Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jennie V. Wright, et al., Petitioners v. Louisville Metro Government, et al.

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A:

Court of Appeals Opinion (July 16, 2025) ........... 1a

Appendix B:

District Court Opinion (Sept. 19, 2024) ............ 18a

Appendix C:

Relevant Statutory Provisions ........................... 27a

1a

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

————

No. 24-5965

————

JENNIE V. WRIGHT and SAUL WRIGHT, on behalf

of Jawand Lyle and Brendon Burnett,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

————

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.

No. 3:21-cv-00308—Benjamin J. Beaton, District

Judge.

Decided and Filed: July 16, 2025

Before: BATCHELDER, GIBBONS, and THAPAR,

Circuit Judges.

————

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Corey M. Shapiro, William E. Sharp,

Crystal Mahoney, ACLU FOUNDATION OF

KENTUCKY, Louisville, Kentucky, Lauren Willard

Zehmer, Sameer Aggarwal, Emma Keteltas Graham,

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Washington, D.C.,

for Appellants. Earl L. Martin III, Darryl S. Lavery,

STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky,

Joseph

R.

Abney,

JEFFERSON

COUNTY

2a

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Louisville, Kentucky, for

Appellees. Matthew F. Kuhn, John H. Heyburn, Jacob

M. Abrahamson, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY

ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, for

Amicus Curiae.

————

OPINION

————

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Louisville Metro Police

Department officers searched Jennie and Saul

Wright’s home. The Wrights say that the search

violated their constitutional rights.

So they sued the city of Louisville and “unknown”

police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district

court dismissed the Wrights’ claims, as well as the

claims of their great-nephews who were living with

them at the time. We lack appellate jurisdiction over

the nephews’ claims, but we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of the Wrights’ claims.

I.

On May 7, 2020, Louisville Metro Police

Department officers searched Jennie and Saul

Wright’s home on 1732 Columbia Street in Louisville,

Kentucky. Jennie and Saul lived there with their two

great-nephews, Jawand Lyle and Brendon Burnett.1

Just under a year later, Jennie and Saul sued

Louisville Metro Government and “unknown police

officers” on behalf of themselves and Jawand and

Brendon in Kentucky state court. Jennie and Saul

were “next friends and guardians” of Jawand and

1 We

mean no disrespect by the use of first names. We use

plaintiffs’ first names here only to distinguish between the family

members and to make things easy on the reader.

3a

Brendon, who were minors at the time of the lawsuit’s

filing. R. 1-1, Pg. ID 6. Their complaint alleged that

the officers, among other things, violated their federal

constitutional right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures. They also sought damages from

the Louisville Metro Government under a Monell

theory of liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658 (1978). So the plaintiffs named the

Louisville Metro Government and “unknown police

officers” as defendants. R. 1-1, Pg. ID 6.

Louisville removed the case to federal court and

moved to dismiss the claims against it. The district

court granted Louisville’s motion. The Wrights

appealed, and this court dismissed the appeal for lack

of jurisdiction. Wright v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, No.

22-5134 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2022). The Wrights’ counsel

then withdrew from representing them.

Proceeding pro se, the Wrights then filed an

amended complaint naming the previously “unknown”

officers. Jawand and Brendon were also named as

plaintiffs alongside the Wrights in the amended

complaint. And following a series of motions and

rulings, the magistrate judge conditionally allowed

Jawand and Brendon to proceed pro se. So Jawand and

Brendon were representing themselves when the

defendants moved to dismiss Jennie’s and Saul’s

claims.

In their motion to dismiss, the defendants made

clear that they were moving to dismiss only Jennie’s

and Saul’s claims. As to Jawand’s and Brendon’s

claims, the defendants sought a more definite

statement about Jawand’s and Brendon’s birth dates.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The defendants moved for a

more definite statement under Rule 12(e) on the very

same day that they moved to dismiss Jennie’s and

4a

Saul’s claims. 2 2 (Weeks later, the magistrate judge

denied Jawand’s and Brendon’s request for a courtappointed attorney. So Jawand and Brendon

remained pro se.)

Next, the defendants moved for judgment on the

pleadings with respect to all the plaintiffs’ claims.

After the motion was ripe, the district court granted

the defendants’ motion to dismiss. In doing so, it

discussed only the claims of “Plaintiffs Jennie and

Saul Wright.” R. 78, Pg. ID 509. Still, having granted

that motion, the district court said that it had thereby

“dismissed all remaining claims.” Id. at Pg. ID 513. So

it denied as moot the remaining motions on the docket.

Those purportedly moot motions included the

defendants’ motion for a more definite statement from

Jawand and Brendon and the defendants’ motion for

judgment on the pleadings. The court’s accompanying

judgment is to the same effect: it “grant[ed] all named

Defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismiss[ed] the

claims against any other ‘unknown police officers.’” R.

79, Pg. ID 514. So, the court “enter[ed] judgment in

favor of the Defendants” and struck “this case from the

active docket.” Id.

* * *

Before we address this appeal, consider the two

critical points that emerge from the procedural

history:

2 Jennie

and Saul filed a response to that motion to dismiss.

Jawand and Brendon didn’t file a response to the motion to

dismiss because the defendants had not moved to dismiss their

claims.

5a

First, by the time the district court ruled on the

defendants’ motion to dismiss, Jawand and Brendon

were representing themselves.

Second, the defendants’ motion to dismiss that the

district court granted was a motion to dismiss only

Saul’s and Jennie’s claims. The defendants did not

move to dismiss Jawand’s or Brendon’s claims. Yet the

district court dismissed Jawand’s and Brendon’s

claims too.3

II.

Following the district court’s order, Jennie and

Saul Wright filed a notice of appeal. A critical

threshold question is whether Brendon and Jawand

were part of that notice of appeal. This question is

important because it goes to this court’s jurisdiction.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 sets forth the

requirements for a proper notice of appeal. If a party

does not meet those requirements, we lack jurisdiction

over that party’s appeal. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244,

248 (1992).

Rule 3 mandates that the notice of appeal “specify

the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each

one in the caption or body of the notice.” Fed. R. App.

3 Alternatively, if the district court is read to not have dismissed

Jawand’s and Brendon’s claims, then it erred in denying the

remaining motions as moot (like the defendants’ motion for a

more definite statement from Jawand and Brendon). If Jawand’s

and Brendon’s claims weren’t dismissed, then the defendants’

motions before the court seeking a more definite statement and a

judgment on the pleadings as to those claims were still alive. But

that’s not the best reading of the district court’s opinion, order,

and judgment. The district court dismissed “all” claims against

the defendants; that “all” encompasses Brendon’s and Jawand’s

claims, even though the defendants had not moved to dismiss

those claims.

6a

P. 3(c)(1)(A). Here, the notice of appeal’s case caption

listed only Saul and Jennie Wright as plaintiffs. The

body of the notice reads as follows: “Notice is hereby

given that the above-named plaintiffs hereby appeal[]

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit; from the order entered on 19th day of

September, 2024 denying plaintiffs’ civil rights

complaint pursuant to [42 U.S.C. § 1983].” R. 80, Pg.

ID 515 (emphasis added). The notice is then signed by

Saul Wright and Jennie Wright.

Given the caption, the body, and the signatures,

the notice of appeal designated only Saul and Jennie

as appellants. Jennie and Saul alone are referenced in

the notice of appeal, and by this juncture in the

litigation, Jawand and Brendon were representing

themselves separately. Indeed, Jennie and Saul would

have been legally incapable of asserting Jawand’s and

Brendon’s right to appeal the district court’s adverse

judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Olagues v. Timken,

908 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting that “we have

consistently interpreted § 1654 as prohibiting pro se

litigants from trying to assert the rights of others”).

And since the magistrate judge had established that

Jawand and Brendon were no longer minors and that

each was capable of representing himself, neither Saul

nor Jennie could litigate on Jawand’s or Brendon’s

behalf under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c).

To be sure, Rule 3 also provides that “[a]n appeal

must not be dismissed for informality of form or title

of the notice of appeal” or “for failure to name a party

whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the

notice.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(7). And we must construe

notices of appeal liberally, especially for pro se

litigants. United States v. Willis, 804 F.2d 961, 963

7a

(6th Cir. 1986); Owens v. Keeling, 461 F.3d 763, 776

(6th Cir. 2006). But however much we strain to

construe this notice of appeal to include Brendon and

Jawand, it conveys no intent on the part of either

Jawand or Brendon to appeal. Plaintiffs direct our

attention to the fact that the notice’s body references

the amended complaint of “plaintiffs,” and it’s true

that Jawand and Brendon were part of that amended

complaint and signed it. Still, only the “above-named

plaintiffs”—Jennie and Saul—elected to appeal. R. 80,

Pg. ID 515 (emphasis added).

In short, plaintiffs are now asking us to conflate

“Jennie and Saul” with “Jennie, Saul, Jawand, and

Brendon,” as the district court did when it dismissed

all plaintiffs’ claims even though the defendants had

moved to dismiss only Jennie’s and Saul’s claims. We

won’t do that.

In any event, Jawand’s and Brendon’s failures to

appeal might not be fatal. They still can move for relief

from the district court under Rule 60(b)(1) in light of

the district court’s dismissal of their claims even

though no motion to dismiss their claims was before it.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); Kemp v. United States, 596

U.S. 528, 530, 534 (2022) (holding that “a judge’s

errors of law” count as “mistakes” under Rule

60(b)(1)). They must make that motion within one year

of the district court’s judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(c)(1); Kemp, 596 U.S. at 533.

III.

We now turn to the district court’s dismissal of

Jennie’s and Saul’s claims against the individual

police officers. The district court dismissed their

claims as untimely. We agree.

8a

A.

Section 1983 empowers plaintiffs like the Wrights

to sue state officers for alleged violations of their

federal constitutional rights, but it doesn’t provide a

statute of limitations to govern such claims. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Instead, section 1988 tells us that

where there is no “suitable” federal law “adapted to the

object” of exercising jurisdiction over federal civil

rights claims like section 1983 suits, federal courts

should borrow state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Federal

courts thus look to the relevant state’s general

personal-injury statute of limitations to govern the

statute of limitations for section 1983 suits. Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Kentucky, that

statute of limitations is one year. See Ky. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 413.140(1)(a); Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing,

896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990).

Jennie and Saul Wright’s original state-court

complaint complied with that statute of limitations,

since they filed it just under a year after their cause of

action accrued. Recall that the original complaint

named only the Louisville Metro Government and

“unknown police officers” as defendants. The amended

complaint provided the names of those officers, but the

amended complaint was filed over three years after

the incident.

Of course, three-plus years falls well outside of

Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations. So the

Wrights’ claims in the amended complaint against the

named officers are untimely unless they “relate back”

to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c)(1). As relevant here, Rule 15(c)(1)

provides that an amended complaint “relates back to

the date of the original pleading” when the plaintiff

9a

made “a mistake concerning the proper party’s [the

defendant’s] identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).

In Zakora v. Chrisman, this court explained that

not knowing “whom to sue is not a misunderstanding

and thus is not a mistake for the purposes of Rule 15.”

44 F.4th 452, 482 (6th Cir. 2022). When they sued

“unknown” officers in their original complaint, the

Wrights did not know the proper parties to sue. Under

Zakora and the precedents it drew upon, the Wrights’

“absence of knowledge” didn’t amount to a “mistake”

that falls within Rule 15’s purview. Id.; see also Cox v.

Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996)

(“Substituting a named defendant for a ‘John Doe’

defendant is considered a change in parties, not a mere

substitution of parties.”). So, the Wrights’ amended

complaint is untimely; they can’t benefit from Rule

15’s relation-back provision.

The Wrights respond that the law was unclear

when they filed their initial complaint: Zakora had yet

to be decided, and Zakora cleared up alleged confusion

in this court’s caselaw as to “whether an amendment

naming a previously unknown Doe defendant can

constitute a ‘mistake’ under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).” Zakora,

44 F.4th at 481. That is critical, they claim, because

the sorts of “mistakes” that Rule 15 covers include

mistakes of law. See, e.g., Black-Hosang v. Ohio Dep’t

of Pub. Safety, 96 F. App’x 372, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2004).

In other words, their mistake of law as to the meaning

of Rule 15 empowers them to take advantage of Rule

15’s relation-back provision after all.

But the Wrights are wrong about the sorts of

mistakes of law that Rule 15 covers. Rule 15’s plain

text allows for relation-back when, among other

things, one party was mistaken as to the identity of a

proper party. How can a mistake about a proper

10a

party’s identity include a “mistake of law”? A “mistake

of law” in this context means the plaintiff thought that

a particular claim was legally viable against a

particular defendant, when in reality the plaintiff had

to bring his claim against a different defendant for it

to be cognizable in federal court. For example, Rule 15

will provide for relation-back when a plaintiff

mistakenly sues an institutional defendant (such that

his suit is barred by sovereign immunity) rather than

an individual defendant who can in fact be sued. See

id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee note

(1966 amendment). So too if a plaintiff mistakenly

sues an individual defendant in his official capacity

rather than in his individual capacity. See, e.g., Hill v.

Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1374–78 (7th Cir. 1991).

But Rule 15 does not allow for relation-back when

a party is mistaken as to what counts as a “mistake”

under the Rule in the first place. Again, under the

Rule, the “mistake” must relate to “the proper party’s

identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). The Wrights

tell us they were mistaken as to whether they were

allowed under pre-Zakora Sixth Circuit precedent to

substitute named defendants for “unknown”

defendants. That’s a mistake of law with respect to the

legal meaning of “mistake” in Rule 15, not a mistake

of law as to “the legal requirements of [the plaintiffs’]

cause of action.” Soto v. Brooklyn Corr. Facility, 80

F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1996). The latter may qualify for

relation-back under Rule 15; the former does not.

Next, the Wrights argue that we should equitably

toll the statute of limitations. The Wrights invoke

principles of “equity and fairness,” as they emphasize

that they worked diligently to file their claim within

the one-year statute of limitations. Appellants’ Br. at

28. But the Wrights didn’t raise equitable tolling

11a

below, so they forfeited the argument. Rembisz v. Lew,

830 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2016). And even if they had

preserved their equitable tolling argument, “[i]t would

fail anyway.” Id. Neither a pro se plaintiff’s ignorance

of the law nor a lawyer’s legal misstep tends to justify

equitable tolling. Nitch v. E. Gateway Cmty. Coll., 857

F. App’x 222, 223 (6th Cir. 2021). So the Wrights’

confusion about the nature of Rule 15 doesn’t warrant

equitable tolling. In short, “federal courts sparingly

bestow equitable tolling,” and we decline to do so here.

Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of

Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2000).

In fairness, equitable tolling might nonetheless

seem appropriate here: The magistrate judge advised

the Wrights to find out the names of the individual

officers and amend their complaint accordingly. As the

district court observed, it does seem “harsh from the

perspective of a pro se litigant” when his amended

complaint is dismissed as time-barred after a

magistrate judge ordered him “to discover the

identities of unknown officers.” R. 78, Pg. ID 512. But

the magistrate judge issued that order in April 2023,

and by that time, the one-year statute of limitations

had already run out. So the court’s order didn’t further

delay the Wrights as the clock continued ticking; the

time was already up. And back when the clock did run

out in May 2021, “the Wrights were still represented”

by counsel. Id.

B.

Failing under their Rule 15 relation-back theory,

the Wrights counter that we should not use

Kentucky’s too-short one-year statute of limitations

for their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims at all. But as

explained above, section 1988 tells us that when

there’s no “suitable” federal law on-point in section

12a

1983 or other civil rights statutes, we look to state law.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). And in 1984, the Supreme Court

in Burnett v. Grattan held that there’s no “suitable”

federal law to govern the statute of limitations for

section 1983 claims. 468 U.S. 42, 48–49 (1984). So we

look to state law, and here the applicable state law

provides for just a one-year statute of limitations. Ky.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1)(a).

The Wrights argue that, in fact, there is suitable

federal law for the statute of limitations in section

1983 suits: 28 U.S.C. § 1658. That provision, enacted

in 1990 (after the Supreme Court decided Burnett),

lays down a four-year statute of limitations for all

“civil action[s] arising under an Act of Congress

enacted after the date of the enactment of this section.”

28 U.S.C. § 1658 (emphasis added). Of course, the

plain text of section 1658’s four-year statute of

limitations doesn’t capture section 1983 actions:

Section 1983 was enacted in the wake of the Civil War,

but section 1658 applies only to causes of action

created after 1990. But to some extent that’s neither

here nor there, because we look for a “suitable” federal

law under section 1988’s borrowing framework only

when there’s no directly applicable federal law in the

first place. So even though section 1658 is not directly

applicable, it might still apply if it is “suitable” to

section 1983.

Still, the Wrights’ attempt to leverage section

1658’s four-year statute of limitations comes up short.

In Burnett, the Supreme Court stated expressly that

“[i]t is now settled that federal courts will turn to state

law for statutes of limitations in actions brought under

the civil rights statutes.” 468 U.S. at 49. As an inferior

court, we can’t upend that settlement ourselves. Thus,

13a

absent a change in law or Supreme Court precedent,

this court will not buck Burnett.

The Wrights’ related argument that Kentucky’s

one-year statute of limitations is too short to vindicate

the federal interests undergirding section 1983 also

fails. Congress itself has provided for a one-year

statute of limitations in the civil rights context—for

actions against those who know of a conspiracy to

deprive individuals of their civil rights but fail to act.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Of course, section 1983 and

section 1986 claims “are distinct.” Brown v. Pouncy, 93

F.4th 331, 337 (5th Cir. 2024). But the fact that

Congress has provided just a one-year statute of

limitations for one type of civil rights action

undermines the notion that the very same statute of

limitations period for section 1983 civil rights actions

is insufficient. See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 61 (Rehnquist,

J., concurring in the judgment) (“The willingness of

Congress to impose a 1-year limitations period in 42

U.S.C. § 1986 demonstrates that at least a 1-year

period is reasonable.”).

* * *

In sum, Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations

applies and Rule 15’s relation-back provision does not,

so the Wrights’ claims against the named individual

officers are untimely.

IV.

A.

The Wrights and the city of Louisville also disagree

as to whether the Wrights’ Monell claim against

Louisville was properly dismissed. Before assessing

the merits, we must first ensure that we have

jurisdiction. We do.

14a

A notice of appeal “encompasses the final judgment

. . . if the notice designates an order that adjudicates

all remaining claims and the rights and liabilities of

all remaining parties.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(5)(A). The

Wrights’ notice of appeal listed the district court’s

September 19 order, which adjudicated all remaining

claims of all remaining parties. Thus, Rule 3 provides

that it “encompasses the final judgment,” and we have

appellate jurisdiction over the Wrights’ Monell claim.

What about the fact that the Wrights didn’t include

the Monell claim in their amended complaint? They

didn’t need to, since it had already been dismissed

when they amended. Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic

Found., 759 F.3d 601, 616–17 (6th Cir. 2014).

In sum, we have appellate jurisdiction over the

Wrights’ Monell claims, and they did not forfeit those

claims by not repleading them in their amended

complaint.

B.

To establish liability against a municipality under

Monell, plaintiffs must identify a particular municipal

policy or custom and show that it caused their

constitutional injury. Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802,

815 (6th Cir. 2003). The original complaint included

both a failure-to-train theory of Monell liability as well

as a policy-or-custom theory. The complaint contains

only bare legal conclusions, not factual allegations

that plausibly allege Monell liability. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating that to survive

a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” (citation

omitted)). Thus, the district court was correct to

dismiss the Monell claims.

15a

Start with the Wrights’ failure-to-train theory. To

survive a motion to dismiss, they had to establish that

Louisville’s training program was inadequate, that the

program’s inadequacy resulted from Louisville’s

deliberate indifference, and that the inadequacy either

caused or was closely related to their injury. Jackson

v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 834 (6th Cir. 2019).

But the Wrights merely asserted that Louisville

“failed to adequately train their officers regarding the

process to obtain a Search Warrant and its subsequent

execution, which is a violation [of] the Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment Rights.” R. 1-1, Pg. ID 10.

Similarly, they stated that Louisville “failed to train

its officers regarding executing Search Warrant[s] to

protect the citizens of Louisville[‘s] Fourth

Amendment Rights.” Id. As the district court

painstakingly explained, these amount to conclusory

assertions, not plausible allegations: “When stripped

of the legal conclusions, the Complaint contains no

factual allegations indicating what the training

policies were, why they were inadequate, how the city

was deliberately indifferent, or how the failures

related to the Wrights’ injuries.” R. 11, Pg. ID 52.

The same goes for the Wrights’ policy-or-custom

theory of Monell liability. The Wrights said that

Louisville had a “policy, or custom regarding obtaining

and executing a Search Warrant” that “deprived” them

of their “Fourth Amendment Right to be protected”

from “unreasonable search and seizure.” R. 1-1, Pg. ID

9. The Wrights also asserted that Louisville’s “policy

and customs” result “in issuance of Search Warrants

predominantly in African Americans’ neighborhoods

without the appropriate probable cause in an

unreasonable manner, in clear violation of the

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Rights.” Id. at Pg. ID

16a

10. These threadbare assertions failed to adequately

allege a policy or custom, nor did they connect the

Wrights’ injuries to such a policy or custom.

Here on appeal, the Wrights argue that we should

take judicial notice of a 2023 Department of Justice

report condemning various Louisville police

department policies and training as inadequate. But

even if we did that, the DOJ report would not rectify

the Wrights’ failure to connect the supposed

inadequate training and unconstitutional customs and

policies to their specific constitutional injuries. Thus,

the report does not change this court’s calculus in

affirming the district court.

And we shouldn’t consider the report, anyway.

Courts take judicial notice of facts, not documents.

Abu-Joudeh v. Schneider, 954 F.3d 842, 848 (6th Cir.

2020). But the Wrights are requesting that we take

judicial notice of the contents of the DOJ report to save

their Monell claim, which really amounts to an

attempt to supplement the record. Id. We can’t grant

that motion: “While Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 10(e)(2) allows for the correction of

‘omissions from or misstatements in the record,’ it does

not allow parties ‘to introduce new evidence in the

court of appeals.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Even if the Wrights’ request was in fact a genuine

request to take judicial notice (rather than a motion to

supplement the record), we would still deny it. Federal

Rule of Evidence 201(b) allows courts to take judicial

notice only of facts “that [are] not subject to reasonable

dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). But the allegations in

the DOJ report that the Wrights want this court to

consider—such as allegations that the department

fails to adequately support, supervise, and investigate

officers—are subject to reasonable dispute.

17a

Finally, we decline the Wrights’ invitation to

remand the case to the district court to consider if the

DOJ report changes anything. That’s a request to

either amend their complaint or reopen the district

court’s judgment, which would require either a Rule

59 or Rule 60 motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59; Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60.

* * *

We affirm the judgment of the district court with

respect to Jennie Wright’s and Saul Wright’s claims.

This court has no appellate jurisdiction over the

dismissal of Jawand’s and Brendon’s claims because

neither Jawand nor Brendon properly appealed.

Jawand and Brendon remain free to file Rule 60(b)

motions with the district court.

18a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

————

No. 3:21-CV-308-BJB

————

Jennie V. Wright, et al.

v.

Louisville Metro Government, et al.

*****

Plaintiffs

Defendants

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Plaintiffs Jennie and Saul Wright allege that

Louisville Metro Police Department officers illegally

entered their home and unlawfully took them into

custody on May 7, 2020. Complaint (DN 1-1) ¶¶ 8–13,

19—20. On May 6, 2021—the day before the state and

federal statutes of limitations would’ve expired in the

normal course—the Wrights filed a lawsuit accusing

the Louisville Metro Government and “Unknown

Police Officers” of violating their civil rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and various state laws. Id. More than

three years later, on June 13, 2023, the Wrights (by

now proceeding pro se1) moved to add the names of six

1 The

Wrights’ representation in this lawsuit has shifted—at

times in an unclear manner. For the first nine months, their

lawyer filed all pleadings with the Court. In February 2022,

however, Jennie Wright began directly filing their notices and

motions. See DNs 13–15, 19, 22, 24. As a result, the Court ordered

the Plaintiffs’ counsel to clarify his continued involvement in the

case. See DN 25. He sought to withdraw (DN 26) in January 2023,

19a

officers as “some of the unknown police officers” listed

in their original complaint. Motion for Leave to

Amend Complaint (DN 39). Because the amended

claim named these officers as defendants after the

statute of limitations had expired, the Court grants

their motion to dismiss (DN 55), dismisses the

remaining claims against the “Unknown Police

Officers,” and denies the remaining motions as moot.

*

The six added officers are the only named

Defendants left in this case; the Court granted

Louisville Metro’s motion to dismiss in 2022. See DN

11. The remaining Defendants now contend that they,

too, should be dismissed because the claims against

them are untimely.

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is

governed by the limitations period for personal-injury

cases in the state where the cause of action arose.

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In

Kentucky, § 1983 actions are limited by the one-year

statute of limitations found in Ky. Rev. Stat. §

413.140(1)(a). Collard v. Ky. Board of Nursing, 896

F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990). “Although state law

provides the statute of limitations to be applied in a §

1983 damages action, federal law governs the question

of when that limitations period begins to run.” Wolfe

v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984)). It

the Magistrate Judge granted that request that same month (DN

28), and the Wrights entered a notice of appearance to proceed

pro se (DN 33) in March 2023. The Court affords the filings

prepared without the assistance of counsel—but not those

submitted by counsel—all the leniency that normally attends pro

se submissions

20a

begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known

of the injury forming the basis of the claim. See RuizBueno v. Maxim HealthCare Servs., 659 F. App’x 830,

833–34 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Cooey v. Strickland, 479

F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007)). Likewise, Kentucky

requires the state-law claims at issue here 2 to “be

commenced within one year after the cause of action

accrued.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a); see, e.g.,

Murray v. Jones, No. 6:20-cv-82, 2022 WL 821662, at

*3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 17, 2022) (applying § 413.140(1)(a)’s

one-year limitations period to negligence per se claim

based on criminal violation).

Here, the one-year limitations period began to run

on May 7, 2020, when Louisville Metro Police

Department officers allegedly entered the Wrights’

home with a fake search warrant. Amended Complaint

(DN 42) at 1–3. In April 2023—almost three years

later—the “unknown police officers” in the case

remained unnamed and unserved. So the Magistrate

Judge ordered the Wrights—who had begun to

represent themselves pro se by then—to “take

appropriate action … to discover the names of the

The Wrights’ initial complaint included a state-law claim

against the unknown officers “pursuant to KRS 522.020 and KRS

466.070.” State Court Complaint (DN 1-1) at 6. The Wrights

didn’t include any state-law claims in the Amended Complaint,

so presumably they are no longer pressing those claims. In any

event, a “K.R.S. 466.070” doesn’t appear to exist as part of the

current codification of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. The Court

takes the State Court Complaint to mean K.R.S. 446.070, which

allows individuals to file civil claims based on statutory

violations—here, a violation of the criminal statute prohibiting

official misconduct, K.R.S. § 522.020. Regardless, as discussed

above, both §§ 522.020 and 446.070 are subject to a one-year

statute of limitations and fail for the same reason as the Wrights’

§ 1983 claim.

2

21a

unknown officers referenced in their Complaint” and

“to amend their Complaint to add those officers as

defendants, and to validly serve those officers with

process.” Discovery & Amendment Order (DN 37) at

11. That order didn’t address the statute of

limitations.

In response, the Wrights moved to amend their

Complaint to “add six additional defendants” in June

2023. Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint at 1. But

because this amendment arrived years after the cause

of action accrued, the limitations period had already

expired. Unless the Wrights can extend or evade the

statute of limitations, therefore, it bars the Wrights’

claims against these new defendants. See Cox v.

Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (1996) (“[N]ew parties

may not be added after the statute of limitations has

run ….”).

The Wrights argue that the amended complaint is

timely because it “relates back” to the original pleading

date under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1).

Response to Motion to Dismiss (DN 56). But none of

Rule 15(c)(1)’s three prongs apply here. An

amendment “relates back to the date of the original

pleading” if: (A) “the applicable statute of limitations

allows relation back;” (B) “the amendment asserts a

claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,

transaction, or occurrence set out … in the original

pleading;” or (C) “the amendment changes the party or

the naming of the party” and “the party to be brought

in” received notice and “knew or should have known

that the action would have been brought against

[him], but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s

identity.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1).

The first prong doesn’t apply because Kentucky’s

statute of limitations is silent on relation back. Asher

22a

v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 320

(6th Cir. 2010) (“[H]ad the Kentucky legislature

wanted the claims of untimely plaintiffs to escape the

time bar in [this statute], it would have spoken.”). Nor

does the second prong apply; it concerns added claims

or defenses, not added parties. Id. at 318.

The third prong is closer, but still fails to connect

the newly added defendants to the original (timely)

filing. The Wrights frame their amendment as a case

of “mistaken identity.” Response to Motion to Dismiss

at 3. Rule 15(c) does cover such cases in some

circumstances. See, e.g., Oh Huff v. Casey County, No.

1:23-cv-102, 2024 WL 1815365, at *2–4 (W.D. Ky. Apr.

25, 2024) (applying Rule 15(c) because the initial

complaint incorrectly named the Casey County

Sheriff). But the sort of “mistake” that may be fixed

under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is not the kind of omission at

issue here. Rule 15(c)(1)(C) permits “parties to correct

misnomers or misdescriptions,” but doesn’t allow “the

addition of a party after the limitations period has run.”

Kelter v. WASP, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 856, 864 (W.D. Ky.

2014); see Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App’x 67, 68–

69 (6th Cir. 2012).

The Wrights’ amendment didn’t correct a mistake;

it added new parties. This forecloses their limitations

argument, because “an amendment which adds a new

party creates a new cause of action and there is no

relation back to the original filing for purposes of

limitations.” In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating,

Inc., 928 F.2d 1448, 1449 (6th Cir. 1991) (quotation

omitted). Replacing “John Doe” and similar pleading

placeholders constitutes a change of parties that is not

covered by Rule 15 relation-back, as many courts have

held. See, e.g., Moore v. Tennessee, 267 F. App’x 450,

455 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing precedent to this effect from

23a

seven sister circuits). Rule 15 “allows relation back for

the mistaken identification of defendants, not for

defendants to be named later through ‘John Doe,’

‘Unknown Defendants’ or other missing appellations.”

Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 482 (6th Cir. 2022).

A “John Doe” placeholder serves a different purpose:

allowing plaintiffs to file suit, “learn who the

responsible individuals were,” and then “join them

before the statutes r[u]n.” Wiggins v. Kimberly-Clark

Corp., 641 F. App’x 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2016).

The Wrights didn’t mistakenly name the wrong

defendants or misidentify them when they used

“unknown police officers.” They simply failed to

identify the defendants at all. So when they added the

officers’ names via amendment, the caselaw cited

above makes clear that they didn’t correct a “mistaken

identification” but instead added new parties. Rule

15(c) doesn’t apply to that situation. Without any

help from Rule 15 or any other argument to

circumvent the statute of limitations, the new parties

appeared in the amended complaint too late to survive

the officers’ limitations defense.33

Because “relief is barred by the applicable statute

of limitations,” the Wrights’ claims against the newly

In some circumstances the doctrine of equitable tolling

mitigates the harshness of limitations periods and provides an

alternate path for excusably tardy plaintiffs. That doctrine

requires a “good excuse” to justify delay. Zakora, 44 F.4th at 482.

The Wrights haven’t invoked equitable tolling or provided any

other excuse or explanation for their three-year delay. Nor is any

such reason apparent to the Court. To be sure, the Magistrate

Judge granted the Wrights’ request to amend their complaint.

But that purely procedural ruling didn’t purport to foreclose the

limitations defense raised by the officers in their motion to

dismiss the claims newly levied against them.

3

24a

added Defendants are “subject to dismissal for failure

to state a claim.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215

(2007). The Court grants the named Defendants’

motion to dismiss and dismisses the claims against

them

with

prejudice.

This

outcome

may

understandably appear harsh from the perspective of a

pro se litigant who responds to an order to discover the

identities of unknown officers, see Discovery &

Amendment Order at 11, only for those officers to

defeat claims based on the timing of their

identification. But statutes of limitations are legal

commands that protect the due-process rights of

defendants—just as relation-back and other doctrines

protect the rights of plaintiffs. Neither is a mere

technicality, Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y.

v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980), and neither may

this Court ignore. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v.

Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) (statutes of

limitations “are intended to put defendants on notice

of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from

sleeping on their rights”). In any event, here the

limitations period passed while the Wrights were still

represented. See above n.1.

**

Whether the amended complaint purported to

substitute the named officers for the “Unknown Police

Office[r]” Defendants or instead to add them as new

Defendants (leaving the Does unchanged) is not clear

from the Amended Complaint or the Motion to Amend

that the Magistrate Judge granted. See DNs 39, 41.

Even if the “Unknown Police Officers” technically

persist as Defendants in this case, notwithstanding

the Wrights’ efforts to substitute known police officers

in their place, the claims against the remaining Doe

Defendants also warrant dismissal. Federal Rule of

25a

Civil Procedure 4(m) provides a 90-day time limit for

service after a complaint is filed. When a plaintiff has

missed that window and had “ample time” to

determine the identities of “John Doe” defendants, a

court may dismiss the defendants from the lawsuit.

See Petty v. County of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 345 (6th

Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v.

City of Ann Arbor, 860 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2017).

Because the Wrights have had three years to identify

any other “unknown police officers,” yet have missed

the window to serve them, the Court dismisses the

claims against them. See, e.g., Carpenter Crest 401 v.

Converti, No. 15-cv-2004, 2017 WL 3190787, at *4 (D.

Ariz. July 27, 2017) (dismissing claims against the

only remaining defendant—a “John Doe” defendant—

for failure to prosecute, and accordingly entering “full

and final judgment” in the action).

***

While the motion to dismiss remained pending, the

Wrights moved to disqualify the judge currently

assigned to this case. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a

judge to “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

“[D]isqualification under section 455(a) must be

predicated … upon extrajudicial conduct rather than

on judicial conduct.” United States v. Story, 716 F.2d

1088, 1091 (6th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).

Extrajudicial conduct concerns only “personal bias as

distinguished from a judicial one, arising out of the

judge’s background and association and not from the

judge’s view of the law.” Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d

409, 423 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). A

challenged judge may rule on the motion for his or her

own disqualification or recusal. See Easley v. Univ. of

26a

Mich. Board of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1355–56 (6th

Cir. 1988).

The Wrights’ motion to disqualify provides no real

reason—whether extrajudicial or otherwise—for

recusal of the undersigned judge under 28 U.S.C. §

455. Indeed, they refer to no bias at all. Instead, the

motion notes their dissatisfaction with the discovery

process in this case. That obviously doesn’t bear on

any extrajudicial conduct. And no source or perception

of bias—of any sort—is apparent. So the Court denies

the motion to disqualify.

****

Three motions remain on the docket: a motion for

more definite statement by the named officers (DN 54),

a motion for summary judgment or for settlement

conference by the Wrights (DN 66), and a motion for

judgment on the pleadings by all named defendants

(DN 67). Because the Court has now dismissed all

remaining claims, it denies these remaining motions

as moot. A separate final judgment will follow.

/s/ Benjamin Beaton

Benjamin Beaton, District Judge

United States District Court

September 19, 2024

27a

APPENDIX C

28 U.S.C. § 1658

§ 1658. Time limitations on the commencement

of civil actions arising under Acts of Congress

(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action

arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the

date of the enactment of this section may not be

commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action

accrues.

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right of

action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit,

manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a

regulatory requirement concerning the securities

laws, as defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), may be

brought not later than the earlier of–

(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts

constituting the violation; or

(2) 5 years after such violation.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States

or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in

any action brought against a judicial officer for an act

28a

or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief

was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any

Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District

of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the

District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1988

§ 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights

(a) Applicability of statutory and common law

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters

conferred on the district courts by the provisions of

titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the

protection of all persons in the United States in their

civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be

exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of

the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to

carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they

are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the

provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and

punish offenses against law, the common law, as

modified and changed by the constitution and statutes

of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of

such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same

is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of

the United States, shall be extended to and govern the

said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause,

and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of

punishment on the party found guilty.

(b) Attorney’s fees

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision

of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of

this title, title IX of Public Law 92–318 [20 U.S.C. 1681

29a

et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

[42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C.

2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

[42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or section 12361 of title 34,

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the United States, a reasonable

attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except that in any

action brought against a judicial officer for an act or

omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity such

officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including

attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in

excess of such officer’s jurisdiction. (c) Expert fees In

awarding an attorney’s fee under subsection (b) in any

action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section

1981 or 1981a of this title, the court, in its discretion,

may include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140

413.140 Actions to be brought within one year.

(1) The following actions shall be commenced within

one (1) year after the cause of action accrued:

(a) An action for an injury to the person of the

plaintiff, or of her husband, his wife, child,

ward, apprentice, or servant;

(b) An action for injuries to persons, cattle, or other

livestock by railroads or other corporations,

with the exception of hospitals licensed

pursuant to KRS Chapter 216;

(c) An action for malicious prosecution, conspiracy,

arrest, seduction, criminal conversation, or

breach of promise of marriage;

(d) An action for libel or slander;

30a

(e) An action against a physician, surgeon, dentist,

or hospital licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter

216, for negligence or malpractice;

(f) A civil action, arising out of any act or omission

in rendering, or failing to render, professional

services for others, whether brought in tort or

contract, against a real estate appraiser holding

a certificate or license issued under KRS

Chapter 324A or a real estate broker or sales

associate holding a license issued under KRS

Chapter 324;

(g) An action for the escape of a prisoner, arrested

or imprisoned on civil process;

(h) An action for the recovery of usury paid for the

loan or forbearance of money or other thing,

against the loaner or forbearer or assignee of

either;

(i) An action for the recovery of stolen property, by

the owner thereof against any person having

the same in his possession;

(j) An action for the recovery of damages or the

value of stolen property, against the thief or any

accessory;

(k) An action arising out of a detention facility

disciplinary proceeding, whether based upon

state or federal law;

(l) An action for damages arising out of a

deficiency,

defect,

omission,

error,

or

miscalculation in any survey or plat, whether

brought in tort or contract, against a licensed

professional land surveyor holding a license

under KRS Chapter 322;

(m) An action for violating KRS 311.782; and

(n) An action for violating KRS 311.731.

(2) In respect to the action referred to in paragraph (e)

of subsection (1) of this section, the cause of action

shall be deemed to accrue at the time the injury is

31a

first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care

should have been discovered; provided that such

action shall be commenced within five (5) years

from the date on which the alleged negligent act or

omission is said to have occurred.

(3) In respect to the action referred to in paragraph (f)

or (l) of subsection (1) of this section, the cause of

action shall be deemed to accrue within one (1) year

from the date of the occurrence or from the date

when the cause of action was, or reasonably should

have been, discovered by the party injured.

(4) In respect to the action referred to in paragraph (h)

of subsection (1) of this section, the cause of action

shall be deemed to accrue at the time of payment.

This limitation shall apply to all payments made

on all demands, whether evidenced by writing or

existing only in parol.

(5) In respect to the action referred to in paragraph (i)

of subsection (1) of this section, the cause of action

shall be deemed to accrue at the time the property

is found by its owner.

(6) In respect to the action referred to in paragraph (j)

of subsection (1) of this section, the cause of action

shall be deemed to accrue at the time of discovery

of the liability.

(7) In respect to the action referred to in paragraph (k)

of subsection (1) of this section, the cause of action

shall be deemed to accrue on the date an appeal of

the disciplinary proceeding is decided by the

institutional warden.

(8) In respect to the action referred to in subsection

(1)(m) and (n) of this section, the cause of action

shall be deemed to accrue after the performance or

inducement or attempt to perform or induce the

abortion.