Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Melvin Trotter, Petitioner v. Florida, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 19, 2026
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No. ______
______________________________________________________________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
______________________________________________________________
MELVIN TROTTER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
___________________________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________________________________________________
CAPITAL CASE
DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
Execution Scheduled: February 24, 2026, at 6:00 PM ET
_____________________________________________________________
MELODY JACQUAY-ACOSTA
*ANN MARIE MIRIALAKIS
MAHHAM SYED
CAPITAL COLLATERAL REGIONAL
COUNSEL - MIDDLE REGION
12973 N. Telecom Parkway
Temple Terrace, Florida 33637
813-558-1600
Support@ccmr.state.fl.us
jacquay@ccmr.state.fl.us
mirialakis@ccmr.state.fl.us
syed@ccmr.state.fl.us
Counsels of Record for Petitioner
*Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court
INDEX TO APPENDIX
Appendix A: Opinion of the Florida Supreme Court ........................................ APP 001
Appendix B: Order (1) Denying Defendant’s Fourth “Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to
Vacate Sentence of Death” After a Signed Death Warrant and (2) Denying
Defendant’s Motion for a Stay of Execution ..................................................... APP 018
Appendix C: Signed Affidavit, Dr. Daniel Buffington ...................................... APP 054
Appendix D: FDOC Log Part 1 .......................................................................... APP 063
Appendix E: FDOC Log Part 2 .......................................................................... APP 084
No. ______
______________________________________________________________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
______________________________________________________________
MELVIN TROTTER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
___________________________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________________________________________________
CAPITAL CASE
DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
Execution Scheduled: February 24, 2026, at 6:00 PM ET
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the Florida Supreme Court
APP 001
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC2026-0214
____________
MELVIN TROTTER,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC2026-0217
____________
MELVIN TROTTER,
Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
February 17, 2026
PER CURIAM.
Melvin Trotter is a prisoner under sentence of death for whom
a death warrant has been signed and an execution date set for
February 24, 2026. He appeals the circuit court’s order summarily
APP 002
denying his successive motion for postconviction relief filed under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, petitions this Court for a
writ of habeas corpus, and requests a stay of execution. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. As we explain
below, we affirm the summary denial of postconviction relief. We
also deny Trotter’s habeas petition and his request for a stay of
execution.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Trotter was convicted of the 1986 first-degree murder of 70year-old Virgie Langford. Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla.
1990). This Court explained:
On June 16, 1986, a truck driver went into
Langford’s grocery in Palmetto, Florida, and found the
seventy-year-old owner, Virgie Langford, bleeding on the
floor in the back of the store. She had suffered a large
abdominal wound which resulted in disembowelment;
there were a total of seven stab wounds. She told the
driver that she had been stabbed and robbed. Several
hours after the surgery for her wounds, the victim went
into cardiac arrest and died.
Id. at 692. The jury recommended the death penalty, and the trial
court sentenced Trotter to death. On direct appeal, this Court
affirmed Trotter’s first-degree murder conviction but reversed
Trotter’s death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase.
-2-
APP 003
At the conclusion of the new penalty phase, the jury again
recommended that Trotter be sentenced to death. Upon finding
that multiple aggravating factors were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt and that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
circumstances, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation
and sentenced Trotter to death. Trotter v. State, 690 So. 2d 1234,
1236 (Fla. 1996). In its sentencing order, the trial court found the
following aggravating factors: (1) Trotter was on community control
at the time of the murder; (2) Trotter had been convicted of a prior
violent felony; (3) the murder took place while Trotter was engaged
in a robbery (merged with pecuniary gain); and (4) the murder was
especially wicked, evil, atrocious, and cruel. Id. at 1236 n.5.
The trial court found as statutory mitigation that at the time of
the murder (1) Trotter was under the influence of extreme mental
and emotional disturbance, and (2) Trotter’s capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. As
nonstatutory mitigation, the court found that (1) Trotter had a
below average IQ, family and developmental problems, and a
disadvantaged background; (2) Trotter may have suffered from a
frontal lobe brain disorder (which the sentencing order indicated
-3-
APP 004
“slowed down [Trotter’s] reaction times”); (3) Trotter was remorseful
“to some degree”; and (4) other nonstatutory factors. Id. at 1236
nn.6-7.
Trotter’s convictions and sentences became final when the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on October 6,
1997. Trotter v. Florida, 522 U.S. 876 (1997).
Since that time, Trotter has unsuccessfully challenged his
death sentence in state and federal courts. See Trotter v. State, 932
So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2006) (affirming denial of initial motion for
postconviction relief, denying state habeas petition, and affirming
the rejection of Trotter’s claim of mental retardation under Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203); Trotter v. State, 10 So. 3d 633
(Fla. 2009) (unpublished table decision) (affirming denial of first
successive motion for postconviction relief); Trotter v. State, 235 So.
3d 284 (Fla. 2018) (affirming denial of second successive motion for
postconviction relief); Trotter v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:06-cv1872-T-17MSS, 2007 WL 3326672 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2007)
(denying federal habeas petition); Trotter v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 535
F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of federal habeas relief).
-4-
APP 005
Governor Ron DeSantis signed Trotter’s death warrant on
January 23, 2026. On February 2, 2026, Trotter filed in the circuit
court a motion for stay of execution and a successive motion for
postconviction relief under rule 3.851 raising two claims: (1) the
alleged failure of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) to
follow the published lethal injection procedures violates Trotter’s
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Florida
Constitution; and (2) executing Trotter constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment because of his advanced age and status as an
elderly person.
On February 6, 2026, the circuit court summarily denied both
of Trotter’s rule 3.851 claims and denied his motion to stay the
execution. Trotter now appeals to this Court the circuit court’s
denial of postconviction relief, petitions this Court for a writ of
habeas corpus, and requests a stay of execution.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief
The “[s]ummary denial of a successive postconviction motion
is appropriate ‘[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case
-5-
APP 006
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Owen
v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017, 1022 (Fla. 2023) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Bogle v. State, 322 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 2021)). We
review the circuit court’s decision de novo, “accepting the movant’s
factual allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the
record, and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows
that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Id. at 1022-23 (quoting
Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2009)). The circuit court
did not err in summarily denying Trotter’s claims.
Trotter’s postconviction appeal raises two issues, the first of
which involves his claim that FDOC maladministered certain lethal
injection procedures in recent executions. According to Trotter,
FDOC’s alleged failure to comply with the published procedures
creates a sure or very likely risk of sufficiently imminent danger and
thus violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. Second, Trotter, who recently turned 65 years old,
argues that executing him at the age of 65 violates the protection
against cruel and unusual punishment because of his status as an
elderly person. We address each issue in turn and explain why
Trotter is not entitled to relief.
-6-
APP 007
1. Lethal Injection Procedures
Trotter challenges the summary denial of his claim that
FDOC’s alleged maladministration of the published procedures for
execution by lethal injection violates his rights under the Eighth
Amendment and corresponding provisions of the Florida
Constitution. In support of this claim, Trotter alleges several
examples of FDOC’s maladministration of its procedures: ad hoc
recordkeeping regarding the removal of lethal injection drugs from
inventory; the administration of incorrect drug doses during certain
executions; the use of a fourth drug, lidocaine, during certain
executions; the use of expired drugs during certain executions; and
the failure to contemporaneously document and accurately record
the drugs used in executions. Trotter maintains that these
instances—based on evidence submitted in a federal lawsuit
brought by since-executed inmate Frank Walls—constitute “a per se
violation of [his] constitutional rights under the [Eighth]
Amendment” due to “sure or very likely risks of sufficiently
imminent danger.”
While Trotter contends that his lethal injection claim is not a
traditional “method-of-execution claim,” the gist of his argument
-7-
APP 008
remains that executing him by lethal injection—given the
allegations he raises—constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Thus, to obtain relief, Trotter must: “(1) establish that the method of
execution presents a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or
very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering and
(2) identify a known and available alternative method of execution
that entails a significantly less severe risk of pain.” Asay v. State,
224 So. 3d 695, 701 (Fla. 2017) (emphasis added) (citing Glossip v.
Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 877 (2015)). The circuit court did not err in
denying an evidentiary hearing on nor in summarily denying this
claim. See Heath v. State, 2026 WL 320522, at *3 (Fla. Feb. 3)
(stating that “speculative and conclusory allegations that lethal
injection protocols present a substantial risk of serious harm are
insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing” (citing Cole v. State,
392 So. 3d 1054, 1065 n.18 (Fla. 2024))), cert. denied, 2026 WL
363902 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2026).
Trotter acknowledges that his allegations are substantively
similar to those we recently addressed in the postconviction appeal
of recently executed inmate Ronald Heath. In Heath, we explained:
-8-
APP 009
The question is not whether protocol deviations
occurred but whether the defendant’s allegations would
demonstrate a substantial and imminent risk that is sure
or very likely to cause serious illness and needless
suffering. Heath’s allegations would not demonstrate
such a risk. The alleged failure to document the removal
of drugs from inventory until one or two days after an
execution would not, without more, show a substantial
and imminent risk that is sure or very likely to cause
serious illness and needless suffering during an
execution. Nor would the alleged failure to log the
removal of etomidate from inventory establish such a risk
where the autopsy indicates the drug was, in fact,
administered. The allegation that lidocaine was
administered on two occasions certainly would not
establish a risk of needless suffering. Heath’s suggestion
that inventory removals on dates that “seemingly
correspond[]” to executions and reflect amounts less
than required by the protocol show that incorrect doses
were used is speculative and Heath does not allege that
such incorrect doses would create a demonstrated risk of
severe pain. The same is true of the alleged use of
expired drugs and the execution that took twenty
minutes and allegedly involved movement. None of
Heath’s allegations would establish that the method of
execution presents a substantial and imminent risk that is
sure or very likely—in other words, a virtual certainty—to
cause serious illness and needless suffering.
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
However, Trotter argues that his lethal injection claim
sufficiently pleads “a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or
very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering during an
execution” and that Heath is distinguishable on this basis. We
-9-
APP 010
disagree.
In addition to the Walls documents, Trotter also relies on an
affidavit submitted by Dr. Daniel Buffington, a clinical
pharmacologist. However, similar to Heath, the outcomes
suggested in the affidavit are speculative and thus do not
demonstrate “a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or very
likely—in other words, a virtual certainty—to cause serious illness
and needless suffering.” Id.
Moreover, because Trotter incorrectly maintains that the
Glossip requirements do not apply to his claim, he fails to identify
an alternative method of execution.
Trotter is not entitled to relief, and we affirm the circuit court’s
denial of this claim.
2. Execution of the Elderly
Trotter also urges this Court to hold that his advanced age
and status as an elderly person exempt him from execution on
Eighth Amendment grounds because carrying out his death
sentence by execution at 65 years of age runs afoul of evolving
standards of decency and would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. The circuit court did not err in denying this claim.
- 10 -
APP 011
Trotter’s Eighth Amendment argument in favor of a categorical
ban on the execution of the elderly is similar to that raised in
Smithers v. State, 420 So. 3d 460 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 323
(2025). Smithers, who was also under an active death warrant,
argued that executing him at age 72 would constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. There, we observed that “[p]resently, the
United States Supreme Court—and this Court—recognize only one
age-based death penalty exemption, which prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty on individuals who were under the
chronological age of 18 at the time that their capital crimes were
committed.” Id. at 465 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578
(2005)). Trotter asks this Court to revisit our holding in Smithers.
We decline to do so.
In rejecting Smithers’ claim that executing him at age 72
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, we observed:
Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to limit the exemption from execution . . .
based on age to those whose chronological age was less
than eighteen years at the time of their capital crime(s),
this Court is bound by those interpretations and is
precluded from interpreting Florida’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment to exempt . . . those
whose chronological age was over eighteen years at the
time of their capital crime(s).
- 11 -
APP 012
Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701,
713 (Fla. 2025)). We concluded that “to the extent we view
Smithers’ argument as precluded by United States Supreme Court
precedent, we are bound by the conformity clause [of the Florida
Constitution],” id. at 466, meaning that
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment is both the floor and the ceiling for
protection from cruel and unusual punishment in
Florida, and this Court cannot interpret Florida’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to
provide protection that the Supreme Court has decided is
not afforded by the Eighth Amendment.
Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 979 (Fla.) (quoting Barwick v. State,
361 So. 3d 785, 794 (Fla. 2023)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161
(2025).
Trotter argues that because the United States Supreme Court
has not expressly addressed whether the elderly are categorically
exempt from execution, this Court is not bound by the conformity
clause and may expand Eighth Amendment protections to the
execution of the elderly. However, as we stated in Gudinas:
While the states are required to adhere to the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, neither the
Eighth nor Fourteenth Amendments require states to
expand the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment
- 12 -
APP 013
or to interpret their own corresponding state constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment in a
more expansive manner than the Supreme Court has
interpreted the federal prohibition.
412 So. 3d at 714 (emphasis added). Consistent with our analyses
in Smithers and Gudinas, we again decline to expand the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to include
individuals 65 years of age and older. As such, we affirm the circuit
court’s summary denial of relief on this issue.
B. Habeas Petition
In his habeas petition, Trotter requests a stay of execution and
an independent investigation of FDOC’s compliance with Florida’s
published lethal injection procedures. According to Trotter, new
evidence suggests that FDOC is not following its published
procedures and is thereby creating a substantial likelihood of
serious injury and needless suffering. Trotter is not entitled to the
relief he seeks.
Even if we were to assume that Trotter’s habeas claim is
properly before this Court, this claim is based on the same
allegations raised in his post-warrant successive motion for
postconviction relief—a motion that the circuit court denied, and
- 13 -
APP 014
the denial of which we affirm in this opinion. In fact, Trotter
concedes that he presents “similar” issues in his postconviction
appeal and in his habeas petition. He contends, however, that his
habeas petition is sufficiently distinguishable from his successive
postconviction appeal because the types of relief he seeks are
different. Trotter notes that instead of seeking to have his death
sentence vacated as in his successive postconviction appeal, here,
he seeks a stay of execution and an investigation into FDOC’s
compliance with its lethal injection procedures. Trotter’s attempt to
circumvent a procedural bar is unavailing. Indeed, Trotter has
“repackaged one of his postconviction claims as a habeas claim,”
and for this reason, his habeas claim is procedurally barred. Davis
v. State, 383 So. 3d 717, 742 (Fla. 2024). “[C]laims [that] were
raised in [a] postconviction motion . . . cannot be relitigated in a
habeas petition.” Knight v. State, 923 So. 2d 387, 395 (Fla. 2005).
Trotter’s habeas claim also fails on the merits for the same
reason that his postconviction claim fails: he has not
“(1) establish[ed] that the method of execution presents a
substantial and imminent risk that is sure or very likely to cause
serious illness and needless suffering,” nor has he “(2) identif[ied] a
- 14 -
APP 015
known and available alternative method of execution that entails a
significantly less severe risk of pain.” Asay, 224 So. 3d at 701
(emphasis added) (citing Glossip, 576 U.S. at 877).
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Trotter’s successive
motion for postconviction relief and deny his habeas petition. As
such, we decline to order a stay of execution.
No oral argument is required, no motion for rehearing will be
considered, and the mandate shall issue immediately.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, SASSO, and
TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Manatee County,
Frederick P. Mercurio, Judge
Case No. 411986CF001225CFAXMA
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mahham Syed,
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Melody JacquayAcosta, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Ann
Marie Mirialakis, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel,
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Stephen
D. Ake, Attorney Manager, Capital Appeals, and Michael W.
- 15 -
APP 016
Mervine, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,
Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
- 16 -
APP 017
No. ______
______________________________________________________________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
______________________________________________________________
MELVIN TROTTER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
___________________________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________________________________________________
CAPITAL CASE
DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
Execution Scheduled: February 24, 2026, at 6:00 PM ET
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX B
Order (1) Denying Defendant’s Fourth “Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to Vacate
Sentence of Death” After a Signed Death Warrant and (2) Denying Defendant’s
Motion for a Stay of Execution
APP 018
g # 241148499 E-Filed 02/06/2026 09:36:16 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR MANATEE COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Case No.:
FSC Case No.:
Plaintiff
1986-CF-001225 AX
SC 1960-82142
v.
MELVIN TROTTER,
DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR
FEBRUARY 24, 2026, 6:00 PM
Defendant.
_____________ /
ORDER (1) DENYING DEFENDANT'S FOURTH "SUCCESSIVE RULE 3.851
MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE OF DEATH..
AFTER A SIGNED DEATH WARRANT
AND (2) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant's "Successive Rule
3.851 Motion to Vacate Sentence of Death" and "Defendant's Motion for a Stay
of Defendant's Execution Until the Conclusion of an Investigation of FDOC's
Compliance of Its 'Lethal Injection Procedure,"' both filed February 2, 2026. The
State filed Responses to both on February 3, 2026, and the Court held a case
management (Huff) hearing on February 4, 2026, after which the Court entered
an order determining that all of Defendant's claims for relief could be resolved
by a review of the record and as a matter of prevailing law without an evidentiary
hearing. After considering Defendant's Motions, the State's Responses, the court
file and record, applicable law, as well as arguments of counsel, and being
1 Hulfv. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla.
1993).
Page 1 of 35
APP 019
otherwise duly advised of the premises, for the reasons stated below, the Court
finds that Defendant is not entitled to any relief.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In its opinion affirming Defendant's conviction, the Florida Supreme Court
summarized the facts of this case as follows:
On June 16, 1986, a truck driver went into Langford's grocery in
Palmetto, Florida, and found the seventy-year-old owner, Virgie
Langford, bleeding on the floor in the back of the store. She had
suffered a large abdominal wound which resulted in
disembowelment; there were a total of seven stab wounds. She told
the driver that she had been stabbed and robbed. Several hours
after the surgery for her wounds, the victim went into cardiac arrest
and died.
The jury found Trotter guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon and
first-degree murder and recommended the death penalty by a nineto-three vote. The trial court found four aggravating circumstances
and four mitigating circumstances.
Finding the aggravating
circumstances outweighing the mitigating circumstances, the court
sentenced Trotter to death.
Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1990). The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed Defendant's conviction but reversed and remanded for a new sentencing
phase. Id.
At resentencing on April 21, 1993, a jury again recommended the death
penalty by a vote of eleven to one, and the Court again imposed the death
sentence. Trotter v. State, 690 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 876 (1997). In doing so, the sentencingjudge observed:
Virgie Langford was killed in the store which she owned and ran for
many years. As with every such proprietor, her store was
undoubtedly her second home. She was stabbed seven times and,
in fact, was disemboweled. As she was removed to the hospital for
treatment[,] she was conscious and was holding her intestines. She
Page 2 of 35
APP 020
was alive for a considerable time after the attack and was aware of
her terrible condition. The victim was seventy years old and met her
death at the hands of a healthy, muscular young man, who
obviously could have subdued his victim with little effort. The
number and force of the stabbings greatly exceeded that needed to
subdue the robbery victim. The Defendant was clearly 'utterly
indifferent to the suffering' of Virgie Langford. 2
Indeed, as noted by a federal district judge on habeas review,
Trotter took seventy year old Virgie Langford around the neck in a
strangle hold, and stabbed her seven times. The stab wounds cut
into her pancreas, liver, and stomach. One wound was eight inches
deep. One cut was severe enough to disembowel her. Virgie Langford
was conscious after the attack, and held her intestines while being
taken to the hospital, where she eventually died of heart failure.
Trotter took her money andfood stamps, left her for dead, and then
bought and smoked crack.
Trotter v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 2007 WL 3326672 at *l (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2007)
(internal citations removed) (emphasis added).
In total, upon resentencing, the Court found four aggravators, 3 two
statutory mitigators, 4 and several non-statutory mitigating circumstances, 5 and
ultimately concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances before sentencing Trotter to death. 6 On appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed Trotter's sentence of death,7 and the United
2 "Sentence 3
First Degree Murder," filed July 23, 1993, at 2-3 (See Attachment 1).
Trotter, 690 So. 2d at 1236 fn. 5 (''Trotter was on community control at the time of the murder;
Trotter had been convicted of a prior violent felony; the crime took place while Trotter was
engaged in a robbery and was for pecuniary gain (although the court listed these two
circumstances separately in its written order, it stated at sentencing that it considered the two
as a single factor); and the murder was especially wicked, evil, atrocious and cruel.").
4 Id. at fn. 6 (''Trotter was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance; and
the capacity of the defendant was substantially impaired.").
5 Id. at fn. 7 (''Trotter has a below average l.Q., has both family and developmental problems, and
has a disadvantaged background; Trotter may have suffered from a frontal lobe brain disorder;
the defendant is remorseful; and other nonstatutory factors.").
6 "Sentence - First Degree Murder," filed July 23, 1993, at 4.
7 Trotter, 690 So. 2d at 1237.
Page 3 of 35
APP 021
States Supreme Court subsequently denied discretionary certiorari review.
Trotter v. Florida, 522 U.S. 876 (1997).
Defendant filed his initial "Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction and
Sentence With Special Request for Leave to Amend," pursuant to Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.850, on June 8, 1998, raising eight claims for relief:
1. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely challenge the validity
of his prior violent felony conviction and failing to present evidence
regarding the circumstances of that prior crime;
2. Trial counsel was ineffective for not having the assistance of a
competent mental health expert;
3. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide mental health experts
with available information necessary for diagnosis of Defendant;
4. Trial counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt during the guilt phase
closing argument;
5. Execution by lethal injection or electrocution is unconstitutional;
6. Florida's death penalty sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its
face and as applied;
7. The penalty phase jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted the
burden to Defendant; and
8. Cumulative errors were not harmless. 8
After an evidentiary hearing on four of the claims, the Court denied the motion
in its entirety. Defendant filed an appeal in Case No. SC03-735. 9 Defendant
also filed a state petition for habeas corpus in Case No. SC03- l 967, raising two
claims:
1. Defendant's death sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi v.
New Jersey 10 and Ring v. Arizona; 11 and
2. Defendant may be incompetent at the time of execution. 12
8
Trotter v. State, 932 So. 2d 1045, 1048 n.4 (Fla. 2006).
9 Id. at 1048.
10 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
II 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
12
932 So. 2d at 1053.
Trotter,
Page 4 of 35
APP 022
After promulgation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 and upon
Defendant's motion, during the pendency of his appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court relinquished jurisdiction for a determination of Defendant's alleged
intellectual disability. 13 This Court determined Defendant was not "mentally
retarded" or intellectually disabled to bar execution. 14 The Florida Supreme
Court affirmed that finding, affirmed the denial of Defendant's postconviction
motion, and denied Defendant's state habeas petition. 15
Defendant filed a federal habeas petition on October 11, 2006, which the
district court denied. Trotter v. Sec'y, Dep'tofCorr., 2007 WL 3326672 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 6, 2007). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, and
the U.S. Supreme Court denied Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari on
December 15, 2008. Trotter v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 535 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1087 (2008).
Defendant then filed a successive Rule 3.851 motion on October 15, 2007
(amended on December 26, 2007), raising three claims challenging Florida's
lethal injection procedures. By an order rendered June 18, 2008, the Court
summarily denied the motion. Defendant appealed two of the claims, and the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the summary denial. Trotter v. State, 10 So. 3d
633 (Fla. 2009) (affirming denial of Defendant's (1) claim that "Florida's lethal
injection procedures violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and
unusual punishment" and (2) challenge to the constitutionality of section
13 Id.
at 1048.
15 Id.
at 1054.
14 Id.
Page 5 of 35
APP 023
945.10, Fla. Stat. (2006), "which exempts from disclosure as public record the
identity of the members of the execution team and the executioners").
On January 5, 2017, Defendant filed a second successive Rule 3.851
motion, requesting the Court vacate his death sentence in this case under Hurst
v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016). and its Florida progeny. By order rendered March
10, 2017, the Court found "the fundamental constitutional rights relied on by
Defendant have not been held to apply retroactively to this case" and summarily
denied Defendant's second successive Motion to Vacate Death Sentence as
untimely. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the summary denial. Trotter v.
State, 235 So. 3d 284 (Fla. 2018).
On January 23, 2026, Governor Ron DeSantis signed a death warrant to
carry out the sentence of death imposed on Defendant. As a result, on the same
day, the Florida Supreme Court issued a scheduling order requiring all
proceedings in this Court to be concluded by 11:00 a.m. on Friday, February 6,
2026. Defendant's execution is scheduled for Tuesday, February 24, 2026, at
6:00 p.m.
Meanwhile, on January 27, 2026, Defendant filed demands for additional
public records from the Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC") and the
Florida Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE"}, both of which objected to the
entirety of Defendant's demands, and by orders rendered January 29, 2026, the
Court sustained both FDOC's and FDLE's objections. Defendant filed an appeal
of those denials in Case No. SC2026-0168.
As previously noted, along with his present "Successive Rule 3.851 Motion
Page 6 of 35
APP 024
to Vacate Sentence of Death," Defendant also filed a "Motion for a Stay of
Defendant's Execution Until the Conclusion of an Investigation of FDOC's
Compliance of Its 'Lethal Injection Procedure."' The State has filed responses to
both Motions. The Court will address each in turn.
APPLICABLE RULE 3.851 PROCEDURAL LAW
A defendant sentenced to death is permitted to file a successive motion for
collateral relief outside of the standard one-year time limitation only if:
(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant
or the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence, or
(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established
within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(l) and has been held to
apply retroactively, or
(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the motion.
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.85l(d)(2).
Even if an exception exists, successive postconviction claims may still be
denied as untimely if there is a delay in raising those claims. See Rodgers v.
State, 288 So. 3d 1038, 1039 (Fla. 2019) (to be considered timely filed as newly
discovered evidence, the motion must be filed within one year of the date upon
which the claim became discoverable through due diligence). Claims that either
were or could have been raised on appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings
are not properly raised in a successive motion. See King v. State, 597 So. 2d
780, 782 (Fla. 1992) (holding that claims were barred because they could have
been, should have been, or were raised in a prior proceeding).
Summary denial is appropriate where successive postconviction claims are
Page 7 of 35
APP 025
refuted by the record. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.85l(f)(5)(B); see also Bogle v. State,
322 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 2021) ("Summary denial of a successive postconviction
motion is appropriate '[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively
show that the movant is entitled to no relief."'). Likewise, summary denial of
purely legal claims is appropriate where such claims are without merit under
controlling precedent. See Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1162-63 (Fla. 2013)
(because Mann raised purely legal claims that have been previously rejected, the
circuit court properly summarily denied relief). Moreover, mere conclusory or
speculative allegations are not sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing.
Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 474 (Fla. 2018). Rather, "the defendant bears
the burden of 'establishing a prima facie case based on a legally valid claim."'
Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 911 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Valentine v. State, 98
So. 3d 44, 54 (Fla. 2012)). If a defendant fails to set forth a facially sufficient
Rule 3.851 claim, summary denial is appropriate. Doty v. State, 403 So. 3d 209
(Fla. 2025) (citing Kocaker v. State, 311 So. 3d 814, 821 (Fla. 2020)).
With this framework in mind, the Court has reviewed the two claims raised
in Defendant's present fourth successive motion and finds that his claims are
untimely, legally insufficient, procedurally barred, or without merit, and
therefore, can be summarily denied.
ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS PREsENTED
CLAIM 1 - LETHAL INJECTION
In his first claim for relief, Defendant alleges that the FDOC's failure to
follow its published Execution by Lethal Injection Procedures is a violation of
Page 8 of 35
APP 026
Defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights under the United States
Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution.
Pointing to "evidence" (i.e., heavily redacted FDOC logs)l 6 presented in a federal
lawsuit by recently executed inmate, Frank Walls, 17 Defendant alleges such
records indicate that FDOC's "ability to competently carry out its own Execution
by Lethal Injection Procedures has been seriously compromised." 18 Defendant
further asserts that such heavily redacted FDOC logs "have exposed the routine
maladministration of critical phases of the execution process and raise serious
concerns over the implementation of the written execution protocols." 19
In
support of this claim, Defendant alleges "FDOC records reveal that the
department has been documenting its removal of execution drugs on an ad hoc
basis, typically after an execution takes place. "20
For example, Defendant refers to the execution of Michael Bell on July 15,
2025, and alleges:
[T]he corresponding inventory log shows that FDOC did not record
removing rocuronium bromide or potassium acetate until the next
day, July 16, 2025. Even more concerning, the logs contain no entry
indicating that etomidate was removed on a date corresponding to
Bell's execution at all, despite the postmortem presence of etomidate
in his bloodstream. 21
Thus, with the Michael Bell example, Defendant argues that Bell must have been
executed without proper documentation of etomidate being used, while
16 See Appendices D and E to Defendant's Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to Vacate Sentence of
Death, filed February 2, 2026.
17 Walls v. Dixon, No. 4:25-cv-0488, ECF 1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2025).
18 Defendant's Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to Vacate Sentence of Death, at 2.
19 Id. at 3.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 3-4.
Page 9 of 35
APP 027
simultaneously admitting that etomidate was found in Bell's system during an
autopsy.
Defendant further faults "the timeliness of when drugs were recorded as
being removed" 22 by pointing to dates reflected in the heavily redacted FDOC logs
when certain drugs-namely etomidate, rocuronium bromide, and potassium
acetate-were "removed" on June 25, 2025, and June 12, 2025, and comparing
those to the preceding execution dates of Thomas Gudinas on June 24, 2025,
and Anthony Wainwright on June 10, 2025, respectively. Defendant also alleges,
'The issues are not limited only to the timeliness of recording when drugs were
checked out and to what drugs were checked out, they also extend to the actual
amount of drugs being checked out." 23 Specifically, Defendant surmises that
"[v]ariations in the amounts being removed for an execution would indicate
incorrect dosages . . . . during multiple executions. "24 In addition, Defendant
alleges, 'The logs even show that at times, FDOC may have implemented a fourdrug protocol," because the heavily redacted logs indicate that "[d]uring the
executions of Edward James and Michael Tanzi, FDOC withdrew lidocaine[,
which is not contemplated within Florida's lethal injection protocols,] from the
Lethal Injection Drug Log. "25
Still relying on the heavily redacted FDOC logs, Defendant further alleges
those "logs may also indicate the use of expired drugs" 26 because they
22 Id.
23 Id.
at 4.
24 Id. (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 5.
26 Id.
(emphasis added).
Page 10 of 35
APP 028
purportedly "recorded the preparation of etomidate with an expiration date of
January 31, 2025, corresponding to the executions of [four death row inmates]" 27
on September 30, 2025; September 17, 2025; August 28, 2025; and August 19,
2025, respectively. 28 Defendant relies on an affidavit of Daniel E. Buffington,
PharmD, MBA, to support the claim that "administering expired lethal injection
drugs during an execution is extremely dangerous because 'the expiration date
guarantees that a drug will retain its full potency and safety when stored as
directed"' and "'[u]tilization of substances that are expired may have reduced
pharmacologic effect or produce unanticipated or unnecessary complications ..
. result[ing] in unnecessary pain or discomfort or an unexpected termination of
the execution procedure prior to the inmate's death. "29
After outlining all his lethal injection concerns, Defendant acknowledges
that FDOC "is entitled to the presumption that it will comply with the lethal
injection protocol," but then he argues that "FDOC loses the presumption that it
will comply with the lethal injection protocol when there is evidence that they
have deviated from the protocols as written. "30 Defendant maintains that "[t]he
records obtained in Walls v. Dixon, No. 25-cv-0488, ECF 1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26,
27 Id. at 5-6.
132 So. 3d 176, 193 (Fla. 2013) (applying strong presumption in
favor of FDOC and observing: "The lethal injection protocol expressly requires that a designated
execution team member will purchase the lethal chemicals to be used in the execution and will
'ensure that the lethal chemicals have not reached or surpassed their expiration dates.· In
addition, the protocol calls for the FDLE monitor to confirm that all lethal chemicals 'are correct
and current.· We will not presume that the DOC will violate its own protocol in regard to assuring
that the lethal drugs have not surpassed their expiration dates.").
29 Defendant's Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to Vacate Sentence of Death, at 6 (emphasis
added).
30 Id.
28 But see Muhammad v. State,
Page 11 of 35
APP 029
2025), show multiple deviations from that constitutionally protected protocol"
and concludes that he has pierced the presumption afforded and "established
that FDOC's abrogation of it's [sic] own protocol creates ... 'sure or very likely
risks of sufficiently imminent danger."' 31
To conclude his allegations in Claim 1, Defendant alleges that the BazeGlossip32 test does not apply to his present claim because "the method-of-
execution is not what is at issue here. "33 Rather, Defendant contends, "What is
at issue is that a failure to comply with the constitutionally prescribed means of
execution violates the Eighth Amendment's guarantee to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment." 34 During the Hu.ff hearing, defense counsel attempted to
clarify its argument, stating "FDOC must comply with [Fla. Stat.§ 922.105)" but
"they have failed to do so." 35
Citing subsections (4) and (5) of that statute,
defense counsel further argued, "Nowhere in the statute does it specify that
FDOC is entitled to change the process once it's been established," but "[w]e
argue that changes made by FDOC, unlike those made by the Legislature, are
violative of the Constitution. "36 The defense maintains that they "have shown
specific instances of [FDOC's] noncompliance" and deviation from their
published lethal injection protocol and avers that "[n]oncompliance with the
procedure is a per se violation of the constitution[al] rights of the inmate. "37
31 Id. at 8 (quoting Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 701
(Fla. 2017)).
32 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015).
33 Defendant's Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to Vacate Sentence of Death, at 11.
34 Id.
35 Huff Hearing Transcript, dated February 4, 2026, at 5.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 6.
Page 12 of 35
APP 030
For relief, Defendant moves the Court to vacate his sentence of death or at
least enter a stay of his execution.
Notably, Defendant acknowledges in his
motion that "[s]imilar allegations have been raised in the capital case of Ronald
Heath, currently awaiting decision before the Florida Supreme Court. "38 As will
be discussed further below, however, the Florida Supreme Court has recently
affirmed the denial of Heath's almost identical postconviction claims.
In its Response, the State moves the Court to summarily deny Defendant's
postconviction motion on the basis that "[e]ach claim is untimely, procedurally
barred, and/or legally insufficient." 39
More specifically, the State argues
''Trotter's method-of-execution claim that the FDOC has violated its lethal
injection protocol is based entirely on speculation and conclusory allegations
and is legally insufficient as a matter of law .... to either pierce the presumption
that FDOC follows its protocol or to show a facially sufficient method-ofexecution claim. "40
''To challenge a method of execution under the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, [a defendant] must '(1) establish
that the method of execution presents a substantial and imminent risk that is
sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering and (2) identify
a known and available alternative method of execution that entails a significantly
less severe risk of pain."' Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054, 1064-65 (Fla. 2024)
3 8 Defendant's Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to Vacate Sentence of Death, at 6.
39 State's Answer to Trotter's Fourth Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief, filed February
3, 2026, at 1.
40 Id. at 4-5.
Page 13 of 35
APP 031
(quoting Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 701 (Fla. 2017) (emphasis added).
"Speculative and conclusory allegations that lethal injection protocols present a
substantial risk of serious harm," however, "are insufficient to warrant an
evidentiary hearing." Heath v. State, No. SC2026-0l 12, --- So. 3d ---, *8-9 (Fla.
Feb. 3, 2026) (emphasis added).
For the following reasons, the Court agrees with the State's response and
finds Defendant is not entitled to any of the relief he seeks. First, Defendant's
allegations-that FDOC's administration of its own lethal injection protocol
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments-are speculative and
conclusory. As in Heath, each of Defendant's "allegations of maladministration
in 2025 stem from documents . . . which included pages listing fields such as
'drug name,' 'package size,' and 'date,' among others." Id. at *8. Defendant's
present claims are based on the same heavily redacted FDOC logs that were at
issue in Heath and about which the Florida Supreme Court just adeptly opined,
The question is not whether protocol deviations occurred but
whether the defendant's allegations would demonstrate a
substantial and imminent risk that is sure or very likely to cause
serious illness and needless suffering. Heath's allegations would not
demonstrate such a risk. The alleged failure to document the
removal of drugs from inventory until one or two days after an
execution would not, without more, show a substantial and
imminent risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious
illness and needless suffering during an execution. Nor would
the alleged failure to log the removal of etomidate from
inventory establish such a risk where the autopsy indicates
the drug was, in fact, administered. The allegation that
lidocaine was administered on two occasions certainly would
not establish a risk of needless suffering. Heath's suggestion
that inventory removals on dates that "seemingly correspond[]"
to executions and reflect amounts less than required by the
protocol show that incorrect doses were used is speculative
Page 14 of 35
APP 032
and Heath does not allege that such incorrect doses would
create a demonstrated risk of severe pain. The same is true of
the alleged use of expired drugs and the execution that took
twenty minutes and allegedly involved movement. None of Heath's
allegations would establish that the method of execution
presents a substantial and imminent risk that is sure o r ~
likely-in other words, a virtual certainty-to cause serious
illness and needless suffering.
Id. at *9-10 (emphasis added). In addition to the Heath Court's timely binding
precedent, in the instant action, none of the heavily redacted FDOC log pages
contain any executed defendant's name or indicate that any of the drugs listed
were used during any execution, further prompting a finding that Defendant's
purported "evidence" of FDOC's alleged maladministration of its protocols is
based on speculation and conjecture. Highlighting the speculative nature of his
claims is Defendant's failure to acknowledge, much less foreclose, reasonable
alternative interpretations of the heavily redacted FDOC logs. For example, it is
possible that the reason FDOC's logs reflect expired etomidate being "removed"
was for the purpose of discarding or destroying it rather than using it for an
execution. 41
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendant
Trotter's allegations in Claim 1 are conclusory and speculative.
Second, Defendant's allegations in Claim 1 are legally insufficient in that
he fails to identify any alternative method of execution, much less a sufficient
one. Thus, Defendant's claim fails the second prong of the Baze-Glossip
requirements. See Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 701 (Fla. 2017) (citing Glossip,
See Execution by Lethal Injection with Certification Letter (Appendix C to "Defendant's
Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to Vacate Sentence of Death"). at 5 (requiring in subsection (6) of
the "Specific Procedures" section that a "designated team member will ensure that the lethal
chemicals have not reached or surpassed their expiration dates").
41
Page 15 of 35
APP 033
576 U.S. at 877). Furthermore, contrary to Defendant's assertion that the BazeGlossip test does not apply to his present claim, the U.S. Supreme Court has
unequivocally opined that "Glossip left no doubt that this standard [Le., the
requirement that a prisoner must show a feasible and readily implemented
alternative method of execution that would significantly reduce a substantial risk
of severe pain] governs 'all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims."'
Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 134 (2019) (citing Glossip, 576 U.S. at 867
(emphasis added)).
In the same opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court further
observed: "[T]he Constitution affords a 'measure of deference to a State's choice
of execution procedures' and does not authorize courts to serve as 'boards of
inquiry charged with determining 'best practices' for executions.'" Bucklew, 587
U.S. at 134. In any event, in Bucklew, the U.S. Supreme Court held Bucklew's
claim that he should not have to prove an alternative method of execution in his
as-applied challenge was "foreclosed by precedent" and reiterated that "Glossip
expressly held that identifying an available alternative is "a requirement of all
Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims." Id. at 136. Moreover, as in
Heath, to the extent that Defendant's request to stay his execution-"until and
unless the Departments disclose records demanded and until there is a full and
independent investigation completed regarding FDOC's compliance with and
carrying out oflethal injection executions in compliance with the constitutionally
accepted lethal injection procedure/protocol" 42-could be construed as a
"Defendant's Motion for a Stay of Defendant's Execution Until the Conclusion of an
Investigation of FDOC's Compliance of Its 'Lethal Injection Procedure,"' filed February 2, 2026,
at 2.
42
Page 16 of 35
APP 034
proposed alternative method of execution, there has been no suggestion that
FDOC does not "plan" to follow protocol in Trotter's execution, and the claim is
insufficiently pleaded.
Heath, at * 11.
Third, Defendant's allegations in Claim 1 are also legally insufficient in
that he fails to carry his burden to overcome the presumption afforded to FDOC.
See, e.g., Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 509 (Fla. 201 7) ("The burden was on
Hannon to overcome the presumption afforded to the DOC, and he failed to carry
his burden."), abrogated on unrelated grounds by Cruz v. State, 372 So. 3d 1237
(Fla. 2023).
It is well-settled and undisputed that FDOC is entitled to a
presumption that it will properly perform its duties while carrying out an
execution. Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326,343 (Fla. 2007); Provenzano
v. State, 761 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 2000); see also Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d
1054, 1065 (Fla. 2024) ("[T]he Department of Corrections is entitled to the
presumption that it will comply with the lethal injection protocol.").
Having
already determined that Defendant's claims are wholly speculative and
conclusory, the Court finds they are insufficient to overcome the strong
presumption that FDOC will properly comply with their Execution by Lethal
Injection Procedures.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Claim 1 is summarily denied.
CLAIM 2 - EXECUTING THE ELDERLY
In his second claim for relief, Defendant, who is sixty-five years old, alleges
that his execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because of his
advanced age and status as an elderly person. He avers his execution "offends
Page 17 of 35
APP 035
the evolving standards of decency and is cruel and unusual punishment. "43 As
"objective indicia of society's standards," Defendant cites to "legislative
enactments and state practice. "44 He argues that Florida laws evince a "clear
and expressed consensus of protecting the elderly," 45 which he defines as age
sixty-five or older for purposes of the instant motion, and cites legislation that
provides for enhanced punishment for offenders and reclassification of offenses
when the victim is over age sixty-five. Defendant posits that Florida legislation
"reflects that evolving standards of decency reject the execution of the elderly." 46
Defendant further contends his execution constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment as the two stated purposes of the death penalty, retribution and
deterrence, "are no longer accomplished by the execution of the elderly." 47 He
cites the reasoning in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986}, Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and argues
that an execution that has no deterrent or retributive value "amounts to
vengeance, offending the dignity of society." 48
He argues, "It is illogical to
conclude that the execution of a prisoner who is elderly and has been
incarcerated for more than three decades serves either a deterrent or retributive
purpose." 49
Defendant also notes the rarity of executions of the elderly. He cites
43
Defendant's Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to Vacate Sentence of Death, at 13.
44 Id.
4 5 Id. at 14.
46 Id.
at 15.
48 Id.
at 17.
47 Id.
49 Id.
Page 18 of 35
APP 036
statistics from the Death Penalty Information Center, which r~flect that of the
1,654 post-Funnan executions, only forty-five (2. 7%) of those exe~uted prisoners
were age sixty-five or older. Defendant concludes that "[t]he objective evidence
would suggest and support that rarity of the execution of the elderly reflects the
evolved standards and supports the finding of the unusual nature of executing
the elderly. "50
In its Response, the State asserts that Defendant's claim that the Eighth
Amendment categorically bars his execution because he is elderly is untimely,
procedurally barred, and legally insufficient, and should be summarily denied.
As previously noted, pursuant to Rule 3.85l(d)(2), there are three
exceptions to the requirement that a postconviction motion be filed within the
time limitation contained in Rule 3.85l(d)(l). Those exceptions are:
(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
movant or the movant's attorney and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or
(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established
within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(l) and has been held
to apply retroactively, or
(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the motion.
The State contends Defendant does not allege, nor do his allegations in Claim 2
fall within, any of the exceptions provided in Rule 3.851(d)(2). The Court agrees.
Defendant has not alleged any facts or law comporting with the exceptions
available under (A) or (C). As for an exception contemplated under (B), as the
State points out, Defendant "does not assert the retroactive application of an
50 Id.
at 20.
Page 19 of 35
APP 037
already recognized constitutional right." 51 Rather, Defendant moves this Court
to adopt a new constitutional exemption from execution in the form of a
categorical bar based on his status as an elderly person.
Attempting to circumvent the time bar, Defendant avers that his claim did
not become ripe until he turned 65 on December 29, 2025. Conversely, citing§
825.101(4), Fla. Stat., the State counters that "Florida law defines 'elderly
person' as one who is 60 years of age or older" and contends that Defendant's
claim became ripe when he turned 60 and is untimely because he "waited five
additional years to raise it. "52 The Court does not find the State's reliance on §
825.101(4) particularly applicable or persuasive, as the definition contained in
that statute not only states that "'elderly person' means a person 60 years of age
or older who is suffering from the infirmities of aging," but it further narrows the
definition of an elderly person to someone "who is suffering from the infirmities
of aging as manifested by advanced age or organic brain damage, or other
physical, mental, or emotional dysfunctioning, to the extent that the ability of the
person to provide adequately for the person's own care or protection is impaired."
§ 825.101(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). There has been no suggestion that
Trotter falls within the narrower class of elderly persons contemplated in section
825.101(4).
Nonetheless, neither the statutes cited by Defendant (sections 784.08(1),
812.045, and 817.5695(2)), which are specifically designed to protect the elderly
51 State's Answer to Trotter's Fourth Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief, filed February
3, 2026, at 18.
52 Id.
Page 20 of 35
APP 038
of this state, nor any federal or Florida case law, prohibit execution of any person
sentenced to death solely based on elderly status. Thus, it is clear that Defendant
is not asserting a claim based on a newly recognized fundamental constitutional
right that has ever been established. It follows that Defendant's claim also could
not have been held to be retroactive. Defendant's claim seeks the declaration of
a new constitutional right, which is not a claim that can be asserted beyond the
limits established in Rule 3.851. Stated simply, Defendant's Claim 2 is untimely
and without any valid exceptions. See, e.g., Windom v. State, 416 So. 3d 1140,
1147 (Fla. 2025) (holding "Windom cannot use the timeliness exception in rule
3.85l(d)(2)(B) to affirmatively establish a new and retroactive constitutional
right"); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 886 (Fla. 2013) ("What Carroll is seeking
is the recognition of a new fundamental constitutional right, which is not
properly pled under rule 3.85l(d)(2)(B)."); Waterhouse v. State, 82 So. 3d 84, 97
(Fla. 2012) (holding that a claim which does not rely on a case in which an
"established fundamental right" has previously been recognized does not satisfy
any subdivision of rule 3.85l(d)(2)), cert denied, 565 U.S. 1187 (2012).
Next, the State argues Defendant's Claim 2 is procedurally barred because
it could have been raised in prior proceedings but Defendant waited until the
Governor signed his death warrant to assert the claim. In support of its position,
the State argues Defendant is attempting to "extend the reasoning" of Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (prohibiting execution of insane prisoners),
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting execution of mentally
retarded prisoners), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting
Page 21 of 35
APP 039
execution of prisoners who were under 18 years old when their crimes were
committed}, to create a new age-based categorical exemption from execution.
The Court is inclined to agree. See, e.g., Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883,
886 (Fla. 2013) (holding that an Atkins/Roper extension claim was procedurally
barred because it could have been raised earlier); see also Rogers v. State, 409
So.
3d
1257,
1263
(Fla.
2025)
("[I]n
an
active warrant case,
a
postconviction claim that could have been raised in a prior proceeding is
procedurally barred."); Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701, 714 (Fla. 2025) ("Postwarrant claims that could have been raised in a
prior proceeding are
procedurally barred." (citing Rogers, 409 So. 3d at 1263)). Nevertheless, even if
Defendant's Claim 2 is not procedurally barred, as explained below, it otherwise
lacks merit.
The Court agrees with the State's assertion that Defendant is not entitled
to relief because his claim seeking an age-based categorical bar to execution of
the elderly is foreclosed by application of the conformity clause and binding
precedent. See, e.g., Gudinas, 412 So. 3d at 713 (holding even the Florida
Supreme Court "lacks the authority to extend Atkins or Roper' due to the
conformity clause); Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 794 (Fla. 2023) ("Because
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to limit the
exemption from execution to those whose chronological age was less than
eighteen years at the time of their crimes, this Court is bound by that
interpretation and is precluded from interpreting Florida's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment to exempt individuals eighteen or more years old
Page 22 of 35
APP 040
from execution on the basis of their age .... "). Indeed, as the State points out,
in Smithers v. State, 420 So. 3d 460 (Fla. 2025), the Florida Supreme Court
expressly rejected Smithers's claim "that his execution constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment because of his advanced age and status as elderly" as
foreclosed by Florida's conformity clause. Id. at 464.
Next, the State alleges that Defendant has failed to establish any national
consensus against executing elderly offenders and contends that "[t)o establish
that evolving standards of decency prohibit a particular punishment, courts
must examine legislative enactments and state practice. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316;
Roper, 543 U.S. at 563."
Defendant's assertion, that the scarcity of executions of persons over the
age of sixty-five evinces evolving standards of decency, is conclusory and, as the
State suggests, fails to establish that there is a national consensus against
carrying out the death penalty due to an offender's advanced age. Additionally,
Defendant has failed to allege "any direct evidence of a societal aversion to
executing
the
elderly,
such
as
evidence
demonstrating
that
juries
disproportionately elect not to impose the death penalty for elderly offenders, or
that governors are more likely to commute death sentences of older prisoners[,]
or that any State has legislated against the execution of the elderly and infirm."
Allen v. Ornoskl 435 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2006) (addressing a similar claim
that due to the defendant's age and infirmities, his execution would violate the
Eighth Amendment). Defendant's conclusion also fails to consider other reasons
for the rarity of executions of the elderly, such as the possibility that "more
Page 23 of 35
APP 041
elderly persons die on death row before their appeals are exhausted." Id.
Accordingly, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that evolving standards of
decency categorically prohibit the execution of elderly persons over the age of
sixty-five.
See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ('The [Eighth]
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.").
Finally, the Court further finds Defendant's arguments are not supported
by the overarching rationale in Roper, Atkins, and Ford. In Roper, the Supreme
Court observed that the "death penalty may not be imposed on certain classes
of offenders, such as juveniles under 16, the insane, and the [intellectually
disabled], no matter how heinous the crime" and explained "[t]hese rules
vindicate the underlying principle that the death penalty is reserved for a narrow
category of crimes and offenders." 543 U.S. at 568-69 (internal citations omitted)
(citing Ford, 477 U.S. 399, and Atkins, 536 U.S. 304). Similarly, the Supreme
Court reasoned that intellectual disability "diminishes personal culpability even
if the offender can distinguish right from wrong," which makes it "less defensible
to impose the death penalty as retribution for past crimes and less likely that
the death penalty will have a real deterrent effect." Id. at 552 (citing Atkins, 536
U.S. at 318-20). In the same vein, the Supreme Court has concluded that there
was no "retributive value" in allowing the execution of the insane, someone "who
has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his
fundamental right to life." Ford, 4 77 U.S. at 409. The classes of persons at issue
in Roper, Atkins, and Ford all had characteristics that rendered them less
Page 24 of 35
APP 042
culpable and undermined the death penalty's purposes of retribution and
deterrence. The mere fact that Defendant is of advanced age does not diminish
his culpability or the retributive value or deterrent effect of the death penalty in
this case in the same manner that a person's status as a juvenile or an insane
person would.
In sum, Defendant's claim that execution of the elderly, and particularly
his execution as a person of advanced age, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment is untimely, legally
insufficient, and without merit.
For these reasons, Defendant's Claim 2 is
summarily denied.
MOTION FOR STAY OF DEFENDANT'S EXECUTION
As with Claim 1 of his fourth successive Rule 3.851 motion, Defendant's
motion for stay of execution centers on heavily redacted FDOC records procured
after executions carried out in 2025. According to Defendant's written motion,
alleged irregularities in those records lead to a conclusion that "FDOC is in fact
not carrying out lethal injection executions in compliance with the protocol." 53
Yet, during the Huifhearing, defense counsel conceded there is a "possibility" 54
that FDOC may be deviating from the approved execution protocol, or at least
committing "incorrect recordkeeping or sloppy recordkeeping, "55 and that such
potential deviation requires an investigation to ensure that Defendant's Eighth
"Defendant's Motion for a Stay of Defendant's Execution Until the Conclusion of an
Investigation of FDOC's Compliance of Its 'Lethal Injection Procedure,"' filed February 2, 2026,
at 6.
54 Huff Hearing Transcript, at 9.
55 Id.
53
Page 25 of 35
APP 043
Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment is preserved.
Specifically, Defendant moves the Court "to order an investigation as to whether
or not FDOC is in compliance with the protocols put in place and to what end
they are failing to comply with the protocol as accepted by the Florida Supreme
Court. "56 Defendant further asserts that only judicial intervention-in the form
of ordering a stay of execution pending an investigation-will ensure his Eighth
Amendment protection is preserved.
In response, the State avers once again that Defendant's reading of the
heavily redacted FDOC records is speculative and, citing Dillbeck v. State, 357
So. 3d 94, 103 (Fla. 2023), further contends that "neither of the two claims
Trotter raised in his successive postconviction motion constitute substantial
grounds for granting a stay. "57
Section 922.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2025), provides that "[t]he execution of a
death sentence may be stayed only by the Governor or incident to an appeal."
Otherwise, "[a] stay of execution pending the disposition of a successive motion
for postconviction relief is warranted only when there are 'substantial grounds
upon which relief might be granted."' Chavez v. State, 132 So. 3d 826, 832 (Fla.
2014) (citing Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941, 951 (Fla. 1998) (emphasis
added)).
As set forth in detail hereinabove, this Court has found that Defendant's
claims are untimely, legally insufficient, procedurally barred, and/or without
56 "Defendant's Motion for a Stay of Defendant's Execution Until the Conclusion of an
Investigation of FDOC's Compliance of Its 'Lethal Injection Procedure,"' at 9.
57 State's Response to Trotter's Motion for a Stay of Execution, filed February 3, 2026, at 1.
Page 26 of 35
APP 044
merit. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to establish any "substantial grounds
upon which relief might be granted," Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 103 (Fla.
2023), and his Motion for Stay of Execution shall, therefore, be denied.
RULING
Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant's fourth "Successive Rule 3.851 Motion to Vacate Sentence
of Death" and "Defendant's Motion for a Stay of Defendant's Execution
Until the Conclusion of an Investigation of FDOC's Compliance of Its
'Lethal Injection Procedure,'" both filed February 2, 2026, are DENIED.
Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court's January 23, 2026,
scheduling order, Defendant's notice of appeal shall be filed by 1 :00
p.m. on Friday, February 6, 2026.
2. The Manatee County Clerk of Court shall file the record on appeal by
4:30 p.m. on Friday, February 6, 2026.
DONE AND ORDERED at Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida this
day of February 2026. @ ~ · " ' ·
Attachments to Order:
1. "Sentence - First Degree Murder," filed July 23, 1993
Page 27 of 35
APP 045
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this i!._ day of February 2026, the Court caused the foregoing
document to be served via the Clerk of Court's case management system, which
served the following individuals via email (where indicated). On the same date,
the Court also served a copy of the foregoing document via email where indicated
and via First Class U.S. Mail on any individuals who do not have an email
address on file with the Clerk of Court.
Stephen D. Ake
Michael W. Mervine
Paula Montlary
Elizabeth Bueter
Marilyn Muir
Scott Browne
Office of the Attorney General
3507 E. Frontage Road, Suite 200
Tampa, FL 336007-7013
Stephen. ake@myfloridalegal.com
Michael. mervine@myfloridalegal.com
Paula.Montla:ry@myfloridalegal.com
Marilyn. Muir@myfloridalegal.com
Scott. Browne@myfloridalegal.com
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
Glenn Martin
Sara Macks
C. Todd Chapman
Office of the State Attorney, Sixth Judicial Circuit
14250 49 th Street North
Clearwater, FL 33762
glennmartin@flsa6.gov
saramacks@flsa6.gov
toddchapman@flsa6.gov
eservice@flsa6.gov
Ann Marie Mirialakis
MahhamSyed
Melody Jacquay
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - M
12973 North Telecom Parkway
Temple Terrace, FL 33637
mirialakis@ccmr.state.fl.us
Page 28 of 35
APP 046
syed@ccmr.state.fl.us
jacguay@ccmr.state.fl.us
supportccmr@ccmr.state.fl.us
Danielle Kelley
Kristen Lonergan
Florida Department of Corrections
501 South Calhoun Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500
danielle. kelley@fde. myflorida.com
courtfilings@fdc.myflorida.com
CO-GCCapLit@fdc.myflorida.com
Kristen.lonergan@fdc.myflorida.com
Lindsey Brigham
lindseybrigham@fdle.state.fl.us
Ed Brodsky
State Attorney, Twelfth Judicial Circuit
2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400
Sarasota, FL 34237
ebrodsky@sao12.org
Larry Eger
Public Defender, Twelfth Judicial Circuit
2071 Ringling Boulevard, Fifth Floor
Sarasota, FL 34237
leger@pdl2.org
Melvin Trotter, DOC #573461
c/o Florida State Prison
Post Office Box 800
Raiford, Florida 32083
Florida Supreme Court
warrant@flcourts.org
Page 29 of 35
APP 047
Attachment 1
Page 30 of 35
APP 048
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR MANATEE COUNTY, PWIUDA
STATE OF FWRIDA,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.
vs.
MELVIN TROTTER,
86-1225-FJ
;p
8
Defendant.
SBHTBIICB -- FIRST DBGRBB lllJRDBR
PIIIDIUI
This case was tried in 1986.
The Judge pronounced the
Defendant guilty of the charge of First Degree Murder and sentenced
him to death.
On appeal the supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
but remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing
(Trotter y.
llllll, 576 so. 2d 691, Fla. 1990). The undersigned was designated
by Assignment Order f93R-252 to conduct the proceeding.
On April
21, 1993, the jury returned its advisory sentence and recommended
death by a vote of 11 to 1.
counsel raised the question of victim impact ovidonco. Victim
impact was not allowed to become a focal point in tho sentencing
proceeding nor has it influenced tho Court in
reaching
its
decision.
The Court finds tho following aggravating factors have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
FILED IN OPEN COURT~
THIS
o2,3
OAYO .
IJ.B SHORE,C~
H-,·(ilf_.~
19
'
0
/3
l
Page 31 of 35
APP 049
(l)
The crime for which the Defendant is to be sentenced was
committed while tho Defendant was on c011J11unity control.
This the
factor which required reversal of the sontenco on the original
appeal.
The statute was subsequently amended to include community
control (FS 921.141, 1991).
Although the state was permitted to
introduce evidence of this factor, this Court would have reached
the same conclusion without this evidence.
(2)
The Defendant has previously been convicted of a felony
involving tho use or threat of violence to some person.
It has
beon demonstrated that the Defendant was previously convicted of
robbery.
The Defendant apparently held an old man down while the
Defendant's cohort robbed the man.
Thore can be no question but
that Defendant participated in a crime of violence.
Y,
Soa Sipone
State, 419 so. 2d 3116 (Fla. 1982).
(3)
The crime for which the Defendant is to be sentenced was
co1111itted while he was engaged in the commission of a robbery.
The
Defendant went to Virgie Langford's store for the purpose of theft
or robbery, and in fact committed a robbery, which resulted in the
death of Virgie Langford.
(4)
The crime for which the Defendant is to be sentenced was
especially wicked, evil, atrocious and cruel.
Virgie Langford was
killed in tho store which she owned and ran for many years.
As
with every such proprietor, her storo was undoubtely hor second
home.
She was stabbed seven times and, in fact, was dis8lllboweled.
As she was removed to the hospital for treatment she was conscious
and was holding her intestines.
She was alive for a considerable
2
Page 32 of 35
APP 050
time after the attack and was aware of her terrible condition.
The
victim was seventy yoara old and met her death at the hands of a
healthy, muscular young man, who obviously could have subdued his
victim with little effort.
The number and force of tho stabbings
greatly exceeded that needed to subdue the robbery victim.
The
Defendant was clearly "utterly indifferent to the suffering" of
Virgie Langford.
(5)
The capital felony was co-itted for pecuniary gain.
HJ'IJDS'JHA CJRCPU'IMQII
The Court finds the following
circumstances have
been demonstrated:
(1)
The capital felony was c0111J11itted while the Defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance.
(2)
The capacity of the Defendant to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
The Defendant
was addicted to crack cocaine and this addiction affected his
mental processes and his ability to control his actions.
It did
not, however, render him insane or unable to control his actions,
or to keep him from undorstanding that his actions were wrong.
(3)
The Dofendant has a below averago I.Q. and has had both
family problems (abuse and neglect) and developmental problems.
He obviously bad a disadvantaged background.
(4)
The Defendant may have suffered from a frontal lobe brain
disorder which slowed down his reaction times:
(5)
The Defendant is remorseful to some degree,
it is
3
Page 33 of 35
APP 051
difficult, however, to separate bia true remorse for the killing
of Virgie Langford from bis aelf pity over his own predicament.
(6)
The court has considered the other nonstatutory factors
presented by the Defendant.
DXAIJJBA DI QJRCQJCS'J'MCII
Tho Court finds the aggravating circUJDStances outweigh the
mitigating cirCW11stances. While the statutory criteria for mental
or notional dieturbance were met, they amount to "less than
insanity but aore than the emotions of tho average man, however
inflamed._•
Seo, state
Ye
Dixon,
283
so.
2d
1
(Pla.
1973).
Defendant's inability to conform his conduct to tho law is a
circuastance,
• ... provided to protect that person who,
while
legally answerable for his actions, may be deserving of some
mitigation of sentence because of his aental state.•
JUxon, ~ . at page 10,
state Ye
The range of activities onc011passed in
these circumstances is neces~rily broad.
In some cases cocaine
addiction or a frontal lobe brain disorders might give rise to a
mental disturbance such as to outweigh any aggravating faotors.
This is not one of those cases.
The Defendant was observed viewing the store before entering
it.
There is no evidence that he was under the influence of any
drug or acting in a bizarre manner.
He was stable enough to wait
until the store was empty before entering and was stable enough to
ask his girlfriend to provide an alibi for him.
He was obviously
aware of tho wrongful nature of his act.
4
Page 34 of 35
APP 052
The Defendant was a cocaine addict and was affected by his
addiction.
The Court finds, however, that while the Defendant
robbed the store to get money to buy cocaine, his addiction and not
a "mental illness" was the motivating factor in the robbery and
murder.
In sum, the Defendant's uso or abuse of cocaine does not
excuse the particularly shocking nature of this murder or outweigh
the aggravating factors proven.
BBHBHCB
In accordance with these findings it is ORDBRJID .um ADJUDOBD
that the Defendant, Melvin Trotter, bo co-itted to the custody of
the Department of corrections of the state of Florida and that he
be executed and put to death in accordance with provisions of the
Laws of Florida
DOllJB DD ORDBRBD this
23rd d
Copies to:
Douglas E. Crow, Esquire
Frederick L. Schaub, Esquire
James Slater, Esquire
5
Page 35 of 35
APP 053
No. ______
______________________________________________________________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
______________________________________________________________
MELVIN TROTTER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
___________________________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________________________________________________
CAPITAL CASE
DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
Execution Scheduled: February 24, 2026, at 6:00 PM ET
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX C
Signed Affidavit, Dr. Daniel Buffington
APP 054
DANIELE. BUFFINGTON, PharmD, MBA
Clinical Pharmacology Services, Inc.
6285 E. Fowler Ave
Tampa, FL 33617
AFFIDAVIT
I, Daniel E. Buffington, PharmD, MBA, am the president and CEO of the
American Institute of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Inc. since 2007, as well as a
clinical associate professor at the University of South Florida, Colleges of
Medicine and Pharmacy. Please see attached Curriculum Vitae.
I have been retained by Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle
Region to consult with their postconviction team in Case No. 411986CF001225A,
State of Florida v. Melvin Trotter. I reviewed Mr. Trotter's Demand for Records
from the Florida Department of Corrections, (FDOC). I have been asked to
consider what information a defendant, and the public for that matter, would
want to know to have confidence that an execution by lethal injection would be
carried out humanely and precisely. Below are the demands for records to be
requested by Mr. Trotter followed by my expert opinion as to the significance and
importance of this information.
Public records from January 1, 2025 to present, should be requested
are as follows:
a. Written records/ checklists, logs, and/ or memorandums of training
activities including simulations, execution process, preparation of
carrying out execution process, and effects of each lethal chemical
as required in subsection (4) of FDOC's procedure, "Training of the
Execution Team and Executioners;"
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff are
properly qualified, trained, and repeatedly demonstrating skill and
proficiency with the FDOC approved protocol and to reduce the risk
of errors or deviation from the critical design and infrastructure that
ensures and humane and effective outcome.]
b. Written
records/ checklists,
logs,
memorandums
and/or
documenting "completion of each step in the process," as required
in subsection (5) of FDOC's procedure, "Use of Checklists;"
APP 055
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff are
properly qualified, trained, and repeatedly demonstrating skill and
proficiency with the FDOC approved protocol and to reduce the risk
of errors or deviation from the critical design and infrastructure that
ensures and humane and effective outcome.]
c. "Signed forms attesting" the team warden's verification that all steps
in the process have been performed properly prior to the
administration of the "pharmaceutical agents (lethal injection
chemicals)," and the that the remaining steps in the process were
performed properly," as required in subsection (5) of FDOC's
procedure, "Use of Checklists;"
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff are
properly qualified, trained, and repeatedly demonstrating skill and
proficiency with the FDOC approved protocol and to reduce the risk
of errors or deviation from the critical design and infrastructure that
ensures and humane and effective outcome.]
d. Written
records/checklists,
logs,
and/or
memorandums
documenting and tracking whether the "pharmaceutical agents
(lethal injection chemicals)" are within their "date range" for use,
have reached, or surpassed their expiration dates" and documenting
the maintenance and proper storage of the "pharmaceutical agents
(lethal injection chemicals)" as required in subsection (6) of FDOC's
procedure, "Purchase and Maintenance of Lethal Chemicals;"
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff has
an organized, accurate, and effective tracking model to ensure that
the correct substances, as approved within the FDOC, have been
properly acquired and that product dating and aging are being
tracked for substances that are awaiting future executions.
Utilization of substances that are expired may have reduced
pharmacologic effect or produce unanticipated or unnecessary
complications. Such an error or deviation could result in
unnecessary pain or discomfort or an unexpected termination of the
execution procedure prior to the inmate's death.]
e. Written
records/checklists,
logs,
and/or
memorandums
documenting the need for refrigeration, proper temperature range
for storage, and/ or monitoring for compliance of temperature and
handling of the lethal chemicals.
APP 056
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff has
an organized, accurate, and effective tracking model to ensure that
the correct substances, as approved within the FDOC, have been
properly acquired and that product storage condition have been
identified, thresholds for storage conditions, and monitoring for
variances or deviations for substances that are awaiting future
executions. Utilization of substances that have not been stored
properly may produce reduced pharmacologic effect or produce
unanticipated or unnecessary complications. Such an error or
deviation could result in unnecessary pain or discomfort or an
unexpected termination of the execution procedure prior to the
inmate's death.]
f. Internal policies and procedures for handling and maintenance of
the "pharmaceutical agents (lethal injection chemicals)" should
there be power loss or other circumstances (such as water,
temperature, humidity, etc.) which may compromise the
pharmaceutical agents (lethal injection chemicals);
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff has
an organized, accurate, and effective tracking model to ensure the
adherence to industry recommended guidelines for the proper
storage conditions for the substances, as approved within the
FDOC, have that established protocols to ensure proper climate and
cold chain conditions (respectively) during power outages or adverse
conditions, have been implemented and tracked by all prior vendors
and post product acquisition for substances that are awaiting future
executions. Such an error or deviation could result in the use of an
adulterated of chemically altered substance and produce reduced
pharmacologic effects or unexpected complications including the
early or acute termination of the execution procedure.]
g. Polices/procedures,
written
logs,
and/or
memorandums
documenting the disposal of expired and otherwise compromised
"pharmaceutical agents (lethal injection chemicals);"
[Importance and impact: To confirm that Corrections staff have
appropriates tracking methods, record keeping systems, and
procedural protocols to ensure that expired or otherwise
compromised substances are accurately identified, rapidly
separated from the inventory, and precluded from use in a future
execution. Failure to properly monitor and remove expired
APP 057
substances could result in the use of substances with reduced
pharmacologic effect or produce unnecessary complications for the
inmate or the abrupt and early termination of an execution
procedure.]
h. Copies of the "logs provided to the team warden and available at the
post execution debriefings" documenting the first FDLE agent
charged with monitoring
and responsible for observing the
preparation of the "pharmaceutical agents (lethal injection
chemicals)" and documenting and keeping a detailed log as to what
occurs in the executioner's room at a minimum of two (2) minute
intervals" as required in subsection (7)(b) of FDOC's procedure,
"FDLE Monitors;"
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the designated
Corrections staff is trained, oriented, present, attentive, accurately
monitoring the preparation of the substances and recording the
events within the executioner's room at proper intervals so that an
accurate record is preserved of the events and that in the event of
errors, deviations, or complications occur that they can be properly
reviewed and analyzed in a timely manner to determine a "root cause
analysis" following an adverse event.]
i. Copies of the "logs provided to the team warden and available at the
post execution debriefings" documenting the second FDLE agent
charged with keeping a detailed log of what is occurring in the
execution chamber at a minimum of two (2) minute intervals" as
required in subsection (7)(c) of FDOC's procedure, "FDLE Monitors;"
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the designated
Corrections staff is trained, oriented, present, attentive, accurately
monitoring the preparation of the substances and recording the
events within the executioner's room at proper intervals so that an
accurate record is preserved of the events and that in the event of
errors, deviations, or complications occur that they can be properly
reviewed and analyzed in a timely manner to determine a "root cause
analysis" following an adverse event.]
j. Memorandums, records, checklists, and/or logs from execution
team member and independent observer from FDLE documenting
their observations and compliance with the preparation of each
APP 058
"pharmaceutical agent (lethal injection chemical)" used in the lethal
injection process as found in subsection (9)(f) of FDOC's procedure,
"On the Day of Execution;"
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the designated
Corrections staff is trained, oriented, present, attentive, accurately
monitoring the preparation of the substances and recording the
events within the executioner's room at proper intervals so that an
accurate record is preserved of the events and that in the event of
errors, deviations, or complications occur that they can be properly
reviewed and analyzed in a timely manner to determine a "root cause
analysis" following an adverse event.]
k. Procedures, directives, documentation, and memorandum of the
execution team members utilization of "aseptic technique" and the
placement of the "IV extension set that will be used to infuse the
pharmaceutical agents (lethal injection chemicals) into the primary
injection line." (See subsection (9)(h) of FDOC's procedure, "On the
Day of Execution");
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff
properly understand and have received effective training and
demonstrated
ongoing proficiency regarding
the
proper
identification, preparation, placement, and securing of IV injection
and administration sites, including the ability to setup and maintain
IV tubing and related apparatus in to primary and alternative
("redundant sites") in order to reduce substantial risk of ineffective
or loss of IV access prior to or during a lethal injection procedure.
Loss of IV access can result in acute complication, pain, or reason
to abort an execution process.]
1. Procedures, directives, documentation, and memorandum for
venous access, both through a central line or if necessary, without
or without a venous cut-down." (See subsection (l0)(h) and (i) of
FDOC's procedure, "Approximately Thirty (30) Minutes Prior to
Execution"); and
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff have
been properly trained, oriented, and develop proficiency in the
different venous access locations, supplies, techniques, and
management of potential site-specific complications to ensure the
successful administration of substances and to avoid or divert from
known potential complications or difficulties. Ineffective IV site
APP 059
selection, maintenance, or loss ofIV access is a known potential risk
factor for unnecessary complications or reason to abort an execution
process.]
m. Forms and documentation of the methodologies and medical
instrumentation utilized by Execution Team Members to assess and
monitor the inmate's depth and sustained level of consciousness
("consciousness checks") including the training, level of competency,
and proficiency.
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff have
been trained, oriented, and developed proficiency with industry
standard and clinically effective methods or medical instruments
utilized to determine an individual's depth or level of
unconsciousness. This is imperative as it is the method to determine
if the individual has successfully reached a depth or level of
unconsciousness to reduce their awareness or sensations sufficient
to progress to the administration of the following lethal injection
drug.]
n. Forms and documentation of the methodologies and medical
instrumentation utilized by Execution Team Members to assess and
affirm the inmate's death including the training, level of competency,
and proficiency.
[Importance and impact: To confirm if the Corrections staff has
been properly trained, oriented and developed proficiency and
provided industry standard medical devices and telemetry
equipment to affirm an inmate's death. This is imperative as it is
essential to continue with the sequence and administration of
approved substances and in the ascribed manner and pattern until
the inmate's death is demonstrated as a formal endpoint. Anything
less would risk an incomplete procedure and risk of the medication
wearing off prior to the inmate's death.]
o. Documentation, checklists, and memorandum of the team warden's
"debriefing interview with every execution team member and the
executioners, documenting any exceptional circumstances that
arose during the execution, as required by as required in subsection
(13)(f)
of FDOC's procedure, "Immediate Post-Execution
Procedures;"
APP 060
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff was
properly trained and prepared to perform their roles, document the
sequence of steps, and record the procedure in a manner that could
identify errors, protocol deviations, or complications that occurred
to aid in avoiding future negative outcomes and spare a inmate the
risk for future unnecessary pain or discomfort.]
p. Protocols, procedures, directives, and checklists regarding:
i. Mixing of the "pharmaceutical agents (lethal injection
chemicals)" and their respective sterile IV solutions ("diluent
fluids");
ii. Proper flushing the syringe if same syringe is used;
iii. When and how syringes are organized, staged, and labeled;
1v. Insertion of needle venous access and how the site is secured.
[Importance and impact: To confirm that the Corrections staff have
developed effective internal procedures to ensure that the proper
protocols, procedures, directives, and checklists have been
implemented to ensure that staff roles and skills have been allocated
to guarantee the proper mixing of substances and respective IV
fluids, accurate manipulation and handling of the medication
administration supplies and that the preparation and
administration of the substances via primary and alternate venous
access routes is optimized. This is critical to avoid the highest risk
for complications with lethal injection protocols, which is ineffective
or lost IV access during the execution procedure.
It would not be necessary to know the identity of any individual involved
with carrying out the lethal injection protocols or any company involved
with this process.
Sincerely,
Daniel E. Buffington, PharmD, MBA
I, Daniel E. Buffington, having been duly sworn or affirm, do hereby depose and
say that the above statements are true and correct.
STATE OF FLORIDA
APP 061
COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH
Sworn to or affirmed and subscribed before me by means of ~hysical
presence
online notarization, this 27th day of January 2026, by Daniel E.
Buffington who is personally known to me or has shown the following
identification:
1'..,i.t··· • .. = a e n a n a a a ..A
" ··0"'1~ltti··
BRITTANY AGRAHAM
rj /:: / ..:_~•;,.r;\ Notary Public • State of Fiorica
) w·~il
·•1
Commission# HH 234562
My Comm, Expires Mar 1, 2026
Bonded through National Notary Assn,
./f~,, r,..~.•-··
1•.,.,•·~
APP 062
No. ______
______________________________________________________________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
______________________________________________________________
MELVIN TROTTER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
___________________________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________________________________________________
CAPITAL CASE
DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
Execution Scheduled: February 24, 2026, at 6:00 PM ET
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX D
FDOC Log Part 1
APP 063
DRUG NAME:
'
DATE
NOC#
I
~/1-4 Ji,;
-INVOICE NAME #
LOT#
EXP. DATE
!:> / 2.02. 7
MFR
IO X ltJM l-
RECEIVED/USED(+/-,
+ {00
BALANCE
/0 0
APP 064
+
.,..
.,.
-r
10
JI()
S"O
~()
1./-f?
I~
ISO
),.
4~()
+/00
/
I ~-0
"Pt?
?(1
/ ;LO
-~-
~o
Cjf)
/
APP 065
DRUG NAME:
NOC#
BALANCE
lo x 2.0mh
RECEIVED/USED(+/-)
+ {)
APP 066
NOC#
DATE
MFR
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
BALANCE
~=-:....,M.__L_____ PACKAGE SIZE,_ _,_0__,X
____~_ ~
_ L__
EXP. DATE
,.....-,---=-,..........---=---------=----__..;....=---------.------
-/()
APP 067
RECEIVED/USED(+/-)
-6
oo
APP 068
DRUG NAME:
DATE
NOC#
I
5 /23 /25
INVOICE NAME #
LO
'
EXP. DATE
12. fz ozh
PACKAGE SIZE:
MF
BALANCE
_\Offi·
125 x 2-0M l- Via Is
\00
RECEIVED/USED(+/-)
+
:
i
'
i
;
i
'
:
i
i
i
i
i
'
APP 069
ND
DA
P. DATE
-r I()
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
BALANCE
-' --·, :J=ll)
3&?
APP 070
DATE
RECEIVED/USED (+/-)
BALANCE
APP 071
NOC#
DATE
~-1~, 2,
INVOICE NAME #
MFR
+
/PP
RECEIVED/USED(+/-)
__.5._~__,..,~/2=-~-J___ PACKAGESIZE It:' Vl'/l'l..
LOT#
EXP. DATE
,,,. ,-p~
BALANCE
/I:?~
APP 072
DRUG NAME:
DATE
NOC#
,
5/23/25
r
I
I
.!. "
:
I
;
I
EXP. DATE
2./ 102ei
PACKAGE SIZE:
MFR
X 1000ml
6\-1og _. 1)
RECEIVED/USED(+/-)
+1-0
BALANCE
~ ()
APP 073
DRUG NAME:
NDC#
s
PACKAGE SIZE:
BALANCE
I1- X /{)()OM L-
RECEIVED/USED (+/-)
APP 074
BALA CE
v'
APP 075
EIVED/USED (+/·)
BALANCE
APP 076
DRUG NAME
H Y/J,t<J X y?/J./J!
,J
__ PACKAGE SIZE_...;..-;,.._ ~_ _X _ / __
J __
_____
/-l
_ c_
/ __
, _5'______
BALANCE
APP 077
ED(+/-)
BALANCE
APP 078
DESCRIPTION
SCDILH 1:LIS0.9%12X1DOOMLLF
V
SIZE
FORM Cl.ASS
12Xl0 IS
- - - --SUMMARY- - - - - 62.83
0.00
62.83
11:TAMOUNT
"OTALRX
·i>TALOTC
SHIP DATE
62.B3
NOTE
CODE
•
62.83
62,83
06/06/2025
62.B3
EKT£NDED
PRICE
TOTAL DUE BY
GRAND TOTAL
APP 079
- -----
493.3&
53.64
PRICE
25X20 SD
412.90
EXTENDED
10X1D MC
10X10 IS
POTASS ACE.T SD 2MEO/ML25X20ML FTV
--
393.50
SODIUM CLIS 0.9% 10X1000ML
ROCURONIUM MO 10MGIML 1DX10ML
10X20 SD ~..---4i,;c..,,-
SODIUM CLSF 0.9% 25X20ML
44.48
441.59
·······················-·SUMMARV
······------1,839.47
TOTAL RX
1).00
TOTAL OTC
1,83-U7
NET AMOUNT
06/22/2025
1,839.47
1,839.47
HVDROXYZ HCL SO 25MG/ML
ETOMIDATESD2MGIML 10X20ML
--
--
SUB TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
TOTAL DUE BY
APP 080
ORIG ORDER
OlY
ORDER
QlY
INVOICED OMIT UOM
QlY
CODE
I
DESCRIPTION
SODIUM CLIS 0.9% 12X1OOOML EXC
SIZE FORM CLASS
12X10 IS
29.99
-·············-···-····SUMMARY--29.99
TOTAL RX
0.00
TOTAL OTC
NET AMOUNT
SHIP DATE
UNITl'RICE
29.99
NOTE
CODE
29.99
29.99
06/28/2025
29.99
EXTENDED
PRICE
TOTAL DUE BY
GRAND TOTAL
APP 081
04/01/2025
06/24/2025 PIECES INVOICED 20
2.X
ETOMIOATE 50 2MG/ML 1OXl OML
ETOMIOATESD2MG/ML 10X10Ml
10X20 SO
10X10 SD
10X10 SO
41.96
30.03
30.03
41.96
83.92
60.06
240.24
135.68
PWla
EXTENDED
10
ETOMIDATE SO 2MG/Ml t OX20ML
UNITPRla
10
2 \)(
SUMMARY
10
719.90
0.00
719.90
719.90
07/24/2025
719.90
10
TOTALRX
TOTAL OTC
NET AMOUNT
SUBTOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
TOTAL DUE BY
APP 082
DESCRIPTION
12X10 IS
59.98
0.00
59.98
------:SUMMARY·-···-·-·-··---·
SODIUM CLIS 0.9% 12X1000ML EXC
TOTAL RX
TOTAL OTC
NET AMOUNT
SHIP DATE
UNIT PRICE
29.99
SUBTOTAL
NOTE
COD£
59.98
59.98
07/02/2025
5'1.98
EXTENDED
PRICE
GRAND TOTAL
TOTAL DUE BY
APP 083
No. ______
______________________________________________________________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
______________________________________________________________
MELVIN TROTTER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
___________________________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________________________________________________
CAPITAL CASE
DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
Execution Scheduled: February 24, 2026, at 6:00 PM ET
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX E
FDOC Log Part 2
APP 084
DATE
VENDOR NAME
INVOICE NUMBER
LOT#
202.
Page:._ ·1_ _
£):""-- ---
PREVIOUS BALANCE: __
APP 085
DATE
'
Yh.1 /25
I
VENDOR NAME
INVOICE NUMBER
LOT#
EXP.DATE
(MM/00/YYYY)
f
I
/ f :!:, I / 1JJ 2- 7
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
+ /00
Page:
2,_
BALANCE
/0()
APP 086
DATE
VENDOR NAME
INVOICE NUMBER
(zfJ hflckage Size:
EXP.DATE
{MM/DD/YYYY}
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED (+/·)
-t- 2..
Page:
:J.._
c0:
BALANCE
50
APP 087
EXP. DATE
PREVIOUS BALANCE :
Page:
g
......
/
BALANCE
0
so
APP 088
. .....,
EXP. DATE
{,o vrali>
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED t+/·)
Page:
:3 2 0
BALANCE
32.
32 0
3Z
APP 089
DATE
VENDOR NAME
INVOICE NUMBER
.......,
LOT#
EXP.DATE
(MMIDD/YYYY)
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
-+ 25
- 2.
+25
-3
+'25
-2-
-z.
- 1-
-z..
-.....
I
Page:._ __
_{)-
BALANCE
APP 090
.......
EXP. DATE
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
-t-25
Page:_
) __
_f!f
BALANCE
-Z.I
APP 091
EXP. DATE
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED (+/·)
4
3
Page:
1q
BALANCE
13 l
APP 092
4"
DATE
INVOICE NAME/#
LOT#
EXP. DATE
MFR
RECEIVED/USED(+/-)
-6
-~
BALANCE
-22
0
APP 093
EXP. DATE
PREVIOUS BAlANCE :
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
Page:._
_
I_
,LJ-
BALANCE
0
'2..25
APP 094
I
DATE
I
7h. i/1.Ci
VENDOR NAME
INVOICE NUMBER
LOT#
EXP.DATE
(MM/DD/YYYY)
I
I
I O / !> I/? 02&>
J..
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
+50
Page: _
___:___
BALANCE
!3D
APP 095
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
(3
Jo
IOI
APP 096
DATE
VENDOR NAME
INVOICE NUMBER
LOT#
EXP. DATE
(MM/DD/YYYY)
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
Page:
J
g-
BALANCE
APP 097
DATE
5 ,11/7,0~-~
I
INV ICE NUMBER
LOT#
EXP. DATE
(MM/OO/YYYY)
I
I
I
{) I 1-, 17 262,,1
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
-t /?-
Page:
/
ft
BALANCE
,~
APP 098
~ - - - - - - - - PACK.AGE SIZE
-2.
+ 1-t 2
BALA CE
12..
APP 099
EXP. DATE
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
Page:
/
ij
BALANCE
APP 100
... . .. .
EXP.DATE
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
Page:_
J__
g'
BALANCE
APP 101
DATE
VENDOR NAME
INVOICE NUMBER
LOT#
EXP. DATE
(MM/OO/YYYY}
PREVIOUS BALANCE:
RECEIVED/USED(+/·)
+
-+
+
+
-
-t
..,..
Page :
\
........
:J_
:Et:
/0
BALANCE
3
4
4
L/50
+
-
-f-
5L/O
52(:)
5~
-/0
-IC>
-0
-/D
+2.
-zo
-I
-I
APP 102
INVOICE DA TI: 07/28/2025
PO
ORDER DATE 07/25/202S
SHIP DATE
ROCURONI\JMMO lOMG/ML lOXIOMl
ROCURONIUMMO lOMG/ML 10X10ML
l'OTASS ACET SO 2MEQ/MUSX20Ml FTV
IOXSMMO
IOXIO MO
10X10 MD
lSlOO SD
286.72
450.56
64.98
,~1ct
OCTEHOEO
P.OCllRONlUM MO lOMG/Ml lOXSML
10X5MMO
201Ui5
SIU fORM CUSS
ROCIJRONIUMMO IOMG/Ml IOXSML
10X20 SO
DESCIIIP?IOfl
FTOMIOATE SO 2MG/Ml lOXlOMl
25)(10 MO
?SXlMSO
309.Sl
UOOCAINE HCl MO 1'1f> lS)( IOML
2SXSO SO
lSXlO SO
2,967.61
0.00
2,967.61
2SX20 SF
POTASS ACET SO 2MEQ/ML2SX20ML FTV
SUMMARY
POTASS ACET SO 2MEQ/Ml.25X50Ml FTV
SODIUM CL SF 0.9% 2Slt20Ml
TOTAUX
TOTAL OTC
NET AMOUNT
08/27/2025
2,967.61
2,967.61
HYOROXVZ HCL SO 25MG/Ml 2SX1 ML
SUBTOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
TOTAL DUE BY
APP 103
Page:
Invoice
Ship VIA
Tenns: Due Date
GROUND
Net 30: 10/18/2025
-=
NDC#
Ordered
Shipped
Remaining
Price Each
Amount
50.00
50.00
0.00
69.00
3,450.00
Expiration dale: 4(30/2027
Lot Qty:
48.00
Expiration dale: 4f30/2027
Lot Qty:
2.00
ETOMIOATE 20MG SOV 10X10ML
Nel Invoice:
Less Discount:
Freight:
Sales Tax:
Invoice Total:
v
3,450.00
0.00
36.49
0.00
3,486.49
APP 104
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.