Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Douglas M. Folts, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefDec 17, 2025
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. ______
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________
DOUGLAS M. FOLTS; MARK A. PULLEY,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
__________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces
__________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
__________
TERRI R. ZIMMERMANN
Zimmermann &
Zimmermann, PLLC
PO Box 3699
Conroe, TX 77305
TREVOR N. WARD
Counsel of Record
SAMANTHA M. CASTANIEN
United States Air Force
Appellate Defense Division
1500 West Perimeter Road
Suite 1100
JB Andrews, MD 20762
(240) 612-4770
trevor.ward.1@us.af.mil
Counsel for Petitioners
QUESTION PRESENTED
The free speech guarantee of the First Amendment
applies to servicemembers. This guarantee is limited
by military law and tradition. Part of that law and
tradition is that military courts use this Court’s free
speech jurisprudence when deciding the scope of the
free speech guarantee for servicemembers. Despite
this, military courts continue to rely on an outdated,
abrogated obscenity standard that this Court has
rejected.
The question presented is:
Whether the military’s obscenity standard is
unconstitutional under Parker v. Levy and Miller v.
California.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
This Rule 12.4 petition consolidates direct appeals
from two servicemembers convicted by courts-martial.
Petitioners are Technical Sergeant Douglas M. Folts
and Staff Sergeant Mark A. Pulley. Respondent in
both cases is the United States.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No nongovernmental corporations are parties to
this proceeding.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Other than the direct appeals that form the basis
for this petition, there are no related proceedings for
the purposes of Rule 14.1(b)(iii):
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED .................................................. i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ...................................... ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.......................... ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS ............................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................... vi
INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .......................... 2
OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................... 2
JURISDICTION ............................................................... 3
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED ..................................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 4
I. Technical Sergeant Folts’s Case ........................... 4
II. Staff Sergeant Pulley’s Case ................................ 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....................... 8
I.
Military law and tradition require courts
to apply this Court’s jurisprudence when
adjudicating free speech claims. ........................ 9
A. Servicemembers have free speech rights, but
those rights are limited by military law and
tradition. ........................................................ 9
B. When assessing unprotected categories of
speech, military courts rely wholly on this
Court’s jurisprudence. ................................. 11
iv
II. The CAAF’s decisions in French and
Meakin conflict with this Court’s
precedent in Miller. .......................................... 12
A. Meakin and French relied on abrogated
precedent from this Court. .......................... 12
1. Meakin reaffirmed the erroneous view
that “indecent” speech is synonymous with the
unprotected category of obscenity. ............... 12
2. Meakin’s origins demonstrate why it
conflicts with this Court’s precedence. .......... 14
B. Without Miller’s limiting principles, indecent
speech regulations—as defined by the
Manual for Courts-Martial—restrict
constitutionally protected speech. .............. 15
1. Meakin’s misinterpretation of the
obscenity doctrine permits the
unconstitutional regulation of parental
discussions with children, even when those
conversations involve sexual education. ....... 16
2. Meakin permits the restriction of purely
private speech between consenting adults.
This, too, is unconstitutional. ........................ 18
CONCLUSION .............................................................. 19
APPENDIX
CAAF Opinion, United States v. Folts,
No. 25-0043 (Aug. 18, 2025) ................................ 1a
CAAF Order, United States v. Folts,
No. 25-0043 (Sep. 24, 2025)............................... 11a
CAAF Order, United States v. Folts,
No. 25-0043 (Mar. 31, 2025) .............................. 12a
v
Air Force Court Opinion, United States v. Folts,
No. ACM 40322 (Aug. 26, 2024)........................ 13a
CAAF Order, United States v. Pulley,
No. 25-0063 (July 22, 2025) .............................. 37a
CAAF Order, United States v. Pulley,
No. 25-0063 (Mar. 31, 2025) .............................. 38a
Air Force Court Opinion, United States v. Pulley,
No. ACM 40438 (f rev) (Aug. 26, 2024) ............. 39a
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 447 (1969) ............................................... 14
Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1953) ................................................. 9
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) ............................................... 11
Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971) ................................................. 11
Counterman v. Colorado,
600 U.S. 66 (2023) ................................................. 14
FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) ............................................... 18
Free Speech Coal. v. Paxton,
606 U.S. 461 (2025) ............................................... 19
Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) ......................................... 16, 18
Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) ............................................... 17
Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) ......................1, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18
Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733 (1974) ......................................... 1, 8, 9
Pierce v. Society of Sissters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) ............................................... 17
Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997) ................................... 16, 17, 18
vii
Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
475 U.S. 41 (1986) ................................................. 19
Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957) ..................................... 1, 12, 14
Standage v. Braithwaite,
526 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D. Md. 2020) ......................... 10
Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000) ................................................. 17
United States v. Brown,
45 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ........................ 9, 11, 15
United States v. Cunningham,
No. ARMY 20220140, 2025 CCA
LEXIS 519 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 4,
2025) ...................................................................... 13
United States v. French,
31 M.J. 57 (C.M.A 1990) ............................. 1, 12, 14
United States v. Grijalva,
84 M.J. 433 (C.A.A.F. 2024) .................................... 8
United States v. Hartwig,
39 M.J. 125 (C.M.A. 1994) .................................... 10
United States v. Howe,
17 C.M.A. 165 (C.M.A. 1967) ................................ 14
United States v. Meakin,
78 M.J. 396 (C.A.A.F. 2019) ........ 1, 6, 12, 14, 18, 19
United States v. Moore,
38 M.J. 490 (C.A.A.F. 1994) .................................. 14
United States v. Priest,
45 C.M.R. 338 (C.M.A. 1972) ................................ 10
United States v. Smith,
85 M.J. 283 (C.A.A.F. 2024) ............ 8, 10, 11, 14, 15
viii
United States v. Wilcox,
66 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 2008) ................ 1, 8, 9, 10, 11
Wash v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997) ............................................... 17
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1)(A) .............................................. 3
10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(3) ................................................... 3
10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) ................................................... 3
10 U.S.C. § 920b .................................................... 4, 15
10 U.S.C. § 920b(c) ...................................................... 3
10 U.S.C. § 934 ...................................................... 4, 15
28 U.S.C. § 1259(3) ..................................................... 3
U.S. CONST. amend I................................................... 3
Other Authorities
Jeffrey L. Hurst, et al.,
Parents’ Attitudes Towards the
Content of Sex Education in the USA:
Associations with Religiosity and
Political Orientation, NAT. INST.
HEALTH (2025) ....................................................... 17
Manual for Courts-Martial Part IV,
Para. 104(b)(3) ......................................................... 4
Manual for Courts-Martial Part IV,
Para. 104(c)(1) ................................................... 4, 15
Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (online ed.
2024) ........................................................................ 5
Obscene, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed.) ................................................................... 13, 14
1
INTRODUCTION
“No one disputes that servicemembers enjoy some
measure of the right to free speech.” United States v.
Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 447 (C.A.A.F. 2008). However,
that right is limited by military law and tradition.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
For decades, military law and tradition have
required the Government to satisfy a three-factor
balancing test when restricting speech. Wilcox, 66
M.J. at 446-48. The first of these factors asks whether
the speech is unprotected under this Court’s
precedent. Id. at 446-47.
Nevertheless, military courts have relied on an
abrogated, outdated obscenity standard from the
1950s for “indecent” speech cases. See United States v.
French, 31 M.J. 57, 59 (C.M.A 1990) (adopting this
Court’s standard in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957)); see United States v. Meakin, 78 M.J. 396,
401 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (using the same standard). This
standard equates all “indecent” speech, as defined by
statute, with unprotected obscenity. See Meakin, 78
M.J. at 401.
This standard conflicts with this Court’s precedent
in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and its
progeny. This is problematic for several reasons. First,
military law and tradition require military courts to
use this Court’s precedent when assessing free speech
cases. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 446-48. By changing the
test for obscenity, military courts have lowered the
Government’s
burden
for
restricting
a
servicemember’s free speech.
Second, this standard creates significant
normative problems. Under Meakin, any private
speech between consenting adults can be regulated,
2
regardless of whether the military has any interest in
regulating that speech. Meakin also has no exceptions
for parental speech, meaning that sexual education by
parents can be regulated as obscene.
This Court should grant review to ensure private,
consensual speech is not regulated by the Government
when it has no unique military interest in doing so. By
granting review, this Court will also ensure that
servicemember parents can educate their children on
sexual and romantic matters without fear of
prosecution and incarceration.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Technical Sergeant (TSgt) Douglas M. Folts and
Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Mark A. Pulley, United States
Air Force, respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari
to review the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces.
OPINIONS BELOW
In TSgt Folts’s case, the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) is pending
publication. It is available at 2025 CAAF LEXIS 689,
2025 WL 2406114, and reproduced at page 2a. The
CAAF’s order denying a timely petition for
reconsideration by the is also pending publication. It
is available at 2025 CAAF LEXIS 795, 2025 WL
2912421, and reproduced at page 11a. A different
petition for reconsideration is available at 85 M.J. 413,
and reproduced at page 12a. The Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals (Air Force Court) decision is
unpublished. It is available at 2024 CCA LEXIS 353,
2024 WL 3936827, and reproduced at page 13a.
In SSgt Pulley’s case, the decision of the CAAF is
pending publication. It is available at 2025 CAAF
3
LEXIS 584, 2025 WL 2305418, and reproduced at
page 37a. The CAAF’s order denying an untimely
petition for reconsideration is available at 85 M.J. 411,
and reproduced at page 38a. The Air Force Court
decision is unpublished. It is available at 2024 CCA
LEXIS 442, 2024 4563616, and reproduced at page
39a.
JURISDICTION
Both petitioners were tried by general courtsmartial. For TSgt Folts, the Air Force Court had
jurisdiction under 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1)(A); Pet.App.
2a-3a. For SSgt Pulley’s case, the Air Force Court had
jurisdiction under 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(3). For both of
Petitioners’ cases, the CAAF had jurisdiction under 10
U.S.C. § 867(a)(3). In TSgt Folts’s case, the CAAF
issued its decision on August 18, 2025. The CAAF
denied a timely petition for reconsideration on
September 24, 2025. In SSgt Pulley’s case, the CAAF
issued its decision on July 22, 2025. The Chief Justice
extended the time for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari to December 19, 2025. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The First Amendment, in pertinent part, provides:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend I.
10 U.S.C. § 920b(c), provides, in pertinent part:
“Any person subject to this chapter who commits a
lewd act upon a child is guilty of sexual abuse of a
child.”
A lewd act under 10 U.S.C. § 920b(c) includes:
4
[I]ntentionally
communicating
indecent
language to a child by any means . . . with an
intent . . . gratify the sexual desire of any
person; or any indecent conduct, intentionally
done with or in the presence of a child,
including via any communication technology,
that amounts to a form of immorality relating
to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar,
obscene, and repugnant to common propriety,
and tends to excite the sexual desire or deprave
morals with respect to sexual relations.
10 U.S.C. §§ 920b(g)(5)(C), (D).
10 U.S.C. § 934, indecent conduct, Manual for
Courts-Martial Part IV, Para. 104(b)(3), provides:
(1) That the accused engaged in certain
conduct; (2) That the conduct was indecent; and
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct
of the accused was either: (i) to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces;
(ii) was of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces; or [both].”
An indecent act under 10 U.S.C. § 934, Manual
for Courts-Martial Part IV, Para. 104(c)(1), is: “[a]
form of immorality relating to sexual impurity
which is grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to
common propriety, and tends to excite sexual
desire or deprave morals with respect to sexual
relations.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Technical Sergeant Folts’s Case
TSgt Folts had a stepdaughter, OM. Pet.App. 16a.
At the time of the charged conduct, OM was in her
freshman year of high school. Pet.App. 21a.
5
TSgt Folts had a close parental relationship with
OM. Trial Tr. at 1181 (“We were really close. I’d go to
him for really anything. . . I feel like I honestly had a
better relationship with him than I did with my own
mom.”). OM would routinely confide in TSgt Folts
about romantic and sexual matters in her life.
Pet.App. 16a-17a; see Trial Tr. at 1408. Specifically,
OM talked to TSgt Folts about masturbation,
masturbatory aids, and her sexual orientation. Trial
Tr. at 1401, 1403, 1409, 1714-16. And the two would
often share jokes about OM’s romantic interests.
Trial. Tr. at 1395-37. Ultimately, TSgt Folts was
supportive of OM and told her to “be happy with who
you are.” Trial Tr. at 1401.
OM and TSgt Folts would often share memes 1 with
one another. Trial Tr. at 1395-97. In March of 2020,
TSgt Folts sent three memes to OM. Those memes
were:
(1) A woman with large breasts, wearing a tank
top with no bra underneath and going
through an airport security checkpoint, with
the caption: “Me: we’re gonna have to
perform a cavity search / Her: but the
detector didn’t even - / Me: ma’[a]m it’s just
protocol;”
(2) a collage consisting of images of a hand with
one finger extended, two fingers extended,
and a man with an amputated arm, each
paired with images of a woman who appears
to be experiencing various degrees of sexual
1 “A ‘meme’ is defined as ‘an amusing or interesting item (such as
a captioned picture or video) or genre of items that is spread
widely online especially through social media.’” Pet.App. 16a n.5
(quoting Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (online ed. 2024)).
6
pleasure, captioned: “Different levels of
adult pleasure funny adult meme;” and
(3) an image of female genitalia with the
cartoon character Piglet superimposed over
it, with the caption: “Wherever you see
Piglet, you know Pooh is only a few inches
away.”
Pet.App. 20a. The memes do not depict any sexual act,
any act of sexual violence or nonconsensual behavior,
nor any sexual acts involving children.
Months later and after an argument, OM and TSgt
Folts’s relationship soured. Trial Tr. at 1422-27. This
resulted in several allegations against TSgt Folts,
including that he inappropriately touched OM. Id.
TSgt Folts was acquitted of these charges. Trial Tr. at
2014.
However,
during
the
investigation,
the
Government found the three memes sent in March of
2020. Trial Tr. at 1643. For sending these memes to
OM, TSgt Folts was charged and convicted of
committing a lewd act with a child. Pet.App. 22a.
On appeal to the Air Force Court, TSgt Folts
challenged his conviction under the First Amendment.
Appellant’s Br. at 5, United States v. Folts, No. ACM
40322, 2024 CCA LEXIS 353, 2024 WL 3936827 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2024); see Pet.App. 25a-27a
(analyzing the free speech claim). The Air Force Court
did not specifically address the free speech issue,
Pet.App. 26a-29a, but relied on Meakin to hold the
memes were unprotected because all “indecent”
speech is unprotected. See Pet.App. 25a (citing
Meakin, 78 M.J. at 401).
7
While the CAAF granted review of a jurisdictional
question, Pet.App. 2a-3a, it declined review of the
First Amendment challenge. TSgt Folts moved for
reconsideration of the CAAF’s decision not to grant
review. Petition for Reconsideration, United States v.
Folts, __ M.J.__, United States v. Folts, 85 M.J. 413
(C.A.A.F. 2025). The CAAF declined to reconsider its
decision whether to grant on this issue. Pet.App. 13a.
II. Staff Sergeant Pulley’s Case
In an online chatroom, DA began a private
conversation with SSgt Pulley. Pet.App. 42a.
Unbeknownst to SSgt Pulley, DA was an undercover
Special Agent with Homeland Security. Id. During
this private conversation, SSgt Pulley sent DA a video
of a clothed prepubescent female sucking on the toe of
an adult male. Id. This video was sent with another
message that said: “[O]ut of the blue sucked on my toe
like a pro last night.” Id. SSgt Pulley was charged with
indecent conduct for the video and accompanying
message.
At trial, SSgt Pulley moved to dismiss the charge
under the First Amendment. App. Ex. XIX. The judge
denied the motion. App. Ex. XLV. On appeal, SSgt
Pulley argued that “purely private communications
with another adult did not constitute obscenity” and
were therefore constitutionally protected. Pet.App. 7a.
The Air Force Court relied on Meakin to find that the
speech was not protected because it occurred online
and was “indecent.” Pet.App. 78a (“We find the
[CAAF’s] considerations of ‘indecent’ and ‘obscene’ in
Meakin to be controlling.”).
SSgt Pulley petitioned the CAAF for review of the
free speech issue, but the CAAF declined review.
United States v. Pulley, 85 M.J. 383 (C.A.A.F. 2025)
8
(order granting review of a Second Amendment issue,
but denying review of the First Amendment issue).
SSgt Pulley, petitioned out of time for the CAAF to
reconsider that decision. Pet.App. 38a (order denying
petition to reconsider). The CAAF denied the motion
and declined to reconsider. Id.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Servicemembers have more limited rights under
the First Amendment than civilians. Levy, 417 U.S. at
758. But these limits are guided by military “laws and
traditions,” which have “developed . . . during [the
military’s] long history.” Id. at 743.
Under military law and tradition, courts use a
three-factor balancing test to analyze free speech.
United States v. Grijalva, 84 M.J. 433, 438 (C.A.A.F.
2024) (citing Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 446-68). The first
factor of that test asks whether the speech falls within
an unprotected category as defined by this Court.
Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 449; see United States v. Smith, 85
M.J. 283, 289-90 (C.A.A.F. 2024) (declining to use the
military’s free speech jurisprudence for the first factor
and, instead, using this Court’s jurisprudence).
In Petitioners’ cases, the Air Force Court used a
military case, Meakin, to hold that the speech was
unprotected. But Meakin—and the CAAF’s earlier
decision in French—conflict with this Court’s
precedent in Miller. Because military courts must use
this Court’s precedent when deciding the first Wilcox
factor, Smith, 85 M.J. at 289-90, reliance on Meakin
was error.
This Court should grant review to either reverse
the lower courts or, alternatively, to vacate and
remand to the CAAF for review of this important
constitutional question.
9
I. Military law and tradition require courts to
apply this Court’s jurisprudence when
adjudicating free speech claims.
Servicemembers have free speech rights. Wilcox,
66 M.J. at 447. However, these rights are limited by
military law and tradition. Levy, 417 U.S. at 743.
Under the military’s law and tradition, courts must
use this Court’s free speech jurisprudence when
deciding
whether
a
speech
restriction
is
unconstitutional. Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448.
A. Servicemembers have free speech rights,
but those rights are limited by military
law and tradition.
“[T]he military is, by necessity, a specialized
society separate from civilian society.” Levy, 417 U.S.
at 743. And, just as military life is distinct from
civilian life, “military law . . . is a jurisprudence which
exists separate and apart from the law which governs
in our federal judicial establishment.” Id. at 744
(quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).
Because of this, the military has, “by necessity . . .
developed laws and traditions of its own.” Id. at 743.
While the military has its own distinct
jurisprudence, servicemembers still have free speech
rights under the First Amendment. Wilcox, 66 M.J. at
447 (“No one disputes that servicemembers enjoy
some measure of the right to free speech granted by
the First Amendment.”) “The right to express ideas is
essential to a democratic government. . . . [And, b]oth
military servicemembers and civilians have the right”
to free speech. United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389,
395 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (citation omitted)
But “the [G]overnment may place additional
burdens on a servicemember’s First Amendment free
10
speech rights due to the unique character of the
military community and environment.” Smith, 85
M.J. at 288. To balance this unique character of the
military with individuals’ free speech rights, the
CAAF created a three-factor test. Wilcox, 66 M.J. at
447-49.
The first factor asks whether the speech falls
within an unprotected category of speech as
articulated by this Court. Id. at 449; see Smith, 85
M.J. at 289-91 (discussing which categories of
unprotected speech applied to the appellant’s words).
If the speech is unprotected, then courts can stop the
analysis because the speech can be regulated. Wilcox,
66 M.J. at 449. But, if the speech is not unprotected,
courts move to the second and third factors.
The second factor asks whether there is a direct
and palpable connection between the speech and the
military mission or environment. Wilcox, 66 M.J. at
449-50. If there is no connection, military courts end
the analysis because the government has no interest
in regulating the speech. Id. at 451. However, if there
is a connection, military courts move to the third
factor, which balances “the essential needs of the
armed services and the right to speak out as a free
American.” Standage v. Braithwaite, 526 F. Supp. 3d
56, 83 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting United States v.
Hartwig, 39 M.J. 125, 129 (C.M.A. 1994)).
This balancing test is unique to the military and
takes into consideration the essential needs of the
Armed Forces. And while the second and third factors
seek to balance the needs of the military against free
speech interests, the first factor is a binary question:
whether the speech falls within an unprotected
category articulated by this Court.
11
B. When assessing unprotected categories of
speech, military courts rely wholly on this
Court’s jurisprudence.
The first Wilcox factor asks whether the speech is
unprotected. 66 M.J. at 448. In assessing this factor,
military courts rely on this Court’s free speech
jurisprudence. Id. (“[T]he right to free speech is not
absolute, and some speech . . . is not protected by the
First Amendment, regardless of the military or
civilian status of the speaker.”); see Brown, 45 M.J. at
395 (first citing Roth, 354 U.S. 476; then citing Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); and then citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
While the Wilcox Court implied that certain categories
of unprotected speech were different in the military,
66 M.J. at 448, the Smith Court rejected this just two
years ago. 85 M.J. at 289-90 (holding that an
abrogated free speech test from this Court did not
apply in the military, despite decades of military
precedent to the contrary).
Ultimately, military law and tradition permit the
Government to restrict servicemember speech to a
greater extent than civilians. However, that greater
restriction comes from the second and third Wilcox
factors, not the first. This means that military courts,
when assessing unprotected categories of speech, rely
wholly on this Court’s jurisprudence.
Despite this, military courts continue to rely on
abrogated obscenity jurisprudence from this Court
when assessing purportedly “indecent” speech. See
discussion at Part II, infra. This Court should grant
review to correct this error of constitutional
magnitude.
12
II. The CAAF’s decisions in French and Meakin
conflict with this Court’s precedent in Miller.
The CAAF’s precedents in French and Meakin rely
on abrogated precedent from this Court for obscenity
cases. French, 31 M.J. at 59 (relying on Roth, 354 U.S.
476); see Meakin, 78 M.J. at 401 (relying on another
CAAF case which, itself, relied on French). But this
Court’s decision in Roth is not the correct obscenity
standard; Miller is. 413 U.S. at 24.
“Indecent” speech in the military is broadly
defined by statute. Because Meakin contains none of
the limiting principles used by this Court in Miller but
nevertheless equates “indecent” to “obscenity,” the
Government can restrict vast amounts of
servicemember speech that would otherwise be
constitutionally protected. This includes sexual
education speech from a military parent to a child and
purely private and consensual intimate partner
speech. Because the CAAF has declined review of this
important issue, only this Court can ensure
servicemember speech is not unduly infringed.
A. Meakin and French relied on abrogated
precedent from this Court.
In both Petitioners’ cases, the Air Force Court
relied on Meakin in finding the speech unprotected.
But the Meakin standard for obscenity conflicts with
the obscenity jurisprudence of this Court.
1. Meakin reaffirmed the erroneous view
that “indecent” speech is synonymous
with the unprotected category of
obscenity.
In Meakin, the CAAF reasoned that “indecent” is
“synonymous with obscene.” 78 M.J. at 401. This
13
means that, so long as the Government proves the
speech is indecent under the applicable statute, the
speech is not protected. This conclusory analysis is
problematic for obvious normative reasons. See
discussion at Parts II.B., infra. But such a standard
also
conflicts
with
this
Court’s
obscenity
jurisprudence.
Under this Court’s decisions, the Government can
regulate speech as obscene only when the Government
proves that:
(1) [An] average person, applying contemporary
community standards would find [the speech],
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest;
(2) [The speech] depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by applicable state law; and
(3) [The speech], taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (cleaned up); see Obscene,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.) (citing Miller, 413
U.S. 15). This Court’s standard requires much more
than merely concluding that “indecent” speech under
a statute is unprotected because all “indecent speech”
is “obscene.” Nevertheless, military courts continue to
use Meakin to guide obscenity analyses. See, e.g.,
Pet.App. 25a-29a, 76a-78a; United States v.
Cunningham, No. ARMY 20220140, 2025 CCA LEXIS
519, at *22 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2025)
(referencing Meakin’s command that all indecent
speech is obscene and, therefore, unprotected).
14
2. Meakin’s origins demonstrate why it
conflicts with this Court’s precedence.
Meakin relied on United States v. Moore, 38 M.J.
490 (C.A.A.F. 1994), for the proposition that
“indecent” and “obscene” are the same. Meakin, 78
M.J. at 401. The Moore Court in turn relied on French,
31 M.J. 57. Moore, 38 M.J. at 492. But the French
Court did not rely on Miller or its progeny. Instead,
and without explanation, the French Court relied on
the abrogated obscenity standard from the pre-Miller
case of Roth, 354 U.S. 476. French, 31 M.J. at 59.
Miller, decided nearly two decades after Roth,
defines the scope of obscenity. Counterman v.
Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 73 (2023) (citing Miller, not
Roth, when discussing the unprotected category of
obscenity); Obscene, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed.) (citing Miller, 413 U.S. 15); cf. Counterman, 600
U.S. at 110 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (highlighting that
while Roth created the unprotected category of
obscenity, the Miller definition controls). Despite the
fact that Miller was decided seventeen years before
French, the CAAF inexplicably relied on an old,
abrogated obscenity case.
While it is not clear why the French Court relied
on Roth instead of Miller, this precedential issue has
striking similarities to another military free speech
case: Smith, 85 M.J. 283. In Smith, the Government
argued that the appellant’s words were “dangerous
speech.” Id. at 289. While the CAAF’s predecessor had
adopted the dangerous speech doctrine, United States
v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 172 (C.M.A. 1967), it was
later abrogated by this Court. Smith, 85 M.J. at 28990 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969)). Despite this abrogation, military courts
15
continued to use the dangerous speech doctrine for
nearly sixty years. See, e.g., Brown, 45 M.J. 389. The
CAAF ultimately held in Smith that the dangerous
speech doctrine was inapplicable in the military
because this Court had abrogated it. 85 M.J. at 290.
This makes sense, since the first factor of the Wilcox
test asks whether the speech is unprotected under this
Court’s jurisprudence, not military precedent.
Despite the CAAF’s recognition that this Court’s
jurisprudence controls for the first Wilcox factor, it
has declined review of the question presented here.
B. Without Miller’s limiting principles,
indecent speech regulations—as defined
by the Manual for Courts-Martial—
restrict constitutionally protected speech.
Indecent speech in the military is defined broadly.
Under 10 U.S.C. § 920b, indecent speech is defined as
that speech that “amounts to a form of immorality
relating to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar,
obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, and
tends to excite the sexual desire or deprave morals
with respect to sexual relations.” A similar definition
exists under 10 U.S.C. § 934, indecent conduct.
Manual for Courts-Martial Part IV, Para. 104(c)(1)
(providing the same definition).
By
abandoning
this
Court’s
obscenity
jurisprudence and equating all indecent speech with
the unprotected category of obscenity, military courts
permit broad restrictions on servicemembers’ free
speech rights without linking the restriction to the
“essential needs” of the Armed Forces. This is true for
both parental speech to children about sexual
education and speech between consenting adults.
Both are constitutionally protected. But without
16
Miller
and
the
Wilcox
balancing
factors,
servicemembers
engaging
in
constitutionally
protected speech are nevertheless subject to criminal
sanction.
1. Meakin’s misinterpretation of the
obscenity
doctrine
permits
the
unconstitutional regulation of parental
discussions with children, even when
those conversations involve sexual
education.
Similar to Miller, this Court has articulated a more
exacting standard for obscenity regulations specific to
minors than Meakin. In Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629, this
Court held that regulation of obscenity for minors was
permissible. Reno, 521 U.S. at 895 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). Material is obscene for minors if it: “(i) is
patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community . . . with respect to what is suitable for
minors; (ii) appeals to the prurient interests of minors;
and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633).
The obscenity for minors standard essentially
mirrors Miller, adjusting it only to reflect that the
standard applies to children. Compare Miller, 413
U.S. at 24, with Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633. Like Miller,
Ginsberg is the standard under this Court’s
jurisprudence that the military courts should be
applying, not Meakin’s conclusory one.
The conclusory logic of Meakin is problematic
because, just like consenting adults, parents who have
conversations of a sexual nature with their children
face criminal sanction, even when done for an
educational purpose. After all, Meakin draws no
17
distinction—so long as speech is “indecent,” it can be
regulated as unprotected speech. This includes speech
about sexual reproduction, even if for a legitimate
educational purpose.
The broad definition of “indecent” speech supports
this. For many, sexual education provided to children
is morally repugnant. Jeffrey L. Hurst, et al., Parents’
Attitudes Towards the Content of Sex Education in the
USA: Associations with Religiosity and Political
Orientation,
NAT.
INST.
HEALTH
(2025),
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10923385/p
df/nihms-1862188.pdf. A prosecutor or jury holding
this view could, within the statutory definition, charge
and convict a servicemember of indecent speech
merely for providing sexual education to their
children.
This Court has previously expressed skepticism
about Government regulation that seeps into a
parent’s right to educate their children about sexual
or romantic affairs. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 878
(discussing the overbroad Communications Decency
Act, especially with regard to parents providing
sexual education); cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65 (2000) (plurality op.) (“[T]he interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children [] is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court.”); Wash. v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (first citing
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); and then
citing Pierce v. Society of Sissters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925))
(“In a long line of cases, we have held that . . . the
‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause
18
includes the rights to . . . direct the education and
upbringing of one’s children.”).
Meakin, along with the broad definition of indecent
speech, permits the restriction of constitutionally
protected speech. This conflicts with both this Court’s
jurisprudence and military law and tradition.
2. Meakin permits the restriction of
purely
private
speech
between
consenting adults. This, too, is
unconstitutional.
The CAAF’s conclusory logic in Meakin also allows
the Government to regulate purely private speech
between consenting adults. 78 M.J. at 402.
This Court has never held such a restriction
constitutional. In fact, in every case where this Court
has upheld a speech restriction as constitutional
under the obscenity doctrine, the subject speech was
of a non-private nature. Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 896-97 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(explaining that obscenity restrictions may implicate
the First Amendment when they regulate speech
between consenting adults). For example, in Miller,
the appellant “conducted a mass mailing campaign to
advertise the sale of . . . ‘adult’ material.” 413 U.S. at
16. This “mass mailing” was, in many cases,
unsolicited. Id. at 16-18. In FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
the appellant aired George Carlin’s infamous “12minute monologue entitled ‘Filthy Words’” at 2:00
P.M. on a Tuesday afternoon over public airways. 438
U.S. 726, 729-30 (1978). In Ginsberg v. New York, the
appellant operated a public lunch counter and sold,
among other things, sexually explicit material to the
public. 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968). And, in Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, appellants owned movie theaters
19
that intended to broadcast “feature-length adult
films.” 475 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1986).
Meakin, in conjunction with the military’s indecent
conduct statutes, has an immense effect on protected
speech. Take, for example, a married couple who
consensually exchange pornographic videos and
images of themselves on a private, online messaging
application. Pornographic videos and images qualify
as obscenity under Miller if they are publicly
broadcast or disseminated to non-consenting
individuals. See Free Speech Coal. v. Paxton, 606 U.S.
461, 466 (2025). But, under the military’s
jurisprudence, the Government could prosecute and
convict a consenting couple for indecent conduct
because there is no carve out for private, consensual
speech. See Meakin, 78 M.J. at 402.
While there may be legitimate reasons for
restricting
servicemembers’
private,
indecent
speech—such as in a deployed environment—such a
restriction cannot be justified under the first Wilcox
factor (i.e., whether it is unprotected speech). Instead,
as military law and tradition demand, such a
regulation must satisfy the second and third Wilcox
factors. This makes sense. The second and third
Wilcox factors balance the essential needs of the
Armed Forces with the free speech interests of the
speaker. These factors, not the first, are better suited
to deal with the unique nature of military service.
CONCLUSION
Military law and tradition require military courts
to use this Court’s jurisprudence for free speech cases.
Despite this, the CAAF has continued to use an
outdated, abrogated obscenity standard to uphold
convictions for “indecent” speech. In doing so, the
20
CAAF has created a dangerous paradigm. Both purely
private speech between consenting adults and sexual
and romantic educational speech by parents can be
regulated as “obscene.” Such a standard conflicts with
this Court’s precedent, military law and tradition, and
offends the core tenets of the First Amendment. This
Court should grant review to correct this
constitutional error.
Respectfully submitted,
TERRI R. ZIMMERMANN
Zimmermann &
Zimmermann, PLLC
PO Box 3699
CONROE, TX 77305
TREVOR N. WARD
Counsel of Record
SAMANTHA M. CASTANIEN
United States Air Force
Appellate Defense Division
1500 West Perimeter Road
Suite 1100
JB Andrews, MD 20762
(240) 612-4770
trevor.ward.1@us.af.mil
Counsel for Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.