is

problematic for obvious normative reasons. See

discussion at Parts II.B., infra. But such a standard

also

conflicts

with

this

Court’s

obscenity

jurisprudence.

Under this Court’s decisions, the Government can

regulate speech as obscene only when the Government

proves that:

(1) [An] average person, applying contemporary

community standards would find [the speech],

taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient

interest;

(2) [The speech] depicts or describes, in a

patently offensive way, sexual conduct

specifically defined by applicable state law; and

(3) [The speech], taken as a whole, lacks serious

literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (cleaned up); see Obscene,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.) (citing Miller, 413

U.S. 15). This Court’s standard requires much more

than merely concluding that “indecent” speech under

a statute is unprotected because all “indecent speech”

is “obscene.” Nevertheless, military courts continue to

use Meakin to guide obscenity analyses. See, e.g.,

Pet.App. 25a-29a, 76a-78a; United States v.

Cunningham, No. ARMY 20220140, 2025 CCA LEXIS

519, at *22 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2025)

(referencing Meakin’s command that all indecent

speech is obscene and, therefore, unprotected).

14

2. Meakin’s origins demonstrate why it

conflicts with this Court’s precedence.

Meakin relied on United States v. Moore, 38 M.J.

490 (C.A.A.F. 1994), for the proposition that

“indecent” and “obscene” are the same. Meakin, 78

M.J. at 401. The Moore Court in turn relied on French,

31 M.J. 57. Moore, 38 M.J. at 492. But the French

Court did not rely on Miller or its progeny. Instead,

and without explanation, the French Court relied on

the abrogated obscenity standard from the pre-Miller

case of Roth, 354 U.S. 476. French, 31 M.J. at 59.

Miller, decided nearly two decades after Roth,

defines the scope of obscenity. Counterman v.

Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 73 (2023) (citing Miller, not

Roth, when discussing the unprotected category of

obscenity); Obscene, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th

ed.) (citing Miller, 413 U.S. 15); cf. Counterman, 600

U.S. at 110 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (highlighting that

while Roth created the unprotected category of

obscenity, the Miller definition controls). Despite the

fact that Miller was decided seventeen years before

French, the CAAF inexplicably relied on an old,

abrogated obscenity case.

While it is not clear why the French Court relied

on Roth instead of Miller, this precedential issue has

striking similarities to another military free speech

case: Smith, 85 M.J. 283. In Smith, the Government

argued that the appellant’s words were “dangerous

speech.” Id. at 289. While the CAAF’s predecessor had

adopted the dangerous speech doctrine, United States

v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 172 (C.M.A. 1967), it was

later abrogated by this Court. Smith, 85 M.J. at 28990 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447

(1969)). Despite this abrogation, military courts

15

continued to use the dangerous speech doctrine for

nearly sixty years. See, e.g., Brown, 45 M.J. 389. The

CAAF ultimately held in Smith that the dangerous

speech doctrine was inapplicable in the military

because this Court had abrogated it. 85 M.J. at 290.

This makes sense, since the first factor of the Wilcox

test asks whether the speech is unprotected under this

Court’s jurisprudence, not military precedent.

Despite the CAAF’s recognition that this Court’s

jurisprudence controls for the first Wilcox factor, it

has declined review of the question presented here.

B. Without Miller’s limiting principles,

indecent speech regulations—as defined

by the Manual for Courts-Martial—

restrict constitutionally protected speech.

Indecent speech in the military is defined broadly.

Under 10 U.S.C. § 920b, indecent speech is defined as

that speech that “amounts to a form of immorality

relating to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar,

obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, and

tends to excite the sexual desire or deprave morals

with respect to sexual relations.” A similar definition

exists under 10 U.S.C. § 934, indecent conduct.

Manual for Courts-Martial Part IV, Para. 104(c)(1)

(providing the same definition).

By

abandoning

this

Court’s

obscenity

jurisprudence and equating all indecent speech with

the unprotected category of obscenity, military courts

permit broad restrictions on servicemembers’ free

speech rights without linking the restriction to the

“essential needs” of the Armed Forces. This is true for

both parental speech to children about sexual

education and speech between consenting adults.

Both are constitutionally protected. But without

16

Miller

and

the

Wilcox

balancing

factors,

servicemembers

engaging

in

constitutionally

protected speech are nevertheless subject to criminal

sanction.

1. Meakin’s misinterpretation of the

obscenity

doctrine

permits

the

unconstitutional regulation of parental

discussions with children, even when

those conversations involve sexual

education.

Similar to Miller, this Court has articulated a more

exacting standard for obscenity regulations specific to

minors than Meakin. In Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629, this

Court held that regulation of obscenity for minors was

permissible. Reno, 521 U.S. at 895 (O’Connor, J.,

dissenting). Material is obscene for minors if it: “(i) is

patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult

community . . . with respect to what is suitable for

minors; (ii) appeals to the prurient interests of minors;

and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social

importance for minors.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting

Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633).

The obscenity for minors standard essentially

mirrors Miller, adjusting it only to reflect that the

standard applies to children. Compare Miller, 413

U.S. at 24, with Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633. Like Miller,

Ginsberg is the standard under this Court’s

jurisprudence that the military courts should be

applying, not Meakin’s conclusory one.

The conclusory logic of Meakin is problematic

because, just like consenting adults, parents who have

conversations of a sexual nature with their children

face criminal sanction, even when done for an

educational purpose. After all, Meakin draws no

17

distinction—so long as speech is “indecent,” it can be

regulated as unprotected speech. This includes speech

about sexual reproduction, even if for a legitimate

educational purpose.

The broad definition of “indecent” speech supports

this. For many, sexual education provided to children

is morally repugnant. Jeffrey L. Hurst, et al., Parents’

Attitudes Towards the Content of Sex Education in the

USA: Associations with Religiosity and Political

Orientation,

NAT.

INST.

HEALTH

(2025),

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10923385/p

df/nihms-1862188.pdf. A prosecutor or jury holding

this view could, within the statutory definition, charge

and convict a servicemember of indecent speech

merely for providing sexual education to their

children.

This Court has previously expressed skepticism

about Government regulation that seeps into a

parent’s right to educate their children about sexual

or romantic affairs. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 878

(discussing the overbroad Communications Decency

Act, especially with regard to parents providing

sexual education); cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,

65 (2000) (plurality op.) (“[T]he interest of parents in

the care, custody, and control of their children [] is

perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty

interests recognized by this Court.”); Wash. v.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (first citing

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); and then

citing Pierce v. Society of Sissters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925))

(“In a long line of cases, we have held that . . . the

‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause

18

includes the rights to . . . direct the education and

upbringing of one’s children.”).

Meakin, along with the broad definition of indecent

speech, permits the restriction of constitutionally

protected speech. This conflicts with both this Court’s

jurisprudence and military law and tradition.

2. Meakin permits the restriction of

purely

private

speech

between

consenting adults. This, too, is

unconstitutional.

The CAAF’s conclusory logic in Meakin also allows

the Government to regulate purely private speech

between consenting adults. 78 M.J. at 402.

This Court has never held such a restriction

constitutional. In fact, in every case where this Court

has upheld a speech restriction as constitutional

under the obscenity doctrine, the subject speech was

of a non-private nature. Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.

844, 896-97 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)

(explaining that obscenity restrictions may implicate

the First Amendment when they regulate speech

between consenting adults). For example, in Miller,

the appellant “conducted a mass mailing campaign to

advertise the sale of . . . ‘adult’ material.” 413 U.S. at

16. This “mass mailing” was, in many cases,

unsolicited. Id. at 16-18. In FCC v. Pacifica Found.,

the appellant aired George Carlin’s infamous “12minute monologue entitled ‘Filthy Words’” at 2:00

P.M. on a Tuesday afternoon over public airways. 438

U.S. 726, 729-30 (1978). In Ginsberg v. New York, the

appellant operated a public lunch counter and sold,

among other things, sexually explicit material to the

public. 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968). And, in Renton v.

Playtime Theaters, appellants owned movie theaters

19

that intended to broadcast “feature-length adult

films.” 475 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1986).

Meakin, in conjunction with the military’s indecent

conduct statutes, has an immense effect on protected

speech. Take, for example, a married couple who

consensually exchange pornographic videos and

images of themselves on a private, online messaging

application. Pornographic videos and images qualify

as obscenity under Miller if they are publicly

broadcast or disseminated to non-consenting

individuals. See Free Speech Coal. v. Paxton, 606 U.S.

461, 466 (2025). But, under the military’s

jurisprudence, the Government could prosecute and

convict a consenting couple for indecent conduct

because there is no carve out for private, consensual

speech. See Meakin, 78 M.J. at 402.

While there may be legitimate reasons for

restricting

servicemembers’

private,

indecent

speech—such as in a deployed environment—such a

restriction cannot be justified under the first Wilcox

factor (i.e., whether it is unprotected speech). Instead,

as military law and tradition demand, such a

regulation must satisfy the second and third Wilcox

factors. This makes sense. The second and third

Wilcox factors balance the essential needs of the

Armed Forces with the free speech interests of the

speaker. These factors, not the first, are better suited

to deal with the unique nature of military service.

CONCLUSION

Military law and tradition require military courts

to use this Court’s jurisprudence for free speech cases.

Despite this, the CAAF has continued to use an

outdated, abrogated obscenity standard to uphold

convictions for “indecent” speech. In doing so, the

20

CAAF has created a dangerous paradigm. Both purely

private speech between consenting adults and sexual

and romantic educational speech by parents can be

regulated as “obscene.” Such a standard conflicts with

this Court’s precedent, military law and tradition, and

offends the core tenets of the First Amendment. This

Court should grant review to correct this

constitutional error.

Respectfully submitted,

TERRI R. ZIMMERMANN

Zimmermann &

Zimmermann, PLLC

PO Box 3699

CONROE, TX 77305

TREVOR N. WARD

Counsel of Record

SAMANTHA M. CASTANIEN

United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Division

1500 West Perimeter Road

Suite 1100

JB Andrews, MD 20762

(240) 612-4770

trevor.ward.1@us.af.mil

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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