Respondents Brief — Rodrigue Alain Ndje Nlend, Petitioner v. Suzanne Parisien, Judge, Superior Court of Washington, King County
Supreme Court briefMar 4, 2026
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No. 25-6685
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
RODRIGUE ALAIN NDJE NLEND,
Petitioner,
v.
SUZANNE PARISIEN, JUDGE, SUPERIOR
COURT OF WASHINGTON, KING COUNTY,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Washington
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Leesa Manion (she/her)
Prosecuting Attorney
Jerry Taylor
Senior Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney
Counsel of Record
King County Prosecuting
Attorney’s Office
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 477-1120
jerry.taylor@kingcounty.gov
Attorneys for Respondent
132010
A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Washington Supreme Court’s orders that Petitioner failed to
meet the statutory requirements for either writ of mandamus or prohibition is
an adequate and independent state-law ground for judgments.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED .............................................................................. i
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF APPENDICES ........................................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... iv
JURISDICTION ............................................................................................. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS .......................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................................... 1
A.
Dissolution Proceedings .................................................................. 1
B.
Posttrial Motions ............................................................................. 3
C.
Extraordinary Writs at the Washington Supreme Court ................. 6
Writ of Prohibition .......................................................................... 6
Writ of Mandamus........................................................................... 7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 8
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 10
A.
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Washington
Supreme Court Orders dismissing the petitions for writ of
mandamus and prohibition ............................................................ 10
1.
B.
State Law Requirements For Extraordinary Writs To
Issue..................................................................................... 11
The Washington Supreme Court Judgments Were Not
Erroneous....................................................................................... 14
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 21
ii
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, FILED APRIL 2, 2025 ............................ 1a
APPENDIX B — RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, FILED MAY 2, 2025 ............................... 5a
APPENDIX C — RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
RCW 7.16.160 Grounds for granting writ ................................................ 8a
RCW 7.16.170 Absence of remedy at law required—Affidavit .............. 9a
RCW 7.16.290 Prohibition defined ........................................................ 10a
RCW 7.16.300 Grounds for granting writ—Affidavit ........................... 11a
ORIGINAL ACTION AGAINST STATE OFFICER ........................... 12a
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) ................................ 11
Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n on Behalf of Washington-Licensed Members v.
Kreidler,
200 Wn.2d 654, 520 P.3d 979 (2022) ..................................................... 13
Beard v. Kindler,
558 U.S. 53, 130 S.Ct. 612, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009) ............................. 11
Braxton v. U.S.,
500 U.S. 344, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ......................... 10
Burrill v. Burrill,
113 Wn. App. 863, 56 P.3d 993 (2002)................................................... 15
Bushman v. New Holland Div. of Sperry Rand Corp.,
83 Wn.2d 429, 518 P.2d 1078 (1974) ............................................... 18, 19
Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) ......................... 10
Colvin v. Inslee,
195 Wn.2d 879, 467 P.3d 953 (2020) ..................................................... 13
Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court,
208 Mass. 162, 94 N.E. 369 (1911) ......................................................... 18
Cruz v. Arizona,
598 U.S. 17, 143 S.Ct. 650, 214 L.Ed.2d 391 (2023) ............................. 11
Floyd v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County,
36 Nev. 349, 135 P.922 (1913) ................................................................ 17
Golden Gate Tile Co. v. Superior Court of California,
City and County of San Francisco et. al.,
159 Cal. 474, 114 P. 978 (1911) ........................................................ 17, 18
Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. 117, 65 S.Ct. 459 89 L.Ed. 789 (1945) .................................... 10
In re Ramirez,
994 S.W.2d 682 (1998)............................................................................ 17
iv
King v. Olympic Pipeline Co.,
104 Wn. App. 338, 16 P.3d 45 (2000)..................................................... 16
Kreidler v. Eikenberry,
111 Wn.2d 828, 766 P.2d 438 (1989) ............................................... 12, 13
Lee v. Kemna,
534 U.S. 362, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002) ....................... 9, 11
Riddle v. Elofson,
193 Wn.2d 423, 439 P.3d 647 (2019) ............................................... 11, 12
State ex rel. O’Brien v. Police Ct.,
14 Wn.2d 340, 128 P.2d 332 (1942) ................................................. 12, 13
State v. Hall,
95 Wn.2d 536, 627 P.2d 101 (1981) ....................................................... 14
State v. Whitney,
69 Wn.2d 256, 418 P.2d 143 (1966) ....................................................... 19
Stewart v. Smith,
536 U.S. 856, 122 S.Ct. 2578, 153 L.Ed.2d 762 (2002) ......................... 11
Walker v. Munro,
124 Wn.2d 402, 879 P.2d 920 (1994) ..................................................... 13
Statutes and Other Authorities
Wash. Const., art. IV, §4..................................................................... 8, 11, 13
Rules of Appellate Procedure 7.2 ................................................................. 15
Rules of Appellate Procedure 7.2(e) ................................................. 14, 15, 16
Rules of Appellate Procedure 16.2(a) ................................................. 8, 11, 13
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.16.300 .................................................................... 8, 12
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.16.160 ................................................................. 8-9, 13
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.16.170 .................................................................... 9, 13
v
JURISDICTION
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Washington Supreme Court’s
denial of mandamus and prohibition because the Petitioner’s petitions for
these extraordinary writs were dismissed on adequate and independent statelaw grounds.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions not provided by
Petitioner are reproduced in an appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Dissolution Proceedings
Valarie Ndje Nlend filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to
Petitioner, Rodrigue Ndje Nlend, in King County Superior Court under King
County Superior Court Cause No. 213-02434-3. App. to Pet. for Writ of
Mandamus. 1. Ms. Nlend was granted permission to serve the Petitioner with
the summons and petition for dissolution via email pursuant to a court order.
App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus. 68. The parties and the trial court used
the email address identified in the Order throughout the proceedings. App. to
Resp’t Answer to Pet. for Mandamus. 5.
The dissolution trial was scheduled for the week of December 11, 2023,
and the court emailed both parties on November 28, 2023, informing them of
the adjusted trial date. App. to Pet. I, 21a at ¶3, Ex. 1. On December 8, 2023,
1
the court informed the parties via email that the case was awaiting assignment,
and they would be notified once the assignment had been made. Id. at ¶4,
Ex.1. The court again notified the parties on December 8, 2023, that the case
remained on standby. Id. at ¶5, Ex. 1.
On December 11, 2023, the court informed the parties via email that the
trial was assigned to Judge Parisien and scheduled to start on December 14,
2023, at 9:00 a.m. in KCCH W-355, and that the bailiff for that court would
provide further instructions. Id. at ¶6, Ex.1.
On December 14, 2023, Ms. Nlend and her attorney appeared before
the Honorable Suzanne Parisien for trial via Zoom, however, Petitioner failed
to appear. Judge Parisien made the following record regarding Petitioner’s
absence:
All right, so I want to just state on the record that the
respondent is not here. Since being assigned this case,
I forget when it was, last week that came to me on
brokerage, on reassignment, I have not heard – we
have not heard anything from the father. He has not
communicated in any way with my bailiff. The email
address that we are using has not been returned.
Nothing’s been returned from that address, and it
appears to be the same address that has been used
throughout these proceedings. We haven’t heard
anything. We haven’t received anything. He was
ordered to appear in person. My courtroom door is
open, we’re down here at the King County
Courthouse, and although the petitioner is appearing
on Zoom, the respondent was ordered, for many
2
reasons, to come in in person and he has failed to do
so.
App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, 21, R. 5:1-16.
On January 22, 2024, Judge Parisien entered orders regarding the
dissolution action. Petitioner filed an appeal in the state court of appeals
(COA) under cause number 863312 challenging the Dissolution Orders
entered by Judge Parisien following the trial. App. to Pet. for Writ of
Mandamus, 26. In his appeal, Petitioner raised several issues related to the
dissolution proceedings including lack of jurisdiction, due process violations
stemming from the claimed lack of notice for the divorce trial and other
related hearings, and judicial bias. Id. at 8-24.
B. Posttrial Motions
While this appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a motion to Vacate the
Judgment and Orders entered following the dissolution trial, pursuant to CR
60(b) on June 26, 2024. App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, 4. On July 12,
2024, Ms. Nlend filed a declaration in which she characterizes the motions as
“frivolous dismissal motions” and urged Judge Parisien to “not allow him to
keep playing this game.” App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, 6. Judge Parisien
denied all of Petitioner’s post-trial motions in orders dated July 25, 2024. App.
to Pet. E, 13a-14a; F, 15a-16a. In the Order Denying Respondent’s Motions,
Judge Parisien stated in pertinent part:
3
THE RESPONDENT has filed a barrage of Motions
on a wide array of issues mostly related to the trial in
this matter which was held on December 14, 2023.
Respondent continues to assert that this court lacks
jurisdiction despite the fact that this specific issue has
been definitively decided by the Court of Appeals
determining that Washington – and only Washington –
has jurisdiction over the parties and their minor
children…The Court incorporates the Findings of Fact
entered by this Court following trial on January 22,
2024. The Court would also note that at every turn,
Respondent has violated court orders related to child
support and maintenance and has been found in
contempt on multiple occasions. He has filed multiple
changes of addresses and has had multiple attorneys
represent him and later withdraw. He claims he had no
notice of the trial before this court on December 14,
2023, yet he was served via email which was court
authorized. Respondent has serially engaged in
intransigent and obfuscation actions resulting in 865
docket entries in this cause number and unknown
numbers of court filings in the three counties in which
he filed divorce proceedings in North Carolina, all of
which were or should have been dismissed given
Washington’s exclusive jurisdiction.
App. to Pet. E, 13a-14a.
In the order denying Respondent’s Motion for Order on Petitioner to
Show Cause, Judge Parisien addressed Petitioner’s claimed lack of notice for
trial stating:
Respondent’s claim that email correspondence
regarding the trial date and court filed documents were
not received at the time of delivery due to issues with
email access is not credible given Respondent’s
history
of
protracted
intransigence
and
demonstratively false information which he has
4
previously provided to judicial officers as specifically
referenced by the Court of Appeals.
App. to Pet. F, 15a-16a.
Petitioner filed an appeal challenging the denial of his post-trial
motions (COA 871587). App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus. 27. While these
two appeals were pending, Petitioner filed another CR 60(b) motion to vacate
on October 7, 2024, raising essentially the same issues as his previous motion.
App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus. 9.
On October 25, 2024, Judge Parisien entered an order declining to rule
on any of the parties’ post-trial motions pursuant to RAP 7.2 except for Ms.
Nlend’s CR 60(a) motion to correct clerical mistakes. App. to Pet. G, 17a.
The Petitioner filed an appeal challenging the Judge Parisien’s October 25,
2024, order (COA 874829). App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus. 28. In this
appeal, Petitioner asked the Court of Appeals to reverse the Declination Order,
rule on the merits of his CR 60(b) motions and vacate the dissolution-related
orders. Id. While his three appeals were pending before the state appellate
court, Petitioner filed yet another CR 60(b) motion on December 2, 2024,
raising essentially the same issues as his previous CR 60(b) motions to vacate.
App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus. 12. Petitioner continued filing motions,
which he titled the “Fraud-Upon-The-Court Motions,” to disqualify Judge
5
Parisien, vacate the dissolution orders, and stay enforcement of the dissolution
orders. App. to Pet. J; App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus. 89, 90, 114.
C. Extraordinary Writs at the Washington Supreme Court
With multiple appeals pending in the Washington Court of Appeals
related to the dissolution case, the Petitioner filed multiple petitions at the state
supreme court seeking writs of review, prohibition (WA Supreme Court No.
103793-7) and mandamus (WA Supreme Court No. 103931-0), arising from
the dissolution action and the trial court’s orders. The Washington Supreme
Court dismissed these petitions in separate orders dated April 2, 2025, and
May 2, 2025, respectively, and in each order the court concluded that the
Petitioner has an adequate legal remedy. App. to Opp. A, B. Petitioner
subsequently filed additional petitions for writ of prohibition and writ of
mandamus under WA Supreme Court No. 1041292 and 1041802.
Writ of Prohibition
In dismissing the petition for writ of prohibition, the Washington
Supreme Court found that petitioner did not satisfy the statutory requirements
for a writ of prohibition to issue. App. of Pet. B, 6a-7a. Specifically, the court
concluded that the trial court did not act outside of its jurisdiction and the
posttrial motions complained of in the petition for writ of prohibition would
be best addressed by the court of appeals under RAP 7.2. Id. at 8a.
6
Regarding the appeal generally, petitioner has a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at law by way of that
ongoing proceeding. In sum, petitioner has failed to
identify any tenable basis for obtaining a writ of
prohibition. The best use of judicial resources at this
juncture is to dismiss the action outright pursuant to
RAP 16.2(d).”
Id.
Writ of Mandamus
The Washington Supreme Court again noted that the Petitioner has a
pending appeal in the state court of appeals related to the dissolution matter
and despite that fact “kept filing frivolous motions in the superior court” and
the trial court “entered an order declining to rule on these motions while the
appeal was pending.” App. to Pet. A, 1a-2a. The court also noted the
Petitioner’s claims of fraud and misconduct against the trial judge which
formed the basis of the writ petition. Id. at 2a. In analyzing the petition under
established state law, the Washington Supreme Court determined that
Petitioner failed to identify a mandatory, non-discretionary act the trial court
failed to undertake and failed to establish the absence of a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy of law. Id. at 3a. The court held that Judge Parisien’s order
declining to act on motions while the appeals were pending was a
discretionary act.
7
Regarding the adequate legal remedy, the Washington Supreme Court
again pointed out the fact that the Petitioner has pending appeals related to the
dissolution case. “[P]etitioner has a potentially adequate remedy by way of
their currently pending appeals. Stated another way, petitioner may, or may
not prevail on appeal. Petitioner may not bypass or short-circuit the appeal
process by way of a frivolous petition for writ of mandamus.” App. of Pet. A,
3a. The Petitioner then filed this petition for writ certiorari in this Court
seeking review of the Washington Supreme Court judgments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should dismiss this petition for lack of jurisdiction. This
Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Washington Supreme
Court dismissing the Petitioner’s petition for writ of prohibition and
mandamus because these decisions were based on independent state-law
grounds that were adequate to support the judgments. In Washington state, the
supreme court has original jurisdiction in writs of prohibition and mandamus
actions against state officers. Wash. Const. art. IV, §4, Rules of Appellate
Procedure (RAP) 16.2(a).
The determination of whether an extraordinary writ should be issued is
governed by state statute. A petitioner must satisfy the statutory requirements
of Wash. Rev. Code §7.16.300 for a writ of prohibition to issue and Wash.
8
Rev. Code §§ 7.16.160, .170 for a writ of mandamus to issue. Failure to satisfy
these statutory requirements is a bar to issuance of either writ.
The Petitioner argues that the Washington Supreme Court’s decisions
dismissing his petitions for writs of prohibition and mandamus were
erroneous and thus review by this Court is necessary. However, the arguments
presented by Petitioner in addition to being meritless, do not form the basis
for this Court to review the Washington Supreme Court decisions based on
well-established and regularly followed state law. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S.
362, 376, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002) (Violation of firmly
established and regularly followed state rules will ordinarily be adequate to
foreclose review of a federal claim). The Washington Supreme Court, in
dismissing the petitions below, found that in each instance that Petitioner
failed to meet the statutory requirements for the requested writ to issue. The
overarching theme in both orders is the fact that Petitioner has an adequate
legal remedy by way of his pending appeals in the state court of appeals which
seek to vacate the dissolution orders and grant a new trial. Given the
circumstances, the Washington Supreme Court decisions were proper and this
petition for writ of certiorari should be dismissed.
9
ARGUMENT
A. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Washington
Supreme Court Orders dismissing the petitions for writ of
mandamus and prohibition.
“A principal purpose for…certiorari jurisdiction…is to resolve
conflicts among the United States courts of appeals and state courts
concerning the meaning of provisions of federal law.” Braxton v. U.S., 500
U.S. 344, 347, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991).
It is a well-
established principle that this Court will not review judgments of state courts
when said judgments rest on adequate and independent state grounds. Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125, 65 S.Ct. 459 89 L.Ed. 789 (1945). In Herb, this
Court previously stated,
Our only power over state judgments is to correct them
to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights.
And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to
revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an
advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be
rendered by the state court we corrected its views of
federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more
than an advisory opinion.
Id.
The independent and adequate principle applies whether the state law
ground is of a substantive or procedural character, and it is jurisdictional.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640
(1991).
10
Where a resolution of a state procedural law question depends on a
federal constitutional ruling, it is not independent of federal law and is subject
to the Supreme Court’s review jurisdiction. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,
75, 105 S.Ct 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). However, where the state law
determination does not depend upon a federal constitutional rule, then it is
independent of federal law. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S.Ct.
2578, 153 L.Ed.2d 762 (2002). “The question whether a state procedural
ruling is adequate is itself a question of federal law.” Beard v. Kindler, 558
U.S. 53,60, 130 S.Ct. 612, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009).
A state procedural rule that is firmly established and regularly followed
will absent exceptional circumstances be deemed adequate grounds to
preclude federal review. Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U.S. 17, 25-26, 143 S.Ct. 650,
214 L.Ed.2d 391 (2023) (citing Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376, 122 S.Ct.
877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002)). In the present case, the Washington Supreme
Court’s basis for dismissing the petitions below did not depend on a federal
constitutional ruling and was based on well-established state law processes.
1.
State Law Requirements For Extraordinary Writs To Issue
The Washington Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in a writ of
prohibition action against state officers. Wash. Const. art. IV, §4, Rules of
Appellate Procedure (RAP) 16.2(a), Riddle v. Elofson, 193 Wn.2d 423, 428,
11
439 P.3d 647 (2019). “A superior court judge is a state officer for the purposes
of original prohibition jurisdiction.” Riddle v. Elofson, 193 Wn.2d at 428. The
writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that must be used with “great
caution and forbearance, for the furtherance of justice and to secure order…in
judicial proceedings.” Riddle v. Elofson, 193 Wn.2d at 429.
A writ of prohibition is a preventative remedy and not a corrective one
and will not issue to prevent the commission of error, take the place of an
appeal or serve as a writ of review for the correction of an error. Id. The
issuance of a writ of prohibition is appropriate when the following conditions
have been satisfied: “1) Absence or excess of jurisdiction, and 2) absence of
a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of legal procedure.”
Kreidler v. Eikenberry, 111 Wn.2d 828, 838, 766 P.2d 438 (1989), Wash. Rev.
Code §7.16.300 (1987). The absence of either of these conditions precludes
the issuance of the writ. Kreidler v. Eikenberry, 111 Wn.2d at 838.
Whether a plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists depends on the
facts of the individual case and rests within the sound discretion of the court
where the writ is sought. State ex rel. O’Brien v. Police Ct., 14 Wn.2d 340,
347-48, 128 P.2d 332 (1942). A remedy is not considered inadequate simply
because it is attended with delay, expense, annoyance or even some hardship.
“There must be something in the nature of the action or proceeding that makes
12
it apparent to this court that it will not be able to protect the rights of the
litigants or afford them adequate redress otherwise than through the exercise
of this extraordinary jurisdiction.” Id. at 348.
Similar to the writ of prohibition, the Washington Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction and the power to issue writs mandamus for all state
officers. Wash. Const. art. IV, § 4, RAP 16.2(a). The writ of mandamus is a
rare and extraordinary remedy. Colvin v. Inslee, 195 Wn.2d 879, 890-91, 467
P.3d 953 (2020). For a writ of mandamus to issue, a petitioner must show that
(1) the party subject to the writ has a clear duty to act, (2) the petitioner has
no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and (3)
the petitioner is beneficially interested. Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n on Behalf
of Washington-Licensed Members v. Kreidler, 200 Wn.2d 654,659, 520 P.3d
979 (2022), Wash. Rev. Code §7.16.160, .170. Even if a petitioner satisfies
all three of these requirements, a writ of mandamus still may not issue because
this court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ is nonexclusive and discretionary. Id.
(citing Walker v. Munro, 124 Wn.2d 402, 407, 879 P.2d 920 (1994)).
The Washington Supreme Court review as it pertains to the petitions
for writ of mandamus and prohibition was limited in scope to whether the
statutory elements for issuance of a writ had been met, not the merits of any
constitutional claims. In this context, the Washington Supreme Court was not
13
obligated to and did not address the merit of petitioner’s constitutional claims.
See State v. Hall, 95 Wn.2d 536, 539, 627 P.2d 101 (1981) (“A reviewing
court should not pass on constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary to
the determination of the case”). The court ultimately found that the petitioner
failed to meet the requisite elements for either writ to issue under state law.
The rulings of the Washington Supreme Court did not rely upon federal
constitutional rulings and are thus independent of federal law and adequate to
support the judgments. Therefore, this Court lacks certiorari jurisdiction to
review.
B. The Washington Supreme Court Judgments Were Not
Erroneous
The Petitioner argues that the Washington Supreme Court judgments
erroneously interpreted state court rules and state constitutional provisions.
Pet’r’s Br. 10. First, Petitioner argues that pursuant to RAP 7.2(e) and the
Washington State Constitution, there are “no discretionary powers allowing a
WA superior court judge to refuse to hear duly submitted post-judgment
motions. Pet’r’s Br. 11. Petitioner also argues that Judge Parisien acted
outside of her authority by refusing to hear his posttrial motions. Pet’r’s Br.
19-21. However, Petitioner’s interpretation of RAP 7.2(e) does not support
his arguments.
14
In Washington state, RAP 7.2 grants authority to trial courts to act after
a case has been accepted for review by a state appellate court. The language
in RAP 7.2(e) does not require a trial court to act on posttrial motions, it is
simply a grant of authority. Stated differently, the trial can act on posttrial
motions as provided in the rule while a case is pending before an appellate
court but is not required to do so. See Burrill v. Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863,
873-74, 56 P.3d 993 (2002) (“A trial court may also hear a postjudgment
motion authorized by the civil rules or statutes.”).
Here, Judge Parisien issued an order informing the parties that the court
would not rule on motions while the case was on review. App. of Pet. G, 17a.
The order did not expressly state that the trial court lacked authority to
adjudicate posttrial motions, it only stated that the trial court declined to do so
while the case was on appellate review. Id. In the dissolution action below,
Petitioner filed numerous posttrial motions in the trial court, including
motions to vacate the dissolution orders, which were all denied. App. to Pet.
G, 13a-15a. The Petitioner’s wife also responded to his motions in declaration
filed with the trial court, stating in pertinent part:
Your Honor, I honestly do not understand what is going
[sic] with all of the Respondent’s filings, and I strongly
object!!!. The Court’s file has hundreds of documents of
the Respondent’s previous frivolous filings…He owes
me around $140,000 in attorney fees in Washington,
and about $84,000 in attorneys fees in North Carolina.
15
He is not paying anything but he is doing everything he
can to ruin me financially by increasing my attorneys’
bills! He keeps changing mailing addresses, and
recently has been changing email addresses as
well!!...Your Honor, he will not stop unless he is forced
to…Your Honor, please do not allow him to keep
playing this game.
App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus. 6.
The legal effect of the trial court’s order was a stay of proceedings while
the case was under appellate review, which the trial court has the inherent
power to do. See King v. Olympic Pipeline Co., 104 Wn. App. 338, 350, 16
P.3d 45 (2000) (a trial court has the inherent power to stay proceedings where
the interest of justice so requires).
Additionally, Judge Parisien’s rationale for issuing the order could be
based on the fact that Petitioner filed several repetitive posttrial motions,
touching upon matters that are before the state court of appeals and any
decision by the trial court would be subject to appellate review under RAP
7.2(e). In such circumstances extending judicial resources to an endless cycle
of appeals despite the fact that the petitioner is already pursuing relief to
address the alleged errors of law undermines the concept of judicial economy.
The order issued by Judge Parisien was within her discretion to issue.
The Petitioner relies upon several cases outside of Washington state in
support of his argument that the Washington Supreme Court should have
16
granted his petitions for the writs. However, these cases appear both factually
and legally distinguishable from the matter before the Washington Supreme
Court. For example, in In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682 (1998), the trial court
failed to respond and rule upon a motion for default judgment Ramirez filed
in his lawsuit against his girlfriend. Ramirez’s motion for default remained on
file for over eighteen months without response from the trial court. The Texas
Court of Appeals stated, “Under these circumstances, mandamus is
appropriate as a means of compelling the trial court to exercise its discretion
and proceed to judgment on Ramirez’s motion for default judgment.” Id. at
684.
In Floyd v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County, 36
Nev. 349, 135 P.922 (1913), the Nevada Supreme Court held that mandamus
should issue in a case where the district court, which pursuant to the Nevada
state constitution had appellate jurisdiction over matters arising from the
justice court, dismissed an appeal. Floyd, 135 P.2d 923-25. Similarly, in
Golden Gate Tile Co. v. Superior Court of California, City and County of San
Francisco et. al., 159 Cal. 474, 114 P. 978 (1911), the California Supreme
Court held that mandamus should issue where a superior court dismissed an
appeal from a justice court based on belief that the appellant failed to comply
with court rules. Id. at 482-84. The court made a point to highlight that “the
17
writ of mandamus has been invariably granted, and when not granted it has
generally been because there was another remedy by writ of error or appeal.”
Id.at 482. The court found that the since the remedy that would have precluded
issuance of a writ i.e., an appeal, was at the heart of the matter, a writ of
mandamus was appropriate.
In Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N.E. 369,
(1911), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that mandamus should issue
where the superior court refused to entertain the defendants’ motion to change
venue. The court found that the superior court had a duty to consider the
motion filed and either overrule as a matter of law or grant the motion and
petitioners had no other adequate remedy at law except this petition. Id. at
165.
The cases that Petitioner cites involving Washington state similarly
offer no support for his argument. In Bushman v. New Holland Div. of Sperry
Rand Corp., 83 Wn.2d 429, 518 P.2d 1078 (1974), the Washington Supreme
Court addressed the grant of a writ of certiorari to review a pretrial discovery
order. Id. at 431-32. This Court highlighted two factors to be considered for a
writ of certiorari regarding interim orders which are:
(1) the alleged error is not unlikely to recur in other
courts…and (2) it (the error) involves a patently
erroneous construction of a statute, as a result, of
which the prosecution has been deprived of a long
18
accepted and highly useful and reliable means of
establishing responsibility for a crime.”
Id. at 432 (citing State v. Whitney, 69 Wn.2d 256, 260-61, 418 P.2d 143, 145
(1966)). The court held that certiorari was proper because the erroneous
interpretation would hinder the plaintiff’s investigation of the case and ability
to present her evidence at trial, and therefore remedy by appeal would not be
adequate. Id. at 432.
In State v. Whitney, 69 Wn.2d 256, 418 P.2d 143 (1966), the Court dealt
with a writ of certiorari, brought by the prosecution in a criminal case
involving the suppression of evidence. Id. at 257-58. A writ of certiorari was
granted based on the aforementioned factors highlighted in Bushman, given
that state has no ability to appeal an order excluding evidence if the defendant
is acquitted. Id. at 260. The court stated, “Because we conceive that the public
has an important and justified interest in the proper administration of criminal
justice and that a thwarting of that interest is apt to follow if this erroneous
construction of legislative enactment is not corrected, we deem it appropriate
to grant the writ.” Id. at 261. In contrast, to these cases, Petitioner sought writs
of mandamus and prohibition in the state supreme court and not certiorari,
which has different legal requirements. Further, the dissolution action and all
the issues attendant to it are fact specific and this Court’s intervention is not
required to prevent the alleged error. This is especially true given that
19
dissolution action and the posttrial orders are currently on appeal at the state
court of appeals. In each of Petitioner’s pending appeals he seeks vacation of
the orders resulting from the dissolution action. App. to Pet. for Writ of
Mandamus. 26-28.
Next, Petitioner argues that the Washington Supreme Court’s finding
that he has an adequate legal remedy is erroneous. Pet’r’s Br. 22. However,
this argument is without merit. In Petitioner’s appeal under COA No. 874829,
he specifically challenged the declination order issued by Judge Parisien on
October 25, 2024 and asked the court to reverse that order and vacate the
dissolution orders. App. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus. 28, at 22-32, 53.
Petitioner asked the state court of appeals to reach the merits of his CR 60
motions and grant the relief requested therein. Id. at 14-15. Further, the
arguments and requested relief, in Petitioner’s appellant brief, “Fraud-UponThe-Court” motion to vacate, and his posttrial motions to vacate are
essentially the same. App. to Pet. J. The heart of each of these pleadings is
Petitioner’s claim that he was not properly served with notice of trial or the
pleadings of the opposing party and therefore the orders are void. The
Petitioner cannot show why his multiple appeals would not afford him an
adequate remedy at law. Whether he prevails on any of his numerous appeals
or not, does not render the remedy inadequate. The appellate process affords
20
him the opportunity to seek review of what he believes to be errors at law.
Therefore, the Washington Supreme Court’s judgments were not erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Judge Parisien respectfully requests this Court
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
LEESA MANION (SHE/HER)
Prosecuting Attorney
JERRY TAYLOR
Senior Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney
Counsel of Record
KING COUNTY PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 477-1120
jerry.taylor@kingcounty.gov
Attorneys for Respondent
March 4, 2026
21
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPENDIX A — RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, FILED APRIL 2, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
APPENDIX B — RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, FILED MAY 2, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5a
APPENDIX C — RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
RCW 7.16.160 Grounds for granting writ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8a
RCW 7.16.170 Absence of remedy at law required—Affidavit . . . . . . . . 9a
RCW 7.16.290 Prohibition defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10a
RCW 7.16.300 Grounds for granting writ—Affidavit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11a
ORIGINAL ACTION AGAINST STATE OFFICER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12a
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
RODRIGUE ALAIN NDJE NLEND,
Petitioner,
No. 1 0 3 7 9 3 - 7
v.
RULING DISMISSING ORIGINAL
ACTION AGAINST STATE OFFICER
HONORABLE SUZANNE PARISIEN,
ET AL.,
Respondents.
Pro so petitioner Rodrigue Njdge Nlend urges this court to exercise its original
jurisdiction under article IV, section 4 of the Washington Constitution and its
concurrent jurisdiction under RCW 7.16.290 to issue a writ of prohibition, an order
vacating superior court orders, and/or a writ of review1 against King County Superior
Court, Suzanne Parisien, and the Department of Social and Health Services (the
department) in relation to marriage dissolution proceedings.
Petitioner is respondent in King County Superior Court dissolution proceedings
initiated by petitioner’s former spouse. The superior court entered a decree of
dissolution in January 2024, followed by a series of orders related to child support, child
custody, and a restraining order. Petitioner filed notices of appeal of these orders.
1
Petitioner specifically seeks a “writ of certiorari;” however, that type of writ is
defined as a “writ of review” in Washington courts. RCW 7.16.030.
1a
NO. 103793-7
PAGE 2
Claiming the superior court’s orders are void, petitioner filed the instant original
action in this court, asking this court to issue orders (1) prohibiting the King County
Superior Court and the Department of Social and Health Services from amending the
superior court’s orders, (2) prohibiting the superior court and the department from
enforcing the allegedly void orders, and (3) prohibiting the superior court and the
department from initiating contempt proceedings against petitioner for failing to
comply with the allegedly void orders. Judge Parisien and the department separately
filed answers urging outright dismissal of petitioner’s action. Petitioner has filed a reply
in support of the action. Now before me for determination is whether to refer the action
to the justices of this court for review on the merits, transfer the action to the appropriate
superior court, or dismiss it outright. RAP 16.2(d).
Washington’s constitution states that this court “shall have original jurisdiction
in . . . mandamus as to all state officers[.]” CONST. art. IV, § 4. This constitutional
provision applies with equal force to writs of prohibition. Ladenburg v. Henke, 197
Wn.2d 645, 650, 486 P.3d 866 (2021); State v. Taylor, 101 Wash. 148, 150-51, 172 P.
217 (1918). One of the ancient writs dating from 12th century England, the writ of
prohibition is an extraordinary remedy intended to prevent government officials from
exceeding their jurisdiction and/or the powers of their positions. Riddle v. Elofson, 193
Wn.2d 423, 428-29, 439 P.3d 647 (2019). To obtain such a writ, petitioner must
establish (1) the superior court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction, and (2) petitioner
lacks a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of legal proceedings.
Riddle, 193 Wn.2d at 430; Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 304 v. Skagit County
Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 177 Wn.2d 718, 722-23, 305 P.3d 1079 (2013); Kreidler v.
Eikenberry, 111 Wn.2d 828, 838, 766 P.2d 438 (1989). Petitioner also seeks a writ of
prohibition under RCW 7.16.290, which defines such a writ as follows: “The writ of
prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the proceedings of any
2a
NO. 103793-7
PAGE 3
tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such proceedings are without or in excess
of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person.”
Petitioner cannot meet the requirements of a writ of prohibition under either the
constitution or RCW 7.16.290 because there is no showing that either the superior court
lacks jurisdiction over the dissolution and related matters. Const. art. IV, §6 (superior
court has jurisdiction over divorce proceedings); chapter 26.09 RCW (governing
dissolution proceedings in superior court). As for the department, petitioner does not
show that the agency is a state officer subject to this court’s original jurisdiction under
article IV, section 4. See Spokane Co. v. Meneses, 3 Wn.3d 99, 109-10, 546 P.3d 1012
(2024) (Secretary of Department of Social and Health Services is not a “state officer”
subject to this court’s original jurisdiction for purposes of petition for writ of
mandamus). Even if the department can be considered a state officer (and it is not),
petitioner does not show that the department exceeded its jurisdiction with respect to
the superior court’s orders. Moreover, the department has statutory authority over child
support enforcement. See chapter 26.23 RCW; chapter 74.20 RCW; chapter
74.20A RCW. Finally, as to a writ of prohibition against either Judge Parisien or the
department, petitioner also has a potentially adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal
or motion for discretionary review in the Court of Appeals with respect to any
department actions taken in relation to this family law matter. RAP 2.2 (direct appeal);
RAP 2.3 (discretionary review).
Turning to petitioner’s action for a writ of review, such a writ will issue only
where the inferior court or tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or acted unlawfully
“and there is no appeal, nor in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law.” RCW 7.16.040. The department, an agency created by the legislature
under RCW 43.20A.030, is not a lower court or tribunal potentially subject to a writ of
review. Even if the department acts in a quasi-judicial capacity in relation to child
3a
NO. 103793-7
PAGE 4
support orders, it acts within its statutory jurisdiction when it collects and enforces child
support in accordance with a superior court order. See In re Marriage of Aldrich, 72
Wn. App. 132, 138, 864 P.2d 388 (1993). A writ of review will not lie as to the superior
court for the same reason: the court is acting within its jurisdiction with respect to this
dissolution and child support matter. Finally, as discussed, petitioner has a potentially
adequate remedy at law by way of seeking appellate review in the normal course.
In sum, petitioner’s original action is so deficient it must be dismissed outright
in accordance with RAP 16.2(d). Petitioner’s motion to transfer clerk’s papers from the
Court of Appeals is denied, as such papers will not assist with this ruling.
The original action is dismissed.
COMMISSIONER
April 2, 2025
4a
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
RODRIGUE ALAIN NDJE NLEND,
Petitioner,
No. 1 0 3 9 3 1 - 0
v.
RULING DISMISSING ORIGINAL
ACTION AGAINST STATE OFFICER
AND DENYING MOTIONS TO STAY
COURT ORDERS AND TO
TRANSFER CLERK’S PAPERS
HON. SUZANNE PARISIEN, ET AL.,
Respondents.
Pro se petitioner Rodrigue Ndje Nlend seeks issuance of a writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition compelling King County Superior Court Suzanne Parisien to decide
certain motions filed by petitioner, and moves for a stay of enforcement of superior
court orders petitioner claims to be void and for transfer of clerk’s papers filed in a
related appeal. For reasons explained below, the writ petition is dismissed and the
motions are denied.
Petitioner is respondent in King County Superior Court dissolution proceedings
initiated by petitioner’s former spouse. The superior court entered a decree of
dissolution in January 2024, followed by a series of orders related to child support, child
custody, and a restraining order. Petitioner has three pending appeals concerning this
dissolution matter.
In this instance, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition
(effectively a mandamus action for purposes of this ruling), naming as respondents
Judge Parisien, all other King County Superior Court judges, and the superior court
5a
NO. 103931-0
PAGE 2
generally, seeking to compel Judge Parisien to rule on certain motions, preferably in
petitioner’s favor. Petitioner also moves for a stay below and for transfer of clerk’s
papers filed in the Court of Appeals. Now before me for determination is whether to
grant these motions and whether to refer petitioner’s original action to the justices of
this court for review on the merits, transfer the action to the appropriate superior court,
or dismiss it outright. RAP 16.2(d).
Washington’s constitution states that this court “shall have original jurisdiction
in . . . mandamus as to all state officers[.]” CONST. art. IV, § 4. A superior court judge
is a state officer for purposes of such an action. Riddle v. Elofson, 193 Wn.2d 423, 428,
439 P.3d 647 (2019). The superior court is not such an officer. Landenburg v. Henke,
197 Wn.2d 645, 650, 486 P.3d 866 (2021). Since petitioner has not named any other
judicial officers, Judge Parisien is the only state officer properly designated as a
respondent in this matter.
Mandamus is a rare and extraordinary remedy turning on the existence of a
nondiscretionary duty of the respondent official. Colvin v. Inslee, 195 Wn.2d 879, 89094, 467 P.3d 953 (2020). A petitioner seeking mandamus relief must show that the
official who is the subject of the petition has a mandatory, ministerial duty to perform
an act required by law as part of that official’s duties. Id. at 892. Thus, if the law does
not require an official to take a specific action, neither may a writ of mandamus. Id. at
893. Mandamus therefore may not be employed to control acts involving the official’s
exercise of discretion. Id. In other words, mandamus is appropriate only where the law
prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to
leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment. Id. Furthermore, and perhaps
most critically in this case, the petitioner must show that they have no plain, speedy,
and adequate remedies at law, a necessary predicate to issuance of a writ of mandamus.
King County v. Sorensen, 200 Wn.2d 252, 258, 516 P.3d 388 (2022). Another element
6a
NO. 103931-0
PAGE 3
that need not be determined here is whether the petitioner is beneficially interested.
Pimentel v. Judges of King County Superior Court, 197 Wn.2d 365, 372, 482 P.3d 906
(2021).
Assuming without deciding that petitioner is beneficially interested, petitioner
clearly has plain, speedy, and adequate remedies at law by way of their appeals pending
in the Court of Appeals, all of which seek to vacate orders entered in the dissolution
action. Singly or collectively, these appeals have the potential of providing petitioner
with a meaningful remedy. The petition for writ of mandamus is so procedurally
defective it must be dismissed outright under RAP 16.2(d).1
As indicated, petitioner moves for a stay below pending disposition of this
original action. RAP 8.1; RAP 8.3. Since the original action is dismissed, there is no
tenable basis for entering a stay. If petitioner wishes to obtain a stay pending appeal,
they should seek one if the Court of Appeals or superior court.
Finally, petitioner moves to transfer clerk’s papers to this court. Such a transfer
is unnecessary for purposes of deciding this ruling. Enough records have been provided
for that purpose. Transfer of additional records will not assist in deciding this matter
and is premature in relation to the ongoing appeals.
The original action is dismissed and the motions for a stay and transfer clerk’s
papers are denied.
COMMISSIONER
May 2, 2025
1
It is noted in passing that a previous original action petitioner filed against Judge
Parisien and the Department of Social and Health Services was dismissed outright under
RAP 16.2(d). Ndje Nlend v. Hon. Suzanne Parisien, et al., No. 103793-7 (Apr. 2, 2025).
7a
RCW 7.16.160 Grounds for granting writ. It may be issued by any
court, except a district or municipal court, to any inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person, to compel the performance of an act
which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and
from which the party is unlawfully precluded by such inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person. [1987 c 202 s 131; 1987 c 3 s
3; 1895 c 65 s 16; RRS s 1014.]
Intent—1987 c 202: See note following RCW 2.04.190.
Severability—1987 c 3: See note following RCW 3.70.010.
Certified on 7/12/2024
RCW 7.16.160
8a
Page 1
RCW 7.16.170 Absence of remedy at law required—Affidavit. The
writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It must be issued
upon affidavit on the application of the party beneficially
interested. [1895 c 65 s 17; RRS s 1015.]
Certified on 7/12/2024
RCW 7.16.170
9a
Page 1
RCW 7.16.290 Prohibition defined. The writ of prohibition is
the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such proceedings are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal,
corporation, board or person. [1895 c 65 s 29; RRS s 1027.]
Certified on 7/12/2024
RCW 7.16.290
10a
Page 1
RCW 7.16.300 Grounds for granting writ—Affidavit. It may be
issued by any court, except district or municipal courts, to an
inferior tribunal, or to a corporation, board or person, in all cases
where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. It is issued upon affidavit, on the application of the
person beneficially interested. [1987 c 202 s 132; 1895 c 65 s 30;
RRS s 1028.]
Intent—1987 c 202: See note following RCW 2.04.190.
Certified on 7/12/2024
RCW 7.16.300
11a
Page 1
RAP 16.2
ORIGINAL ACTION AGAINST STATE OFFICER
(a) Generally. The Supreme Court and the superior court have concurrent original
jurisdiction of a petition against a state officer in the nature of quo warranto, prohibition, or
mandamus. This rule applies only to an action originating in the Supreme Court.
(b) Initiating Proceeding. The proceeding is initiated by filing the petition in the Supreme
Court and filing proof of service of the petition on the proper parties. Service of the petition must
be made as provided in the Superior Court Civil Rules and statutes for service of a summons in a
superior court action. The clerk of the Supreme Court will note the petition for hearing and
provide notice to the parties.
(c) Motion Procedure Governs. The petition is treated by the Supreme Court as a motion
to a commissioner or clerk. Title 17 relating to motions governs the response to the petition, oral
argument, decisions by ruling, and the means of objecting to the ruling of the commissioner or
clerk.
(d) Decisions Made by Commissioner or Clerk. A commissioner or clerk will, at the
hearing, determine if the petition should be decided by the Supreme Court, transferred, or
dismissed. If the commissioner or clerk decides that the petition should be transferred, the
petition will be transferred to a superior court for determination on the merits. If the petition is
not transferred or dismissed, the commissioner or clerk will refer questions of fact to a master or
to the superior court unless an agreed and adequate written statement of facts is approved by the
parties prior to or at the hearing. The commissioner or clerk will also determine the timing of all
remaining steps in the proceeding, including time for filing briefs on the merits.
(e) Procedure if Petition Is Not Transferred. The procedure if the petition is not
transferred is the same as the procedure in the Supreme Court after acceptance of review of a trial
court decision, except as otherwise directed by a ruling of the commissioner or clerk as provided
in section (d).
(f) Statutory Time Limits Govern. If a statute provides a time within which a petition
against a state officer in the nature of quo warranto, prohibition, or mandamus must be filed, the
petition must be filed in the Supreme Court within the time period established by the statute.
(g) Costs. Costs are determined and awarded as provided in Title 14. The appellate court
will award costs by supplemental judgment and will, on motion, transmit the judgment to the
clerk of the superior court in the county selected by the party who is awarded costs. The
supplemental judgment to the superior court shall be filed as a judgment in that court without
payment of a filing fee.
References
Form 16, Petition Against State Officer; Const. art. 4, § 4; CR 4, Process, (d) Service;
RCW 4.28, Commencement of Actions; RCW 7.16, Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition;
RCW 7.56, Quo Warranto.
[Adopted effective July 1, 1976; Amended effective September 1, 1985; September 1, 2014.]
12a
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.