Opposition Brief — Jeffrey Andrews, Petitioner v. United States

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No. 25-668

In the Supreme Court of the United States

JEFFREY ANDREWS, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON

Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

ROBERT N. STANDER

Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

BRIAN C. TOTH

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

The question presented in the petition for a writ of

certiorari (Pet. i) is as follows:

“Was the Second Circuit correct to uphold Clean Water Act authority over wetlands that are not ‘as a practical matter indistinguishable’ from covered waters?”

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below ................................................................................ 1

Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 1

Statement ......................................................................................... 2

Argument ....................................................................................... 10

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Glynn Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Sea Island Acquisition,

LLC, 146 F.4th 1080 (11th Cir. 2025),

cert. denied, 2026 WL 795140 (2026) ................................. 14

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,

240 U.S. 251 (1916) ............................................................... 16

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) ....... 4, 5, 7, 11

Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023).............................. 6, 7, 10

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) ......................... 12

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,

509 U.S. 1 (1993) ................................................................... 12

Statutes, regulation, and rules:

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ................................. 2

33 U.S.C. 1251(a) ................................................................. 2

33 U.S.C. 1311 ............................................................ 2-4, 13

33 U.S.C. 1311(a) ................................................................. 2

33 U.S.C. 1318 ...................................................................... 3

33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3) ............................................................ 2

33 U.S.C. 1319(b) ................................................................. 2

33 U.S.C. 1319(d) ................................................................. 2

33 U.S.C. 1344 ...................................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. 1344(a) ................................................................. 2

(III)

IV

Statutes, regulation, and rules—Continued:

Page

33 U.S.C. 1362(6) ................................................................. 2

33 U.S.C. 1362(7) ................................................................. 2

33 U.S.C. 1362(12) ............................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. 1362(14) ............................................................... 2

28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) ................................................................... 9

33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1) ................................................ 7, 10, 13, 14

Fed. R. Civ. P. :

Rule 36 ........................................................................ 3, 4, 13

Rule 36(a)(3) ......................................................................... 4

Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a) .................................................................... 12

Miscellaneous:

90 Fed. Reg. 52,498 (Nov. 20, 2025) ................................ 11, 15

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 25-668

JEFFREY ANDREWS, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-7a) is

available at 2025 WL 855763. The order of the district

court granting the government’s motion for summary

judgment on liability (Pet. App. 8a-38a) is reported at

677 F. Supp. 3d 74. The order of the district court granting an injunction (Pet. App. 39a-46a) is available at 2024

WL 2800232.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

March 19, 2025. A petition for rehearing was denied on

July 24, 2025 (Pet. App. 47a). On September 24, 2025, Justice Sotomayor extended the time within which to file a

petition for a writ of certiorari to and including November 21, 2025, and the petition was filed on November 20,

2025. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA or

Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., to protect “the chemical,

physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). To achieve that objective, the

CWA generally prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant

by any person.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). The Act defines the

term “discharge of a pollutant” to include “any addition

of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(12). The term “pollutant” means,

among other things, “dredged spoil,” “rock,” and “sand.”

33 U.S.C. 1362(6). The term “point source” means “any

discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,” including

bulldozers, backhoes, and tractors. 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).

And the term “navigable waters” means “the waters of

the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33

U.S.C. 1362(7).

Section 1311’s prohibition on “the discharge of any

pollutant” is subject to certain exceptions. 33 U.S.C.

1311(a). One of them appears in 33 U.S.C. 1344, which

authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to “issue permits” for “the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal

sites.” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a). If the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finds that a person is violating Section 1311, it may issue an order requiring that person to

comply. 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3). EPA may also commence

a civil action for appropriate relief, including an injunction and civil penalties. 33 U.S.C. 1319(b) and (d).

2. This case involves property in New Haven County,

Connecticut. D. Ct. Doc. 224-6, at 9 (Oct. 21, 2022). Petitioner and his wife purchased the property in 2001,

and in 2011 they transferred ownership of the property

to their three adult children. D. Ct. Doc. 224-2, at 1 (Oct.

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21, 2022). The property consists of both upland areas and

freshwater wetlands. Pet. App. 12a. Running through

the property is an unnamed tributary of the Farm River,

which flows into Long Island Sound. Id. at 12a, 32a-33a.

In 2010, petitioner began using bulldozers and other

heavy machinery to engage in “clear-cutting, stumping,

grubbing, filling, and grading” on the property. Pet. App.

27a-28a. By 2016, those activities had caused the filling

of approximately 13.3 acres of wetlands. Id. at 14a, 28a.

After learning about those activities through local officials, the Corps visited the property and “confirm[ed] the

presence of wetlands as well as the filling of those wetlands without the requisite permit.” Id. at 16a. The Corps

referred the matter to EPA, which conducted an inspection of the property and issued a “Notice of CWA Violations.” Id. at 18a; see id. at 17a-18a.

3. a. In 2020, the United States filed a civil enforcement action in federal district court against petitioner,

his wife, and his three adult children. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7-10.

The United States alleged that the defendants had violated Section 1311 by causing the discharge, without a

permit, of dredged or fill material into wetlands, as well

as a tributary, that are “waters of the United States.”

Compl. ¶¶ 63-64. The United States sought injunctive relief and civil penalties. Compl. ¶¶ 65-66.1

b. The parties proceeded to discovery. Pet. App. 19a21a. In March 2022, the government sent petitioner a

set of requests for admission pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 36. Pet. App. 28a. The government

The United States also alleged that the defendants had failed to

respond to EPA’s requests for information, in violation of 33 U.S.C.

1318. Compl. ¶¶ 68-72. The district court granted the government’s

motion for summary judgment as to liability on that claim, Pet. App.

36a-37a, and the court of appeals affirmed, id. at 4a-6a.

1

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asked petitioner to admit, among other things, that he (or

others working under his direction) had placed dredged

or fill material into wetlands “that are hydrologically

connected by surface waters to navigable waters.” D. Ct.

Doc. 224-3, at 7 (Oct. 21, 2022). Under Rule 36, “[a] matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served,

the party to whom the request is directed” responds.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Petitioner “failed to respond”

within 30 days. Pet. App. 28a.

c. In October 2022, the government moved for summary judgment on liability. D. Ct. Doc. 224 (Oct. 21,

2022). The government explained that, in order to establish that petitioner had violated Section 1311, the

government was required to “demonstrate that (1) the

areas in which the fill activities occurred satisfy the regulatory definition of a wetland and (2) those wetlands

are ‘waters of the United States’ * * * within the regulatory jurisdiction of the CWA.” D. Ct. Doc. 224-1, at 33

(Oct. 21, 2022).

With respect to the first prong, the government observed that the applicable regulations define “wetlands”

as those “areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances

do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted

for life in saturated soil conditions.” D. Ct. Doc. 224-1,

at 34 (citation omitted). The government argued that

there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the

areas petitioner had filled satisfied that definition. Ibid.

With respect to the second prong, the government relied on this Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United States,

547 U.S. 715 (2006). D. Ct. Doc. 224-1, at 34-39. The government observed that Rapanos had “generated no majority opinion for the Court.” Id. at 34. Instead, four Jus-

5

tices concluded that the CWA covers only those wetlands

with a “continuous surface connection” to “a relatively

permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters,” “making it difficult to determine

where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion). In contrast, the

Justice who provided the fifth vote for the judgment, Justice Kennedy, concluded that the CWA covers only those

wetlands that have a “significant nexus” with navigable

waters, and that such a nexus exists where “the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of those waters.

Id. at 779-780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

The government contended that the wetlands in this

case satisfy both the Rapanos plurality’s test and Justice Kennedy’s test. D. Ct. Doc. 224-1, at 36. Under the

plurality’s test, the government argued that the Farm

River is a traditional navigable water, and that the unnamed tributary is a relatively permanent body of water

connected to the River. Id. at 37. The government further contended that the wetlands in this case have a “continuous surface connection” to the unnamed tributary.

Ibid. The government expressed the view that a “ ‘continuous surface connection’ is a ‘physical connection requirement,’ but does not require surface water to be continuously present between the wetland and the tributary.” Ibid. (citation omitted). The government then argued that the requisite connection exists in this case, citing, among other things, the expert report of Dr. T. Andrew Earles, who had found “continuous surface flow

paths during runoff events connecting the wetlands [in

this case] with the Unnamed Tributary.” Id. at 38 (citation omitted); see D. Ct. Doc. 224-6, at 3, 21.

6

As the local rules of the district court required, the

government also filed a statement of undisputed material facts. D. Ct. Doc. 224-2. The government stated that

there was no genuine dispute that the wetlands in this

case “have a continuous surface connection to the Unnamed Tributary,” or that there are “continuous surface

flow paths during runoff events connecting the wetlands”

with that tributary. Id. at 16.

After the government filed its summary-judgment

motion, the district court held an in-person status conference “for the sole purpose of ensuring” that petitioner,

who was proceeding pro se, had received copies of all

filings and was aware of his obligation under the local

rules to respond to the government’s statement of undisputed material facts. Pet. App. 10a; see id. at 9a-10a. In

January 2023, petitioner filed a one-page opposition that

did not respond to the government’s statement, cite any

“evidence that would be admissible at trial,” or “mention

any facts at issue in this case.” Id. at 10a-11a; see D. Ct.

Doc. 240 (Jan. 19, 2023). Instead, the opposition asserted

only that petitioner had “[c]onstitutionally enumerated

and protected rights” to build on his private property.

D. Ct. Doc. 240, at 1. In reply, the government noted that

petitioner had “failed to identify any legal theory that

would excuse his violations of the [CWA].” D. Ct. Doc.

241, at 4 (Feb. 1, 2023).

4. While the government’s summary-judgment motion was pending, this Court issued its decision in Sackett

v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023). The Sackett Court adopted

the Rapanos plurality’s “formulation of when wetlands

are part of ‘the waters of the United States.’ ” Id. at 678.

The Sackett Court therefore held that “the CWA extends

to only those wetlands that are ‘as a practical matter indistinguishable from waters of the United States,’ ” which

7

“requires the party asserting jurisdiction over adjacent

wetlands to establish”: (1) “ ‘that the adjacent body of

water constitutes * * * a relatively permanent body of

water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters’ ”; and (2) “ ‘that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to

determine where the “water” ends and the “wetland”

begins.’ ” Id. at 678-679 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at

742, 755) (brackets omitted).

5. In June 2023, after this Court’s decision in Sackett, the district court granted the government’s motion

for summary judgment on liability. Pet. App. 8a-38a. At

the outset, the court stated that the “ ‘special solicitude’ ”

that “ ‘pro se litigants’ ” are owed “does not absolve [petitioner] of his obligations under the Federal and Local

Rules.” Id. at 11a (citation omitted). The court deemed

the “factual assertions” in the government’s statement

of undisputed facts to be “admitted” because petitioner

had failed to respond to that statement. Ibid. The court

also deemed “admitted” the material in the government’s

requests for admission because petitioner had “failed to

respond” to those requests. Id. at 28a.

The district court then held that the government had

shown that petitioner had discharged pollutants from a

point source into navigable waters. Pet. App. 24a-33a.

First, the court found that the government had “demonstrate[d] that the filling activities occurred in areas

deemed ‘wetlands’ under the CWA and attendant regulations.” Id. at 29a; see id. at 29a-30a. The court noted

that the regulations define “[w]etlands” as “areas that

‘are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water.’ ” Id. at 30a (quoting 33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1)). And the

court found no genuine dispute of material fact that the

wetlands in this case satisfy that definition. Ibid.

8

Second, the district court determined that the government had “show[n] that those wetlands are ‘waters

of the United States’ ” under this Court’s decision in Sackett. Pet. App. 29a; see id. at 30a-33a. The district court

explained that the government had “put forward undisputed evidence showing that [a] ‘continuous surface connection’ exists between the wetlands and the Unnamed

Tributary.” Id. at 33a. The court pointed to Dr. Earles’s

expert report, “which shows that continuous surface flow

paths link the wetlands with the Unnamed Tributary.”

Ibid. The court also emphasized that petitioner had “admitted” that the wetlands “are hydrologically connected

by surface waters to navigable waters.” Id. at 28a-29a.

In May 2024, the district court entered a default judgment against petitioner’s wife and his three adult children, who had failed to appear. D. Ct. Doc. 260-1 (May 2,

2024). The court then issued an order granting an injunction against all of the defendants. Pet. App. 39a-46a. The

injunction requires the defendants “to restore the disturbed wetlands” on the property in accordance with a

restoration plan. Id. at 40a; see id. at 40a-45a. The order

states that the injunction is “not permanent,” id. at 44a,

and that “appropriate civil penalties” will “be determined

after the Restoration Plan is completed,” id. at 45a.

6. Petitioner was the only defendant who appealed

the district court’s May 2024 order granting an injunction. Pet. App. 3a. In his pro se opening brief, petitioner

argued that the government’s own witnesses had testified that “there is no surface water and no surface water

connection” on his property. Pet. C.A. Br. 11 (capitalization omitted); see id. at 6-7, 12; Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 5.

In response, the government argued that petitioner had

“confuse[d] data collected to determine the presence of

wetlands meeting the regulatory definition in 33 C.F.R.

9

§ 328.3(c)(1) with the facts required to establish CWA jurisdiction under the Sackett decision.” Gov’t C.A. Br. 24.

The government explained that the testimony petitioner

had cited was an expert witness’s testimony “about his

process of digging soil test pits to evaluate wetland indicators, such as hydric soil and hydrology, in order to

establish the presence of wetlands meeting the regulatory definition in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(1).” Ibid. The government emphasized that “whether there is CWA jurisdiction over a given wetland” is a separate question. Id.

at 25. After noting that the “relevant connection for CWA

jurisdiction is the ‘continuous surface connection’ between the wetlands meeting the regulatory definition in

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(1) and a covered water of the United

States,” the government argued that “the evidentiary

record establishes” the existence of such a connection in

this case. Id. at 25-26 (citation omitted).

In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals affirmed “the order of the district court, to the extent that

it imposed injunctive relief against [petitioner].” Pet.

App. 7a; see id. at 1a-7a. As an initial matter, the court

of appeals observed that “[t]he district court ha[d] not

issued a ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 because it ha[d] not decided whether to impose

civil penalties and if so how much.” Id. at 3a-4a. The

court of appeals nevertheless determined that it had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) because

the district court’s May 2024 order was an interlocutory

order granting an injunction. Pet. App. 4a.

Turning to the merits, the court of appeals understood

petitioner’s opening brief to argue that “the case should

have been dismissed because there is no surface water

on his property.” Pet. App. 5a (citing Pet. C.A. Br. 6-7).

“[D]isagree[ing]” with that argument, the court explained

10

that “[t]he CWA applies to wetlands that have ‘a continuous surface connection’ with ‘relatively permanent

bodies of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Sackett, 598 U.S. at 678)

(brackets omitted). The court of appeals then agreed

with the district court that petitioner’s activities had occurred in areas that constitute wetlands, which the applicable regulation defines as “soil that is regularly ‘saturated by surface or ground water.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 33

C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1)). The court of appeals also agreed with

the district court that petitioner had “fail[ed] to rebut

the expert report” showing that those wetlands were

“connected to traditional navigable waters.” Ibid. The

court of appeals therefore held that petitioner had “not

shown that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the government as to his liability under the CWA.” Id. at 6a.

7. After the district court issued its May 2024 order

granting injunctive relief, one of the other defendants,

Wesley Andrews, retained counsel and began coordinating with EPA. D. Ct. Doc. 276 (June 7, 2024). Wesley Andrews recently submitted a restoration plan in

accordance with the court’s order. D. Ct. Doc. 386, at 1

(Mar. 27, 2026). EPA has reviewed the plan and has determined that it adequately complies with the court’s injunction. Ibid.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends (Pet. 18) that, under this Court’s

decision in Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023), “regulable wetlands” under the CWA “must be indistinguishable from covered waters.” Petitioner forfeited that argument below, however, and the lower courts did not address it. Petitioner also contends (Pet. 23) that “any surface connection between water and wetland must be

11

aquatic.” But “undisputed evidence” established the existence of a surface-water connection in this case, Pet.

App. 33a, and petitioner never argued below that the

connection was insufficiently continuous.

Moreover, the meaning of “waters of the United

States” is the subject of a pending rulemaking by EPA

and the Corps. 90 Fed. Reg. 52,498, 52,498 (Nov. 20,

2025). There is no sound reason for this Court to preempt

that rulemaking by intervening now, especially given the

interlocutory posture of this case. The petition for a writ

of certiorari should be denied.

1. Petitioner asks this Court to grant certiorari to resolve whether wetlands must be “indistinguishable from

covered waters” in order to be “regulable” under the

CWA. Pet. 18; see Pet. i, 3-4. That issue does not warrant this Court’s review.

Petitioner did not raise in either of the courts below

the question whether Sackett imposes an “indistinguishability” requirement. Pet. 18. In the district court, petitioner argued only that he had “[c]onstitutionally enumerated and protected rights” to build on his private

property. D. Ct. Doc. 240, at 1. And in the court of appeals, petitioner’s only CWA-related argument was that

his property contains “no surface water and no surface

water connection.” Pet. C.A. Br. 11 (capitalization omitted); see id. at 6-7, 12. Indeed, the word “indistinguishable” appeared only once in petitioner’s merits briefs on

appeal, as part of a quotation of a passage from the plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715

(2006). Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 16. Neither there nor anywhere else in his briefs did petitioner contend that the

Court had imposed a standalone “indistinguishability”

requirement. By failing to raise the issue below, petitioner has forfeited any argument that such a require-

12

ment exists. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.

400, 413 (2012) (deeming forfeited an argument not raised

or addressed below).

The courts below likewise did not consider whether

Sackett imposes an “indistinguishability” requirement.

The court of appeals understood petitioner’s only CWArelated argument on appeal to be that “the case should

have been dismissed because there is no surface water

on his property.” Pet. App. 5a (citing Pet. C.A. Br. 6-7).

With respect to that argument, the court of appeals concluded that petitioner had “not shown that the district

court [had] erred,” id. at 6a, without addressing whether

any “indistinguishability” requirement exists.

“Where issues are neither raised before nor considered by the Court of Appeals, this Court will not ordinarily consider them.” Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.

Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (citation omitted). Petitioner

provides no reason to depart from that principle here.

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari, including its request for summary reversal (Pet. 4 n.1, 32-34),

should be denied.

2. Petitioner also contends that, under Sackett, “any

surface connection between water and wetland must be

aquatic.” Pet. 23; see Pet. 22 (arguing that Sackett requires that there be “a continuous surface water connection between a wetland and covered water”). But even assuming that the question whether Sackett imposes an

“aquatic surface connection requirement” (Pet. 23) is

fairly included within the question presented, see Sup.

Ct. R. 14.1(a), that issue does not warrant this Court’s

review.

By his litigation conduct below, petitioner “admitted”

that a surface-water connection exists between the wetlands on his property and covered waters. Pet. App. 28a;

13

see p. 7, supra. During discovery, the government served

on petitioner a set of requests for admission that asked

him to admit, among other things, that he (or others

working under him) had placed dredged or fill material

into wetlands “that are hydrologically connected by surface waters to navigable waters.” D. Ct. Doc. 224-3, at 7.

After petitioner “failed to respond” to the government’s

requests within the period specified by Rule 36, the district court deemed the facts asserted in those requests

—including the fact that the wetlands on his property

“are hydrologically connected by surface waters to navigable waters”—to have been “admitted by [petitioner]

and conclusively established.” Pet. App. 28a-29a. The

court also noted that Dr. Earles’s “undisputed” expert

report “shows that continuous surface flow paths link

the wetlands with the Unnamed Tributary.” Id. at 33a.

And on appeal, the Second Circuit held that petitioner

had “fail[ed] to rebut the expert report concluding that

his property had wetlands connected to traditional navigable waters.” Id. at 5a.

Petitioner nevertheless characterizes the court of appeals’ decision as “reject[ing]” the existence of an “aquatic

surface connection requirement.” Pet. 23; see Pet. 24

n.11 (describing the decision below as “reject[ing]” a

“surface water connection requirement”). According to

petitioner (Pet. 22-23), the court rejected such a requirement when it stated that “the CWA does not require

surface water but only soil that is regularly ‘saturated

by surface or ground water.’ ” Pet. App. 5a (quoting 33

C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1)). Petitioner misreads that sentence

of the court’s opinion.

Throughout this case, the government has explained

that establishing a Section 1311 violation requires proof

that “(1) the areas in which the fill activities occurred sat-

14

isfy the regulatory definition of a wetland and (2) those

wetlands are ‘waters of the United States’ * * * within

the regulatory jurisdiction of the CWA.” D. Ct. Doc. 2241, at 33; see pp. 4-6, supra. The district court’s analysis

tracked those two prongs, see Pet. App. 29a-33a, and the

government’s brief on appeal emphasized the distinction between them, see Gov’t C.A. Br. 24; pp. 8-9, supra.

Accordingly, the court of appeals’ decision should likewise be read as tracking those two prongs, by first addressing 33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1)’s definition of “wetlands”

and then addressing the connection between the wetlands and jurisdictional waters. See Pet. App. 5a. Petitioner therefore is wrong in characterizing (Pet. 23) the

sentence of the court of appeals’ decision that quotes

and relies on the regulatory definition as a “rejection of

an aquatic surface connection requirement.” That sentence addresses only the first prong, not the second. 2

In his petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioner does

not appear to dispute the existence of some surface-water

connection between the wetlands on his property and

jurisdictional waters. Indeed, he appears to acknowledge

that a “surface water connection” exists at least “during

rainfall-runoff events.” Pet. 6; see Pet. 32. Petitioner appears to dispute (Pet. 32) only whether such a “surface

water connection” is sufficiently “continuous.” In the

courts below, however, petitioner did not argue that the

relevant “surface water connection” was insufficiently

In a footnote, petitioner contends (Pet. 24 n.11) that the court of

appeals’ “rejection of a surface water connection requirement” conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Glynn Environmental

Coalition, Inc. v. Sea Island Acquisition, LLC, 146 F.4th 1080 (2025),

cert. denied, 2026 WL 795140 (2026) (No. 25-908). But because the

court of appeals in this case did not reject such a requirement, the

asserted conflict does not exist.

2

15

continuous. To the extent that petitioner addressed the

issue at all, he seemed to dispute only whether any such

“surface water connection” existed. Pet. C.A. Br. 11.

The courts below thus had no occasion to address the

continuity of the surface-water connection between petitioner’s wetlands and the unnamed tributary of the

Farm River. Accordingly, this case would be a poor vehicle for considering the surface-water-connection issue

that petitioner now raises.

3. This Court’s review also is unwarranted because

the meaning of “waters of the United States” is the subject of a pending rulemaking by EPA and the Corps.

Last November, the agencies published a proposed rule

that would interpret the term “[c]ontinuous surface connection” to mean “having surface water at least during

the wet season and abutting (i.e., touching) a jurisdictional water.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 52,546 (emphasis omitted). The agencies also sought public comment on alternative approaches to the meaning of “continuous surface connection,” including one that would require “the

perennial presence of surface water (i.e., year-round)

over the wetland,” id. at 52,529, and another that would

require only that the wetland “abut[]” a jurisdictional

water, id. at 52,530. The public-comment period closed

on January 5, 2026. Id. at 52,498. The agencies have

not yet taken final action on the rule.

There is no sound reason for this Court to intervene

while the agencies’ rulemaking is ongoing. This Court’s

consideration of the requisite connection between wetlands and jurisdictional waters would benefit from the

agencies’ consideration of that issue in light of public

comments. Granting review at this juncture would preempt the agencies’ rulemaking process and risk foreclosing some of the options the agencies are considering.

16

Moreover, this case is in an “interlocutory” posture.

Pet. App. 4a (brackets and citation omitted); see Pet. 13

n.6 (acknowledging that “[t]he remedy phase is ongoing”). The “restorative injunction” entered by the district court is “not permanent.” Pet. App. 44a. And the

district court “has not issued a ‘final decision’ within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it has not decided

whether to impose civil penalties and if so how much.”

Id. at 3a-4a. Accordingly, if and when the agencies issue

a final rule on the meaning of “waters of the United

States,” petitioner could have the opportunity before final judgment to obtain the benefit of that rule, including

by asking for the injunction against him to be modified

if the rule supports that request. The interlocutory posture of this case makes the Court’s review particularly

unwarranted at this time. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co.

v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916) (concluding

that the interlocutory posture of a case “furnished sufficient ground for the denial of [an] application”).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON

Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

ROBERT N. STANDER

Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

BRIAN C. TOTH

Attorney

APRIL 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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