Petition for Rehearing — Linda Sun, Petitioner v. D.C. Office of Employee Appeals, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 15, 2026
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No. __ 25-6745
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
LINDA SUN,
Petitioner
Vv.
D.C. OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE APPEALS, ET AL.,
Respondents
On Petition for Rehearing of the Denial of
a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
LINDA SUN
Petitioner, Pro Se
4813 SOUTH DAKOTA AVENUE, NE
WASHINGTON, DC 20017-2728
(202)907-9215
Icsun8@yahoo.com
RECEIVED
MAY 19 2026
Table of Contents
page
Petition for Rehearing scwascucoucomswassnsnanwavencasveteavesans sis geydleuieeeveiGaeleeecvasSemeacascenaes 1
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.......ccccccccseccosccceseccceccececececcecess 1
Reasons for Granting Rehearing............cccccccsseeeceeseceececsecvssevseccecsuuceecessucecececs. 2
I, Intervening Circumstances of Substantial or Controlling Effect.......... 2
II. Other Substantial Grounds Not Previously Presented.........esccccscceeee. 6
A. Sun’s Convincing Mosaic of Circumstantial Evidence
Reveals Genuine Issues of Material Facts That Infer
1Discrimination and
Retaliation............ccscccessccssecesssscceauceeuseseseeseeaeceeesausecueess 7
B. Retroactive Application of Ismael Is Required to Protect
Sun’s Property Interest.............ccccccseccseseccceeseucceuseteucesuceuecs 9
C. The “Human Loss” of Sun’s Career Service Status
Satisfies the Muldrow Standard..........cccccccsseccescceeccaveceecseves 10
CONclusiON. sesssnnesmwassarineassacws snes wannasisaedenceuadciledeteGediisGeneadves soceannenoaaapeaeneenoureeass 11
Certification of Petitioner. ...........ccccccccssecsscesececcecuesseceuasvesesecsecuansecesesececcuseees 11
Index to Appendices
Appendix A
Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree, et al.
No. 25-10604 (11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025).......00.ccccceecacssecccceusceccescusesscerseenens 2a
Appendix B
42 U.S.C. § L981. ccc ascccssecenscceuecseceueseeuaeeeusecuesecesseunceueseesunsess 13a
Appendix C
Letter of employment, D.C. Department of Human Resources........066. ss 14a
Appendix D
Second Amended Complaint {{ 46-52, Sun v. District of Columbia,
No. 1:12-cv-01919 (D.D.C. May 15, 2013).........ccsscccsceecccescsssesseseeusesees 16a
Appendix E
Sun email to Taylor and Shreve regarding Taylor’s objection to her
communication with Parag Khandar, attorney, from the Asian Pacific
American Legal Resource Center...........ccccccececsescccececsatecesscssusccaveeeaecs 18a
Appendix F
Memorandum Opinion, p. 3 of 31, Sun v. District of Columbia, No. 1:12-cv-
01919 (D.D.C. September 30, 2015).........cc.ccccececcesecsscauccecceenscureeueescunss 19a
Table of Authorities
Cases page
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation
BOL U.S. 211 (1991)............0cccuecnesnssoscnssstscescosesssanscesees cee onaliQaQeUsegiseeSbeldiseasiens 9
Hittle v. City of Stockton, California, et al.
604 U.S. (2ODB)...........s.secvcrarcacscevccecssvuvcosessossecscussae cess sbleghieataawawoucauioysebiat 3,6
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
AID UES. 792) (1978)... .. .cemarannanenrmuaansamwnmnerveeounarematinecemnmmoeneer eel 1—6, 10, 11
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis
GOL U.S. 346 (2024)... ccecccceccceeceeeeseeceuseussauscuseuceueeucausueseeesecenesenessesensesens 10
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
SOO U.S. 502 (1998)... ccecssccssccseesecveeeveesseesaveseseeeeuaeeaeeuteneeuestesueeceesesenseess 2
Sun. v. District of Columbia Government, et al.
No. 16-7032 (D.C, Cir. 2017)........cccccseceeceeeeeeeceeeeseceseueceeesuesenecueesuneesenecanenes 1,5
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Constitution Article VI, Clause 2..........c.ccccsccccuceececnececcecscesseseccerecevcceevens 10
Statutes and Rules
Supreme Court Rule 44.2...........cccccsecseceeceeeveseuseeseeseeseaesaceueeuseseeueeeeesuneseneeneusss 1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)..........ccccsessscsecccuseseseucceuseusesuuceuscecuuecausenses 5
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56............cccccccccsencenceeueeecseecuceecerecsseeeeeeeees 2, 7,9
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964..........cccscceecseeeeceeeccuvsesaucecceuvenseeeanecs 3, 4
AZ U.S.C. § 1981... occ cccccceseeeeeeeeeenuueeeeeseeeueneccssesecssaeceseueeeennseeuensesuuuensesessess 2,4
DAC. Codex 1-GOG1071 a) se sanssaunsunssescanuencnsnarmsnanmsrearacnenneccumuncecs calaseacasons menace saeaacearD, 5,9
D.C. Code § 1-615.51 et seg. (D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act).........s00cscreeess 4,10
D.C. Code § 2-1402.11 (D.C. Human Rights Act)..........cccsccecesesecueceeceeeeeceeensee 4,10
D.C. Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA)..........c.csccecsecceeceuseaeesecees 5, 9, 10
DCMR Title 14 § 4004.2 (2012)
DPM § 1616.2 (2012)..............
No. 25-6745
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Petition for Rehearing
Petitioner Linda Sun respectfully requests a rehearing of her Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari (filed November 24, 2025; placed on the docket February 6, 2026;
denied April 20, 2026). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 44.2, this petition rests on
intervening circumstances of a substantial and controlling effect: the December 5,
2025 decision in Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree, et al., No. 25-10604
(11th Cir.). (App. 2a)
Because Ismael was decided on December 5, 2025—after Sun’s petition was
originally filed on November 24, 2025, and precisely as it was undergoing standard
clerical correction before being docketed on February 6, 2026—the resulting circuit
split between the 11th Circuit’s “convincing mosaic” standard and the D.C. Circuit’s
rigid McDonnell Douglas framework—as applied in Linda Christine Sun v. District
of Columbia Government, et al. 1 which remains binding and on direct review—
constitutes a substantial ground not previously capable of being presented.
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved
The intervening circuit decision prompting this petition directly implicates
42 U.S.C. § 1981, the verbatim text of which is set forth in Appendix B (App 13a) of
this petition. All other relevant provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
1 Linda Christine Sun v. District of Columbia Government, et al., No. 16-7032 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2017)
1
and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) were set forth in the
original Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
Reasons for Granting Rehearing
I. Intervening Circumstances of Substantial or Controlling Effect
While the McDonnell Douglas framework requires an employee to prove
pretext in the third prong of the test, Ismael instructs courts that under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 courts must look for genuine issues of material fact in a
totality of circumstantial evidence (the “mosaic” standard) of which pretext is a part.
Under Ismael the issue is whether the McDonnell Douglas framework supplants
Rule 56 at summary judgment. The court ruled the framework is simply a
procedural method for establishing “an order of proof and production,” quoting
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks.”
The McDonnell Douglas test provides a three-prong process to review
circumstantial evidence. In the first prong the employee must establish a prima
facie case. In the second prong the burden shifts to the employer to state legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. In the third prong, if the court
believes the employer’s reasons, the employee needs to prove the employer’s
rationale is pretextual in order to survive summary judgment.
The district court in Ismael granted summary judgment to the employer on
Ismael’s § 19813 retaliatory discharge claim because it held he failed to prove
2 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521, 113 S. Ct.
3 (a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
2
defendants’ non-retaliatory reason was a pretext. The district court decided the
McDonnell Douglas framework was identical to the standard of convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence. On appeal, the employer similarly argued pretext,
convincing mosaic, and summary judgment amounted to the same thing. The court
disagreed. It stated evidence of pretext was a subset of the mosaic of circumstantial
evidence. The court referred to the dissent in Hitile v. City of Stockton, California,‘
where Justices Thomas and Gorsuch argued against the denial of certiorari, that the
McDonnell Douglas test distorted the evidence of discriminatory intent which would
have satisfied Rule 56.
The 11* Circuit held the district court improperly conflated the McDonnell
Douglas framework and the standard of convincing mosaic, which equates with
summary judgment as a standard for employment discrimination. If an employee
presents enough “triable” issues of discriminatory intent in a convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence, the court held, the employee will always survive a motion
for summary judgment. An employee’s inability to prove pretext at this point cannot
be grounds for summary judgment because the mosaic of circumstantial evidence is
broader than pretext.
Similarly, in Sun’s case, the district court granted summary judgment to OTA
under the McDonnell Douglas framework on her Title VII and D.C. Human Rights
Act (DCHRA) claims. As in Ismael, the court found Sun “failed to produce probative
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
4 Hittle v. City of Stockton, California, 605 U.S. ___ 145 S. Ct. 759,763 (2025)
3
evidence to rebut defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her
termination.” The district court ruled Sun was an at-will employee, an error based
upon OTA’s misrepresentation to cover up Shreve’s misconduct. As a result, the
court could not find what public policy Sun was referring to in the first cause of
action, Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy—despite the fact that the
Complaint plainly stated Sun was in the Career Service with due process rights
In misconstruing Sun’s employee status as at-will, the court at first tried to
apply exceptions to the at-will doctrine and then determined they did not apply. It
also used the McDonnell Douglas test on the Whistleblower Protection Claim and
dismissed it in the same manner it did the Title VII claim. The court relied on OTA’s
reasons for the second prong of the test, and quoted OTA legislative director Joel
Cohn that “many judges only know of OTA through Ms. Sun’s transgressions.”
Cohn’s embellishment was entirely inconsistent with the record and without basis.
D.C. Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) judges Robert Sharkey, Margaret
Mangan, and the late Paul Handy among others routinely provided for Sun to attend
mediation and hearings at OAH, because 14 DCMR 4004.2 (2012) permits
nonlawyers to give technical assistance to tenants at appearances before OAH.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, conflating McDonnell Douglas with summary
judgment:
Summary judgment on appellant’s Title VII claim was proper.
Appellees offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for appellant’s
termination. Appellant has failed to produce evidence sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find that the asserted reasons were not the actual
reasons, and that appellees intentionally discriminated against hev....
Because the McDonnell Douglas framework also applies to
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the D.C. Human Rights Act,
summary judgment on those claims was also proper....Similarly, the
District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act “adopts a burdenshifting scheme that in some ways parallels federal Title VII
jurisprudence,” and the district court properly granted summary
judgment on that claim because appellant failed to “come forward with
credible evidence showing that the legitimate independent reason the
defendant offered was pretext for an actual, discriminatory motive or
did not actually motivate the challenged personnel action.®
In one fell swoop the McDonnell Douglas apparatus extinguished Sun’s rights. The
D.C. Circuit, however, did correct the district court’s “at-will” error.
Turning to appellant’s claim of wrongful termination in violation of
public policy, the parties now agree that appellant was not an at-will
employee. Thus, the common law claim of wrongful termination in
violation of public policy is unavailable, and the District of Columbia
Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act provides her sole remedy.§
Under the CMPA, rules for adverse action were specified in DPM sections
1601 through 1619.7 They applied to Career Service employees who completed a
probationary period. In an order remanding to OKA, the D.C. Superior Court
determined the applicable regulation expressing the public policy in question was
DPM § 1616.2 (2012). The OEA hearing examiner did not have a D.C. Bar license
required under D.C. Code § 1-606.01(m) to conduct the June 2020 remand hearing.
OEA conceded. The OEA Initial Decision on Remand was void. (Pet. Cert. App 63a).
As a result of the void decision the claim of wrongful termination was never
litigated under the CMPA. The D.C. Circuit’s correction of the district court’s error
5 Sun v. District of Columbia Government, et al., No. 16-7032 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a) provides findings of fact must not be set aside unless clearly
erroncous.
7 The District of Columbia Personnel Regulations are published in the District Personnel Manual
(DPM).
remains a hollow victory. Its judgment under the McDonnell Douglas framework is
still binding and now conflicts with the intervening 11 Circuit’s decision,
deepening circuit splits. By waiving their right to respond and not responding,
Respondents have elected not to contest that this case presents a clean vehicle to
address the circuit splits.
Still open on direct review, the 2017 D.C. Circuit judgment is the proper
subject of this Petition because it directly quashed Sun’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1981. The lower court's application of the McDonnell Douglas framework stands in
direct opposition to the Eleventh Circuit’s intervening decision in Ismael. This
conflict deepens a critical circuit split, making the intervening rule a substantial
and controlling change in law.
II. Other Substantial Grounds Not Previously Presented
In the original petition, Sun addressed the problems in the first and second
prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test. She noted the Court found the pretext (third)
prong of the test in Hittle v. City of Stockton® was improper. At the time Sun lacked
a clarified standard to resolve the confusion and demonstrate how the record should
survive summary judgment despite a supposed failure of the pretext prong. Like
Hitile Sun presented ample evidence of discriminatory and retaliatory intent on the
part of Taylor and Shreve who decided to terminate Sun.
The Ismael decision now provides this missing link. It allows Sun to present
for the first time the specific evidentiary tool required to show that the district
8 Mittle v. City of Stockton, California, et al., 604 U.S. ___ (2025)
6
court’s focus on the third prong affirmed by the D.C. Circuit was a legal error that
distorted the entire Rule 56 analysis on the record. Ismael explicitly holds that a
court cannot grant summary judgment based solely on a failure to satisfy the
pretext prong if the record as a whole establishes a genuine dispute of material
facts. Rather, a court must evaluate whether an employee has produced a
convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence—the specific evidentiary tool—that
would allow a jury to find for the employee.
A. Sun’s Convincing Mosaic of Circumstantial Evidence Reveals
Genuine Issues of Material Facts That Infer Discrimination and
Retaliation.
When viewed through the lens of Ismael, the administrative record reveals a
coordinated pattern of discrimination and retaliation. These are not isolated
procedural lapses, but critical tiles in a convincing mosaic:
e The record is replete with instances of Taylor’s harassment. (Pet. Cert. pp.
18-20). Taylor criticized Sun relentlessly for unauthorized practice of law
(UPL) without any basis, creating a hostile and offensive work environment.
e D.C. Superior Court Civil Rule 9a permits nonlawyers to file continuances.
Taylor berated Sun for filing a continuance for a tenant who was overseas at
the time and could not return to D.C. in time for her court appearance.
e Sun was terminated without notice just four days after disclosing Shreve was
still running her own company, reported on Dun & Bradstreet, DUNS No. 01-
377-2608. (Pet. Cert. App. 86a).
e Sun had an implied contract. After a year’s probation she had permanent
status as a Career Service employee. (App 14-17a).
OTA Attorney Advisor Andrew Gibbs drafted a fake letter that was concealed
from Sun for a year and subsequently rebutted by the tenant—hearsay
evidence which the district court nevertheless relied on to grant summary
judgment. (Pet. Cert. App. 88a)
Discovery revealed the OTA Director secretly arranged Sun’s termination with
DCHR a year in advance, demonstrating a long-term coordinated effort to
circumvent the law. (Pet. Cert. App. 96a-97a)
Taylor and Shreve commented that Sun did not know what was required in
American culture. (Pet. Cert. p. 20)
OTA objected to Sun’s unemployment benefits, an action only overturned after
the D.C. Department of Employment Services found the agency lacked
sufficient evidence.
OTA terminated Sun’s health insurance prematurely in February 2012,
depriving her of the statutory 31-day grace period and causing a months-long
lapse in coverage and loss of term life insurance eligibility.
OTA failed to provide the mandatory OEA appeal rights (OEA Rule 605) in
the Summary Removal Directive, leading the OEA ALJ eventually to find
jurisdiction over the five-year-late appeal. (Pet. Cert. App. 44a)
The Summary Removal Notice contained at least seven counts involving an
OTA tenant who refuted them in a Witness Statement. (Pet. Cert. App 71a)
But the district court used the counts for the second prong to grant summary
judgment to OTA despite the issues of material fact.
e The January 27, 2020 Order (2017 CA 007451 P(MPA)) remanded to OEA to
review DPM § 1616.2 (2012).9 OEA altered it to 16B DCMR 1616.2 which did
not exist. (Pet. Cert. App 11a).
e The OEA ALJ committed fraud on the court by misrepresenting the Superior
Court’s mandate and denied Sun her protected status under the CMPA. (Pet.
Cert. App. 6a)
e D.C. Code § 1-606.01(m) requires OEA hearing examiners must be licensed to
practice law in D.C. OEA conceded hearing examiner Joseph Lim was not
licensed. The cause of termination was never adjudicated. (Pet. Cert. App.
68a)
e The court altered a word in Sun’s evidence, “superficial,” to “supervision” to
favor OTA. (App. 18-19a)
B. Retroactive Application of Ismael is Required to Protect Sun’s
Property Interest
Under Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation,© when a court applies a rule of
federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation and
must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review. Because
this case remains pending, the Jsmael standard—which clarifies the mandatory
application of Rule 56—must be applied retroactively to Sun’s claims. The
9 “An agency head may summarily remove an employee under this section only if at the time the
summary removal action is taken, a good faith effort has been made to determine that at least one (1)
of the conditions described in §1616.1 is met; and only if the action is taken for cause pursuant to
§1603. Otherwise, the employee shall be entitled to an advance written notice as specified in §1608.”
10 Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 501 U.S. 211 (1991)
9
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution reinforces this mandate, ensuring that
federal standards are applied uniformly. Denying rehearing would leave Sun’s
Constitutionally protected property interest bound by an obsolete interpretation of
the McDonnell Douglas framework that directly conflicts with the Rule 56 analysis
established in Ismael. Retroactive application of Ismael will remedy the very harms
that Sun suffered under a lower court’s misapprehension of federal laws.
C. The "Human Loss" of Sun’s Career Service Status Satisfies the
Muldrow Standard
In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, this Court held that a plaintiff with a
discrimination claim only had to show "some harm" regarding the conditions of
employment. For several months following the summary removal, Sun suffered from
overwhelming fatigue, severe headaches, and fainting spells that limited her ability
to work only one hour at a time. Because her health insurance benefits were cut off
before the statutory grace period ended, Sun was left without the necessary coverage
to address these concerns ahead of the next enrollment period. The D.C. Circuit’s
dismissal of Sun’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981, DCHRA, and WPA claims ignored her rights
under the CMPA that created a property interest for employees in the Career
Service who could not be terminated without cause. The cause for Sun’s termination
was never adjudicated. Combined with the mosaic of circumstantial evidence, the
summary removal and the premature termination of Sun’s life and health insurance
constitute identifiable harm—facilitated by the third prong legal error—that
satisfies the Muldrow standard with room to spare.
11 Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024)
10
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the petition for rehearing
and certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand this case to the D.C. Circuit.
The substantial intervening authority of Ismael v. Roundtree directly conflicts with
the decision below, thereby deepening a persistent!® circuit split regarding the
proper application of the McDonnell Douglas framework at summary judgment—a
conflict that only this Court can resolve.
Certificate of Petitioner
I, Linda Sun, pro se Petitioner, hereby certify that the above Petition for
Rehearing is restricted to the grounds specified in Rule 44.2 (intervening
circumstances of a substantial or controlling effect or other substantial grounds not
previously presented), and is presented in good faith and not for delay.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: May 15, 2026 Linda Sun, pro se
4813 South Dakota Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20017-2728
(202) 907-9215
Icsun8@yahoo.com
13 App A, page 9a — Ismael characterizes the persistent confusion as a "McDonnell Douglas game of
whack-a-mole" where appellate courts must “strike down” new and creative misapplications of the
framework as substantive doctrine.
11
Index to Appendices
Appendix A page
Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree, et al.
No. 25-10604 (11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025).........cccccccccesceeecesecseccssevecseceseuseens 2a
Appendix B
42 ULS.C. § L981... ccc ccececccscneseccuesceceeeeesteseeaueeceeeeeesceeeeeueusteegeeveuees 18a
Appendix C
Letter of employment, D.C. Department of Human Resources............ 6+ l4a
Appendix D
Second Amended Complaint J{ 46-52, Sun v. District of Columbia,
No. 1:12-cv-01919 (D.D.C. May 15, 2018).........ccccecccsceeceeeseccessaeeeeseseeenes 16a
Appendix E
Sun email to Taylor and Shreve regarding Taylor’s objection to her
communication with Parag Khandar, attorney, from the Asian Pacific
American Legal Resource Center.........cscccscscsscscceesceeesceeensesersestansesetess 18a
Appendix F
Memorandum Opinion, p. 3 of 31, Sun v. District of Columbia, No. 1:12-cv-
01919 (D.D.C. September 30, 2015).........cccccscceceeseceeceeecseetseeseeteeseeentees 19a
la
APPENDIX A
AHMED S. ISMAEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHERIFF RICHARD ROUNDTREE, in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff
of the Richmond County Sheriff's Office, CAPT. EVERETTE JENKINS, in his
individual capacity and acting under color of law as supervisor of the Richmond
County Sheriffs Office, SGT. WILLIAM McCARTY, in his individual capacity acting
under color of law as a supervisor of the Richmond County Sheriffs Office, COL.
CALVIN CHEW, in his individual capacity acting under color of law as a
supervisor of the Richmond County Sheriff's Office, Defendants-Appellees,
AUGUSTA RICHMOND COUNTY COMMISSION, Defendant.
No, 25-10604, Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
December 5, 2025.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, D.C. Docket No. 1:22-
cv-00108-JRH-BKE.
Before ABUDU, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge.
Ahmed Ismael appeals the District Court's grant of summary judgment, which dismissed his § 1981
retaliatory discharge suit. We hold that the District Court improperly conflated the McDonnell Douglas
pretext analysis and the "convincing mosaic" standard. We reverse and remand for the District Court
to, in the first instance, apply the correct standard.
1. BACKGROUND
The Richmond County Sherrif's Office ("RCSO") hired Ismael as a deputy sheriff on March 21, 2020.
Shortly thereafter, Ismael was offered the opportunity to work an ongoing special, off-duty, assignment
providing security at the Urban Air Adventure Park in Augusta, Georgia ("Urban Air"). By mid-2021,
Ismael was promoted to "officer-in-charge" at Urban Air.
A. Ismael's Alleged Workplace Harassment
Lieutenant Everette Jenkins worked the Urban Air special assignment with Ismael. There, Ismael
alleges that Jenkins frequently harassed him because of his race. Ismael was born in the Republic of
Iraq and is a person of Arabic descent. Jenkins allegedly called Ismael a "terrorist," told him to "go play
in the sand,” and warned colleagues that Ismael "may have a bomb." Jenkins admitted to making the
terrorist comment but denied all others. 2a
The owner of Urban Air, William Gilbert, testified that he "frequently" witnessed Jenkins make racist
remarks to Ismael. General Manager Jordan Chambliss said there was "not one instance” where
Jenkins "did not refer to [Ismael] as a terrorist, or make some crude remark about sand, bombs or not
being able to speak English."
Jenkins' job performance was allegedly less than stellar. Gilbert testified that he had to ask Jenkins at
least five times to do his job instead of sitting in his car in the parking lot. He described Jenkins’ work
ethic as "unprofessional." Chambliss added that Jenkins "was late to most every shift,” often left early,
but always demanded a full paycheck.
At the same time, Jenkins was the commander of the RCSO SWAT team, which Ismael hoped to join.
Though Ismael wanted to report Jenkins’ racial harassment and poor job performance, Jenkins
allegedly warned Ismael that it would sink his chances at making the SWAT team. According to
Chambliss, Jenkins "made it abundantly clear that he could walk all over Ismael because he would be
the determining factor as to whether he would ever make it onto “his' team or approve any training."
B. Ismael's Formal Complaint and Firing
On September 13, 2021, Ismael attended a five-day SWAT team training course in Forsyth County. On
the final day, Ismael failed the written exam, and, accordingly, Jenkins told him he could not join the
team. Ismael's drive home was approximately two-and-a-half hours. Although he was driving his patrol
vehicle and still in RCSO uniform, Ismael decided to briefly visit the Burke County Sherrif's Office
("Burke County") to inquire about job openings. He was told that he could apply online and completed
his drive home.
Since Ismael was no longer a prospect for the SWAT team, Jenkins no longer had leverage over
Ismael. Accordingly, Ismael filed an internal affairs complaint on Monday, September 20, 2021. He
detailed Jenkins' offensive remarks, harassment, and general misconduct at Urban Air. Gilbert and
Chambliss submitted letters corroborating Ismael's account. At the time he filed the complaint, Ismael
was in good standing with RCSO and had no prior disciplinary infractions.
Sergeant William McCarty was assigned to investigate Ismael's complaint. McCarty's investigation
included calls to at least seven officers and an interview with Jenkins. McCarty tried to call Gilbert and
Chambliss but could not reach them. He issued his report on October 19, 2021, writing that he could
not verify Ismael's allegations and concluding: “The complaint is not sustained."
On September 23, 2021, while the investigation into Jenkins was still ongoing, McCarty received an
email from Jimmy Wylds of Burke County, inquiring about Ismael. First, McCarty forwarded the email to
RCSO Captain Glen Rahn, writing "Lookie here." Then McCarty answered Wylds:
Ismael isn't very impressive. He failed swat school and Jenkins told him he had to tum
his stuff in. So now Ismael has filed a complaint against Jenkins claiming hostile work
environment among other things which | am having to deal with. | worked a special with
him one night and he seems to have a big chip on his shoulder about something.
Discipline wise he ok...thus far. 3a
(emphasis added)
A few days later, RCSO Colonel! Calvin Chew allegedly received a call from an anonymous Burke
County deputy. According to Chew, the deputy told him about Ismael's brief pit-stop to Burke County to
inquire about job openings. McCarty emailed Wylds to confirm this information, and Wylds responded
affirmatively.
Here, the parties differ on a couple of facts. In discovery, Ismael received access to Chew's phone
records, which show that no anonymous call was received in the timeframe alleged by Chew. Ismael,
though, does not assert an alternative theory as to how McCarty and RCSO learned about his visit to
Burke County. The parties also differ on whether Ismael was technically "on duty" or “off duty” when he
stopped at Burke County, and whether his behavior violated an official RCSO policy. McCarty flipflopped as to whether Ismael was on or off duty but eventually testified: "| would probably say that he
was off duty.” Nonetheless, Appellees contend that "[w]hether he was off duty or on duty, the act of
using a patrol vehicle for personal errands is a violation of RCSO policy."
On September 28, 2021, Ismael was slated to begin work at 6:00 p.m. He scheduled an interview with
Burke County at noon, believing he would have ample time before beginning his shift. Shortly before
his interview, though, McCarty called Ismael and asked him to report to RCSO "as soon as possible."
McCarty testified that the timing was merely "coincidental." Ismael attended the interview in uniform
and then reported directly to RCSO. During the interview, Chew allegedly received a second
anonymous call, informing him that Ismael had returned to Burke County.
At this point, Rahn emailed Chew and Sherriff Roundtree the following: "Just confirmed Deputy
[Ismael] was in Burke County in our vehicle doing an interview to be hired. He will not be hired and we
will have the DR for Termination ready by the time we finish talking with him.” A few minutes later,
McCarty began the termination paperwork. The report cited a violation of RCSO's "Manner of Conduct"
policy Rule 4.41] it listed two incidents: (1) Ismael visiting Burke County on September 17, 2021, in
his patrol car to inquire about employment opportunities while he was "still on Richmond County time"
and (2) Ismael visiting Burke County on September 28, 2021, in his patrol car to interview for a
position. Sherriff Roundtree signed the termination report that same day.
C. Lawsuit and Ismael's Evidence of Retaliation
Ismael claims he was fired in retaliation for his harassment complaint against Jenkins. On August 14,
2022, Ismael sued Roundtree, Jenkins, McCarty, and Chew for retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2] He amended his complaint twice, retaining only the
§ 1981 claim. Discovery commenced, and Defendants moved for summary judgment. In response to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Ismael presented the following circumstantial evidence in
support of his claim:
* McCarty's email to Wylds, where he improperly disclosed Ismael's hostile work
environment complaint and wrote that Ismael's disciplinary status is “okay ... thus far,"
potentially suggesting it would not remain "okay" for long.
* Phone records showing that Chew did not receive any anonymous calls during the
timeframe he alleges. 4a
« Affidavits from former RCSO personnel stating that they often made personal detours
in their patrol vehicles, that supervising officers knew of the practice, and that they were
never investigated or punished.
* McCarty's testimony that he could not recall any other officer being investigated or
punished for making personal use of their patrol vehicle.
* Roundtree's inability to find records or otherwise identify specific instances of officers
disciplined for similar vehicle infractions, despite testifying that it happened in the past.
* Roundtree's testimony that he was "very good friends" with Jenkins for over twentyfive years.
* The fact that Ismael was fired only eight days after filing his complaint against Jenkins.
* Ismael's termination report, which was created before he was interviewed about or
informed of an investigation into his potential misconduct, contrary to RCSO
investigatory procedures.
* Roundtree and McCarty’s early insistence that Ismael was fired for using his patrol car
for personal errands while "on duty," followed by McCarty's acknowledgment that he
was "probably ... off duty."
* The disparity between the investigations conducted into Jenkins and Ismael.
The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment. First, the Court found that Ismael had
established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. Then, the Court found that the defendants
properly articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Ismael's termination. Finally, the Court held
that Ismael "failed to prove" that the defendants’ articulated reason was a pretext for retaliation.
ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, conducting our inquiry with the same
legal principles as the district court. Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2018).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A
genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party." Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir.
2016). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but a "mere scintilla of
evidence ... will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Young v. City of Palm Bay,
358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004).
lil. DISCUSSION
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons ... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce
contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” In 1975, the
Supreme Court held that § 1981 "affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private
5a
employment," notwithstanding other available remedies like Title vil.[3] Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S, 454, 457-61, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1719-20 (1975). In 2008, the Court held that § 1981 also
supports a private cause of action for employees who face retaliation for their complaints about
workplace discrimination. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S, 442, 445, 128 S$. Ct. 1951, 1954
(2008). _
A. The District Court Conflated McDonnell Douglas Pretext and
the Convincing Mosaic Standard
Employment discrimination and retaliation cases, including those brought under § 1981, are shaped by
the famous yet ill-understood Supreme Court holding in McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792,93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). There, the Court introduced a three-part evidentiary burden shifting
framework:
1. First, the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, which may be done by showing:
(i) the plaintiff is in a protected group; (ii) the plaintiff was well qualified; (iii) the plaintiff
suffered an adverse employment action; and (iv) the plaintiff was treated less favorably
than similarly situated employees outside of the plaintiff's protected group.
2. Second, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.
3. Third, if the employer provides an adequate reason, the plaintiff has the opportunity
to demonstrate that the employer's proffered rationale is pretextual.
See id. at 802-04, 93 S. Ct. at 1824-25; see also Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2022).
Retaliation claims (as opposed to direct discrimination claims) follow the same framework, but the
prima facie case is modified. There, a plaintiff must show: (i) that she engaged in a protected activity,
like filing a complaint for discrimination; (ii) that she suffered a material adverse action; and (iii) that
there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Chapter 7 Thy.
Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012).
The McDonnell Douglas framework is canonical; it can be found in first order across employment law
textbooks, treatises, and hornbooks. But burden-shifting regimes are hardly unique; many have existed
for centuries at common law. See, e.g., Byme v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 200 (Exch. 1863). Our Court
has repeatedly intimated that McDonnell Dougias is not all it's cracked up to be. To understand what
the framework does, we find it useful to begin by answering what it does not do.
1. McDonnell Douglas is Limited
Decisions from both the Supreme Court and our Circuit cabin the substantive application of McDonnell
Dougias. First, McDonnell Douglas "is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement,” so it has
no application on a motion to dismiss. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,_534 U.S. 506, 510, 122 S. Ct.
992, 997 (2002). Second, it plays no role at trial. Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322
(11th Cir. 1999) ("It is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas
analysis."); Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715,103 S. Ct. 1478, 1482 (1983)
6a
(reversing bench trial findings because the court “erroneously focused on the question of prima facie
case rather than directly on the question of discrimination"). This is because "once the prima facie case
has “fulfilled its role in forcing the defendant to come forward with some response,’ it no longer has any
154 (2024) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 609 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2742
(1993)). Third, the framework is inapplicable on post-trial motions. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715,103 S. Ct.
at 1482 (1983).
Most relevant here, our Court has held that McDonnell Dougias was "never was intended to be, the
sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion in an employment discrimination
a "plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence that creates a
triable issue concerning the employer's discriminatory intent" and (2) that a “triable issue of fact exists
if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker."
id. (quoting Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
This holding adopted what is often referred to as the "convincing mosaic standard.” See, e.g., Tynes,
88 F.4th at 946. We have applied it in equal measure to claims of discrimination and retaliation. Berry
v. Crestwood Healthcare, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2023) ("An employee may rely on a convincing
mosaic of circumstantial evidence to prove retaliation."). Initially, there was confusion as to whether we
had created a new analytical framework, something of a McDonnell Douglas 2.0. In time, however, we
made clear that the "convincing mosaic" analysis—despite its flowery language—is a stand-in for the
Rule 56 summary judgment standard applied to employment discrimination. See id. at 1311 ("[A]
‘convincing mosaic’ is a metaphor, not a legal test and not a framework."); Tynes, 88 F.4th at 1311
(describing the convincing mosaic standard as a "rearticulation of the summary judgment standard").
As in other contexts, a plaintiff may avoid summary judgment by presenting a wide range of
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may include "(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements...,
and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn, (2)
systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the employer's justification
is pretextual." Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting
9 a NE /|
Silverman, 673 F.3d at 733-34) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Convincing Mosaic is Broader than Pretext
Our precedent, then, makes clear that a plaintiff who cannot establish the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case is entitled to a full review under the convincing mosaic standard. But here, Ismael aid
establish his prima facie case, and the District Court advanced to steps two and three of McDonnell
Douglas. At step three, the Court held that Ismael failed to raise an inference of pretext. But the Court
was confronted with one final question: should it a/so analyze the evidence under the convincing
mosaic standard? It declined, reasoning that a separate analysis would be redundant. Relying on dicta
in Ossman v. Meredith Corp., the District Court decided that "the convincing mosaic inquiry is identical
to the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework," so it "need not decide if the convincing mosaic
7a
framework also serves as an independent basis" to support Ilsmael's claim. 82 F.4th 1007, 1020 (11th
Cir. 2023).
Appellees ask us to sign off on this interpretation. They argue that "the terms pretext, convincing
mosaic, and summary judgment are substantively the same thing" and that "the pretext prong ... is the
same as the ordinary summary judgment standard." We disagree. Though we recognize that both
inquiries are probative of the same ultimate question, we are persuaded that they are not identical.
To show pretext, a plaintiff must show "both that the [employer's] reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason" for the adverse action. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
The latter requirement unquestionably holds the same focus as the convincing mosaic standard. The
former, however, does not. Requiring a plaintiff to negate the defendant's explanation on summary
judgment has at least two defects. First, it is not required to succeed at trial. Second, it detracts from
the plaintiffs affirmative case that the driving cause was illegal discrimination or retaliation.
In Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, the Supreme Court held that claims brought
under § 1981 must show that an illicit motive was a "but-for" cause for the adverse action, rather than
merely a "motivating factor." 589 U.S. 327, 340, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). But it is not required,
under either § 1981 or Title VII, to show that the unlawful purpose was the on/y contributing factor. "
[T]he traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some
other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision." Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia,
590 U.S. 644, 656, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).
A plaintiff can even succeed where there are multiple but-for causes: "so long as the plaintiff's
[protected characteristic] was one but-for cause of [the adverse] decision, that is enough to trigger the
law." Id. at 656, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (emphasis added). In this situation, the employer's reason might be
both factually grounded and directly causal—in other words, unassailable as pretext. If we require the
plaintiff to negate their counterparty's rationale, we permit the absurd result of a plaintiff losing on
summary judgment for failing to demonstrate a falsity that she would not need to show at trial.
Moreover, focusing on the defendant's justification can lead both litigants and the court down a rabbit
hole that obfuscates the plaintiffs affirmative claim. This is precisely what we sought to avoid when we
adopted the convincing mosaic standard. See Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328. In Tynes, we emphasized that,
at summary judgment, "we ask only one question: whether there is sufficient evidentiary basis for the
jury to find that the defendant internationally discriminated against the plaintiff." 88 F.4th at 947. In
retaliation claims, we ask whether the defendant intentionally retaliated against the plaintiff because of
the plaintiffs protected activity. Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310. These questions appropriately frame the inquiry
on the plaintiffs asserted theory of the case. By contrast, the pretext inquiry lets the defendant's
explanation take center stage, requiring the plaintiff to present contradictory evidence rather than direct
or circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.
Surely, the plaintiff might find it useful to attack the defendant's account. Evidence that their
explanation is untruthful, inconsistent, or that the alleged conduct was not typically punished may ail be
probative of malfeasance. But, as we have explained before, the "entire evidentiary picture” goes
further than pretext. See Yelling _v. St. Vincent's Health Sys.,_ 82 F.4th 1329, 1242 (11th Cir, 2023). Our
precedent specifically describes evidence of pretext as a subset of potentially relevant circumstantial
evidence. /d. And, while this Circuit has no published opinion finding the requisite summary judgment
8a
inference after a plaintiff failed on pretext,!4 we have recognized the possibility, and we conduct both
analyses accordingly. See id.; Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310.
Finally, we do not think the Supreme Court intended pretext to be the sole determinate at any stage of
litigation, but especially at summary judgment. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that when a
defendant's reason for the adverse action "suffices to meet the prima facie case,” the plaintiff must "be
afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the defendant's] stated reason for [the plaintiffs] rejection was
in fact pretext.” 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S. Ct. at 1825 (emphasis added). We do not take this language to
reframe the dispositive question on summary judgment or at trial, but rather to emphasize that the
"inquiry must not end" with a defendant's plausible explanation. See id. Even taken literally, the plaintiff
is always given the "opportunity" to show pretext; our Court has simply elaborated that it is not the
"exclusive means” to survive summary judgment. See Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310.
In Burdine, the Supreme Court further explained that the plaintiff's "opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision ... merges with the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination." 450 U.S. at
256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095. "She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." /d. This appropriately categorizes pretext as an avenue
to demonstrate the defendant's illicit motive, but not as the end-all be-all.
Most recently, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented from a denial of certiorari, arguing that the
McDonnell Douglas frame-work has spawned "widespread confusion" and that the Court should offer
"clear guidance" on how lower courts should conduct their review on summary judgment. Hittle v. City
of Stockton, California, 604 U.S. : 145 S. Ct. 759, 763 (2025) (Thomas, _J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). The posture in Hittle matches the posture here; the district court granted summary
judgment “on the ground that Hittle had not shown sufficient evidence of pretext.” /d. at__, 145 S. Ct.
at 763-64. Thomas explained:
This case highlights how McDonnell Douglas may distort a lower court's analysis. Hittle
presented "ample" evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of those who decided to
terminate him. That evidence is more than likely sufficient for Hittle to establish a
genuine dispute of material fact as required by Rule 56. Yet, after applying McDonnell
Douglas, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit ruled for the city.
Id. at__, 145 S. Ct. at 764. Though we lack clarity from the Supreme Court regarding McDonnell
Douglas' appropriate role—if any—at summary judgment, we reaffirm that it is not the only game in
town, and that it does not supplant Rule 56.
A plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to confront her burden of proof head-on, if she so chooses.
Our Court's convincing mosaic standard heeds this directive and preserves the plaintiffs opportunity at
summary judgment to directly create an inference of discrimination or retaliation—"shorn of all [the]
McDonnell Douglas prophylaxis.” Tynes, 88 F.4th at 953 (Newsom, _J., concurring). For these reasons,
we hold that summary judgment should not be granted for failure to demonstrate pretext unless it also
"reflects a failure to put forward enough evidence for a jury to find for the plaintiff on the ultimate
question of discrimination" or retaliation. fd. at 947.
9a
B. The Legal Error Stifled Review of Ismael's Evidence
The previous Section explains why, as a legal matter, the District Court was wrong to conflate a
showing of pretext with the standard to survive summary judgment. If we could find that this error was
in name only, and that the district court considered all appropriate evidence, it might have been a
harmless error. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 ("[T]he court shall give judgment after an examination of the
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). But
the Court's language shows that it focused narrowly on the defendant's purported rationale and
ignored other evidence probative of Appellees’ illicit intent.
For example, Ismael presented evidence that other officers often ran errands in their patrol cars, such
as picking up food, going to the gym, and picking up children, but were never punished. The Court
found this immaterial:
[E]ven assuming the alleged personal errands were common and Defendants were
aware of these practices, they do not show the reason for [Ismael's] termination was
unworthy of credence because these are not appropriate comparators, nor do they
establish conflicting testimony regarding the reason for [Ismael's] termination. Further,
the fact that no other officer has been fired for similar conduct, without evidence
another officer has actually engaged in sufficiently similar conduct, does not prove the
stated reason was false.
(emphasis added). The Court treated just about all of Ismael's evidence this way: rejecting it unless it
"negated the proffered reason" for his termination.
As a threshold matter, Ismael does not need to “prove” anything to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Moreover, comparator evidence can still be useful even where there are "material
differences" between a plaintiff and her comparator. Tynes, 88 F.4th at 947. "[l]t is the jury's role—not
ours—to determine how much weight comparator evidence should be given." /d. at 947; see also
Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022) (finding circumstantial evidence probative even
when lacking a "strict comparator"). And, as we emphasize today, evidence does not need to attack—
or even have anything to do with—the defendant's purported rationale to help raise an inference of
discrimination.
Because the District Court only analyzed Ismael's claim through the narrow lens of McDonnell Douglas
pretext, we reverse and remand with instruction to apply the correct summary judgment standard.
Specifically, the Court should ask whether Ismael's circumstantial evidence, when artfully adhered
together and viewed as one, allows a reasonable juror to envision an image of retaliation and find in
Ismael's favor.
C. Proper Review on Summary Judgment
Today's holding takes one more swing at the McDonnell Douglas game of whack-a-mole, where we
must strike down courts that find new and creative ways to incorrectly apply the framework as
substantive doctrine. Correctly understood, McDonnell Douglas is a "procedural device, designed only
to establish an order of proof and production." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521, 113 S. Ct. at 2754. No more, no
10a.
less. Accordingly, we offer the following instruction for district courts to properly review summary
judgment motions. The roadmap differs depending on whether the plaintiff can demontrate a prima
facie case or not.
1. Plaintiff Demonstrates Prima Facie Case
If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, she is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of illicit
intent. This necessarily means that if the defendant fails to proffer evidence of a legitimate reason for
the adverse employment action, summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff is appropriate. 2]
Where, as is more common, the defendant comes forth with evidence and successfully rebuts the
presumption, "the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no longer
relevant." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. It "simply drops out of the picture.” /d. at 511, 113
S. Ct. at 2749. At this point, the court must proceed to ask whether "the record, viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a
jury to infer intentional discrimination [or retaliation] by the decisionmaker." Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328. A
showing of pretext (or lack thereof) would certainly be relevant. But a plaintiff's inability to disprove the
defendant's rationale cannot be the sole grounds for summary judgment.
2. Plaintiff Fails to Demonstrate Prima Facie Case
If the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, she does not automatically lose on summary
judgment. See Smith, 644 F.4th at 1328. In Tynes, we explained why this is so:
When the Supreme Court uses the term "prima facie case" in this context, it does so "in
a special sense." The Court itself has explained that although that phrase may
sometimes "describe the plaintiffs burden of producing enough evidence to permit the
trier of fact to infer the fact at issue,” within the McDonnell Douglas framework the term
“prima facie case" has a different meaning—it marks "the establishment of a legally
mandatory, rebuttable presumption."
88 F.4th at 945 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7, 101 S.Ct. at 1094) (internal citations omitted).
Rather than lose by default, the consequence is that the plaintiff must produce enough evidence, on
her own and without any helpful evidentiary burdens or presumptions, to demonstrate a material issue
of triable fact. A court, therefore, should advance directly to the convincing mosaic inquiry.
A helpful analogy can be drawn to the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur for negligence. If a
plaintiff invokes that doctrine, the court must determine whether "the plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for
a reasonable jury to find ... the accident is of the type that usually happens because of negligence."
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 17 cmt. j (A.L.I. 2010). If the court so finds, some
jurisdictions employ a “rebuttable presumption, thereby requiring the defendant to come forward with
some exculpatory evidence or suffer judgment as a matter of law." /d. This “level[s] the playing field
and encourage[s] the defendant to disclose relevant evidence." /d. cmt. i. But a court would never
grant summary judgment just because a plaintiff failed res ipsa's threshold inquiry. Instead, it would
evaluate the plaintiffs evidence under the appropriate summary judgment standard for ordinary
negligence, without any inferences or presumptions.
11a
McDonnell Douglas, like res ipsa, offers plaintiffs an evidentiary advantage if their case satisfies a
preliminary assessment, namely, the prima facie case. If plaintiffs cannot satisfy that test, the inquiry
does not end. Rather, a district court must turn to evaluate the evidence before it, applying the duly
promulgated Rule 56 summary judgment standard.
iV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and
remand for the
District Court to apply the correct summary judgment standard in the first instance.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
[1] Rule 4.4 reads, in relevant part: "An off-duty employee will not conduct themselves in a manner as to reflect
discredit upon the Sherriffs Office."
[2] Ismael also alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection under law in violation of both 42 U.S.C. §§
1985 and 1986. These counts were jater dropped.
{3] State and local government employees must bring their § 1981 claims under § 1983, because it serves as the
“exclusive federal remedy for violations of the rights guaranteed in § 1981 by state governmental units." Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2722 (1989). Here, plaintiffs appropriately brought
their action under § 1983.
[4] In a 2023 unpublished opinion, however, we found exactly this. See Brown v. Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, No. 21-
41328, 2023 WL 2386500, at *6 (11th Cir. Mar. 7, 2023). There, we concluded that the plaintiff did not show pretext
under McDonnell Douglas but that he did present a convincing mosaic of discriminatory intent because that
standard allowed him to add his "more general evidence of discriminatory intent to the equation." /d.
[5] Or, if only the defendant has moved for summary judgment, the court must reject that motion.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.
12a
APPENDIX B
42 U.S. Code § 1981 - Equal Rights Under the Law
(a) Statement of Equal Rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other.
(b) “Make and Enforce Contracts” Defined
For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
(c) Protection Against Impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
13a
ty
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Department of Human Resources
:.o.@ 8
fies SPE APPENDIX C
SERS
September 6, 2007
Linda Sun
716 Madison Street, NW
Washington. DC. 20002
Dear Ms. Sun:
This is to confirm your September 6, 2007 oral acceptance of our offer of employment
with the District of Columbia government. You were selected under Vacancy
Announcement No. 6975 for the position of Program Support Specialist, DS-301-11/4, at
an annual salary of $53,639. This position is in the District of Columbia Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 941 North Capitol Street, NE #9300. As previously
agreed, the effective date of your appointment is Monday September 17, 2007. You will
be appointed in the Career Service.
Persons appointed in the Career Service are subject to the satisfactory completion of a
one-year (1-year) probationary period, you will be required to complete the one-year (1-
year) probationary period.
This position is not covered under collective bargaining.
You will be eligible to receive health insurance, retirement, and life insurance benefits.
More information about these benefits is available on our website at www. dcop.de.gov.
In accordance with the requirements of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
of 1986, any person accepting employment in the United States is required to complete a
Form 1-9, Employment Eligibility Verification. This form must be completed when you
report for processing. At that time you must present original documents that establish
your identity and employment eligibility, as follows:
e One (1) document from List A on Enclosure A: or
e If you do not have one (1) of these documents, you will need to provide one (1)
document from List B on Enclosure A to establish identity; and
e One (1) document from List C on Enclosure A to establish employment
eligibility.
We will make copies of your documents for our records and return the originals to you.
14a
2000 14" Street 4" Floor, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20009
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.