Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robert Armendaris, Petitioner v. Arizona
Supreme Court briefJan 5, 2026
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 25-_______
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
_____________________________
Robert Armendaris,
Petitioner,
v.
State of Arizona,
Respondent.
_____________________________
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To the Arizona Court of Appeals
_____________________________
Randal McDonald
Post-Conviction Clinic
ASU Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law
111 E. Taylor St.
Phoenix, AZ 85004
Randal.McDonald@ASU.edu
Mikel Steinfeld
Counsel of Record
Office of the Maricopa County
Public Defender
620 W. Jackson, Ste. 4015
Phoenix, AZ 85003
602-506-7711
Mikel.Steinfeld@Maricopa.gov
ISSUE
This Court long interpreted the Sixth Amendment consistent with how our
founders understood it. One component of that right was that criminal defendants
“should be tried by a jury composed of not less than twelve persons.” Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898). Of this conclusion, this Court reasoned, “there can
be no doubt.” Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900).
In Williams v. Florida, the Court shifted to a functionalist approach.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1970). Parting from decades of
jurisprudence, the majority concluded that 12 people were not necessary to the
function of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 100-01. Six jurors were enough. Id.
Two years later, this functionalist approach became the basis for a plurality
decision discarding jury unanimity in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972).
But in the unanimity context, this Court rejected the functionalist approach
just six years ago in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 100 (2020). Rather, this Court
was guided by how our founders understood the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 89-93.
The obvious tension between Williams and Ramos has led many to call for
this Court to reconsider Williams—including Justice Gorsuch. See Khorrami v.
Arizona, 598 U.S. __, 143 S. Ct. 22 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Cunningham v. Florida, 144 S. Ct. 1287 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
This Petition asks:
Does the Sixth Amendment guarantee the right to a 12-person jury?
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ISSUE ............................................................................................................................. ii
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
OPINIONS BELOW ...................................................................................................... 2
JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 3
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED......................................................... 3
STATEMENT ................................................................................................................. 4
REASONS THIS PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED .............................................. 7
1.
Williams v. Florida cannot be squared with Ramos v. Louisiana’s
original-meaning framework. .......................................................................... 7
A.
At the founding, the right to an “impartial jury” included a jury of
12. .................................................................................................................. 7
B.
Williams acknowledged the original meaning—and declined to
enforce it. .................................................................................................... 10
C.
Within a decade, Williams’s functionalist approach proved
problematic. ................................................................................................ 12
D.
Ramos restored history as the measure of the Sixth Amendment........... 15
E.
Applying Ramos, “impartial jury” means a jury of 12. ............................. 16
2.
This case is an ideal vehicle to resolve the question presented. .................. 17
3.
The question presented is recurring, important, and has already
prompted calls for this court’s review............................................................ 20
4.
Stare decisis does not bar reconsideration of Williams v. Florida. .............. 23
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 26
iii
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page
Cases
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) ....................................................................... 19
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) ............................ii, 1, 2, 12, 15-16, 21, 24-25
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).................................................... 1, 2, 12-16, 25
Cap. Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899) ............................................................ 9, 24
Cunningham v. Florida, 144 S. Ct. 1287 (2024) ................................................ii, 21-22
Guzman v. State, 350 So.3d 72 (Fla. App. 2022) ................................................... 21-22
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995).......................................................... 26
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 399 (1972) ................................................................ 12
Khorrami v. Arizona, 598 U.S. __, 143 S. Ct. 22 (2022) ..............................ii, 21-23, 26
Maxwell v. Dow, , 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900) ........................................................ ii, 9, 24
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).............................................. 1, 10, 17, 24
People v. Sargeant, 230 A.D.3d 1341 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. App. Div. 2024) ................ 22
Phillips v. State, 316 So.3d 779 (Fla. App. 2021) ....................................................... 21
Pool v. Superior Ct., 677 P.2d 261 (Ariz. 1984) .......................................................... 19
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020) ......................... ii, 2, 5, 7, 15-17, 20-22, 24-27
Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) ...................................... 1, 10, 17, 24
Salmon v. State, 387 So.3d 393 (Fla. App. 2024)........................................................ 22
State v. Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755 (Ariz. App. 2025) ............................. 2, 4, 18, 20, 22
State v. Soliz, 219 P.3d 1045 (2009) ........................................................................... 5-6
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) ........................................ ii, 1, 9, 11, 16-17, 24
United States v. Johnson, 143 F.4th 184 (2d Cir. 2025)............................................. 21
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)...................... ii, 1, 2, 5, 7, 10-12, 14-17, 19-27
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. Amend. 6........................................... ii, 1-3, 5, 7-9, 11-12, 15-16, 18-24, 26
U.S. Const. Amend. 14......................................................................................... 3, 5, 20
Ariz. Const. Art. 2, § 23 ........................................................................................... 4, 18
Statutes and Rules
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ........................................................................................................ 3
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702 .......................................................................................... 4, 18
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-902 .............................................................................................. 18
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3821 ........................................................................................ 4, 18
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-102 .......................................................................................... 4, 18
Supreme Court Rule 30 ................................................................................................. 3
iv
Other Authorities
Justin W. Aimonetti, Holmes v. Walton and its enduring lessons for
originalism, 106 Marq. L. Rev. 73 (2022) ................................................................ 22
Hon. Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of
Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1993) ......................................... 7, 8, 17
Sir William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England (1795) ........... 8, 17
Samuel Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English Language (1785) ........................... 8-9
Robert H. Miller, Six of One is Not a Dozen of the Other: A reexamination of
Williams v. Florida and the size of state criminal juries, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev.
621 (1998) ................................................................................................................. 7-8
Thomas Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language (1780) ................. 9
Wanling Su & Rahul Goravara, What is a Jury?, 103 N.C. L. Rev. 969 (2025) ........ 22
James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 295 (1892) ........... 8
v
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Robert Armendaris petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the Arizona Court of Appeals.
INTRODUCTION
At the time of our founding, the right to a jury had a well-understood
meaning: 12 people.
And this Court faithfully interpreted the right to guarantee 12-person juries
for years. See, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898); Rasmussen v.
United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529 (1905); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 292
(1930).
Until Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
While earlier decisions had emphasized the original understanding of the
Sixth Amendment, Williams took a novel approach: function. Id. at 99-100. Size
didn’t make the cut. Id. at 100-01. Assessing its view of the purpose of a jury, the
Williams majority concluded that a 12-person jury wasn’t necessary for the jury’s
function. Id. Two years later, unanimity didn’t make the cut either. Applying the
same functionality analysis, the plurality in Apodaca v. Oregon ruled that
unanimity was not essential to the jury’s function. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
410-11 (1972).
The failings of Williams were seen quickly. Folks started studying the impact
of jury size. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978). And jury size was
1
important. Larger juries did a better job deliberating and made better decisions. Id.
at 232-34. Smaller juries created variances that favored the prosecution and
excluded people with minority viewpoints. Id. at 236. Not only were minority
viewpoints excluded, minority groups—including racial minorities—were more
likely to be excluded. Id. at 236-37.
This Court stopped the bleeding in Ballew v. Georgia and ruled that a 5person jury violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 239. But this Court also “readily
admit[ted] that we do not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and
five.” Id.
Five years ago, this Court corrected course in the jury-unanimity context. In
Ramos v. Louisiana, this Court found it problematic to replace “the ancient
guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict” with the Court’s “own functionalist
assessment” of the Sixth Amendment. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 100 (2020).
Instead, the Sixth Amendment should be read consistent with what our founders
understood. In Ramos, that meant unanimity.
Ramos rejected the functionalist approach used in Apodaca. Now, Williams
cannot be reconciled with Ramos. This Court should grant certiorari and overrule
Williams.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals is reported at State v.
Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755 (Ariz. App. 2025). It is attached at Appendix 1a.
2
JURISDICTION
This petition is timely, and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1257(a). The Arizona Court of Appeals issued its opinion on March 13, 2025.
Appendix 1a. Mr. Armendaris then petitioned for review with the Arizona Supreme
Court. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on October 6, 2025. Appendix 8a.
This established a 90-day date of January 1, 2026. Because that is a holiday, the
deadline rolls over to the next business day, January 2, 2026. See Supreme Court
Rule 30(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ….
U.S. Const. Amend. 6.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
No state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ….
U.S. Const. Amend. 14, § 1.
3
STATEMENT
Robert Armendaris asked for a jury of 12 people. State v. Armendaris, 567
P.3d 755, ¶ 9 (Ariz. App. 2025) (Appendix 1a). He had been charged with luring a
minor for sexual exploitation. Id. The minor in question was an undercover officer
posing as a 16-year-old. Id. at ¶ 8.
Because of his charge, Mr. Armendaris faced serious consequences. If
convicted, he faced up to 8.75 years in prison. Id. at ¶ 20; see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13702(D). And upon conviction, he would have to register as a sex offender.
Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755, ¶ 11; see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3821(A)(14).
But Mr. Armendaris didn’t get a jury of 12 people; only eight people decided
his case. Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755, ¶ 10.
Under Arizona law, Mr. Armendaris was only entitled to a jury of eight
people. Id. at ¶ 20. The Arizona Constitution provides for the right to a jury. Ariz.
Const. Art. 2, § 23. But a 12-person jury is only guaranteed “in criminal cases in
which a sentence of death or imprisonment for thirty years or more is authorized by
law ….” Id. For all other cases, the Arizona Constitution requires a jury of “not less
than six ….” Id. Arizona statute sets the number at eight: “A jury for trial in any
court of record of any other criminal case shall consist of eight persons ….” Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 21-102(B).
This eight-person jury convicted Mr. Armendaris. Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755,
¶ 11. The trial court sentenced Mr. Armendaris to lifetime supervised probation and
ordered Mr. Armendaris to register as a sex offender. Id.
4
On appeal, Mr. Armendaris argued he should have received a 12-person jury.
Id. at ¶ 13.
The Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the right to an impartial jury and “applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at ¶ 15.
But relying on Williams v. Florida, the court rejected Mr. Armendaris’s
argument. Id. at ¶¶ 15-19 (discussing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)).
“More than 50 years ago,” the court observed, this Court “ruled the Sixth
Amendment does not require a 12-person jury.” Id. at ¶ 15. And two years later, the
Arizona Constitution was amended to authorize juries of fewer than 12 people. Id.
The lower court also observed that the Arizona Supreme Court had reviewed the
issue and “concluded that Arizona’s jury laws passed Sixth-Amendment muster
under Williams.” Id. at ¶ 16 (citing State v. Soliz, 219 P.3d 1045, ¶¶ 6-7 (2009)).
Mr. Armendaris argued that this Court’s more recent decision in Ramos v.
Louisiana changed how we should look at the Sixth Amendment. See id. at ¶¶ 17-18
(discussing Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020)). Rather than look at a
functional approach, Ramos requires courts to look at what the Sixth Amendment
“meant at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption.” Id. at ¶ 18. And at the time
of adoption, the Sixth Amendment was understood to require a 12-person jury. Id.
The lower court did not engage with this argument. Id. at ¶ 19.
Instead, the court concluded simply that it was bound by Williams and
related Arizona authority. Id. at ¶ 19. “But even if the Arizona Supreme Court or
5
United States Supreme Court ultimately agrees with Armendaris’ position, this
court is bound by the holdings in Williams and Soliz.” Id.
“Williams still holds today.” Id.
And because Williams still holds, a jury of just eight people can decide cases
in which a defendant faces nearly a decade in prison, lifetime probation, and sex
offender registration. Id. at ¶ 20.
“Based on controlling precedent,” the court ruled, “Armendaris has not
established error.” Id.
Mr. Armendaris petitioned for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. The
Arizona Supreme Court denied review on October 3, 2025 (Appendix 8a).
Because “Williams still holds today,” Mr. Armendaris files this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.
6
REASONS THIS PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED
1.
Williams v. Florida cannot be squared with Ramos v. Louisiana’s
original-meaning framework.
Williams v. Florida upheld criminal convictions by juries smaller than 12
even though the Court acknowledged that, at the time of the founding, a criminal
jury was universally understood to consist of 12 people. Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970).
Under Ramos v. Louisiana, that acknowledgment should have ended the
analysis. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020).
It did not. And that’s the problem.
A.
At the founding, the right to an “impartial jury” included a jury
of 12.
When the Sixth Amendment was adopted, the meaning of “impartial jury”
was settled. In criminal cases, it referred to a jury composed of 12 people who were
required to reach a unanimous verdict. That understanding was neither contested
nor uncertain. It was part of the legal background against which the Sixth
Amendment was drafted and ratified.
English common law fixed the criminal jury at 12. As Richard S. Arnold—
former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—
has noted, “In 1367, during the rule of Edward III (1327-1377), the requirement of a
unanimous verdict of twelve was firmly established.” Hon. Richard S. Arnold, Trial
by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1, 8 (1993); accord Robert H. Miller, Six of One is Not a Dozen of the Other: A
7
reexamination of Williams v. Florida and the size of state criminal juries, 146 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 621, 638-39 (1998). This aligns with Professor Thayer’s assessment—
reached in 1892—that the “requirement of twelve in the petty jury” became “the
settled rule” by the end of the 14th century. James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its
Development, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 295, 297 (1892). And Sir William Blackstone
explained in 1795 that “the founders of the English law have with excellent forecast
contrived … that the truth of every accusation … should afterwards be confirmed by
the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen,
and superior to all suspicion.” 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 349 (1795).1
Colonial practice followed suit. “In fact, an examination of colonial legislation
in the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary eras uncovers considerable evidence
that the Framers simply understood ‘jury’ to mean a unanimous body of twelve.”
Miller, Six of One is Not a Dozen of the Other, 146 U. Penn. L. Rev. at 640. And by
“1791 it was clear that the colonists believed a jury of fewer than twelve to be a
concept both alien and ominous.” Arnold, Trial by Jury, 22 Hofstra L. Rev. at 14.
When the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right to an “impartial jury,” it
incorporated that settled understanding.
Indeed, the common definition of a jury included reference to a group of 12.
Samuel Johnson’s 1785 dictionary defined jury as “a company of men, as twentyfour, or twelve, sworn to deliver a truth upon such evidence as shall be delivered
1 Available at https://archive.org/details/bim_eighteenth-century_commentaries-on-
the-laws_blackstone-william-sir_1793_4/page/349/mode/2up.
8
them touching the matter in question.” Samuel Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the
English Language 1084 (1785).2 Thomas Sheridan’s dictionary, published five years
earlier, provided a nearly identical definition: “a company of men, as twenty-four or
twelve, sworn to deliver a truth upon such evidence as shall be delivered them
touching the matter in question.” Thomas Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the
English Language 542 (1780).3
And for more than a century, this Court recognized that reality.
In Thompson v. Utah, decided in 1898, this Court understood that “the word
‘jury’ and the words ‘trial by jury’ were placed in the constitution of the United
States with reference to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in this
country and in England at the time of the adoption of that instrument ….”
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898). That meant that the defendant
“should be tried by a jury composed of not less than twelve persons.” Id.
One year later, in Cap. Traction Co. v. Hof, this Court affirmed “that the
word ‘jury’ … means a tribunal of twelve men ….” Cap. Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S.
1, 15 (1899).
In 1900, this Court held that “a jury composed, as at common, of twelve
jurors was intended by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution” in
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900). Of this conclusion, “there can be no
doubt.” Id.
2 Available at
https://archive.org/details/dictionaryofengl01johnuoft/page/n1083/mode/2up.
3 Available at https://archive.org/details/generaldictionar00sher/page/542/mode/2up.
9
Five years later, this Court concluded in Rasmussen v. United States that the
“constitutional requirement that ‘the trial of all crimes … shall be by jury,’ means,
as this court has adjudged, a trial by the historical, common-law jury of twelve
persons ….” Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529 (1905).
And then in 1930, in Patton v. United States, this Court held: “A
constitutional jury means 12 men as though that number had been specifically
named; and it follows that, when reduced to eleven, it ceases to be such a jury quite
as effectively as though the number had been reduced to a single person.” Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 292 (1930).
Under the common law, a jury was composed of 12 people. In the colonies, a
jury was composed of 12 people. Our founders understood the word jury to refer to a
group of 12 people. And this Court consistently interpreted the word jury to mean a
group of 12 people—until Williams.
B.
Williams acknowledged the original meaning—and declined to
enforce it.
Williams v. Florida did not dispute the historical understanding of the jury
trial right. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-91. To the contrary, the majority
acknowledged that criminal juries at common law consisted of 12 people and that
this number had become fixed during the 14th century. Id. at 88-89.
Instead, the Williams majority was bothered that our history “affords little
insight into the considerations that gradually led the size of that body to be
generally fixed at 12.” Id. at 87. And this Court demeaned possible explanations as
10
“rest[ing] on little more than mystical or superstitious insights into the significance
of ‘12.’” Id. at 88.
The majority thus characterized the requirement that a jury be composed of
12 people as “a historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise
to the jury in the first place.” Id. at 89-90. And the Court found trouble assessing
our Framers’ intent—despite the several cases cited above evidencing that intent.
Id. at 92-99.
The Williams majority then broke from Sixth Amendment precedent. Id. at
99-100.
Before Williams, this Court interpreted the right to a jury consistent with the
term’s original meaning. In Thompson v. Utah, this Court had ruled that “jury” and
“trial by jury” had to be understood by “the meaning affixed to them in the law as it
was in this country and in England at the time of the adoption of” the Constitution.
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898).
But the Williams majority abandoned this standard and instead looked to
function. Id. at 99-100. “The relevant inquiry, as we see it, must be the function that
the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial.” Id.
And the majority did not believe 12 people were necessary for a jury to perform its
function. Id. at 100-01. In his Williams dissent, Justice Marshall would have
adhered to Thompson. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As
he saw it, the majority had “not made out a convincing case that the Sixth
Amendment should be read differently than it was in Thompson even if the matter
11
were now before us de novo—much less that an unbroken line of precedent going
back over 70 years should be overruled.” Id.
Williams was not the only case to take this functionalist approach.
Two later, in Apodaca v. Oregon, this Court assessed whether the Sixth
Amendment guaranteed the right to a unanimous jury. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 405-06 (1972). Relying on Williams, the four justices in the main opinion took a
functionalist view: “Our inquiry must focus upon the function served by the jury in
contemporary society.” Id. at 410. And the justices found unanimity unimportant to
the “function” of the criminal jury: “In terms of this function we perceive no
difference between juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to
convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one.” Id. at 411. In a sister case,
Justice Marshall again dissented. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 399, 399 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). This time joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall
criticized the majority’s functionalist approach “that allows it to strip away, one by
one, virtually all the characteristic features of the jury as we know it.” Id. at 400.
Instability surfaced almost immediately.
C.
Within a decade, Williams’s functionalist approach proved
problematic.
Just eight years later, this Court faced the next intrusion—a jury composed
of five people—in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 224 (1978).
Already, research had proved the functional conclusions in Williams to stand
on shaky ground.
12
“First,” this Court acknowledged in Ballew, “recent empirical data suggest
that progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group
deliberation.” Id. at 232. And “this decline leads to inaccurate fact-finding and
incorrect application of the common sense of the community to the facts.” Id.
Smaller groups are less likely to remember key details. Id. at 233. “Furthermore,
the smaller the group, the less likely it is to overcome the biases of its members to
obtain an accurate result.” Id.
“Second, the data now raise doubts about the accuracy of the results achieved
by smaller and smaller panels.” Id. at 234. Particularly important, “the risk of
convicting an innocent person … rises as the size of the jury diminishes.” Id. And
smaller juries were less likely to reach correct decisions. Id. at 234-35. In one study
this Court identified, “12-person groups reached correct verdicts 83% of the time; 6person panels reached correct verdicts 69% of the time.” Id.
“Third, the data suggest that the verdicts of jury deliberation in criminal
cases will vary as juries become smaller, and that the variance amounts to an
imbalance to the detriment of one side, the defense.” Id. at 236. Smaller juries are
less likely to hang. Id. Studies showed that juries would hang with just one juror,
but they were more likely to hang when two jurors were not convinced of guilt. Id.
Jury size can then play a crucial role. “If a minority viewpoint is shared by 10% of
the community, 28.2% of 12-member juries may be expected to have no minority
representation, but 53.1% of 6-member juries would have none.” Id. And 34% of 12-
13
person juries would have two minority-view members; only 11% of 6-person juries
would have two. Id.
Fourth, these statistics identify “problems not only for jury decisionmaking,
but also for the representation of minority groups in the community.” Id. If a
minority group makes up only 10% of the population, “53.1% of randomly selected
six-member juries could be expected to have no minority representative among their
members, and 89% not to have two.” Id. at 237.
Fifth, the nature of the criminal system masks the problem. Id. Because our
system “handles so many clear cases,” one study posited that inconsistencies would
arise in about 14% of cases. Id. But this undervalues case-by-case differences. Id. at
238. More to the point, it is in these borderline cases that the right to a jury is at its
zenith. Id. at 237-38. “When the case is close, and the guilt or innocence of the
defendant is not readily apparent, a properly functioning jury system will insure
evaluation by the sense of the community and will also tend to insure accurate
factfinding.” Id. at 238.
This Court adhered to Williams. Id. at 239.
But the studies led this Court “to conclude that the purpose and functioning
of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional degree,
by a reduction in size to below six members.” Id. And this Court acknowledged that
the line between five and six was murky. Id. “We readily admit that we do not
pretend to discern a clear line between six members and five.” Id. But the studies
indicated any further reduction in size would be problematic. Id.
14
Importantly, Ballew dealt with a misdemeanor case. Id. at 225.
And still this Court ruled that reducing the jury to five people violated the
Sixth Amendment. Id. at 225, 240-41.
Within a decade, Williams’s functional approach was a problem. And this
Court started to back away from it. It drew a line at 6, but acknowledged that there
was no real reason to draw the line there.
Fortunately, this Court has returned to the appropriate assessment: original
understanding.
D.
Ramos restored history as the measure of the Sixth
Amendment.
Six years ago, in Ramos v. Louisiana, this Court again took up the issue of
jury unanimity and rejected the functionalist approach that originated in Williams.
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 88, 93-94, 98-100 (2020).
The main problem with Apodaca was the functionalist approach that began
with Williams: “The deeper problem is that the [Apodaca] plurality subjected the
ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict to its own functionalist assessment
in the first place.” Id. at 100.
This functionalist approach “overlook[ed] the fact that, at the time of the
Sixth Amendment’s adoption, the right to a trial by jury included a right to a
unanimous verdict.” Id. (emphasis original). Our founders’ goal was not to create
“fruitful topics for future cost-benefit analyses”; the goal was “to ensure that their
children’s children would enjoy the same hard-won liberty they enjoyed.” Id. The
right to a jury trial “may serve purposes evading our current notice. We are
15
entrusted to preserve and protect that liberty, not balance it away aided by no more
than social statistics.” Id.
The functionalist approach embraced in Williams and applied in Apodaca
was a departure from this Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Before
Williams, this Court was guided by the original public meaning of the Sixth
Amendment. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898).
The eight years that followed Williams proved the foresight of our founders
and the errors of the functionalist approach. Studies proved that smaller juries were
functionally flawed. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978). Reduced jury
size meant less effective group deliberations, less accurate decisions, and less
diversity, whether by viewpoint or protected status. Id. This Court stemmed the
bleeding in Ballew v. Georgia and ruled that a 5-person jury violated the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 239. But this Court also admitted that it could not even “pretend
to discern a clear line between six members and five.” Id.
In Ramos, this Court returned its Sixth Amendment analysis to the original
public meaning of the text.
E.
Applying Ramos, “impartial jury” means a jury of 12.
Under Ramos v. Louisiana’s framework, the Sixth Amendment secures those
features that defined a jury trial at the founding. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83,
89-93 (2020).
Unanimity was one. Id.
16
Jury size was another. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898);
Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529 (1905); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276, 292 (1930); Hon. Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional
Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 8 (1993); 4
Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England 349 (1795).
The question is not whether a jury of fewer than 12 can, in the Court’s
judgment, reach reliable results. Williams asked that question. Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1970). Ramos explains why it’s the wrong question. Ramos, 590
U.S. at 98-100. The Constitution does not permit courts to discard historically
essential features of a right just because they come to believe those features are
unnecessary. Id. at 100.
At the founding, a criminal jury meant 12 people. Williams acknowledged
that fact and declined to enforce it. Ramos requires the opposite approach. The two
decisions cannot be reconciled.
2.
This case is an ideal vehicle to resolve the question presented.
This case presents a clean, straightforward opportunity to decide whether
Williams v. Florida should remain good law after Ramos v. Louisiana. Arizona law
required that Mr. Armendaris receive only an eight-person jury, Mr. Armendaris
preserved the constitutional issue, the lower court’s decision was dictated by
Williams, and no procedural or jurisdictional obstacles stand in the way of review.
17
First, Mr. Armendaris was deprived of a 12-person jury because Arizona law
required an eight-person jury in his case. Ariz. Const. Art. 2, § 23; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §
21-102(B).
Mr. Armendaris faced serious consequences if convicted. He faced up to 8.75
years in prison. Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755, ¶ 20; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(D). Even
if not imprisoned, he faced lifetime probation. Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755, ¶ 11; Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 13-902(E). And he faced compelled sex-offender registration.
Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755, ¶ 11; see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3821(A)(14).
Yet Mr. Armendaris was tried and convicted by an eight-person jury because
his potential sentence did not exceed 30 years’ imprisonment. Ariz. Const. Art. 2, §
23; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-102(B). The jury size was not the result of consent, waiver,
or strategic choice. It was imposed by law.
That posture matters. This case does not present questions about forfeiture,
invited error, or voluntary relinquishment of a constitutional right. It squarely
presents whether the Sixth Amendment permits a state to mandate criminal
convictions by juries composed of fewer than 12 people.
Second, Mr. Armendaris preserved his Sixth Amendment challenge. Mr.
Armendaris raised his Sixth Amendment challenge to the eight-person jury in a
pretrial motion. Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755, ¶ 9. The trial court rejected the claim,
and Mr. Armendaris renewed it on appeal. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 13. The Arizona Court of
Appeals even acknowledged that Mr. Armendaris had preserved the claim. Id. at ¶
13.
18
This separates Mr. Armendaris from many of the petitioners that have
brought this issue to this Court’s attention.
There is no dispute about preservation. The question presented is properly
before this Court.
Third, the lower court’s decision was based solely on adherence to Williams
and Arizona cases that followed Williams. Id. at ¶ 19.
The court accurately explained Mr. Armendaris’s argument. See id. First, the
court should have evaluated the right to “trial by an impartial jury” as our founders
understood it when adopting the Sixth Amendment. Id. Second, “the phrase ‘meant
12 jurors’ at the time of ratification.” Id. (brackets omitted).
The court of appeals did not refute this reasoning.
Rather, the court ruled that it was bound by Williams. Id. at ¶ 19. “Arizona
courts must follow United States Supreme Court precedent ‘with regard to the
interpretation of the federal constitution.’” Id. (quoting Pool v. Superior Ct., 677
P.2d 261, 271 (Ariz. 1984)).
“Williams still holds today.” Id. And only this Court can reconsider Williams.
See id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997)).
That acknowledgment underscores why review is warranted. Lower courts
are bound by Williams, even where they recognize its tension with this Court’s
current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Only this Court can resolve that conflict.
Fourth, this case presents a pure issue of federal constitutional law and does
not include any separate legal grounds for affirmance.
19
The decision below rests entirely on the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755, ¶¶ 15-20. Arizona
law requires eight-person juries in cases like this one, but state law cannot mandate
what the Sixth Amendment forbids. The court of appeals expressly relied on
Williams as controlling federal precedent. Id. at ¶ 19. This case therefore presents a
pure question of federal constitutional law.
This case is also not impacted by any harmless-error analysis. Although the
lower court stated that it reviews constitutional errors for harmlessness, it did not
engage in any harmless-error analysis. Id. at ¶¶ 13 (noting the court reviews for
harmless error because the issue had been preserved), 14-20 (never engaging in a
harmless-error review). As a result, there is no alternative ground on which the
judgment can be affirmed. The sole issue is whether the eight-person jury violated
the Sixth Amendment.
3.
The question presented is recurring, important, and has already
prompted calls for this court’s review.
Whether the Sixth Amendment permits states to convict criminal defendants
using juries smaller than 12 is a recurring and consequential constitutional
question. It affects the structure of criminal trials, the scope of a fundamental
constitutional right, and the uniformity of Sixth Amendment protections
nationwide.
First, jurists and academics have called on this Court to address the tension
between Williams and Ramos.
20
And Justice Gorsuch is one of the jurists calling to resolve the issue. In
Khorrami v. Arizona and Cunningham v. Arizona, Justice Gorsuch dissented from
the denial of certiorari and urged the Court to reconsider Williams. Khorrami v.
Arizona, 598 U.S. __, 143 S. Ct. 22 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Cunningham v. Florida, 144 S. Ct. 1287 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
Judge Lohier of the Second Circuit—writing a concurring opinion for eight
judges—observed that “[g]ood arguments may well exist for revisiting Williams ….”
United States v. Johnson, 143 F.4th 184, 185 (2d Cir. 2025).
Judge Gross of the District Court of Appeals of Florida also recognized the
tensions between Ramos and Williams in a concurring opinion in Guzman v. State,
350 So.3d 72, 78 (Fla. App. 2022) (Gross, J., concurring). Because of this tension,
“like Wile E. Coyote momentarily suspended in midair after running off a cliff,
Williams hovers in the legal ether, waiting for further examination by the Supreme
Court.” Id.
Judge Makar, also with the District Court of Appeals of Florida, similarly
recognized the tension in a concurring opinion in Phillips v. State, 316 So.3d 779,
788 (Fla. App. 2021) (Makar, J., concurring). Judge Makar observed that Ramos
rejected Apodaca’s functionalist approach—which was first implemented in
Williams. Id. Judge Makar thus noted “that the issue of jury size under the Sixth
Amendment may be ripe for re-evaluation.” Id.
21
Academics too have called on this Court to revisit Williams in the wake of
Ramos. See Wanling Su & Rahul Goravara, What is a Jury?, 103 N.C. L. Rev. 969,
977-78 (2025); Justin W. Aimonetti, Holmes v. Walton and its enduring lessons for
originalism, 106 Marq. L. Rev. 73, 92-96 (2022).
But the binding nature of Williams prevents the very sort of split this Court
would normally look for.
Judges Lohier, Gross, and Makar were relegated to issuing concurring
opinions that pointed out the tension between Williams and Ramos.
Others, like Judge B.L. Thomas with the District Court of Appeal of Florida,
have argued that the Sixth Amendment does not require a 12-person jury. Salmon
v. State, 387 So.3d 393, 394-95 (Fla. App. 2024).
And many courts identify the argument and merely follow Williams. That’s
what the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court did in People v.
Sargeant, 230 A.D.3d 1341, 1346-47 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. App. Div. 2024). And it’s
what the Arizona Court of Appeals did here. State v. Armendaris, 567 P.3d 755, ¶ 19
(Ariz. App. 2025).
Second, the issue is recurring in states like Florida and Arizona. Only six
states authorize juries composed of fewer than 12 people: Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Utah. Still, since Ramos, defendants have
repeatedly asked this Court to reconsider Williams. See Khorrami v. Arizona, No.
21-1553; Cunningham v. Florida, No. 23-5171; Arrellano-Ramirez v. Florida, No.
23-5567; Crane v. Florida, 23-5455; Guzman v. Florida, No. 23-5173; Jackson v.
22
Florida, No. 23-5570; Sposato v. Florida, No. 23-5575; Fontes v. Arizona, No. 255819; Jose v. Arizona, No. 24-6520. Those petitions reflect a recurring problem:
lower courts are bound by Williams.
Third, the current state of the law produces unequal Sixth Amendment
protections. The result of Williams is a patchwork system in which the Sixth
Amendment jury-trial right varies depending on where a defendant is tried. Most
states continue to guarantee 12-person juries in criminal cases, either by statute or
constitutional provision. See Khorrami, 143 S. Ct. at 23 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). A small minority—including Arizona—authorize juries
smaller than 12. See id. Thus, two defendants accused of identical crimes may
receive materially different Sixth Amendment protections based solely on
geography. That disparity is difficult to reconcile with a constitutional provision
that was meant to secure a uniform national right.
This issue is too important to leave unresolved. The jury trial right occupies a
central place in the constitutional structure. It is fundamental to our justice system
and serves as a critical safeguard against government overreach. The size of the
jury is not a peripheral detail; it affects deliberation, representation, and the
collective judgment that the Sixth Amendment guarantees.
4.
Stare decisis does not bar reconsideration of Williams v. Florida.
Although stare decisis promotes stability, it does not require this Court to
adhere to all decisions.
23
In Ramos v. Louisiana, Justice Kavanaugh set forth three overarching factors
that provide the “special justification” needed to overrule a prior constitutional
decision. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 121 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). First,
the decision is grievously or egregiously wrong. Id. at 121-22. Second, the prior
decision has caused significant negative jurisprudential or real-world consequences.
Id. at 122. And third, overruling would not unduly upset reliance interests. Id.
Applying those three standards, this Court should overrule Williams.
First, Williams was egregiously wrong. In Ramos, Justice Kavanaugh
reasoned, “When Apodaca was decided, it was already an outlier in the Court’s
jurisprudence, and over time it has become even more of an outlier.” Id. at 125.
This applies with even greater strength to Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970). Before Williams, this Court had a long history of looking to the original
meaning of the Sixth Amendment. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898);
Cap. Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 15 (1899); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586
(1900); Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529 (1905); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 292 (1930). That history repeatedly and rightly concluded that
“Our founders understood the word jury to refer to a group of twelve people.” See
Patton, 281 U.S. at 292. But Williams departed from this long line of jurisprudence
and implemented a brand-new functionalist approach. Williams, 399 U.S. at 99-100.
The same approach that this Court ruled improper in Ramos. Ramos, 590 U.S. at
100, 106.
24
Second, Williams has caused significant negative consequences. In his Ramos
concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh noted that Apodaca had sanctioned “the conviction
at trial … of some defendants who might not be convicted under the proper
constitutional rule ….” Id. at 126 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). That basis alone “has
traditionally supplied some support for overruling an egregiously wrong criminalprocedure precedent.” Id. But Louisiana’s reasons for removing unanimity was also
important: racism. Id. at 126-29.
Again, this conclusion applies with equal, if not greater, force to Williams. In
the eight years that followed Williams, studies proved that smaller juries were less
effective. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978). The studies showed
that smaller juries were “less likely to foster effective group deliberation” and more
likely convict an innocent person. Id. at 232-35. Smaller juries created “an
imbalance to the detriment of one side, the defense,” and exclude minority
viewpoints. Id. at 236. And it also meant that juries were more likely to exclude
minority jurors. Id. at 236-37. While the purpose may not have been racism, studies
confirm the effect is the same. See id.
Third, overruling Williams would not unduly upset any reliance interests. In
Ramos, only two jurisdictions used non-unanimous juries. See Ramos, 590 U.S. at
129 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). As Justice Kavanaugh recognized, overruling
Apodaca would “invalidate some non-unanimous convictions where the issue is
preserved and the case is still on direct review.” Id. But that was “a small price to
25
pay for the uprooting of this weed.” Id. (quoting Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S.
695, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
Here, only six jurisdictions provide for juries of fewer than 12 people. See
Khorrami v. Arizona, 598 U.S. __, 143 S. Ct. 22, 23 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). While more than the two jurisdictions in Ramos, nearly all
states have refused to implement Williams. Certainly, some convictions may be
invalidated—those “where the issue is preserved and the case is still on direct
review.” See Ramos, 590 U.S. at 129 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). But that’s a small
price to pay.
This Court is willing to overrule cases when they are egregiously wrong, have
caused significant negative consequences, and are not heavily relied upon. Cases
like Williams.
CONCLUSION
Williams v. Florida deviated from this Court’s Sixth Amendment approach.
Before Williams, this Court consistently interpreted the Sixth Amendment as our
founders understood it: a jury of 12 people who had to reach a unanimous decision.
But Williams’s functionalist approach disrupted this steady jurisprudence. Jury
size—unnecessary to the function of the jury. Jury unanimity—unimportant.
In Ramos v. Louisiana, this Court correctly rejected the functionalist
approach that Williams initiated. And this Court returned to reading our Sixth
Amendment as our founders did.
26
But Williams remains. And lower courts are left powerless to do anything
about Williams because they are bound by this Court’s decisions.
Williams invented the functionalist approach this Court rejected in Ramos.
The time has come for this Court to overturn Williams. This Court should
grant the petition.
Respectfully submitted,
Randal McDonald
Post-Conviction Clinic
ASU Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law
111 E. Taylor St.
Phoenix, AZ 85004
Randal.McDonald@ASU.edu
Mikel Steinfeld
Counsel of Record
Office of the Maricopa County
Public Defender
620 W. Jackson, Ste. 4015
Phoenix, AZ 85003
602-506-7711
Mikel.Steinfeld@Maricopa.gov
27
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.