Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lateef Maple, Petitioner v. Maryland

E-FILI

Rachel Dombrowski, Ck

Appellate Court of Maryla

10/29/2024 2:33 1

Circuit Court for Baltimore County—....

Case No. C-03-CR-20-002914

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 0396

September Term, 2023

LATEEF MAPLE

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Albright, A.,

Kehoe, S.,

Getty, Joseph M.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Kehoe, J.

Filed: October 29, 2024

* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule

of stare decisis. It may be cited for persuasive value only if the citation conforms to

Maryland Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

-Unreported Opinion­

Following the conclusion of a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,

the Appellant, Lateef Maple (“Mr. Maple”), was convicted of first-degree murder and

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conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Mr. Maple argues three errors on appeal. First,

that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction of first-degree murder and

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Next, he contends that the trial court erred in

its discretion when regulating closing arguments. Finally, Mr. Maple claims that the ; rial

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court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence that depicted his location in the Kelboirrie

Road area of Baltimore County two days after the murder For reasons that we will; out! ne,

we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

I.

Factual Background

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We will set forth such facts as are necessary to address the issues raised bn appeal.

A. The Incident

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On July 28, 2020, Trevor Hamlet (“Mr. Hamlet”), his brother Trent Alexander (“Mr.

Alexander”), his girlfriend Vanesia Gaskins (“MsT Gaskins”), and Casey Pulley (“Mr.

Pulley ),’ rented a room at the Four Seasons Hotel in Baltimore City to go swimming at

the hotel pool. In the late afternoon, Mr. Hamlet’s group drove to the Four Seasons in Mr.

Hamlet s Black GMC Denali.

At the hotel, Mr. Hamlet’s group valeted the Derail,

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changed in their room, and went to drink alcohol by the pool around 4:00 or 5:00 p.mj

second group of three women and a light-skinned, tattoojed man in plaid Burberry she

rts,

1 Mr. Hamlet, Mr. Alexander, Ms. Gaskins, and Mr. Pulley are referred to as “Mr.

Hamlet’s group” for brevity.

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-Unreported Opinion-

later identified as Donwin Brooks (“Mr. Brooks”), also gathered by the pool. Mr.

Alexander testified that around 6:00 p.m., the women in the second group began arguing

wit i Ms. Gaskins. Shortly after, one of the women came up behind Ms. Gaskins, pulled

her hair throwing Ms. Gaskins to the-ground and started a physical fight between the

women. Mr. Alexander punched the woman in the face causing Mr. Hamlet, Mr. Pulley,

Mr. Brooks, and the two other women to join the fight. During the course of the fight, Mr.

Alexander also, hit Mr. Brooks in the face, giving him a black eye.

Four Seasons security .broke up the fight after approximately fifteen to twenty

minutes, allowed the groups to gather their belongings, and escorted both groups out of the

bui! ding. Mr. Hamlet and Mr. Brooks’ groups waited outside the hotel for the. valet to

bring their vehicles when both groups began verbally antagonizing each other.. Mr. Brooks

threatened to kill Mr. Hamlet’s group and said they could find him at Gilmore Homes.

Arc und 6:30 p.m.,’Mr. Hamlet’s group left the Four Seasons and drove to 2019 Kelboume

Road in Baltimore County.

While Mr. Hamlet’s group departed from the Four Seasons, Mr. Brooks saw his

cousin and good friend,2 Mr. Maple, parked across from the hotel. Around 6:29 p.m., Mr.

Maple arrived at the Four Seasons in a silver Honda Accord coupe with dealership tags.

Mr. Maple said he came to the Four Seasons to pick up food. However, Mr. Maple didnot

picK up his food. As Mr. Brooks approached Mr. Maple, he noticed Mr. Brooks had a

2 Mr. Maple and Mr. Brooks are close friends and cousins by marriage. Mr. Maple refers

to Mr. Brooks as “Cuz” or “cousin.”

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-Unreported Opinion-

swollen black eye and said “well, shit, I’ll give you-a ride, man, fuck that fool” and took

Mr. Brooks “where he got to go.” Mr. Brooks entered Mr. Maple’s Honda to follow the

Denali, leaving his vehicle at the Four Seasons.

Surveillance footage from the lour

Seasons then shows Mr. Maple’s Honda follow Mr. Hamlet’s Denali around the front of

the hotel.

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Once.Mr, Hamlet’s group arrived at 2019 Kelbourne Road they decided to buy rrore

alcohol at Charlie Brown Liquor’s Discount Liquor Store on Hazelwood Avenue. Waile

waiting for Mr. Hamlet outside the liquor store, Mr. Alexander realized he unknowiigly

grabbed Mr. Brooks’ cell phone at the Four Seasons, stomped on the phone, and threw it

into the woods behind the liquor store.

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Mr. Alexander testified that the group returned to Kelbourne Road and exited Mr.

Hamlet’s Denali. They were walking toward his brother’s'house when Mr. Alcxardcr

Everyone other than Mr. Hamlet ran to t ake

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cover, Mr. Alexander said that Mr. Hamlet was “stuck.”! Mr.: Alexander testified thai he

heard gunshots ringing from behind him.

saw a man in all black, wearing a ski mask, stand behind his brother with a gun pointe^ to

Mr. Hamlet’s head, he heard a gunshot, and watched his brother drop. The man who shot

Mr. Hamlet turned around and ran behind the apartment complex on Kelbourne Read.

After the shooter ran, Mr. Alexander ran to Mr. Hamlet to check if his heart was beating

but, instead, lost control and testified that he “started raging.”

A few hours after the shooting, Mr. Alexander and Mr. Hamlet’sfrnother provided

statements at the police station. At the station, Mr. Alexander told the police that the person

-Unreported Opinion-

who shot Mr. Hamlet was the man they fought at the Four Seasons pool and that Mr.

Alexander knew it was him because Mr. Alexander “got him a couple of times.” However,

Mr; Alexander could not recall who the shooter was or what he told the police during his

testimony at trial.

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On July 28, Tyrane McKever (“Ms. McKever”) was sitting outside near Flintshire

Road.3 She watched,a black Dodge Journey with tinted windows pull up through the

apartment complex entrance on the comer of Flintshire Road and Kelboume Road and

maJ ce a U-turn towards the entrance it came-from.. Ms. McKever watched a'“white or light

skinned man” of average size wearing green basketball shorts, a grey or black hoodie, and

a mask covering his face get out from the passenger side of Dodge Journey and walk to the

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other side of the building on Kelboume Road. Ms. McKever then heard gun shots and

watched the man run back, to the Dodge Journey, jump into, the passenger seat, and the

vehicle peeled off. Surveillance footage from Hazelwood Body & Fender shows the Dodge

Journey leaving the Kelboume Road area at 7:12 p.m. After the Dodge Journey left, Ms.

McKever went to the area where she heard the gunshots. She saw a man lying on the

gro; md with a crowd of people screaming around him.

Officer James Marsh received a call for the shooting at 2019 Kelboume Road

around 7:12 or 7H3 p.m. Officer Marsh arrived at the location by 7:18 .p.m. and observed

a Black male, later identified as Mr. Hamlet, lying on the ground with a gunshot wound to

3 The record indicates that Mr. Hamlet lived at an apartment complex on Kelboume Road

which intersects Flintshire Road.

-Unreported Opinion-

the head and another male victim, Mr. Pulley, walking around with a gunshot wound tc the

elbow. A medical examiner testified that Mr. Hamlet suffered several gunshot wounds,

one to the head and two to the lower chest. Officer Marsh secured the perimeter: and

confirmed that the gunman left the scene. Officer Marsh’s body cam footage showed Mr.

Hamlet lying on the ground while a bystander administered CPR. The body cam audio and

a 911 call also depict Mr. Alexander screaming in the background. Mr. Hamlet was taken

to the hospital and pronounced dead at 7:57 p.m.

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FBI Special Agent Michael Fowler (“Agent Fowler”) analyzed Mr. Maple’s4:cell

site location information (“CSLI”) to determine where he traveled between 6:00 and 7:40

p.m. on July 28. Agent Fowler found that between 6:32 and 6:41 p.m., Mr. Maple headed

northbound off 1-83 to 695. During the drive, Mr. Maple received an incoming FaceTime

call at 6:44 p.m.5 Mr. Maple then drove south into the Kelboume Road area between 6:52

and 7.06 p.m. At 6:59 p.m., surveillance footage from Hazelwood Body & Fender shows

Mr. Maple s car on Hazelwood Avenue, .2 miles from Kelboume Road, headed towards a

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dead-end area. At 7:05 p.m., Hazelwood Body & “Fender surveillance footage shows jMr.

Maple’s Honda driving behind Mr. Hamlet’s Denali on Hazelwood Avenue. Mr. Maple’s

CSLI revealed that he remained in the Kelboume Road area between 7:06 and 7:18 p.m.

and returned to Baltimore City between 7:23 and 7:37 p.m. (T5 at 45-47)

Mr. Maple has two cell phones ending in 4575 and 9589. Agent Fowler used Mr.

Maple’s cell phone ending in 4575 to map his locations on July 28.

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5 Detective Fisher reviewed Mr. Maple’s cell phone and iCloud data during the

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investigation. Although Detective Fisher could not recover everything, he noticed an

incoming call at 6:44 p.m. on Mr. Maple’s iCloud data.

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-Unreported Opinion-

On July 30, two days after the shooting, a license plate reader recorded Mr. Brooks’

vehicle driving through the Kelboume Road area. The State also presented evidence

showing that Mr. Maple’s phone connected to a cell tower near Kelboume Road at the

same time Mr. Brooks’ vehicle drove through the area. Although it is possible that Mr.

Maple either drove in the. Kelboume Road area or down 1-95, which runs near the

Kelboume Road neighborhood, defense counsel raised an objection based on the relevancy

oft lis evidence at trial:

STATE:r So, you have the Defendant, Donwin Brooks, there’s a Co­

Defendant, Donwin Brooks, vehicle going up Kelboume Road and at that

same time, you have Lateef Maple’s phone hitting off a tower in that area

[on July 30].

THE COURT: On the same day.

STATE: Same day, same time.

THE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: On the 3 Oth, two days later?

STATE: On the 30th, yes.

THE COURT: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The, theTHE COURT: Because it’s at Kelboume I’m going to overrule the objection.

I think it’s relevant.

AGENT: That between 12:00, 12:07 is consistent with being up in the area

of our red and purple pins. Again, the Hazelwood Avenue area of Baltimore

County. And then by 12:12:29, 12:12:33 (inaudible).

STATE: All right. Now, you also testified you were given the latitude and

longitude-of-a potential license_plate reader, a possible license plate reader

-Unreported Opinion­

hit for a vehicle. Are your findings consistent with a cell phone possibly

being in that vehicle?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Possibly, it can possibly?

THE COURT: Sustained.

STATE: Are your findings consistent with a cell phone being in that vehicle?

AGENT: It’s [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Same, exactly the same question.

THE COURT: Well, he said possibly before.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, how could it be otherwise?

THE COURT: Well, [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: How, how could it possibly be, okay.

THE COURT: I’m going to overrule. I mean, it’s a, it’s a yes or no answer.

AGENT: Yeah, it’s consistent with being in that general area. I cannot place

a phone in a specific vehicle. I can say it’s consistent with being in that

general area where that vehicle is at the time that vehicle was there.

The State’s Attorney opened closing arguments by saying “losing a loved one is

hard and that Mr. Hamlet s mother did not get to say goodbye to her son. Defense counsel

objected to this statement arguing that it invited the jury’s sympathy instead of asking it to

look at the evidence. The trial judge overruled this objection but admonished the State’s

attorney that she was walking a fine line of prejudicial sympathy.

Additional facts will be provided as they become relevant.

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Questions Presented

II.

Mr. Maple noted a timely appeal and presents the following issues which we

rephrase as follows:6

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1. Are successive links of circumstantial evidence legally sufficient to

support Mr. Maple’s convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy

to commit first-degree murder?

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2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in regulating closing arguments and

responding to defense counsel’s objections to the State’s remarks about

the victim’s mother and playing two pieces of evidence?

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3. Did the" trial court abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence Mr.

Maple’s CSLI depicting the location of his cell phone in the Kelboume

Road area two days after the victim’s death?

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III.'

Discussion

A. Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence for First-Degree Murder and

Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Murder

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

prohibits criminal convictions of any person except upon sufficient evidence. of every

eler lent of the offense. Jacksonv. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). In State v. Albrecht,

the Supreme Court of Maryland set forth the standard of review for appellate courts:

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We emphasize that when an appellate court is called upon to determine

whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain a criminal conviction, it is not

the function or the duty of the appellate court to undertake a review of the

record that would amount to a retrial of the case. Rather, we review the

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6 In’his brief, Mr. Maple framed the questions as follows:

1. Was the evidence insufficient to convict Mr. Maple of first-degree murder and

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder?

2. Did the trial court err in permitting the state to make numerous improper comments

I appealing to the emotions of the jury during closing argument?

3. Did the trial court err in permitting the state to introduce irrelevant evidence?

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-Unreported Opinion­

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving due regard to the trial

court’s finding of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and,

significantly, • its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of

witnesses. Fundamentally, our concern is not whether the trial court’s verdict

is in accord with what appears to us to be the weight of the evidence, but

rather is only with whether the verdicts were supported with sufficient

evidence—that is, evidence that either showed directly, or circumstantially,

or supported a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier

of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable

doubt.

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336 Md. 475, 478-79 (1994) (citations and footnote omitted); see also Morgan v. State,

134 Md. App. 113, 120-21 (2000). Ultimately, the test for determining legal sufficiency

of evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the cr me

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 338; Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 457

(1997). Under this standard, the reviewing court must view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences deducible from the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. See Smith

v. State, 415 Md. 174, 185-86 (2010). We defer to the jury’s inferences and deterrpine

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whether they are supported by the evidence. Id. at 183 (citing State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527,

534 (2003)). We do not second-guess the jury’s determination where there are “competing

rational inferences but give deference to all reasonable inferences that the fact finder nay

draw. Smith, 415 Md. at 183. When reviewing an issue of legal sufficiency in a jury trial,

we only consider whether the prosecution has satisfied its burden of production by

producing legally sufficient evidence to permit a guilty verdict. See Chisum v. State, 227

Md. App. 118, 125 (2016).

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1. Circumstantial Evidence

“Maryland has long held that there is no difference between direct and

circumstantial evidence.” Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 226 (1993); Jensen v. State, 127

Md. App. 103, 117 (1999); Morgan, 134 Md. App. at 121. Circumstantial evidence alone

may be sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction provided that the evidence supports

rational inferences from which the trier of fact could be convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt of the guilt of the accused. See Hebron, 331 Md. at 117; Veney v. State, 251 Md.

182, 201 (1968). However, inferences made from circumstantial evidence must rest upon

more than mere speculation or conjecture. Taylor, 346 Md. at 458.

The prosecution may present either a single strand or successive links of

circumstantial evidence. Morris v. State, 192 Md. App. 1, 31 (2010); see also Jensen, 127

Md. App. at 118 n.6. If guilt is based on a single strand of evidence, the circumstances

must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence to meet the standard for

legll sufficiency. Jensen, 127 Md. App. at 117-18 (citing Hebron, 331 Md. at 224). To

the contrary, applying this hypothesis of innocence to multiple strands of circumstantial

evidence would be improper because viewing the circumstances from the state’s

perspective may be inconsistent, but not dispositive, of the defendant’s innocence. Id. at

118. Therefore, the circumstances must be considered collectively. Hebron, 331 Md. at

227 (citing Gilmore v. State, 263 Md. 268, 293 (1971), vacated on other grounds by

Gilmore v. Maryland, 408 U.S. 940 (1972))).

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It is not necessary to exclude every

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possibility of the defendant’s innocence, produce absolute certainty in the minds of jurors,

or that each circumstance, standing alone, be sufficient to establish guilt. See id.

2. Accomplice to First-Degree Murder and Conspiracy to Commit

First-Degree Murder

First-degree murder is the intentional killing of another person with willfulness,

deliberation, and premeditation. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-201(a)(l). “To prove

first-degree murder, the State must adduce evidence ‘that the defendant possessed the in ent

to kill (willful), that the defendant had conscious knowledge of that intent (deliberate),”’

and there was time for the defendant to premeditate the murder. Morris, 192 Md. App>. at

31 (quoting Wiley v. State, 328 Md. 126, 133 (1992)). Premeditation is proved by showing

that the “design to kill must have preceded the killing by an appreciable length of time, that

is, enough time to be deliberate.” Wiley, 328 Md. at 133 (quoting Tichnell v. State, 287

Md. 695, 717 (1980)).

Furthermore, a person may be an accomplice and held criminally responsible, for

crimes committed by another when participating in the “principal offense either a.s a

principal in the first degree (perpetrator), a principal in the second degree (aider and

abettor) or as an accessory before the fact (inciter).” Diggs & Allen v. State, 213 Md. App.

28, 85 (2013). A principal in the second degree is not the actual perpetrator but is one x^jho,

in some way, participates in the commission of a felony by aiding, commanding,

counseling, or encouraging the perpetrator. See State v. Williams, 397 Md. 172, 194

(2007), abrogated on other grounds by Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 18-23 (2008); Morgan,

134 Md. App. at 131-32.

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On the other hand, an accomplice who is an accessory before the fact aids,

commands, counsels, or encourages the commission of a felony before it occurs and is

neither actually nor constructively present at the scene of the crime. Williams, 397 Md. at

193. Even so, an accomplice “must participate in the commission of a crime knowingly,

voluntarily, and with common criminal intent with the principal offender, or must in some

way advocate or encourage the commission of the crime.” Silva v. State, 422 Md. 17, 28

(2011).

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Moreover, conspiracy is a common law crime in Maryland. Mitchell v. State, 363

Md. 130, 145 (2001). The offense is described as a:

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Combination of two dr more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose,

or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. The essence of a

criminal conspiracy is an unlawful agreement. The agreement need not be

formal or spoken, provided there is a meeting of the minds reflecting a unity

of purpose and design. In Maryland, the crime is complete when the unlawful

agreement is reached, and no overt act in furtherance of the agreement need

be shown.

Id. Circumstantial evidence may be used to show a conspiracy from which a common

purpose or design may be inferred by the parties’ meeting of the minds. Id. at 145. To

establish a meeting of the minds the parties must:

(l) have given sufficient thought to the matter, however briefly or even

impulsively, to be able mentally to appreciate or articulate the object of the

conspiracy—the objective to be achieved or the act to be committed, and (2)

whether informed by words or gesture, understand that another person also

has achieved that conceptualization and agrees to cooperate in the

achievement of that objective or the commission of that act. Absent that

minimum level of understanding, there cannot be the required unity of

purpose and design.

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Id. at 145-46. The parties must have a specific intent for both agreeing to the conspiracy

and to assist, in some way, in committing the crime. Id. at 146. If the conspiracy is to

commit murder, the intent must be to commit, or have someone commit, the acts which

constitute murder. Id.

3. Analysis

Mr. Maple argues that his convictions of first-degree murder and conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder rest entirely on circumstantial evidence that required the jury

to speculate Mr. Maple’s guilt. The State counters that the prosecution must only produce

circumstantial or direct evidence to support its theory that'Mr. Maple was an accomplice

to the murder and conspired with Mr. Brooks, from which the jury could infer the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' We believe the evidence was sufficient

to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Maple aided,

commanded, counseled, or encouraged Mr. Hamlet’s murder.

The test for legal sufficiency of evidence to sustain a criminal conviction for first-

degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder requires us to review multiple

links of circumstantial, evidence and to deduce its cumulative effect, from which we may

determine whether the State met its burden.of proof that established Mr. Maple’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.

We first review whether the State admitted sufficient evidence to convince a rational

trier of fact to find that Mr. Brooks committed the intentional killing of Mr. Hamlet with

willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-201(a)(l).

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First, Mr. Alexander’s testimony andsurveillance footage revealed that Mr. Brooks and

Mr. Hamlet’s groups fought at the Four Seasons, Mr. Brooks threatened to kill Mr.

Hamlet’s group, Mr. Brooks and Mr. Maple drove behind Mr. Hamlet’s vehicle near the

Four Seasons and past Hazelwood Body & Fender—.2 miles from 2019 Kelboume Road—

and Mr. Alexander witnessed the shooter walk up behind Mr. Hamlet, with a gun pointed

to his head, and shoot him on Kelboume Road. These strands of circumstantial evidence

are sufficient to convince a jury that the murder was intentional, willful, and deliberate

which satisfies the essential elements of first-degree murder.

Furthermore, premeditation is proven when the “design to kill must have preceded

the killing by anappreciable length of time, that is, enough time to deliberate.” Tichnell,

287 Md. at‘717. Here, the State submitted surveillance footage showing Mr; Brooks enter

Mr. Maple’s car outside the Four Seasons moments after Mr. Brooks threatened to kill Mr.

Hamlet’s group. Mr. Maple’s vehicle then follows the Denali past the Four Seasons. Agent

Fowler testified that Mr. Maple’s CSLI revealed his location, driving to Baltimore County,

between 6:32 p.m. and 6:52 p.m. Mr. Alexander was in possession of Brooks phone at this

time and Mr. Maple’s iCloud data shows an incoming FaceTime call at 6:44 p.m. Around

6:59 p.m., Hazelwood Body & Fender footage captured Mr. Maple’s car following behind

Mr. Hamlet’s Denali and, moments later, the Dodge Journey passed Mr. Maple’s car in the

same area. The Dodge Journey then parked at the comer of Flintshire Road and Kelboume

Road wherethe shooter jumped out of the car, ran to Mr. Hamlet’s group, committed the

murder, and fled in the Dodge Journey. The evidence presented supports the inference that

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Mr. Hamlet s murder was premeditated. After piecing together each link of circumstantial

evidence, any rational fact finder could infer that the elements for first-degree murder and

premeditation were met beyond a reasonable doubt.

We next turn to Mr. Maple’s contentions_that the evidence was insufficient to

establish accomplice liability and conspiracy. An accomplice may be held criminally

responsible for crimes committed by another when participating in the principal offense

either as a principal in the second degree (aider and abettor) or as an accessory before the

fact (inciter). Diggs & Allen, 213 Md. App. at 85. A principal in the second degree is not

the actual perpetrator but is one who participates in the commission of a felony by aiding,

commanding, counseling, or encouraging the perpetrator. Morgan, 134 Md. App. at 131.

Conversely, an accessory before the fact aids, commands, Counsels, or encourages the

commission of a felony before it occurs and is neither actually nor constructively present

at the scene of the crime. Id. Moreover, criminal conspiracy is an unlawful-agreement

which need not be formal or spoken, provided there is a meeting of the minds reflecting a

unity of purpose and design. Mitchell, 363 Md. at 145. The crime is complete when the

unlawful agreement is reached, and no overt act in furtherance of the agreement need be

shown. Id.

The State tendered substantial links of circumstantial evidence to convince a rational

fact finder to infer accomplice liability and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Mr.

Maple admitted to Detective Fisher that he had no reason to' be in Baltimore County on

July 28. He also admitted that he was in Baltimore City to pick up food but after Mr.

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Brooks approached Mr. Maple at the Four Seasons, he noticed Mr. Brooks’ swollen black

eye and said “well, shit, I’ll give you a ride,, man, fuck that fool” and took Mr. Brooks

“where he got to go.” Around 6:30 p.m., surveillance footage shows Mr. Brooks enter Mr.

Maple’s car and follow the Denali at the Four Seasons. At 6:59 p.m., Hazelwood Body &

Fender surveillance captured Mr. Maple’s vehicle in the Kelboume Road area. At 7:05

p.m., the same surveillance system recorded Mr. Maple following Mr. Hamlet’s Denali .2

miles from.Kelboume Road. Moreover, Officer Marsh received a 911 call for the shooting

at 7:12 p.m. and arrived ,at the;scene by 7:18 p.m. Mr. Maple’s CSLI confirmed that he

remained in the Kelboume Road area between 7:06 and 7:18 p.m. Mr. Maple returned to

Baltimore City between 7:23 and 7:37 p.m. Mr. Maple’s efforts to drive Mr. Brooks from

Baltimore City to the. Kelboume Road area in Baltimore County—in addition to remaining

in the area until either shots were fired,'or the police responded to the shooting—the State

admitted successive links of circumstantial evidence which a jury could infer that Mr.

Maple conspired.with Mr. Brooks to aid, command, counsellor encourage the commission

of Mr. Hamlet’s murder.

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Mr. Maple offers the theory that on July 28, Mr. Maple simply gave his good friend

a ride, dropped him off near Kelboume Road, and returned to Baltimore City without

Imowledge of or agreeing to Mr. Brooks intentions to kill Mr. Hamlet. He cites the

following deficiencies in the evidence:

Not a single witness testified that Mr. Maple shot the victim or conspired

with Donwin Brooks to shoot the victim. No evidence showed that Mr.

Maple had a motive to shoot the victim, knew the victim, or was involved

with the fight at the pool between Brooks and the group with the victim. The

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brother of the victim who witnessed the shooting testified that he had ‘never

seen [Mr. Maple] ever. ’

Not a shred of evidence shows that Brooks told Mr. Maple he had a gun, that

he told Mr. Maple why he wanted to go to .Kelboume Road, or that he

planned on killing the victim.

Mr. Maple’s argument essentially requires this Court to take the position that absent

direct evidence, a rational trier of fact could not find Mr. Maple guilty of first-degree

murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. However, an unlawful agreement

need not be formal or spoken, provided there is a meeting of the minds reflecting a unity

of purpose and design. Mitchell, 363 Md. at 145. As we explained above, the State

presented successive links of circumstantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact

could infer that an agreement was made to commit Mr. Hamlet’s murder.

Mr. Maple further argues that his conviction rested entirely on speculation. In

Cerrato-Molina v. State, we noted:

The jury must, indeed, speculate. In performing its broader duty of deciding

whether or not to draw a permitted inference or in deciding which inference

to draw out of a range of permitted inferences, the jury is by definition

engaged in a speculative exercise. Informed and educated speculation,

however, is not blind or haphazard speculation, which is, indeed,

inappropriate.

223 Md. App. 329, 333 (2015). In this case, the jury is permitted to.speculate on whether

the accumulated circumstantial evidence against Mr. Maple added up to the commission

of a crime. The dots the jury was asked to connect indicate that they were not asked to

speculate in a blind or haphazard manner.

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A single strand of circumstantial evidence appears meaningless before collectively

reviewing the circumstances.

Given the successive links of circumstantial evidence

admitted at trial, any rational trier of fact could conclude that Mr. Hamlet was intentionally

shot and murdered, and that Mr. Maple and Mr. Brooks premeditated the shooting during

the drive from Baltimore City to Baltimore County. Finally, the evidence was sufficient

to convince a jury that Mr. Maple aided, commanded, counseled, or encouraged Mr.

Brooks in the commission of Mr. Hamlet’s murder by driving Mr. Brooks to the scene of

the crime and remaining in Baltimore County until shots were fired or the police arrived.

After reviewing The evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State, we are

persuaded That any rational trier of fact could reasonably find Mr. Maple guilty of firstl

degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.

B. The State’s Closing Arguments

Mr. Maple next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling

defense counsel’s objections to the prosecution’s remarks about the victim’s family and

replaying two pieces of evidence admitted at trial. The State counters that the trial court

soundly exercised its discretion when regulating closing arguments and responding to

defense counsel’s objections. The State also posits that even if we determine their remarks

were improper, reversal is not warranted. We agree with the State.

18

-Unreported Opinion-

1. The Prosecution’s Remarks and Evidence Played at Closing Arguments

First, Mr. Maple argues that the prosecutor’s comments improperly constituted an

appeal to the passions, prejudices, and sympathies of the jurors when the State opened its

closing argument by stating:

STATE: Thank you, Your Honor. Losing a loved one is difficult, whether it

be after a long-prolonged illness, natural causes (inaudible). Youjust hope

that you’re able to say goodbye, that you can tell them that you love them.

The Defendant didn’t care that Trevor’s mom Defense counsel immediately objected to the State’s initial remarks which the trial court

sustained as to what Mr. Maple thought. Closing arguments continued as follows:

STATE: The victim’s mom -

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Over, overruled at this point.

STATE: The victim’s mom did not get to say goodbye to her son. She did

not get to tell him she loved him. His —

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I have a standing objection to this whole, I

don’t, I hate to stand up and interrupt someone during closing THE COURT: I understand.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — or opening, but this is, I’ve never seen this.

THE COURT: I -

STATE: First of all, I’m not going to comment on that statement because

that’s not accurate, butTHE COURT: Understood. All right. So, I, I would sustain as to the, do you

want to approach?

The trial court sustained the objection, and counsel approached the bench:

19

-Unreported Opinion-

THE COURT: I assume the objection is because of-

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s, it’s totally inappropriate and, and, and

prejudicial, (inaudible) get up and tell how his mom feels, they didn’t get to

say goodbye (inaudible) didn’t do it. Let them present, let them speak to the

evidence, (inaudible) his mom and grandmom are, have been crying for the

last two years. Can you imagine, are you allowing that?

STATE: First of all, it came into evidence. They saw the mom on the video.

THE COURT: Um hm.

STATE: And we know she didn’t get to say goodbye because of the time in

the video. So, (inaudible) never came into evidence.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What does that have to do with guilt or innocence?

THE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What in the world does that have to do with guilt

or innocence?

THE COURT: Okay

STATE: The State should be able to make their arguments.

THE COURT: You can, but I, I just think we’re walking a fine line between

prejudicial sympathy, you know, how would you feel if it were your family

(inaudible) [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We really are, Judge, we are.

STATE: Okay.

THE COURT: So, with that caution in mind.

After the bench conference, the State continued its closing, argument:

STATE: (inaudible). So, I apologize. The, the victim’s fifteen-year-old

brother had to watch him be executed in front of his own face. Fifteen years

old. The occupants of the apartments had to hear, and you got to hear the 911

20

-Unreported Opinion­

call. Gunshots rang out. Had to hear screams of call 911 from his fifteenyear-old brother as he lay dying.

Now, but for the Defendant’s actions, Trevor Hamlet would not have been

killed. And we know that because Mr. Brooks, the Co-Defendant, had no

way to find him. They didn’t know each other, came from totally different

areas, Baltimore City versus the County, had nowhere, way to know where

to go, but for the Defendant.

And then that starts the line of events. Now, my job as the prosecutor is to

take you through the law. Those are the jury instructions provided by Your

Honor, the Judge. And.show you how the facts that came into evidence apply

to the law in this case. ...

Heeding the trial court’s warnings after the bench conference, the State only

mentioned the victim’s mother again for the purpose of addressing Mr. Alexander’s

inconsistent testimony when asked to identify the shooter:

[STATE:] When asked in the courtroom to identify the shooter, [Mr.

Alexander] did not do so. In the courtroom he is asked in front of a gallery

of people where it is recorded to state who killed his brother and this is the

individual he watched execute his brother, must be terrifying. But when he

just finds out that his brother has died, the first words out of his mouth are I

hed to the police because he knew who the shooter was. He had just found

out, he didn t know prior to that that his brother had died. His mom comes in

and tells him. And it is then that he first says I know who did it. It’s at that

point that he knows he will never see his brother again. He wants justice. He

wants the person who did it to be held responsible. And in this instance, and

you’ll see, he is beside himself, understandably. He is very close to his

brother Defense counsel objected to this statement which the court overruled. The State then

played a video admitted as evidence at trial. The video showed Mr. Alexander, in an

emotional state, telling the police that he lied in their first interview about knowing the

identity of the shooter. Defense counsel subsequently objected:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I want to renew my objection. This is

not appropriate. It’s not (inaudible) emotional appeal to the jury is not

appropriate . -

21

-Unreported Opinion-

STATE: Your Honor, -

THE COURT: Well, this is, it’s in evidence, so objection is overruled.

(AUDIO STOPS)

THE COURT: This is in evidence.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I know it’s in evidence but, but this, butTHE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — but we’re not hearing -

THE COURT: It’s her right to highlight the evidence.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That’s the point of closing.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I ask for a standing objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Understood, it’s noted for the record. Thank you.

The prosecution continued to highlight Mr. Alexander’s testimony with evidence depicting

the time and scene of the crime. The prosecution played a responding officer’s body cam

footage from July 28:

[STATE:] In fact, there’s a statement the Defendant makes, was it

noticeable? And he could see that black eye as he shot his brother. And he

doesn’t know that he's being followed. And he has not seen the surveillance

footage so doesn’t know that that vehicle is outside their apartment. [Mr.

Brooks] then ran back towards Flintshire, confirmed by Ms. McKever. And

what you hear on that body worn camera as he’s watching his brother lay

dying on the sidewalk is him screaming.

(AUDIO PLAYS - SCREAMING)

(AUDIO STOPS)

22

-Unreported Opinion-

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Really? Can I, I renew my objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

Mr. Maple urges this court to find that the trial court abused its discretion by

overruling defense counsel’s objections and grant Mr. Maple a new trial. Mr. Maple adds

that the evidence against him was extremely thin and the prosecution’s closing arguments

urged the jurors to convict Mr. Maple based on emotional appeals from the reactions of the

victim s mother and brother. The State counters that the trial court soundly exercised its

discretion in response to the prosecutor’s remarks and playing two pieces of evidence that

were properly admitted at trial.

.

2. Standards for Closing Arguments

An appellate court should not disturb the trial court’s judgment absent clear abuse

of discretion of a character likely to have injured the complaining party.” Mitchell v. State,

408 Md. 368, 380-81 (2009) (cleaned up).7

What exceeds the limits of permissible

comments in closing argument are determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 380. The

presiding judge in a criminal trial has broad discretion to control the scope and duration of

counsel’s closing arguments. Ingram v. State, 427 Md. 717, 727 (2012) (citing Wilhelm v.

State, 272 Md. 404, 431 (1974)). Determining whether a portion of the prosecution’s

7 The Supreme Court of Maryland explained a recent increase in using “cleaned up” as a

parenthetical. Lopez v. State, 458 Md. 164, 195 n.13 (2018). The parenthetical “signals

that the current author has sought to improve readability by removing extraneous, non­

substantive clutter (such as brackets, quotation marks, ellipses, footnote signals Internal

citations or made un-bracketed changed to capitalization) without altering the substance

of the quotation.” Id.

23

-Unreported Opinion­

argument is improper or prejudicial rests largely within the trial judge’s discretion because

they are in the best position to determine the propriety of the argument in relation to the

evidence adduced in the case. Mitchell, 408 Md. at 380-81.

In closing arguments, prosecutors are permitted liberal freedom of speech and may

make any comment or draw any reasonable inference that is warranted by the evidence.

Lee v. State, 405 Md. 148, 163 (2008). The purpose and importance of closing arguments:

[S]erves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in

. a criminal case. For it is only after all the evidence is in that counsel for the

parties are in a position to present their respective versions of the case as a

whole. Only then can they argue the inferences to- be drawn from all the

testimony, and point out the weaknesses of their adversaries’ positions. And

for the defense, closing argument is the last clear chance to persuade the trier

of fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan

advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that

the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.

Id. at 161-62 (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).

Attorneys are afforded wide latitude in presenting closing arguments because

“summation provides counsel with an opportunity to creatively mesh the diverse facets of

trial, meld the evidence presented with plausible theories, and expose the deficiencies in

his or her opponent’s argument.” Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 230 (1991). Despite this

freedom, closing arguments should not appeal to the passions and prejudices of a jury

which “may so poison the minds of the jurors that an accused may be deprived of a fair

trial.” Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 597 (2005) (quoting Eley v. State, 288 Md. 548, 552

(1980)).

Even so, the prosecution may “discuss the facts proved or admitted in the

—

■

•

—

24

-Unreported Opinion­

pleadings, assess the conduct of the parties, and attack the credibility of witnesses.”

Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 413. The prosecution is “free to comment legitimately and speak

fully, although harshly, on the accused’s actions and conduct if the evidence supports his

comments, as is accused’s counsel to comment on the nature of the evidence and the

character of witnesses the prosecution produces.” Id. at 412.

Even when, a prosecutor makes an inappropriate remark during summation, a

reversal is not automatically warranted.” Henry, 324 Md. at 231. Unless it appears that

the jury were actually misled or were, likely to have been misled or influenced to the

prejudice of the accused by impermissible comments from the State’s Attorney, reversal

of the conviction on this ground would not be justified. Reidy v. State, 8 Md._App. 169,

172 (1969). To determine reversible error, the reviewing court may consider several

factors including the propriety and severity of the remarks, the measures taken to cure any

potential prejudice, and the weight of the evidence against the accused. Lee, 405 Md. at

165 (citing Lawson, 389 Md. at 592; Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145, 159 (2005)).

3. Analysis

Mr. Maple’s defense counsel first objected to the State’s reference that “losing a

loved one is hard” and that Mr. Hamlet’s mother was unable to say goodbye to her son.

Mr. Maple relies on Lee to assert that the State’s closing argument appealed to the juror’s

emotions.

In Lee, the Court determined that the prosecuting attorney’s statements

throughout their rebuttal argument were improper-and exceeded the permissible scope of

closing arguments. 405 Md. at 170. The prosecutor stated that a victim’s testimony was

-Unreported Opinion-

not credible because they were following “the law of the streets,” the jury should protect

their community and clean up the streets, and the jury should teach Lee a lesson not to

“follow the law of the streets” by settling disputes with violence. Id. at 160. The Court

held that the prosecutor’s remarks constituted improper comments by alluding to facts not

in evidence and requesting the jury to base its verdict on the juror’s personal interests rather

than objectively viewing the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 172-74.' The Court reasoned

■ that the prosecutor’s remarks were prejudicial to the defendant because the comments were

not isolated but part of persistent appeals to the jurors’ biases, passions, and prejudices. Id.

at 175.

.

-

The prosecutor’s statements in Lee are distinct from the State’s remarks in the case

before us.. Unlike in Zee, the State did not draw on the emotions of the jury or request that

the jury “protect their community” or “teach the defendant a lesson.” Although the State’s

comments verge on prejudicial sympathy, the State argued that it relied on the timestamps

from the police interview admitted at trial when concluding that Mr. Hamlet’s mother did

not get to say goodbye to her son. The propriety and severity of the State’s remarks are

minimal and did not poison the minds of the jurors to deprave Mr. Maple of a fair trial.

Additionally, the trial judge took steps to cure any potential prejudice when the court

admonished the State’s attorney for saying that “the victim’s mom did not get to say

goodbye to her son. She did not get to tell him she loved him.” Defense counsel objected

to this statement and the parties approached the bench. During the bench conference, the

court issued a warning to the State that the comments about the victim’s mother “walk[ed]

26

-Unreported Opinion-

a fine line between prejudicial sympathy [sic].” Following the bench conference, the State

resumed its closing arguments and instructed the jury that their “job as the prosecutor is to

take you through the law. Those are the jury instructions provided by Your Honor, the

Judge. And show you how the facts that came into evidence apply to the law in this case.”

The State mentioned Mr. Hamlet’s mother once more during closing arguments to address

Mr. Alexander’s witness testimony.8 Even so, the State adhered to the trial court’s warning

and refrained from mentioning Mr. Hamlet’s mother throughout the rest of closing

arguments, including rebuttal.

: ‘

We next consider the weight of the evidence against the accused. Mr. Maple insists

that given the paucity of the evidence against Mr. Maple;-these closing arguments urged

the jurors to convict Mr. Maple based on emotional appeals for the victim’s brother and

mother. As we established above, the State presented significant links of circumstantial

evidence from which any rational trier of fact could reasonably find Mr. Maple guilty of

first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The State’s closing

arguments highlighted the evidence admitted at trial and drew rational inferences from the

evidence. The remarks at the onset of the State’s closing argument that “losing a loved one

is hard and that “the victim’s mom did not get to say goodbye to her son” do not outweigh

the surveillance footage, Mr. Maple’s CSLI, expert testimony, arid witness testimony

admitted at trial. We find that the State’s remarks were not improper.

8 We will further discuss Mr. Maple’s argument against the State replaying body cam

footage from July 28, the 911 call, and Mr. Alexander and his mother’s police interview.

27

-Unreported Opinion-

Mr. Maple also asserts that the State improperly constituted an appeal to the

passions, prejudices, and sympathies of the jurors when it argued that “the victim’s fifteen-

year-old brother had to watch Mr. Hamlet be executed in front of his own face,” played the

911 call, and showed the video recording of Mr. Alexander and his mother being

interviewed by the police. We do not agree. The State may discuss facts proved or

admitted in the pleadings, assess the conduct of the parties, and attack the credibility of

witnesses. Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 413. First, Mr. Maple was charged as an accomplice to

Mr. Hamlet’s murder. The State admitted the responding officer’s body cam footage from

July 28, and Mr. Alexander testified to witnessing the shooter stand behind his brother with

a gun pointed to his head, heard a gunshot, and watched his brother drop. Here, the State’s

closing arguments summated evidence admitted at trial.

Next, the-State’s closing argument addressed the credibility of Mr. Alexander’s

testimony when asked to identify the shooter at trial. In doing so, the State commented on

Mr. Alexander witnessing the death of his brother, recounted evidence of the responding

officer’s body earn footage from July 28, and replayed Mr. Alexander’s interview with the

police. The evidence that the State relied upon in closing arguments was properly admitted

at trial without objection. Despite the emotional state of Mr. Alexander and his mother in

the recordings, the trial court explained that defense counsel’s objection was overruled

because the recordings were in evidence, and the State had the right to highlight the

evidence. The State’s comments were not improper but a prelude to explaining Mr.

Alexander’s inconsistent statements.

28

-Unreported Opinion-

Giving deference to the trial court’s determinations, we find that the prosecutor

made reasonable and legitimate inferences from the facts admitted in evidence7We do not

find that the jury was misled, likely to have been misled or influenced by prejudice in the

State s closing argument. The State’s remarks were proper and do not warrant reversal.

Furthermore, the trial court soundly exercised its discretion in regulating closing arguments

and responding to defense counsel’s objections. Absentia clear abuse of discretion, we

affirm the trial court.

C. Relevancy of Evidence

We now turn to the relevancy of Agent Fowler’s testimony concerning Mr. Maple’s

CSLI in the Kelboume Road area on July 30, two days after the murder. Mr. Maple argues

that Agent Fowler s testimony was irrelevant evidence admitted at trial because the object

of the alleged conspiracy to murder Mr. Hamlet had already been accomplished. The State

contends that there is a low threshold for admitting relevant evidence at trial, explaining

that Agent Fowler s testimony was admitted as circumstantial evidence to support the

State s theory of continued action between Mr. Maple and Mr. Brooks, as co-conspirators.

Our decision is narrowed to whether the trial court admitted relevant evidence under Rule

5-402.

While trial judges generally have wide discretion when weighing the relevancy of

evidence in light of unfairness or efficiency considerations; Maryland Rule 5-402 prohibits

trial judges from admitting irrelevant evidence. See State v. Simms, 420 Md. 705, 724

(2011). The issue Of whether a particular item of evidence should be admitted or excluded

-Unreported Opinibn-

is committed to the considerable and sound discretion of the trial court, and the abuse of

discretion standard of review is applicable to the ‘trial court’s determination of relevancy.’”

Id. (quoting Ruffin Hotel Corp. ofMd. v. Gasper, 418 Md. 594, 619 (2011)).

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is

of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be withouttiie evidence:” Md. Rule 5-401. Rule 5-401 provides that the threshold

that must be met only requires that the evidence have any tendency to make the existence

of a fact of consequence to the cause of action. Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 591 (2000)

(emphasis added). Potential evidence meets this threshold when it is logically related to

the matter at issue in the case. Id. A party seeking to establish the relevancy of evidence

does not have to demonstrate that the evidence is weighty enough to carry the party’s

burden of persuasion. Id. The trial court “must be satisfied that the proffered evidence is

what the party claims the item to be, and, if so, that its admission increases or decreases

the probability of the existence of a material fact.” Id.

In accordance with statutory law, the test for relevance is whether the evidence,

viewed in a light with all other evidence, tends to make the proposition asserted more or

less probable. Id. at 592. Additionally, circumstantial evidence regarding a defendant’s

conduct may be admissible as a circumstance showing a consciousness of guilt. Id. at 593.

Evidence of the defendant’s behavior after the commission of a crime may be admissible,

not as conclusive evidence of guilt, but as circumstantial evidence from which guilt may

be inferred. Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557, 575 (2007).

30

-Unreported Opinion-

In the case before us, the. State relied purely on circumstantial evidence and

introduced Agent Fowler’s testimony in support of its theory that Mr. Maple and Mr.

Brooks conspired to murder Mr. Hamlet. Agent Fowler’s testimony explained that Mr.

Maple s CSLI was detected in the Kelboume Road area, on July 30, two days after Mr.

Hamlet was murdered. The trial court determined that Agent Fowler’s testimony was

relevant because Mr. Maple’s CSLI depicts him returning to the scene of the crime on the

same day Mr. Brooks vehicle was recorded on a license plate reader in the area. Moreover,

Agent Fowler’s underlying report showing Mr. Maple’s CSLI in the Kelboume Road area

and the license plate reader recording Mr. Brooks’ vehicle in the area were both admitted

into evidence without objection.

Upon reviewing additional evidence presented at trial, Agent Fowler’s testimony

reasonably made it more probable, although not conclusive, that Mr. Maple agreed to aid,

command, counsel, or encourage Mr. Brooks in the commission of Mr. Hamlet’s murder.

Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly admitted Agent Fowler’s testimony.

IV-

Conclusion

We find that legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict because the

State produced significant links of circumstantial evidence which a rational trier of fact

could reasonably find Mr. Maple guilty of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit

first-degree murder.

Furthermore, the trial court soundly exercised its discretion in

regulating closing arguments and admitting relevant evidence. Finally, we hold that the

trial court properly admitted relevant evidence supporting the State’s theory that Mr. Maple

31

i

-Unreported Opinion-

and Mr. Brooks acted as co-conspirators.. For those reasons, we affirm the decision of the

Circuit Court of Baltimore County.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

BALTIMORE COUNTY IS AFFIRMED.

APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.

32

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i

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Supreme Court of jUlarplanb

Gregory Hilton,

Clerk

Robert C. Murphy Courts of Appeal Building

361 Rowe Boulevard

Annapolis, Maryland 21401

(410) 260-1500

(800) 926-2583

February 26, 2025

NOTICE OF ORDER

LateefMaple v. State ofMaryland

Petition No. 404, September Term, 2024

On February 26, 2025, the Court entered an order1 denying the petition for writ of

certiorari in this Court.

/s/ Gregory Hilton

Clerk

Copy to:

All counsel of record

Any unrepresented parties

Clerk, Appellate Court of Maryland

Clerk, Circuit Court

1 The Court’s order can be viewed online at https://www.mdcourts.gov/scm/petitions.