Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lonnie Joseph Parker, Petitioner v. United States

No. 25In the

Supreme Court of the United States

LONNIE JOSEPH PARKER,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the eighth circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Ronald W. Chapman II, Esq., LL.M.

Counsel of Record

The Chapman Firm, P.C.

456 East Milwaukee Street

Detroit, MI 48202

(346) 242-7626

ron@chapmanandassociates.com

Counsel for Petitioner

131790

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a doctor can be convicted of unlawfully

prescribing controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)

(1) and 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) based on a deviation from

the standard of care in a single state.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner, the defendant-appellant below, is Dr.

Lonnie J. Parker.

Respondent is the United States of America, appellee

below.

iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

U.S. District Court for the Western District of

Arkansas: United States v. Lonnie Parker, Case No.

4:19-cr-40018-SOH-1. Judgment entered on August 27,

2024. See Pet.App.12a.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit: United

States v. Lonnie Parker, Case No. 24-2813. Judgment

entered August 1, 2025. See Pet.App.1a.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A. Legal background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

B. This litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . . 7

I.

The Eighth Circuit’s holding is wrong . . . . . . . . . 7

v

Table of Contents

Page

A. The text of the CSA confirms that

prosecutions under § 841 must be based

on a national standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

B. The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation

creates a 50-state patchwork and

disrupts uniformity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

C. This Court has already held that § 841(a)

(1) prosecutions must be based on a

national standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

II. The question presented is of national

importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

III. This case is an ideal vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

vi

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

A P P E N DI X A — O P I N ION O F T H E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, FILED

AUGUST 1, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A P P E N DI X B — J U D G M E N T I N A

CRIMINA L CA SE, UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DI S T R IC T OF A R K A NS A S , F I L E D

AUGUST 27, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12a

A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, FILED

SEPTEMBER 11, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30a

vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Gonzales v. Oregon,

546 U.S. 243 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10

Gonzalez v. Reich,

545 U.S. 1 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Leland v. State of Oregon,

343 U.S. 790 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Ross v. Blake,

578 U.S. 632 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Ruan v. United States,

597 U.S. 450 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 13

United States v. Joseph,

709 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

United States v. Moore,

423 U.S. 122 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 4, 8, 12, 14

United States v. Parker,

145 F.4th 915 (8th Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . 3, 7, 12, 13, 14

Statutes and Rules

21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4, 6, 7, 8

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9,

10, 11, 12, 13, 14

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 13

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Arkansas Medical Practice Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Controlled Substances Act . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Other Authorities

Medical Board of California, Guidelines for

Prescribing Controlled Substances for Pain

(Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.mbc.ca.gov/About/

Meetings/ Mater ial /2 95 3 3/r x-Mater ials20140929.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully petitions this Court for a writ

of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eighth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Eighth Circuit’s August 1, 2025, opinion (Pet.

App.1a) is reported at 145 F.4th 915.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

The Eighth Circuit entered its judgment on August 1,

2025, and denied rehearing en banc on September 11,

2025. See Pet.App.30a.

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) states:

(a) Unlawful acts. Except as authorized by

this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any

person knowingly or intentionally—

(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,

or possess with intent to manufacture,

distribute, or dispense, a controlled

substance[.]

2

21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) states:

A prescription for a controlled substance to

be effective must be issued for a legitimate

medical purpose by an individual practitioner

acting in the usual course of his professional

practice. The responsibility for the proper

prescribing and dispensing of controlled

substances is upon the prescribing practitioner,

but a corresponding responsibility rests with

the pharmacist who fills the prescription. An

order purporting to be a prescription issued not

in the usual course of professional treatment

or in legitimate and authorized research is not

a prescription within the meaning and intent

of section 309 of the Act (21 U.S.C. 829) and

the person knowingly filling such a purported

prescription, as well as the person issuing it,

shall be subject to the penalties provided for

violations of the provisions of law relating to

controlled substances.

INTRODUCTION

The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), in particular 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), was enacted to target drug trafficking.

In United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975), this Court

affirmed that Congress deemed the harsh penalties for

unlawful distribution under § 841(a)(1) an appropriate

sanction for drug trafficking by a registered physician.

Thus, in prosecutions of physicians under § 841(a)(1), this

Court has held that the jury is to consider whether the

physician acted “in accordance with a standard of medical

practice generally recognized and accepted in the United

States.” Moore, 423 U.S. at 138-39.

3

Despite the wide variety among legitimate medical

viewpoints on what type of treatment is appropriate for a

particular patient treated with controlled substances, the

Eighth Circuit below concluded that a physician—here,

Petitioner Dr. Lonnie Parker—could be convicted of a

federal felony because the quantity of his prescriptions

exceeded the recommended maximum daily amount

set by the Arkansas State Medical Board—that is, his

prescriptions exceeded the recommended maximum daily

amount set by a single state. The Eighth Circuit held

that “there is nothing in the language of § 841(a)(1) that

suggests that a physician’s conduct must be compared to

a national standard.” 145 F.4th 915, 920 (8th Cir. 2025).

That holding is wrong, and this Court should intervene

to clarify that, in prosecutions of physicians under § 841(a)

(1), the jury is to consider whether the doctor’s conduct

fell within the bounds of any “generally recognized and

accepted” medical practice in the United States, Moore,

423 U.S. at 138-139, instead of, as the Eighth Circuit held,

the nuances of a single state’s regulations.

Without inter vention, the CSA will have been

converted into a mechanism to weaponize non-criminal

state regulatory guidance into the basis for federal

criminal liability—something that the text of § 841(a)(1)

does not authorize and that Congress never authorized

or intended.

STATEMENT

A.

Legal background.

Section 841(a)(1) of Title 21, U.S. Code, provides that

“[e]xcept as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be

4

unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally * * *

to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with

intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled

substance[.]” And 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) provides that

“[a] prescription for a controlled substance to be effective

must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an

individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his

professional practice.” As this Court has explained, in

§ 841(a) prosecutions, the jury is to consider whether the

defendant acted “in accordance with a standard of medical

practice generally recognized and accepted in the United

States.” United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 138-39

(1975). In Ruan v. United States, this Court clarified that,

in order for a doctor to be convicted under § 841(a)(1), the

government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he “knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized

manner.” 597 U.S. 450, 457 (2022). This case concerns the

correct benchmark for evaluating whether a physician’s

dispensing of controlled substances is “authorized.”

B. This litigation.

1. Lonnie Joseph Parker, M.D. was a licensed

medical practitioner in Arkansas who held a valid DEA

registration to prescribe controlled substances. Parker Br.

9. Dr. Parker treated a spectrum of patients at his clinics,

Primary Care Specialist and Modern Medicine, located

in Texarkana, Arkansas. Id. Many of those patients

were chronic pain patients requiring opioid medications

to manage and treat their intractable pain. Id. Because

Texarkana, and Arkansas more generally, suffered from

a shortage of physicians, Dr. Parker stepped in to treat

many patients afflicted with addiction but nonetheless

suffering from pain. See id. He declined to turn these

5

patients away. Dr. Parker grew up near Texarkana on

his stepfather’s farm. Id. at 10. He has deep ties to the

community, and he helped the patients that he could. Id.

Following his service in the Marine Corps, Dr. Parker

received his medical degree from the Mayo Clinic Medical

School in Rochester, Minnesota. Id. He practiced as a

generalist following his medical training before a mentor

of his, Dr. Donald Duncan, steered him toward taking

a particular interest in pain. Id. Dr. Parker’s growing

interest in pain led him to seek certification for treating

addiction, and with the help of a psychiatrist in Little

Rock, he opened a suboxone treatment center on the

Arkansas side of Texarkana. Id.

Dr. Parker went on to treat pain and addiction patients

for decades until in October 2019 the government sought

to put an end to that. The DEA obtained and executed a

search warrant at Primary Care Specialists on October

8, 2019. Id. Several electronic patient records were seized

and the clinic’s computers imaged. Id. The DEA then

retained a Florida physician, Dr. Mark Rubenstein, to

review five of the seized patient records. That selection of

five files was based on a review of Dr. Parker’s Prescription

Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) data. Patients with “a

high level of prescribing” were selected for Dr. Rubenstein

to review. Id. at 11.

2. The government indicted Dr. Parker on nine

counts of drug trafficking under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

and (b)(1)(C). That Indictment was then superseded,

twice, and five counts remained. R. Doc. 114. Counts 1,

4 and 5 involved prescribing a Schedule II controlled

substance, Oxycodone. Count 1 also alleged that the

6

Oxycodone prescription caused the death of Patient N.C.

Id. Both Counts 2 and 3 involved prescribing a Schedule

V controlled substance, Promethazine HCl. Dr. Parker

pled not guilty on all counts, and he proceeded to trial in

the Western District of Arkansas.

3. At the eight-day trial, the government called DEA

agent Sheli Chupik who testified about the Arkansas

Medical Practice Act, the Regulations of the Arkansas

Medical Board, and the 2016 Center for Disease Control

and Prevention Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for

Chronic Pain (2016 CDC Guidelines). Parker Br. at 11-12.

Included in that testimony was an explanation of Morphine

Milligram Equivalents (MMEs), in which Chupik

explained that the CDC cautions against prescribing

greater than 50 MMEs per day unless there is a specific

justified need. Id. at 12.

The government then called, as an expert witness,

a Florida physician named Dr. Mark Rubenstein. Dr.

Rubenstein testified that the Arkansas Medical Practice

Act defines “excessive” opioid prescribing as involving

anything above 50 MME per patient per day. Parker Br.

at 13.

4. The district court proposed instructing the jury

that the phrase “legitimate medical purpose” and “usual

course of professional practice” in 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)

meant acting in accordance with appropriate criteria for

prescribing controlled substances in the State of Arkansas.

Petitioner objected to this instruction. The district court,

finding no error with the phrasing, instructed the jury

accordingly, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty

on Count One (but not guilty with respect to the death

7

enhancement), guilty on Counts Two, Three, and Four,

but not guilty on Count Five.

The district court sentenced Petitioner to 87 months in

prison on Counts One and Four, and 12 months in prison

on Counts Two and Three—all of which were ordered to

run concurrently.

5. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Petitioner argued

that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it

could convict Petitioner if it found that he deviated from

Arkansas’s prescribing regulations. The Eighth Circuit

rejected that argument, holding that “there is nothing in

the language of § 841(a)(1) that suggests that a physician’s

conduct must be compared to a national standard.” United

States v. Parker, 145 F.4th 915, 920 (8th Cir. 2025). The

Eighth Circuit affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. Id.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

The Eighth Circuit’s holding is wrong.

The Eighth Circuit held that “there is nothing in the

language of § 841(a)(1) that suggests that a physician’s

conduct must be compared to a national standard.” 145

F.4th 915, 920 (8th Cir. 2025). That holding is wrong, and

backwards. Instead of asking whether anything in the text

of § 841(a)(1) calls for a national standard, the Court of

Appeals should have asked whether there is any indication

in the text of § 841(a)(1) that would lead to the conclusion

that Congress authorized federal criminal prosecutions

based on a fifty-state patchwork of regulatory codes.

Congress did not. Petitioner was convicted under a

standard that is not found in the law, was not authorized

8

by Congress, and has no foothold in this Court’s precedent.

The Court should grant the petition and clarify that a

doctor can only be convicted under § 841(a)(1) and 21

C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) if the Government proves beyond a

reasonable doubt that his conduct was not authorized

under any standard of care recognized in this United

States and that he acted as a drug trafficker, see United

States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 137 (1975).

A.

The text of the CSA confirms that prosecutions

under § 841 must be based on a national

standard.

Nothing in the text of the CSA suggests that Congress

authorized federal criminal prosecutions based on a fiftystate patchwork of regulatory codes. As this Court has

made clear, “[s]tatutory interpretation, as we always say,

begins with the text.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638

(2016) (citation omitted).

Section 841(a)(1) makes no mention of state prescribing

criteria. From a textualist approach, Congress has not

delegated any authority to the States to set the limits

of conduct required under § 841(a)(1). Likewise, the

implementing regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a), states

that for a prescription to be valid, it must be issued for a

“legitimate medical purpose by a practitioner acting in

the usual course of professional practice.” The regulation

makes no mention of state prescribing guidelines and,

indeed, when the regulation was first adopted, most states

did not even have prescribing guidelines. The notion that

a state can have such a broad impact on the application of

federal law is foreign to the application of federal criminal

statutes.

9

The lower courts’ contention that a state board,

committee, or sub-committee has the power to influence

the interpretation of the law, and thereby alter the conduct

required by Congress or the DEA, ignores the absence of

any indication from Congress that a violation of § 841(a)(1)

is contingent on state law. Indeed, as this Court has held,

§ 841(a)(1) targets “illicit drug dealing and trafficking as

conventionally understood.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.

243, 270 (2006). Section 841(a)(1) does not criminalize mere

deviations from state regulatory guidelines. See id.

B. The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation creates a

50-state patchwork and disrupts uniformity.

The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of § 841(a)(1) also

leads to the absurd result that doctors who prescribe

controlled substances can be criminally prosecuted, fined,

and even imprisoned—up to life—based on a deviation

from a standard of care that may be entirely reasonable

in other states.

1. At the time of Petitioner’s conduct in this case,

Arkansas law counseled against prescribing over 50

MMEs per day to a single patient. And because proof at

trial established that he did, the Government’s expert

testified that Petitioner was not “authorized” to do so.

The district court instructed the jury that the phrase

“legitimate medical purpose” and “usual course of

professional practice” meant acting in accordance with

appropriate criteria for prescribing controlled substances

in the State of Arkansas. Parker Br. 32-33. That instruction

invited the jury to convict Petitioner for conduct that, at

the time of the verdict in this case, was not illegal in many

other states. For example, in California, the threshold was

10

90 MMEs per patient per day, which is nearly double that

of Arkansas. Parker Br. 26-27. The upshot is that, had

Petitioner been prosecuted in California, he likely would

not—indeed, could not—have been convicted.

Even dating as fa r back as 2 014, Cali for nia

acknowledged: “There are differing opinions among

reputable experts and organizations as to what MED

[Morphine Equivalent Dose] should trigger a consultation.”

This led California to adopt an 80 mg per day MME back

in 2014. Medical Board of California, Guidelines for

Prescribing Controlled Substances for Pain (Sept. 25,

2014).1

The notion that liability under § 841(a)(1) turns on the

location where a doctor happens to practice is at odds with

fundamental notions of uniformity in the application of

federal criminal law. See Leland v. State of Oregon, 343

U.S. 790, 797 (1952) (recognizing the federal government’s

interest in uniformity in the application of federal law).

Further, this Court has held that “[e]ven though regulation

of health and safety is primarily, and historically, a matter

of local concern, there is no question that the Federal

Government can set uniform national standards in these

areas.” Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 271 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). And the Gonzalez Court

explicitly concluded that the dispensation of narcotics to

treat pain is one of those areas where Congress sought

to create uniformity. Id.

The Eighth Circuit’s ruling below disrupts that

uniformity by allowing liability under § 841(a)(1) to turn on

1. https://www.mbc.ca.gov/About/Meetings/Material/29533/

rx-Materials-20140929.pdf.

11

the nuances of a single state’s prescribing guidelines. The

Court should grant certiorari to clarify that Congress did

not intend for liability under § 841(a)(1) to be circumscribed

in this way.

2. The unworkability of having liability under § 841(a)

(1) turn on a specific state’s regulations is illustrated by the

following hypothetical. Suppose Michigan were to adopt

opioid prescribing regulations that limited physicians

to a mere 5 MMEs per patient per day. If a physician

in Michigan prescribed above this amount, he could,

under the logic of the Eighth Circuit’s holding below, be

prosecuted and convicted under the CSA, notwithstanding

the fact that in no other state would this conduct be

banned.

This is almost exactly what happened here, with the

only difference being the amount of MMEs at issue.

3. Moreover, this Court has already rejected the

notion that a state can hijack Congress’s power under

the Commerce Clause to regulate purely intrastate

activities if those activities have national reach. In

Gonzalez v. Reich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), this Court struck

down California’s attempt to legalize medical marijuana.

In so doing, the Court held that “state action cannot

circumscribe Congress’s plenary commerce power.” Id.

at 29 (citation omitted).

Here, by allowing the jury to convict Petitioner based

purely on the nuances of Arkansas state law, Arkansas

now has, in effect, the ability to dictate the full scope of

liability under a federal criminal statute—§ 841(a)(1). This

result is inconsistent with the Court’s holding in Reich, and

12

the Court should grant certiorari to clarify that liability

under the CSA does not—indeed, cannot—turn on the

nuances of a single state’s prescribing regulations.

C.

This Court has already held that § 841(a)(1)

prosecutions must be based on a national

standard.

The Eighth Circuit held that “there is nothing in the

language of § 841(a)(1) that suggests that a physician’s

conduct must be compared to a national standard.”

145 F.4th at 920. But this Court has already held that

prosecutions under § 841(a)(1) are not governed by the

medical standards at play in a single state. In Moore,

this Court held that in § 841(a) prosecutions, the jury is

to consider whether the defendant acted “in accordance

with a standard of medical practice generally recognized

and accepted in the United States.” 423 U.S. at 138-39.

That holding makes sense. “A standard,” id., is exactly

that: “a standard of medical practice generally accepted

in the United States.” Id. True, Arkansas’s 50 MME per

patient per day is one such standard which is accepted in

the United States. But it is of course not the only standard.

In § 841(a)(1) prosecutions, Congress deliberately chose

to cast a wide net in defining when a prescription in

authorized, and this Court recognized as much in Moore.

Thus, to convict a physician for unauthorized prescribing,

the government must prove that the physician’s conduct

deviated from what is generally accepted in the United

States—not merely that the conduct was disfavored by a

single state’s medical board.

The Eleventh Circuit has understood this Court’s

precedents as requiring the jury, in § 841(a)(1) prosecutions,

13

to evaluate the physician’s conduct against “a standard of

medical practice generally recognized and accepted in

the United States.” United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d

1082, 1095 (11th Cir. 2013). In Joseph, the court held that

“[t]his instruction did not suggest that the jury must

evaluate the conduct of the defendants against a single

national standard of practice. The instruction instead

required the prosecution to prove that the actions of the

defendants were inconsistent with any accepted standard

of professional practice.” Id. (emphasis in original). The

Eleventh Circuit had it right.

The Eighth Circuit below, however, erred in concluding,

145 F.4th at 920, that Petitioner’s deviation from the MME

guidelines in a single state—here, Arkansas—could

trigger federal felony liability under the CSA even though

Petitioner’s conduct was demonstrably not prohibited in

many other states, and for hundreds of thousands of other

physicians, throughout the country.

II. The question presented is of national importance.

The answer to the question presented is of the utmost

importance nationwide because it affects countless doctors

on a daily basis, and the consequences of a conviction under

§ 841 are “severe,” as § 841 calls for “severe penalties upon

those who violate it, including life imprisonment and fines

up to $1 million.” Ruan v. 597 U.S. at 460 (citing § 841(b)

(1)(C).

There are approximately one million doctors in the

United States. Those doctors treat an untold number of

patients, many of whom suffer from intractable, chronic,

debilitating pain. The Eighth Circuit’s holding endorsed

14

a view of the CSA that anchors criminal liability to

prescribing guidelines in a single state, notwithstanding

the fact that deviation from those guidelines in many other

states would not be considered criminal, and would not

even be considered problematic by a state’s medical board.

Unless this Court intervenes, it follows that doctors

who prescribe opioids now will fear an indictment if

they deviate from a state medical board’s guidelines on

prescribing opioids, even if the doctors legitimately believe

that certain treatment is necessary for the patient’s wellbeing.

III. This case is an ideal vehicle.

This case is an ideal vehicle for addressing the question

presented. Petitioner challenged the district court’s jury

instruction. Parker Reply Br. at 9. The parties briefed

the question before the Eighth Circuit, and the Eighth

Circuit addressed and decided the question in a published

opinion. 145 F.4th 915, 920-21. If the Court were to find

error in the jury instruction here, a new trial would be

required—and there would be no alternative grounds for

affirmance—because the error is not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. The district

court’s instruction invited the jury to convict Petitioner on

a standard that is not found in the text of § 841(a)(1) and

which conflicts with this Court’s previous holding that, in

prosecutions of physicians under § 841(a)(1), the jury is to

consider whether the physician acted “in accordance with

a standard of medical practice generally recognized and

accepted in the United States.” Moore, 423 U.S. at 138-39.

15

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Ronald W. Chapman II, Esq., LL.M.

Counsel of Record

The Chapman Firm, P.C.

456 East Milwaukee Street

Detroit, MI 48202

(346) 242-7626

ron@chapmanandassociates.com

Counsel for Petitioner

December 2025

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

A P P E N DI X A — O P I N ION O F T H E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, FILED

AUGUST 1, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A P P E N DI X B — J U D G M E N T I N A

CRIMINA L CA SE, UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DI S T R IC T OF A R K A NS A S , F I L E D

AUGUST 27, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12a

A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, FILED

SEPTEMBER 11, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30a

1a

Appendix

A

APPENDIX A — OPINION

OF THE

UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,

FILED AUGUST 1, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2813

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LONNIE JOSEPH PARKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Arkansas - Texarkana

Submitted June 13, 2025

Filed August 1, 2025

Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, A RNOLD and

GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Lonnie Parker, a licensed medical

practitioner, guilty of distributing oxycodone and

promethazine HCl with codeine solution in a manner

unauthorized by the Controlled Substances Act. See 21

2a

Appendix A

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court1 sentenced Parker to

87 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Parker contends that

the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions,

the jury instructions were improper, and the district court

committed procedural error in sentencing. Finding no

reversible error, we affirm.

I.

On August 3, 2018, an officer in Plano, Texas pulled

an individual—whom we will refer to as N.C.—over for

reckless driving. N.C. was visibly impaired and had a

yellow stain on his mouth. The officer asked N.C. if he had

taken any medication, and N.C. responded that he had

taken Lyrica for hand or back pain. After arresting N.C.,

the officer searched N.C.’s car and discovered numerous

prescription bottles which listed Parker as the prescribing

physician. N.C. was transported to the Plano City Jail and

died later that same day.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)

began suspecting that Parker was operating his medical

clinic in Texarkana, Arkansas as a “pill mill” from which

he illegally distributed various opioid prescriptions. On

October 8, 2019, the DEA executed a search warrant at

Parker’s clinic and seized numerous patient records. The

DEA retained an independent pain treatment expert—Dr.

Mark Rubenstein—to review a subset of those records.

Rubenstein reviewed N.C.’s patient record, as well as the

1. The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief Judge, United States

District Court for the Western District of Arkansas.

3a

Appendix A

patient records of four individuals whom we will refer

to here as J.F., L.H., G.T., and K.J. The Government

subsequently determined that Parker had distributed

oxycodone—a schedule II controlled substance—and

promethazine HCl with codeine solution—a schedule

V controlled substance—in violation of the Controlled

Substances Act.

On June 15, 2022, a grand jury returned an indictment

charging Parker with unauthorized distribution of

oxycodone to N.C., J.F., and L.H., and unauthorized

distribution of promethazine HCl with codeine solution to

G.T. and K.J. See id. The indictment also charged Parker

with causing the death of N.C. See id. § 841(b)(1)(C).

During an eight-day jury trial, the Government

presented testimony from sixteen witnesses. As relevant

here, the Government called Rubenstein as an expert

witness in the area of pain management. Rubenstein

explained Arkansas’s regulations regarding legitimate

medical practice in pain management. He testified

that Parker had not conformed his conduct to those

regulations. According to Rubenstein, Parker had failed to

conduct necessary physical examinations for his patients,

prescribed oxycodone and promethazine HCl with codeine

solution inappropriately, and maintained deficient and

internally inconsistent patient records.

At the close of trial, the district court gave various

instructions to the jury. Instruction No. 6 instructed

the jury that “[t]he terms ‘legitimate medical purpose’

and ‘usual course of professional practice’ mean acting

4a

Appendix A

in accordance with appropriate criteria for prescribing

controlled substances in the State of A rkansas.”

Instruction No. 14 instructed the jury that it could find

that Parker “acted knowingly if [it found] . . . that the

defendant believed there was a high probability that

[N.C., L.H., and J.F.] were addicted to oxycodone, and that

[G.T. and K.J.] were diverting promethazine with codeine

cough syrup, and that he took deliberate actions to avoid

learning of that fact.”

The jury found Parker guilty of the unauthorized

distribution of oxycodone to N.C. and L.H., and the

unauthorized distribution of promethazine HCl with

codeine solution to G.T. and K.J. It found Parker not

guilty of the unauthorized distribution of oxycodone to

J.F. and also not guilty of causing the death of N.C. At

sentencing, the parties disputed the quantity of controlled

substances that should be used to calculate Parker’s base

offense level under the sentencing guidelines. Parker

argued that the district court should consider only those

controlled substances that were prescribed to N.C., L.H.,

G.T., and K.J. on the date set forth in the indictment. The

Government argued that the district court should also

include uncharged prescriptions written by Parker to

N.C., L.H., G.T., and K.J. outside of that date as relevant

conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The district court agreed

with the Government and calculated Parker’s base offense

level as 28. After accounting for a two-level enhancement

for using a special skill to facilitate the offense, the

district court calculated Parker’s total offense level as 30.

Parker’s total offense level of 30 combined with a criminal

history category of II resulted in an advisory sentencing

5a

Appendix A

guidelines range of 108 to 135 months’ imprisonment. The

district court varied downwards and sentenced Parker

to 87 months’ imprisonment. The district court noted

that, even if it had ruled in Parker’s favor on quantity, it

nonetheless would have imposed the same sentence.

II.

On appeal, Parker asserts that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions and that the jury

instructions were erroneous. He also contends that the

district court miscalculated the quantity of controlled

substances used in determining his base offense level. We

address each claim in turn.

A.

We first address whether the evidence was sufficient

to convict Parker of the unauthorized distribution of

oxycodone and promethazine HCl with codeine solution.

We review sufficiency of the evidence challenges de

novo, “viewing the evidence and the jury’s credibility

determinations in the light most favorable to its verdict

and reversing only if no reasonable jury could have found

[the defendant] guilty.” United States v. Obi, 25 F.4th 574,

577 (8th Cir. 2022).

To prove Parker guilty of the unauthorized distribution

of oxycodone and promethazine HCl with codeine solution,

the Government had to show that Parker “knowingly or

intentionally” distributed the controlled substances in a

manner not “authorized” by the Controlled Substances

6a

Appendix A

Act. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). A licensed medical practitioner

is “authorized” to prescribe controlled substances when he

issues a prescription “for a legitimate medical purpose . . .

acting in the usual course of his professional practice.” 2

21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2025). Parker contends that the

evidence was insufficient because the Government did

not prove that he acted without a “legitimate medical

purpose.” But Rubenstein reviewed Parker’s patient files

and testified that, with respect to each patient named

in the indictment, Parker either prescribed controlled

substances that were not appropriate for the claimed

ailment or prescribed excessive amounts of controlled

substances. See United States v. Heaton, 59 F.4th 1226,

1246 (11th Cir. 2023) (noting that a physician violates

§ 841(a)(1) when he prescribes “an excessive quantity of

controlled substances” or prescribes controlled substances

that have “no logical relationship to the treatment of the

patient’s alleged condition”). Rubenstein also testified

that Parker prescribed controlled substances without

performing physical examinations that would have

informed him if such prescriptions were necessary. See

id. (noting that a physician violates § 841(a)(1) when he

distributes controlled substances without physically

examining patients). The jury was entitled to accept

2. Parker asks this court to decide whether the terms

“legitimate medical purpose” and “in the usual course of his

professional practice” should be considered in the conjunctive or

disjunctive. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2025). Because the jury was

instructed on the conjunctive and the Government does not challenge

this determination, we take no position on whether the terms

“legitimate medical purpose” and “usual course of his professional

practice” should be considered in the conjunctive or disjunctive.

7a

Appendix A

Rubenstein’s testimony, which provided sufficient evidence

to conclude that Parker had prescribed oxycodone and

promethazine HCl with codeine solution without “a

legitimate medical purpose.” 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a); see

United States v. Cole, 721 F.3d 1016, 1022 (8th Cir. 2013)

(“[I]n reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge,

we are obliged to defer to the jury’s determination of the

credibility of the witnesses.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Accordingly, we reject Parker’s challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence.

B.

We next address Parker’s challenge to the jury

instructions—specifically, Instructions No. 6 and 14.

Because Parker raised these arguments for the first time

on appeal, Parker has forfeited them and we review only

for plain error. See United States v. Ford, 888 F.3d 922,

925-26 (8th Cir. 2018). To establish plain error, Parker

“must show that there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and

(3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. at 926 (internal

quotation marks omitted). If all three conditions are met,

“an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to

notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Id.

Parker argues that Instruction No. 6, which instructed

the jury that “[t]he terms ‘legitimate medical purpose’

and ‘usual course of professional practice’ mean acting

in accordance with appropriate criteria for prescribing

controlled substances in the State of Arkansas,” wrongly

8a

Appendix A

limited the jury to consider only the criteria set forth

by a single state. According to Parker, the district court

should have instead instructed the jury on a national

standard, namely the regulations set forth by the Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). However,

there is nothing in the language of § 841(a)(1) that suggests

that a physician’s conduct must be compared to a national

standard. And, contrary to Parker’s assertion that the

Supreme Court in Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450, 142

S. Ct. 2370, 213 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2022) disavowed reference

to a state standard, Ruan addressed only the mens rea

required under § 841(a)(1). See id. at 457. Parker therefore

has not identified an error in Instruction No. 6 that is plain.

Moreover, he fails to show how the instruction affected his

“substantial rights.” Ford, 888 F.3d at 926. He does not

identify a meaningful distinction between the standards

set forth by the CDC and the State of Arkansas that

would justify reversal in this case. Accordingly, we reject

Parker’s challenge to Instruction No. 6.

As for Instruction No. 14, it instructed the jury that

it could find that Parker “acted knowingly if [it found] . . .

that the defendant believed there was a high probability

that [N.C., L.H., and J.F.] were addicted to oxycodone,

and that [G.T. and K.J.] were diverting promethazine with

codeine cough syrup, and that he took deliberate actions

to avoid learning of that fact.” Parker asserts that the

instruction was erroneous because it wrongfully equated

treating addicted patients with criminal conduct. While

we agree with Parker that treating addicted patients

is not in and of itself criminal conduct, we cannot say

that he has established that he is entitled to relief. “In

9a

Appendix A

determining the effect of [a challenged] instruction on the

validity of [a] conviction, [courts] accept at the outset the

well-established proposition that a single instruction to

a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must

be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” Boyde v.

California, 494 U.S. 370, 378, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 108 L. Ed.

2d 316 (1990). Before closing arguments, the district court

instructed the jury on the basic elements of the charged

offenses, informing the jury that the Government had

to show that Parker acted without “a legitimate medical

purpose” and outside “the usual course of his professional

practice” in order to be convicted. Instruction No. 6,

which reiterated those basic requirements to the jury,

never equated treating addicted patients with criminal

conduct. And Instruction No. 13 clarified that, if Parker

“dispense[d] a drug in good faith, in medically treating

a patient,” then “he has dispensed the drug lawfully.”

Instruction No. 13 did not draw artificial lines between

treating patients who were addicted and those who

were not. Moreover, while it is true that Instruction

No. 14 referred to addiction, the same instruction also

stated that a “willfully blind defendant is one who takes

deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of

wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually

known the critical facts.” Because we cannot view the

“addicted” language in Instruction No. 14 in artificial

isolation—and the jury instructions as a whole clarified

what constituted criminal conduct—we cannot say that

Parker has established entitlement to relief for plain error.

See Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 508, 141 S. Ct.

2090, 210 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2021) (noting that establishing

plain error is “difficult”).

10a

Appendix A

In addition, Parker argues that the jury instructions

were erroneous because the district court gave Instruction

No. 14 without explicitly reciting to the jury a particular

fact that Parker took deliberate action to avoid learning.

Parker contends that such a reference is mandated by

the Supreme Court’s decision in Global-Tech Appliances,

Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 131 S. Ct. 2060, 179 L. Ed.

2d 1167 (2011). However, the portion of the opinion cited

by Parker only states the basic requirements for the

doctrine of willful blindness, namely that “[t]he defendant

must subjectively believe that there is a high probability

that a fact exists” and that “the defendant must take

deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.” Id. at 769.

The opinion nowhere states that the district court must

specifically identify that fact for the jury. Accordingly, we

reject Parker’s challenge to Instruction No. 14.

C.

Finally, we address Parker’s claim of procedural

error in his sentencing. “Procedural error includes failing

to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines

range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to

consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based

on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain

the chosen sentence . . . .” United States v. Feemster,

572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a

district court committed procedural error, “we review

the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its

interpretation and application of the Guidelines, de novo.”

11a

Appendix A

United States v. Frisch, 704 F.3d 541, 543 (8th Cir. 2013)

(alteration omitted).

Parker contends that the district court erred in

calculating the quantity of controlled substances used

to determine his base offense level. He asserts that

the district court’s calculation should not have included

conduct outside of the indictment. He also claims that

some of his prescriptions to the individuals named in the

indictment were legitimate and therefore should not be

included in quantity. We need not address the merits of

Parker’s contention as any error is harmless. We have held

that, even when a district court miscalculates a sentence,

any error is harmless “when the district court indicates

it would have alternatively imposed the same sentence

even if a lower guideline range applied.” United States

v. Hamilton, 929 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 2019). Here, the

district court stated that it would have “impose[d] [the]

same sentence regardless” of its ruling on quantity. Thus,

any error was harmless and we reject Parker’s challenge

to his sentence.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.

12a

Appendix B IN A CRIMINAL

APPENDIX B — JUDGMENT

CASE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS,

FILED AUGUST 27, 2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Western District of Arkansas

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number: 4:19CR40018-001

USM Number: 21657-009

Ronald W. Chapman, II

Defendant’s Attorney

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

LONNIE JOSEPH PARKER

THE DEFENDANT:

 pleaded guilty to count(s)

 pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)

was accepted by the court.

which

 was found guilty on count(s) One (1), Two (2), Three

(3), and Four (4) of the Second Superseding Indictment

on October 28, 2022.

after a plea of not guilty.

13a

Appendix B

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title &

Section

21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(C),

and C.F.R.

§ 1306.04

Nature of

Offense

Distribution

of a Schedule

II Controlled

Substance

Without an

Effective

Prescription

21 U.S.C.

Distribution

§§ 841(a)(1),

of a Schedule

841(b)(3), and V Controlled

21 C.F.R.

Substance

§ 1306.04

Without an

Effective

Prescription

Offense Ended Count

08/01/2018 &

1&4

01/04/2019

08/29/2018 &

11/17/2018

2&3

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2

through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed

pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

 The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)

Five (5) of the Second Superseding Indictment on October

28, 2022.

 Count(s)

 is  are dismissed on the

motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United

States attorney for this district within 30 days of any

14a

Appendix B

change of name, residence, or mailing address until

all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments

imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to

pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and

United States attorney of material changes in economic

circumstances.

August 26, 2024

Date of Imposition of Judgment

/s/ Susan O. Hickey

Signature of Judge

Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States

District Judge

Name and Title of Judge

August 27, 2024

Date

15a

Appendix B

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

LONNIE JOSEPH PARKER

4:19CR40018-001

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody

of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a

total term of: eighty-seven (87) months on Count One

and Count Four; twelve (12) months on Count Two and

Count Three, with all counts to run concurrently with

each other; for a total term of eighty-seven (87) months.,

with credit for time served in federal custody.

 The court makes the following recommendations to

the Bureau of Prisons:

That the defendant be housed in FCI Texarkana.

 The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United

States Marshal.

 The defendant shall surrender to the United States

Marshal for this district:

 at

 a.m.  p.m. on

.

 as notified by the United States Marshal.

 The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence

at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

 before 2 p.m. on October 9, 2024.

 as notified by the United States Marshal.

 as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services

Office.

16a

Appendix B

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

to

with a certified copy of this judgment.

at

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

,

17a

Appendix B

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised

release for a term of: three (3) years on Count One and

Count Four, and one (1) year on Count Two and Count

Three, with all terms to run concurrently for a total

term of three (3) years.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

1.

You must not commit another federal, state or local

crime.

2.

You must not unlaw fully possess a controlled

substance.

3.

You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled

substance. You must submit to one drug test within

15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two

periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the

court.

 The above drug testing condition is suspended,

based on the court’s determination that you

pose a low risk of future substance abuse.

(check if applicable)

4.



You must make restitution in accordance with 18

U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute

authorizing a sentence of restitution. (check if

applicable)

18a

Appendix B

5.



You must cooperate in the collection of DNA

as directed by the probation officer. (check if

applicable)

6.



You must comply with the requirements of the

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

(34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as directed by the

probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any

state sex offender registration agency in the

location where you reside, work, are a student,

or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check

if applicable)

7.



You must participate in an approved program for

domestic violence. (check if applicable)

You must comply with the standard conditions that have

been adopted by this court as well as with any other

conditions on the attached page.

19a

Appendix B

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with

the following standard conditions of supervision. These

conditions are imposed because they establish the basic

expectations for your behavior while on supervision and

identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to

keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about

improvements in your conduct and condition.

1.

You must report to the probation office in the

federal judicial district where you are authorized

to reside within 72 hours of your release from

imprisonment, unless the probation officer

instructs you to report to a different probation

office or within a different time frame.

2.

After initially reporting to the probation office,

you will receive instructions from the court or

the probation officer about how and when you

must report to the probation officer, and you must

report to the probation officer as instructed.

3.

You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial

district where you are authorized to reside

without first getting permission from the court

or the probation officer.

4.

You must answer truthfully the questions asked

by your probation officer.

20a

Appendix B

5.

You must live at a place approved by the probation

officer. If you plan to change where you live or

anything about your living arrangements (such

as the people you live with), you must notify

the probation officer at least 10 days before

the change. If notifying the probation officer

in advance is not possible due to unanticipated

circumstances, you must notify the probation

officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a

change or expected change.

6.

You must allow the probation officer to visit you at

any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must

permit the probation officer to take any items

prohibited by the conditions of your supervision

that he or she observes in plain view.

7.

You must work full time (at least 30 hours per

week) at a lawful type of employment, unless

the probation officer excuses you from doing

so. If you do not have full-time employment you

must try to find full-time employment, unless the

probation officer excuses you from doing so. If

you plan to change where you work or anything

about your work (such as your position or your job

responsibilities), you must notify the probation

officer at least 10 days before the change. If

notifying the probation officer at least 10 days

in advance is not possible due to unanticipated

circumstances, you must notify the probation

officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a

change or expected change.

21a

Appendix B

8.

You must not communicate or interact with

someone you know is engaged in criminal activity.

If you know someone has been convicted of a

felony, you must not knowingly communicate or

interact with that person without first getting

the permission of the probation officer.

9.

If you are arrested or questioned by a law

enforcement officer, you must notify the probation

officer within 72 hours.

10. You must not own, possess, or have access to

a firearm, ammunition, destructive device,

or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was

designed, or was modified for, the specific

purpose of causing bodily injury or death to

another person such as nunchakus or tasers).

11. You must not act or make any agreement with a

law enforcement agency to act as a confidential

human source or informant without first getting

the permission of the court.

12. If the probation officer determines that you

pose a risk to another person (including an

organization), the probation officer may require

you to notify the person about the risk and you

must comply with that instruction. The probation

officer may contact the person and confirm that

you have notified the person about the risk.

13. You must follow the instructions of the probation

officer related to the conditions of supervision.

22a

Appendix B

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the

conditions specified by the court and has provided me

with a written copy of this judgment containing these

conditions. For further information regarding these

conditions, see Overview of Probation and Supervised

Release Conditions, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant’s Signature

Date

23a

Appendix B

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1.

The defendant shall submit his person, residence,

and/or vehicle to a search conducted by the

U.S. Probation Office at a reasonable time and

in a reasonable manner based upon reasonable

suspicion of evidence of a violation of any

condition of supervised release. Failure to submit

to a search may be grounds for revocation.

2.

The defendant shall not purchase, possess, use,

distribute, or administer marijuana or obtain or

possess a medical marijuana card or prescription.

If the defendant is currently in possession of

a medical marijuana card, he will turn it over

immediately to the probation office.

24a

Appendix B

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary

penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

TOTALS $

Assessment Restitution

Count 1

100.00

Count 2

25.00

Count 3

25.00

Count 4:

100.00

$ -0-

Fine

AVAA

Assessment*

JVTA

Assessment**

$ -0-

$ -0-

$ -0-

 The determination of restitution is deferred until . An

Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C)

will be entered after such determination.

 The defendant must make restitution (including

community restitution) to the following payees in the

amount listed below.

* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim

Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L.

No. 114-22.

25a

Appendix B

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall

receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless

specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage

payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the

United States is paid.

Name of

Payee

Total

Loss***

Restitution Priority or

Ordered

Percentage

TOTALS

$

$

*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required

under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for

offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but

before April 23, 1996.

26a

Appendix B

 Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea

agreement $



The defendant must pay interest on restitution and

a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution

or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after

the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6

may be subject to penalties for delinquency and

default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).



The court determined that the defendant does not

have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered

that:



the interest requirement is waived for

 fine

 restitution.



the interest requirement for

 fine

 restitution is modified

as follows:

27a

Appendix B

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment

of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

A  Lump sum payment of $ 250.00 due immediately.

 not later than , or

 in accordance with  C  D,  E, or  F below;

or

B  Payment to begin immediately (may be combined

with  C,  D, or  F below); or

C  Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly)

installments of $ over a period of (e.g., months or

years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the

date of this judgment; or

D  Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly)

installments of $ over a period of (e.g., months

or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days)

after release from imprisonment to a term of

supervision; or

E  Payment during the term of supervised release

will commence within (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after

release from imprisonment. The court will set

the payment plan based on an assessment of the

defendant’s ability to pay at that time; or

28a

Appendix B

F  Special instructions regarding the payment of

criminal monetary penalties:

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise,

if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of

criminal monetary penalties is due during the period of

imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except

those payments made through the Federal Bureau of

Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are

made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments

previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties

imposed.

 Joint and Several

Case

Number

Defendant

and CoDefendant

Names

(including

defendant

number)

Joint and

Total

Several

Amount Amount

Corresponding

Payee, if

appropriate

29a

Appendix B

 The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

 The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

 The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in

the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1)

assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution

interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine

interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment,

(9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of prosecution

and court costs.

30a

Appendix

C UNITED STATES

APPENDIX C — ORDER

OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,

FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No: 24-2813

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

LONNIE JOSEPH PARKER,

Appellant.

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Arkansas – Texarkana

(4:19-cr-40018-SOH-1)

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The

petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

Judge Shepherd did not participate in the consideration

or decision of this matter.

September 11, 2025

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Susan E. Bindler