Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Eric Fru Nji, Wilson Nuyila Tita, and Wilson Che Fonguh, Petitioners v. United States

Supreme Court briefFeb 11, 2026

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No. 25-____

IN THE

ERIC FRU NJI,

WILSON NUYILA TITA, and

WILSON CHE FONGUH,

Petitioners,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Mirriam Z. Seddiq

Seddiq Law Firm

Suite 300-33

P. O. Box 1127

Rockville, MD 20850

(301) 513-7832

Counsel for Wilson Che Fonguh

Erin M. Trodden

Office of the Federal Public Defender

Western District of Virginia

401 East Market Street Suite 106

Charlottesville, VA 22902

(434) 220-3380

Counsel for Wilson Tita

February 11, 2026

Robert J. Wagner

Counsel of Record

Robert J. Wagner, PLC

101 Shockoe Slip, Suite I

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 814-8172

robwagnerlaw@gmail.com

Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court and Fourth Circuit erred by allowing the jury to be

instructed under a Pinkerton standard, a willful blindness instruction, and with an

aiding and abetting instruction in this transport of firearms case, and thereby

unconstitutionally diminished the government’s standard of proof, constituting an

important question of federal law this Court should address.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland

United States v. Tita, et al., No. 1:21cr334 (March 22,

2023)

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

United States v. Tita, el al,, No. 23-4236, 4284, 4387

(December 16, 2025)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................................................................i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ...................................................................... ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS .................................................................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................iv

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ........................................................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW .................................................................................................. 1

JURISDICTION ........................................................................................................ 1

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 3

Background ......................................................................................................... 3

Fourth Circuit’s Opinion .................................................................................... 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............................................................... 8

1. The District Court Erroneously Instructed the Jury Under the

Pinkerton Standard ............................................................................................. 8

2. The District Court Improperly Instructed the Jury Regarding Willful

Blindness ........................................................................................................... 15

3. Additionally, there was an aiding and abetting instruction and a

requirement that the reviewing Court look upon the instructions

cumulatively ...................................................................................................... 20

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 22

APPENDIX

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT, FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2025 ...................................... 1a

JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT, FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2025 .................................... 30a

DENIAL OF REHEARING OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, FILED DECEMBER 16,

2025.................................................................................................................. 32a

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Boyd v. United States,

271 U.S. 104, 46 S.Ct. 442, 70 L.Ed. 857 (1926) ............................................. 14

Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ........................................... 21

Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62 (1991) .......................................................................................20, 21

Global–Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,

653 U.S. 754 (2011) ........................................................................................... 17

Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc.,

50 F.3d 1291 (4th Cir. 1995)............................................................................. 14

United States v. Aramony,

88 F.3d 1369 (4th Cir. 1996).......................................................................10, 11

United States v. Ashley,

606 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2010)...................................................................9, 10, 11

United States v. Dinkins,

691 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2012)...................................................................9, 10, 11

United States v. Hale,

857 F.3d 158 (4th Cir. 2017).......................................................................16, 19

United States v. Jinwright,

683 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2012)............................................................................. 16

United States v. Lighty,

616 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2010).................................................................15, 17, 18

United States v. Manzella,

791 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1986)...............................................................10, 11, 12

United States v. McCauley,

983 F.3d 690 (4th Cir. 2020)....................................................................... 13-14

United States v. McLellan,

959 F.3d 442 (1st Cir. 2020) ............................................................................. 21

United States v. Mendoza-Medina,

346 F.3d 121 (5th Cir. 2003)............................................................................. 17

United States v. Miltier,

882 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 2018)............................................................................... 14

United States v. Nguyen,

493 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2007)............................................................................. 17

United States v. Oti,

872 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017)............................................................................. 17

United States v. Ravenell,

66 F.4th 472 (4th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 1344, 218 L.Ed.2d

422 (2024) ....................................................................................................18, 19

United States v. Sanchez,

917 F.2d 607 (1st Cir. 1990) ............................................................................. 10

United States v. Serrano-Delgado,

29 F.4th 16 (1st Cir. 2022) ............................................................................ 9, 10

United States v. Singh,

518 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2008)............................................................................. 11

United States v. Sperling,

506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974) ............................................................................ 10

United States v. Vinson,

852 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2017).......................................................................18, 19

United States v. Whittington,

26 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 1994).........................................................................18, 19

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 371 .......................................................................................................... 3

18 U.S.C. § 554(a) ................................................................................................ 3, 13

18 U.S.C. § 922(k)................................................................................................ 3, 13

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) .................................................................................................... 11

22 U.S.C. § 2778 .................................................................................................. 3, 13

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .................................................................................................... 1

50 U.S.C. § 4819 ........................................................................................................ 3

50 U.S.C. §§ 4801-4852 ........................................................................................... 13

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Fourth Circuit, Pet. App. A, is available at 1 5 9 F.4th 25 9 .

The Fourth Circuit’s order denying rehearing en banc, Pet. App. C, is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

The Fourth Circuit entered judgment on November 18, 2025, Pet. App. A ,

and denied petitioner’s timely petition for rehearing en banc on December 16, 2025,

Pet. App. B . This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners argued to the Fourth Circuit that the cocktail of jury instructions

provided by the district court reduced the standard of proof to less than that of beyond

a reasonable doubt. The Pinkerton instruction, the willful blindness instruction, and

the aiding and abetting instruction were not properly supported by the evidence

adduced at trial and, cumulatively, amounted to instructions to the jury that deprived

the defendants of a fair trial.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Background

The first indictment charged Mr. Nji, and his co-Appellants with Conspiracy

to Unlawfully Export Firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1), Unlawful

Export of Firearms, in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (Count 2), a count under the

Export Control Reform Act, in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 4819 (Count 3), and

Transportation of Firearms with Obliterated Serial Numbers, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(k) (Count 4). JA27 (referring to the Joint Appendix from the Fourth

Circuit record). The indictment was returned on August 26, 2021 by a grand jury in

the District of Maryland, Baltimore Division. That indictment was superseded in

March of 2022 adding a Smuggling of Firearms count, under 18 U.S.C. § 554(a)

(Count 5). JA53.

Instructions at the District Court

The government presented the district court with its proposed jury instructions

on March 17, 2022. JA90-133. In response, the defendants submitted objections to the

proposed jury instructions of the government on April 14, 2022. JA272-276.

At trial, when the district court indicated its intentions to discuss jury

instructions, an objection to the willful blindness instruction was proffered

immediately. JA1448. The court suggested a telephone conference in court that

afternoon of May 3, 2022 to address objections to the proposed instructions.

The next day, May 4, 2022, began with the district court presenting the charge

to the jury. JA1455. Included in the instructions were a conspiracy instruction that

particularly focused on how the “knowing” element of the offense “is a matter of

inference.” A Pinkerton instruction was provided to the jury as well as a willful

blindness instruction. To all of these instructions the Appellants noted their

objections.

The district court, when instructing the jury on Count One, the conspiracy

count, told the jury that, “[t]he defendant’s knowledge, again, it’s a matter of

inference. It’s a matter you may infer from the facts that have been proved.” JA1481.

Appellants raised their objections to the “knowledge language” presented to the jury

under the conspiracy charge, arguing that it was an incorrect statement of law.

JA1508.

The district court instructed the jury as to willful blindness, stating the

following:

In determining whether the defendant acted knowingly you may

consider whether a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what

would otherwise have been obvious to him. If you find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with or that a

defendant's ignorance was solely and entirely the result of a

conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth, that is, that the

serial numbers were removed, obliterated, or altered, then this

element may be satisfied, but guilty knowledge may not be

established by demonstrating that a defendant was negligent,

foolish, or mistaken. If you find a defendant was aware of a high

probability that the serial numbers were removed, obliterated, or

altered and that the defendant acted with deliberate disregard of

the facts, you may find that the defendant acted knowingly.

However, if you find a defendant actually did not know that the

serial numbers were removed, obliterated, or altered he may not

be convicted. It's entirely up to you whether you are to find any

defendant deliberately closed his eyes and what inferences, if any,

should be drawn from the evidence on this issue.

JA1495-96. Appellants all objected to the willful blindness instruction as it applied

to Count 4. JA1507-1508.

An aiding and abetting instruction was also provided to the jury. JA1501. The

jury was instructed as to the following regarding aiding and abetting:

An aider and abetter must know the crime is being committed and

act in a way that is intended to bring about the success of the

criminal venture. To determine whether a defendant aided or

abetted the commission of a crime with which he is charged you

may ask yourself these questions: Did he participate in the crime

charged as something he wished to bring about? Did he knowingly

associate himself with the criminal venture? Did he seek by his

actions to make the criminal venture succeed? If he did, the

defendant is an aider and abetter and guilty of the offense, but if

you answer any of those questions no, the defendant is not an aider

and abetter and you must find him not guilty.

JA1501-1502. This was described as one of the many methods “by which you [the

jury] may evaluate the possible guilt of a defendant for the substantive charges in the

superseding indictment. JA1502.

The district court also provided the Pinkerton instruction to the jury over the

objection of Appellants. JA1502-1503. Under this instruction, the court laid out the

reasonable foreseeability standard and five elements of Pinkerton to the jury, which

instructed the jury to find guilt if the substantive crime was committed, that a

member of the conspiracy committed the crime, that the defendant was a member of

the conspiracy at the time the substantive crime was committed, and “that the

defendant could have reasonably foreseen that the substantive crime might have

been committed by his co-conspirators.” JA1502-1503. This instruction was formally

objected to as “too confusing and is likely to mislead the jury.” JA1507.

Objections were also raised to the failure of the district court to instruct the

jury that they must unanimously find that an overt act was committed, and must

agree on that overt act. JA 1507.

The district court overruled the Pinkerton instruction objection, saying that

Pinkerton “is fairly Blackletter law and is no more confusing than the rest of the

instructions.” JA1508-1509. The district court also denied the unanimity on overt acts

objection based on case authority provided by the government and the willful

blindness instruction objection because she found that “the layout of the basement,

the noise, the people who traveled together, et cetera.” JA1509-1510.

Appellants appealed on the individual instructions, but also on the collective

impact of the challenged instructions. So much of the charge and the instructions

provided to the jury minimized the standard of proof that the government must

satisfy. Considering that the jury was provided a Pinkerton instruction, a willful

blindness instruction, a relaxed “knowing” instruction under the conspiracy charge

that emphasized drawing inferences, and an aiding and abetting charge, the

confluence of these instructions deprived the Appellants of a fair trial.

Fourth Circuit’s Opinion

The Fourth Circuit improperly denied relief for the defendants with regard to

the instructions, individually and collectively. The Pinkerton instruction, the willful

blindness instruction, the aiding and abetting instruction and the conspiracy

instruction together deprived the defendants of a fair trial. The Fourth Circuit found

that the Pinkerton instruction was properly given because the evidence of knowledge

of the obliteration of the firearms’ serial numbers was not as the defendants argued.

According to the Fourth Circuit, the group sought to conceal the activities in which

they engaged, especially with the firearms. Opin. at 17. The Fourth Circuit stated

that “it would have at least been reasonably foreseeable to any member that other

members would obliterate the serial numbers on the firearms they were shipping to

Cameroon to prevent those firearms from being traced back to the group and exposing

their activities.” Id. at 17-18. Thus, because the matter was not as complex as the

defendants contended, the instruction was found to be “clearly appropriate here.” Id.

at 18.

As to the willful blindness instruction, which the Fourth Circuit conceded

“should be handled with caution,” the court also found no fault with the district court

approving this instruction. Id. The court found, “(1) that the defendant subjectively

believed there was a high probability that a fact existed and (2) that the defendant

took deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact.” Id. at 18-19.

The defendants’ arguments on the matters of the knowledge instruction,

specifically the reliance on inferences with the conspiracy, and the aiding and

abetting instruction were also rejected by the Fourth Circuit. With short shrift, the

court dismissed these arguments. Curiously, the Fourth Circuit failed to consider the

effect of the combination of the instructions on the jury. Nowhere in the opinion did

the court assess whether the instructions as a whole reduced the burden of proof

under which the government labors. This was the principal focus of the defendants’

instructions argument.

The petitioners take issue with these findings.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Erroneous instructions were presented to the jury with respect to: (1) the

Pinkerton instruction; (2) allowing the jury to be instructed under the willful

blindness standard; (3) the aiding and abetting instruction; and (4) a legally

insufficient definition of “knowingly” under the conspiracy instructions. Each of these

errors constituted abuses of discretion by the district court, deprived the Appellants

of their substantial rights, and resulted in prejudice to all of the defendants.

Together, these instructions deprived Appellants of a fair trial by reducing the

standard of the government’s proof well below the constitutional requirement of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court should grant certiorari to address the

reduction in the government’s burden of proof that these instructions permitted.

1. The District Court Erroneously Instructed the Jury Under the Pinkerton

Standard

A Pinkerton instruction allows a jury to find a defendant guilty of a substantive

charge, when there is also a conspiracy allegation, based on a standard that a

defendant could reasonably have foreseen that the substantive crime might have

been committed. This minimized standard of proof reduces the evidentiary burden

upon the government in the appropriate case. This is not such a case.

The Pinkerton instruction provided to the jury in this case read as follows:

“First, that the crime charged in the substantive count, Two, Three, Four or Five was

committed; second, that the person or persons you find actually committed the crime

were members of the conspiracy that you found existed; third, that the substantive

crime was committed pursuant to the common plan and understanding you found to

exist among the conspirators; fourth, that the defendant was a member of that

conspiracy at the time the substantive crime was committed; and fifth that the

defendant could have reasonably foreseen that the substantive crime might be

committed by his coconspirators.” JA1502-1503.

Under the law, Pinkerton liability requires a baseline level of proof by the

government that the offense conduct at issue “is reasonably foreseeable and in

furtherance of the conspiracy.” See United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 384 (4th

Cir. 2012). Additionally, an instruction under Pinkerton should be denied when the

facts and circumstances presented are significantly complex, and require a

combination of levels of proof and analysis, as is found in this case. See United States

v. Serrano-Delgado, 29 F.4th 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2022). Under the facts and circumstances

of this case, the Appellants could not have reasonably foreseen that the serial

numbers of the firearms were being ground out or obliterated. No such instruction of

law should have been approved by the district court and provided to the jury under

the record established by the government. The district court’s erroneous instruction

under Pinkerton requires reversal of Counts Four and Five, the substantive counts of

conviction.

The Fourth Circuit has held that:

The principles of conspiratorial liability articulated in Pinkerton

provide that a person is “liable for substantive offenses committed

by a co-conspirator when their commission is reasonably

foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v.

Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 142–43 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, Pinkerton

liability encompasses a person who, while not directly committing

an offense, has “participat[ed] in a conspiracy that leads a

confederate to engage in that conduct.” Ashley, 606 F.3d at 143.

The principle underlying the Pinkerton doctrine is that

“conspirators are each other’s agents; and a principal is bound by

the acts of his agents within the scope of the agency.” United States

v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1379 (4th Cir.1996) (quoting United

States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir.1986)).

Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 384. Appellants’ involvement in the packing and loading of

ammunition, and participation in providing humanitarian aid to countrymen in

Cameroon, by no means indicated that a “confederate” – Muma and St. Michael –

would engage in the conduct of grinding out serial numbers from firearms.

Actual knowledge of such conduct should have been required by the district

court before the Pinkerton instruction was approved, and the government failed to

present evidence of such knowledge.

The First Circuit has warned that “a Pinkerton charge ‘should not be given as

a matter of course.’” United States v. Serrano-Delgado, 29 F.4th 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2022),

citing to United States v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 612 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990) and United

States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1341 (2d Cir. 1974). Concerns about the Pinkerton

instruction have also suggested that in complex cases, “the charge can cause

confusion.” See Serrano-Delgado, 29 F.4th at 24; United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d

1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1986). This is especially true when a jury is presented with a

series of facts and circumstances and are instructed to draw inferences of guilt based

on those facts and circumstances, as presented here. See Serrano-Delgado, 29 F.4th

at 24.

The Fourth Circuit has addressed Pinkerton liability frequently in cases

involving a firearm and whether the use of that firearm is reasonably foreseeable.

Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 142–43 (Pinkerton liability found under an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

charge); Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 384 (Pinkerton principles applied in drugs and firearms

case). In these case which involve robbery and narcotics, the underlying criminal

activity was inherently dangerous; the foreseeability of the use of a firearm in these

types of cases was simple and straightforward.

In contrast with the Pinkerton cases referenced above is the case presented

here. There was no reasonable foreseeability that firearms shipped to Africa by St.

Michael would have their serial numbers ground out. St Michael was a U.S. military

service man believed by Appellants to have had licenses for the shipping of those

firearms. He certainly made it clear that he had licenses for the purchase and

ownership of those firearms. And no direct evidence was presented in support of this

premise.

Pinkerton liability has also often attached in situations in which leaders of

conspiracies are aware of the substantive crimes of their underlings. See United

States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 253 (4th Cir. 2008) (Pinkerton liability as a leader of a

Mann Act conspiracy); United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1379 (4th Cir. 1996)

(fraud case involving Pinkerton liability by leader of the fraudulent scheme).

Additionally, in such cases, it is frequently the principals that are bound by the

conduct of the agents under Pinkerton, not the other way around – as we have here.

Under United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1379 (4th Cir. 1996), the Fourth

Circuit found that, “[t]he idea behind the Pinkerton doctrine is that the conspirators

are each other’s agents; and a principal is bound by the acts of his agents within the

scope of the agency.” (emphasis added); see also United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d

1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1986).

In this case, the government sought to bind Appellants, as agents, to the

conspiratorial objectives of the principals. The objectives at issue were by no means

reasonably foreseeable by the lesser culpable agents, the Appellants, in

their

narrower roles in the conspiracy, as compared to Muma and St. Michael. The

government in this case has sought to impose Pinkerton liability on the Appellants

mostly through inferences of foreseeability. There was no direct evidence that the

Appellants were aware of the obliteration of serial numbers, as pointed out in the

Appellants’ opening brief. The evidence in this case failed to include any texts or

WhatsApp messages discussing the serial numbers; there was no testimony of any

statements made by the Appellants about serial numbers, much less the grinding of

serial numbers; there were no pictures of any of the Appellants’ presence in the room

where the grinding took place. The Fourth Circuit ignored these significant facts.

This is not a case that qualified for a Pinkerton instruction, and allowing this

instruction was unlawful as confusing and misleading to the jury. The charges at

issue were too complex, the collection of charges considered under the conspiracy

count too broad, and the substantive charges to be considered independently of the

conspiracy charge too numerous to allow such a liberal construction of reasonable

foreseeability that the substantive crime might have been committed to be applied

in this case.

The complexity of this case cannot be overstated. The Superseding Indictment

in this case was 27 pages in length. The conspiracy allegations covered specific and

detailed allegations of: (1) violations of the Arms Export Control Act, in violation of

22 U.S.C. § 2778, which prohibits the export of “defense articles;” (2) violations of the

Export Control Reform Act of 2018, in violation of 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801-4852, which

“authorizes the President to control the export of items subject to the jurisdiction of

the United States;” (3) transporting, shipping and receiving firearms with obliterated

serial numbers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k); and (4) smuggling of firearms from

the United States to Nigeria, “contrary to any law or regulation of the United States,”

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). The standards to be applied under the instructions

governing these counts included various constructs of “knowingly” and “willfully,”

including confusing matters of knowingly and willfully under the conspiracy

instructions.

The conspiracy allegations encompassed 13 pages of the charging document.

They included a listing of overt acts from paragraphs 24(a) to 24(ff) – a total of 31

overt acts. Pinkerton instructions are not intended for a case and a situation in which

the allegations before the jury are so complex.

Upon review of a district court’s decision to grant the request for a jury

instruction, the reviewing court’s role is to assess the decision “for abuse of discretion,

and review whether a jury instruction incorrectly stated the law de novo.” See United

States v. McCauley, 983 F.3d 690, 694–95 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Miltier,

882 F.3d 81, 89 (4th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). Such review considers the jury

instruction “in light of the whole record,” and requires a determination of whether

the instruction “adequately informed the jury of the controlling legal principles

without misleading or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted); McCauley, 983 F.3d at 694. The review by this

Court should require a finding that an erroneous instruction “seriously prejudiced

the challenging party’s case” before the verdict will be set aside. See id.

The Fourth Circuit has previously determined that, generally, a district court

is provided significant discretion in decisions regarding the instructions to provide

the jury due to their unique perspective in seeing the evidence and assessing the

witnesses. Id. And appellate courts will usually “exercise restraint and review the

instructions in the context of the whole trial, not act as a particularly strict teacher

grading a student essay for perfection.” Id. at 694; Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50

F.3d 1291, 1293 (4th Cir. 1995).

As this Court has held, “a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” McCauley

at 694-695, citing Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107, 46 S.Ct. 442, 70 L.Ed. 857

(1926). In this case, however, the instructions provided to the jury included (1) the

Pinkerton instruction, (2) the willful blindness instruction (3) a contested definitional

instruction of “knowingly” under the conspiracy charge, and (4) an aiding and

abetting instruction. The overall charge to the jury highlighted the confusing and

misleading nature of the Pinkerton instruction. Granting this instruction amid that

array of questionable instructions constituted an abuse of the district court’s

discretion. The instructions as provided to the jury in this case did not “accurately

and fairly state the controlling law” under the facts and circumstances presented, and

failed to provide the jury with a fair and appropriate legal guide to follow. See United

States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 366 (4th Cir. 2010). The Fourth Circuit failed to

address this salient point.

2. The District Court Improperly Instructed the Jury Regarding Willful

Blindness

In the rare instances in which a willful blindness instruction may be

appropriate, it should never be given under circumstances in which there is no clear

evidence of a defendant’s actual awareness of the illegal conduct and insufficient

evidence of purposeful efforts of the defendant to deliberately ignore the clear

indications of wrongdoing. In this case, there was neither clear evidence of such

awareness by the Appellants, nor was there evidence of purposeful efforts to ignore

such evidence. The Fourth Circuit failed to grasp this dynamic. Especially when the

jury is instructed that all that is needed is reasonable foreseeability that the

substantive crime might be committed under Pinkerton, allowing for a willful

blindness instruction to substitute for an actual finding by the jury of a knowing

violation of the law is particularly disconcerting. In this case, the facts and

circumstances of the case failed to warrant the court’s findings that the legal

standards under either Pinkerton or willful blindness should have guided the jury;

ultimately, these instructions created what amounted to a legal standard well below

one of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This interplay between Pinkerton and willful

blindness was ignored by the panel in its decision.

The principle that willful blindness will satisfy a knowledge element in

criminal law is premised on the understanding that defendants should not be

permitted to escape the reach of criminal statutes that require proof that a defendant

acted knowingly or willfully “by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence

of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.” See United States

v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) (“To allow the most clever, inventive,

and sophisticated wrongdoers to hide behind a constant and conscious purpose of

avoiding knowledge of criminal misconduct would be an injustice in its own right”);

see also United States v. Hale, 857 F.3d 158, 168–69 (4th Cir. 2017).

This Court should set the standard that a court’s reliance on the willful

blindness instruction is limited, and district courts must be cautious in avoiding a

conviction based on a reduced standard of recklessness or even negligence. See

Jinwright, 683 F.3d at 478. Assurances must be in place to satisfy the two basic

requirements of proof that: “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is

a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions

to avoid learning of that fact.” Id. No such assurances were in place in this case.

Additionally, the Fourt Circuit has found, as this Court should find, that the

“requests for willful blindness instructions should be handled with caution” and

“should be rarely given.” Jinwright, 683 F.3d at 478. There is a serious risk that the

willful blindness instruction could lead to a conviction based on less than a proof

beyond a reasonable doubt standard “with respect to a key fact making his conduct

illegal.” See United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 378 (4th Cir. 2010); United States

v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., United States v. Oti, 872

F.3d 678, 697 (5th Cir. 2017) (observing “‘[w]e have often cautioned against the use

of the deliberate ignorance instruction’”) (quoting United States v. Mendoza-Medina,

346 F.3d 121, 132 (5th Cir. 2003); Global–Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 653 U.S.

754, 767 (2011).

Evidence of the Appellants’ alleged knowledge of obliterated serial numbers

came principally through speculation and conjecture. Inferences were asked to be

drawn and circumstantial evidence was relied upon to suggest such knowledge, as

discussed above and in the Appellants’ opening brief. There were no texts or

WhatsApp messages discussing the serial numbers, no statements made by the

Appellants about serial numbers, no pictures of any of the Appellants’ presence in the

extremely small room where the grinding took place – no clear evidence of their

knowledge of the offense conduct. This was a dynamic the Fourth Circuit chose to

ignore. More striking, though, is that no evidence was presented by the government

that any of the Appellants avoided going to St. Micheal’s basement, or to the area of

St. Michael’s basement where the grinding of serial numbers was taking place. There

was no evidence whatsoever of the Appellants’ avoidance of anything that was going

on with the conspiracy.

As the Fourth Circuit found in Lighty, the willful blindness instruction was not

appropriate because there was no evidence presented at trial that the defendant,

Flood, was deliberately indifferent to or avoided the criminal activity at issue. Lighty,

616 F.3d 321 at 378. The defense presented was one of not being present for the

criminal conduct and “[u]nder such circumstances, a willful blindness instruction was

not appropriate because the evidence did not suggest that Flood engaged in deliberate

acts to avoid actual knowledge of the” crimes. Id.

A willful blindness instruction provides the government, under appropriate

circumstances, with an alternative method of proving knowledge. United States v.

Ravenell, 66 F.4th 472, 490 (4th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1344, 218 L. Ed.

2d 422 (2024) (“the government may ‘prove knowledge by establishing that the

defendant deliberately shielded himself from clear evidence of critical facts that are

strongly suggested by the circumstances.’” United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357

(4th Cir. 2017)) (emphasis added). The willful blindness instruction in this case

provided the government with an unwarranted boost on the issue of knowledge that

was unsupported by the evidence or the law. There was neither evidence sufficient to

show that the Appellants knew of the obliterated serial numbers, nor was there

evidence that the Appellants deliberately shielded themselves from this vague

evidence of grinding of serial numbers. The record lacked any evidence that the

defendants took deliberate actions to avoid finding out that the serial numbers on the

firearms were being grinded or obliterated, or that such an inference arose from the

defendants’ conduct. See United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 463 (4th Cir.

1994) (“A deliberate avoidance instruction, like all jury instructions, is proper only if

there is a foundation in evidence to support a finding of deliberate avoidance.”). No

such evidence was presented to the jury. There was no basis to give a willful blindness

instruction.

Willful blindness instructions are generally found in cases with obvious drug

dealing when an accused person says he or she did not know the drug dealing was

going on. See Ravenell, 66 F.4th 472, 477 (money laundering conspiracy relating to

two drug organizations); Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 515 (involved drug conspiracy charges).

This instruction can also be found in fraud and theft cases that involve very clear

evidence of criminal conduct and deliberate efforts of an accused person to shield from

the obvious and very clear evidence. See Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 463 (conspiracy to

defraud elderly victim); Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357 (conspiracy to defraud a bank);

Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 478 (conspiracy to defraud the United States); Hale, 857

F.3d 158, 169 (involved willful blindness of conspiracy to steal goods). There is a

reason why this instruction is seldom used. The evidence supporting this instruction

must fit squarely within the requirements set forth under the law. In this case they

did not. The Fourth Circuit failed to draw the obvious distinctions between this case

and the willful blindness cases that preceded this case.

Any error in providing this instruction was far from harmless, especially in the

context of the other erroneous instructions provided by the district court to the jury.

Again, this is an argument that the Fourth Circuit failed to address. The convictions

must be reversed based on this erroneous instruction.

3. Additionally, there was an aiding and abetting instruction and a

requirement that the reviewing Court look upon the instructions

cumulatively

The jury was presented with an aiding and abetting instruction in addition to

the Pinkerton instruction, which allowed for a finding of guilt premised only on

reasonable foreseeability that a crime might be committed, a willful blindness

instruction that allowed for a guilty verdict based on avoidance of evidence of guilty,

and a knowledge instruction for the conspiracy count that encouraged findings of

guilt based on inferences. At some point, with all of these instructions suggesting

findings based on proof of knowledge and intent that undermine findings of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court is compelled to step in and draw lines to

protect the rights of the defendants. The Fourth Circuit failed to do so. The district

court also abandoned its requirement to hold the government to its standard of proof

of beyond a reasonable doubt. With so many exceptions and exclusions which allowed

for the jury to find alternate means to a guilty verdict in this case, the exceptions and

exclusions in the instructions swallowed the rule of law that had to be applied. The

convictions must be overturned.

This Court has held that instructions of law “may not be judged in artificial

isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and

the trial record. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). Constitutional error exists

only if “‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the ... instruction in

a way’” that would lead to conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt for

each element of the charged offense. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde, 494

U.S. at 380).

The standard for determining whether an error is harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did

not contribute to the verdict obtained. This involves reviewing the entire record and

considering the likely impact of the error on the minds of the jurors (United States v.

McLellan, 959 F.3d 442 (1st Cir. 2020)).

This is not a case like Sandstrom, Francis, Rose or Pope, each of which involved

only one unconstitutional instruction. Here, the violations were scattered throughout

48 pages of instructions. Many of the jury instructions contained more than one

violation.

The effect was a constant drumbeat that directed the jury to presume criminal

intent. The errors raise grave doubt about the jury's ability to perform a fair factfinding function.

Unlike cases containing a single tainted instruction, the instructions in this

case do not provide the possibility to a reviewing court to excise and isolate the bad

and find that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty even if the jury had

never heard the bad instructions. The whole process was infected. See Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 22–23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827–28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The

application of the harmless error test to a case such as this is in a very real sense

unprecedented.

One instruction after another allowed the jury to infer and speculate as to the

defendants’ guilt. In addition to a “reasonable foreseeability” instruction under

Pinkerton was a “deliberate ignorance” or willful blindness instruction. Added to that

was a conspiracy instruction that encouraged the jury to draw inferences from

confusing facts. Added to these was an aiding and abetting instruction which

resulted in the whole mix of instructions being terribly confusing and misleading.

In the sufficiency of the evidence section, it was explained to this Court that

the government failed to provide evidence sufficient for a finding of guilt as to all of

the charges. The district court provided the jury with instructions that were

unwarranted under the facts presented. This Court must reverse the Appellants’

convictions to properly address the district court’s errors.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, this Court should grant the petition for a writ

of certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand for further consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

Mirriam Z. Seddiq

Seddiq Law Firm

Suite 300-33

P. O. Box 1127

Rockville, MD 20850

(301) 513-7832

Counsel for Wilson Che Fonguh

/s/ Robert J. Wagner

Robert J. Wagner

Counsel of Record

Robert J. Wagner, PLC

101 Shockoe Slip, Suite I

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 814-8172

robwagnerlaw@gmail.com

Counsel for Petitioners

Erin M. Trodden

Office of the Federal Public Defender

Western District of Virginia

401 East Market Street Suite 106

Charlottesville, VA 22902

(434) 220-3380

Counsel for Wilson Tita

February 11, 2026

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . 1a

JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2025 . . . . 30a

DENIAL OF REHEARING OF THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, FILED

DECEMBER 16, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32a

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4236

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

ERIC FRU NJI, a/k/a Eric Fru Ngi,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-4284

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

WILSON NUYILA TITA,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-4387

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

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WILSON CHE FONGUH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:21-cr-00334-RDB-2)

Argued: September 12, 2025

Decided: November 18, 2025

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge

Gregory and Judge Harris joined.

ARGUED: Erin Margaret Trodden, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,

Charlottesville, Virginia; Robert James Wagner, ROBERT J. WAGNER PLC, Richmond,

Virginia; Justin Eisele, SEDDIQ LAW FIRM, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. Mary

Jessica Kirsch Munoz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt,

Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Miriam Z. Seddiq, SEDDIQ LAW FIRM,

Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant Wilson Che Fonguh. Kelly O. Hayes, United States

Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, David C. Bornstein, Assistant United States Attorney,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

In connection with their secret efforts to provide arms and ammunition to

Anglophone fighters in Cameroon, Wilson Tita, Eric Nji, and Wilson Fonguh were

convicted in the District of Maryland of (1) conspiracy to export arms and ammunition

from the United States without an export license, to conceal such exports and smuggle

them, and to transport firearms with obliterated serial numbers, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 371; (2) transporting firearms with obliterated serial numbers, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(k); and (3) smuggling firearms, ammunition, and related items, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 554(a).

The district court sentenced each defendant to 63 months’

imprisonment, at the bottom of the sentencing range determined by the court to be

applicable, and to a two-year term of supervised release.

The defendants appealed, challenging (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) some

of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, (3) some of its jury instructions, and (4) some of

its sentencing rulings. As we explain herein, we find no reason to disturb either the

defendants’ convictions or their sentences, and therefore we affirm.

When longstanding sectional tensions in their native country of Cameroon erupted

into armed conflict, Wilson Tita, Eric Nji, and Wilson Fonguh joined with several other

Cameroonian Americans to form a group dedicated to sending weapons and ammunition

to Anglophone fighters in Cameroon who were battling the Francophone government’s

forces. The group — nicknamed by its members as the “Peanut Project,” in reference to

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their code word for bullets — met regularly at the home of Tamufor St. Michael, in

Baltimore County, Maryland. His relatively small basement — referred to by members as

“the lab” — served as the group’s base of operations and manufacturing site. The Peanut

Project was well organized, having written bylaws that referred to members as “council

members” and preparing formal minutes of meetings. It also was careful to maintain

secrecy, with its members communicating regularly through encrypted messages over

WhatsApp and in closed in-person meetings at the lab. Indeed, a bylaw required secrecy,

which the members policed. St. Michael — who had previously served in the U.S. military,

had taken gunsmithing classes, and had extensive knowledge of firearms — set up the lab

with the equipment and supplies necessary for members to clean, prime, and refurbish

ammunition; to assemble firearms; to prepare firearms and other items for shipping; and to

maintain records. The items prepared there for shipping were wrapped in “layers and

layers” of aluminum foil, plastic wrap, and duct tape and were packaged in a manner

designed to conceal them.

Although the Peanut Project began operating in late 2017, it did not come to the

attention of the U.S. government until February 2019, when law enforcement agents

received a tip about a particular 40-foot shipping container onboard a cargo ship travelling

from the Port of Baltimore to Nigeria, which is adjacent to Cameroon. Rather than offloading the container in Nigeria, authorities returned it to Baltimore, where law

enforcement agents recovered over 35,000 rounds of ammunition and 39 firearms from

among vehicles and other cargo shipped in the container. Nine of the firearms had been

privately manufactured and did not have serial numbers, but 28 other firearms had serial

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numbers that had been obliterated, leaving behind coarse grinding marks on the firearms.

Most of the firearms and much of the ammunition were found hidden inside compressor

tanks, which had been cut open, filled with carefully wrapped packages and spray foam,

welded back together, and repainted. The shipping container also contained other military

equipment, including rifle scopes, gunpowder, Tannerite (a commercially available kit to

make exploding targets), empty shell casings, machetes, trip wire, and military clothing.

Law enforcement agents traced the shipping container to St. Michael and then obtained a

warrant in July 2019 to search his house. Upon execution of the warrant, the agents

discovered “a full-scale manufacturing operation” for reloading ammunition and

manufacturing firearms.

A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Tita, Nji, and

Fonguh, charging them in five counts with (1) conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371;

(2) exportation of defense articles without a license, in violation of the Arms Export

Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778; (3) exportation of controlled items without a license, in

violation of the Export Control Reform Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4819; (4) transportation of

firearms with obliterated serial numbers, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 922(k); and

(5) smuggling, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554(a).

At the 10-day jury trial, the government presented testimony from 12 witnesses, 2

of whom had been members of the group. The two members explained in detail the

operations and the defendants’ involvement in them. In his defense, Tita called St. Michael

as a witness, and both Nji and Fonguh testified in their own defense. The jury found the

defendants guilty of conspiracy (Count I), the transportation of firearms with obliterated

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serial numbers (Count IV), and smuggling (Count V), and it acquitted them on Counts II

and III, which charged violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Control

Reform Act.

After the defendants filed post-trial motions, challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence and various rulings made by the district court during trial, the case was reassigned

to a different district judge, who conducted a hearing on the motions and then denied them.

In preparation for sentencing, the probation officer prepared a presentence report

for each defendant that recommended, among other things, applying a 6-level sentencing

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) because the conspiracy involved 25 to 99

firearms, and a 4-level sentencing enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) based on the

defendants’ engaging in the “trafficking of firearms.” Nji and Fonguh challenged both

recommended enhancements, while Tita challenged only the latter, and the district court

overruled their objections. The court then calculated the advisory sentencing range to be

63 to 78 months’ imprisonment for each defendant and sentenced each defendant at the

bottom of that range to 63 months’ imprisonment, along with two years of supervised

release.

From the district court’s judgments dated March 22, 2023, April 5, 2023, and May

25, 2023, the defendants filed these appeals, which we then consolidated.

The defendants contend first that the evidence presented by the government was

insufficient to support their convictions under § 922(k) (Count IV), and derivatively under

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§ 554(a) (Count V) and § 371 (Count I). They argue mainly that the evidence was

insufficient to show their mens rea for the § 922(k) offense — i.e., that they knew that the

serial numbers on the firearms had been obliterated.

This argument is a difficult one for the defendants to make, as they bear a “heavy

burden” in seeking to overturn a jury conviction for insufficient evidence. United States v.

Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 184 (4th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). They must show that “after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [no] rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). And under this standard, a court is required to draw

all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor and to “assume that the jury resolved

all contradictions in testimony” in its favor as well. United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th

292, 308 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 572 (4th Cir.

2011) (cleaned up)). Thus, “reversal for insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case

where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (cleaned up).

Under this standard, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s

finding that the defendants were aware of the obliteration of the firearms’ serial numbers

and had the necessary mens rea for violating § 922(k).

First, the Peanut Project was a small, closely knit group dedicated to shipping

firearms and ammunition to Anglophone fighters in Cameroon. And part of their mission

was to conceal the source of firearms, especially because of a past incident in which the

Cameroonian government was able to trace a firearm back to the United States based on

its serial number. Concealing serial numbers on the firearms thus became a fundamental

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element of their work, and they accomplished it by grinding the serial numbers off of the

purchased firearms they sent to Cameroon. The grinding was done in the Peanut Project’s

lab, which was a small, compact space where members could hear each other and generally

could know what the others were doing. There was evidence that verbal instructions to

grind firearms were given in the presence of two of the defendants, Nji and Fonguh, and

that the grinding operation was both noisy and obvious. Moreover, each ground firearm

was visibly defaced with a large, ill-defined grind area that would have been readily visible,

especially to anyone handling or packaging it. And firearms so defaced were indeed

packaged in the lab for further concealment. The operations in the lab, while kept secret

from the outside world, were open and visible to all members present, and the members,

including the defendants, participated in lab work over a lengthy period, working in the lab

up to three days each week. In these circumstances, a jury had circumstantial evidence that

all members present in the lab were familiar with its mission and operations and knowingly

participated in their fulfillment.

At trial, the government presented the testimony of two former Peanut Project

members who knew the operations and worked with the defendants in particular. Roger

Akem testified that the Peanut Project group packaged and concealed the weapons and

ammunition they were shipping to Cameroon “[s]o that [they] can be hidden from” both

“[t]he authorities here in the U.S. and [those in] Nigeria.”

He added that “the

understanding of the group” was that “we had to conceal it” because “[t]here was no way

you could send it out without concealing.” (Emphasis added). He also testified that the

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defendants knew of and participated in this mission and, indeed, that each of the defendants

came to the lab to help in shipping preparations.

The government also presented testimony of Alambi Muma, another former

member of the Peanut Project, who testified that, from the outset of the project, “all of us

that came together . . . decided” to keep the activities secret, “[b]ecause to some extent,

we underst[ood] that” if the American authorities or the Cameroonian authorities found

out, “they’re going to stop us and it’s illegal.” (Emphasis added). Indeed, the group’s

bylaws, drafted by Tita, contained an entire section emphasizing the importance of the

group’s “concealment methods.” And as to the specific function of the defendants, Muma

testified that Nji was sometimes responsible for taking notes and performing inventory for

the group, that Nji and Fonguh would prepare ammunition and would help load and

package the arms and ammunition, and that Tita would oversee what they were doing and

give them directions. He stated also that at a time when Nji and Fonguh were in the lab

with him, St. Michael verbally assigned the task of grinding off serial numbers to him with

instructions that the others could hear. And when Muma began the task of grinding, he

donned gloves and goggles and used a grinder that was noisy, which made his activity

especially noticeable. Muma also testified that he usually went to the lab with Nji and

Fonguh and that when he was performing the grinding function, he could see the other

people who were in the basement — “It’s in a small space, a very small space like about

three, three meter square.”

Finally, the government presented the jury with some of the actual guns seized with

the serial numbers obliterated and photographs of the remaining guns seized with serial

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numbers obliterated, all of which revealed highly visible defacing of the guns where the

serial numbers had been located, such that anyone seeing them or packaging them would

have seen the defacing.

We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that Tita, Nji,

and Fonguh knew that serial numbers were being or had been obliterated on firearms that

the group was shipping to Cameroon. And even if the jury had doubts as to whether the

defendants had actual knowledge, it certainly could have concluded that the obliterations

were reasonably foreseeable to them in furtherance of the conspiracy that they had joined,

as necessary for vicarious liability under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).

See United States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 142–43 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[t]he

Pinkerton doctrine makes a person liable for substantive offenses committed by a coconspirator when their commission is reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the

conspiracy”).

The defendants also argue that the government failed to prove that the weapons in

question were actually firearms, as that term is used in § 922(k). The relevant statute

defines “firearm” to include a “weapon . . . which will or is designed to or may readily be

converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). The

defendants’ argument, however, develops little traction. As the defendants concede, the

government brought many of the guns to court for the jury to see and presented photographs

of all of them. In addition, law enforcement officers who found the weapons identified

them specifically by manufacturer, make, and model. They also found ammunition

packaged with the weapons, suggesting strongly that they were firearms. And, as the

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government emphasizes, the whole point of the operation was to send firearms and

ammunition to Anglophone fighters in Cameroon to assist them in their fight with the

Francophones. Clearly, the jury could conclude that the guns in question were, in fact,

“firearms.”

In sum, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendants’

convictions under § 922(k) (Count IV), as well as § 554(a) (Count V) and § 371 (Count I).

III

The defendants contend next that the district court abused its discretion in granting

the government’s motion to exclude testimony from the defendants’ expert, Efi Walters

Tembon, described by the defendants as a native of the Anglophone section of Cameroon

who was forced to flee the country in 2018 due to abuses and threats by the Francophone

government. The defendants proffered that Tembon would testify about the armed conflict

between the Cameroonian government and Anglophone Cameroonians and how “the

Cameroonian government [had] engaged in violent acts of retaliation even against nonviolent dissent and protests.” The defendants argued that such evidence was critical to

support their contention that the concealment of their activities was part of an effort to keep

their friends and families in Cameroon safe, rather than reflecting knowledge that their

activities were illegal.

The district court, however, granted the government’s motion to exclude Tembon’s

testimony, explaining that the defendants’ state of mind could not be proved through expert

testimony and that, in any event, expert testimony as to “the details of the Cameroonian

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conflict” was more likely to confuse the jury than help it. The court assured the defendants,

however, that they could offer other evidence along this line to explain the reason for the

secrecy of their operations.

On appeal, the defendants argue that the evidence was relevant and should have

been admitted, as it went to the defendants’ state of mind. They acknowledge that an expert

cannot offer an opinion as to a defendant’s mental state under Federal Rule of Evidence

704(b), but they note that the Supreme Court has made clear that expert witnesses can

provide information that jurors can then use in deciding a defendant’s mental state for

themselves. See Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024). While there may be two sides

to this issue, we conclude that the district court’s decision fell well within its discretion to

manage the trial fairly. In its ruling, the district court explained that the expert had a

particular “point of view” about the conflict that “may very well be valid,” but that

admitting his testimony would create “a great risk of allowing the jury to assume there is

some justification” for the defendants’ conduct. The court also noted that the expert’s

testimony would have only minimal, indirect relevance as to why the defendants exhibited

their high concern over keeping operations secret. But the court nonetheless allowed the

defendants, through other testimony, to explain the conflict and their fear of the

Cameroonian government and thereby provide direct evidence of their state of mind. And

indeed, they did so.

In these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in avoiding a distracting, collateral mini-trial about the nature and merits of the

conflict in Cameroon.

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The defendants also contend that the district court abused its discretion in making

rulings that denied them the ability to introduce a pretrial statement made by a

coconspirator, Tse Bangarie. Specifically, prior to pleading guilty, Bangarie participated

in a proffer session with the government with the idea of reaching a cooperation agreement.

According to the government’s record of the proffer:

Bangarie warned St. Michael about the illegality of shipping arms from the

U.S. to Cameroon. St. Michael claimed that he had the military training on

how to conceal shipments and even had a badge to get what he needed

accomplished. Further, St. Michael suggested to Bangarie that his military

superiors knew what he had planned to do and thus convinced Bangarie that

there was no need for concern. Bangarie did think it was possible that he

could have been guided by his military superiors.

The defendants wanted to introduce this statement into evidence and to question Bangarie

about it — and only it, as defendants’ counsel assured the court — to demonstrate that they

had relied on St. Michael’s claim that their exportation of arms to Cameroon was

legitimate. To that end, the defendants subpoenaed Bangarie to testify at trial, and Bangarie

indeed appeared in court with his counsel. But Bangarie’s counsel advised the court that

Bangarie would “be asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege not to incriminate himself if

he were called to the stand,” noting that while he had pleaded guilty to certain offenses, he

was still awaiting sentencing.

The court concluded that, in the circumstances, Bangarie’s “Fifth Amendment

assertion [was] valid” because “he could be exposing himself to liability” since his

conviction was not yet final and since the government did not accept the truthfulness of the

statement that he had made in the proffer session. As the court explained:

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Mr. Bangarie . . . has pled guilty. He has not yet been sentenced. It is not a

final conviction in that sense. It is possible — I’m not expecting it, but it is

possible that he could even move to withdraw his guilty plea. It is not a final

sentence, and there’s not a final conviction at this point.

Moreover, as the Government has indicated, they do not, have not accepted

the truth of that particular statement. We might note that this was a proffer

session that did not result in a cooperation agreement. And the content of

that particular piece of Mr. Bangarie’s proffer is not necessarily consistent

with the statement of facts that he swore to under oath.

So I do believe that he could be exposing himself to liability in a couple of

different ways: Possibly as to the facts of this case given that it’s not a final

conviction and possibly because of the issue of the truthfulness of that

particular statement.

The court then ruled that Bangarie need not take the stand.

In response, the defendants then requested that the court admit Bangarie’s statement

into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 807, which is the residual exception to the

hearsay rule of evidence. That Rule allows the admission of hearsay evidence if it is

“supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness” and “is more probative on the point

for which it is offered” than any other reasonably available evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 807(a).

The court, however, also denied this request, explaining:

A proffer statement not accepted by the Government, not under oath, I don’t

think has a great deal of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. On top

of that, Mr. St. Michael, who did testify, denied having made such a

statement. [Yet,] Rule 807 is looking for a statement that is more probative

on the point for which it’s offered than any other evidence the proponent can

obtain through reasonable efforts.

The defendants now contend that the district court violated their Sixth Amendment

right to compel testimony and their Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial when it barred

them from examining Bangarie “on a question-by-question basis.”

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Our review of “whether a district court violated a defendant’s right to a complete

defense by improperly permitting a witness to invoke the right against self-incrimination”

is conducted under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Oliver,

133 F.4th 329, 335 (4th Cir. 2025).

To be sure, as we have repeatedly recognized, “[w]hen a witness asserts a right

against self-incrimination that may conflict with a defendant’s right to present a complete

defense, the district court ‘must make a proper and particularized inquiry into the

legitimacy and scope of the witness’ assertion of the privilege.’” Oliver, 133 F.4th at 336

(quoting Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir. 1990)). Moreover, “[a] witness

may be totally excused only if the court finds that he could legitimately refuse to answer

any and all relevant questions.” Id. at 337 (quoting Gaskins, 916 F.2d at 950). But we

have also explained that the district court is not required to have the witness take the stand

and “assert the privilege on a question-by-question basis” when the record reflects that “the

district court’s decision to permit invocation of the privilege was not overbroad.” Id. at

337–38.

The record reflects that the district court conducted the requisite “proper and

particularized inquiry” and that the scope of the privilege afforded to Bangarie was not

overbroad. Significantly, the district court confirmed that the only subject on which

defendants’ counsel wanted to question Bangarie was the single statement he had made

during the proffer session with the government. In that statement, Bangarie suggested that

St. Michael had “convinced [him] that there was no need for concern” because St. Michael

had “a badge” and approval from “military superiors.” But that statement appeared to be

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inconsistent with the subsequent statement of facts to which Bangarie swore under oath

when pleading guilty. He admitted during his plea that he had known it was illegal for the

group to ship defense items overseas. Given that context and the fact that Bangarie’s

conviction was not yet a final judgment, we conclude that the district court reasonably

concluded that compelling Bangarie’s limited testimony on this issue could potentially

expose him to additional adverse consequences. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S.

314, 326 (1999) (recognizing that “[w]here the sentence has not yet been imposed a

defendant may have a legitimate fear of adverse consequences from further testimony”).

We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

admit the government’s report of Bangarie’s pre-plea statement into evidence under

Federal Rule of Evidence 807. That residual hearsay exception requires that the hearsay

statement be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness” and that it be “more

probative” than other available evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 807(a). The court found neither

criterion satisfied, and we conclude that it had ample reason to do so.

In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Bangarie need

not take the stand after validly invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and in denying the defendants’ request to admit the statement made by

Bangarie during the proffer session.

As to their last argument on their convictions, the defendants contend that the

district court erred by (1) instructing the jury under the Pinkerton standard for liability,

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(2) granting a willful blindness instruction, and (3) providing the jury a legally insufficient

definition of “knowingly” in the conspiracy instruction. Taken together, and also with the

court’s aiding and abetting instruction, the defendants argue that the instructions “deprived

[them] of a fair trial” by “reducing the standard of the government’s proof well below the

constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

First, with respect to the Pinkerton instruction, we note that the district court

correctly understood that under Pinkerton, a defendant engaged in a conspiracy can become

liable for the substantive crimes of his coconspirators that were reasonably foreseeable and

done in furtherance of the conspiracy. See 328 U.S. at 645–48; see also Ashley, 606 F.3d

at 142–43. And the defendants do not challenge the substance of the district court’s

instruction as a correct statement of the law. Rather, they argue that “there was an

insufficient evidentiary foundation” to warrant giving the instruction because the jury could

not find from the evidence presented that the obliteration of firearm serial numbers was

“reasonably foreseeable” to members of the conspiracy.

We believe, however, that this argument overlooks extensive evidence

demonstrating the mission of the group, its prior adverse experience related to a firearm

with a visible serial number, and its overriding efforts to keep their activities concealed.

Indeed, the group’s bylaws emphasized the importance of their “concealment methods.”

Moreover, the group was a small and closely knit, operating over an extended period of

time in a small space dedicated to preparing firearms and ammunition for shipment and

packaging them in disguise. Given the group’s purpose, methods, and mission, a jury

certainly could find that it would have been at least reasonably foreseeable to any member

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that other members would obliterate the serial numbers on the firearms they were shipping

to Cameroon to prevent those firearms from being traced back to the group and exposing

their activities.

The defendants argue alternatively that, in any event, “the case was far too complex

to allow for Pinkerton vicarious liability,” pointing to United States v. Serrano-Delgado,

29 F.4th 16 (1st Cir. 2022), which warned that “in some complex cases, the charge can

cause confusion,” particularly when “the jury is being asked to infer” that a conspiracy

existed from “a series of disparate criminal acts.” Id. at 24 (cleaned up). But the

circumstances there are far removed from the circumstances presented in this case. We

conclude that the application of Pinkerton was clearly appropriate here.

The defendants also challenge the willful blindness instruction, again arguing that

there was not enough evidence to justify giving it. To be sure, we have recognized that

“‘requests for willful blindness instructions should be handled with caution,’ because of

the risk that the instruction could mislead a jury into believing that it could convict the

defendant for his mere negligence or recklessness with respect to a key fact making his

conduct illegal.” United States v. Hale, 857 F.3d 158, 168 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United

States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 2012)). “Nonetheless, it is appropriate to

instruct the jury on willful blindness when the defendant claims lack of guilty knowledge

in the face of evidence supporting an inference of deliberate ignorance.” Id. (cleaned up).

For the doctrine to apply, two basic requirements must be satisfied — (1) that the defendant

subjectively believed there was a high probability that a fact existed and (2) that the

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defendant took deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact. Id.; see also Global-Tech

Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011).

Here, as noted, there was ample evidence from which to find that the defendants had

actual knowledge that the group was obliterating the serial numbers on firearms before

packaging them in disguise and sending them overseas. But from that same evidence, a

jury could also reasonably conclude that if, as the defendants maintained, they did lack

actual knowledge, they could have avoided learning of the obliteration operations only by

taking deliberate actions to avoid confirming what they must have surely strongly

suspected. For instance, the jury could conclude that Nji and Fonguh almost certainly

participated in helping to wrap the firearms in “layers and layers” of plastic wrap,

aluminum foil, and duct tape as a part of the concealment efforts, giving them ample

opportunity to personally observe the irregular grinding marks on the firearms where the

serial numbers had been obliterated. Yet, if the jury were to believe the defendants that

they only helped load the packages containing the firearms once they were already

wrapped, it could reasonably infer, in the context of the mission and their membership in

the group, that this reflected a deliberate choice by the defendants to avoid handling the

firearms directly.

Finally, the defendants challenge the district court’s instruction about “knowledge,”

which told the jury that “[t]he defendant’s knowledge, again, it’s a matter of inference. It’s

a matter you may infer from the facts that have been proved.” They argue that “[p]lacing

such an emphasis on a jury’s reliance on inferences diverts them from their principal

obligation — to find that there was an agreement to violate the law and that the defendant

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knowingly and voluntarily entered into that unlawful agreement.” But the instruction is

clearly not objectionable, as it simply told the jury that the key element of knowledge was

one that “may” be inferred from circumstantial evidence.

At bottom, we conclude that the district court did not err in giving the jury the

instructions that the defendants have challenged.

As to their sentencing, the defendants contend first that the district court erred in

applying a 6-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C), which applies when the

“the offense involved” 25 to 99 firearms, and a 4-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5),

which, at the time, applied when “the defendant engaged in the trafficking of firearms.”

They argue that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when evaluating relevant

conduct and failed to make the “required particularized findings” necessary to support the

enhancements’ application. More specifically, the defendants argue that “the district court

relied simply on the fact of the defendants’ convictions to impose the enhancements in this

case” and that “[t]his was error” because, as they maintain, the “jury instructions permitted

the defendants to be convicted under Pinkerton,” whereas “the standard for relevant

conduct under § 1B1.3 of the Guidelines is narrower.” And the error, they contend, was

even more pronounced with respect to § 2K2.1(b)(5) because that enhancement did not

even encompass § 1B1.3’s accountability for jointly undertaken criminal activity. Finally,

Tita acknowledges that he did not object to the 6-level enhancement based on the number

of firearms involved, but he maintains that we should nonetheless correct the error under

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the plain-error standard. The defendants request that we vacate their sentences and remand

to the district court for more particularized findings as to these two enhancements.

The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to, among other things, transport

firearms with obliterated serial numbers and smuggle them. In the presentence reports

prepared for them, the probation officer recommended applying the 6-level enhancement,

stating in Tita’s and Nji’s reports that “[t]he offense involved 28 firearms” and using

similar language in Fonguh’s report. (Citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C)). The reports also

stated, “The defendant trafficked in firearms, . . . therefore 4 levels are added.” (Citing

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5)). Those reports were provided to the defendants before sentencing.

The defendants, except for Tita, objected to the 6-level enhancement recommended

in the presentence report, stating, as Nji argued:

Mr. Nji was given 6 levels based upon the assumption that 28 firearms with

obliterated serial numbers were the subject of the offenses for which the jury

found Mr. Nji guilty. . . . Based upon . . . the fact that the government did

not prove the number of obliterated firearms which were known by Mr. Nji,

Mr. Nji is entitled to the minimum number of levels of adjustment for the

minimum number of obliterated firearms.

(Emphasis added). And Fonguh made a similar objection. During sentencing before the

district court, the defendants again made the same argument. As Nji’s counsel stated:

Our point in this was that there are a lot of firearms involved. There were a

lot of activities on the parts of different people. There was a defense of —

some of the defenses raised by all the three co-defendants were who was

present when certain actions were taking place, who was involved in packing,

when were they involved in packing, what were they packing, what were they

packing, who was involved in obliterating serial numbers? When? Who was

present when that happened?

Counsel thus concluded:

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So all the jury found was that there was a trafficking and a smuggling, and

in order to find that they would have had to find that there was trafficking of

firearms and smuggling of firearms. But there was never a finding as to how

many firearms my client was involved in trafficking, how many firearms my

client was involved in smuggling.

In response, the court noted that the defendants were also convicted of conspiracy,

which would make each of them responsible for relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.

It then found, “He’s a member of a conspiracy, and was found guilty of being a member of

a conspiracy to transport and smuggle weapons. And . . . the evidence was that there were

28 weapons involved.” (Emphasis added). The court explained that it did not understand

why there had to be proof with respect to each defendant about the number of firearms that

were involved as to that defendant. Accordingly, it overruled the defendants’ objections

to the application of the 6-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C).

Contrary to the defendants’ argument, we cannot find that the district court confused

Pinkerton liability with the scope of relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The district

court did not rely on or mention Pinkerton principles when addressing relevant conduct.

This fact alone renders inapplicable the ruling in United States v. Evans, 90 F.4th 257, 263

(4th Cir. 2024), on which the defendants rely. Rather, the court found that the offense

jointly undertaken by the defendants involved more than 25 firearms.

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the 6-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C)

applies when “the offense involved” 25 to 99 firearms. It does not suggest that each

defendant must know of the firearms; rather, the offense of which the jury found the

defendant guilty must involve at least 25 firearms. Thus, for the enhancement to apply,

each defendant need not have known precisely how many firearms their coconspirators

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transported or attempted to transport to Cameroon or that the coconspirators obliterated the

serial numbers on 28 of those firearms. Rather, under § 1B1.3, each defendant becomes

accountable for the acts of others that were within “the scope of the criminal activity the

particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake,” so long as those acts are “in furtherance

of that criminal activity” and “reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal

activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) & cmt. n.3(B). Having been found guilty of a single

conspiracy to transport and smuggle firearms with obliterated serial numbers, the

defendants’ circumstances fit the accountability requirements of § 1B1.3.

The district court simply applied these principles, finding that the defendants had

been convicted of conspiracy for their role in the Peanut Project and that the evidence

showed that 28 firearms with obliterated serial numbers had been transported pursuant to

that conspiracy. It explained correctly that there was no support for the defendants’

argument that they each had “to know the exact number of firearms with obliterated serial

numbers” when conducting the “relevant conduct analysis under 1B1.3.”

And as to the court’s finding “that there were 28 weapons involved,” the defendants

have not disputed the number. Indeed, the record shows that the government introduced

physically or through photographic evidence each of the 28 firearms on which the serial

number had been obliterated. And the presentence report concluded that 28 firearms were

involved. As the court concluded, “I don’t really see what the basis is for challenging the

plus 6 offense increase.” We agree. The court’s conclusion that 28 firearms were involved

in the offense was not clearly erroneous.

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The analysis of the defendants’ challenge to the 4-level enhancement under

§ 2K2.1(b)(5) for engaging in the trafficking of firearms is slightly different, but our

conclusion is the same. Under the version of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the

time of sentencing, § 2K2.1(b)(5) provided for a 4-level enhancement if “the defendant

engaged in the trafficking of firearms.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2021) (emphasis added).

As the defendants note, the Guidelines’ commentary explained that the use of “[t]he term

‘defendant,’ consistent with § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), limits the accountability of the

defendant to the defendant’s own conduct and conduct that the defendant aided or abetted,

counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.” Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13(B)

(latter emphasis added). Of course, the evidence in this case shows that the defendants

either personally participated in, or aided and abetted, the trafficking of two or more

firearms, and they have in essence not argued otherwise. Accordingly, we conclude that

the district court did not err in also applying this enhancement.

VII

Finally, the defendants contend that the district court committed reversible error by

imposing two conditions of supervised release in the written judgments entered against

them that differed from the articulation of those conditions made by the court orally during

sentencing, in violation of United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020). In view

of this error, they request that we vacate the sentence and remand their cases for plenary

resentencing.

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The applicable principles are grounded in statute and reiterated in the Sentencing

Guidelines. And they are consistently applied in our decisions with respect to them.

When a court imposes a term of supervised release, it must impose a list of

conditions that are mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (“mandatory conditions”). The

statute also provides that the court may impose “discretionary conditions” so long as they

comply with the requirements of § 3583(d). And, in either event, the probation office must

provide the defendant with “a written statement” of the conditions that have been imposed.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(f).

The Sentencing Guidelines restate the mandatory conditions that the district court

must impose for all terms of supervised release.

See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a).

As to

discretionary conditions, the Guidelines provide a list of 13 “standard conditions” that the

district court may apply, as appropriate. Id. § 5D1.3(c). The Guidelines also list as

discretionary other “special conditions” that may be relevant to particular circumstances.

Id. § 5D1.3(d), (e).

Because the “mandatory conditions” are a necessary part of any sentence that

imposes supervised release and defendants are appropriately on notice of them, a district

court “need not orally pronounce mandatory conditions at sentencing.” Rogers, 961 F.3d

at 296. But as to all “discretionary conditions,” which the court may impose as they relate

to sentencing factors, the default requirement is that the district court read all discretionary

conditions at sentencing. See id. at 297–98. Nonetheless, we have carved out a limited

exception, recognizing “that a district court may satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce

discretionary conditions through incorporation.” Id. at 299. For instance, “standard

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conditions” identified by the Sentencing Guidelines and adopted by local standing orders

of court may be imposed by incorporation simply by explicitly referencing them during

sentencing. This incorporation by reference is authorized because the defendant is put on

notice at his sentencing hearing “that a certain set of conditions will be imposed on his

supervised release,” even if each standard condition is not read aloud to him. Id.; see also

United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 346 (4th Cir. 2021).

Finally, we have held that the conditions imposed orally during sentencing reflect

the controlling conditions imposed by the court and that where the written judgment

includes discretionary conditions that were not orally pronounced, or where there is an

inconsistency between the two, the defendant’s sentence must generally be vacated. See

Singletary, 984 F.3d at 346; United States v. Lassiter, 96 F.4th 629, 639–40 (4th Cir. 2024).

At each sentencing here, the district court incorporated by reference the 13 standard

conditions of supervised release that the district court had adopted with a standing order.

And those 13 conditions are virtually verbatim the 13 standard conditions in the Sentencing

Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c). At issue here are standard conditions 6 and 7, which

provide:

[6]

You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your

home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take

any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or

she observes in plain view.

[7]

You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type

of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing

so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find fulltime employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from

doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about

your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you

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must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change.

If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not

possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the

probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or

expected change.

District of Maryland Standing Order 2020-13, Misc. No. 00-308 (filed June 10, 2020).

Moreover, these standard conditions were also included in full in the sentencing

recommendation made by the probation officer to the district court, which was provided to

the defendants as part of their presentence reports. And each defendant confirmed at

sentencing that he had reviewed his report.

During sentencing, the district court told each defendant clearly that it was imposing

both the mandatory and standard conditions. Specifically, it told Tita:

You shall comply with all of the mandatory and standard conditions of

supervised release, as well as the additional conditions. The mandatory and

standard conditions I need to carefully summarize for you as required by

recent case authority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit.

(Emphasis added). It told Nji that it was going to place him on supervised release for the

total period of two years “with the mandatory conditions, which I must go over with you

clearly, and standard conditions, and additional conditions.” And it told Fonguh, “You

shall comply with all those conditions, both the mandatory and standard conditions, as well

as certain additional conditions that I’m going to note.”

The court also chose to summarize some conditions it thought important,

specifically summarizing standard conditions 6 and 7. Regarding standard condition 6, it

told Tita that he “must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or

elsewhere”; it told Nji similarly that he “must allow the probation officer to visit you at

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any time at your residence”; and it also told Fonguh that he “must allow the probation

officer to visit you at any time.” The court did not, however, read the entire condition.

And as for the work requirement in condition 7, the court told Tita and Nji that they “must

work full time at a lawful type of employment,” and it told Fonguh that he “must make

every effort to work full-time, at least 30 hours per week.” Again, the court did not read

the entire condition.

Following sentencing, the court entered judgments that contained the full text of the

standard conditions as incorporated by the court, which included the full text of standard

conditions 6 and 7.

The defendants now argue that the district court’s practice in summarizing a portion

of the conditions violated the ruling we adopted in Rogers because the written judgment

was more complete than the oral summary.

We conclude, however, that by expressly incorporating the standard conditions

adopted by the standing order of the district court, the court properly announced the

standard conditions orally in court, and the written judgment that included the standard

conditions did not violate Rogers. See United States v. Turner, 122 F.4th 511, 519 (4th

Cir. 2024) (holding that because “the district court incorporated the conditions as set forth

in the PSR” during the sentencing hearing, and because those incorporated conditions were

“a word-for-word match with those in Turner’s written judgment,” that was “enough to

satisfy the dictates of our Rogers decision”).

The defendants, however, focus on the district court’s summarization of some

conditions, failing to acknowledge the earlier incorporation by reference to the standard

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conditions. Because the summarizations were just that — summaries — they were not as

fulsome as the standard conditions being summarized. But that does not, we conclude,

violate Rogers, as the defendants argue. Indeed, in Turner, we specifically rejected a

defendant’s attempt to “fault[] the district court for going further” and, after incorporating

the standard conditions, proceeding to also read them aloud with slight deviations in

language. 122 F.4th at 519–20. While there certainly may arise circumstances where a

problematic ambiguity could result from providing summarizations, see United States v.

Bullis, 122 F.4th 107, 119 (4th Cir. 2024), the record here shows that the district court

made clear that it was expressly incorporating the “standard conditions” that the defendants

had previously received and that during sentencing it was only purporting to “summarize”

some of the conditions that it thought were important to the defendants. Given the

unambiguous express incorporation of the standard conditions in these cases, we do not

fault the district court for then proceeding to summarize some conditions for the defendants

in a manner that omitted details.

Having fully considered the defendants’ challenges to their convictions and

sentences and finding them unpersuasive, we affirm the judgments of the district court.

AFFIRMED

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 23-4236 (L)

(1:21-cr-00334-RDB-2)

___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

ERIC FRU NJI, a/k/a Eric Fru Ngi

Defendant - Appellant

___________________

No. 23-4284

(1:21-cr-00334-RDB-1)

___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

WILSON NUYILA TITA

Defendant – Appellant

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___________________

No. 23-4387

(1:21-cr-00334-RDB-3)

___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

WILSON CHE FONGUH

Defendant - Appellant

___________________

JUDGMENT

___________________

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgments of the district

court are affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in

accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ NWAMAKA ANOWI, CLERK

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 23-4236 (L)

(1:21-cr-00334-RDB-2)

___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

ERIC FRU NJI, a/k/a Eric Fru Ngi

Defendant - Appellant

___________________

No. 23-4284

(1:21-cr-00334-RDB-1)

___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

WILSON NUYILA TITA

Defendant – Appellant

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___________________

No. 23-4387

(1:21-cr-00334-RDB-3)

___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

WILSON CHE FONGUH

Defendant - Appellant

___________________

ORDER

___________________

The court denies the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc and the

motion to exceed length limitations. No judge requested a poll under Fed. R. App.

P. 40 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Niemeyer, Judge Gregory, and

Judge Harris.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.