Opposition Brief — Chadwick Willacy, Petitioner v. Florida

No. 25-7220

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CHADWICK WILLACY,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 21, 2026, AT 6:00 P.M.

JAMES UTHMEIER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA

Office of the Attorney General

3507 E. Frontage Rd., Ste. 200

Tampa, Florida 33607

Telephone: (813) 287-7900

scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com

capapp@myfloridalegal.com

SCOTT A. BROWNE

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL W. MERVINE

SPECIAL COUNSEL, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL

JONATHAN S. TANNEN

SENIOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

OUNSEL

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

In 1990, Chadwick Willacy brutally murdered his neighbor, Marlys Sather,

after she discovered him burglarizing her home. Willacy beat, bound, and strangled

Ms. Sather, stole her ATM card and vehicle, withdrew money from her account, and

then returned to her home, where he doused her with gasoline and set her on fire.

Ms. Sather died from smoke inhalation. A jury convicted Willacy of burglary, robbery,

arson, and first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death.

On March 6, 2026, a week before any death warrant issued, Willacy sought

broad public records from the Florida Department of Corrections under Florida Rule

of Criminal Procedure 3.852, asserting that the records were needed to determine

whether an Eighth Amendment challenge to the administration of Florida’s lethal

injection protocol could be developed. One week later, on March 13, 2026, Florida

Governor Ron DeSantis signed a death warrant scheduling Willacy’s execution for

April 21, 2026. After the warrant was issued and without filing any postconviction

motion, Willacy expanded his efforts on March 18 by seeking additional records from

the Executive Office of the Governor, the Office of the Attorney General, and the State

Attorney, this time targeting internal and interagency communications and warrantrelated materials. He claimed the records were necessary to determine whether

constitutional violations had occurred in connection with the agencies’ responses to

his earlier additional records demand and the signing of the execution warrant.

The Florida courts denied both the pre-warrant and post-warrant additional

public records demands, concluding that they were not tied to any colorable

i

postconviction claim and therefore impermissible under Florida’s claim-driven

framework governing capital postconviction public records production.

Willacy now seeks certiorari review and asks this Court to consider the

following question:

Do the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, or Eighth Amendment

require a State to provide a capital defendant with access to additional public

records to discover or develop a method-of-execution claim?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iv

OPINION BELOW ......................................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED......................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY................................. 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .............................................................. 8

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 15

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co.,

585 U.S. 33 (2018) ....................................................................................................... 9

Baze v. Rees,

553 U.S. 35 (2008) ............................................................................................... 11, 12

Bucklew v. Precythe,

587 U.S. 119 (2019) ................................................................................................... 14

Cooey v. Strickland,

589 F.3d 210 (6th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................... 13

Damas v. State,

423 So. 3d 816 (Fla. 2025) .......................................................................................... 7

Flynt v. Ohio,

451 U.S. 619 (1981) ................................................................................................... 14

Glossip v. Gross,

576 U.S. 863 (2015) ............................................................................................. 11, 12

Gray v. Netherland,

518 U.S. 152 (1996) ................................................................................................... 10

Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501 U.S. 452 (1991) ..................................................................................................... 9

Herb v. Pitcairn,

324 U.S. 117 (1945) ................................................................................................... 10

In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc.,

683 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1996) ........................................................................................ 11

Jordan v. Mississippi State Executioner,

2025 WL 1752391 (5th Cir. June 24, 2025) ............................................................. 13

Kearse v. State,

428 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 2026) ............................................................................................ 7

Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343 (1996) ................................................................................................... 10

Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976) ................................................................................................... 11

Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ............................................................................................. 2, 10

iv

Montana v. Wyoming,

563 U.S. 368 (2011) ..................................................................................................... 9

Mullaney v. Wilbur,

421 U.S. 684 (1975) ..................................................................................................... 9

Phillips v. DeWine,

841 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2016) ..................................................................................... 11

Pierce County v. Guillen,

537 U.S. 129 (2003) ..................................................................................................... 1

Sawyer v. Whitley,

505 U.S. 333 (1992) ................................................................................................... 14

State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,

329 U.S. 459 (1947) ................................................................................................... 12

Wainwright v. Goode,

464 U.S. 78 (1983) ....................................................................................................... 9

Wellons v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,

754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) ........................................................................... 10, 11

West v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co.,

311 U.S. 223 (1940) ..................................................................................................... 9

Willacy v. Jones,

No. SC16-497, 2017 WL 1033679 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2017) ............................................. 3

Willacy v. McNeil,

33 So. 3d 36 (Fla. 2010) .............................................................................................. 3

Willacy v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.,

2014 WL 3594213 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2014), aff'd, 703 F. App'x 744 (11th Cir.

2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 964 (2018) ..................................................................... 3

Willacy v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.,

No. 6:08-CV-619, 2018 WL 11244847 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2018) ............................. 3

Willacy v. State,

90 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 2012) ............................................................................................ 3

Willacy v. State,

238 So. 3d 100 (Fla. 2018) .......................................................................................... 3

Willacy v. State,

314 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 2021) .......................................................................................... 3

Willacy v. State,

640 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1994) ........................................................................................ 2

Willacy v. State,

696 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1997) .......................................................................................... 3

v

Willacy v. State,

967 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2007) ...................................................................................... 2, 3

Willacy v. State,

No. SC2026-0483, 2026 WL 880900 (Fla. Mar. 31, 2026) ......................................... 5

Willacy v. State,

Nos. SC2026-0519 & SC2026-0526,

2026 WL 1021168 (Fla. Apr. 15, 2026) ................................. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14

Williams v. Hobbs,

658 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................... 11

Zakrzewski v. State,

415 So. 3d 203 (Fla. 2024) .......................................................................................... 7

Zink v. Lombardi,

783 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2015) ................................................................................... 11

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ........................................................................................................ 1

28 U.S.C. § 2254 ............................................................................................................. 3

Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution ........................................................... 5

Rules

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(i)(2)(A)-(D) ............................................................................... 10

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142(c) ..................................................... 1, 6, 14

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 ................................................. i, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9

Rule 3.852(h) and (i) .................................................................................................... 11

vi

OPINION BELOW

The decision of the Florida Supreme Court is reported at Willacy v. State, Nos.

SC2026-0519 & SC2026-0526, 2026 WL 1021168 (Fla. Apr. 15, 2026).

JURISDICTION

Willacy invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), but that

statute authorizes review only of “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the

highest court of a State.” “As a general matter, to be reviewed by this Court, a statecourt judgment must be final as an effective determination of the litigation and not

of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein.” Pierce County v. Guillen, 537

U.S. 129, 140 (2003) (internal citation and quotation omitted). The decision below is

not final. The Florida Supreme Court did not adjudicate any claim attacking the

validity of Willacy’s conviction or sentence. Instead, it exercised limited jurisdiction

to review a nonfinal discovery order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure

9.142(c). In doing so, the court applied a deferential standard, asking only whether

the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law. Willacy, 2026 WL

1021168, at *6-7. Because the decision below resolves only a case-specific discovery

dispute and leaves all substantive claims untouched, it is not a final judgment.

In any event, this Court lacks jurisdiction for the independent reason that the

decision rests on adequate and independent state law grounds. The Florida Supreme

Court denied relief based on Willacy’s failure to satisfy state law requirements

governing postconviction discovery, specifically, the settled rule that such requests

must be tied to a colorable claim for postconviction relief. Id. at *5-6. That state law

1

determination is sufficient to support the lower court’s decision and foreclose this

Court’s review. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The State accepts Willacy’s statement of the constitutional provisions involved.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Willacy was sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of Marlys Sather.

She was Willacy’s neighbor who returned home unexpectedly on September 5, 1990,

and caught him burglarizing her home. Willacy bludgeoned Ms. Sather, bound her

ankles with wire and duct tape, and strangled her with such force that a portion of

her skull was dislodged. He then stole her ATM card and car keys, withdrew money

from her bank account, and returned to her home. There, he disabled the smoke

detectors, doused Ms. Sather with gasoline, positioned a fan to intensify the flames,

and set her on fire. She died from smoke inhalation. Willacy v. State, 967 So. 2d 131,

135 (Fla. 2007).

Conviction and Death Sentence

A jury convicted Willacy in 1991 of burglary, robbery, arson, and first-degree

murder and recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed. The

Florida Supreme Court affirmed his convictions but vacated his sentence and

remanded for a new penalty phase. Willacy v. State, 640 So. 2d 1079, 1084 (Fla. 1994).

On remand, a jury again recommended death, and the trial court imposed a death

sentence supported by five aggravating factors and no statutory mitigation. The trial

2

court gave multiple nonstatutory mitigators little weight. Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d

693, 694-95 (Fla.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 970 (1997).

State and Federal Collateral Proceedings

Over the ensuing decades, Willacy pursued extensive postconviction and

habeas litigation in both state and federal courts. Each effort failed. See Willacy v.

State, 967 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2007) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus and

affirming denial of initial motion for postconviction relief), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1265

(2008); Willacy v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 6:08-CV-619, 2014 WL 3594213 (M.D. Fla.

July 18, 2014) (denying 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition), aff’d, 703 F. App'x 744 (11th Cir.

2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 964 (2018); Willacy v. McNeil, 33 So. 3d 36 (Fla. 2010)

(denying successive petition for writ of habeas corpus); Willacy v. State, 90 So. 3d 822

(Fla. 2012) (affirming denial of first successive motion for postconviction relief), cert.

denied, 568 U.S. 1147 (2013); Willacy v. Jones, No. SC16-497, 2017 WL 1033679 (Fla.

Mar. 17, 2017) (denying second successive petition for writ of habeas corpus); Willacy

v. State, 238 So. 3d 100 (Fla.) (affirming denial of second successive postconviction

motion), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 866 (2018); Willacy v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 6:08CV-619, 2018 WL 11244847 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2018) (denying motion to alter or

amend judgment); Willacy v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 18-13072 (11th Cir. Apr. 19,

2019) (denial of certificate of appealability); Willacy v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 2112460 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021) (denial of petition seeking leave to file a successive

habeas petition); Willacy v. State, 314 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 2021) (affirming denial of third

successive postconviction motion).

3

Proceedings Under Warrant

On March 13, 2026, Governor Ron DeSantis signed a death warrant scheduling

Willacy’s execution for April 21, 2026, at 6:00 p.m. Willacy, 2026 WL 1021168, at *1.

One week earlier, on March 6, 2026, Willacy served a supplemental public records

demand on the Florida Department of Corrections pursuant to Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.852, which governs capital postconviction public records

production. That demand sought expansive categories of records generated after

March 1, 2025, relating to virtually every aspect of the administration of Florida’s

lethal injection protocol, including execution team training, execution logs and

compliance verification, drug acquisition and administration procedures, monitoring

data, methods for assessing consciousness and confirming death, and post-execution

debriefings. Id. at *4. Willacy asserted that the records were necessary to determine

whether the Florida Department of Corrections was complying with its protocol and

whether a constitutional violation might exist. Id. at *5.

After the warrant was issued, Willacy expanded his efforts, serving additional

demands on the Executive Office of the Governor, the Office of the Attorney General,

the State Attorney, and the Florida Department of Corrections, seeking broad

internal and interagency communications regarding the signing of the execution

warrant and his March 6 records request. Id. at *4. He argued that the records were

necessary to determine whether the agencies were communicating about the March

6 public records demand, and whether the signing of the execution warrant was

responsive to that demand. Id. In written objections, the agencies argued, inter alia,

4

that Willacy’s requests should be denied because they were unrelated to any colorable

claim for postconviction relief, a prerequisite showing for obtaining additional public

records under Rule 3.852(h) and (i). Id. at *5.

During the circuit court’s hearing, Willacy argued that the denial of the records

requests would violate his right to access public records under article I, section 24 of

the Florida Constitution and his federal rights to due process and equal protection

under the United States Constitution. Id. at *3. Following argument, the circuit court

sustained the agencies’ objections. Id. at *4.

Critically, Willacy never filed a successive motion for postconviction relief, and

the time set by the state circuit court for him to do so expired. His requests thus

sought records not to support any pending claim, but to determine whether one might

exist. See id. at *3. And his subsequent litigation posture only reinforces that defect.

Rather than presenting a cognizable postconviction claim, Willacy repeatedly sought

review of the circuit court’s denial of his record demands. He first pursued mandamus

relief, which the Florida Supreme Court denied. Willacy v. State, No. SC2026-0483,

2026 WL 880900, at *1 (Fla. Mar. 31, 2026). And after the post-warrant proceedings

in the state circuit court concluded, he again sought review, this time through a

petition for writ of habeas corpus and a direct appeal.

The Florida Supreme Court denied relief in all respects. The court held that

interlocutory discovery orders are not cognizable in a habeas corpus petition under

state law. Willacy, 2026 WL 1021168, at *7. Further, the court exercised limited

jurisdiction by treating the appeal as a petition under Florida Rule of Appellate

5

Procedure 9.142(c), which governs review of nonfinal orders in capital postconviction

proceedings. Id. at *3-4. At the same time, the court dismissed Willacy’s attempt to

obtain review of the denial of his motion for an extension of time, explaining that the

issue was not tied to any cognizable postconviction claim for relief and therefore

constituted a nonappealable interlocutory matter. Id. at *3.

Applying the state’s certiorari standard governing such nonfinal review, the

court explained that Willacy was required to demonstrate both irreparable harm and

a departure from the essential requirements of law. Id. at *4. Although the court

assumed for argument’s sake that Willacy could satisfy the irreparable harm

requirement given the impending execution, it held that he failed to establish any

legal error. Id. at *4-5.

The court concluded that Willacy’s requests were properly denied because they

were not connected to any colorable claim for postconviction relief, as required by

longstanding Florida precedent. Id. at *5-6. Rule 3.852, the court explained, is a

limited discovery mechanism designed to facilitate the development of existing

claims; it does not authorize “fishing expeditions” aimed at uncovering whether a

claim might exist. Id. at *5. Willacy’s March 6 request was therefore deficient because

it was premised on speculation rather than any identified constitutional violation. Id.

The same defect applied to Willacy’s March 18 requests. Even accepting

Willacy’s theory that such communications might exist, the court explained that they

would not establish any cognizable ground for postconviction relief. Id. at *6.

Challenges to the Governor’s decision to issue a death warrant, or communications

6

among executive branch officials, do not provide a basis for relief from a criminal

judgment or sentence. Id. Accordingly, those requests likewise amounted to

impermissible attempts at exploratory discovery. Id.

The court further rejected Willacy’s attempt to frame the denial of records as

violating due process, equal protection, or access to courts, emphasizing that it had

repeatedly rejected materially indistinguishable arguments in recent decisions. Id. at

*6 (citing King v. State, No. SC2026-0336, 2026 WL 672101, at *5-6 (Fla. Mar. 10,

2026) (rejecting due process and equal protection challenge to denial of public records

request untethered to a colorable claim for postconviction relief), cert. denied, 2026

WL 730666 (U.S. Mar. 16, 2026); Kearse v. State, 428 So. 3d 75, 81 (Fla. 2026) (same),

cert. denied, 2026 WL 586905 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2026); Damas v. State, 423 So. 3d 816,

823 (Fla. 2025) (same); Zakrzewski v. State, 415 So. 3d 203, 211-12 (Fla. 2024) (same),

cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 57 (2025)). As in those cases, the court concluded that because

Willacy failed to identify any divergence from protocol or other factual basis

supporting a constitutional claim, the denial of records did not implicate

constitutional rights. Id. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of Willacy’s request

for an in camera inspection, explaining that such review is discretionary and not

required where the defendant offers only speculation that relevant material might

exist. Id. at *6-7.

Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not

depart from the essential requirements of law in denying the requests, because

Willacy sought records to discover whether a claim might exist rather than to support

7

a colorable postconviction claim—a use of Rule 3.852 foreclosed by longstanding state

law precedent. Id.

Now, less than a week before his scheduled execution, Willacy petitions this

Court and seeks review of the following question:

Do the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, or Eighth Amendment

require a State to provide a capital defendant with access to additional public

records to discover or develop a method-of-execution claim?

The State opposes certiorari.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The petition does not warrant review. It arises from a case-specific discovery

dispute involving public records requests concededly untethered to a colorable claim

for postconviction relief, and the decision below rests on independent and adequate

state law grounds, is consistent with settled federal law, and creates no conflict

warranting this Court’s intervention. The case is also a poor vehicle, as the Florida

Supreme Court reviewed only a nonfinal discovery ruling under a deferential

interlocutory appellate standard, and Willacy’s failure to identify a colorable

postconviction claim independently forecloses relief. In essence, the petition seeks to

constitutionalize a right to discovery in search of a postconviction claim, a proposition

this Court’s precedent forecloses. Further review is unwarranted.

I.

The Decision Rests on Adequate and Independent State Grounds.

This Court lacks jurisdiction because the Florida Supreme Court’s decision

rests on adequate and independent state law grounds. It is a “fundamental principle”

that “our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States

8

and the Federal Government.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). While

this Court is the highest authority on the interpretation of federal law, “[t]he highest

court of each State, of course, remains ‘the final arbiter of what is state law.’”

Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 377 n.5 (2011) (quoting West v. Am. Telephone &

Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940)). As a consequence, “the views of the state’s

highest court with respect to state law are binding on the federal courts.” Wainwright

v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983); see also Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome

Pharm. Co., 585 U.S. 33, 44 (2018); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975).

That principle controls here. Although Willacy invokes due process and equal

protection, the decision below turns on the Florida courts’ application of their settled,

claim-driven framework for capital postconviction public records demands. Under

Rule 3.852, a capital defendant is not entitled to free-ranging access to public records.

Instead, the rule conditions any additional records production on a series of threshold

showings: the defendant must identify specific materials not already available in the

central records repository, demonstrate that the requested records are relevant to a

postconviction proceeding under Rule 3.851 or reasonably calculated to lead to

admissible evidence, and ensure that the request is narrowly tailored and not unduly

burdensome. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(i)(2)(A)-(D). This framework reflects Florida’s

settled precedent that postconviction additional public record requests serve to

develop existing claims, not to search for new ones.

Applying those standards, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Willacy

failed to satisfy Rule 3.852’s threshold requirements because his requests were not

9

tied to any colorable postconviction claim. See Willacy, 2026 WL 1021168, at *5-6.

Instead, as the court explained, Willacy sought discovery to determine whether such

a claim might exist. Id. at *5. That determination is dispositive as a matter of state

law and fully sufficient to support the decision. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041-42.

Willacy’s effort to recast that state law ruling as a federal constitutional

violation does not alter the jurisdictional analysis. This Court “correct[s] wrong

judgments” only insofar as they “incorrectly adjudge federal rights,” not to revisit a

state court’s interpretation of its own procedural rules. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117,

125 (1945). Because the judgment below rests on independent and adequate state

grounds, this Court lacks authority to review it.

II.

The Decision Below Correctly Applies Settled Federal Law.

Even if jurisdiction existed, the decision below is correct and presents no

unsettled question of federal law. Willacy’s claims rest on a premise this Court has

repeatedly rejected: that the Constitution entitles a litigant to obtain discovery in

order to identify or develop a claim. It does not. The right of access to courts

guarantees only the ability to bring claims, not to discover them, and due process has

“little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded.”

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-56 (1996); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 168

(1996).

Consistent with those principles, lower courts have uniformly rejected

assertions that capital defendants possess a constitutional right to obtain executionrelated information. See Wellons v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260, 1267

10

(11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting claim that due process or the First Amendment entitles a

capital defendant to disclosure of execution-drug information); Zink v. Lombardi, 783

F.3d 1089, 1108 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding inmates have no constitutional

right to information about the source of execution drugs and rejecting access-to-courts

and due process theories); Williams v. Hobbs, 658 F.3d 842, 851-52 (8th Cir. 2011)

(rejecting claim that lack of information about execution procedures violates due

process or the right of access to courts); Phillips v. DeWine, 841 F.3d 405, 419-20 (6th

Cir. 2016) (rejecting access-to-courts challenge to limits on disclosure of execution

procedures).

That settled framework forecloses Willacy’s theories. He does not contend that

he is unable to bring an Eighth Amendment claim; he asserts only that he lacks

information to discover one. But the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to be

heard, not a right to conduct open-ended discovery in search of a claim. See Mathews

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Williams, 658 F.3d at 852. In any event, Willacy

received all the process he was due, including notice, a hearing, and appellate review.

Nor do Willacy’s remaining constitutional theories alter that conclusion. His

equal protection claim fails because he is not similarly situated to members of the

general public; he seeks records through a specialized, litigation-specific framework

governing capital postconviction proceedings. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852; In re Amends. to

Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc., 683 So. 2d 475, 476 (Fla. 1996). And his Eighth Amendment

claim rests on speculation, which cannot establish a substantial risk of severe pain.

See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53-55 (2008); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 877 (2015).

11

At most, Willacy hypothesizes that protocol deviations may have occurred, might

recur, and could result in unconstitutional pain. That conjecture is insufficient,

particularly given the presumption that state officials follow established procedures

absent concrete evidence to the contrary. State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329

U.S. 459, 462 (1947). Willacy also failed to identify any alternative execution method

that would be “feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[] a

substantial risk of severe pain,” a necessary element of any method-of-execution

challenge. Glossip, 576 U.S. at 877 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 52).

Willacy received all the process the Constitution requires: notice, a hearing,

and appellate review. What he seeks is something more, a constitutional right to

discovery untethered to any colorable postconviction claim. This Court’s precedent

forecloses that theory.

III.

The Petition Raises No Conflict and No Important Federal Question.

The petition identifies no conflict among state courts of last resort or federal

courts of appeals, and no conflict between the Florida Supreme Court’s decision and

any decision of this Court. On the contrary, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision is

fully consistent with this Court’s precedent and with the uniform approach of lower

courts rejecting materially indistinguishable claims. Nor does Willacy identify any

authority supporting the rule he proposes that the Constitution requires discovery to

identify or develop a claim. The absence of such authority confirms that this case does

not present an important or unsettled question of federal law. Instead, it involves a

routine application of settled principles to a fact-specific discovery dispute. See

12

Willacy, 2026 WL 1021168, at *5-6. That is not a basis for certiorari review. The

absence of any supporting authority and the uniform rejection of Willacy’s theory

confirm that this case does not warrant this Court’s review.

IV.

This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle for Review.

This case would be a poor vehicle for addressing any federal question even if

one were presented. The factual dispute about whether deviations occurred alone

means there are far better potential vehicles (even if this Court were inclined to take

up the question of whether there is a constitutional right to discovery in state-court

postconviction proceedings). See, e.g., Jordan v. Mississippi State Executioner, No. 2570013, 2025 WL 1752391, at *2-3 & n.2 (5th Cir. June 24, 2025) (noting prison

officials admitted they “did not strictly follow the execution protocol” regarding

consciousness checks in prior executions), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2834 (2025); Cooey

v. Strickland, 589 F.3d 210, 224 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding even proof of past medical

negligence insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment claim and noting the

Eighth Circuit has held the same in a case alleging “a series of mistakes in

administration of the protocol”). A case with uncontested deviations in prior

executions provides a far better vehicle than this post-warrant case with a sharp

disagreement about whether any deviations occurred at all.

Most importantly, Willacy never filed a successive motion for postconviction

relief, and the time to do so has expired. The case therefore arises as a freestanding

discovery dispute unconnected to any live claim for relief. The Florida Supreme

Court’s decision reflects that posture. It exercised limited jurisdiction to review a

13

nonfinal discovery order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142(c) and

applied a deferential standard, asking only whether the circuit court departed from

the essential requirements of law. See Willacy, 2026 WL 1021168, at *6-7. The court

likewise declined to address issues not tied to any claim for relief. Id. at *4.

Certiorari is not granted to review interlocutory discovery rulings. See Flynt v.

Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 620 (1981). And the posture here would independently prevent

this Court from reaching any broader question. This case thus arrives as a

freestanding discovery dispute, wholly unconnected to any viable claim for relief.

Finally, granting Willacy the full relief he seeks from this Court would not

assure him substantive relief on his Eighth Amendment claim. At most, he would

receive a remand and, perhaps, evidentiary development. But the only thing he would

be assured is a prolonged delay before the State can set another execution date.

Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 149 (2019) (noting a capital defendant who filed a

method-of-execution suit just days before his scheduled execution obtained a stay and

litigated that suit for five years and through several other stays and delays). This

Court should not use the extraordinary power of certiorari to intervene in an

execution when there is little certainty the defendant would obtain substantive relief

instead of mere delay. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 n.7 (1992) (“A court

may resolve against” a last-minute capital litigant “doubts and uncertainties” on “the

sufficiency of his submission.”).

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CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. The decision below rests

on independent and adequate state law grounds, is consistent with this Court’s

precedent, and presents no conflict or important question warranting review. This

case arrives in a procedurally defective posture, involving only a fact-bound discovery

ruling untethered to any colorable claim for postconviction relief. Willacy’s attempt

to recast that ruling as a constitutional violation provides no basis for this Court’s

intervention.

JAMES UTHMEIER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA

Office of the Attorney General

3507 E. Frontage Rd., Ste. 200

Tampa, Florida 33607

Telephone: (813) 287-7900

scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com

capapp@myfloridalegal.com

/S/ SCOTT A. BROWNE

SCOTT A. BROWNE

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL W. MERVINE

Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General

JONATHAN S. TANNEN

Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

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