Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Timothy Rosin, Petitioner v. Kimberly Hill

3fn tlje Supreme (Court of tFje Bniteb States

TIMOTHY ROSIN,

Petitioner,

v.

KIMBERLY HILL, in her personal capacity,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

APPENDIX

Timothy Rosin

6000 Arbutus Lane

Clinton, MD 20735

(301) 848-3243

Pro Se Petitioner

Twenty-ninth day of November, MMXXV

United States Commercial Printing Company • www.uscpc.us • (202) 866-8558

App-i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A

Opinion [Not Precedential], United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit, Timothy Rosin v. Kimberly Hill,

in her personal capacity,

No. 24-2025 (Sep. 2, 2025)............................ App-1

Appendix B

Judgment [affirming district court

summary judgment], United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,

Timothy Rosin v. Kimberly Hill, in her

personal capacity,

No. 24-2025 (Sep. 2, 2025)............................ App-4

Appendix C

Memorandum

opinion

[summary

judgment for Hill granted] United States

District Court for the District of

Maryland, Timothy Rosin v. Kimberly

Hill,

No. 8:21-cv-00983-TDC (Sep. 10, 2024).... App-5

App-ii

Appendix D

Transcript of the deposition of Kimberly

A. Hill, United States District Court for

the District of Maryland, Timothy Rosin

v. Kimberly Hill,

No. 8:21-cv-00983-TDC (Apr. 4, 2024)..... App-20

Appendix E

Demotion Letter (May 7, 2018).................. App-22

App-1

Appendix A

[Filed: Aug. 18 2025]

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2025

TIMOTHY ROSIN,,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

KIMBERLY HILL, in personal capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:21-cv-00983TDC)

Submitted:

August 28, 2025

Decided:

September 2, 2025

App-2

Before GREGORY, QUATTLEBAUM, and HEYTENS,

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bryan A. Chapman, LAW OFFICE OF BRYAN A.

CHAPMAN, Mitchellville, Maryland, for Appellant.

Andrew G. Scott, Briah M. Gray, PESSIN KATZ LAW,

P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in

this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Timothy Rosin appeals the district court’s order

granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have reviewed

the parties’ briefs and the joint appendix, and we

conclude that Rosin has waived appellate review of

the district court’s order by failing to sufficiently

develop his appellate arguments in the opening brief.

Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 615 (4th Cir. 2023)

(“A party waives an argument by failing to present it

in its opening brief or by failing to develop its

argument— even if its brief takes a passing shot at

the issue.” (citation modified)), cert, denied, 144 S. Ct.

2631 (2024). Even if Rosin had not waived review,

we find no reversible error in the district court’s

decision to grant summary judgment on his

procedural due process claim.

Accordingly, we

App-3

affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

App-4

Appendix B

FILED: September 2, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2025

(8:21-cv-00983-TDC)

TIMOTHY ROSIN

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

KIMBERLY HILL, in personal capacity,

Defendants - Appellee.

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the decision of this court,

the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance

of this court’s mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App.

P. 41.

Zs/ NWAMAKA ANOWL CLERK

App-5

Appendix C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

TIMOTHY ROSIN,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.

TDC-21-0983

v.

KIMBERLY HILL,

Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Timothy Rosin has filed this civil

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which

Defendant Kimberly Hill, Superintendent of the

Charles County Public Schools (“CCPS”), is the sole

remaining defendant. Rosin alleges a violation of his

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution based on his

demotion from his position as the principal of Indian

Head Elementary School to vice principal of GaleBailey

Elementary

School

in

May

2018.

Superintendent Hill has filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment, which is fully briefed. Having reviewed the

briefs and submitted materials, the Court finds that

no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For

the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary

Judgment will be GRANTED.

App-6

BACKGROUND

The Court has issued two prior opinions in this

case, one resolving a Motion to Dismiss and one

resolving

Superintendent

Hill’s

Motion

for

Reconsideration of that ruling, both of which are

incorporated by reference. Rosin v. Bd. Of Educ. of

Charles Cnty. (“Rosin I”), No. TDC-210983, 2021 WL

4554342 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 2021); Rosin v. Hill (“Rosin

II”), No. TDC-21-0983,2022 WL 3621478 (D. Md. Aug.

23, 2022).

Rosin served as the principal of Indian Head

Elementary School (“Indian Head”), located in Indian

Head, Maryland, from 2013 to 2018. During his fiveyear tenure as principal at Indian Head, CCPS

provided him with five annual performance

evaluations corresponding to each school year. In his

first three evaluations, relating to the 2013-2014,

2014-2015, and 2015-2016 school years, Rosin was

rated “highly effective.” Joint Record (“J.R.”) 42, 10506, ECF No. 63. For both the 2016-17 and 2017-18

school years, Rosin was rated “effective.” J.R. 107-10.

I.

The Personnel Action

On April 12, 2018, Superintendent Hill, CCPS

Deputy Superintendent Amy Hollstein, and CCPS

School Administrator Linda Gill met with Rosin and

his union representative, Daniel Besseck. At this

meeting, Hill verbally informed Rosin that, by her

decision, CCPS would “transfer or reassign” Rosin

“from the principalship at Indian Head to a vice

principalship” at a different elementary school, which

had not yet been identified. J.R. 39. Hill also told

App-7

Rosin that his salary would be held intact for two

years. At her deposition, Hill testified that this

decision was made “under the authority of [section]

6—201 “ of the Education Article of the Maryland

Code (“Section 6—201”), Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 6—

201(b)(2)(h) (LexisNexis 2022), which she described as

providing a school superintendent with the “authority

to transfer and reassign employees for the good of the

school district.” J.R. 39. Section 6—201 provides that:

as to “[a]ll principals, teachers, and other certificated

personnel,” the county superintendent shall: “(i)

Assign them to their positions in the schools; (ii)

Transfer them as the needs of the schools require; (iii)

Recommend them for promotion; and (iv) Suspend

them for cause and recommend them for dismissal in

accordance with § 6—202 of this subtitle.” Md. Code

Ann., Educ. 6-201(b)(2).

As reflected in contemporaneous notes taken by

Besseck and Gill, Hill and the other CCPS officials

discussed Rosin’s performance as principal of Indian

Head and some of the reasons for the personnel action.

At his deposition, Besseck testified that in informing

Rosin of the transfer, Hill told Rosin that his

principalship was “not strong at this time” and that

the “evidence” did not show that he was the “right fit”

or “right for [the] job.” J.R. 10. In discussing some of

the concerns about Rosin’s performance as principal,

Hill or one of the other CCPS officials stated that

Rosin was not effectively utilizing available “Title I”

funds, consisting of additional grant funding provided

to schools with a certain percentage of children living

in poverty, and that he may not have understood how

to use those funds. J.R. 10. In addition, they discussed

concerns raised in a teacher survey, including that

App-8

teachers believed that the school administration’s

response to discipline was leading to lower

achievement, and that professional development

activities were “scattered.” J.R. 9. According to Gill’s

notes, Hill told Rosin that his skills “don’t seem to

have evolved” with the changing needs of the principal

position, and that his skills were “best used” as a vice

principal. J.R. 33.

On May 7, 2018, Rosin received a letter from

Nikial Majors, the CCPS Executive Director of

Human Resources. The letter stated that Hill “is

reassigning you in the best interest of the school

system to a vice principal position at Gale-Bailey

Elementary School (“Gale-Bailey”) for the 2018-2019

school year.” J.R. 44. The letter also informed Rosin

that his salary would be frozen at his current level as

a principal for two school years if he “remain[ed]

employed as a vice principal in good standing,” after

which the salary would be “adjusted appropriately for

the position you are then serving.” J.R. 89. According

to Rosin, his salary was frozen consistent with the

terms of the letter for the first full year after the

personnel action, the 2018-2019 school year at GaleBailey, and for approximately half of his second school

year at Gale-Bailey, until his reassignment to a

teaching position at John Hanson Middle School

following a playground incident at Gale-Bailey.

Hill did not consider this personnel action to

implicate the procedural requirements of section 6202 of the Education Article (“Section 6—202”), which

expressly provides procedures to govern the

suspension or dismissal of a public school employee,

including a “teacher, principal, supervisor, assistant

superintendent, or other professional assistant,” by

App-9

the relevant county board of education “[O]n the

recommendation of the county superintendent.” Md.

Code Ann., Educ. § 6-202(a)(l)(i)(v). Under this

provision, employees may be suspended or dismissed

for

“[i]mmorality,”

“[m]isconduct

in

office,”

“[i]nsubordination,” “[i]ncompetency,” or “[w]illful

neglect of duty.” Id Before such an employee may be

removed from a position for such reason, “the county

board [of education] shall send the individual a copy

of the charges against the individual” and give the

individual an opportunity to request a hearing before

the Board or an arbitrator. Id. 6—202(a)(2)(i). At her

deposition, Hill stated that the personnel action “was

not a disciplinary action [or] a termination” of Rosin’s

employment, J.R. 40, and that it was “never my

intention to suspend or dismiss” Rosin. J.R. 39. As a

result, Hill did not inform Rosin of any “formal

charges” from among the potential reasons for

suspension or dismissal set forth in Section 6-202. Id.

IL

Procedural History

On April 21, 2021, Rosin filed suit against Hill,

Hollstein, and the Board of Education of Charles

County (“the Board”), alleging due process violations

and age discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§

1983”) and state law claims of defamation and breach

of contract based on the May 2018 demotion from

principal of Indian Head to vice principal of GaleBailey (“the Indian Head demotion”) and his

November 2019 demotion from vice principal of GaleBailey to classroom teacher. After Defendants filed a

Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure the Court issued a memorandum opinion

App-10

granting in part and denying in part the Motion. See

Rosin I, 2021 WL 4554342, at *10. The Court granted

the Motion to Dismiss as to all claims except the 1983

due process claim against Hill relating to the Indian

Head demotion. See id. In that claim, Rosin alleged

that Hill violated his due process rights when “he was

informed on May 7, 2018 that he was being demoted

from principal to vice principal” because (I) “[t]he

letter did not state a specific reason for [his] demotion”;

and (2) it “did not identify a procedure for appealing

the demotion.” Compl. 176-77, ECF No. I. In denying

the Motion to Dismiss as to that claim, the Court held

that Rosin “may proceed based only on the alleged

failure to provide Rosin with a reason for his demotion,

not based on the alleged failure to notify him of his

right to appeal that demotion.” Rosin I, 2021 WL

4554342, at *9. Hill later filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, which was denied. Rosin II, 2022 WL

3621478, at *1. Hill then filed an Answer, and the

parties engaged in discovery.

DISCUSSION

In the present Motion, Hill seeks summary

judgment in her favor pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56 on the sole claim remaining in this

case, the 1983 due process claim against her based on

the Indian Head demotion in May 2018. As grounds,

Hill argues that (I) Rosin did not have a property

interest in his position as a principal under Maryland

law; (2) Rosin was not deprived of any property

interest; (3) even if Rosin had been deprived of a

property interest, he was provided sufficient due

process; and (4) in the alternative, Hill is entitled to

App-11

qualified immunity. In Rosin I and Rosin 11, the

Court found that Rosin had stated a plausible claim

that he had a property interest in his position as a

principal. Rosin I, 2021 WL 4554342, at *8; Rosin 11,

2022 WL 3621478, at *3-4. The Court need not decide

whether the record evidence is sufficient to support a

finding that he had such a property interest because,

even assuming that he did, summary judgment is

warranted because the undisputed evidence

demonstrates that he received notice of the reasons

for the demotion, and any claim that additional

procedural steps were required is barred by qualified

immunity.

1.

Legal Standard

Under Rule 56, the Court grants summary

judgment if the moving party demonstrates that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), In assessing such a motion,

the Court views the facts in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences

drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on

facts supported in the record, not simply assertions in

the pleadings. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club,

346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). A fact is “material”

if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute

of material fact is “genuine” only if sufficient evidence

favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of

fact to return a verdict for that party, [d. at 248-49.

App-12

IL

Notice of Reasons

In the Complaint, as to the only remaining

cause of action, Rosin asserts in Count 3 that his due

process rights were violated because he was demoted

from principal to vice principal without receiving a

“specific reason” for his demotion and without being

informed of a procedure by which to appeal the

demotion. Compl. 176, In denying the Motion to

Dismiss as to this claim, the Court limited the claim

to whether Rosin’s due process rights were violated

because he did not receive a specific reason for the

demotion. Rosin I, 2021 WL 4554342, at *9. As noted

in Rosin II, there are various potential sources of a

due process right to notification of the reason for the

demotion. For example, although Section 6—201 does

not explicitly impose any notice requirement, Article

9 of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)

between the Board and the Education Association of

Charles County, which was in effect at the time of the

Indian Head demotion, provides that a school

employee may not be subjected to an involuntary

transfer or demotion “without notice of the reason” for

the transfer. Rosin II, 2022 WL 3621478, at *4.

Specifically, the CBA provides that “[aln involuntary

transfer will be made only after a meeting between

the employee and his or her supervisor, at which time

the employee will be notified of the reason for the

transfer,” and that an employee who objects may then

“request a meeting with the Superintendent.” J.R. 4;

see Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311, 352 (4th

Cir. 2022) (holding that an employment dispute

resolution plan adopted by a court provided

employees “with substantive rights that are protected

App-13

property interests” for purposes of a due process

claim); Cheli v. Taylorville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 986 F.3d

1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding that a collective

bargaining agreement which established that an

employee could not be terminated except “for

reasonable cause . . . created a protected property

interest for which he was entitled to due process”).

Upon review of the record developed during

discovery, the Court finds that, even assuming that

Rosin had a property interest in his position as a

principal and that due process required a meeting and

notice of the reason for the demotion, pursuant to the

CBA or otherwise, there is no genuine issue of

material fact over whether Rosin received such notice.

The record evidence, including the deposition

testimony of Hill and Besseck, establishes that Hill,

accompanied by Hollstein and Gill, had a meeting

with Rosin on April 12, 2018 and directly informed

him that he was being reassigned from principal of

Indian Head to vice principal of Gale-Bailey. In that

meeting, Hill generally asserted that Rosin was being

reassigned to vice principal because his principalship

was “not strong at this time” and that the “evidence”

did not show that he was the “right fit” or “right for

[the] job.” J.R. 10. Hill provided certain specific facts

supporting this conclusion, including that he had not

effectively used Title I funds and did not appear to

understand how to use them, that there were concerns

raised in a teacher survey, particularly in relation to

student disciplinary policies, and that his skills had

not evolved to match the needs of the principal

position. Thus, the record evidence establishes that

Rosin was provided the reasons for the personnel

action. To the extent that the CBA requires that a

App-14

school employee facing an involuntary transfer must

also be notified of the right to request a meeting with

the superintendent, that requirement was satisfied by

the fact that Rosin was, in fact, provided with such a

meeting.

In opposing the Motion, Rosin primarily

provides reasons for his belief that the personnel

action was unjustified, including because it was unfair

to hold Rosin responsible for teacher dissatisfaction

with student disciplinary policies where a recently

enacted state law limiting the suspension or expulsion

of disruptive students had curtailed his ability to

remove students from the classroom. He asserts that

the demotion was therefore arbitrary and capricious

and violated a Maryland regulation providing that

when the State Board of Education considers the

appeal of a decision by a local board of education, the

State Board may not substitute its judgment for that

of the local school board unless the decision was

“arbitrary or unreasonable” in that it was “contrary to

sound educational policy” or “a reasoning mind could

not have reasonably reached the conclusion the local

board or local superintendent reached.” Md. Code

Regs. 13A.01.05.06(B) (2023). This argument is

unpersuasive because Rosin’s claim as articulated in

the Complaint is one of procedural due process arising

from an alleged failure to provide notice of the reason

for the personnel action. See Compl. 176-77. Rosin

never alleged in the Complaint a claim that the action

violated this regulation or any other substantive claim

against the personnel action. A plaintiff may not

amend the complaint in a brief opposing a motion for

summary judgment. Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v.

App-15

Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 455 F. Supp. 2d 399, 435-36

(D. Md. 2006).

Significantly, Rosin has not shown how his

claim that his demotion was arbitrary and capricious

within the meaning of the identified state regulation

constitutes a violation of procedural due process

under the Constitution. He did not claim, and there is

no authority supporting the argument, that

procedural due process is violated solely because the

plaintiff believes that the reasons for a personnel

action were not justified.

Notably, in his deposition, Rosin specifically

stated that he did not dispute Hill’s account of what

was said at the April 12, 2018 meeting, or the notes

taken by Besseck and Gill, which memorialize some of

the stated reasons for the personnel action.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine

issue of material fact on the issue of whether Rosin

received notice of the reasons for his demotion to vice

principal. Where this alleged failure was the basis of

Rosin’s due process claim, the Court will grant

summary judgment on Count 3.

Ill.

Qualified Immunity

In the alternative, to the extent that Rosin may

argue that Hill’s stated reasons were insufficient, or

that additional process was required, Court finds that

Hill is entitled to qualified immunity from such claims

because there is no clearly established law requiring

additional safeguards. As stated in Rosin I, when

qualified immunity is asserted, a court must consider

two questions: (1) whether the facts, viewed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the

official violated a constitutional right; and (2)

App-15

Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 455 F. Supp. 2d 399, 435-36

(D. Md. 2006).

Significantly, Rosin has not shown how his

claim that his demotion was arbitrary and capricious

within the meaning of the identified state regulation

constitutes a violation of procedural due process

under the Constitution. He did not claim, and there is

no authority supporting the argument, that

procedural due process is violated solely because the

plaintiff believes that the reasons for a personnel

action were not justified.

Notably, in his deposition, Rosin specifically

stated that he did not dispute Hill’s account of what

was said at the April 12, 2018 meeting, or the notes

taken by Besseck and Gill, which memorialize some of

the stated reasons for the personnel action.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine

issue of material fact on the issue of whether Rosin

received notice of the reasons for his demotion to vice

principal. Where this alleged failure was the basis of

Rosin’s due process claim, the Court will grant

summary judgment on Count 3.

Ill.

Qualified Immunity

In the alternative, to the extent that Rosin may

argue that Hill’s stated reasons were insufficient, or

that additional process was required, Court finds that

Hill is entitled to qualified immunity from such claims

because there is no clearly established law requiring

additional safeguards. As stated in Rosin I, when

qualified immunity is asserted, a court must consider

two questions: (1) whether the facts, viewed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the

official violated a constitutional right; and (2)

App-16

“whether the right was clearly established,” that is,

“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001);

see Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 2007).

For qualified immunity to apply, only one of the

questions has to be resolved in favor of the defendant.

See Henry, 501 F.3d at 377, Courts may address the

questions in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 236 (2009).

Whether a right was “clearly established” turns

on whether “the contours of the right [were]

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what [the official] is doing violates

that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987). In assessing this question, a court generally

considers whether the right is found in “cases of

controlling authority in [this] jurisdiction”—here, the

United States Supreme Court, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the

Supreme Court of Maryland—but it may also consider

“a consensus of cases of persuasive authority from

other jurisdictions” as a basis to find that the conduct

was barred by clearly established law. Booker v. S.C.

Dep’t of Corrs., 855 F.3d 533, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2017)

(citations omitted). A court seeks to identify a case in

which a government official “acting under similar

circumstances ... was held to have violated” the right.

White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017); see Safar v.

Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2017). Although

the facts of such a case need not be “identical” to the

present facts, Safar, 859 F.3d at 248, it should be

“obvious” that the case applies to the facts, White, 137

S. Ct. at 552.

App-17

Here, to the extent that Rosin could argue that

the reasons for his reassignment offered by Hill were

insufficiently specific, he has not shown that there is

clearly established law requiring any greater level of

specificity, and the Court has found none. In

particular, to the extent that Rosin argues that Hill

had to provide the type of notice referenced in Section

6-202, which requires that when suspending or

demoting a principal or comparable official, the Board

must “send the individual a copy of the charges

against the individual” consisting of a charge of

immorality, misconduct in office, insubordination,

incompetency, or willful neglect of duty, as well as

notice of the right to a hearing before the Board, Md.

Code Ann., Educe 6—202(a), there is no clearly

established law providing that due process requires

these protections under the circumstances present

here. First, although the Court relied in part on

Section 6—202 in concluding that Rosin had

sufficiently alleged a property interest in his position

as a principal, the Court also held that the specific

procedural protections required are a matter of

federal law. See Rosin II, 2022 WL 3621478, at *3-5

(citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.

532, 541 (1985) and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,

455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982)). Rosin has not identified any

controlling authority or consensus of persuasive

authority establishing that, as a matter of federal law,

when a school employee is being reassigned or

demoted to a lower position but with the same pay for

a temporary period of time, any procedural

protections beyond notice of the reason for the action

and a meeting with the superintendent are

constitutionally required. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ.

App-18

v, Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (“The

essential requirements of due process . . . are notice

and an opportunity to respond.).

Second, there is no controlling authority

definitively establishing that the protections of

Section 6—202 are required in the scenario at issue

here. Although the Court has previously outlined how

a demotion of a principal to a lower-level position that

eventually results in lower pay arguably goes beyond

a mere transfer or reassignment covered by Section

6—201, and instead could be deemed to be the

equivalent of a suspension or dismissal subject to the

protections of Section 6—202, there is no controlling

authority on this issue. See Rosin I, 2021 WL 4554342,

at *8; Rosin 11, 2022 WL 3621478, at *2-3. Indeed,

Hill has cited an administrative ruling that it argues

supports the position that Section 6—202 does not

apply to such a demotion. See, e.g, Hayes v. Bd: Of

Educ. of Carroll Cnty., MSBE op. No. 719, at 725 (Jan.

31, 1978).

Finally, the record evidence developed in

discovery shows that under the specific facts of this

case, a reasonable official in Hill’s position would not

necessarily understand that failing to meet the notice

requirements of Section 6—202 in this instance would

violate due process. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.

While Section 6—202 relates to “[g]rounds for

discipline,” Md. Code Ann., Educ. 6-202, Hill testified

that her decision to reassign Rosin was not

disciplinary and was based on her belief that he “was

not as effective” in the principal role but that “he still

had many skills and talents to offer the children of our

district and I felt that those skills and talents could

be best utilized in the vice principal position.” J.R. 40.

App-19

Besseck, Rosin’s union representative, acknowledged

that Hill’s action relating to Rosin was an

administrative transfer permitted by Section 6—201,

and that it was “non-punitive” and “non-disciplinary. ”

J.R. 13. Under these circumstances, the Court

concludes that, at a minimum, there is no clearly

established law demonstrating that a reasonable

official in Hill’s position would necessarily

understand that the personnel action taken against

Rosin was covered by Section 6—202, or that the

notice requirements of that provision are required by

due process.

Thus, the Court finds that summary judgment

in favor of Hill is also warranted because she has

qualified immunity from Rosin’s due process Claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Hill’s Motion for

Summary Judgment will be GRANTED. A separate

Order shall issue.

Date: September 10, 2024 /s/Theodore D. Chuang

THEODORE D. CHUANG

United States

District Judge

App-20

Appendix D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

(SOUTHERN DIVISION)

TIMOTHY ROSIN,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs .

* Civil Action No.: .

KIMBERLY HILL, et al. * 8:21-cv-00983-TDC

Defendants . *

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The deposition of KIMBERLY A. HILL was

taken on Thursday, April 4, 2024, commencing at

11:01 a.m. , at the offices of Charles County Public

Schools, 5980 Radio Station Road, Room

158, La Plata, Maryland, before Melissa Fleming,

Notary Public.

[Page 72 reproduced]

App-21

What I do believe and what I will say is

that Mr. Rosin was not competent as a principal,

but I felt he could still be competent as a vice

principal. So it was less about which school and

more about the skill set needed to do a job.

He is very good with children. They love

him. And a vice principal is someone who deals

more with the kids, whereas, when you’re just

dealing with the adults that’s more of the

principal’s role.

MR. CHAPMAN: Okay. All right. 1 appreciate

your response.

(Hill Deposition Exhibit Number 11 was

marked for identification.)

BY MR. CHAPMAN:

Q. Let! s take a look at page 7, Interrogatory

Number 5.

A. Okay

Q. And could you begin reading that first section

down towards where it says Maryland

Education Code.

App-22

Appendix E

[Logo of Charles County Public Schools]

Charles County Public Schools

5980 Radio Station Road

P.O. Box 2770

La Plata, MD 20646

Main line: 301-932-6610

___________________________________ www.ccboe.com

Kimberly A. Hill, Ed.D.

Office of Human Resources

Superintendent of Schools____________ 301-937-7255

Fax: 301-934-7235

Nikial M. Majors

Executive Director of Human Resources

May 7, 2018

Mr. Timothy Rosin

6000 Arbutus Lane

Clinton, MD 20735

Dear Mr. Rosin,

Superintendent Kimberly A. Hill is reassigning you in

the best interests of the school system to a vice

principal position at Gale Bailey Elementary School

for the 2018-20 J 9 school year. You will have the title

of vice principal, and if you remain employed as a vice

principal in good standing, your salary will be frozen

at your current 2017-2018 level for two school years.

Subsequent to that time, your salary will be adjusted

appropriately for the position you are then serving.

App-23

This reassignment will be made public on May 8, 2018

at the conclusion of the Board Meeting, at which time

many school-based administrative assignments for

next year will be announced. You may inform your

staff, your school community, and others that you are

making this move for your own personal reasons. If

you would like assistance with your message to your

staff and school community, please feel free to contact

Katie O'Malley-Simpson in ext. 7221.

Thank you for your continued service to Charles

County Public Schools.

Sincerely,

Zs/ Nikial M Majors

Nikial M. Majors, SPHR, SHRM-SCP

Executive Director of Human Resources