Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jacob Bellinsky, Petitioner v. Rachel Zinna Galan, fka Rachel Bellinsky

Supreme Court briefFeb 12, 2026

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

zs-us/ORISINAL

In The

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

Supreme Court of tlje Wniteii ^>tatdg feb i 2 2026

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Jacob Bellinsky,

Petitioner,

Rachel Zinna Galan,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WITH APPENDIX

Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky

c/o 7661 McLaughlin Road, #283

Falcon, CO 80831-4727

jbellinsky@gmail.com

Phone: (303) 883-7706

February 12, 2026

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), which provides that removal “shall effect”

federal jurisdiction and that state courts “shall proceed no further,” divests state

courts of authority to enter custody or relocation orders after a notice of removal is

filed and served, rendering post-removal orders void unless and until a federal court

remands, as reaffirmed in Acevedo Feliciano.

Whether the Due Process Clause permits a judicial officer to adjudicate

parental-rights proceedings while simultaneously defending personal-capacity

federal civil-rights claims arising from the same underlying dispute, creating an

unwaivable structural conflict under Tumey, Caperton, and Williams.

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment permits state courts to apply

procedural or doctrinal frameworks in parental-rights proceedings that allow

preserved jurisdictional and structural due-process objections to go unadjudicated,

thereby subjecting the fundamental parental liberty recognized in Troxel v.

Granville to diminished constitutional protection in contrast to the protections

afforded other fundamental rights, and rendering that liberty insufficiently

enforceable as a matter of federal constitutional law.

This case warrants review under Supreme Court Rule 10 because lower

courts have adopted conflicting approaches to the jurisdictional effect of removal

under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), and because the questions presented concern the

enforceability of fundamental parental rights and the structural constitutional

safeguards required for their adjudication.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky was the Respondent in the underlying domestic

relations proceedings in the District Court for Gilpin County, Colorado, Case No.

2015DR7; the Appellant in the Colorado Court of Appeals, extraordinary appellate

Case No. 24CA355; and the Petitioner in the Colorado Supreme Court, Case No.

25SC549. Respondent, Rachel Bellinsky, now known as Rachel Zinna Galan, was

the Petitioner in the underlying state-court proceedings, the Appellee in the

Colorado Court of Appeals, and the Respondent in the Colorado Supreme Court.

Respondent appeared pro se in the appellate proceedings below and did not file

responses to Petitioner’s extraordinary appeal in the Colorado Court of Appeals or

his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Colorado Supreme Court. Respondent is

the only opposing party to the proceedings below.

Judicial Officers: The following judicial officers participated in the

proceedings below and issued the orders reviewed in the opinions appended to this

petition:

•

Magistrate Bryce David Allen, District Court for Gilpin County, who

presided over the February 9, 2024 hearing and entered the relocation and

decision-making orders challenged on appeal.

•

Judge Lindsay L. VanGilder, District Court for Gilpin County, who

adopted the magistrate’s orders on March 27, 2024.

•

Judge Tow, Judge Yun, and Judge Sullivan, Colorado Court of Appeals,

who issued the Court of Appeals’ July 17, 2025 opinion in Case No. 24CA355

and the August 14, 2025 order denying Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing.

•

Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, who denied certiorari in Case

No. 25SC549 on November 17, 2025, with Justice Boatright and Justice Hart

not participating.

These judicial officers are not parties to this proceeding but are identified

because their actions and rulings form the basis of the federal constitutional

questions presented.

LIST OF RELATED CASES

Case No.

Case Name/Case Description

No.______

Jacob Bellinsky, Petitioner v. Rachel Zinna Galan

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Lower Ct: Supreme Court of Colorado

Case Number: 2025SC549 (cert denied)

Opinion Under Review:

Colorado Court of Appeals, No. 24CA355

Decision: 07-17-25; Rehearing Denied: 08-14-25

Status/Date

Docketed: TBD

TO BE FILED 1

NOT YET

DOCKETED

Jacob Bellinsky, Petitioner v. Rachel Galan, et. al

No. 25-6231

No. 24-7195

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit (Nos. 24-1351 & 24-1352)

Jacob Bellinsky, Petitioner v. State of Colorado

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Lower Ct: District Court of Colorado, Elbert Co.

Case Number: 2024CV2

Decision Date: 09-25-24

Discretionary Court Decision Date: 01-13-25

Docketed: 11-07-25

Denied: 01-26-26

Docketed: 05-13-25

Denied: 10-06-25

Jacob Bellinsky, Petitioner v. Rachel Zinna Galan

No. 24-7196

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Lower Ct: Supreme Court of Colorado

Case Number: 2024SA214

Decision Date: 02-21-25

iii

Docketed: 05-13-25

Denied: 10-06-25

I'.SITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Case No.

Case Name/Case Description

Statu s/D ate

No. 26-1031

No. 26-1032

No. 24-1352

No. 24-1351

No. 23-1409

Case No.

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, et al.

Filed: 02-02-26

(Second Appeal of l:23-cv-03461 Civil Rights

Complaint —18JD False Criminalization Crime

Sprees) (10th Circuit, 2025)

PENDING/ACTIVE

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, et al.

(Second Appeal of l:23-cv-03163 Civil Rights

Complaint — Relocation of Minor Children Crime

Spree) (10th Circuit, 2025)

Filed: 02-02-26

PENDING/ACTIVE

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, et al.

Filed: 09-10-24

(Appeal of l:23-cv-03461 Civil Rights Complaint

-18JD False Criminalization Crime Sprees)

(10th Circuit, 2025)

REVERSED/REMANDED l:23-cv-03461

Order/Judgment:

07-22-25

Rehearing Denied:

08-11-25

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, et al.

(Appeal of l:23-cv-03163 Civil Rights Complaint

— Relocation of Minor Children Crime Spree)

(10th Circuit, 2025)

REVERSED/REMANDED l:23-cv-03163

Filed: 09-10-24

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, et al.

(Appeal of l:23-cv-01799 State Court Removal

Action of 2015DR7)

(10th Circuit, 2024)

Filed: 12-27-23

Order/Judgment:

07-22-25

Rehearing Denied:

08-11-25

Dismissed:

01-26-24

THE.DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Case Name/Case Description

Status/Date

Jacob Bellinsky v. Philip Jacob Weiser, et al.

l:25-cv-02062

l:23-cv-03461

(Civil Rights Complaint — Injunctive and

Declaratory Relief regarding Void State Orders)

(D. Colo., Pending)

Filed: 07-03-25

PENDING/ACTIVE

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, et al.

Filed: 12-30-23

Dismissed: 08-23-24

(Civil Rights Complaint —18th Judicial District

False Criminalization Crime Sprees)

(D. Colo., 2024)

1st DISMISSAL REVERSED & REMANDED

Mandate: 08-19-25

REOPENED

Dismissed: 01-28-26

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, et al.

l:23-cv-03163

l:23-cv-01799

(Civil Rights Complaint - Relocation of Minor

Children Crime Spree)

(D. Colo., 2024)

Mandate: 08-19-25

REOPENED

1st DISMISSAL REVERSED & REMANDED

Dismissed: 01-28-26

Rachel Zinna Galan v. Jacob Bellinsky,

Plaintiff

Filed: 07-17-23

(Removal of ‘State Court Action’ [Crime Spree]

in 2015DR7) (D. Colo., 2023)

Case No.

Filed: 11-29-23

Dismissed: 08-23-24

SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO

Case Name/Case Description

Dismissed: 11-21-23

Status/Date

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan

2025SC549

2025SA97

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Colorado Court of

Appeals (Relief from Colorado Court of Appeals

July 17, 2025 affirmance in 2024CA355 of void

relocation orders in 2015DR7) [Pursuant to Rule

60(b) Relief] (Colo. S. Ct., 2025)

Jacob Bellinsky v. Elbert County Court, Chief

Judge Ryan Stuart, Senior Judge Dinsmore

Tuttle, and People of the State of Colorado

Petition Pursuant to C.A.R. 21

(Relief Sought for Senior Judge Recusal in 22M143

and Void Orders in Underlying Cases)

(Colo. S. Ct., 2025)

Filed: 09-08-25

Denied: 11-17-25

Filed: 04-07-25

Denied: 05-08-25

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan

2024SA214

Extraordinary Appeal of Denial of Habeas Corpus

Relief from Elbert County District Case 2024CV5

(Colo. S. Ct., 2025)

Jacob Bellinsky v. People of the State of Colorado

2024SC691

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Elbert County

District Court Case 2024CV2 (Colo. S. Ct., 2025)

Jacob Bellinsky v. People of the State of Colorado

2024SA228

Criminal Conviction Appeal of Case 2024CV2

[Pursuant to Rule 60(b) Relief] (Colo. S. Ct., 2024)

Filed: 07-19-24

Denied: 02-21-25

Filed: 10-31-24

Denied: 01-13-25

Filed: 08-09-24

Denied: 09-13-24

Jacob Bellinsky v. Jared Polis, Brian Boatright,

Stephen Fenberg, & Julie McCluskie

2023SA223

Emergency Sworn Petition for Extraordinary

Relief Pursuant to Colorado's Constitution

[Rule 60(b) Relief in 2015DR7, 2022C59,

2022M143, 2022M152, et al.] (Colo. S. Ct., 2023)

Filed: 09-01-23

Denied: 09-15-23

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, Jared

Polis, Brian Boatright, Jeffrey Pilkington,

Stephen Fenberg, & Alec Garnett

2022SA274

Emergency Petition & Demand for Full Redress &

Other Extraordinary Relief Due

[Pursuant to USA & Colorado Constitutions &

Rule 60(b) Relief in 2015DR7, et al.]

(Colo. S. Ct., 2022)

Filed: 08-22-22

Denied: 08-23-22

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, Jared

Polis, Brian Boatright, Jeffrey Pilkington,

Stephen Fenberg, & Alec Garnett

2022SA274

Petition for Responses & Adjudication on the

Merits of Subject Matter of Original Petition &

Demand for Full Redress and Other Extraordinary

Relief Due [Rule 60(b) Relief in 2015DR7]

(Colo. S. Ct., 2022)

Filed: 08-31-22

Denied: 09-01-22

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan

2021SA245

Petition Pursuant to C.A.R. 21

(Extraordinary Relief Sought for Underlying Void

Orders in 2015DR7) (Colo. S. Ct., 2021)

Filed: 08-09-21

Denied: 08-12-21

[______

Case No.

2025CA2427

2024CA355

Case Name/Case Description

Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky v. Steven Vasconcellos,

State Court Administrator

Appeal of Petition for Order to Show Cause

Under P.A.I.R.R. 2 §5

(Colo. Ct. App., PENDING)

Filed: 12-17-25

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan

Extraordinary Appeal of Void Orders on

Relocation of Minor Children in 2015DR7

(Colo. Ct. App., 2025)

Filed: 03-01-24

Affirmed: 07-17-25

Rehearing Denied:

08-14-25

(Absent Jurisdiction)

Status/Date

PENDING

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan

2024CA328

2021CA634

Extraordinary Pre-Appeal of Conviction for

Alleged Violation of 2022C59 PO in 2022M143

(Colo. Ct. App., 2024)

Filed: 02-21-24

Denied: 02-28-24

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan

Filed: 05-04-21

Opinion: 08-04-22

(Withdrew Consent Absent Jurisdiction)

Appeal of Post-Decree Orders in 2015DR7

(Colo. Ct. App., 2022)

Appeal of Post-Decree Orders in 2015DR7

(Colo. Ct. App., 2022)

Filed: 07-19-21

Opinion: 08-04-22

(Withdrew Consent Absent Jurisdiction)

Case Name/Case Description

Status/Date

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan

2021CA1062

■siitetei

Case No.

Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky v. Steven Vasconcellos,

State Court Administrator

2025CV335

Petition for Order to Show Cause Under

P.A.I.R.R. 2 §5

(Colo. Denver District Court, 2025)

Filed: 04-28-25

Hearing: 10-28-25

Denied: 10-28-25

Jacob Bellinsky v. Rachel Zinna Galan, et al.

2024CV5

2024CV2

Forthwith Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [Pursuant to State and Federal

Constitutions and Our Laws and Precedence

Made in Pursuance Thereof]

(Colo. Elbert Co. District Court, 2025)

Filed: 06-07-24

Denied: 07-10-24

Bellinsky v. People of the State of Colorado

Filed: 04-15-24

Denied: 09-25-24

(Opinion-Affirmed)

(Appeal of Conviction in 22M143)

(Colo. Elbert Co. District Court, 2025)

Richard F. Spiegle v. Jacob Bellinsky

(Court-appointed services in connection with

2023CV20019

void-2015DR7 - absent jurisdiction)

(Colo. Gilpin County Court, 2024)

People of the State of Colorado v. Jacob Bellinsky

2022M143

(Alleged Violation of Protection Order Case)

(Colo. Elbert County Court, 2024)

Filed: 07-11-23

Void Judgment

Entered: 05-16-24

Filed: 11-28-22

Closed: 04-08-24

People of the State of Colorado v. Jacob Bellinsky

2022M152

(Alleged Violation of Protection Order Case)

(Colo. Elbert County Court, 2023)

Filed: 11-29-22

Closed: 04-26-23

Rachel Zinna Galan v. Jacob Bellinsky

2022C59

(Civil Protection Order Case in Connection with

2015DR7 - Obtained by Fraud and Perjury)

(Colo. Elbert County Court, 2022)

Filed: 09-26-22

Closed: 10-07-22

Andrew Newton Hart v. Jacob Bellinsky

2022C36810

(Civil Protection Order Case in Connection with

2015DR7 - Obtained by Fraud and Perjury)

(Colo. Jefferson Co. District Court, 2022)

Jacob Bellinsky v. Steven James Lazar

2017C000028

Temporary Protection Order

(Colo. Gilpin Co. Court, 2017)

Filed: 08-31-22

Closed: 09-08-22

Filed: 12-26-17

2015DR7

Rachel Bellinsky (n/k/a Rachel Zinna Galan)

v. Jacob Bellinsky

Dissolution of Marriage - Domestic Relations

(Colo. Gilpin Co. District Court)

2014M00613

People of Colorado v. Rachel Tonya Bellinsky

Criminal DV Arrest:

(n/k/a Rachel Zinna Galan),

12-11-14

Criminal Arrest — DV — Assault in the 3rd Degree Mandatory PO:

(Victim: Jacob Bellinsky)

12-12-14/12-15-14

(Colo. Gilpin Co. Court)

Filed: 04-13-15

Status: Void

(Absent Jurisdiction)

STATE OF FLORIDA: IN THE COUNTY COURT OF THE NINETEENTH

JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR INDIAN RIVER COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No.

Case Name/Case Description

Status/Date

State of Florida v. Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky

312025MM00

Filed: 11-12-25

(Criminal Violation of Domestic Violence

1965A

PENDING

Injunction (Ml) - Obtained by Perjury/Fraud)

Case No.

75072301

RABBINICAL COURT

Case Name/Case Description

Bellinsky, Jacob (Ya’akov Ben Chaim) v.

Rachel Rische (k/n/a, Rachel Zinna Galan)

(Neve Tzedek Rabbinical Court, Zera Avraham,

Denver, Colorado, 2015)

Status/Date

Jewish Divorce

Judgment Executed:

04-12-15

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED................................................................................................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW.................................................................. ii

LIST OF RELATED CASES............................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................... viii

INDEX TO APPENDICES.................................................................................................. x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................................... xi

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI..................................................................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW.............................................................................................................. 2

JURISDICTION..................................................................................................................... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............................. 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................................ 5

A. The Constitutional Stakes of This Case.................................................................. 5

B. Background and Procedural History........................................................................6

C. Proceedings in the Trial Court: Jurisdictional Nullity and Fraudulent

Continuation...................................................................................................... 11

D. Structural Due Process Violations and Fraud on the Court.............................. 14

E. Appellate Review Based on a Distorted and Incomplete Record....................... 15

F. National Significance and Systemic Constitutional Implications......................16

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. This Case Presents an Important and Recurring Question Concerning the

Supremacy Clause and Jurisdictional Voidness After Removal............... 20

II. The Petition Presents Structural Due Process and the Non-Waivable Right to a

Neutral Decisionmaker in Parental-Rights Adjudication...........................24

III. The Decision Below Threatens the Practical Force of Troxel and This Court's

Parental-Rights Jurisprudence, and Raises Serious Equal Protection

Concerns............................................................................................................. 27

IV. This Case Is an Appropriate and Necessary Vehicle for Review...................... 30

CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................... 33

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:

Colorado Court of Appeals Opinion (Affirming Relocation & Decision-Making Orders)

Bellinsky v. Galan, No. 2024CA355

(Colo. App. July 17, 2025)......................................................................................... A1-A17

APPENDIX B:

Colorado Court of Appeals Order Denying Petition for Rehearing

No. 2024CA355 (Aug. 14, 2025)....................................................................................... Bl

APPENDIX C:

Colorado Supreme Court Order Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari

In re Marriage of Bellinsky, No. 2025SC549 (Nov. 17, 2025)...................................... Cl

APPENDIX D:

District Court Order Adopting Magistrate’s Relocation & Decision-Making Orders

District Court, Gilpin County, Case No. 2015DR7 (Mar. 27, 2024).................... D1-D3

APPENDIX E:

Magistrate’s Relocation and Decision-Making Order

District Court, Gilpin County, Case No. 2015DR7 (Feb. 9, 2024)...................... E1-E14

APPENDIX F:

Notice of Removal to Federal Court + Attached Objections

Galan v. Bellinsky, No. l:23-cv-01799 (D. Colo. July 17, 2023).......................... F1-F22

APPENDIX G:

Order Remanding Removal Action

Galan u. Bellinsky, No. l:23-cv-01799 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2023).........................G1-G12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

United States Supreme Court Cases

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992)

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)

i, 14, 15, 25, 26, 31, 32

Elliott v. Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328 (1828)

Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869)

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)

14, 28, 32

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)

Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940)

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996)

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)

5, 27

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)

4, 31, 32

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

5, 27

Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285 (2017)

Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 140 S. Ct. 696 (2020)

i, 12, 13, 15, 22, 23, 24, 32

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

5, 16, 25, 27, 29

5, 16, 17, 25, 27, 29, 34

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)

Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118 (1882)

12, 22

Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880)

12, 22

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)

i, 2, 5, 6, 16-19, 27-32, 34

i, 14, 15, 24, 26, 31, 32

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010)

Vallely v. N. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920)

Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972)

25, 29

Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016)

i, 25, 26, 31, 32

United States Courts of Appeals Cases

12, 22, 23, 24

Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 1998)

Albonetti v. Gafford, 520 F.2d 1115, 1117 (5th Cir. 1975)

Benson v. SI Handling Sys., Inc., 188 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1999)

Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc)

Jenkins v. MTGLQ Investors, 218 F. App’x 719 (10th Cir. 2007)

Omer v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 1994)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl.2 (Supremacy Clause) .1,2, 4, 7, 11-12, 15, 17, 19-20, 22-24, 31, 33-34

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause).i, 1-2, 4-5, 14, 19, 21, 23, 25-26, 29-31

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (Equal Protection Clause)

i, 4, 17, 19, 29, 31, 34

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)

3, 4

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1446(d)

i, 1,4, 7, 11-13, 15, 16, 18-20, 22-24, 30-33

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)

28 U.S.C. § 2101(c)

RULES

Supreme Court Rules:

Supreme Court Rule 10

.............. i, 18, 19, 20

Supreme Court Rule 13

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari

to review the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Case No. 24CA355,

following the Colorado Supreme Court’s denial of discretionary review in Case No.

25SC549.

Congress enacted § 1446(d) as a mandatory jurisdiction-transferring command

implementing the Supremacy Clause. The statute does not merely regulate

procedure; it withdraws adjudicatory authority from state courts and reallocates it

to federal tribunals until remand.

This case presents recurring federal questions concerning removal divestiture

under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), the structural neutrality required by due process when

parental rights are adjudicated, and whether fundamental parental liberty remains

enforceable when state courts treat jurisdictional and structural constitutional

defects as immaterial because a proceeding is labeled “family law.” It arises from

state-court proceedings that continued after Petitioner invoked removal and federal

law commanded that the state court “shall proceed no further”; from adjudication by

a judicial officer subject to unresolved structural conflicts; and from appellate review

that affirmed without adjudicating preserved federal objections and on a materially

distorted procedural narrative.

The resulting orders—affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals and left

undisturbed by the Colorado Supreme Court—now stand as final judgments

materially burdening one of the most fundamental liberty interests protected by the

Constitution: the right of a parent to the care, custody, and control of his children.

At every stage, Petitioner raised federal constitutional objections. He argued

that once removal was filed and served, federal law stripped the state courts of

authority to proceed; that custody and relocation orders entered thereafter were void

under the Supremacy Clause; and that due process does not permit adjudication of

parental rights by a judicial officer simultaneously named as a personal-capacity

defendant in related federal civil-rights litigation arising from the same case. Those

objections were preserved and squarely presented. They were not resolved on the

merits. Instead, the courts below treated the dispute as routine domestic-relations

discretion and affirmed orders whose validity Petitioner challenged on jurisdictional,

structural, and constitutional grounds.

These questions are not case-specific. They implicate whether federal removal

divestiture is enforceable in domestic-relations proceedings, whether structural

neutrality is constitutionally waivable in parental-rights adjudication, and whether

Troxel’s guarantees retain practical force when jurisdictional and structural

objections are disregarded. When such failures occui' in the one domain where

liberty interests are at their zenith, the result is not merely procedural error. It is

the erosion of constitutional governance itself.

This petition does not seek review of custody or relocation fact-finding. It

presents only federal questions concerning adjudicatory authority and structural

constitutional guarantees.

This petition presents a clean and urgent opportunity for this Court to

reaffirm that fundamental rights may not be effectively extinguished through

proceedings conducted without lawful authority, before tribunals lacking the

structural guarantees of neutrality, and affirmed without adjudication of preserved

federal defects. The federal questions are purely legal and dispositive of the validity

of the orders below.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Bellinsky v. Galan, No.

24CA355, issued on July 17, 2025, affirming the district court’s relocation and

parental decision-making orders, is reproduced in the Appendix at App. A. The

Colorado Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s timely Petition for Rehearing in Case

No. 24CA355 by order dated August 14, 2025, reproduced in the Appendix at App. B.

The Colorado Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in

In re Marriage of Bellinsky, Case No. 25SC549, on November 17, 2025. That order is

reproduced in the Appendix at App. C.

JURISDICTION

The Colorado Supreme Court denied discretionary review in this case on

November 17, 2025, in In re Marriage of Bellinsky, Case No. 25SC549. The judgment

of the Colorado Court of Appeals therefore became final on that date. This petition is

timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) and Supreme Court Rule 13.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) to review final

judgments of a state court of last resort in which a decision could be had. The

decision under review is the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Case No.

24CA355, which the Colorado Supreme Court declined to review.

The federal questions presented—arising under the Supremacy Clause and

the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment—were

timely raised and preserved in the state courts. The state courts did not clearly

indicate reliance on independent state-law grounds, and therefore federal review is

appropriate under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause)

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges

in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws

of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause)

“No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law....”

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (Equal Protection Clause)

“No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.”

28 U.S.C. § 1446(d)

“Promptly after the filing of such notice of removal of a civil action the

defendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse parties

and shall file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which

shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless

and until the case is remanded.”

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)

“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which

a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of

certiorari....”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Constitutional Stakes of This Case

This case asks whether fundamental parental rights may be effectively

extinguished through proceedings that are not merely erroneous, but structurally

illegitimate—proceedings alleged to be void for want of authority after removal,

adjudicated by a decisionmaker subject to unresolved structural conflict, and

conducted on a materially distorted procedural record.

The parent-child relationship occupies a unique position in constitutional

jurisprudence. This Court has repeatedly recognized that parental authority over

the care, custody, and upbringing of children constitutes a fundamental liberty

interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,

65-66 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405

U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534—35 (1925); Meyer

v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).

This Court has likewise emphasized that the Constitution protects not only

the substantive parental interest, but also the integrity of the adjudicative process

by which the State burdens that interest. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753—54; Stanley, 405

U.S. at 656-58; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-70.

Because parental rights lie at the core of ordered liberty, their adjudication

requires strict adherence to three constitutional preconditions: (1) lawful authority

to proceed at all; (2) structural neutrality of the decisionmaker; and (3) adjudication

on a truthful procedural record rather than one corrupted by material

misrepresentation. Petitioner contends those preconditions failed here—and that the

failure was preserved and repeatedly presented, yet left unadjudicated.

The question presented is not whether parental rights are fundamental —

that question was resolved in Troxel. The question is whether those rights remain

constitutionally enforceable when lower courts employ procedural doctrines that

prevent adjudication of preserved federal objections.

Troxel does not merely recognize parental liberty as fundamental; it

presupposes adjudicative structures capable of protecting that liberty. Where

proceedings occur without lawful jurisdiction, before structurally conflicted

tribunals, or without adjudication of preserved federal objections,

Troxel’s

guarantees become nominal rather than enforceable. The constitutional question

presented is therefore not whether Troxel applies, but whether it can retain practical

force if such structural defects are permitted to stand.

B. Background and Procedural History

The procedural history demonstrates three preserved federal issues: state

proceedings conducted after removal invoked federal jurisdiction; adjudication by a

magistrate simultaneously defending personal-capacity civil-rights claims; and

reliance on materially false assertions that no response or objections were filed.

Removal to Federal Court and State Court’s Express Rejection:

On July 17, 2023, Petitioner filed a Notice of Removal transferring

jurisdiction over the post-decree proceedings in In re Marriage of Bellinsky, Case No.

2015DR7, to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. See App.

F. The notice expressly invoked federal jurisdiction and the Supremacy Clause

consequences of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).

Two days later, on July 19, 2023, the state court entered a Post-Decree Case

Management Order that did not acknowledge divestiture or stay proceedings.

Instead, the magistrate explicitly rejected the legal effect of removal in categorical

terms:

“The Court recognizes no authority referenced in Respondent’s Notice of

Removal of State Court Action to United States District Court that removes

this Court’s jurisdiction and, thus, this Court maintained initial and

continuing jurisdiction and enters the following ORDERS:” (Post-Decree Case

Management Order, July 19, 2023) (emphasis added)

This statement was not an ambiguity, oversight, or silence. It was an express

declaration that the state court would proceed notwithstanding removal and

notwithstanding federal law commanding that the state court “shall proceed no

further unless and until the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).

The July 19, 2023 order then set the matter for further proceedings and

imposed Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 16.2 obligations as though

jurisdiction remained intact. The state court thus had actual notice that removal

had been filed and expressly chose to disregard the federal command—eliminating

any argument that continued proceedings were the product of inadvertence or lack of

notice.

This is precisely the scenario § 1446(d) was enacted to prevent: a state court

that has been notified of a removal proceeding as though federal law does not apply.

Continuation of State Proceedings During Federal Jurisdiction:

Despite the pending removal, the state court continued to exercise

adjudicatory power over parental decision-making and relocation. No remand had

yet issued when the case was procedurally advanced, and no stay was entered.

Ultimately, the case proceeded to a relocation and decision-making hearing on

February 9, 2024, before Magistrate Bryce David Allen.

The February 9, 2024 “Default” Hearing on a False Record:

On February 9, 2024, Magistrate Bryce David Allen conducted a relocation

hearing in Case No. 2015DR7. See App. E. Petitioner did not appear. At the outset of

the hearing, the following exchange occurred:

“I did not see any response — by Mr. Bellinsky. Let me take a look at that as

to the motions. Ms. — Galan did you ever receive any type of response from

Mr. Bellinsky?” (Feb. 9, 2024 Tr. at 10).

Respondent Galan responded unequivocally:

“No I did not.” (Id.), (emphasis added)

These statements were materially false and supplied the procedural predicate

for default and formed the basis on which the tribunal proceeded to adjudicate

custody and relocation without opposition. Petitioner had filed written jurisdictional

objections and removal-related filings, including objections attached to the Notice of

Removal and filed in the state-court record. See App. F. The assertion that "no

response" or "no objections" existed formed the procedural predicate for treating the

matter as uncontested and for proceeding in what the court later described as

default.

Notably, even the district court acknowledged in its own order on review that

"Father filed a Response and Objection on June 21, 2023" and that "the hearing was

continued multiple times." App. D at 1. The objections were documented in the court

file, attached to the Notice of Removal, and confirmed by sworn affidavit. See App. F;

App. I at 25.

The representation that no response existed was not a good-faith oversight; it

was a material misstatement of a matter of record that formed the procedural

predicate for adjudicating fundamental parental rights as uncontested.

Moments later, the magistrate stated on the record that he was proceeding "in

default." The hearing resulted in oral findings granting Mother's relocation motions

and modifying decision-making authority. A written order followed. See App. E. The

factual and procedural predicates for the relocation order were thus directly

traceable to the false assertions made on the record at the outset of the hearing.

Structural Conflict at Time of Adjudication:

At the time of the February 9, 2024 hearing and the issuance of the relocation

and decision-making orders:

•

Magistrate Bryce David Allen had been named as a personal-capacity

defendant in federal civil-rights litigation (Case No. l:23-cv-03163, D. Colo.,

filed November 29, 2023) arising from his own conduct in the proceedings

below — more than ten weeks before the hearing at which he entered the

challenged orders;

•

Respondent Rachel Zinna Galan was a co-defendant in the same federal

litigation; and

•

Steven James Lazar, also a co-defendant in that same federal litigation,

was present, testified, and participated in the hearing as a witness.

(See App. E; App. D; App. F.)

Despite these circumstances, the magistrate made no disclosure of conflict, no

inquiry into recusal, and no findings addressing structural neutrality.

Adoption of Relocation Orders by District Court:

Following the February 9, 2024 hearing, Magistrate Allen entered written

relocation and decision-making orders. Those orders were subsequently adopted by

District Judge Lindsay VanGilder on March 27, 2024. See App. D-E.

The orders repeatedly relied on findings premised on Petitioner’s supposed

non-participation, lack of objection, and absence from the proceedings—premises

directly traceable to the false assertions made on the record at the outset of the

hearing.

Appellate Proceedings on an Uncorrected Record:

Petitioner appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Case No. 24CA355. In his

Opening Brief, Petitioner expressly raised:

•

the Supremacy Clause consequences of removal under § 1446(d);

•

the jurisdictional voidness of post-removal state-court orders;

•

the structural conflict created by adjudication before a judicial officer

simultaneously defending related federal civil-rights claims; and

•

the reliance on materially false procedural narratives stating that no

objections were filed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed on July 17, 2025, without adjudicating those

threshold federal issues. See App. A.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Rehearing renewing the same objections. The

Court of Appeals denied rehearing without addressing them. See App. B.

Petitioner then sought review in the Colorado Supreme Court, again

presenting the federal jurisdictional, structural due-process, and fraud-on-the-court

issues. The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari without opinion. See App. C.

Resulting Posture:

As a result, final state-court orders materially burdening Petitioner’s

fundamental parental rights now rest on:

•

proceedings conducted after federal jurisdiction had been invoked;

•

an express statement by the state court that removal did not affect its

jurisdiction;

•

adjudication by a structurally conflicted tribunal; and

•

a record shaped by uncorrected, materially false assertions that Petitioner

filed “no objections.”

Those defects were preserved, presented, and left unadjudicated.

C. Proceedings in the Trial Court: Jurisdictional Nullity and Fraudulent

Continuation

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), removal “shall effect” federal jurisdiction and the

state court “shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.”

Removal is not a discretionary housekeeping matter; it is a Supremacy Clause

mechanism by which Congress withdraws state adjudicatory power and transfers

authority to a federal forum. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880)

(recognizing removal as an instrument of federal supremacy); Steamship Co. v.

Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 122 (1882) (once removal is effected, the state court “can

proceed no further” until remand).

This Court has reaffirmed that state-court orders entered after removal are

void because the state court loses all adjudicatory authority upon removal. Roman

Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 140 S. Ct. 696, 700-01 (2020)

(per curiam). The courts of appeals likewise recognize that removal strips state-court

power as a matter of law. Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir.

1998); see also Jenkins v. MTGLQ Investors, 218 F. App’x 719, 723 (10th Cir. 2007).

The Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged that removal occurred forty-six

days after Respondent filed her relocation motion and concluded that removal was

therefore untimely and “facially meritless.” App. A

14. Petitioner consistently

maintained that removal was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because it was filed

within thirty days of service and receipt of the operative relocation filings, and he

preserved that position throughout the proceedings below, including in his Petition

for Rehearing and in his briefing in the Colorado Court of Appeals and Colorado

Supreme Court. Petitioner further contends that, regardless of any dispute

concerning removal timeliness, § 1446(d)’s mandatory command that the state court

“shall proceed no further” is triggered by the filing and service of the notice of

removal, not by a state-court determination regarding the merits or procedural

validity of removal. See Acevedo, 140 S. Ct. at 700-01. The proper remedy for an

improper removal is a federal remand—not continued state-court proceedings in

defiance of federal law.

Here, the federal district court retained jurisdiction from July 17, 2023, until

November 21, 2023, when it ordered remand. See App. F-G. During that period, the

state court entered a Case Management Order on July 19, 2023—two days after

removal and four months before remand—and proceeded to schedule and conduct

proceedings affecting parental decision-making and relocation while the case

remained in federal court. Petitioner contends those proceedings were conducted

without lawful jurisdiction.

Petitioner appealed the federal remand order to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See Galan v. Bellinsky, No. 23-1409 (10th Cir.). That

appeal was not resolved until January 26, 2024, when the Tenth Circuit dismissed

for lack of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The state court

conducted the relocation hearing on February 9, 2024—just fourteen days after the

final federal disposition—and proceeded in default based on representations that

Petitioner had filed no objections.

Petitioner contends that from removal through the Tenth Circuit’s order, the

federal jurisdictional question remained pending for over six months, during which

the state court continued to exercise authority that § 1446(d) commanded it to

suspend.

D. Structural Due Process Violations and Fraud on the Court

The Due Process Clause requires adjudication by a neutral and disinterested

decisionmaker. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Caperton v. A.T. Massey

Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883—84 (2009). Fraud on the court occurs when materially

false representations corrupt the judicial process itself. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.

Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944). These structural safeguards ensure

that fundamental liberty interests are not burdened through proceedings lacking

neutrality, jurisdictional legitimacy, or record integrity. The doctrinal development

of these principles is addressed more fully in Reasons II and III below.

Petitioner preserved allegations that false procedural narratives were

permitted to stand uncorrected and were relied upon in adjudicating fundamental

parental rights. The proceedings therefore combined three structural defects:

1. Adjudication following federal jurisdictional divestiture;

2. Adjudication by a judicial officer with a direct personal stake in related

litigation; and

3. Adjudication based upon a materially falsified record.

The confluence of those defects implicates the core due-process guarantee that

liberty interests cannot be burdened by a tribunal whose authority is disputed under

federal supremacy, whose neutrality is structurally compromised, and whose

decisional record rests on materially contested procedural predicates.

E. Appellate Review Based on a Distorted and Incomplete Record

Petitioner sought extraordinary appellate relief in the Colorado Court of

Appeals, Case No. 2024CA355. In his Opening Brief and subsequent filings,

Petitioner presented federal constitutional objections including:

1. the Supremacy Clause consequences of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d);

2. the structural conflict of the adjudicator;

3. fraud upon and by the court allegations arising from materially false

representations that Petitioner filed no objections or responses; and

4. the constitutional implications of adjudicating parental rights through

proceedings alleged to be jurisdictionally void.

On July 17, 2025, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the relocation and

decision-making orders. See App. A. Petitioner contends the Court of Appeals

treated the dispute as a routine domestic-relations matter and did not substantively

adjudicate the federal jurisdictional and structural due-process objections raised by

Petitioner — objections that went to whether the tribunal had lawful power to act at

all and whether the process met constitutional minimums of neutrality and record

integrity. The Court of Appeals' opinion does not cite, discuss, or distinguish 28

U.S.C. § 1446(d), Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 140

S. Ct. 696 (2020), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal

Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), or any other authority bearing on removal divestiture or

structural neutrality. The preserved federal questions were not decided adversely;

they were not decided at all.

Petitioner sought rehearing, which was denied. See App. B. He then sought

review in the Colorado Supreme Court, which denied certiorari without opinion. See

App. C. Petitioner contends that the state appellate process affirmed orders entered

after alleged jurisdictional divestiture and did not address properly preserved

federal constitutional objections bearing on jurisdiction, neutrality, and record

integrity.

F. National Significance and Systemic Constitutional Implications

The issues presented extend beyond the facts of this case. Across jurisdictions,

family-court litigants increasingly encounter:

•

adjudication after federal law has divested state-court jurisdiction, in defiance

of § 1446(d)'s mandatory command;

•

adjudication by structurally conflicted tribunals whose neutrality is

compromised by personal stakes in related litigation, compounded by reliance

on materially false procedural narratives; and

•

appellate review that treats these defects as immaterial so long as the

underlying proceeding is labeled "domestic relations"—declining to adjudicate

preserved federal constitutional objections and effectively placing parental

rights beyond the reach of federal law.

This Court has repeatedly warned that constitutional protections do not

diminish in family-law contexts. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972);

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753

(1982). The Court has likewise recognized that constitutional guarantees must

remain fully enforceable where state procedural mechanisms risk suppressing the

exercise of fundamental rights. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,

460-63 (1958). The Constitution does not tolerate adjudicative frameworks that

indirectly chill or nullify protected liberties through structural or procedural devices.

If state courts may continue adjudicating after federal divestiture, permit

structurally conflicted tribunals to preside over core liberty interests, or decline to

adjudicate preserved federal objections because proceedings are labeled “domestic

relations,” then the parental rights recognized in Troxel risk becoming doctrinal

abstractions rather than enforceable constitutional guarantees. Such a regime would

create a functional exception to federal supremacy and structural due process

precisely where liberty interests are at their apex.

When courts permit adjudication after jurisdiction has been withdrawn by

federal law, allow conflicted tribunals to proceed, or affirm orders resting on

materially distorted procedural narratives, the resulting disparity raises serious

Equal Protection concerns. In practical effect, litigants asserting parental rights are

subjected to procedural regimes that would not be tolerated in other civil or

constitutional contexts.

The Constitution does not permit the State to impose diminished safeguards

on fundamental liberty interests solely because they arise in domestic-relations

proceedings. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-58.

These failures are not isolated irregularities. Custody and relocation

determinations occur daily in state courts nationwide, and their timing often renders

post hoc federal correction impracticable. Without this Court’s intervention,

jurisdictional

and

structural

may

defects

repeatedly

produce

irreversible

consequences while remaining effectively insulated from meaningful federal review.

This case therefore presents a clean and urgent opportunity for the Court to

clarify that constitutional protections do not diminish at the courthouse door of

domestic-relations proceedings, and that structural illegitimacy cannot serve as a

lawful foundation for adjudicating the parent-child relationship. The questions

presented—concerning

removal

divestiture,

structural

neutrality,

and

the

enforceability of Troxel’s guarantees—each independently warrant certiorari and

together present an unusually compelling basis for review.

Removal disputes arise nationwide and frequently intersect with time

sensitive custody and relocation proceedings, where jurisdictional errors produce

irreversible consequences before federal review can occur. Without this Court’s

clarification, lower courts will continue to apply § 1446(d) inconsistently, allowing

state adjudication after removal in some jurisdictions while treating such orders as

void in others. That divergence undermines the uniform enforcement of federal

jurisdictional mandates and warrants this Court’s intervention under Rule 10.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This petition does not ask the Court to review the merits of custody or

relocation. It asks only whether state adjudicatory power existed after removal and

whether the Constitution permits parental-rights adjudication by a structurally

conflicted decisionmaker. These are recurring federal questions concerning

jurisdiction and constitutional structure, and their resolution does not require

review of custody fact-finding or domestic-relations merits.

This petition satisfies the Court’s certiorari criteria. See Sup. Ct. R. 10. It

presents (i) an important and recurring question whether 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) divests

state courts of authority to enter or enforce custody and relocation orders once

removal is effected, and whether post-removal state adjudication is void under the

Supremacy Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; (ii) a

clean and dispositive constitutional question whether due process permits a judicial

officer to adjudicate custody and parental-rights proceedings while simultaneously

serving as a personal-capacity defendant in related federal civil-rights litigation

arising from the same case; and (iii) an important and recurring question whether

Troxel’s parental-liberty protections and the Equal Protection Clause require that

jurisdictional and structural due-process objections in custody proceedings receive

the same adjudication afforded in other civil matters.

This case satisfies this Court’s certiorari criteria because it presents recurring

conflicts among lower courts concerning the jurisdictional effect of removal under 28

U.S.C. §

1446(d), reflects a marked departure from settled constitutional

requirements of judicial neutrality and lawful adjudicatory authority, and raises

exceptionally important questions regarding the uniform enforcement of federal

supremacy and the protection of fundamental parental liberty interests. The

decision below illustrates a broader and growing instability in which state courts,

particularly in domestic-relations proceedings, have treated federal removal

divestiture and structural due-process safeguards as discretionary rather than

mandatory—producing divergent outcomes across jurisdictions and undermining the

uniform operation of federal law.

Additionally, this petition satisfies all three criteria under Supreme Court

Rule 10:

First, it presents a conflict among courts of appeals and state courts

regarding whether § 1446(d) categorically divests state jurisdiction or permits

practical validation of post-removal proceedings—a recurring split affecting removal

uniformity nationwide (Rule 10(a)).

Second, it raises exceptionally important questions concerning enforcement

of federal supremacy, structural neutrality requirements, and the protection of

fundamental parental liberty where state courts decline to adjudicate preserved

constitutional objections (Rule 10(c)).

Third, the decision below departs from the accepted course of judicial

proceedings by affirming orders entered after jurisdictional divestiture, adjudicated

by a tribunal alleged to be structurally conflicted, and sustained without addressing

threshold federal issues.

This division among lower courts satisfies Rule 10(a) and (c) because it

produces inconsistent enforcement of a federal jurisdiction-transferring statute

governing adjudicatory authority nationwide.

I. This Case Presents an Important and Recurring Question Concerning the

Supremacy Clause and Jurisdictional Voidness After Removal

This case concerns the enforceability of Congress’s jurisdiction-transferring

command in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), enacted pursuant to the Supremacy Clause to

withdraw state adjudicatory authority upon removal.

This Court has repeatedly held that adjudication in the absence of jurisdiction

is void, not merely erroneous or voidable. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.

Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010) (judgments entered without jurisdiction or in

violation of due process remain subject to collateral attack); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94—95 (1998) (jurisdiction is a threshold limitation

on judicial power); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) (jurisdiction

defines a court’s power to proceed).

For more than a century, this Court has made clear that judgments entered

without jurisdiction “are regarded as nullities” and are, in legal effect, no orders at

all. Vallely v. N. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353 (1920). And the Court’s

earliest cases recognize that when a tribunal acts without lawful authority, its

judgments are void and incapable of legal enforcement. Elliott v. Piersol, 26 U.S. (1

Pet.) 328, 340 (1828).

This Court has further held that when Congress withdraws jurisdiction from

state tribunals, state-court proceedings conducted thereafter are not merely

erroneous but absolutely void. In Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-40 (1940),

the Court explained that where federal law vests exclusive adjudicatory authority in

federal courts, state-court orders entered in defiance of that withdrawal are “beyond

the power of the state court to make” and therefore subject to collateral attack. Kalb

establishes that voidness in this context is structural and jurisdictional; a judgment

entered without authority “is not a judgment at all.” Id. at 438.

Those principles apply with special force in the removal context because

removal is a Supremacy Clause mechanism by which Congress shifts adjudicatory

authority to a federal forum. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880).

Congress’s command is categorical: upon filing the notice of removal and providing

notice to the state court, removal “shall effect” federal jurisdiction and “the State

court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. §

1446(d). This Court has long recognized that once removal is effected, state-court

proceedings are suspended absent remand. Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118,

122 (1882).

Most importantly for this case, the Court recently reaffirmed that state-court

orders entered after removal are void because the state court loses all adjudicatory

authority upon removal. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo

Feliciano, 140 S. Ct. 696, 700—01 (2020). The courts of appeals, including the Tenth

Circuit, likewise recognize that removal strips state-court power as a matter of law.

Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 1998). Federal courts

likewise recognize that judgments entered without jurisdiction or in violation of due

process are void and subject to vacatur when properly challenged. See Omer v.

Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994). That principle reflects longstanding

Supreme Court precedent recognizing that jurisdictional defects render judicial acts

legal nullities.

The decision below cannot be reconciled with these settled principles.

Petitioner preserved and presented the federal question whether state-court custody

and relocation orders entered after removal “effect[ed]” federal jurisdiction—and

while § 1446(d) commanded the state court to “proceed no further”—are void and

unenforceable as a matter of federal supremacy and due process. Yet the Colorado

Court of Appeals affirmed the resulting orders without adjudicating that threshold

federal limitation on state-court power. That outcome threatens uniformity in the

enforcement of § 1446(d) and Acevedo', if post-removal state orders can be affirmed in

practice, then federal divestiture becomes optional and the Supremacy Clause

becomes aspirational—particularly in the very setting where liberty interests are at

their zenith.

The domestic-relations exception recognized in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504

U.S. 689 (1992), limits federal courts' power to issue divorce, alimony, and custody

decrees. It does not authorize state courts to disregard § 1446(d)’s mandatory

command while removal is pending. Ankenbrandt governs what a federal court may

adjudicate on the merits; it says nothing about a state court’s obligation to stop

proceedings upon removal. The proper remedy for a removal that falls within the

domestic-relations exception is a federal remand order—not state-court proceedings

in defiance of federal law during the pendency of removal.

Courts have reached inconsistent outcomes on whether post-removal state

orders are categorically void or merely irregular. Compare Roman Catholic

Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 140 S. Ct. 696, 700-01 (2020); Akin v.

Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 1998) (state jurisdiction

extinguished upon removal), with decisions permitting practical validation or

harmless-error treatment of post-removal proceedings

in domestic-relations

contexts.

The lower courts have adopted materially conflicting approaches to § 1446(d)’s

command that state courts “shall proceed no further” once removal is effected. Some

courts treat post-removal state adjudication as jurisdictionally void ab initio. See

Acevedo, 140 S. Ct. at 700—01; Akin, 156 F.3d at 1034. Other courts have permitted

state proceedings to retain practical or legal effect where removal is later deemed

improper or the case is remanded, effectively treating § 1446(d) as procedural rather

than jurisdictional. See, e.g., Benson v. SI Handling Sys., Inc., 188 F.3d 780, 782

(7th Cir. 1999); cf. Albonetti v. Gafford, 520 F.2d 1115, 1117 (5th Cir. 1975). These

divergent approaches create substantial uncertainty regarding whether federal

removal divestiture is categorical or contingent—an issue of recurring national

importance directly implicating the Supremacy Clause and uniform federal

jurisdiction.

The conflict is especially consequential in domestic-relations proceedings,

where the timing of relocation and custody determinations often renders post-hoc

federal correction impracticable, allowing jurisdictionally defective orders to produce

irreversible family-law consequences. These divergent approaches warrant this

Court’s review to ensure uniform enforcement of federal jurisdictional mandates.

II. The Petition Presents Structural Due Process and the Non-Waivable

Right to a Neutral Decisionmaker in Parental-Rights Adjudication

This Court has long recognized that due process requires adjudication by a

neutral and disinterested decisionmaker. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927);

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Structural bias violates due process even

absent proof of actual prejudice; the Constitution is concerned with the probability

and appearance of bias where the circumstances create a serious risk of unfairness.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883-84 (2009). The Court has

repeatedly reaffirmed that structural conflicts cannot be treated as harmless

because they undermine the legitimacy of the tribunal itself. Ward v. Vill. of

Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).

This Court’s structural-neutrality jurisprudence further confirms that

adjudicators

with

personal

institutional

stakes

litigation

cannot

constitutionally preside over matters in which those interests are implicated. See

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821—25 (1986) (due process violated

where decisionmaker possessed personal interest in litigation outcome); Williams v.

Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8—10 (2016) (structural bias requires recusal where

adjudicator previously participated in prosecutorial decision); Rippo v. Baker, 580

U.S. 285, 287—88 (2017) (due process violated where objective risk of bias exists

regardless of proof of actual prejudice).

The principle applies with heightened force when the State materially

burdens the parent-child relationship, because parental rights occupy a unique

constitutional status. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). Yet in practice, structural neutrality concerns are

often minimized in family-court settings under the mistaken assumption that

domestic-relations adjudication is exempt from strict constitutional requirements.

This Court’s precedents recognize no such exception.

Here, the structural conflict was not theoretical. Magistrate Allen adjudicated

custody and relocation — materially burdening the parent-child relationship —

while simultaneously serving as a personal-capacity defendant in federal civil-rights

litigation arising from his own conduct in the very proceedings below. At the same

hearing, co-defendant Galan made materially false representations to the tribunal

that Petitioner had filed "no objections," and the tribunal relied on those

representations to proceed in default. The structural conflict was thus operative, not

incidental: the adjudicator's co-defendant supplied the false procedural predicate on

which the adjudicator relied. That nexus between structural bias and record

corruption distinguishes this case from disputes in which a conflict exists but can be

argued to have had no effect on the proceeding.

This case presents a dispositive question: whether due process permits a

judicial officer to adjudicate custody and relocation while simultaneously serving as

a personal-capacity defendant in related federal civil-rights litigation arising from

the same course of events, and whether structural neutrality is a non-waivable

constitutional prerequisite to valid adjudication of fundamental parental rights

under Tumey, Caperton, and Williams. The issue was preserved, is purely legal, and

goes to the validity of the adjudication itself.

Lower courts diverge in applying Tumey-Caperton neutrality principles to

domestic-relations proceedings. Some courts apply full structural-bias analysis when

parental rights are implicated, while others dilute neutrality requirements through

deference doctrines or harmless-error rationales. This case presents an ideal vehicle

for clarifying that structural neutrality is a non-waivable constitutional prerequisite

even in family-court adjudication.

III. The Decision Below Threatens the Practical Force of Troxel and This

Court's Parental-Rights Jurisprudence, and Raises Serious Equal

Protection Concerns

In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), this Court reaffirmed that the

interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children "is perhaps the

oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." That principle

rests on a century of precedent recognizing parental authority and family integrity

as core liberty interests. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v.

Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651; Santosky,

455 U.S. at 753—54. This Court has further held that the procedures by which a

State terminates or materially reallocates parental rights must satisfy heightened

standards of reliability and fairness. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753—54; M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,

519 U.S. 102, 116—17 (1996) (recognizing the unique significance of parental-rights

adjudication and its claim to constitutional procedural protections).

Troxel is unenforceable unless courts maintain the structural safeguards that

make adjudication of parental rights constitutionally legitimate. The constitutional

concern presented here is not whether Troxel recognized parental rights as

fundamental, but whether those rights retain practical force when proceedings occur

without lawful jurisdiction, before structurally conflicted tribunals, or when properly

preserved federal constitutional challenges to the legitimacy of the adjudicative

process go unresolved.

Those rights become illusory if the State may materially burden the parent

child relationship through proceedings that are jurisdictionally void under federal

removal law, adjudicated by a structurally conflicted tribunal, and affirmed without

addressing challenges bearing on jurisdiction, neutrality, and record integrity. The

decision below illustrates a growing danger: that parental rights recognized in

Troxel will exist in doctrine but not in enforcement because domestic-relations

labeling is used to treat jurisdictional defects and structural due-process violations

as immaterial.

The appellate non-adjudication in this case compounds the problem. The

Court of Appeals did not decide the federal questions adversely on the merits; it did

not address them at all. When a state appellate court affirms orders that materially

burden fundamental parental rights while declining to engage preserved federal

constitutional objections bearing on jurisdiction and the legitimacy of the

adjudicative process, the result is a form of insulation by silence. Fraud on the

court—an offense against the integrity of the judicial process itself, Hazel-Atlas

Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944); Bulloch v. United States,

763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (recognizing fraud on the court as

conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process)—cannot be

rendered unreviewable through appellate non-adjudication.

Whatever the ultimate merits of Petitioner's fraud allegations, appellate

affirmance cannot treat record-integrity challenges as immaterial when they bear on

jurisdiction, neutrality, and the legitimacy of adjudication. When a court affirms

while declining to adjudicate preserved federal objections that the process was

jurisdictionally void, structurally conflicted, and procedurally distorted, it risks

transforming contested falsehoods into binding finality. That is incompatible with

due process where fundamental liberty interests are being materially burdened. See

Ward, 409 U.S. at 62.

This Court has repeatedly rejected the premise that dome Stic-relations

adjudication is constitutionally exempt. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-57; Santosky, 455

U.S. at 753. The question here is not whether States may decide custody disputes; it

is whether States may do so outside lawful jurisdiction, without structural

neutrality, and while declining to adjudicate preserved federal objections. That

approach conflicts with Troxel's insistence that parental liberty is fundamental and

enforceable. It also raises serious Equal Protection concerns: when family-court

litigants are subjected to procedural regimes that would not be tolerated in other

civil or constitutional contexts—when jurisdictional defects and structural conflicts

are excused solely because the proceeding is labeled "domestic relations" — the State

has functionally relegated parents to a diminished tier of constitutional protection.

See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-58 (invalidating family-law procedures that treated

parents as constitutionally inferior).

Courts increasingly diverge in whether Troxel's protections include procedural

safeguards requiring jurisdictional legitimacy and structural neutrality. Some courts

treat Troxel as imposing enforceable constitutional limits; others treat it as

compatible with discretionary adjudication despite jurisdictional and structural

defects. This case provides an opportunity to restore uniform understanding of

Troxel's practical force and to clarify that family-law proceedings do not form a

constitutional safe harbor from review of fraud-based legitimacy challenges.

This case also presents an important opportunity to clarify that constitutional

protections governing structural neutrality and parental liberty apply with equal

force in domestic-relations adjudication. Lower courts increasingly diverge in

whether family-law labeling permits relaxation of jurisdictional and structural due-

process safeguards. That divergence threatens the uniform enforcement of this

Court’s parental-rights jurisprudence and risks rendering Troxel’s guarantees

doctrinal rather than practical. The issue is recurring, nationally significant, and

unlikely to receive consistent resolution without this Court’s review.

IV. This Case Is an Appropriate and Necessary Vehicle for Review

This case is ideal for plenary review. The Colorado Supreme Court denied

discretionary review without opinion, leaving the Colorado Court of Appeals’

judgment as the final decision. Petitioner timely raised, fully preserved, and

repeatedly presented the federal questions at every stage. The issues are threshold

and dispositive: whether § 1446(d) divestiture renders post-removal state custody

adjudication void; whether structural neutrality is constitutionally required where

parental rights are materially burdened; and whether preserved jurisdictional and

structural objections may be treated as immaterial in custody proceedings because

the matter is labeled “family law.”

The questions presented are purely legal and require no further factual

development. They turn on the legal effect of § 1446(d) and the Supremacy Clause;

the constitutional requirement of a neutral decisionmaker under this Court’s

structural-bias precedents; and whether Troxel’s protections, reinforced by equal

protection principles, retain practical force when state courts decline to adjudicate

preserved federal objections. No adequate and independent state ground clearly

supports the judgment in a manner that defeats review under Michigan v. Long, 463

U.S. 1032 (1983).

The questions presented are purely legal. They require no additional

factfinding:

Question One turns on the legal effect of § 1446(d) and whether the state

court's express refusal to honor removal renders its subsequent orders void — a

question of federal statutory construction and Supremacy Clause enforcement.

Question Two turns on whether a judicial officer with a personal stake in

related litigation satisfies the structural-neutrality requirements of Tumey,

Caperton, and Williams — a question of constitutional law applied to undisputed

facts.

Question Three turns on whether Troxel's guarantees include enforceable

procedural safeguards or may be effectively nullified by appellate non-adjudication

and domestic-relations labeling — a question of constitutional doctrine.

The Colorado Court of Appeals' opinion does not contain a reasoned decision

on any of the federal questions presented. It does not cite or discuss § 1446(d),

Acevedo, Tumey, Caperton, Williams, Hazel-Atlas, or any other authority bearing on

removal divestiture, structural neutrality, or fraud on the court. Under Michigan v.

Long, 463 U.S. at 1040—41, when it is not clear from the opinion and order whether

the state court's decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground, this

Court will accept jurisdiction and presume the decision rests on federal grounds.

Absent this Court's intervention, the combination of jurisdictional disregard

after removal, structurally conflicted adjudication, and appellate non-adjudication of

preserved federal challenges risks immunizing fundamental parental liberty from

federal constitutional review.

The three questions presented form a unified challenge to whether

fundamental parental rights may be effectively extinguished through proceedings

that lack lawful authority, structural neutrality, and record integrity—and whether

such defects may be insulated from federal review by declining adjudication. This

alignment strengthens the case's suitability for plenary review and its capacity to

provide broadly applicable guidance on removal enforcement, structural due process,

and Troxel's practical force.

This case presents a clean vehicle for resolving these questions. The judgment

below is final. The federal issues were preserved at every stage. Resolution of the

Questions Presented does not require review of custody fact-finding or domestic

relations merits. If the Court concludes that § 1446(d) divested state authority or

that structural judicial bias invalidated the adjudication, the appropriate remedy is

vacatur of jurisdictionally void orders and remand for proceedings before a neutral

tribunal with lawful authority.

The facts relevant to the Questions Presented are undisputed. Petitioner filed

and served a notice of removal on July 17, 2023. The state court proceeded to enter

case-management and adjudicatory orders thereafter. The federal district court later

remanded the case, and subsequent appellate proceedings followed. The Questions

Presented turn solely on the legal consequences of those undisputed procedural

events and require no review of custody fact-finding.

CONCLUSION

This case presents three interlocking constitutional violations that threaten to

place fundamental parental liberty beyond the reach of federal law. State courts

continued adjudicating custody after federal removal divested their authority. A

structurally conflicted magistrate entered orders while defending personal-capacity

civil-rights claims arising from the same litigation. Appellate courts affirmed

without adjudicating any preserved federal objection to jurisdiction, neutrality, or

record integrity—treating constitutional defects as immaterial solely because the

proceeding involved family law.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that fundamental parental rights do

not exist at the sufferance of the State. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).

Yet if the decision below is allowed to stand, those rights may be effectively

extinguished through proceedings that are void at inception (Supremacy Clause

divestiture), compromised in execution (structural conflict and alleged fraud on the

court), and immune from meaningful review (appellate silence on preserved federal

objections). That result would place an entire category of fundamental liberty

interests beyond the practical protection of federal law—transforming Troxel from

enforceable constitutional doctrine into a hollow abstraction.

The questions presented are not case-specific anomalies. They recur

nationwide wherever state courts treat removal divestiture as optional, structural

neutrality as waivable, and appellate review of constitutional objections as

unnecessary—but only in domestic-relations proceedings. The resulting two-tier

system of constitutional protection contradicts this Court's repeated holdings that

fundamental parental rights do not diminish at the family-court door. Stanley v.

Illinois,

405 U.S.

645,

656—58

(1972).

Without this

Court's intervention,

jurisdictional voidness, structural conflicts, and appellate non-adjudication will

continue to converge in family courts nationwide, rendering federal constitutional

protections unenforceable precisely where liberty interests are at their zenith.

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted this 12th day of February, 2026,

Rabbi Jacob Bellinsky, Sui Juris

c/o 7661 McLaughlin Road, #283

Falcon, CO 80831-4727

ibellinsky@gmail.com

Phone: (303) 883-7706

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.