Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gifford Johnson, III, Petitioner v. Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
Supreme Court briefAug 28, 2025
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Case: 24-40497
Document: 38-2
Page: 1
Date Filed: 02/11/2025
®niteb States Court of appeals
for tfje jfiftlj Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 24-40497
February 11,2025
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Gifford Johnson, III,
Petitioner—Appellant,
versus
Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division,
Respondent—Appellee.
Application for Certificate of Appealability
the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:23-CV-190
UNPUBLISHED ORDER
Before Smith, Graves, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Gifford Johnson, III, Texas prisoner # 01736258, moves for a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his conviction of murder. The district
court denied and dismissed his petition after concluding that it was time
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Document: 38-2
Date Filed: 02/11/2025
No. 24-40497
barred. Johnson challenges that ruling by asserting that his actual innocence
serves as a gateway to the consideration of his § 2254 claims.
To obtain a COA, Johnson must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). As the district court dismissed his
petition on procedural grounds, Johnson is required to demonstrate “that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Johnson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, his motion
for a COA is DENIED. In light of Johnson’s failure to make the COA
showing, we do not reach whether the district court erred by denying an
evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Davis, 971 F.3d 524,534-35 (5th Cir.
2020).
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United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTNathan
,JhulynOchsner,
1® 202^,Clerk„
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
No. 3:23-cv-i9O
GIFFORD JOHNSON, III, TDCJ #01736258, PETITIONER,
v.
BOBBY LUMPKIN, RESPONDENT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge.
State inmate Gifford Johnson, III, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a
federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from his state
court conviction and sentence for murder. Dkt. 1. Respondent Bobby Lumpkin
answered and provided a copy of the state-court records. Dkts. 10, 11. Johnson
filed a reply. Dkt. 16. Having considered the petition, the answer and reply, all
matters of record, and the applicable legal authorities, the court determines that
the petition should be dismissed for the reasons that follow.
I.
BACKGROUND
In August 2011, a jury found Johnson guilty of one count of murder in
Galveston County Cause Number 10CR0548. Dkt. 11-1 at 267-71. Johnson pleaded
true to one enhancement, and the court sentenced him to life in prison on August
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12, 2011. Id. Johnson’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See
Johnson v. State, No. 01-11-00820-CR, 2013 WL 4680360 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Johnson filed a petition for discretionary review (PDR) with the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, Dkt. 11-22, but it was stricken on January 15, 2014, for failing
to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9-4(i)(3). Dkt. 11-23. The Court
of Criminal Appeals gave Johnson 30 days in which to file a conforming PDR, id.,
but Johnson did not do so.
On May 9, 2018, Johnson filed an application for a state writ of habeas
corpus, alleging, among other claims, that appellate counsel provided ineffective
assistance by not filing a conforming PDR. Dkt. 11-32 at 4-23. On September 12,
2018, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief on Johnson’s application to the
extent that it gave him leave to file an out-of-time PDR. Dkt. 11-34; see also Ex
parte Johnson, No 01-11-00820-CR, 2018 WL 4344430 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept, 12,
2018) (mem. op., not designatedfor publication). The Court of Criminal Appeals
dismissed Johnson’s substantive claims as premature. Id.
Johnson filed his pro se PDR on September 25, 2018. Dkt. 11-28. On
November 7,2018, the Court of Criminal Appeals refused Johnson’s PDR. Dkt. 11-
29. Johnson did not seek further review in the United States Supreme Court. Dkt.
1 at 3.
On November 15, 2018, Johnson filed his second application for a state writ
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of habeas corpus, seeking a ruling on the substantive claims that had been
previously dismissed as premature. Dkt. 11-36 at 4-25. The state habeas trial court
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that relief be
denied on the merits. Id. at 142-50. On April 17, 2019, the Court of Criminal
Appeals denied the application without written order on the trial court’s findings
without a hearing. Dkt. 11-37; Ex parte Johnson, Writ No. 88,735-02.
On January 10, 2022, Johnson filed a third application for a state writ of
habeas corpus, contending that he had discovered new evidence showing that his
trial counsel had lied during the proceedings on Johnson’s second habeas
application. Dkt. 11-39 at 3-20. The state habeas trial court entered findings of fact
and conclusions of law, recommending that the application be dismissed. Id. at
135-37. On June 29, 2022, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Johnson’s
third application as a subsequent application. Dkt. 11-40.
On June 19, 2023, Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 to start these federal proceedings. Dkt. 1. In that petition, he
raised one claim of “actual innocence,” one claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel during jury selection, and one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
based on prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 6-7. Concerning the timeliness of his
petition, Johnson alleged that his “new” evidence shows that trial counsel “lied”
during the earlier state habeas proceedings. Id. at 9. He asks this court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on his claims and grant him relief. Id. at 7.
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The respondent filed an answer, contending that Johnson’s petition is
untimely and does not fall within any of the exceptions to the limitations period.
Dkt. io. Johnson filed a reply, contending that the limitations period should start
to run on the date he obtained the new evidence and that, alternatively, his actual
innocence excuses his untimely filing. Dkt. 16.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
One-Year Limitations Period
Johnson’s petition is governed by provisions of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (AEDPA),
which contains a one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). That one-
year period runs from the latest of four accrual dates:
(A)
the date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B)
the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States
is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;
(C)
the date on which the constitutional right
asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or
(D)
the date on which the factual predicate of the
claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due
0
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diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period is an affirmative defense, which the
respondent raised in his answer and which he contends requires dismissal of
Johnson’s petition as time-barred. Dkt. 10 at 10-15.
Because Johnson challenges a state-court judgment, his AEDPA limitations
period presumptively began to run on “the date on which the judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The pleadings and matters of record
show that Johnson’s conviction became final for purposes of federal habeas review
on February 5, 2019, the date on which his time to seek review in the United States
Supreme Court expired after the denial of his authorized out-of-time PDR.1 See
Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 2003) (providing that a state
prisoner’s conviction becomes final for purposes of § 2244 when the time to file a
petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court has expires); see also Sup. Ct.
R. 13(1) (providing that a petition for certiorari seeking review of a state-court
judgment subject to discretionary review must be filed within 90 days after entry
^‘[Wjhere a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time
direct appeal during state collateral review, but before the defendant has first sought
federal habeas relief, his judgment is not yet ‘final’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A).”
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 121 (2009). Instead, the judgment becomes final
at the conclusion of the proceedings relating to those out-of-time proceedings, including
an authorized out-of-time PDR. Id.; see also Womack v. Thaler, 591 F.3d 757,757-58 (5th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (concluding that the time for filing a § 2254 petition “began to
run after the conclusion of proceedings relating to [the petitioner’s] out-of-time PDR”).
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of the order denying discretionary review). Under § 2244(d), the deadline for
Johnson to file a timely federal habeas petition was one year later, on February 5,
2020. But Johnson did not file his federal habeas petition until June 19, 2023—
more than three years after the limitations period had expired. His claims are
therefore time-barred unless a later accrual date applies.
Under § 2244(d)(2), the time during which a properly filed application for
state habeas relief or other collateral review is pending is not counted toward the
limitations period. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 5 (2000). Johnson filed his
state habeas application on November 15, 2018—before the expiration of the
federal limitations period—and it was denied on April 17, 2019.2 Johnson is
therefore entitled to 153 days of statutory tolling due to the pendency of this state
habeas application, extending the limitations period for his federal habeas
petition until July 7, 2020. Johnson’s June 19, 2023, federal habeas petition was
filed almost three years outside this limitations period even after accounting for
statutory tolling.
Johnson filed a third application for a state writ of habeas corpus on
2Although this was Johnson’s second-in-time application, it was not considered a
successive application. See Ex parte Santana, 227 S.W.3d 700, 703-04 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (“[Wlhen an initial application presents claims challenging the validity of the
prosecution or the judgment of guilt and presents a claim concerning the denial of the
right to appeal and this Court grants an out-of-time appeal while dismissing the
remaining grounds for relief, the initial application does not qualify as an application that
challenged the conviction for purposes of [Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.07]
Section 4(a).” (citing Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469,472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997))).
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January io, 2022. Dkt. 11-39 at 3-20. This application, filed eighteen months after
the federal limitations period had already expired, does not revive or extend the
already expired limitations period, nor does it provide for additional statutory
tolling. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000). Johnson’s June
2023 federal petition is therefore time-barred unless another exception applies.
In his petition, Johnson alleges that the timeliness of his petition should be
governed by § 2244(d)(1)(D), which starts the one-year limitations period on the
date that the factual basis for his claims was discovered or could have been
discovered with the exercise of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Even
if the court were to agree, the record shows that Johnson knew of the factual basis
of his current claims for more than one year before he filed his June 2023 federal
petition.
Construed broadly, Johnson’s federal petition raises the following five
claims:
1. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to use Johnson’s
1999 arm injury as a defense by offering evidence that the injury would have
physically prevented Johnson from killing the victim in the manner
described by the medical examiner. Johnson contends that newly obtained
photos of his injuries and scars rebut trial counsel’s assertion in the state
habeas proceedings that he did not know about Johnson’s injury.
2. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to interview witness
Rodney Stoll before trial and by failing to use his description of the person
seen by the victim’s car to show that Johnson did not match that
description.
3. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to interview Meshia
Johnson, who could have testified concerning the reason she sent funds to
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Johnson in Louisiana, which would have contradicted the state’s theory that
the payment and flight to Louisiana reflected Johnson’s conscience of guilt.
4. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during jury selection by failing
to strike, either for cause or peremptorily, prospective jurors who worked
at the courthouse, who knew police officers, and who had family members
who had been murdered.
5. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
prosecutor’s improper comments during closing arguments.
Dkt. 1 at 6-7. Assuming § 2244(d)(1)(D), applies, the limitations period for these
claims began to run on “the date a petitioner is on notice of the facts which would
support a claim, not the date on which the petitioner has in his possession
evidence to support his claim.” In re Young, 789 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 2015).
As to claims 1, 4, and 5, the alleged errors occurred at Johnson’s trial, and
Johnson knew, or with reasonable diligence could have known, the factual basis
for those claims during his 2011 trial. In addition, Johnson raised claims 1,4, and
5 in his original state habeas application filed in May 2018, establishing that he
knew the factual basis for those claims at that time. Similarly, Johnson raised
claim 2 in the state habeas application he filed on November 15,2018, establishing
that he knew the factual basis for that claim at that time. Because the record shows
that Johnson knew the factual basis for these four claims almost five years before
he filed his June 2023 federal petition, claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 are untimely even if
the court considers the limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(D).
As to claim 3, the record shows that Johnson knew of the factual basis for
this claim no later than February 2020, when Meshia Johnson signed the affidavit
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that Johnson now uses in support of his claims. Because Johnson knew the factual
basis for this claim more than three years before he filed his June 2023 federal
petition, this claim is untimely even if the court considers the limitations period
under § 2244(d)(1)(D). Therefore, application of the limitations period under
§ 2244(d)(1)(D) does not make Johnson’s federal petition timely filed, and it is
time-barred unless another statutory exception applies.
But Johnson does not allege facts showing that either of the other two
statutory exceptions to the limitations period apply. He has not alleged that any
unconstitutional state action prevented him from filing his federal habeas petition
before the expiration of the limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). And
he has not alleged facts to show that his claims are based on a newly recognized
constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Thus, the record does not
establish a statutory basis to allow Johnson to avoid the effect of the limitations
period. His petition is barred by limitations unless another exception applies.
B.
Equitable Tolling
In some circumstances, equitable tolling can extend the federal habeas
limitations period. But equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy that applies
only “when strict application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable.”
Mathis v. Thaler, 616 F.3d 461, 475 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Wilson, 442
F.3d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)); see also Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d
806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable tolling applies, at the district
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court’s discretion, only “in rare and exceptional circumstances”). A “[habeas]
petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood
in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649
(2010) (cleaned up). The failure to meet the statute of limitations “must result
from external factors beyond [the petitioner’s] control; delays of the petitioner’s
own making do not qualify.” In re Wilson, 442 F.3d at 875. Thus, a “garden variety
claim of excusable neglect” does not support equitable tolling. Lookingbill v.
Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2002). Neither does an unawareness of
the law, lack of knowledge of filing deadlines, pro se status, or lack of legal
training. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171-72 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing cases).
The habeas petitioner has the burden of establishing that equitable tolling is
warranted. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; Hardy v. Quarterman, 577 F.3d 596,
598 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Even construing Johnson’s habeas petition liberally, he has not shown that
he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. He does not identify
any extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from timely filing his federal
petition. And his delay of over four years in filing his state habeas application after
his PDR was stricken, combined with the additional four-year delay between the
denial of his second state habeas application and the filing of his federal petition,
compel the court to conclude that Johnson has not diligently pursued his claims.
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Equitable tolling is not intended to benefit “those who sleep on their rights.”
Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 n.11 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Covey v. Ark.
River Co., 865 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 1989)), and Johnson’s long periods of
inactivity evince a lack of diligence. Johnson is not entitled to equitable tolling of
the limitations period, and his petition is time-barred absent another legal basis
for extending the limitations period or excusing him from it.
C.
Actual Innocence
In an effort to avoid the effect of the limitations period, Johnson alleges that
he should be excused from complying with the limitations period because he is
actually innocent. Actual innocence, if proven, may excuse a failure to file a federal
habeas petition with AEDPA’s statute of limitations and provide a “gateway” to
review otherwise time-barred claims. McQuiggen v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386
(2013). To be excused based on actual innocence, the habeas petitioner must
present “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not
presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)- In addition, the
petitioner must “persuade[] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no
juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” McQuiggen, 569 U.S. at 386 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). In making
that determination, the court must consider “all the evidence, old and new,
incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be
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admitted under rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.” House v. Bell,
547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). But “[e]vidence does not qualify as ‘new’ under the
Schlup actual-innocence standard if it was always within the reach of [the
petitioner’s] personal knowledge or reasonable investigation.” Hancock v. Davis,
906 F.3d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
In his petition, Johnson does not identify evidence that qualifies as “new”
under the Schlup and Hancock standard. While Johnson provides affidavit
testimony from Stoll and Meshia Johnson that was not presented at trial, this
testimony does not constitute “new” evidence because these witnesses testified at
Johnson’s 2011 trial and their proposed testimony was within Johnson’s
knowledge or a reasonable investigation. Likewise, the physical limitations from
Johnson’s 1999 arm injury were known to him at the time of trial, and the photos
from his surgery do not constitute “new” evidence under the Schlup and Hancock
standard as they were available to him with reasonable investigation. Similarly,
the DNA report, which shows Johnson’s DNA on the steering wheel of the victim’s
car but not the gear shift, does not constitute “new” evidence because that report
was available, and in fact was actually introduced, during the 2011 trial. Dkt. 11-11
at 207-08. This lack of “new” evidence, standing alone, bars Johnson’s claim of
actual innocence.
But even if the affidavit testimony from Stoll and Meshia Johnson could be
considered “new” evidence, it is not of such a nature as to persuade the court that
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“in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find
[Johnson] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” McQuiggen, 569 U.S. at 386
(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). Stoll testified at trial that he could not identify
the man he saw standing at the rear of the victim’s car on the evening of the
murder, and he did not identify Johnson at trial. The jury was also aware that the
clothing worn by the person Stoll saw standing by the victim’s car was different
from the clothing Johnson was wearing earlier on the night of the murder. Stoll’s
“new” testimony, which describes further differences between Johnson and the
person standing by the victim’s car on the evening of her murder, is not
sufficiently material to lead the court to conclude that it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have convicted Johnson in light of this “new”
testimony.
Similarly, Meshia Johnson testified that she sent money to Johnson by
Western Union when he was in Louisiana. It was undisputed that Johnson was
arrested after he returned to Texas. Meshia Johnson’s “new” testimony that she
sent the money specifically so that Johnson could afford to return to Texas is not
of such a nature as to negate the state’s evidence of flight or to conclude that it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror hearing the “new” testimony would
vote to find Johnson guilty.
In sum, the evidence Johnson offers in support of his actual innocence
claim fails to satisfy the demanding standard set forth in Schlup and Hancock.
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Therefore, his actual-innocence claim fails to excuse the untimely filing of his
federal petition, and his petition is dismissed as barred by limitations.
III.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Habeas corpus actions under § 2254 require a certificate of appealability to
proceed on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
335-36 (2003). Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a
district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final
order adverse to the petitioner.
A certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner makes “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2),
which requires a petitioner to demonstrate “‘that reasonable jurists would find the
district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’”
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Under the controlling standard, a petitioner must show
“that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-
El, 537 U.S. at 336 (cleaned up). A district court may deny a certificate of
appealability, sua sponte, without requiring further briefing or argument.
Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
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After careful review of the record and the applicable law, the court
concludes that reasonable jurists would not find its assessment of Johnson’s
claims debatable or wrong. Because Johnson does not allege facts showing that
his claims could be resolved in a different manner, a certificate of appealability
will not issue in this case.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the court orders as follows:
1.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Gifford Johnson, III, Dkt.
1, is denied and this action is dismissed with prejudice.
2.
All pending motions are denied as moot.
3.
A certificate of appealability is denied.
The clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties of record.
SIGNED on Galveston Island this 15 day of July, 2024.
JEFFREY VINCENT BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15
GIFFORD JOHNSON, III, Petitioner-Appellant, versus ERIC GUERRERO, DIRECTOR, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 13259; 2025 LX 164388
No. 24-40497
___________________ ____________ May 30, 2025, Filed
Notice:
REFER T° FEDERAL RULES 0F APPELLATE PROCEDURE RULE 32.1 GOVERNING THE
CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
Editorial Information: Prior History
U<?nr Nn' S’rvS ?AHPPea' fr°^ the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
UbDC No. 3.23-CV-190.Johnson v. Guerrero, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11458 (May 12, 2025)
Counsel
Gifford Johnson, III, Petitioner - Appellant, Pro se, Rosharon, TX.
...
_
, ,
For Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent - Appellee: Cara Hanna, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General Austin TX
Judges: Before SMITH, GRAVES, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.'
Opinion
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
UNPUBLISHED ORDER
Per Curiam:
Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a motion for reconsideration (5th Cir R 40 I O P 1 the
motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Because no member of the panel or judge in regular active
service requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc (Fed. R. App. P.40 and 5th Cir R 40)
the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.
'
CIRHOT
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