Opposition Brief — Hamed Kian, Petitioner v. Florida
Supreme Court briefApr 20, 2026
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No. 25-6623
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
HAMED KIAN,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
_______________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH DISTRICT
_______________
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
_______________
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of Florida
1515 N. Flagler Drive,
Suite 900
West Palm Beach, FL
33401
Phone: (561) 837-5016
crimappwpb@
myfloridalegal.com
JAMES UTHMEIER
Attorney General of
Florida
CELIA TERENZIO
Bureau Chief, Criminal
Appeals
Counsel of Record
JOSEPH MOLLICA
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
More than half a century ago, this Court held that
Florida’s use of six-person juries satisfies the Sixth
Amendment. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86
(1970). After examining the history and purpose of the
right to trial by jury, the Court concluded that the
framers enshrined no 12-juror requirement in the
Constitution, even though most founding-era juries
consisted of 12 persons. Relying on Williams, Florida
and five other states continue to use fewer than 12 jurors in at least some criminal trials. In Florida, where
all noncapital crimes are tried before six-member juries, roughly 5,000 criminal convictions are currently
pending on direct appeal.
As in Minor v. Florida, 2026 WL 490842 (Feb. 23,
2026), the question presented is whether the Court
should overrule Williams and hold that the Sixth
Amendment requires the use of 12-person juries in serious criminal cases.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED.......................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................... iii
STATEMENT .............................................................. 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 3
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE PETITIONER’S
INVITATION TO RECONSIDER AND OVERRULE
WILLIAMS. ..........................................................3
II. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE. ..........................19
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 22
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972) ............................................ 2, 10
Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) ................................................ 13
Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223 (1978) .......................................... 11, 14
Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) .................................................. 13
Braxton v. United States,
500 U.S. 344 (1991) .................................................. 4
Chafin v. Chafin,
568 U.S. 165 (2013) ................................................ 19
Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967) .................................................. 20
Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149 (1973) .................................... 10–12, 19
Collins v. Youngblood,
497 U.S. 37 (1990) .................................................. 11
Davis v. Florida,
143 S. Ct. 380 (2022) ................................................ 3
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
597 U.S. 215 (2022) .................................................. 8
Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) .................................................. 1
Gibson v. State,
16 Fla. 291 (1877)..................................................... 1
Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) ................................................ 12
Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965) ................................................ 13
iv
Hurst v. Florida,
577 U.S. 92 (2016) .................................................. 21
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps.,
Council 31,
585 U.S. 878 (2018) ............................................ 4, 13
Khorrami v. Arizona,
143 S. Ct. 22 (2022) ............................ 3, 9, 13, 15, 17
Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162 (1986) ................................................ 17
Ludwig v. Massachusetts,
427 U.S. 618 (1976) ................................................ 11
Minor v. Florida,
2026 WL 490842 (Feb. 23, 2026) ..........................i, 3
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) ................................................ 12
Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1 (1999) .............................................. 20–22
Parada v. United States,
2026 WL 79784 (Jan. 12, 2026) ........................... 3–4
Phillips v. Florida,
142 S. Ct. 721 (2021) ................................................ 3
Pretell v. Florida,
143 S. Ct. 1027 (2023) .............................................. 3
Ramos v. Louisiana,
590 U.S. 83 (2020) .............................. 2, 6, 10–12, 19
Rockford Life Insurance Co. v. Illinois Dept. of
Revenue,
482 U.S. 182 (1987) .................................................. 6
Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) ................................................ 13
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................ 13
Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975) ................................................ 12
v
United States v. Ahmad,
974 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1992) .................................. 7
United States v. Gabay,
923 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1991) ................................ 7
United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506 (1995) ................................................ 11
United States v. Johnson,
117 F.4th 28 (2d Cir. 2024) ...................................... 7
United States v. Smith,
789 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1986) ..................................... 7
United States v. Stratton,
779 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1985) ..................................... 7
Washington v. Recuenco,
548 U.S. 212 (2006) ................................................ 21
Weaver v. Massachusetts,
582 U.S. 286 (2017) ................................................ 20
Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914) ................................................ 13
Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) ................... i, 1, 3, 6–9, 11–13, 17
Statutes & Constitutional Provisions
Act of February 17, 1877, ch. 3010, § 6,
1877 Fla. Laws 54 .............................................. 1, 18
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-102 ............................................. 3
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-82 ............................................. 3
Fla. Const. art. I, § 22 ............................................... 18
Fla. Stat. § 460.411 ..................................................... 1
Fla. Stat. § 913.10 ............................................... 1, 3, 7
Ind. Code § 35-37-1-1 .................................................. 3
Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 218, § 26A ................................ 3
Utah Code. Ann. § 78B-1-104 ..................................... 3
vi
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a)................................................... 19
Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b).................................................. 7
U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10 .................................................. 5–6
Other Authorities
Alice Guerra et al., Accuracy of Verdicts Under
Different Jury Sizes and Voting Rules,
28 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221 (2020) ......................... 15
Annals of Cong. (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) ....... 9
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) ............... 12
Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Jury Size and the
Hung-Jury Paradox,
42 J. Legal Stud. 399 (2013) .................................. 15
Bridget M. Waller et al., Twelve (Not So) Angry Men:
Managing Conversational Group Size Increases
Perceived Contribution by Decision Makers,
14 Grp. Processes & Intergrp. Rels. 835 (2011) .... 14
Chief Adm’r of Cts., New York State Unified Court
System 2017 Annual Report (2018),
https://tinyurl.com/yckheu9v ................................. 17
Chief Adm’r of Cts., New York State Unified Court
System 2018 Annual Report (2019),
https://tinyurl.com/yc7cvjhe................................... 17
Chief Adm’r of Cts., New York State Unified Court
System 2019 Annual Report (2020),
https://tinyurl.com/2wtwfmdm .............................. 17
Fla. Off. of State Cts. Adm’r, Florida’s Trial Courts
Statistical Reference Guide FY 2017-18 (2019),
https://tinyurl.com/433vwfy3 ................................. 16
vii
Fla. Off. of State Cts. Adm’r, Florida’s Trial Courts
Statistical Reference Guide FY 2018-19 (2020),
https://tinyurl.com/43zywh5n ................................ 16
Fla. Off. of State Cts. Adm'r, Florida's Trial Courts
Statistical Reference Guide FY 2016-17 (2018),
https://tinyurl.com/4drv24ky ................................. 16
Henry G. Connor, The Constitutional Right to a Trial
by a Jury of the Vicinage,
57 U. Pa. L. Rev. & Am. L. Reg. 197 (1909) ............ 8
James Wilson, Works of the Honourable James
Wilson (1804) .......................................................... 10
Jud. Council of Cal., 2018 Court Statistics Report:
Statewide Caseload Trends (2018),
https://tinyurl.com/5n6tj9pr .................................. 16
Jud. Council of Cal., 2019 Court Statistics Report:
Statewide Caseload Trends (2019),
https://tinyurl.com/mwmby3h5 ............................. 16
Jud. Council of Cal., 2020 Court Statistics Report:
Statewide Caseload Trends (2020),
https://tinyurl.com/2mym3hrx ............................... 16
Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, Jury Size and the Free
Rider Problem,
19 J.L. Econ. & Org. 24 (2003) .............................. 14
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton,
Sept. 14, 1789, 1 Letters and Other Writings of
James Madison (1865) ............................................. 9
Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry,
Sept. 14, 1789,
https://tinyurl.com/muu5xzfa .................................. 9
Nicolas Fay et al., Group Discussion as Interactive
Dialogue or as Serial Monologue: The Influence of
Group Size,
11 Psych. Sci. 481 (2000) ....................................... 14
viii
Off. of Ct. Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the
Texas Judiciary Fiscal Year 2017 (2018),
https://tinyurl.com/mtrp379s ................................. 16
Off. of Ct. Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the
Texas Judiciary Fiscal Year 2018 (2019),
https://tinyurl.com/2s3fsmpf .................................. 16
Off. of Ct. Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the
Texas Judiciary Fiscal Year 2019 (2020),
https://tinyurl.com/ywh779v3 ................................ 16
Patrick E. Higginbotham et al., Better by the Dozen:
Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury,
104 Judicature 46 (2020) ....................................... 19
Paul Samuel Reinsch, The English Common Law in
the Early American Colonies,
1 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History
367 (1907) ................................................................. 8
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 343–44 (1769) ............................................ 8
William S. Brackett, The Freehold Qualification of
Jurors,
29 Am. L. Reg. 436 (1881) ........................................ 8
1
STATEMENT
1. In 1877, Florida began using six-person juries to
try noncapital criminal defendants. See Act of February 17, 1877, ch. 3010, § 6, 1877 Fla. Laws 54. That
same year, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
use of six-person juries neither “destroy[ed] [n]or infring[ed] the right of trial by jury.” Gibson v. State, 16
Fla. 291, 300 (1877). Ninety years later, this Court
opened another avenue to challenge the validity of
Florida’s six-person juries, holding that states are
bound by the jury-trial guarantee in the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). But just two years after that, this Court concluded that six-person juries
satisfy that guarantee. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 86 (1970). For nearly as long as states have had a
Sixth Amendment duty to provide criminal jury trials,
this Court’s message to the people of Florida has been
clear: the jury structure that they have settled on for
a century and a half fulfills that duty. Unsurprisingly
then, Florida has continued its longstanding practice
of using six-person juries in trials of noncapital offenses. See Fla. Stat. § 913.10.
2. The petitioner was tried for five counts of practicing chiropractic medicine without a license. See Fla.
Stat. § 460.411(1). Because this crime is not punishable by death, the trial court empaneled a six-person
jury as dictated by Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 913.10.
The petitioner’s counsel questioned the venire panel
extensively and participated in jury selection, exercising cause and peremptory challenges to various prospective jurors the petitioner deemed undesirable. Tr.
80–108. Once selected, the petitioner accepted the
2
jury as empaneled and proceeded to trial without objection. Tr. 107–11. The trial court specifically asked
the petitioner personally if he accepted the jury as selected and the petitioner answered affirmatively. Tr.
109.
The evidence at trial revealed that the petitioner’s
license to practice chiropractic medicine in Florida
was suspended. C.R. 567–71; Tr. 126–30. Three patients testified that the petitioner performed chiropractic treatment on them during five separate visits
after the suspension of his license. Tr. 181, 188, 193,
199–202. Chart notes belonging to two of the patients
and the petitioner’s office patient schedule similarly
reflected that the petitioner performed chiropractic
treatment on those three patients during those five
separate visits. C.R. 572–76, 591–609; Tr. 145, 157.
Presented with this evidence, the jury returned
unanimous guilty verdicts on all five counts. See R.
384; Tr. 313–15.
3. The petitioner appealed his convictions to Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, arguing—for
the first time—that the Sixth Amendment entitled
him to be tried by a 12-person jury because this Court
abrogated Williams in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S.
83 (2020), which held that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous verdicts in state court as in federal
court, overruling Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972). The Fourth District affirmed in a per curiam,
summary decision. Pet. App. 2. The petitioner then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.
3
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The petitioner contends that the Court should review the Fourth District’s summary decision and use
it as a vehicle to overrule Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970), which held that the Sixth Amendment permits six-person juries in criminal cases. The Court
should, as it has done in several recent cases, decline
the invitation to revisit Williams. See Minor v. Florida, 2026 WL 490842 (Feb. 23, 2026); Parada v.
United States, 2026 WL 79784 (Jan. 12, 2026); Pretell
v. Florida, 143 S. Ct. 1027 (2023); Khorrami v. Arizona, 143 S. Ct. 22 (2022); Davis v. Florida, 143 S. Ct.
380 (2022); Phillips v. Florida, 142 S. Ct. 721 (2021).
The petitioner makes no serious attempt to show that
overruling Williams is warranted under traditional
principles of stare decisis, and it is not. Not only was
Williams correctly decided; overruling it also would
imperil thousands of criminal convictions in Florida
and five other states that for more than 50 years have
relied on its rule. 1
The petition should be denied.
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE PETITIONER’S
INVITATION
WILLIAMS.
TO
RECONSIDER
AND
OVERRULE
The petitioner has not justified revisiting Williams’ holding that the Sixth Amendment permits juries comprised of six members in serious criminal
1
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-102; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-82; Fla.
Stat. § 913.10; Ind. Code § 35-37-1-1; Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 218,
§ 26A; Utah Code. Ann. § 78B-1-104.
4
cases. Although the petitioner urges the Court to
grant review to overrule this 55-year-old case, he does
not acknowledge his heavy burden to show that the
Court should do so.
This Court does not lightly overrule precedent.
“Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Janus v. Am.
Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585
U.S. 878, 916 (2018). To that end, this Court considers
several factors before overruling a prior decision: the
quality of the prior decision’s reasoning, the workability of its holding, its consistency with other
cases, post-decision developments, and reliance on the
decision. Id. at 917. Those factors favor leaving Williams undisturbed.
1. The petitioner urges this Court to hold this case
“pending resolution” of the petitions for certiorari in
Parada v. United States and Minor v. Florida, petitions which raised the same question presented as
this one. Pet. ii. This Court has since denied those petitions, as it should here. Parada v. United States,
2026 WL 79784 (Jan. 12, 2026); Minor v. Florida, 2026
WL 490842 (Feb. 23, 2026).
2. The primary purpose for which this Court uses
its certiorari jurisdiction is to resolve conflicts among
the United States courts of appeal and state courts
“concerning the meaning and provisions of federal
law.” Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348
(1991).
5
Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States identifies the relevant considerations in
determining the propriety of certiorari review. Noting
review is only granted for “compelling reasons,” the
Rule indicates consideration of a decision by a state
court of last resort should involve an unresolved question of federal law or a conflict among higher courts.
Specifically, the rule states, in relevant part,
The following, although neither controlling nor
fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate
the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the
same important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last
resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a
lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
Court’s supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court
of last resort or of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of
federal law that has not been, but should be,
6
settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.
U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10.
Cases that do not divide the federal or state courts
or that do not present important, unsettled questions
of federal law usually do not merit certiorari review.
Rockford Life Insurance Co. v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182, 184 n. 3 (1987).
3. The petitioner is wrong to dismiss Williams’ reasoning as “contrary to the understanding of the Sixth
Amendment at the time of the Founding.” Pet. 13; see
also id. at 11–14. On the contrary, Justice White’s
opinion for the Court in Williams—thick with scholarly footnotes—extensively canvassed the history of,
and purposes behind, the jury-trial right as established by “the Framers” in the Sixth Amendment. 399
U.S. at 103. The Court devoted 13 pages to the history
and development of the common-law jury and the
Sixth Amendment. See id. at 87–99; see also Ramos,
590 U.S. at 152 (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing that
Williams contained “a detailed discussion of the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment jury-trial
right”). Williams examined the history surrounding
the common-law 12-person jury requirement. See 399
U.S. at 87–89, 87 nn.19–20, 88 n.23. It addressed the
Court’s previous cases discussing jury size. See id. at
90–92, 90 n.26, 91 nn.27–28, 92 nn.29–31. It discussed
the history of Article III’s jury-trial provision and the
accompanying ratification debates. See id. at 93–94,
93 nn.34–35. It analyzed the drafting history of the
7
Sixth Amendment, including disputes over what language to use. See id. at 94–97, 94 n.37, 95 n.39. And it
considered contemporaneous constitutional provisions and statutes regarding juries. See id. at 97 &
nn.43–44. The upshot was that, as a matter of original
meaning, the word “jury” in the Sixth Amendment did
not codify any common-law practice of empaneling 12
jurors. See id. at 99–100.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(1), Section 913.10’s federal counterpart, provides for a jury
of 12 as the default in federal criminal trials. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 23(b)(1). But Rule 23(b)(3) further provides
that “[a]fter the jury has retired to deliberate, the
court may permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict, even without a stipulation by the parties, if the
court finds good cause to excuse a juror.” Fed. R. Crim.
P. 23(b)(3). Federal district courts may do so over defense objection because the right to a 12-person jury is
neither a constitutional right nor a substantial one.
See id.; Williams, 399 U.S. at 100; see also United
States v. Johnson, 117 F.4th 28, 40 (2d Cir. 2024),
reh’g en banc denied, 143 F.4th 184 (2d Cir. 2025),
cert. denied, 2026 WL 490645 (Feb. 23, 2026); United
States v. Ahmad, 974 F.2d 1163, 1164 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536, 1539, 1541–43
(11th Cir. 1991), reh’g en banc denied, 934 F.2d 1266
(11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196,
204–05 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017
(1986); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 831,
834–35 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1162
(1986). Rule 23(b)(3) and this associated authority further supports Williams’ holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury does not encompass a jury of 12.
8
The Petitioner makes no attempt to identify error
in Williams’ analysis. As Williams observed, while the
“jury at common law came to be fixed generally at 12,
that particular feature of the common law jury appears to have been a historical accident,” 399 U.S. at
89 (footnote omitted), and was not uniform even at
common law, as the Pennsylvania colony “employed
juries of six or seven,” id. at 98 n.45 (citing Paul Samuel Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early
American Colonies, in 1 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 367, 398 (1907)).
But even assuming uniformity in common-law
practice, the Court explained that not every such practice was “immutably codified into our Constitution.”
Williams, 399 U.S. at 90; see Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 253 (2022) (“[T]he
fact that many States in the late 18th and early 19th
century did not criminalize pre-quickening abortions
does not mean that anyone thought the States lacked
the authority to do so.”). For example, at English common law, a jury consisted of 12 male freeholders (i.e.,
landowners) from the vicinage (i.e., county) of the alleged crime. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 343–44 (1769); see also Henry G.
Connor, The Constitutional Right to a Trial by a Jury
of the Vicinage, 57 U. Pa. L. Rev. & Am. L. Reg. 197,
198–99 (1909) (quoting the Continental Congress’s explanation of the prevailing practice of using “12 . . .
countrymen and peers of [the accused’s] vicinage”);
William S. Brackett, The Freehold Qualification of Jurors, 29 Am. L. Reg. 436, 444–46 (1881) (detailing the
colonies’ widespread practice of following the commonlaw requirement that juries consist only of “freeholders”). Yet the petitioner does not contend that the
9
Sixth Amendment at any point in history mandated
that a jury consist only of male landowners hailing
from a particular county.
As Williams correctly observed, any such contention would be inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment’s drafting history. The Framers, the Court explained, resoundingly rejected James Madison’s proposal to constitutionalize in the Sixth Amendment all
the “accustomed requisites” of the common-law jury.
Williams, 399 U.S. at 94 (quoting 1 Annals of Cong.
452 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). Instead, the
Sixth Amendment that the Framers proposed and the
people ratified required only that juries be impartial
and drawn from the state and district in which the
crime was committed, which departed from the common-law practice by allowing Congress to establish
the relevant vicinage through its creation of judicial
districts. And though one might conclude that the
Framers rejected the common-law requisites of jury
composition because they were implicit in the word
“jury,” Williams, 399 U.S. at 96–97 (noting the possibility); see also Khorrami, 143 S. Ct. at 25 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), Madison certainly did not think that was the case. He lamented
that in removing the common-law requirements, the
Framers “str[uck] . . . at the most salutary articles.”
Williams, 399 U.S. at 95 n.39 (quoting Letter from
James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Sept. 14, 1789,
in 1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 491
(1865)). And Senator Richard Henry Lee “grieved”
that they had left the “Jury trial in criminal cases
much loosened.” Letter from Richard Henry Lee to
10
Patrick
Henry,
Sept.
14,
1789,
https://tinyurl.com/muu5xzfa. Those would seem dramatic reactions to the mere trimming of surplusage.
4. The petitioner errs in contending that this
Court’s recent decision in Ramos requires overruling
Williams. Pet. 14–16. Ramos held that the Sixth
Amendment constitutionalized the common-law requirement that a jury be unanimous, thus overruling
this Court’s fractured decision to the contrary in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). In doing so, Ramos discounted the relevance of the Amendment’s
drafting history, stating that “rather than dwelling on
text left on the cutting room floor, we are much better
served by interpreting the language Congress retained and the States ratified.” 590 U.S. at 98. The
Court instead relied on the fact that the unanimity of
a jury verdict was “a vital right protected by the common law,” id. at 90, to conclude that the Sixth Amendment protected the same.
But it does not follow that the Sixth Amendment
codified all aspects of the jury trial that existed at
common law—in particular the common-law rules for
jury composition such as the number of jurors, vicinage, and juror landownership. James Wilson—a
framer of the Constitution and one of the first Justices
on this Court—for instance observed: “When I speak
of juries, I feel no peculiar predilection for the number
twelve.” 2 James Wilson, Works of the Honourable
James Wilson 305 (1804) (quoted in Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149, 156 n.10 (1973)). Rather, Wilson wrote,
a jury “mean[s] a convenient number of citizens, selected and impartial, who . . . are vested with discretionary powers to try the truth of facts.” Id. at 306. Six
11
impartial jurors acting by unanimous consent satisfy
that definition. And the Court in Williams itself noted
that its holding that a jury of six is constitutional was
distinct from the requirement of unanimity, which, it
observed, “unlike [jury size], may well serve an important role in the jury function”—namely, “as a device for insuring that the Government bear the heavier burden of proof.” 399 U.S. at 100 n.46.
Still less does it follow that the Court should discard Williams as Ramos discarded Apodaca. Unlike
Williams, which commanded a solid majority of this
Court, Apodaca was a uniquely fractured decision
that several Justices concluded in Ramos was not entitled to respect under the doctrine of stare decisis at
all. See Ramos, 590 U.S. at 93–97 (opinion of Gorsuch,
J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ.);
id. at 112–14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part) (calling Apodaca a “universe of one”); id. at 100–02 (opinion of Gorsuch, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.)
(concluding that Apodaca supplied no governing precedent). Unlike Apodoca’s holding that the Sixth
Amendment does not require unanimous juries in
state prosecutions, which subsequent cases referred to
as an “exception” to settled incorporation doctrine and
struggled to explain what it “mean[t],” Ramos, 590
U.S. at 95–97, Williams has consistently been “adhere[d] to” and “reaffirm[ed].” Ballew v. Georgia, 435
U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined
by Stevens, J.); see also Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427
U.S. 618, 625–26 (1976); Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. 37, 52 n.4 (1990); United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 510 n.2 (1995). And in Colgrove, this Court
followed Williams in holding that six-person juries
satisfy the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury
12
trial in civil cases. 413 U.S. at 158–60. That does not
reflect a decision that has “become lonelier with time.”
Ramos, 590 U.S. at 111.
5. Nor is reconsidering Williams warranted on the
ground that the Court followed its detailed historical
analysis with an assessment of the purpose of the jury
trial and the functioning of a six-person jury. See 399
U.S. at 100–02. In Williams, this Court construed the
purpose of the jury right to be “the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,” and reasoned that the difference between a jury of six and 12
is not likely to make a difference in that regard “particularly if the requirement of unanimity is retained.”
Id. at 100. The Court also found that the available
data “indicate that there is no discernible difference
between the results reached by” six- and 12-person juries. Id. at 101 & n.48 (citing studies).
Purpose may validly inform the meaning of text.
See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012) (“Of course,
words are given meaning by their context, and context
includes the purpose of the text.”). Not surprisingly,
this Court’s criminal-procedure precedents routinely
have considered purpose—and with far less analysis
of original meaning than Williams—in interpreting
constitutional text. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (Sixth Amendment requires juries selected from fair cross-section of community);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471–74 (1966) (law
enforcement must inform detainees of Fifth Amendment rights and obtain waiver before proceeding with
interrogation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
13
343–45 (1963) (Sixth Amendment requires court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (evidence
seized in violation of Fourth Amendment is inadmissible at trial); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88
(1963) (prosecution must provide exculpatory evidence to defendant); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984) (Sixth Amendment requires
defense attorney to provide effective assistance); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002) (Eighth
Amendment prohibits imposing capital punishment
on mentally disabled); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 568–69 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing capital punishment for crimes committed when
defendant was under 18); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 614–15 (1965) (Fifth Amendment prohibits
adverse inference from defendant’s failure to testify).
There is no basis for discounting Williams’ reasoning
simply because it also considered the “function”
served by the right. 399 U.S. at 99.
6. The petitioner is also wrong that post-decision
developments have cast doubt on Williams’ reasoning
that a six-person jury fulfills the purposes of the Sixth
Amendment. The petitioner cites Justice Blackmun’s
opinion in Ballew and subsequent research to suggest
that empirical evidence shows that six-person juries
do not function as well as 12-person juries. Pet. at 16–
20; see also Khorrami, 143 S. Ct. at 26–27 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). But those do
not present the kinds of overwhelming developments
sufficient to “erode” Williams’ “underpinnings,” Janus, 585 U.S. at 924—and in many ways later developments corroborate Williams.
14
To start, Ballew itself did not find that the purported developments warranted overruling Williams;
it “adhere[d] to” and “reaffirm[ed]” Williams. 435 U.S.
at 239 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
And for good reason: post-Williams scholarship is, at
most, mixed on this point.
In fact, social-science studies amply support Williams’ conclusions, leading some scholars to criticize
courts for claiming that six-person juries are inferior.
See Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, Jury Size and the Free
Rider Problem, 19 J.L. Econ. & Org. 24, 24 (2003).
Smaller juries are preferable to larger ones in several
ways. For one, larger juries can lead to a “free riding”
phenomenon where jurors pay less attention and participate less in deliberations because they think there
are plenty of other jurors to do the work. Id. at 40.
That, in turn, can lead to less accurate verdicts. Id.
Six-person juries, by contrast, are more likely to
make decisions as a group rather than by a few outgoing jurors who dominate deliberations. See Bridget
M. Waller et al., Twelve (Not So) Angry Men: Managing Conversational Group Size Increases Perceived
Contribution by Decision Makers, 14 Grp. Processes &
Intergrp. Rels. 835, 839 (2011); see also Nicolas Fay et
al., Group Discussion as Interactive Dialogue or as Serial Monologue: The Influence of Group Size, 11 Psych.
Sci. 481, 481 (2000) (reporting similar findings in nonjury groups). Put differently, a juror is more likely to
find his or her voice in a smaller group setting.
Many assume that the additional jurors in a 12person jury make it more likely that one or more jurors will prevent the conviction of an innocent defendant. But if that were true, the rates of hung-juries
15
would be higher for 12-person juries than six-person
juries. Yet empirical data shows no significant differences in the rates of hung juries between six- and 12person juries. See, e.g., Barbara Luppi & Francesco
Parisi, Jury Size and the Hung-Jury Paradox, 42 J.
Legal Stud. 399, 402–04 (2013) (collecting studies).
And other studies show that if required to be unanimous, six-person juries do not suffer from a meaningful increase in inaccurate verdicts. See Alice Guerra et
al., Accuracy of Verdicts Under Different Jury Sizes
and Voting Rules, 28 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221, 232
(2020) (concluding that unanimous six-person juries
“are alternative ways to maximize the accuracy of verdicts while preserving the functionality of juries”).
That reality is reflected in publicly available statistics. Far from returning higher rates of convictions,
see Khorrami, 143 S. Ct. at 26 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari), Florida juries convict criminal defendants at comparable—and possibly even
slightly lower—rates than juries in jurisdictions that
use 12 jurors. For example, between 2017 and 2019,
felony juries in Florida convicted defendants at rates
16
of 74.0%, 2 73.3%, 3 and 72.1%, 4 respectively. In the
same years, felony juries in Texas convicted at rates
of 79.0%, 5 81.0%, 6 and 78.0%; 7 felony juries in California convicted at rates of 86.0%, 8 85.0%, 9 and 84.0%; 10
and felony juries in New York convicted at rates of
2
See Fla. Off. of State Cts. Adm’r, Florida’s Trial Courts Statistical Reference Guide FY 2016-17 3-21 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/4drv24ky (1,901 convictions out of 2,570 cases that
went to the jury).
3
See Fla. Off. of State Cts. Adm’r, Florida’s Trial Courts Statistical Reference Guide FY 2017-18 3-21 (2019), https://tinyurl.com/433vwfy3 (1,784 convictions out of 2,434 cases that
went to the jury).
4
See Fla. Off. of State Cts. Adm’r, Florida’s Trial Courts Statistical Reference Guide FY 2018-19 3-21 (2020), https://tinyurl.com/43zywh5n (1,621 convictions out of 2,248 cases that
went to the jury).
5
Off. of Ct. Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the Texas
Judiciary Fiscal Year 2017 Court-Level - 20 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/mtrp379s.
6
Off. of Ct. Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the Texas
Judiciary Fiscal Year 2018 Court-Level - 21 (2019), https://tinyurl.com/2s3fsmpf.
7
Off. of Ct. Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the Texas
Judiciary Fiscal Year 2019 Court-Level 23 (2020), https://tinyurl.com/ywh779v3.
8
Jud. Council of Cal., 2018 Court Statistics Report: Statewide
Caseload Trends 69 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/5n6tj9pr.
9
Jud. Council of Cal., 2019 Court Statistics Report: Statewide
Caseload Trends 69 (2019), https://tinyurl.com/mwmby3h5.
10
Jud. Council of Cal., 2020 Court Statistics Report:
Statewide
Caseload
Trends
55
(2020),
https://tinyurl.com/2mym3hrx.
17
74.6%, 11 73.7%, 12 and 75.2%. 13 The petitioner’s implication that Florida juries are steamrolling criminal
defendants relative to other jurisdictions thus lacks
support in the data. Instead, the data reflect what
multiple studies have shown: six- and 12-person juries
similarly serve to “interpos[e] between the accused
and his accuser . . . the commonsense judgment of a
group of laymen.” Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. 14 It is
thus not true, as the petitioner would have it, that
Williams’ assessment of the six-person jury’s effectiveness “has proven incorrect.” Pet. 17.
7. The petitioner adds insult to error in suggesting
that Florida’s six-person jury rule was adopted “to
suppress minority voices.” Pet. 20–21. Beyond noting
that the rule dates from Reconstruction, however, the
petitioner cites no evidence suggesting that is so, and
makes no attempt to explain how a rule establishing
the size of juries without regard to race could be a covert instrument of racism.
11
Chief Adm’r of Cts., New York State Unified Court System
2017 Annual Report 48 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/yckheu9v.
12
Chief Adm’r of Cts., New York State Unified Court System
2018 Annual Report 42 (2019), https://tinyurl.com/yc7cvjhe.
13
Chief Adm’r of Cts., New York State Unified Court System
2019 Annual Report 38 (2020), https://tinyurl.com/2wtwfmdm.
14
Relying on studies purporting to show that smaller juries
result in fewer minority jurors, the petitioner suggests that sixperson juries threaten the right to a jury drawn from a fair crosssection of the community. See Pet. 18–19; see also Khorrami, 143
S. Ct. at 26 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Even if that were true, the fair-cross-section requirement applies
only to the venire, not the petit jury. Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 173–74 (1986).
18
Florida history in fact shows quite the opposite.
The petitioner believes it nefarious that “[t]he common law rule of a jury of twelve was still kept in Florida while federal troops remained in the state,” but
that Florida then reduced the size of certain juries to
six in 1877, after the departure of federal troops that
had occupied Florida after the Civil War. Pet. 20–21.
But the petitioner fails to note that, even after that,
Florida also retained 12-person juries in capital cases,
Act of February 17, 1877, ch. 3010, § 6, 1877 Fla. Laws
54, a fact quite inconsistent with the petitioner’s
charge of racism. And in any event, the petitioner does
not contend that any part of Florida’s current constitution, which was adopted in 1968 and provides that
“the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be
fixed by law,” Fla. Const. art. I, § 22, was motivated
by racial animus.
8. Finally, the petitioner does not so much as
acknowledge, let alone dispute, that overruling Williams would have sweeping consequences for the citizens of Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Utah, who have for decades relied on
Williams in using criminal juries of less than 12 jurors.
Florida is the third most populous state in the
country and tries all noncapital crimes before six-person juries. Currently, roughly 5,000 criminal convictions are pending on direct appeal in Florida. Overruling Williams would force the use of public resources to
conduct thousands of retrials on top of the trials already pending and might well result in the release of
convicted criminals into the public.
19
The states’ reliance interests here far outstrip the
already “massive” and “concrete” reliance interests in
Ramos. 590 U.S. at 161 (Alito, J., dissenting). There,
only two states allowed nonunanimous jury verdicts,
and overruling Apodaca affected only those convictions that were actually obtained by nonunanimous
verdicts. The affected convictions numbered somewhere in the hundreds. Id. at 108. Here, by contrast,
six states use juries with less than 12 jurors in at least
some criminal prosecutions. And all convictions from
those juries would suddenly be suspect. In Florida,
that is every conviction that is not a capital case,
which amounts to several thousand.
As a last point on reliance, overruling Williams
would not affect only criminal cases. In Colgrove, this
Court relied on Williams in holding that the Seventh
Amendment permits six-person juries in civil trials.
413 U.S. at 158–60. Consequently, nearly 90% of federal civil verdicts would also be in jeopardy. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 48(a); Patrick E. Higginbotham et al., Better
by the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil
Jury, 104 Judicature 46, 50 (2020) (finding that only
roughly 12% of federal civil trials use 12-person juries). The petitioner fails to establish sufficient
grounds for this Court to take the extraordinary step
of invalidating thousands of criminal and civil judgments.
II. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE.
At any rate, this case is a poor vehicle for reconsidering Williams. This Court generally avoids deciding
legal issues when doing so will have no effect on the
litigants in the case. See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S.
20
165, 172 (2013). Yet even if the Court granted the petition and overruled Williams, the petitioner would
not obtain relief because the error would be harmless.
A constitutional error at trial generally does not
require automatic reversal. Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). An error usually requires reversal only if it was likely to have affected the outcome
of the trial. Id. Thus, “most constitutional errors can
be harmless.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8
(1999). If the defendant had the assistance of counsel
in a trial with an impartial adjudicator, “there is a
strong presumption” that any errors are subject to
harmless-error analysis. Id.
The only exception to the general rule subjecting
constitutional errors to harmless-error analysis is for
so-called “structural errors.” Weaver v. Massachusetts,
582 U.S. 286, 294–95 (2017). But the exception applies
only to a “very limited class” of errors. Neder, 527 U.S.
at 8. Those errors fall under three categories—none of
which would include empaneling fewer than 12 jurors.
First, an error may be structural when the violated
right protects some interest other than preventing erroneous convictions. Weaver, 582 U.S. at 295. But the
petitioner himself argues that accuracy is the interest
protected by the purported 12-person requirement.
Pet. 17–20. Second, errors are structural when they
are inherently harmful such that they always result
in fundamental unfairness. Weaver, 582 U.S. at 296.
Smaller juries, however, cannot be said to always result in unfairness—in many cases they will have no
effect or may even benefit the defendant. Third, an error is structural if the effect of the error is impossible
to determine. Id. at 295–96. But as this Court held in
21
Neder, the effect of violating a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment jury right is sometimes possible to determine because a court can review the record and, if the
evidence is “overwhelming” and “uncontroverted,” determine beyond a reasonable doubt what the jury
would have done. 527 U.S. at 9.
In Neder, an element of the charged offense was
omitted from the jury instructions such that the jury
did not find every element of the offense. See id. at 8.
Even though that error deprived the defendant of his
Sixth Amendment jury right because the omission
meant a jury never convicted him of the charged offense, the Court held that the error was harmless. Id.
at 15, 19–20. Because the record contained “overwhelming” and “uncontroverted” evidence of the omitted element, the Court found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury would have found the omitted element. See id. at 9, 19–20. Similarly, this Court has
subjected other deprivations of a Sixth Amendment
jury to harmless-error analysis. See Washington v.
Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 221–22 (2006) (subjecting a
judge’s unconstitutional finding of a fact that increased the maximum possible sentence to harmlesserror analysis); Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 102–03
(2016) (remanding to determine whether depriving
defendant of the right to have a jury find aggravating
factors necessary for a death sentence was harmless).
Were Williams overruled, the same reasoning
would apply here. A court can review the trial record
and evaluate whether the evidence was “overwhelming” such that there is no reasonable doubt that an
additional six jurors would not have affected the outcome. If anything, the case for harmless-error review
22
is stronger here than in Neder as an appellate court at
least has the benefit of a jury finding as to each element of the offense.
The State would prove any error here harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence at trial was
“overwhelming.” Three of the petitioner’s patients testified that, on five separate occasions, the petitioner
performed chiropractic treatment on them while the
petitioner’s license was suspended in Florida. The
chart notes of two of the patients and the petitioner’s
office patient schedule also reflected that the petitioner performed chiropractic treatment five separate
times on those three patients, corroborating the patients’ testimony. Changing the size of the jury would
not have altered the outcome. Thus, the petitioner
would not be entitled to reversal of his conviction
whether or not the Court overruled Williams. So even
if the Court wishes to take the drastic step of overruling a 55-year-old precedent, the Court should at least
do so in a case where the decision will affect the ultimate outcome.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
23
Respectfully submitted,
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of Florida
1515 N. Flagler Drive,
Suite 900
West Palm Beach, FL
33401
Phone: (561) 837-5016
crimappwpb@
myfloridalegal.com
JAMES UTHMEIER
Attorney General of
Florida
CELIA TERENZIO
Bureau Chief, Criminal
Appeals
Counsel of Record
JOSEPH MOLLICA
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent
April 20, 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.