Opposition Brief — Jeffrey Andrews, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefApr 24, 2026
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 25-668
In the Supreme Court of the United States
JEFFREY ANDREWS, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
D. JOHN SAUER
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
ROBERT N. STANDER
Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
BRIAN C. TOTH
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
The question presented in the petition for a writ of
certiorari (Pet. i) is as follows:
“Was the Second Circuit correct to uphold Clean Water Act authority over wetlands that are not ‘as a practical matter indistinguishable’ from covered waters?”
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below ................................................................................ 1
Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 1
Statement ......................................................................................... 2
Argument ....................................................................................... 10
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Glynn Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Sea Island Acquisition,
LLC, 146 F.4th 1080 (11th Cir. 2025),
cert. denied, 2026 WL 795140 (2026) ................................. 14
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,
240 U.S. 251 (1916) ............................................................... 16
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) ....... 4, 5, 7, 11
Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023).............................. 6, 7, 10
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) ......................... 12
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1 (1993) ................................................................... 12
Statutes, regulation, and rules:
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ................................. 2
33 U.S.C. 1251(a) ................................................................. 2
33 U.S.C. 1311 ............................................................ 2-4, 13
33 U.S.C. 1311(a) ................................................................. 2
33 U.S.C. 1318 ...................................................................... 3
33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3) ............................................................ 2
33 U.S.C. 1319(b) ................................................................. 2
33 U.S.C. 1319(d) ................................................................. 2
33 U.S.C. 1344 ...................................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1344(a) ................................................................. 2
(III)
IV
Statutes, regulation, and rules—Continued:
Page
33 U.S.C. 1362(6) ................................................................. 2
33 U.S.C. 1362(7) ................................................................. 2
33 U.S.C. 1362(12) ............................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1362(14) ............................................................... 2
28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) ................................................................... 9
33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1) ................................................ 7, 10, 13, 14
Fed. R. Civ. P. :
Rule 36 ........................................................................ 3, 4, 13
Rule 36(a)(3) ......................................................................... 4
Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a) .................................................................... 12
Miscellaneous:
90 Fed. Reg. 52,498 (Nov. 20, 2025) ................................ 11, 15
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 25-668
JEFFREY ANDREWS, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The order of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-7a) is
available at 2025 WL 855763. The order of the district
court granting the government’s motion for summary
judgment on liability (Pet. App. 8a-38a) is reported at
677 F. Supp. 3d 74. The order of the district court granting an injunction (Pet. App. 39a-46a) is available at 2024
WL 2800232.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
March 19, 2025. A petition for rehearing was denied on
July 24, 2025 (Pet. App. 47a). On September 24, 2025, Justice Sotomayor extended the time within which to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari to and including November 21, 2025, and the petition was filed on November 20,
2025. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).
(1)
2
STATEMENT
1. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA or
Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., to protect “the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). To achieve that objective, the
CWA generally prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant
by any person.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). The Act defines the
term “discharge of a pollutant” to include “any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.” 33 U.S.C. 1362(12). The term “pollutant” means,
among other things, “dredged spoil,” “rock,” and “sand.”
33 U.S.C. 1362(6). The term “point source” means “any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,” including
bulldozers, backhoes, and tractors. 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).
And the term “navigable waters” means “the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33
U.S.C. 1362(7).
Section 1311’s prohibition on “the discharge of any
pollutant” is subject to certain exceptions. 33 U.S.C.
1311(a). One of them appears in 33 U.S.C. 1344, which
authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to “issue permits” for “the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal
sites.” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a). If the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finds that a person is violating Section 1311, it may issue an order requiring that person to
comply. 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3). EPA may also commence
a civil action for appropriate relief, including an injunction and civil penalties. 33 U.S.C. 1319(b) and (d).
2. This case involves property in New Haven County,
Connecticut. D. Ct. Doc. 224-6, at 9 (Oct. 21, 2022). Petitioner and his wife purchased the property in 2001,
and in 2011 they transferred ownership of the property
to their three adult children. D. Ct. Doc. 224-2, at 1 (Oct.
3
21, 2022). The property consists of both upland areas and
freshwater wetlands. Pet. App. 12a. Running through
the property is an unnamed tributary of the Farm River,
which flows into Long Island Sound. Id. at 12a, 32a-33a.
In 2010, petitioner began using bulldozers and other
heavy machinery to engage in “clear-cutting, stumping,
grubbing, filling, and grading” on the property. Pet. App.
27a-28a. By 2016, those activities had caused the filling
of approximately 13.3 acres of wetlands. Id. at 14a, 28a.
After learning about those activities through local officials, the Corps visited the property and “confirm[ed] the
presence of wetlands as well as the filling of those wetlands without the requisite permit.” Id. at 16a. The Corps
referred the matter to EPA, which conducted an inspection of the property and issued a “Notice of CWA Violations.” Id. at 18a; see id. at 17a-18a.
3. a. In 2020, the United States filed a civil enforcement action in federal district court against petitioner,
his wife, and his three adult children. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7-10.
The United States alleged that the defendants had violated Section 1311 by causing the discharge, without a
permit, of dredged or fill material into wetlands, as well
as a tributary, that are “waters of the United States.”
Compl. ¶¶ 63-64. The United States sought injunctive relief and civil penalties. Compl. ¶¶ 65-66.1
b. The parties proceeded to discovery. Pet. App. 19a21a. In March 2022, the government sent petitioner a
set of requests for admission pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 36. Pet. App. 28a. The government
The United States also alleged that the defendants had failed to
respond to EPA’s requests for information, in violation of 33 U.S.C.
1318. Compl. ¶¶ 68-72. The district court granted the government’s
motion for summary judgment as to liability on that claim, Pet. App.
36a-37a, and the court of appeals affirmed, id. at 4a-6a.
1
4
asked petitioner to admit, among other things, that he (or
others working under his direction) had placed dredged
or fill material into wetlands “that are hydrologically
connected by surface waters to navigable waters.” D. Ct.
Doc. 224-3, at 7 (Oct. 21, 2022). Under Rule 36, “[a] matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served,
the party to whom the request is directed” responds.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Petitioner “failed to respond”
within 30 days. Pet. App. 28a.
c. In October 2022, the government moved for summary judgment on liability. D. Ct. Doc. 224 (Oct. 21,
2022). The government explained that, in order to establish that petitioner had violated Section 1311, the
government was required to “demonstrate that (1) the
areas in which the fill activities occurred satisfy the regulatory definition of a wetland and (2) those wetlands
are ‘waters of the United States’ * * * within the regulatory jurisdiction of the CWA.” D. Ct. Doc. 224-1, at 33
(Oct. 21, 2022).
With respect to the first prong, the government observed that the applicable regulations define “wetlands”
as those “areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted
for life in saturated soil conditions.” D. Ct. Doc. 224-1,
at 34 (citation omitted). The government argued that
there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the
areas petitioner had filled satisfied that definition. Ibid.
With respect to the second prong, the government relied on this Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006). D. Ct. Doc. 224-1, at 34-39. The government observed that Rapanos had “generated no majority opinion for the Court.” Id. at 34. Instead, four Jus-
5
tices concluded that the CWA covers only those wetlands
with a “continuous surface connection” to “a relatively
permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters,” “making it difficult to determine
where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion). In contrast, the
Justice who provided the fifth vote for the judgment, Justice Kennedy, concluded that the CWA covers only those
wetlands that have a “significant nexus” with navigable
waters, and that such a nexus exists where “the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of those waters.
Id. at 779-780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
The government contended that the wetlands in this
case satisfy both the Rapanos plurality’s test and Justice Kennedy’s test. D. Ct. Doc. 224-1, at 36. Under the
plurality’s test, the government argued that the Farm
River is a traditional navigable water, and that the unnamed tributary is a relatively permanent body of water
connected to the River. Id. at 37. The government further contended that the wetlands in this case have a “continuous surface connection” to the unnamed tributary.
Ibid. The government expressed the view that a “ ‘continuous surface connection’ is a ‘physical connection requirement,’ but does not require surface water to be continuously present between the wetland and the tributary.” Ibid. (citation omitted). The government then argued that the requisite connection exists in this case, citing, among other things, the expert report of Dr. T. Andrew Earles, who had found “continuous surface flow
paths during runoff events connecting the wetlands [in
this case] with the Unnamed Tributary.” Id. at 38 (citation omitted); see D. Ct. Doc. 224-6, at 3, 21.
6
As the local rules of the district court required, the
government also filed a statement of undisputed material facts. D. Ct. Doc. 224-2. The government stated that
there was no genuine dispute that the wetlands in this
case “have a continuous surface connection to the Unnamed Tributary,” or that there are “continuous surface
flow paths during runoff events connecting the wetlands”
with that tributary. Id. at 16.
After the government filed its summary-judgment
motion, the district court held an in-person status conference “for the sole purpose of ensuring” that petitioner,
who was proceeding pro se, had received copies of all
filings and was aware of his obligation under the local
rules to respond to the government’s statement of undisputed material facts. Pet. App. 10a; see id. at 9a-10a. In
January 2023, petitioner filed a one-page opposition that
did not respond to the government’s statement, cite any
“evidence that would be admissible at trial,” or “mention
any facts at issue in this case.” Id. at 10a-11a; see D. Ct.
Doc. 240 (Jan. 19, 2023). Instead, the opposition asserted
only that petitioner had “[c]onstitutionally enumerated
and protected rights” to build on his private property.
D. Ct. Doc. 240, at 1. In reply, the government noted that
petitioner had “failed to identify any legal theory that
would excuse his violations of the [CWA].” D. Ct. Doc.
241, at 4 (Feb. 1, 2023).
4. While the government’s summary-judgment motion was pending, this Court issued its decision in Sackett
v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023). The Sackett Court adopted
the Rapanos plurality’s “formulation of when wetlands
are part of ‘the waters of the United States.’ ” Id. at 678.
The Sackett Court therefore held that “the CWA extends
to only those wetlands that are ‘as a practical matter indistinguishable from waters of the United States,’ ” which
7
“requires the party asserting jurisdiction over adjacent
wetlands to establish”: (1) “ ‘that the adjacent body of
water constitutes * * * a relatively permanent body of
water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters’ ”; and (2) “ ‘that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to
determine where the “water” ends and the “wetland”
begins.’ ” Id. at 678-679 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
742, 755) (brackets omitted).
5. In June 2023, after this Court’s decision in Sackett, the district court granted the government’s motion
for summary judgment on liability. Pet. App. 8a-38a. At
the outset, the court stated that the “ ‘special solicitude’ ”
that “ ‘pro se litigants’ ” are owed “does not absolve [petitioner] of his obligations under the Federal and Local
Rules.” Id. at 11a (citation omitted). The court deemed
the “factual assertions” in the government’s statement
of undisputed facts to be “admitted” because petitioner
had failed to respond to that statement. Ibid. The court
also deemed “admitted” the material in the government’s
requests for admission because petitioner had “failed to
respond” to those requests. Id. at 28a.
The district court then held that the government had
shown that petitioner had discharged pollutants from a
point source into navigable waters. Pet. App. 24a-33a.
First, the court found that the government had “demonstrate[d] that the filling activities occurred in areas
deemed ‘wetlands’ under the CWA and attendant regulations.” Id. at 29a; see id. at 29a-30a. The court noted
that the regulations define “[w]etlands” as “areas that
‘are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water.’ ” Id. at 30a (quoting 33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1)). And the
court found no genuine dispute of material fact that the
wetlands in this case satisfy that definition. Ibid.
8
Second, the district court determined that the government had “show[n] that those wetlands are ‘waters
of the United States’ ” under this Court’s decision in Sackett. Pet. App. 29a; see id. at 30a-33a. The district court
explained that the government had “put forward undisputed evidence showing that [a] ‘continuous surface connection’ exists between the wetlands and the Unnamed
Tributary.” Id. at 33a. The court pointed to Dr. Earles’s
expert report, “which shows that continuous surface flow
paths link the wetlands with the Unnamed Tributary.”
Ibid. The court also emphasized that petitioner had “admitted” that the wetlands “are hydrologically connected
by surface waters to navigable waters.” Id. at 28a-29a.
In May 2024, the district court entered a default judgment against petitioner’s wife and his three adult children, who had failed to appear. D. Ct. Doc. 260-1 (May 2,
2024). The court then issued an order granting an injunction against all of the defendants. Pet. App. 39a-46a. The
injunction requires the defendants “to restore the disturbed wetlands” on the property in accordance with a
restoration plan. Id. at 40a; see id. at 40a-45a. The order
states that the injunction is “not permanent,” id. at 44a,
and that “appropriate civil penalties” will “be determined
after the Restoration Plan is completed,” id. at 45a.
6. Petitioner was the only defendant who appealed
the district court’s May 2024 order granting an injunction. Pet. App. 3a. In his pro se opening brief, petitioner
argued that the government’s own witnesses had testified that “there is no surface water and no surface water
connection” on his property. Pet. C.A. Br. 11 (capitalization omitted); see id. at 6-7, 12; Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 5.
In response, the government argued that petitioner had
“confuse[d] data collected to determine the presence of
wetlands meeting the regulatory definition in 33 C.F.R.
9
§ 328.3(c)(1) with the facts required to establish CWA jurisdiction under the Sackett decision.” Gov’t C.A. Br. 24.
The government explained that the testimony petitioner
had cited was an expert witness’s testimony “about his
process of digging soil test pits to evaluate wetland indicators, such as hydric soil and hydrology, in order to
establish the presence of wetlands meeting the regulatory definition in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(1).” Ibid. The government emphasized that “whether there is CWA jurisdiction over a given wetland” is a separate question. Id.
at 25. After noting that the “relevant connection for CWA
jurisdiction is the ‘continuous surface connection’ between the wetlands meeting the regulatory definition in
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(1) and a covered water of the United
States,” the government argued that “the evidentiary
record establishes” the existence of such a connection in
this case. Id. at 25-26 (citation omitted).
In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals affirmed “the order of the district court, to the extent that
it imposed injunctive relief against [petitioner].” Pet.
App. 7a; see id. at 1a-7a. As an initial matter, the court
of appeals observed that “[t]he district court ha[d] not
issued a ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 because it ha[d] not decided whether to impose
civil penalties and if so how much.” Id. at 3a-4a. The
court of appeals nevertheless determined that it had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) because
the district court’s May 2024 order was an interlocutory
order granting an injunction. Pet. App. 4a.
Turning to the merits, the court of appeals understood
petitioner’s opening brief to argue that “the case should
have been dismissed because there is no surface water
on his property.” Pet. App. 5a (citing Pet. C.A. Br. 6-7).
“[D]isagree[ing]” with that argument, the court explained
10
that “[t]he CWA applies to wetlands that have ‘a continuous surface connection’ with ‘relatively permanent
bodies of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Sackett, 598 U.S. at 678)
(brackets omitted). The court of appeals then agreed
with the district court that petitioner’s activities had occurred in areas that constitute wetlands, which the applicable regulation defines as “soil that is regularly ‘saturated by surface or ground water.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 33
C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1)). The court of appeals also agreed with
the district court that petitioner had “fail[ed] to rebut
the expert report” showing that those wetlands were
“connected to traditional navigable waters.” Ibid. The
court of appeals therefore held that petitioner had “not
shown that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the government as to his liability under the CWA.” Id. at 6a.
7. After the district court issued its May 2024 order
granting injunctive relief, one of the other defendants,
Wesley Andrews, retained counsel and began coordinating with EPA. D. Ct. Doc. 276 (June 7, 2024). Wesley Andrews recently submitted a restoration plan in
accordance with the court’s order. D. Ct. Doc. 386, at 1
(Mar. 27, 2026). EPA has reviewed the plan and has determined that it adequately complies with the court’s injunction. Ibid.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner contends (Pet. 18) that, under this Court’s
decision in Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023), “regulable wetlands” under the CWA “must be indistinguishable from covered waters.” Petitioner forfeited that argument below, however, and the lower courts did not address it. Petitioner also contends (Pet. 23) that “any surface connection between water and wetland must be
11
aquatic.” But “undisputed evidence” established the existence of a surface-water connection in this case, Pet.
App. 33a, and petitioner never argued below that the
connection was insufficiently continuous.
Moreover, the meaning of “waters of the United
States” is the subject of a pending rulemaking by EPA
and the Corps. 90 Fed. Reg. 52,498, 52,498 (Nov. 20,
2025). There is no sound reason for this Court to preempt
that rulemaking by intervening now, especially given the
interlocutory posture of this case. The petition for a writ
of certiorari should be denied.
1. Petitioner asks this Court to grant certiorari to resolve whether wetlands must be “indistinguishable from
covered waters” in order to be “regulable” under the
CWA. Pet. 18; see Pet. i, 3-4. That issue does not warrant this Court’s review.
Petitioner did not raise in either of the courts below
the question whether Sackett imposes an “indistinguishability” requirement. Pet. 18. In the district court, petitioner argued only that he had “[c]onstitutionally enumerated and protected rights” to build on his private
property. D. Ct. Doc. 240, at 1. And in the court of appeals, petitioner’s only CWA-related argument was that
his property contains “no surface water and no surface
water connection.” Pet. C.A. Br. 11 (capitalization omitted); see id. at 6-7, 12. Indeed, the word “indistinguishable” appeared only once in petitioner’s merits briefs on
appeal, as part of a quotation of a passage from the plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006). Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 16. Neither there nor anywhere else in his briefs did petitioner contend that the
Court had imposed a standalone “indistinguishability”
requirement. By failing to raise the issue below, petitioner has forfeited any argument that such a require-
12
ment exists. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 413 (2012) (deeming forfeited an argument not raised
or addressed below).
The courts below likewise did not consider whether
Sackett imposes an “indistinguishability” requirement.
The court of appeals understood petitioner’s only CWArelated argument on appeal to be that “the case should
have been dismissed because there is no surface water
on his property.” Pet. App. 5a (citing Pet. C.A. Br. 6-7).
With respect to that argument, the court of appeals concluded that petitioner had “not shown that the district
court [had] erred,” id. at 6a, without addressing whether
any “indistinguishability” requirement exists.
“Where issues are neither raised before nor considered by the Court of Appeals, this Court will not ordinarily consider them.” Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (citation omitted). Petitioner
provides no reason to depart from that principle here.
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari, including its request for summary reversal (Pet. 4 n.1, 32-34),
should be denied.
2. Petitioner also contends that, under Sackett, “any
surface connection between water and wetland must be
aquatic.” Pet. 23; see Pet. 22 (arguing that Sackett requires that there be “a continuous surface water connection between a wetland and covered water”). But even assuming that the question whether Sackett imposes an
“aquatic surface connection requirement” (Pet. 23) is
fairly included within the question presented, see Sup.
Ct. R. 14.1(a), that issue does not warrant this Court’s
review.
By his litigation conduct below, petitioner “admitted”
that a surface-water connection exists between the wetlands on his property and covered waters. Pet. App. 28a;
13
see p. 7, supra. During discovery, the government served
on petitioner a set of requests for admission that asked
him to admit, among other things, that he (or others
working under him) had placed dredged or fill material
into wetlands “that are hydrologically connected by surface waters to navigable waters.” D. Ct. Doc. 224-3, at 7.
After petitioner “failed to respond” to the government’s
requests within the period specified by Rule 36, the district court deemed the facts asserted in those requests
—including the fact that the wetlands on his property
“are hydrologically connected by surface waters to navigable waters”—to have been “admitted by [petitioner]
and conclusively established.” Pet. App. 28a-29a. The
court also noted that Dr. Earles’s “undisputed” expert
report “shows that continuous surface flow paths link
the wetlands with the Unnamed Tributary.” Id. at 33a.
And on appeal, the Second Circuit held that petitioner
had “fail[ed] to rebut the expert report concluding that
his property had wetlands connected to traditional navigable waters.” Id. at 5a.
Petitioner nevertheless characterizes the court of appeals’ decision as “reject[ing]” the existence of an “aquatic
surface connection requirement.” Pet. 23; see Pet. 24
n.11 (describing the decision below as “reject[ing]” a
“surface water connection requirement”). According to
petitioner (Pet. 22-23), the court rejected such a requirement when it stated that “the CWA does not require
surface water but only soil that is regularly ‘saturated
by surface or ground water.’ ” Pet. App. 5a (quoting 33
C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1)). Petitioner misreads that sentence
of the court’s opinion.
Throughout this case, the government has explained
that establishing a Section 1311 violation requires proof
that “(1) the areas in which the fill activities occurred sat-
14
isfy the regulatory definition of a wetland and (2) those
wetlands are ‘waters of the United States’ * * * within
the regulatory jurisdiction of the CWA.” D. Ct. Doc. 2241, at 33; see pp. 4-6, supra. The district court’s analysis
tracked those two prongs, see Pet. App. 29a-33a, and the
government’s brief on appeal emphasized the distinction between them, see Gov’t C.A. Br. 24; pp. 8-9, supra.
Accordingly, the court of appeals’ decision should likewise be read as tracking those two prongs, by first addressing 33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1)’s definition of “wetlands”
and then addressing the connection between the wetlands and jurisdictional waters. See Pet. App. 5a. Petitioner therefore is wrong in characterizing (Pet. 23) the
sentence of the court of appeals’ decision that quotes
and relies on the regulatory definition as a “rejection of
an aquatic surface connection requirement.” That sentence addresses only the first prong, not the second. 2
In his petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioner does
not appear to dispute the existence of some surface-water
connection between the wetlands on his property and
jurisdictional waters. Indeed, he appears to acknowledge
that a “surface water connection” exists at least “during
rainfall-runoff events.” Pet. 6; see Pet. 32. Petitioner appears to dispute (Pet. 32) only whether such a “surface
water connection” is sufficiently “continuous.” In the
courts below, however, petitioner did not argue that the
relevant “surface water connection” was insufficiently
In a footnote, petitioner contends (Pet. 24 n.11) that the court of
appeals’ “rejection of a surface water connection requirement” conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Glynn Environmental
Coalition, Inc. v. Sea Island Acquisition, LLC, 146 F.4th 1080 (2025),
cert. denied, 2026 WL 795140 (2026) (No. 25-908). But because the
court of appeals in this case did not reject such a requirement, the
asserted conflict does not exist.
2
15
continuous. To the extent that petitioner addressed the
issue at all, he seemed to dispute only whether any such
“surface water connection” existed. Pet. C.A. Br. 11.
The courts below thus had no occasion to address the
continuity of the surface-water connection between petitioner’s wetlands and the unnamed tributary of the
Farm River. Accordingly, this case would be a poor vehicle for considering the surface-water-connection issue
that petitioner now raises.
3. This Court’s review also is unwarranted because
the meaning of “waters of the United States” is the subject of a pending rulemaking by EPA and the Corps.
Last November, the agencies published a proposed rule
that would interpret the term “[c]ontinuous surface connection” to mean “having surface water at least during
the wet season and abutting (i.e., touching) a jurisdictional water.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 52,546 (emphasis omitted). The agencies also sought public comment on alternative approaches to the meaning of “continuous surface connection,” including one that would require “the
perennial presence of surface water (i.e., year-round)
over the wetland,” id. at 52,529, and another that would
require only that the wetland “abut[]” a jurisdictional
water, id. at 52,530. The public-comment period closed
on January 5, 2026. Id. at 52,498. The agencies have
not yet taken final action on the rule.
There is no sound reason for this Court to intervene
while the agencies’ rulemaking is ongoing. This Court’s
consideration of the requisite connection between wetlands and jurisdictional waters would benefit from the
agencies’ consideration of that issue in light of public
comments. Granting review at this juncture would preempt the agencies’ rulemaking process and risk foreclosing some of the options the agencies are considering.
16
Moreover, this case is in an “interlocutory” posture.
Pet. App. 4a (brackets and citation omitted); see Pet. 13
n.6 (acknowledging that “[t]he remedy phase is ongoing”). The “restorative injunction” entered by the district court is “not permanent.” Pet. App. 44a. And the
district court “has not issued a ‘final decision’ within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it has not decided
whether to impose civil penalties and if so how much.”
Id. at 3a-4a. Accordingly, if and when the agencies issue
a final rule on the meaning of “waters of the United
States,” petitioner could have the opportunity before final judgment to obtain the benefit of that rule, including
by asking for the injunction against him to be modified
if the rule supports that request. The interlocutory posture of this case makes the Court’s review particularly
unwarranted at this time. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co.
v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916) (concluding
that the interlocutory posture of a case “furnished sufficient ground for the denial of [an] application”).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
D. JOHN SAUER
Solicitor General
ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
ROBERT N. STANDER
Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
BRIAN C. TOTH
Attorney
APRIL 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.