Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Joseph Sowe, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefApr 7, 2026
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No. ______________
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
Joseph Sowe,
Petitioner,
v.
United States of America,
Respondent.
___________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
___________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
___________
Jason D. Hawkins
Federal Public Defender
Maria Gabriela Vega
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Federal Public Defender’s Office
Northern District of Texas
525 South Griffin Street, Suite 629
Dallas, TX 75202
(214) 767-2746
gabriela_vega@fd.org
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment.
2.
Whether Congress may criminalize intrastate firearm possession based
solely on the firearm crossing state lines at some point before the defendant came to
possess it.
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner is Joseph Sowe, who was the Defendant-Appellant in the court below. Respondent, the United States of America, was the Plaintiff-Appellee in the court
below.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States v. Sowe, No. 3:21-cr-00357-N, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Judgment entered on July 7, 2025.
United States v. Sowe, Nos. 25-10821, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Judgment entered on January 7, 2026.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented ....................................................................................................... i
Parties to the Proceeding .............................................................................................. ii
Related Proceedings....................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... iii
Appendices .................................................................................................................... iv
Table of Authorities ....................................................................................................... v
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari .................................................................................... 1
Opinions Below .............................................................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................... 1
Provisions Involved ........................................................................................................ 1
Statement of the Case ................................................................................................... 2
I.
Facts and Proceedings in District Court....................................................... 2
II.
Appellate Proceedings ................................................................................... 4
Reasons For Granting This Petition ............................................................................. 4
I.
Lower courts require guidance on how to adjudicate Second Amendment
challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prosecutions. ......................................... 4
II.
In any event, this Court should hold the instant petition pending the
outcome in United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. argued Mar. 2,
2026). .............................................................................................................. 9
III.
This Court should delineate the boundaries of federal authority under the
Commerce Clause in the firearm context. .................................................. 11
A.
Federal appellate courts differ on the relationship between
Scarborough and Lopez. .................................................................... 13
B.
An unchecked Commerce power would significantly expand
Congress’s reach into state affairs. .................................................. 16
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 17
iii
APPENDICES
Appendix A Opinion, United States v. Sowe, No. 25-10821
(5th Cir. January 7, 2026) ........................................ Pet. App’x a001–002
Appendix B Judgment and Sentence, United States v. Sowe, No. 3:21-cr-00357-N
(N.D. Tex. July 7, 2025) ......................................... Pet. App’x a003–a009
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Federal Cases
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) ................................................................................................ 16
Alderman v. United States,
562 U.S. 1163 (2011) ....................................................................................... 13, 16
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008) .................................................................................................. 7
Kanter v. Barr,
919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................... 9
Lawrence on Behalf of Lawrence v. Chater,
516 U.S. 163 (1996) ................................................................................................ 10
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012) ................................................................................................ 17
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022) ...................................................................................................... 5
Pitsilides v. Barr,
128 F.4th 203 (3d Cir. 2025) .................................................................................... 9
Range v. Att’y Gen.,
124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc) ................................................................ 8, 9
Scarborough v. United States,
431 U.S. 563 (1977) ................................................................................................ 11
United States v. Bishop,
66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) ...................................................................................... 14
United States v. Chesney,
86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996) .............................................................................. 15, 16
United States v. Cockerham,
162 F.4th 500 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................... 8
United States v. Cortes,
299 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................ 14
v
United States v. Crump,
120 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................. 15
United States v. Diaz,
116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024) ......................................................................... 4, 8, 10
United States v. Dorris,
236 F.3d 582 (10th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................ 15
United States v. Doucet,
No. 24-30656, 2025 WL 3515404 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025) ........................................ 8
United States v. Duarte,
101 F.4th 657 (9th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................... 8
United States v. Duarte,
137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) ............................................................................... 7, 8
United States v. Dubois,
94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 145
S. Ct. 1041 (2025) ..................................................................................................... 7
United States v. Gateward,
84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................... 15
United States v. Hanna,
55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................. 15
United States v. Hemani,
No. 24-1234 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2026) ............................................................ 9, 10
United States v. Hembree,
165 F.4th 909 (5th Cir. 2026) ................................................................................... 8
United States v. Hunt,
123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................... 7
United States v. Jackson,
110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................. 7
United States v. Johnson,
42 F.4th 743 (7th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................... 11
United States v. Kimble,
142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................... 9
vi
United States v. Kirk,
105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................. 13
United States v. Kuban,
94 F.3d 971 (5th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................... 13
United States v. Lemons,
302 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................. 15
United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) ........................................................................ 11, 12, 13, 16, 17
United States v. Mitchell,
160 F.4th 169 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................... 8
United States v. Moore,
666 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................... 4
United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) .................................................................................... 13, 16, 17
United States v. Patterson,
853 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................. 14
United States v. Patton,
451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................ 14
United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. 680 (2024) ........................................................................................ 5, 6, 13
United States v. Rawls,
85 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................. 14, 15
United States v. Santiago,
238 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2001) ................................................................................... 15
United States v. Schnur,
132 F.4th 863 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................... 9
United States v. Seekins,
52 F.4th 988 (5th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................. 11, 16
United States v. Shelton,
66 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................... 15
United States v. Smith,
101 F.3d 202 (1st Cir. 1996) ................................................................................... 15
vii
United States v. Sowe,
No. 25-10821, 2026 WL 45255 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (reprinted at
Pet. App’x a001–a002) .............................................................................................. 4
United States v. Williams,
113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................... 8, 9
United States v. Wright,
607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................ 15
Vincent v. Bondi,
127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025) ............................................................................... 7
Zherka v. Bondi,
140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025) .................................................................................. 7, 8
Federal Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) .......................................................................................... 2, 4, 6, 8
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) ...................................................................................................... 9
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) ........................................................................................................ 11
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................................................................ 1
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, § 1202, 82 Stat. 197 ........................................................................................ 11
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. Amendment II ........................................................................................ 1, 4
U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, cl. 3 ................................................................................. 1, 16
United States Constitution Second Amendment ......................................................... 4
Other Authorities
Br. for the United States, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S.
Dec. 12, 2025), 2025 WL 3708950, at *10, at *37-40 ............................................ 10
Pet. for Cert., United States v. Cockerham, No. 25-1029 (U.S. Feb. 27,
2026), 2026 WL 596482 .......................................................................................... 10
Pet. for Cert., United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. June 2,
2025), 2025 WL 1593262 .......................................................................................... 9
viii
Reply Br. for the United States, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234
(U.S. Feb. 19, 2026), 2026 WL 499787 .................................................................. 10
Tr. Oral Argument, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. Mar. 2,
2026)........................................................................................................................ 10
ix
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Joseph Sowe seeks a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished opinion is available at United States v. Sowe,
No. 25-10821, 2026 WL 45255 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026). It is reprinted in Appendix A to
this Petition. The district court’s judgment and sentence in United States v. Sowe,
No. 3:21-cr-00357-N (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2025), is reprinted in Appendix B.
JURISDICTION
The Fifth Circuit entered judgment on January 7, 2026. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes[.]
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.
U.S. Const. amend. II.
1
Section 922(g)(1) of Title 18, which provides in relevant part:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year…
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
Facts and Proceedings in District Court
In 2009, at age 17, Joseph Sowe was convicted of burglary of a habitation, for
which he ultimately received a three-year imprisonment sentence. ROA.247-48.1 He
was released on parole in late 2011 and discharged the sentence in late 2013.
ROA.247-48. More than seven years later, on February 11, 2021, Sowe backed his
vehicle into another car in a 7-Eleven parking lot. ROA.244. Local police officers observed the accident and approached. ROA.244. Sowe slowly drove away until officers
knocked on his driver’s side window, ordering him to stop. ROA.244. When Sowe went
to step out, officers smelled marijuana. ROA.244. They also saw what they suspected
to be a bag of marijuana on the center console and a blunt in the ashtray. ROA.244.
Sowe volunteered that there was more marijuana in the glove compartment.
ROA.244. When officers went to look, they discovered a Smith and Wesson, Model
SD40VE, .40-caliber pistol bearing Serial No. FYZ8683, between the middle console
1 “ROA” refers to Record On Appeal.
2
and passenger seat. ROA.244. This discovery led to Sowe’s federal indictment for unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ROA.1214.
Sowe moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional because it violated the Second Amendment and lay beyond the scope of Congress’s commerce power. ROA.84-104. The district court denied the motion. ROA.11618. Sowe then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. ROA.185, 257. As part of his
guilty plea, Sowe executed a written stipulation of facts where he admitted that “he
knowingly possessed, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce,” the Smith
and Wesson pistol. ROA.121. Sowe also admitted that “he had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” and
that he knew it before the possession. ROA.121. The stipulation, however, did not
specify when or how Sowe obtained the firearm, when the firearm last traveled in
commerce, or whether Sowe’s conduct or even a commercial transaction caused the
firearm’s last movement in commerce. ROA.121. It also did not detail Sowe’s criminal
history. ROA.121.
During the presentence investigation, U.S. Probation found that Sowe had
been convicted of felony escape in addition to the burglary in 2009. ROA.247-48. The
presentence report also settled on the following guideline calculations: Offense Level
14, Criminal History Category IV, and advisory guideline range of 27–33 months imprisonment. ROA.257. The district court adopted these calculations at sentencing.
3
ROA.274. But the district court also granted a downward departure due to overrepresentation of criminal history. ROA.235. Thus, the court sentenced Sowe using a 21–
27 months guideline range as the sentencing anchor. ROA.235. The district court imposed 21 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. ROA.23536, see also Pet. App’x a004–a005.
II.
Appellate Proceedings
Sowe raised three challenges to his § 922(g)(1) conviction on appeal. First,
Sowe pressed his disagreement with how precedent interprets “in or affecting commerce” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Second, Sowe argued that, if properly interpreted, Congress exceeded its commerce power when it enacted § 922(g). Third, Sowe maintained
that his § 922(g)(1) conviction could not pass constitutional muster under the Second
Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. United States v. Sowe,
No. 25-10821, 2026 WL 45255 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (reprinted at Pet. App’x a001–
a002). The panel held that Sowe’s challenges were all foreclosed, relying on United
States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471–72 (5th Cir. 2024), to dispose of the Second Amendment challenge. 2026 WL 45255, at *1; Pet. App’x a002.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION
I.
Lower courts require guidance on how to adjudicate Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prosecutions.
The Second Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to keep and bear
arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Yet § 922(g)(1) denies that right to anyone previously
convicted of a crime punishable by a year or more. Historically, Second Amendment
4
challenges to § 922(g)(1) prosecutions uniformly failed. See United States v. Moore,
666 F.3d 313, 316–17 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting authorities). But New York State Rifle
& Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), changed the legal landscape.
Now “[w]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct,” the government must “justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S.
at 24. No longer may the government defend a regulation by showing that it is narrowly tailored to achieve an important or even compelling state interest. Id. at 17–
24. As for the “historical inquiry” courts must conduct, “whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation” depends on
“whether the two regulations are ‘relevantly similar.’” Id. at 28–29 (quoting C. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 (1993)). Relevant similarity, as sketched out by Bruen, means that the regulations must match on “how and
why” the Second Amendment right is burdened. Id. at 29. Otherwise stated, “whether
modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed
self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified are central considerations….” Id. (cleaned up).
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), then applied Bruen to a federal
firearm crime. But Rahimi “conclude[d] only this: An individual found by a court to
pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed
consistent with the Second Amendment.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 702 (emphasis added).
True, Rahimi clarified that “the appropriate analysis involves considering whether
5
the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Id. at 692 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26–31) (emphasis added). And it
found that “Section 922(g)(8)[’s]…prohibition on the possession of firearms by those
found by a court to present a threat to others fits neatly within the tradition th[at]
surety and going armed laws,” both “founding era regimes,” “represent.” Id. at 698.
But Rahimi’s reasoning left unresolved whether the government could invoke this
tradition to justify a statute like § 922(g)(1), which imposes a permanent firearm possession ban regardless of any threat, judicially determined or otherwise, that an individual person may pose.
Rahimi thus still left lower courts “at sea when it comes to evaluating”
§ 922(g)(1), placing the court in acute “need [of] a solid anchor for grounding their
constitutional pronouncements.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 747 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Lacking that guidance, “lower courts applying Bruen’s approach have been unable to
produce consistent, principled results, and, in fact, they have come to conflicting conclusions on virtually every consequential Second Amendment issue to come before
them.” Id. at 743 (Jackson, J., concurring) (cleaned up). Some circuits see no need to
conduct Bruen’s text-and-history analysis in the § 922(g)(1) context, relying instead
on Supreme Court dicta predating Bruen. Others apply Bruen’s text-and-history
framework but disagree about whether felons are part of “the people” protected by
the Second Amendment. The courts of appeals have also split on the traditions that
justify § 922(g)(1), and they vary as to whether the statute is vulnerable to as-applied
challenges.
6
To start, the Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
“have upheld the categorical application of § 922(g)(1) to all felons.” United States v.
Duarte, 137 F.4th 743, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th
697, 707–08 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1129 (8th Cir.
2024); Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 2025); United States v.
Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 145 S.
Ct. 1041 (2025)); Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68, 75, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2025). Each placed
significant weight on this Court’s statement in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008), that “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons” are “presumptively lawful.” See Hunt, 123 F.4th at 703–04; Jackson, 110 F.4th
at 1128–29 Vincent, 127 F.4th at 1265; Dubois, 94 F.4th at 1293; Duarte, 137 F.4th
at 750–52; Zherka, 140 F.4th at 75 (relying on pre-Bruen precedent that cited Heller’s
presumptively lawful language to conclude that the statute is facially constitutional).
The Second, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits went even farther. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that both the text and history supported the exclusion of felons
from the arms-bearing right. See Hunt, 123 F.4th at 704–08. The Eighth Circuit
reached the same end point based on the history alone. See Jackson, 110 F.4th at
1126–29. The en banc Ninth Circuit “agree[d] with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits
that…historical tradition is sufficient to uphold the application of § 922(g)(1) to all
felons.” Duarte, 137 F.4th at 761 (citing Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1127–28; Hunt, 123
7
F.4th at 706).2 The Second Circuit later joined the ranks on this side of the split.
Zherka, 140 F.4th at 78–79.
On the other end, the Sixth Circuit has endorsed that Ҥ 922(g)(1) might be
unconstitutional as applied to at least some felons.” Duarte, 137 F.4th at 748 (citing
United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 661–62 (6th Cir. 2024)). “[T]he Third Circuit
has held that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to a felon who was convicted
of making a false statement to secure food stamps.” Duarte, 137 F.4th at 748 (citing
Range v. Att’y Gen., 124 F.4th 218, 222–23 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc)). And the Fifth
Circuit has reversed § 922(g)(1) convictions on as-applied grounds. See United States
v. Hembree, 165 F.4th 909, 910 (5th Cir. 2026); United States v. Cockerham, 162 F.4th
500 (5th Cir. 2025); United States v. Mitchell, 160 F.4th 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2025);
United States v. Doucet, No. 24-30656, 2025 WL 3515404 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025). See
also United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 469–70 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2024) (first opening
the door to as-applied constitutional challenges post-Bruen).
The Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits agree Heller’s “presumptively lawful” dicta
could not “supplant the most recent analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in
Rahimi….” Diaz, 116 F.4th at 466. See also Range, 124 F.4th at 224–25; Williams,
113 F.4th at 646. But on the history, the Fifth Circuit alone endorsed capital punishment at the founding as the dispositive historical analogue, see Diaz, 116 F.4th at
2 In Duarte, the en banc Ninth Circuit overruled a panel opinion holding the statute
unconstitutional as applied to a person with prior convictions for vandalism, drug
possession, and evading arrest. See United States v. Duarte, 101 F.4th 657, 661–63
(9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 108 F.4th 786 (9th Cir. 2024), on
reh’g en banc, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025).
8
467–70, whereas the Third Circuit found the historical availability of the death penalty irrelevant, see Range, 124 F.4th at 231; accord Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 461–
62 (7th Cir. 2019), abrogated by Bruen (Barrett, J., dissenting). The linchpin for the
Third Circuit’s constitutional holding instead relied on the lack of evidence that the
claimant “poses a physical danger to others.” Range, 124 F.4th at 232.
For its part, the Sixth Circuit blessed “governments label[ing] whole classes as
presumptively dangerous,” Williams, 113 F.4th at 657, but “refuse[d] to defer blindly
to § 922(g)(1) in its present form.” Range, 124 F.4th at 230 (citing Williams, 113 F.4th
at 658–61). According to the Sixth Circuit, “history shows that § 922(g)(1) might be
susceptible to an as-applied challenge” by individuals who show they are “not dangerous….” Williams, 113 F.4th at 657. The Fifth Circuit later agreed in part with this
analysis. United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Williams,
113 F.4th at 661–62). But the circuits departed on the scope of the inquiry. Compare
United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308, 318 (5th Cir. 2025), with Williams, 113 F.4th
at 659–60. The Third Circuit aligns with the Sixth Circuit on this point. Pitsilides v.
Barr, 128 F.4th 203, 211–12 (3d Cir. 2025).
II.
In any event, this Court should hold the instant petition pending the
outcome in United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. argued Mar. 2,
2026).
This term, the Court will decide whether the government may constitutionally
prosecute Ali Danial Hemani under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) based on proof of habitual
or regular marijuana use. See generally Pet. for Cert., United States v. Hemani,
No. 24-1234 (U.S. June 2, 2025), 2025 WL 1593262. According to the government,
Hemani’s prosecution falls within a historical principle that allows for the temporary
9
disarmament of categories of people based on the legislature’s judgment that the disarmed category poses a “special danger” of firearm misuse. See Br. for the United
States, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2025), 2025 WL 3708950,
at *10, at *37–40; Reply Br. for the United States, United States v. Hemani, No. 241234 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2026), 2026 WL 499787, at *1, at *5–8; Tr. Oral Argument 3:11–
18, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026). If the Court accepts
that analytical approach for drawing the boundaries of Second Amendment protection, there exists a “reasonable probability” that the Fifth Circuit would reconsider
the methodology it adopted in Diaz. See Lawrence on Behalf of Lawrence v. Chater,
516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996). See also Pet. for Cert., United States v. Cockerham, No. 251029 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2026), 2026 WL 596482, at *4 (also citing Lawrence for proposition
that Hemani could affect the Fifth Circuit’s analysis on the constitutionality of
§ 922(g)(1) prosecutions).
For instance, Hemani touches on the scope of the historical principle that can
be drawn from founding-era surety laws. See 2025 WL 3708950, at *22–23, *26; 2026
WL 499787, at *7, *12–13; Hemani Tr. 3:19–4:6, 6:5–10. Hemani also relatedly involves whether and to what extent laws at the founding that imposed punishment
other than disarmament can serve as historical analogues. See 2025 WL 3708950, at
*25–26; 2026 WL 499787, at *7–11. Both considerations are critical to Diaz’s analysis.
See Diaz, 116 F.4th at 468–71 & n.5. As such, Sowe respectfully requests the Court
to hold the instant petition pending the outcome in Hemani. See Stutson v. United
States, 516 U.S. 163, 181(1996) (“We regularly hold cases that involve the same issue
10
as a case on which certiorari has been granted and plenary review is being conducted
in order that (if appropriate) they may be ‘GVR’d’ when the case is decided.”) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
III.
This Court should delineate the boundaries of federal authority under
the Commerce Clause in the firearm context.
A predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 prohibited “[a]ny person who…has been convicted by a court of
the United States or of a State…of a felony” from receiving, possessing, or transporting “in commerce or affecting commerce any firearm.” Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1202, 82
Stat. 197. In Scarborough v. United States, this Court addressed “whether proof that
the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon and commerce.” Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 564 (1977) (emphasis added). Scarborough answered this question “yes,” but the Court did not linger on
the constitutional implications of its statutory construction. See id. at 577; see also
United States v. Johnson, 42 F.4th 743, 750 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that the decision
in Scarborough “was one of statutory interpretation”); United States v. Seekins, 52
F.4th 988, 991 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(“[T]he Court’s holding in Scarborough was statutory, not constitutional.”).
By contrast, this Court did examine the constitutional question presented by
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The statute “made
it a federal offense ‘for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.’” Id. at 551
11
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V)). The district court held that the
act constituted a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, but the appellate court
reversed. Id. at 551–52. This Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that the statute lay “beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 552.
In so doing, the Court cabined Congress’s commerce power to “three broad categories of activity” subject to regulation: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate
commerce”; (2) activities, even if intrastate, that threaten “the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” Id. at 558–59 (internal citations omitted). The
Court quickly disposed of any justification for § 922(q) under the first two categories,
focusing its inquiry on the third. Id. at 559. It noted that § 922(q) was “a criminal
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic
enterprise,” elaborating in a footnote that “States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law” and that federal criminalization of “conduct
already denounced as criminal by the States…effects a change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.” Id. at 561 & n.3. The Court also
expressed deep concern that the government’s arguments for why possession of a firearm in a local school zone substantially affected commerce lent themselves to no limiting principle, opening the door to a “a general federal police power.” Id. at 563–66.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “possession of a gun in a local school zone is in
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
12
affect any sort of interstate commerce.” Id. at 567. “Respondent was a local student
at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.” Id.
Given Lopez, it is “doubt[ful] that § 922(g)(8)”—and by extension § 922(g)(1)—
“is a proper exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.” Rahimi, 602
U.S. at 765 n.6 (2024) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring))
(Thomas, J., dissenting). But lower courts cannot conclusively resolve the tension between Scarborough and Lopez. The ultimate question posed by Lopez—“whether” intrastate possession of a firearm that crossed state lines long before the regulated possession “affect[s] interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional
power of Congress to regulate”—“can be settled finally only by this Court.” United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (cleaned up).
A.
Federal appellate courts differ on the relationship between
Scarborough and Lopez.
Federal courts have “cried out for guidance from this Court” on this issue for
decades. Alderman v. United States, 562 U.S. 1163, 131 S. Ct. 700, 702 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Simply put, “Scarborough is in fundamental and irreconcilable conflict with the rationale of the United States Supreme
Court in [Lopez].” United States v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1996) (DeMoss,
J., dissenting). Still, the Fifth Circuit “continue[s] to enforce § 922(g)(1)” because it is
“not at liberty to question the Supreme Court’s approval of the predecessor statute to
[§ 922(g)(1)].” United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1015 n.25 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
13
(per curiam). See also United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 243 (5th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam) (Garwood, J., concurring) (“one might well wonder how it could rationally be
concluded that mere possession of a firearm in any meaningful way concerns interstate commerce simply because the firearm had, perhaps decades previously before
the charged possessor was even born, fortuitously traveled in interstate commerce,”
but concluding that Scarborough’s “implication of constitutionality” “bind[s] us, as an
inferior court,…whether or not the Supreme Court will ultimately regard it as a controlling holding in that particular respect.”).
The Fifth Circuit is not alone. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 853 F.3d
298, 301–02 (6th Cir. 2017) (“If the Lopez framework is to have any ongoing vitality,
it is up to this Court to prevent it from being undermined by a 1977 precedent,” i.e.,
Scarborough, “that does not squarely address the constitutional issue.” (quoting Alderman v. United States, 562 U.S. 1163, 131 S. Ct. at 703 (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari))); United States v. Cortes, 299 F.3d 1030, 1037 n.2 (9th Cir.
2002) (although “[t]he vitality of Scarborough engenders significant debate,” committing to “follow Scarborough unwaveringly” “[u]ntil the Supreme Court tells us otherwise”); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 587–88, 588 n.28 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting
that, until the Supreme Court is more explicit on the relationship between Lopez and
Scarborough, a lower court is “not at liberty to overrule existing Supreme Court precedent”); United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 634–35 (10th Cir. 2006) (collecting
cases).
14
Nine courts of appeals have upheld § 922(g)(1) based solely on Scarborough’s
minimal nexus test. See United States v. Smith, 101 F.3d 202, 215 (1st Cir. 1996);
United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United
States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670, 671–72 (3d Cir. 1996); Rawls, 85 F.3d at 242–43;
United States v. Lemons, 302 F.3d 769, 771–73 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d
1456, 1461–62, 1462 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 584–
86 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Only
two courts of appeals have engaged in Lopez’s substantial-effects test and reasoned
that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under it. See United States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462,
466 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.
1995) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225
(2019)); United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 568–70 (6th Cir. 1996).
Because courts often fail to apply the Lopez test to these firearm possession
cases at all, defendants across the country lack the constitutional protection from
congressional overreach provided by Lopez. For instance, applying Lopez would demand that § 922(g)’s “possess in or affecting commerce” element require either: 1)
proof that the defendant’s offense caused the firearm to move in interstate commerce;
or, at least, 2) proof that the firearm moved in interstate commerce at a time reasonably near the offense. But Scarborough continues to control the outcome in a large
majority of circuits, leaving the “empty, formalistic” requirement of a jurisdictional
15
provision as the only check on Congress’ power to criminalize this kind of intrastate
activity. Chesney, 86 F.3d at 580 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
B.
An unchecked Commerce power would significantly expand
Congress’s reach into state affairs.
The federal government’s enumerated powers are “few and defined,” while the
powers which remain in the state governments are “numerous and indefinite.” Lopez,
514 U.S. at 552 (citing The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292–293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)). One
such enumerated power is “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States[.]”
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But without limits on federal regulatory power, our nationwide regulation would become “for all practical purposes . . . completely centralized” in a federal government. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 548 (1935). And “constitutional limits on governmental power do not enforce
themselves;” instead, “[t]hey require vigilant—and diligent—enforcement.” Seekins,
52 F.4th at 989 (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
“Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce” to regulate the activity, but Congress’s mere act of legislating “does
not necessarily make it so.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557
n.2) (cleaned up). Here, inserting the phrase “which has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce” after any object connected to intrastate activities
that Congress may want to police cannot fulfill the constitutional requirement. See
Alderman, 131 S. Ct. at 702 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(“Scarborough, as the lower courts have read it, cannot be reconciled with Lopez be-
16
cause it reduces the constitutional analysis to the mere identification of a jurisdictional hook.”). A judicial blessing of constitutional magnitude for this minimal nexus
would “effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). The Commerce
Clause power would be reduced to a rubber stamp, opening the door to a federal police
power in direct contravention of the federal government the Constitution enshrines.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (“the Founders denied the National Government” “the
police power,” “reposed in the States”); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519, 536 (2012) (the Commerce Clause “must be read carefully to avoid creating a
general federal authority akin to the police power”).
CONCLUSION
Petitioner Joseph Sowe respectfully submits that this Court should grant certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, or at minimum, hold the petition pending the outcome in Hemani.
17
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of April, 2026.
JASON D. HAWKINS
Federal Public Defender
Northern District of Texas
/s/ Maria Gabriela Vega
Maria Gabriela Vega
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Federal Public Defender’s Office
525 S. Griffin Street, Suite 629
Dallas, Texas 75202
Telephone: (214) 767-2746
gabriela_vega@fd.org
Attorney for Petitioner Joseph Sowe
18
Case: 25-10821
Document: 53-1
Page: 1
Date Filed: 01/07/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 25-10821
Summary Calendar
____________
FILED
January 7, 2026
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Joseph Sowe,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:21-CR-357-1
______________________________
Before Davis, Jones, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Joseph Sowe pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and he was sentenced to 21
months of imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that this court’s precedent
misinterprets § 922(g) because the statute requires more than merely past
interstate travel at an indeterminate time and that, as interpreted by this
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Pet. App'x a001
Case: 25-10821
Document: 53-1
Page: 2
Date Filed: 01/07/2026
No. 25-10821
court, the statute exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.
He also argues that the statute is unconstitutional on its face in light of New
York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). He concedes
his arguments are foreclosed but nevertheless raises the arguments to
preserved them for further review. The Government has filed an unopposed
motion for summary affirmance or, alternatively, for an extension of time in
which to file a brief.
As he concedes, Sowe’s Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed.
See United States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 571, 573 (5th Cir. 2023); United States v.
Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013). The parties are also correct
that Sowe’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed. See United States v.
Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822
(2025). Because summary affirmance is appropriate here, see Groendyke
Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969), the Government’s
motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the alternative motion for
an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED, and the district court’s
judgment is AFFIRMED.
2
Pet. App'x a002
Case 3:21-cr-00357-N
Document 91
Filed 07/07/25
Page 1 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
PageID 354
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
v.
JOSEPH SOWE
THE DEFENDANT:
☐ pleaded guilty to count(s)
JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
Case Number: 3:21-CR-00357-N(1)
USM Number: 59140-509
Marti Rachel Morgan
Defendant’s Attorney
pleaded guilty to count(s) before a U.S.
☒ Magistrate Judge, which was accepted by the
☐
☐
court.
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was
accepted by the court
was found guilty on count(s) after a plea of not
guilty
Count 1 of the Indictment filed August 3, 2021.
The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:
Title & Section / Nature of Offense
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon
Offense Ended
02/11/2021
Count
1
The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984.
☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)
☐ Count(s) ☐ is ☐ are dismissed on the motion of the United States
It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name,
residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If
ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic
circumstances.
JUNE 30, 2025
Date of Imposition of Judgment
Signature of Judge
DAVID C. GODBEY,
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Name and Title of Judge
JULY 7, 2025
Date
Pet. App'x a003
Case 3:21-cr-00357-N
Document 91
AO 245B (Rev. TXN 9/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
DEFENDANT:
CASE NUMBER:
Filed 07/07/25
Page 2 of 7
PageID 355
Judgment -- Page 2 of 7
JOSEPH SOWE
3:21-CR-00357-N(1)
IMPRISONMENT
Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, but taking the Guidelines as advisory pursuant to United States v. Booker,
and considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United
States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:
21 (Twenty-One) months as to count 1. This sentence shall run concurrently to any sentence imposed in Case No. F-2152281
in the 265th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Dallas, Texas.
☒ The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
That the defendant be designated to a facility in the Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas area, if possible.
☒ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
☐ The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:
☐ at
☐
a.m.
☐
p.m.
on
☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.
☐ The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:
☐ before 2 p.m. on
☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.
☐ as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.
RETURN
I have executed this judgment as follows:
Defendant delivered on
at
to
, with a certified copy of this judgment.
_______________________________________
UNITED STATES MARSHAL
By
_______________________________________
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL
Pet. App'x a004
Case 3:21-cr-00357-N
Document 91
AO 245B (Rev. TXN 9/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
DEFENDANT:
CASE NUMBER:
Filed 07/07/25
Page 3 of 7
PageID 356
Judgment -- Page 3 of 7
JOSEPH SOWE
3:21-CR-00357-N(1)
SUPERVISED RELEASE
Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of: Three (3) years as to Count 1.
MANDATORY CONDITIONS
1.
You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.
2.
You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
3.
You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release
from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.
☐ The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you pose a low risk of future
4.
5.
☐
substance abuse. (check if applicable)
You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence
of restitution. (check if applicable)
You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (check if applicable)
☒
6. ☐ You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et
seq.) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which
you reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check if applicable)
7.
☐ You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (check if applicable)
You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional
conditions on the attached page.
Pet. App'x a005
Case 3:21-cr-00357-N
Document 91
AO 245B (Rev. TXN 9/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
DEFENDANT:
CASE NUMBER:
Filed 07/07/25
Page 4 of 7
PageID 357
Judgment -- Page 4 of 7
JOSEPH SOWE
3:21-CR-00357-N(1)
STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are
imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed
by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.
1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your
release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time
frame.
2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and
when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.
3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from
the court or the probation officer.
4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.
5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living
arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying
the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72
hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer
to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
7. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from
doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses
you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job
responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10
days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of
becoming aware of a change or expected change.
8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been
convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the
probation officer.
9. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that
was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or
tasers).
11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant
without first getting the permission of the court.
12. If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may
require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the
person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.
13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.
U.S. Probation Office Use Only
A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a
written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. I understand additional information regarding these
conditions is available at www.txnp.uscourts.gov.
Defendant’s Signature
Date
Pet. App'x a006
Case 3:21-cr-00357-N
Document 91
AO 245B (Rev. TXN 9/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
DEFENDANT:
CASE NUMBER:
Filed 07/07/25
Page 5 of 7
PageID 358
Judgment -- Page 5 of 7
JOSEPH SOWE
3:21-CR-00357-N(1)
SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
The defendant shall participate in outpatient mental health treatment services as directed by the probation
officer until successfully discharged. These services may include medications prescribed by a licensed
physician. The defendant shall contribute to the costs of services rendered (copayment) at a rate of at least $20
per month.
The defendant shall participate in an outpatient program approved by the probation officer for treatment of
narcotic, drug, or alcohol dependency that will include testing for the detection of substance use, abstaining
from the use of alcohol and all other intoxicants during and after completion of treatment, and contributing to
the costs of services rendered (copayment) at the rate of at least $20 per month.
Pet. App'x a007
Case 3:21-cr-00357-N
Document 91
AO 245B (Rev. TXN 9/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
DEFENDANT:
CASE NUMBER:
Filed 07/07/25
Page 6 of 7
PageID 359
Judgment -- Page 6 of 7
JOSEPH SOWE
3:21-CR-00357-N(1)
CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES
The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the Schedule of Payments page.
TOTALS
Assessment
$100.00
Restitution
$.00
Fine
$.00
AVAA Assessment*
$.00
JVTA Assessment**
$.00
☐ The determination of restitution is deferred until
An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO245C) will be entered
after such determination.
The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.
If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.
☐ Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $
☐ The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before
☐
the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on the Schedule
of Payments page may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).
The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:
☐ the interest requirement is waived for the
☐ fine
☐ restitution
☐ the interest requirement for the
☐ fine
☐ restitution is modified as follows:
* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.
** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22
*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after
September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.
Pet. App'x a008
Case 3:21-cr-00357-N
Document 91
AO 245B (Rev. TXN 9/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
DEFENDANT:
CASE NUMBER:
Filed 07/07/25
Page 7 of 7
PageID 360
Judgment -- Page 7 of 7
JOSEPH SOWE
3:21-CR-00357-N(1)
SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS
Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:
A
☐
Lump sum payments of $
due immediately, balance due
☐
not later than
, or
☐
in accordance
D,
☐
E, or
☐
F below; or
B
☐
Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with
☐
C,
☐
D, or
C
☐
Payment in equal
D
☐
Payment in equal 20 (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $
over a period of
(e.g., months or years), to commence
(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of
supervision; or
E
☐
Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within
(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from
imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay at that time; or
F
☒
Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:
It is ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of $100.00 for Count 1, which shall be due
immediately. Said special assessment shall be paid to the Clerk, U.S. District Court.
☐
C,
☐
☐
F below); or
(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $
over a period of
(e.g., months or years), to commence
(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or
Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during
imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility
Program, are made to the clerk of the court.
The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.
Joint and Several
See above for Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several
Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.
☐
☐
☐
The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):
The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:
Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine
principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of prosecution and court
costs.
Pet. App'x a009
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.