Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Marvin Bowman, Petitioner v. City of Chicago Board of Education
Supreme Court briefDec 29, 2025
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Case: 24-2938
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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
llntieb States (Court nf Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 29, 2025*
Decided September 29, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No, 24-2938
MARVIN BOWMAN
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
v.
No. l:21-CV-03015
CITY OF CHICAGO BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Edmond E. Chang,
Judge.
ORDER
Marvin Bowman, a Chicago Public Schools teacher, sued the Chicago Board of
Education, alleging that he was a victim of religious discrimination, retaliation, and
harassment by school officials. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
’ We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
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the Board because Bowman's evidence did not create a triable issue of material fact. We
affirm.
Since becoming a teacher in 2004, Bowman, a self-identified "Bible-Christian,"
routinely requested a few days off each year for religious observances. These requests
were routinely approved by school officials. This changed in 2017 when Ali
Muhammed became the interim principal at Bowman's school. During his first year,
Muhammed hosted a staff event where he shared his recent conversion from Islam to a
form of Christianity and invited the school community to attend a religious service held
in the school building after hours. Bowman declined to participate, citing his opposition
to using the school for religious purposes and his confidence in his own faith.
Shortly after this event, school officials began questioning why Bowman wanted
certain days off and allegedly withheld Bowman's pay for two previously approved
religious-leave days. After Muhammed became principal on a permanent basis,
Bowman's classes also began to include a higher number of students with disabilities
than allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement between the school and teachers'
union. When Bowman reported the imbalance to Muhammed, the principal told him,
"You don't praise the Lord and you got to praise the Lord." Because Muhammed failed
to address the imbalance and Bowman found his comment insulting, Bowman filed
union grievances and a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Education. Bowman
attested that he encountered additional problems at school shortly thereafter. The
temperature in his classroom fluctuated. Muhammed began avoiding him. And another
teacher videotaped Bowman during a meeting without Bowman's knowledge and
edited it in an embarrassing way.
Bowman sued the Chicago Board of Education, alleging, as relevant here,
religious discrimination, retaliation, and harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
Bowman's claims centered on the school officials' response to his requests for religious
leave, the composition of his classes, and the other challenges he faced at the school, all
of which he attributed to his religion and to his complaints about Muhammad's
treatment of him.
The Board sought summary judgment on all claims, and the court granted the
motion in its entirety. On the religious discrimination claim, the court concluded that
Bowman failed to furnish evidence that supported a Title VII discrimination claim
under both the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802-03 (1973), and the holistic approach of Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,
834 F.3d 760, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2016). Specifically, the court determined that Bowman had
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not suffered an adverse employment action, and even if he had, the Board provided
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Regarding the retaliation claim,
the court determined that Bowman failed to produce evidence that any action was
motivated by his protected activities. Finally, the court held that Bowman did not
demonstrate that any harassment was motivated by his religion.
Bowman appeals. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Bowman. See Anderson v. Street,
104 F.4th 646, 651 (7th Cir. 2024). We first address his claim of discrimination, and then
his claims of retaliation and harassment.
In religious discrimination cases under Title VII, the central inquiry is "whether
the plaintiff has introduced evidence that would 'permit a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the plaintiff's ... religion ... caused the discharge or other adverse
employment action.'" Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 143 F.4th 800, 809 (7th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Igasaki v. III. Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021)). An
adverse employment action is any "harm" that leaves the plaintiff "worse off" with
respect to an "identifiable term or condition of employment." Muldrow v. City of St.
Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354—55 (2024)f; Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335,1337
(7th Cir. 2024). It need not be "material," "significant," or "substantial." Thomas,
120 F.4th at 1337. Examples include delaying training, denying vacation times,
transferring shifts, and considering family circumstances in a biased way. Id.
Bowman did not show that he suffered an adverse employment action. His
primary allegation—that his classes had a disproportionate number of students with
disabilities—may have affected his daily responsibilities and left him feeling
unsupported. But under Muldrow, this does not qualify as an adverse action because the
issue was school-wide and not unique to him. Bowman's own evidence—a spreadsheet
of class compositions for the 2021-22 school year—confirms that the composition of
many general education classes exceeded the proportion of special education students
permitted by the collective-bargaining agreement. While Bowman argues that the
overages were limited to non-core classes exempt from the agreement, the data also
shows that core subjects like English, science, and social studies were affected. His
further argument that the data is inaccurate, alleging school officials manipulated
student records to deflate his percentages, is unsupported. Although the imbalance may
have impacted Bowman's working conditions, a broad issue affecting multiple teachers
+ The district court's summary-judgment ruling predates Muldrow.
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does not support his claim of individualized mistreatment. See Arnold v. United Airlines,
Inc., 142 F.4th 460, 470-71 (7th Cir. 2025) (minor changes within the normal scope of
employment did not constitute an adverse action under Muldrow).
Bowman's other alleged adverse action—the denial of his requests for religious
time off—is not supported by the record. The Board submitted documentation showing
that each of Bowman's time-off requests was approved and that he was compensated
accordingly. Although there were some delays in approvals and payments, the Board
explained that district policy requires audits of such requests. The classroom
temperature issues, Muhammad's avoidance of him, and the teacher videotaping him
also did not affect the terms or conditions of Bowman's employment—every aspect of
his job remained the same. These slights do not constitute adverse employment actions
under Muldrow.
Bowman likewise cannot establish a Title VII retaliation claim. To succeed on
such a claim, Bowman must demonstrate that he engaged in a protected activity,
suffered an adverse employment action, and that a causal connection exists between the
two. See Anderson, 104 F.4th at 654. In the retaliation context, the standard for an adverse
employment action is more demanding than in a discrimination claim: Instead of
requiring only "some harm," the action must be materially adverse—meaning it results
in "significant" harm. Est. of Harris v. City of Milwaukee, 141 F.4th 858, 869 (7th Cir. 2025)
(citing Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 350, 357-58); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). Because Bowman cannot establish an adverse employment
action for his discrimination claim, he necessarily cannot meet the higher standard for
his retaliation claim.
Bowman likewise cannot establish a Title VII harassment claim because he did
not endure conduct that was severe or pervasive. To prevail on a hostile work
environment claim, Bowman must show: "(1) [his] work environment was objectively
and subjectively offensive, (2) the harassment [he] complained of was based on [his
religion], (3) the conduct was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of
employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment, and (4) there is a
basis for employer liability." See Anderson, 104 F.4th at 652 (citation modified);
see also Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 427 (2013).
Bowman fails to satisfy this standard, as the incidents he alleges—delays in
approving religious leave, disproportionate assignment of special-education students,
Muhammad's avoidance, classroom temperature fluctuations, and video surveillance
by another teacher—do not constitute the type of severe or pervasive conduct necessary
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to support a harassment claim under Title VII. See Rongere v. City of Rockford, 99 F.4th
1095,1105 (7th Cir. 2024) (pay complaints, social marginalization, and longer hours are
not severe or pervasive); Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004,1015 (7th Cir. 2018) (excessive
monitoring is not sufficient).
Lastly, although Muhammed's comment concerning Bowman's religious beliefs
is troubling, an isolated remark (unless extremely serious) does not constitute a change
in the terms and conditions of employment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 788 (1998). Muhammed's comment was insufficiently serious to rise to that
level. Cf, Shanojfv, III. Dep’t of Human Servs., 258 F.3d 696, 699, 705-06 (7th Cir.
2001) (concluding that a hostile work environment was created when a supervisor made
statements such as "I hate everything that you are" and "I know how to put you Jews in
your place").
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Case: l:21-cv-03015 Document#: 127 Filed: 09/27/24 Page 1 of 16 PagelD #:2142
United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division
MARVIN BOWMAN,
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
No. l:21-CV-03015
)
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
)
)
)
)
Judge Edmond E. Chang
)
Defendant.
)
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Marvin Bowman, a social studies teacher at a Chicago public high school,
claims that—among other things—he received late payments for paid religious holi
days, had too many special education students in his classes, and was secretly rec
orded during class and meetings. R. 1, Compl. at 4-6; R. 5, Am. Compl. at 4-6; R. 82-
2, Bowman Dep. at 14, 16—18, 24, 30-33.1 He says that he faced this treatment be
cause of his religion and because he filed multiple union grievances. Am. Compl. at
4—6. So Bowman brought this suit, alleging that the Chicago Board of Education, his
school’s principal, and another teacher discriminated, harassed, and retaliated
against him. Id.2 Earlier in the case, the individual defendants were dismissed (as
well as a damages claim on behalf of his students), Bowman v. Jones Coleman, No.
1 Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,
a page or paragraph number.
2 The Court has jurisdiction over this Title VII case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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l:21-CV-03015, 2021 WL 6113205, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 25, 2021), and the parties
then eventually finished discovery.
The Board now moves for summary judgment on what remains of the case,
arguing that Bowman fails to provide adequate evidence supporting his claims. R. 80,
Def.’s Mot.; R. 81, Def.’s Br. at 1, 8—9. Because the Court agrees and concludes that
Bowman does not show—even with the record viewed in his favor—that he faced disf ■
crimination, retaliation, or harassment because of his religion or union grievances,
the motion is granted.
I. Background
Marvin Bowman has been a social studies teacher at George Corliss High
School (a Chicago public school) since 2004. R. 82, DSOF U 1; Bowman Dep. at 9. As
a “Bible-Christian,” Bowman requests a few schooldays off each year for religious
observances. Bowman Dep. at 28:21-23; DSOF
20; R. 82-11, Timesheet Records.
Under the Chicago Board of Education’s rules, teachers are allowed “up to three (3)
non-attendance days with pay in a school year for the observance of religious holi
days, which shall not be considered an absence.” DSOF if 8; R. 82-9, Board Rule 4 at
27. Teachers must request these days off in advance through the district’s payroll
system. DSOF
9-10; R. 82-4, Muhammad Verif. TH 6-7. The school’s principal or
clerk reviews and approves the request, and then the district’s payroll department
processes payment to the teacher for the days off. DSOF TH 10—11; Muhammad Verif.
•I 7.
2
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But in response to some teachers abusing this benefit, starting in 2018, the
payroll department began auditing all requests for paid time off for religious holidays.
DSOF Tj 16; R. 82-5, Cunningham Verif. | 9. For each request, the department refers
to a list of major religious holidays, and if the requested day off is not on the list, the
department will not process payment for it. DSOF H 15-16; Cunningham Verif.
UTI 8-9. Instead, the department sends an email to the employee and asks for more
information. Id. It then works with the Board’s law department to decide whether to
approve the request. Id.; R. 82-10, Sims Dep. at 7-8, 12, 14-15.
For years, Bowman has submitted his requests for days off through the payroll
system. But he says that once Ali Muhammad became the interim principal at Corliss
High School in 2017, “all of a sudden people started blocking [Bowman’s] pay and
eventually questioning things about the faith [he] practice[s].” Bowman Dep. at 24.
So Bowman submitted a grievance to the Chicago Teachers Union, claiming that he
was not paid for two religious holidays that he requested and took off in 2021. DSOF
U 64; R. 82-27, 2021 Union Grievance.
In addition to these payroll issues, Bowman also claims that once Muhammad
became principal, Bowman’s classes began filling up with “unusually high numbers
of special needs students.” CompL at 5. The Chicago Teachers Union’s collective bar
gaining agreement requires that no more than 30% of the students in a general edu
cation classroom be special education students. (This is referred to by the parties as
the “70/30 ratio.”) DSOF
24; R. 82-12, Collective Barg. Agr. at 106. For multiple
years, the number of special education students in Bowman’s classes exceeded 30%.
3
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R. 82-25, Ernesti Letter. So he filed union grievances and a complaint to the Illinois
State Board of Education about this imbalance. R. 82-24, Jan. 2020 Union Grievance;
R. 82-26, Oct. 2020 Union Grievance; R. 82-28, Ill. State Bd. of Educ. Letter.. Bowman
alleges that Muhammad then began retaliating against him for filing these griev
ances and complaints by further “overpopulating” his classes with special education
students. Bowman Dep. at 14.
Bowman also alleges that he faced several other issues at the school. First, he
says that Muhammad purposely avoided him at the start of the 2017-18 school year.
Bowman Dep. at 11. Second, he asserts that Muhammad turned “the heat up and
down to cause extreme temperatures in [Bowman’s] classroom” and “manipulate [d]”
the temperature based on what Bowman was wearing. R. 82-3, Pl.’s Ans. to Def.’s
Interr.
9; Bowman Dep. at 16-18. Finally, he claims that another teacher, Sheila
Jones-Coleman, “secretly videotap [ed]” him and posted a “doctored video” of him onto
the school’s shared Google Drive. Bowman Dep. at 30—33.
Based on all of this, Bowman brought this suit against the Chicago Board of
Education (his employer), principal Muhammad, and teacher Jones-Coleman. Compl.
at 1. Because Bowman is a pro se litigant, the Court construes his filings expansively.
Bowman claims that the Defendants have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act by discriminating, harassing, and retaliating
against him because of his religion and because he filed grievances about the number
of special needs students in his classes. DSOF
69; Am. Compl. 4-6. The Defendants
then filed a partial motion to dismiss, requesting that this Court dismiss the claims
4
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against the two individual defendants and strike Bowman’s request for damages for
his former special needs students. R. 20, Mot. to Dismiss at 1. The Court granted that
motion, reasoning that Title VII applies only to employers, not to individuals, and
that Bowman does not have standing to sue for damages on behalf of his students.
Bowman, 2021 WL 6113205 at *3-4. So all that remains in this case are Bowman’s
Title VII and IHRA claims against the Board.3
II. Legal Standard
In deciding the Board’s motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to Bowman. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating sum
mary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
(2007). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determi
nations, Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011),
3Claims under the IHRA are treated the same way as claims under Title VII. So
throughout this opinion, the Court’s analysis of Bowman’s Title VII claims also applies
equally to his IHRA claims. See Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th
Cir. 2016).
5
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and must consider only evidence that can “be presented in a form that would be ad
missible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party seeking summary judgment
has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute and that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d
451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);
Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the ad
verse party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
III. Analysis
A. Discrimination
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be
cause of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l). There are two ways for someone to advance past summary judgment
on a Title VII employment discrimination claim. The first is satisfying the burden
shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff
must offer evidence to show that: “(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he met his
employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) another similarly situated employee outside of his protected class received
better treatment from his employer.” Gamble v. Fiat Chrysler Autos. U.S. L.L.C., 993
6
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F.3d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).4 Once the plaintiff has satisfied each ele
ment of a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to offer a nondiscriminatory motive, and if the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext.” Id. (cleaned up). The relevant
inquiry is “whether the other employees’ situations were similar enough to the plain
tiffs that it is reasonable to infer, in the absence of some other explanation, that the
different treatment was a result of race or some other unlawful basis.” de Lima Silva
v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 917 F.3d 546, 559 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
The second way to get to trial on a Title VII claim is for the plaintiff to offer
circumstantial evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that he was the
victim of discrimination. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir.
2017). The ultimate question is “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the plaintiffs race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other pro
scribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Id.
The Board argues that under either method, Bowman’s discrimination claim
fails. The Court agrees. For starters, Bowman does not offer evidence to show that he
suffered an adverse employment action. A “cognizable adverse employment action is
a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
4 This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,
and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,
18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
7
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significant change in benefits.” Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel-Ind., 546 F.3d 832, 838 (7th
J
Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Though Bowman experienced some inconveniences, none of
them caused a significant change in his employment status.
To start, Bowman was not fired, demoted, or disciplined. DSOF If 46; Muham
mad Verif.
31-33; Bowman Dep. at 92-93. And he neither had his work schedule
changed nor had his pay or benefits decreased. DSOF
46; Bowman Dep. at 92; Mu
hammad Verif. m 34-35. He claims that after Muhammad became the principal at
Corliss High, Bowman started not getting paid for religious holidays that he re
quested and took off. DSOF
17; Bowman Dep. at 24. The evidence conclusively
shows otherwise. Muhammad approved every one of Bowman’s religious holiday re
quests and never asked him to go unpaid for a requested holiday. DSOF
19; R. 82-
6, Muhammad Dep. at 37, 44; Muhammad Verif. m 8-9. And though some of the
payments were delayed because the payroll department audited Bowman’s requests,
he did end up getting paid for all of the days that he requested off. DSOF
man Dep. at 75-76; Cunningham Verif.
21; Bow
13. So Bowman did not experience an ad
verse employment action related to his religious holiday pay. See Lewis v. Wilkie, 909
F.3d 858, 868 (7th Cir. 2018).
Next, Bowman notes that too many special education students were placed into
his classes. Am. Compl. at 4. But that does not qualify either. “A materially adverse
employment action is more than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job respon
sibilities.” Dass v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 675 F.3d 1060, 1069 (7th Cir. 2012). And alt
hough having classes that exceeded the 70/30 ratio may have been challenging for
8
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Bowman and may have even increased his workload, it did not “significant [ly] change
[his] employment status.” .Chaudhry, 546 F.3d at 838 (cleaned up). In fact, to reduce
the burden on Bowman, Muhammad assigned a co-teacher, a special education class
room assistant, and a student teacher to Bowman’s class. DSOF 1 33; R. 82-16, Mu
hammad 2020 Parent Email at 1-3. That cements that the deviation from the 70/30
ratio was also not an adverse employment action, even when the facts are viewed in
Bowman’s favor.
As for the rest of Bowman’s complaints: he supplies no evidence to support his
allegations, and the Board’s evidence directly disproves them. Bowman alleges that
Muhammad purposefully avoided and ignored him. But Muhammad did no such
thing. Muhammad Verif.
36; Muhammad Dep. at 11. For example, when Bowman
reached out to Muhammad about the 70/30 ratio issue, Muhammad engaged with
him and asked for his suggestions on how to better support him. R. 82-15, Muham
mad 70/30 Ratio Email at 1-2. Bowman also claims that Muhammad manipulated
the temperature in Bowman’s classroom to antagonize him. Bowman Dep. at 16—17.
Again, that speculation is not based on personal knowledge. Muhammad had no con
trol over the heating and cooling systems at the school; those were managed by the
building engineer and the facilities department. Muhammad Verif. TH 24, 26; Mu
hammad Dep. at 56—59. And when Bowman told Muhammad about the temperature
fluctuations, Muhammad asked the facilities department to address it and then even
offered to switch Bowman to a different classroom. Muhammad Verif.
hammad Dep. at 58-59.
9
25-26; Mu
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Finally, Bowman contends that another teacher secretly recorded him and
then posted a doctored video of him on the school’s Google Drive. Bowman Dep. at
30-32. But the Board explains, without contradiction, that during the pandemic,
when Corliss High School was conducting classes remotely, the school generally rec
orded all classes and staff meetings. DSOF
58; Muhammad Verif. t 29; Muhammad
Dep. at 50. The video platform would notify all attendees verbally and in writing that
it was recording the class or meeting, and then it would automatically send them a
copy of the recording. Id. Bowman simply does not offer evidence to rebut that no
teachers or other Board employees ever secretly recorded Bowman or doctored a video
of him. Muhammad Verif. U 30; Muhammad Dep. at 49. So Bowman did not suffer an
adverse employment action.
But even if the delayed payments and increased number of special education
students did qualify as adverse employment actions, Bowman’s claim would still lose
because he provides no concrete evidence that other employees at Corliss High School
were treated better than him. Plus, the undisputed evidence shows they were not.
Bowman’s delayed pay for religious holidays was not at all unique to him. The
payroll department treated his religious holiday requests the same way it treats all
teachers’ requests. Cunningham Verif.
6-13. Under the school district’s policies, a
teacher must submit a written request for a religious holiday to his school’s principal
at least two days in advance. Cunningham Verif.
4. Once the principal approves the
request, it is sent to the payroll department. Cunningham Verif.
4—5. The depart
ment then reviews each request on a case-by-case basis to determine if it qualifies for
10
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paid time off. Specifically, if the requested day off is not on the payroll department’s
list of major holidays, the department emails the employee and asks for more infor
mation. DSOF
15-16; Cunningham Verif.
8-9. It then works with the Board’s
law department to decide whether to approve the request. Id.-, Sims Dep. at 7, 8, 12,
14—15. Unsurprisingly, this review process results in delayed payments for non-major
religious holiday requests. So the questioning and delayed payments that Bowman
experienced were just standard procedure. All teachers, including those who are not
Bible Christians like Bowman, are subject to the same process for religious holiday
requests.
Similarly, Bowman was (unfortunately) far from the only teacher with exces
sive numbers of special education students in his class. Corliss High School as a whole
has struggled for years to maintain the 70/30 ratio. Muhammad Verif.
14; Muham
mad Dep. at 13, 20, 32. Bowman’s own evidence shows that dozens of classes at
Corliss were comprised of more than 30% special education students and that many
teachers had even higher percentages of those students than Bowman did. R. 89,
Exh. 29, Class Rosters. So again, teachers outside of Bowman’s protected religious
class did not receive better treatment than he did.
That said, even if Bowman had established a prima facia case of employment
discrimination, which would shift the burden to the Board to provide nondiscrimina-
tory motives for its actions, the Board more than carries that burden. It first explains
that it began its policy of auditing all religious holiday requests because some teach
ers throughout the district were abusing the ability to take these days off. Def.’s Br.
11
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at 11-12; Cunningham Verif.
9. That is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
reviewing and delaying payment for Bowman’s religious holiday requests. And the
record supports that explanation. Cunningham Verif.
9.
The Board then notes that Bowman’s classes exceeded the 70/30 ratio because
Corliss High School is a neighborhood school (that means that any child from the
surrounding area may attend) and the neighborhood that it is in has a high percent
age of special education children. Def.’s Br. at 12; Muhammad Verif. | 3; R. 82-13,
Lofton Dep. at 31:2—5. Plus, Corliss is a small school, and because the district provides
school budgets based on student population size, Corliss could not hire more teachers
to spread special education students across numerous class sections for a particular
subject. Lofton Dep. at 31:2-17. Given these constraints, Muhammad submitted
waiver applications to the Illinois State Board of Education, asking it to waive the
70/30 ratio requirement for classes that did not comply (including Bowman’s). Mu
hammad Verif. TH 15-16, 22; Lofton Dep. at 31:18—23. Again, that is all supported by
the evidence and provides valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for the school placing
more special education students in Bowman’s classes. Moreover, Bowman provides
no evidence that shows that the Board delayed his payments or put more special ed
ucation students in his classes because of his religious beliefs. So he fails to establish
any connection between his protected class status and the alleged adverse employ
ment actions. That is yet another reason that Bowman’s discrimination claim fails.
12
Case: l:21-cv-03015 Document#: 127 Filed: 09/27/24 Page 13 of 16 PagelD #:2154
B. Retaliation
Title VII also bars employers from retaliating against their employees for com
plaining about discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). For his retaliation claim to
survive summary judgment, Bowman must show that a reasonable jury could find
that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment ac
tion; and (3) the adverse action was motivated by the protected activity. Lord v. High
Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). But the standard for what
counts as an adverse employment action here is different than it is for discrimination
claims. An adverse action for retaliation purposes “need not be one that affects the
terms and conditions of employment.” Lewis, 909 F.3d at 867 (cleaned up). Instead,
courts simply ask whether the action “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,
918 (7th Cir. 2016). Having said that, Title VII does not set forth a “general civility
code for the American workplace,” so “petty slights, minor annoyances, and bad man
ners” do not qualify as materially adverse actions. Id.
Despite this lower standard for adverse actions for retaliation claims, Bow
man’s retaliation claim still fails because he does not offer evidence showing that the
adverse actions he suffered were motivated by his protected activities. Bowman al
leges that Muhammad retaliated against him for filing union grievances about hav
ing too many special education students in his classes. Am. Compl. at 4-6. He sug
gests that in retaliation, Muhammad blocked or delayed his pay for religious holidays
and “overcrowded” his classes with even more special education students. Id. But
13
Case: l:21-cv-03015 Document#: 127 Filed: 09/27/24 Page 14 of 16 PagelD #:2155
again, Bowman offers no evidence that Muhammad or the Board took those actions
because he filed union grievances. And Bowman does not counter the Board’s evidence
that its motives for the actions were legitimate and non-retaliatory.
As discussed above, undisputed evidence shows that Bowman’s payments were
delayed (not blocked or denied) because his requests were audited as per the payroll
department’s standard protocol for all teachers’ religious holiday requests. Cunning
ham Verif.
6-13.. And the audit policy was instituted because some teachers were
8-9; Sims Dep. at 7, 8, 12, 14-15. Like
abusing the benefit. Cunningham Verif.
wise, the record establishes that Bowman’s classes had too many special education
students in them because Corliss High School as a whole—due to its size and neigh
borhood population—struggled to maintain the 70/30 ratio. Muhammad Verif.
14;
Muhammad Dep. at 13, 20, 32; Lofton Dep. at 31:2-17. So neither the delayed pay
ments nor the increased number of special education students were retaliatory ac
tions in response to Bowman filing union grievances. Thus, regardless of whether he
satisfies the first two elements of the test for retaliation claims, Bowman’s claim fails
because he does not tie the alleged adverse actions to his protected activity.
14
Case: l:21-cv-03015 Document#: 127 Filed: 09/27/24 Page 15 of 16 PagelD #:2156
C. Harassment
The same goes for Bowman’s harassment claim; he fails to connect the harass
ment he allegedly faced to his religion or any other protected characteristics. A har
assment or hostile-work-environment claim “requires proof of four elements: (1) the
plaintiffs workplace was both subjectively and objectively offensive; (2) the plaintiffs
[protected category] was the cause of the harassment; (3) the harassment was severe
or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Lord, 839 F.3d at 561.
Like with retaliation, whether or not Bowman satisfies other prongs of-this
test, he does not show that he was harassed because he is a Bible Christian. As pre
viously discussed, the evidence reveals that all of the Board’s actions that might qual
ify as harassment were caused not by Bowman’s religious identity, but rather by le
gitimate, unrelated factors. The closest call is the Board’s delay in paying Bowman
for his requested religious holidays, but that too does not satisfy the causation re
quirement. Once again, all teachers’ religious holiday requests were audited, and all
payments for non-major religious holidays were delayed and subject to follow-up
questions. Cunningham Verif.
6—13. So Bowman was not targeted or harassed for
being a Bible Christian—he just experienced the same payment delays that plenty of
teachers faced, including many outside of Bowman’s protected category. Cunningham
Verif. TH 8—9; Sims Dep. at 7, 8, 12, 14—15. And he provides no evidence to the con
trary. Bowman’s harassment claim—like his others—does not survive summary judg
ment.
15
Case: l:21-cv-03015 Document#: 127 Filed: 09/27/24 Page 16 of 16 PagelD #:2157
IV. Conclusion
The Court grants the Board’s motion for summary judgment, R. 80, and the
case is dismissed with prejudice.
ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: September 27, 2024
16
Case: l:21-cv-03015 Document #: 124 Filed: 07/22/24 Page 1 of 3 PagelD #:2135
7/01/2024
To the Chief Judge Honorable Rebecca Pallmeyer,
no. 21 cv 03015
JUL 2 2 2024
THOMAS G.3RUT0N
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
I am writing this letter to you because of concerns I had about the behavior of the
defendants in the matter of Bowman v. Board of Education City of Chicago and some incidents
that have occurred. In January of 2022, I filed a motion to alert the court that I was being
retaliated against by the defendants, but it was denied. Earlier this year, on February 13, 2024,1
filed another motion because I wanted to notify the court that the retaliation and harassment
continues and I didn't get a response. I did get the note from box.com that the documents were
successfully received but did not get the official notice from the court saying that the documents
were received.
In the meantime, I waited and tried to be patient as it was explained to me at the time I
sent in the documents that this process was new. I even withstood a lot of yelling and screaming
by the person who was helping me as I was turning these documents in. Days turned to weeks
and weeks to a month as I waited for a response. In the meantime, the amount of incidents
increased in the work place. Almost daily the heat was turned too high in my classroom. At times
me and my students were wandering around the school building attempting to find a place to do
education without this retaliatory and harassing practice. Eventually the heat would then be
turned high in the areas we fled to for relief.
I sent email after email to the principal and engineers usually with absolutely no response.
Then to add insult to injury, a camera was placed on the wall in my classroom that neither me
nor my students approved of. Essentially, we were being seriously vexed, irritated and harassed
and it was being video and audio taped without me and my students permission. Eventually, I
began inquiring about the documents I sent in to the court. 1 called the clerk of the judge a couple
weeks after I sent in the documents, and for the first time, in the last 3 years, I did not get a
response. I don't know what the reason was for this but I do recognize it was the only time it
happened. With no entity or institution assisting me, I felt great despair and did not know where
to turn. In the meantime, I did change my phone number and decided to attempt to call the clerk
again and was later able to reach him. When I eventually reached the clerk, he explained he had
not received the documents I sent in. I then sent in the documents again. I also went before the
Local School Council for our school and explained what has been going on with the retaliatory
and harassing behavior, and a member on the council stated that she would contact the people
downtown and inform them about this. Then all of a sudden the heat being turned up
miraculously stopped. What I had been claiming all along about this practice of inappropriately
manipulating the heat, turned out to be the truth. It was now hospitable in my room again. It
was a practice that could be controlled and the way this all played out, proved it.
Case: l:21-cv-03015 Document #: 124 Filed: 07/22/24 Page 2 of 3 PagelD #:2136
In the meantime, the case has set in Summary Judgement for nearly a year and a half. It
continues to be under advisement and the retaliation and harassment continues. When many of
these acts are occurring they are not just effecting me but the students that sit in my classroom
as well. From turning the heat up extremely high, to turning it down low with cool airconditioning added in a Chicago winter, the behavior continues. They had recently put a camera
in my classroom and despite me informing them that neither I nor my students or their parents
gave them the right to record us during class, the camera remained for a while. This meant that
every moment of my day from the time I arrived or even making a simple phone call during lunch,
was being video taped.
It is now July 1, 2024, and we are off for Summer break and, as of last week, I have
received a response from the judge that the motion I turned in to the court is, like the case, under
advisement. The way this case just drags on with all these strange occurrences from no
resolution to documents being received by the court but no communication being sent out about
them, are rather strange and seem to be denying and delaying justice. In the meantime, I am
retaliated against and harassed, my students by default as well, and absolutely no entity, city,
state of federal is doing anything about it.
I am contacting you to inform you of the continued retaliation and harassment because
, the longer this case has been delayed, the more it has intensified. Me and my students should
not have to go through this constant violation of our civil and Human Rights. I have sent
communications to various entities city, state and federal and have received no resolution or
even a response at times, in this matter. In the meantime, this case sits stagnant in the court
also with no resolution. If you need anything from me to assist in making this matter move,
please feel free to contact me. I can be reached at marvinbowmanl@yahoo.com or 773 3227328.
Best regards,
Marvin Bowman, Pro Se
/S/ Marvin Bowman
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Case: l:21-cv-03015 Document #: 125
:2138
AUG 14 202* VA
To the Chief Judge Honorable Virginia M. Kenda|U 7H0MASG 3RUT0N
Case No. 21 CV 03015
8/04/2024
CLERK, US. DISTRICT COURT
I am forwarding this letter to you to ensure that you are aware of the matters that are of
great concern to me. I sent this letter to the former Chief judge and then found out shortly
thereafter she was leaving. The letter was delayed for a couple of weeks in the mailroom, but I
am guessing it was eventually turned in. This letter is being sent to you because a lot of harassing
and retaliatory behavior has been directed at me and numerous acts have taken place, especially
recently, as I attempted to inform the court of the behavior. These violations have hindered my
attempts to do my job, and as the beginning of school year grows closer without resolution, this
behavior rouses deep concern. If you need to contact me, feel free to do so. I sent this letter to
the prior Chief judge who has now left and now I am forwarding it to you to ensure that you
receive it.
I am writing this letter to you because of concerns I had about the behavior of the
defendants in the matter of Bowman v. Board of Education City of Chicago and some incidents
that have occurred. In January of 2022, I filed a motion to alert the court that I was being
retaliated against by the defendants, but it was denied. Earlier this year, on February 13, 2024,1
filed another motion because I wanted to notify the court that the retaliation and harassment
continues and I didn't get a response. I did get the note from box.com that the documents were
successfully received but did not get the official notice from the court saying that the documents
were received.
In the meantime, I waited and tried to be patient as it was explained to me at the time I
sent in the documents that this process was new. I even withstood a lot of yelling and screaming
by the person who was helping me as I was turning these documents in. Days turned to weeks
and weeks to a month as I waited for a response. In the meantime, the amount of incidents
increased in the work place. Almost daily the heat was turned too high in my classroom. At times
me and my students were wandering around the school building attempting to find a place to do
education without this retaliatory and harassing practice. Eventually the heat would then be
turned high in the areas we fled to for relief.
I sent email after email to the principal and engineers usually with absolutely no response.
Then to add insult to injury, a camera was placed on the wall in my classroom that neither me
nor my students approved of. Essentially, we were being seriously vexed, irritated and harassed
and it was being video and audio taped without me and my students permission. Eventually, I
began inquiring about the documents I sent in to the court. I called the clerk of the judge a couple
weeks after I sent in the documents, and for the first time, in the last 3 years, I did not get a
response. I don't know what the reason was for this but I do recognize it was the only time it
happened. With no entity or institution assisting me, I felt great despair and did not know where
to turn. In the meantime, I did change my phone number and decided to attempt to call the clerk
again and was later able to reach him. When I eventually reached the clerk, he explained he had
Case: l:21-cv-03015 Document #: 125 Filed: 08/14/24 Page 2 of 3 PagelD #:2139
not received the documents I sent in. I then sent in the documents again. I also went before the
Local School Council for our school and explained what has been going on with the retaliatory
and harassing behavior, and a member on the council stated that she would contact the people
downtown and inform them about this. Then all of a sudden the heat being turned up
miraculously stopped. What I had been claiming all along about this practice of inappropriately
manipulating the heat, turned out to be the truth. It was now hospitable in my room again. It
was a practice that could be controlled and the way this all played out, proved it.
In the meantime, the case has set in Summary Judgement for nearly a year and a half. It
continues to be under advisement and the retaliation and harassment continues. When many of
these acts are occurring they are not just effecting me but the students that sit in my classroom
as well. From turning the heat up extremely high, to turning it down low with cool airconditioning added in a Chicago winter, the behavior continues. They had recently put a camera
in my classroom and despite me informing them that neither I nor my students or their parents
gave them the right to record us during class, the camera remained for a while. This meant that
every moment of my day from the time I arrived or even making a simple phone call during lunch,
was being video-taped.
It is now July 1, 2024, and we are off for Summer-break and, as of last week, I have
received a response from the judge that the motion I turned in to the court is, like the case, under
advisement. The way this case just drags on with all these strange occurrences, from no
resolution to documents being received by the court, but no communication being sent out about
them, are rather strange and seem to be denying and delaying justice. In the meantime, I am
retaliated against and harassed, my students by default as well, and absolutely no entity, city,
state of federal is doing anything about it.
I am contacting you to inform you of the continued retaliation and harassment because,
the longer this case has been delayed, the more it has intensified. Me and my students should
not have to go through this constant violation of our civil and Human Rights. I have sent
communications to various entities city, state and federal and have received no resolution or
even a response at times, in this matter. In the meantime, this case sits stagnant in the court
also with no resolution. If you need anything from me to assist in making this matter move,
please feel free to contact me. I can be reached at marvinbowmanl@yahoo.com or 773 3227328.
Best regards,
Marvin Bowman, Pro Se
/S/ Marvin Bowman
Case: l:21-cv-03015 Dement #: 125 Filed: 08/14/24 Page 3 of 3 PagelD #:2140
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OPINION AND AWARD
In the Matter of the
Arbitration Between:
)
)
)
CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION,
LOCAL 1, AFT
)
)
Case Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and
20-10-066(zf)
)
)
and
(Marvin Bowman/Corliss High School)
)
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE CITY OF CHICAGO
)
)
Before James Q. Brennwald, Arbitrator
Date of Award:
June 30, 2023
Award Summary:
(1) Beginning October 25, 2019, the Board violated Article 21-19
of the CBA in connection with the composition of each of the
following three classes the Grievant was assigned to teach: his first
period class in the 2019-2020 school year; his first period class in
the 2020-2021 school year; and his fifth period class in the 20202021 school year.
(2) The Board did not, on or after October 25, 2019, violate Article
27-3 of the CBA in connection with the assignment of special
education co-teachers to classes the Grievant was assigned to teach
as a regular education teacher in either the 2019-2020 or 20202021 school year.
The grievances are sustained in part and denied in part.
Appearances:
For the CTU:
Josiah A. Groff
Dowd, Bloch, Bennett, Cervone,
Auerbach & Yokich
For the Board:
Jonathon H. Latka
Assistant General Counsel
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zj) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 2 of 24
I.
INTRODUCTION
In accordance with the terms of their collective bargaining agreement, the Chicago
Teachers Union, Local 1, AFT (“the Union”) and the Board of Education of the City of
Chicago (“the Board”) selected the undersigned to decide a dispute raised by the
captioned grievances. A hearing was conducted on January 18, 2023 via electronic
videoconference, with the parties and the undersigned appearing from separate, remote
locations. At hearing, the parties were granted full opportunity to present evidence and
argument in support of their positions. By agreement of the parties, the evidentiary
record was left open at the conclusion of the hearing, and the Board subsequently
submitted additional exhibits on February 6, 2023. There being no objection from the
Union, the additional Board exhibits were admitted into evidence. Both parties submitted
post-hearing briefs in electronic form by the May 5, 2023 due date, the briefs were
exchanged by the undersigned via email, and the record was closed.
IL
ISSUES
At hearing, the Board proposed the following statement of the issues presented
for decision:
(1) For the period of October 25, 2019 to June 24, 2021, did the Board
violate Article 21-19 of the contract in connection with the composition
of one or more of the classes the Grievant was assigned to teach? If so,
what is the remedy?
(2) For the period of October 25, 2019 to June 24, 2021, did the Board
violate Article 27-3 of the contract in connection with the assignment of
special education co-teachers to classes the Grievant was assigned to teach
as a regular education teacher. If so, what is the remedy?1
i Transcript ("Tr.") p. 10.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zj) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 3 of 24
The Union proposed a statement identical to the Board’s, except only for its specification
of a different time period. According to the Union, the relevant timeframe for both issues
is October 25, 2019 to the present.2 The parties granted me authority to determine the
appropriate formulation of the issues presented, and also stipulated to my jurisdiction
and authority to decide those issues.3
Based on the evidence of record and the parties’ arguments, and for the reasons I
will discuss, I find that the Board’s proposed statement of the issues accurately reflects
the questions presented for decision by the captioned grievances.
III.
RELEVANT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 21
SPECIAL EDUCATION TEACHERS
21-19. Special Education Student Ration. When a student’s IEP calls
for services in a general education classroom, the student must be served
in a class that is composed of students of whom at least 70 percent are
without lEPs, that utilizes the general curriculum, that is taught by an
instructor certified for general education, and that is not designated as a
general remedial classroom.
ARTICLE 27
CLASS COVERAGE
«»• 'I'
27-3. Using Appointed Teachers or TATs to Provide Class Coverage.
The BOARD agrees, in principle, that no teacher shall be requested to
2 Tr. 9-11.
3 Tr. 11.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zj) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 4 of 24
assume responsibility for students from classrooms of absent teachers
when substitutes are unavailable. In elementary schools, middle schools,
education and CTE guidance centers and high schools, at no time should
special education classes nor special programs, such as library, physical
education, shop, TESL, bilingual or special reading. classes, be
discontinued so that substitute service may be performed by teachers of
these programs, except in the case of emergencies, in which case the above
teachers shall be subject to last call, with special education teachers the
very last to be called, after available non-teaching certificated personnel
have been assigned.
IV.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Board is responsible for overseeing the operations of the Chicago Public
Schools (“CPS”). The Union represents a bargaining unit of teachers, paraprofessionals
and other school-related personnel employed by the Board, and covered under the terms
of their July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2024 collective bargaining agreement ("the
CBA"). At all times relevant to this dispute, the Grievant, Marvin Bowman, has been a
general education social studies teacher at Corliss High School (“Corliss”), and covered
under the terms of the CBA.
The first grievance at issue was filed by the Union on behalf of the Grievant on
or about January 21, 2020, and alleged two violations of the CBA.4 First, the grievance
alleged, 13 of the 31 students in the Grievant’s first period class were special education
students with individualized education plans (“lEPs”). That ratio violated the
requirement of CBA Article 21-19 that at least 70% of the students in a general education
classroom be students without lEPs. The grievance also stated that the special education
co-teacher assigned to his first period class was “rarely present” due to her Case Manager
4 Joint Exhibit ("JX") 2, pp. 1-2.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zj) and 20-10-066(zf) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 5 of 24,
duties. After quoting Article 21-19, the grievance went on to state, “additionally,” that
the special education co-teacher assigned to the Grievant’s second period class “is pulled
out of class every Tuesday to work with students in the Autism program.” The grievance
then quoted Article 27-3 of the CBA. As a remedy for those alleged violations of the
contract, the Union requested that Corliss “immediately address the student special
education ratio” in the Grievant’s first period general education class; and “immediately
direct the special education co-teachers assigned to both [the Grievant’s] 1st and 2nd
period class daily.”
In a February 19, 2020 email response,5 the Principal at Corliss, Ali Muhammad,
addressed the Article 21-19 and Article 27-3 claims separately. Under the heading
“Article 21-19,” he acknowledged that “13 of 30” students in the Grievant’s first period
class had an IEP, “three over” the number allowed by the CBA. He went on to state as
follows regarding the Grievant’s first period class:
With Corliss having a diverse learner population being near 40% of our
population, there are things that are beyond our immediate control. We
. do the best that we can with the size of our staff and the amount of students
we serve. One of the students in the class has been out (due to an accident
outside school) and is assigned to be homebound, which brings the total
number to two students over the limit. We are diligently working to rectify
this issue as soon as possible. As much as I want to provide a solid timeline
at this time I am unable to do so.
In regards to the Case Manager missing the class, especially in December,
there have been situations that were beyond the control of administration.
In addition to Case Manager meetings, the Case Manager experienced a
death in her family., which caused her to be absent. I have spoken with the
Case Manager regarding these concerns, and she will work to ensure that
Mr. Bowman is aware of the times when she cannot be present, due to
Case Manager duties. Again, with the size of our population, which
directly impacts the size of our staff, we are doing the best that we can to
5 JX 2, pp. 3-4.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zf) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 6 of 24
provide services to students and maintain a positive working environment
for teachers. When the Case Manager is absent due to sick days, personal
business and/or professional developments, she will request a substitute
teacher.
Under the heading “Article 27-3,” Principal Muhammad wrote:
The teacher assigned to the Cluster program is currently on FMLA. We
have advertised (since September) for a TAT but have not had any apply.
In order to provide the students enrolled in the Cluster program instruction
rather than a substitute teacher (sometimes different subs), Diverse Learner
teachers have been asked and are in agreement with spending one day each
(totaling five days a week) in the Cluster Program to provide instruction.
A substitute is assigned to cover each of the Diverse Learner teacher’s
classes on the days they volunteer to cover the Cluster Program. Again,
this is not the optimal situation, but again, we are working with the
resources that we have in order to provide all students with a quality
education. At this time, this practice has ceased.
The second grievance was filed during the following school year, on October 23,
2020.6 That grievance alleged that both the Grievant’s first and fifth period general
education classes were out of compliance with the 70% requirement of Article 21-19,
with only 15 of 27 students in the first period class not having lEPs, and only nine of 28
students in the fifth period class without lEPs. The grievance also alleged that Corliss
failed to staff a special education teacher to assist him with instruction in his first period
class. The grievance referenced the similar grievance filed during the previous school
year, and stated that it was “never addressed.” The grievance further stated that
“ultimately,” the Grievant was “worried about the success of the students assigned to
these classrooms.” As a resolution, the Union requested, among other items, that Corliss
“[i]mmediately address” the special education student ratio in the Grievant’s first and
fifth period classes; and “outline the steps taken to fill the special education vacancy.”
6 JX 3, pp. 1-2.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zj) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 7 of 24
In a November 13, 2020 email, Principal Muhammad wrote as follows with
respect to the Grievant’s first period class:
Due to the amount of students enrolled in Corliss (101 of 285: 88 with
lEP’s and 13 with Section 504 plans), Corliss filed an appeal and received
an additional Diverse Learner Teacher position. Corliss has identified a
candidate and offered the position. The candidate is in the on-boarding
process. At this time, we do not have an anticipated start date.7
Regarding the fifth period class, Principal Muhammad wrote:
Corliss is aware that the ratio of Diverse Learner students in the 5th period
class is out of compliance. Unfortunately, this is the case for several other
classes as well. This is caused by the amount of Diverse Learner students
exceeding the amount of staffing available. Staffing being regular
education positions (i.e. Social Studies, Science) as opposed to Diverse
Learner positions. We have attempted to find a remedy to this situation,
yet at this time, a feasible solution has not been determined.
The response went on to explain why several different options were either not feasible,
or would not solve the problem.
The Grievant’s claims regarding his classes failing to meet the 70% requirement
were also included in a complaint he filed with the Illinois State Board of Education in
October 2020 based on Title 23, Section 226.730 of the Illinois Administrative Code,
which tracks the language of CBA Article 21-19.8 In a letter dated December 11, 2020,
the ISBE stated its findings that, as the Grievant alleged, his 2019-2020 first period class
was out of compliance with the 70% requirement, as were his 2020-2021 first and fifth
7 JX 3, pp. 3-4.
8 Union Exhibit ("UX") 2.
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period classes.9 The letter listed a number of corrective actions and other steps that
Corliss was required to take, including convening IEP team meetings to ensure the
provision of compensatory services for students with disabilities in the Grievant’s current
first period class; providing verification that a vacant special education teacher position
had been filled; and ensuring that all classrooms either meet the 70% requirement, or
that any non-compliance be approved through submission of a Class Composition
Deviation Application.10
The parties were unable to resolve the grievances, and forwarded them to
arbitration for final and binding resolution.
V.
A.
ANALYSIS AND OPINION
The Nature and Scope of the Dispute
As reflected in the grievance statements and Principal Muhammad’s responses,
the dispute raised by the two grievances before me arises out of the Union’s allegations
that, during both the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years, the Grievant was assigned
to teach in general education classrooms in which fewer than 70% of the students were
without lEPs, in violation of Article 21-19 of the CBA. Both grievances also allege that
there was an insufficient special education co-teacher presence in certain of the
Grievant’s classrooms, the first grievance specifically claiming a violation of Article 273 with respect to his second period co-teacher being pulled from class every Tuesday to
work in another program. As the party alleging violations of the contract, the burden of
9 UX 3, p. 6.
10 UX 3, p. 7.
CTU/CBOE, Nos, 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zf) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 9 of 24
proving its claims rests with the Union.11
The Union raises a threshold procedural issue, arguing that I have authority to
consider and remedy not only the violations alleged to have occurred during the 20192020 and 2020-2021 school years in which the subject grievances were filed, but also
similar violations alleged to have occurred with respect to the Grievant’s classrooms
during the 2021-2022 school year. The Union contends that, although it is true that only
the grievances filed with respect to the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years have
been brought before me for decision in this proceeding, it would be illogical, pointless
and contrary to precedent to require the Union to re-grieve a continuing, ongoing issue
every school year. Because the grievances at hand placed the Board on notice that there
were ongoing problems, I have authority to remedy all subsequent violations.
I cannot agree with the Union that my jurisdiction over the 2019-2020 and 20202021 grievances gives me authority to also address the violations the Union alleges to
have occurred during the 2021-2022 school year. As reflected in its written statements
of both grievances, the Union’s claims are based on factual allegations regarding specific
classrooms to which the Grievant was assigned in each of those years, pertaining to the
percentage of non-IEP students, and the absence of co-teachers. The recitation in those
grievances of the underlying factual allegations is consistent with the parties’ agreement,
in CBA Article 3-6.3, that a grievance must specify “the complaint(s) and/or violation(s)
alleged and a brief statement of facts sufficient to allow a response.” I also note that, in
Article 3-6-2, the parties agreed that the time limits for filing a grievance begin to run
with “the occurrence of the event giving rise to the alleged violation.”. In the context of
the Union’s claims in this case, there could not have been an “occurrence of an event” in
2021-2022 regarding the composition of the Grievant’s classrooms, or a lack of co
teacher presence, until after the school year began and classroom assignments had been
11 Theodore J. St. Antoine, Editor, 77?e Common Law of the Workplace (2nd ed. 2005) §1.93, pp. 54-55.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zf) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 10 of 24
made.
In short, although the 2021-2022 violations alleged by the Union implicate the
same CBA provisions on which it relies in its grievances from the prior two school years,
the 2021-2022 allegations arose out of different grievable facts and circumstances
occasioned by the Grievant’s new classroom and co-teacher assignments. The Board was
therefore entitled to specific notice of the new facts and circumstances that the Union
claims violated the CBA, by way of a new grievance that included a statement of the
factual allegations sufficient to allow the Board to formulate a response.
Notably, and consistent with that conclusion, the record reflects that the Union
in fact did just that, filing a new grievance on October 28, 2021 alleging violations of
Article 21-19 that occurred in the 2021-2022 school year.12 Just as in the grievances for
the previous two school years, the Union’s October 28, 2021 grievance set out the facts
that gave rise to the grievance, specifying the five classes to which the Grievant was
assigned in 2021-2022 in which the population of non-IEP students was below 70%, as
well as the relevant numbers of students in each of those classes. In a May 6, 2022 letter
to the Union, the Board stated that, based on adjustments made by Corliss and
agreements reached by the parties at a January 31, 2022 appeal conference, “the
grievance is deemed resolved.”13 Regardless of whether that grievance was in fact the
subject of a mutually agreed final resolution, the parties are in full agreement that they
have not brought that grievance to me for decision in this proceeding. That being the
case, it is plain that my jurisdiction extends only to the two grievances the parties have
agreed to present for decision, covering the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years.
Because neither of those grievances placed the Board on notice of any of the Union’s
12 Board Exhibit ("BX") 5.
13 BX 6.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zf) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 11 of 24
claims that arose during the 2021-2022 school year, all such claims are outside the scope
of my jurisdiction.14 I will confine my analysis accordingly.
B.
The Alleged Violations of the 70% Requirement Under Article 21-19
The Grievant testified that he has been a general education social studies teacher
since he began working at Corliss in 2004, and that he has never been a special education
teacher. By the terms of Article 21-19, general education classrooms that include special
education students - meaning students with lEPs - “must” also include non-special
education students, meaning those without IEPS, in a proportion equal to at least 70%
of the total student population of the classroom.
14 The Dry Storage Corporation case cited by the Union supports that conclusion (see 1995 BNA LA Supp.
116017 (1995)). In that case, Arbitrator Goldstein noted that his authority was "limited to the issue raised
by the written grievance," particularly in view of the fact that the parties did not agree on the issue
statement. He also noted that "[a]n event that occurs after the filing of a grievance is generally not found
to fall within its scope." Nevertheless, in that case, Arbitrator Goldstein found that the union's grievance
of the company's "relocating accounts within other Dry Storage Companies," and the company's
alleged failure to allow employees to "follow the work," fairly encompassed a claim that employees
should have been allowed to move to a company facility that was opened subsequent to the filing of the
grievance. There are two conspicuous features of this case that distinguish it from Dry Storage, and
compel a different result. First, unlike the broadly worded grievance in Dry Storage, the grievances
before me were both quite fact-specific in their allegations, precisely identifying the classrooms at issue
in each of the two school years covered by the grievances, as well as the specifics of the violations alleged
to have occurred with respect to each classroom. Second, the post-grievance event at issue in Dry Storage
was never made the subject of a separate grievance that both parties agreed was not before the
arbitrator, as was the case here. In short, there is simply no reason not to apply the general rule
articulated by Arbitrator Goldstein in Dry Storage, and find that my authority in this proceeding is
limited to the specific issues raised by the written grievances before me.
The other case cited by the Union is also distinguishable, because it did not involve a question of
whether a post-grievance event was properly before the arbitrator. Instead, the issue in that case
ultimately went to whether a remedy could properly include redress for a pre-grievance event that was
never grieved. In Chicago Board of Education and Chicago Teachers Union, Grievance ofM. Boyland (2018),
Arbitrator Benn found that a January 22, 2015 grievance challenging a teacher's "unsatisfactory"
performance evaluation rating was timely, based on the October 31, 2014 date of release of the final
rating. He also determined that the rating violated the CBA, and that, because the grievant had been
laid off effective August 24,2014 as a consequence of the Board's earlier, preliminary projection that her
rating would be unsatisfactory, she was entitled to reinstatement and backpay as a remedy,
notwithstanding the fact that the layoff was never grieved, and had taken effect long before the
grievance was filed.
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As the Union correctly notes, in his February 19 and November 13, 2020
responses to the two grievances before me, Principal Muhammad essentially admitted
that, as alleged in the grievances, the percentage of non-IEP students was below 70% in
the Grievant’s first period class in 2019-2020, and in his first and fifth period classes in
2020-2021. Those allegations were also left unrebutted at hearing, and the Board
accordingly concedes their factual accuracy in its post-hearing brief.
Notwithstanding that concession, the Board maintains in its brief that the Union
was unable to show a violation of Article 21-19. In support of that argument, the Board
notes that, as Principal Muhammad testified, and as reflected in the ISBE’s December
11, 2020 letter, the ISBE has a procedure for granting deviations from the 70%
requirement if a school can demonstrate that it is unable to comply. According to the
Board, the Union was unable to prove a violation of Article 21-19 because it failed to
show that the Board did not “adequately engage” with ISBE regarding the ratio of
general education to special education students in the classes at issue.
I do not find the Board’s argument persuasive. The 70% standard agreed to by
the parties in Article 21-19 is both clear and mandatory. The language does not state
any exceptions to the application of that clear standard, based on “adequate
engagement” with the ISBE or any other circumstance, and there is no evidence before
me that the parties have otherwise agreed to any such exceptions.15 There being no
dispute that the 70% standard was not satisfied for the Grievant’s first period class in
2019-2020, or for either his first or fifth period classes in 2020-2021, the Union has met
its burden of proving that Corliss violated Article 21-19 with respect to each of those
15 The Board does not contend, and the record does not reflect, that the ISBE ever approved a "class
composition deviation" from the State of Illinois' 70% requirement for any of the three classes at issue.
Therefore, there is no question before me as to whether such an approval would have been a valid
defense to any of the claimed violations of Article 21-19. Accordingly, this decision should not be
construed as in any way addressing that discrete question.
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classes.
C.
1.
The Alleged Violations of Article 27-3 Regarding Co-Teachers
The Parties’ Arguments
The grievances also alleged that the Grievant was given inadequate co-teacher
assistance with the special education students in his 2019-2020 first and second period
classes, and in his 2020-2021 first period class. The Union maintains that the only
dispute regarding those claims is factual. According to the Union, the evidence supported
the Grievant’s allegations that, in the fall of 2019, his first period co-teacher, Lisa
Ingram, was rarely present, and that his second period co-teacher, Fatima El, was used
as a regularly scheduled substitute in the Cluster Program every Tuesday. It is undisputed
that, the following fall, the Grievant went without a co-teacher in his first period class
until Dr. Quintella Bounds was hired to fill that role. The Union argues that, in all three
instances, the Board violated Article 27-3 by failing to “meet its promise” that the
Grievant “would have a special education teacher to help the special education students
assigned to his general education classes.”16 More specifically with respect to the
Grievant’s second period co-teacher in 2019-2020, the Union contends that the regular
assignment of Ms. El to work as a substitute violated the requirement stated in Article
27-3 that special education co-teachers be called to work as substitutes only in
emergencies, and, even then, only as the last option.17 The Union requests that the
Grievant be awarded a monetary remedy for the Board’s violations of Article 27-3, in an
amount equal to what it would have cost the Board to provide a co-teacher for the
Grievant’s classrooms.
16 Union's post-hearing brief at p. 11.
17 Union brief at p. 5 and p. 16.
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The Board takes the position that the Union failed to meet its burden of proving
any violations of Article 27-3, because it was unable to show that any of the Grievant’s
co-teachers were requested to cover the classrooms of absent teachers, such that any
programs at Corliss were discontinued.18 Ms. Ingram provided a substitute to fill in
when she attended Case Manager professional development. Because she was never
requested to assume responsibility for students from the classroom of an absent teacher,
and her provision of a substitute never resulted in the discontinuation of any
programming at Corliss, there was no violation of Article 27-3. In the case of Ms. El, a
substitute co-teacher was assigned to the Grievant’s classroom on the one day each week
she was assigned to work in the Cluster Program. Because Ms. El was never pulled from
the Grievant’s classroom because a substitute was unavailable, and because there was no
discontinuation of any programming at Corliss because of this arrangement, there was
no violation of the contract. The Board concedes that the co-teacher position in the
Grievant’s fall 2020 first period class was vacant for approximately the entire semester.
However, the Board asserts, the Union has cited no provision of the CBA that entitles
the Grievarit to a monetary remedy for the absence of a permanent co-teacher during the
period that Corliss was diligently searching for a candidate to fill the vacancy.
2.
The Evidence
(a) Fall 2019 first period: Lisa Ingram
The Grievant testified that, after the first week of the 2019-2020 school year, his
assigned first period co-teacher, Ms. Ingram, was “missing in action” for “practically
the whole first semester,” except only for “a couple of days at the beginning of
18 Board's post-hearing brief at pp. 14-15.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zf) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 15 of 24
December.”19 On cross-examination, he stated that she “showed up the first week,” as
well as “maybe once or twice in week five,” and “just a couple of times at the beginning
of December,” for a total of two weeks out of the 20 weeks of the first semester.20 He
also testified that no substitute filled in for Ms. Ingram when she was away, and that he
did not know what she was doing when she was absent from his first period classroom.21
After the January 21, 2020 grievance was filed and the second semester started, she
began to show up more regularly.22
Principal Muhammad testified that Ms. Ingram had Case Manager duties that
were separate from her responsibilities as a co-teacher. There were times when she would
have been pulled from the Grievant’s first period class to attend District-wide Case
Manager professional development sessions; however, it was his understanding that, in
those instances, she would have requested a substitute, with “the hope” that a substitute
would “take the assignment and show up.”23 He testified further that, when the January
21, 2020 grievance was filed, it was “the first time I was aware that she never showed
up to class.” Principal Muhammad stated that he did not “recall that to be her practice,”
and that, other than a bereavement leave and “any day she may have taken off for
personal reasons,” Ms. Ingram “did report to work on a regular basis and fulfilled her
duties.” He also testified that she would not have been pulled out of class to serve as a
substitute in another classroom, because Corliss does not do that.24
19 Tr. 28-30.
20 Tr. 68-69.
21 Tr. 29 and 62.
22 Tr. 29. The first semester of the 2019-2020 school year ended on approximately January 30,2020. (Tr.
71; JX 4.)
» Tr. 85-88.
24 Tr. 88-89.
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For the hearing, the Board was able to produce a spreadsheet itemizing substitute
teacher requests submitted by Corliss teachers from December 23, 2019 to December
23, 2022.25 However, because the Board’s automated system for tracking substitute
requests only maintains records for three years, by the time of the hearing in this case,
the Board was unable to generate records regarding substitute requests made prior to
December 23, 2019.26 The Board did not offer any explanation for its failure to request
and preserve those records at any time prior to August 2022, as evidence to support its
position in responding to the Union’s January 21, 2020 grievance. The available records,
such as they are, support the Grievant’s testimony. Those records reflect that Ms. Ingram
requested a substitute on six different days in January 2020, and that her request went
unfilled on each of those days.
I have no doubt that Principal Muhammad believes to be true his assertions that
it was Ms. Ingram’s practice to report to work on a regular basis, and that she acted in
accordance with that practice with respect to her first period co-teaching duties in the
fall of 2019. However, Principal Muhammad did not provide any description of the basis
for his belief that Ms. Ingram regularly showed up for the Grievant’s first period class,
other than what sounds like an assumption on his part. In the absence of any indication
that he had any reliable factual basis for coming to any understandings regarding Ms.
Ingram’s attendance that semester, I find Principal Muhammad’s testimony insufficient
to rebut the Grievant’s first-hand, eyewitness observations regarding Ms. Ingram’s
regular absence from his classroom.
I also note that Principal Muhammad did not offer any specific rebuttal to the
Grievant’s testimony that a substitute never appeared in his classroom on the days that
25 JX 8.
26 See January 28,2023 affidavit of Piper Haywood.
CTWCBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zf) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 17 of 24
Ms. Ingram was absent. Instead, Principal Muhammad stated only his understanding
that, in accordance with standard procedures, Ms. Ingram “would have” at least
requested a substitute. She may well have. But as the available records demonstrate, her
submission of a request did not necessarily mean that a substitute in fact showed up in
the Grievant’s classroom.
For all of those reasons, based on the Grievant’s testimony, I find that Ms. Ingram
was absent from the Grievant’s first period class for the entirety of the 2019 first
semester, except only for the first week, approximately two days in week five, and
approximately two days in the beginning of December. I also find that no substitute co
teacher was provided for his classroom on any of the days Ms. Ingram was absent.
(b) Fall 2019 secondperiod: Fatima El
There is no dispute that, in the Grievant’s second period class that year, the
assigned co-teacher, Fatima El, was pulled out of the Grievant’s class every Tuesday to
work in the Cluster Program. The Grievant testified that no substitute co-teacher was
provided to his classroom on those Tuesdays until beginning in approximately the end
of November of 2019, after the occurrence of a November 19 fighting incident between
two students.27
Principal Muhammad explained that Ms. El was part of a rotation of teachers
who each filled in one day every week for Cluster Program teacher Alicia WilcoxsonDavis, who was on a leave of absence. He also testified that two retired teachers had
been hired to fill in for Ms. Wilcoxson-Davis, and that the one who was usually used
was Bernice Boyd. Principal Muhammad acknowledged on cross-examination that Ms.
27 Tr. 30-36, 61-64 and 70.
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Boyd was assigned to substitute for Ms. Wilcoxson-Davis, not for Ms. El, but also stated
that, on the Tuesdays when Ms. El filled in for Ms. Wilcoxson-Davis in the Cluster
Program, there “would have been a sub” for Ms. El.28 Principal Muhammad did not
provide any indication that he had any personal knowledge, or any other reliable factual
basis for coming to any understandings as to whether, in fact, there was a substitute for
Ms. El in the Grievant’s classroom on any of the dates at issue. As I have noted, the
Board was unable to produce records documenting substitute requests made and filled
prior to December 23, 2019. I therefore find Principal Muhammad’s testimony
insufficient to rebut the Grievant’s first-hand, eyewitness observation that, until the end
of November 2019, no substitute ever appeared in his classroom on any of those days,
and credit the Grievant’s testimony accordingly.
(c) Fall2020 first period vacancy
There is no dispute that, as alleged in the second grievance, for the first semester
of the 2020-2021 school year, the Grievant was without a special education co-teacher
for his first period class, until a vacancy was filled by Dr. Quintella Bounds.29 According
to the Grievant, Dr. Bounds began working in his classroom in early January of 2021.30
3.
Application of the Terms of Article 27-3
Having found that the Board was unable to rebut the Grievant’s testimony
regarding the absences of his co-teachers in the two first semester .2019-2020 class
28 Tr. 106-107.
29 Tr. 96, 99.
30 Tr. 41-42 and 64-65.
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periods at issue, the question to be addressed is whether either of those circumstances,
or the absence of a co-teacher for his first period class in the first semester of the 2020-
2021 school year, constituted a violation of Article 27-3.
In its post-hearing brief, the Union asserts that the Board was required, in all three
of those class periods, to “have a special education teacher to help the special education
students assigned to [the Grievant’s] general education classes.”31 The Union does not
specify the language of Article 27-3 on which it relies in making that assertion. It does,
however, specifically cite the second sentence of Article 27-3 in claiming that the Board
violated the CBA by assigning Ms. El to work as a substitute in the Cluster Program one
day each week, under circumstances that did not constitute an emergency.
In its brief, the Board argues that, in order to prove a violation of Article 27-3,
the Union has to show that the Grievant’s co-teachers were requested to assume
responsibility for students from the classrooms of absent teachers, and that Corliss
programs were discontinued as a result.32 The Board maintains that neither circumstance
occurred in this case.
Turning to the language of the contract, I note that Article 27-3 consists of two
sentences. In the first, the parties stated the Board’s agreement, “in principle,” that “no
teacher shall be requested to assume responsibility for students from classrooms of
absent teachers when substitutes are unavailable.” The Union does not allege, and the
record does not establish, that the Grievant was ever asked to assume responsibility for
students from another classroom because their teacher was absent, and because a
substitute could not be found.
31 Union's post-hearing brief at p. 11.
32 Board's post-hearing brief at pp. 14-15.
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In the second sentence of Article 27-3, the parties agreed that, in specified
educational facilities including high schools, “at no time should special education classes
nor special programs, such as library, physical education, shop, TESL, bilingual or
special reading classes, be discontinued so that substitute service may be performed by
teachers of these programs, except in the case of emergencies, in which case the above
teachers shall be subject to last call, with special education teachers the very last to be
called, after available non-teaching certificated personnel have been assigned.” By its
terms, that sentence precluded Corliss from discontinuing a special education class, or a
“special program,” so that it could assign the teacher of that class or program to serve
as a substitute, except only in the case of an emergency.
As the Union argues, the record established that Ms. El, the Grievant’s second
period special education co-teacher in 2019-2020, was regularly assigned away from the
Grievant’s class to serve as a substitute for a teacher who was on a leave of absence. The
record also established that this happened on a scheduled basis, one day every week. I
agree with the Union that the planned nature of that substitute work by Ms. El did not
in any sense constitute an “emergency” within the meaning of Article 27-3. However, to
prove a violation of the second sentence of Article 27-3, the Union must first show that
the teacher’s assignment to act as a substitute resulted in the discontinuation of a special
education class or “special program.” The class Ms. El co-taught with the Grievant was
a general education class, and therefore neither a special education class nor a “special
program” of the type listed as examples in Article 27-3. Even if it had been either, there
is no evidence that the class was ever discontinued on any day because of Ms. El’s weekly
assignment to work as a substitute. Because there was no showing that Corliss’s
assignment of Ms. El to work as a substitute during second period one day each week
resulted in the discontinuation of a special education class or special program, the Union
was unable to meet its burden of proving that the assignment violated Article 27-3.
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The Union did not allege a violation of Article 27-3 with respect to Ms. Ingram
in its 2019-2020 grievance, or with respect to the vacancy in the co-teacher position in
its 2020-2021 grievance. Nevertheless, the Union argues that both situations constituted
a violation of Article 27-3, because the Board had an obligation to ensure that the
Grievant at all times had appropriate co-teacher assistance. As I have noted, the Union
does not cite to any specific contract language in support of that proposition. That is for
good reason, as there is no such.language to be found in Article 27-3. The grievance
responses and actions of Principal Muhammad evidenced his general concurrence with
the idea that it was in the students’ interests that Corliss do whatever could be done to
ensure the regular presence of a co-teacher in the Grievant’s. classrooms. However, that
agreement in principle does not equate to an admission by the Board that it is under a
contractual obligation to ensure that there is always a substitute for an absent co-teacher,
or that co-teacher vacancies will not be left unfilled. There being no language to that
effect in the CBA, I have no basis for finding that the Board was subject to any such
binding contractual commitments.
For all of those reasons, I find that the Union was unable to meet its burden of
proving that the Board violated Article 27-3 with respect to the Grievant’s 2019-2020
first and second period classes, or his 2020-2021 first period class.
D.
Conclusion and Remedy
I have found that, as alleged by the Union, Corliss violated CBA Article 21-19 in
each of the following three instances when it assigned the Grievant to general education
classrooms in which fewer than 70% of the students were without an IEP: his first period
class in the 2019-2020 school year; his first period class in the 2020-2021 school year;
and his fifth period class in the 2020-2021 school year. The evidence also established
that, in both of the first period classes, he taught without the assistance of a special
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zfl and 20-10-066(zj) (Marvin Bowman) -Page 22 of 24
education co-teacher for the entire first semester of the school year, except only for a
total of approximately two weeks in the fall of 2019.
As a remedy for Corliss’s violations of Article 21-19, the Union requests an award
confirming that the violations occurred, and also directing Corliss not to violate Article
21-19 in the future; I note that, by limiting its remedy request to stating the requirements,
pf the contract and directing future compliance, the Union implicitly acknowledges that'Corliss’s violations of Article 21-19 did not result in any identifiable, compensable losses
jfor which the Grievant could be made whole.33
In response to the Union’s remedy request, the Board states that it is already
subject to an October 28, 2022 ISBE directive that it comply with the 70% requirement
in the future. That directive was issued following a second complaint made by the
Grievant to the ISBE in December of 2021. Therefore, the Grievant is already assured
that the Board is working closely with the ISBE to address the student ratio concerns at
Corliss, and no future remedy is necessary.
Principal Muhammad testified that the roughly 30 to 32% proportion of special
education; students at Corliss is unusually high as compared to other CPS schools,
particularly considering that, with an average annual student enrollment of
approximately 300 students, Corliss has a relatively small student population. 34
Nevertheless, the fact that compliance with the requirements of Article 21-19 has posed
a challenge for Corliss administration does not make compliance any less of an
33 See Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (BNA, 8th ed. 2016) Ch. 18.3.D.ii, p. 18-27: "An
arbitrator's award must compensate for actual losses, and compensatory damages must be based on
cognizable loss causally traceable to the breach." A monetary award that does not correspond to actual
losses sustained can be deemed punitive, and beyond the scope of an arbitrator's authority. Id., Ch.
18.3.D.ii and 18.3.F.
34 Tr. 78.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zf) and 20-10-066(zj) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 23 of 24
imperative. As the Union stated on behalf of the Grievant in the 2020-2021 school year
grievance, ultimately, the school’s lack of compliance negatively impacted the students’
chances for success. In the October 28, 2022 letter relied on by the Board, the ISBE noted
the school’s “ongoing challenges” to meet the 70% requirement under the applicable
state regulation, and directed the Board to (1) “[c]ontinue to implement” a plan it had
developed to “prevent further violations” of that regulation; and (2) “[e]ngage in the
enhanced general supervision process in order to further analyze and resolve the issue.”
The letter also noted that, on October 21, 2022, the Board had “submitted the required
statement of assurance.”35
jThe evidence relative to the two grievances before me established that, over the!
Course of the two consecutive school years ajt issue, Corliss required the Grievant to teach!
[a total'of three different classes that were out of compliance with the 70% non-IEP!
Student standard mandated by Article 21-19. In two of those classes - one in each school
year - he did so without any co-teaching assistance for virtually an entire semester! Given!
jthose circumstances, and the assurance required by the ISBE pertaining to Corliss’s future
Compliance with the state regulation, I find no reason that the Union should not be1
Awarded a similar assurance that the Board will do whatjs necessary to secure Corliss’s
future compliance with its express obligation under Article 21-19.1 will therefore grant!
ithe Union s request that Corliss be directed to comply with Article 21-19 prospectively?
For all of the reasons discussed in this opinion, and based on the language of the
CBA, the evidence of record, and the arguments of the parties, I enter the following:
35 UX 7.
CTU/CBOE, Nos. 20-01-129(zj) and 20-10-066(zj) (Marvin Bowman) - Page 24 of 24
VI.
A.
AWARD
Beginning October 25, 2019, the Board violated Article 21-19 of the CBA
in connection with the composition of each of the following three classes the Grievant
was assigned to teach: his first period class in the 2019-2020 school year; his first period
class in the 2020-2021 school year; and his fifth period class in the 2020-2021 school
year.
B.
The Board did not, on or after October 25, 2019, violate Article 27-3 of
the CBA in connection with the assignment of special education co-teachers to classes
the Grievant was assigned to teach as a regular education teacher in either the 20192020 or 2020-2021 school year.
The grievances are sustained in part and denied in part.
As a remedy for the Board’s violations of Article 21-19,1 direct the Board to take
the steps necessary to ensure Corliss’s future compliance with Article 21-19.
James Q. Brennwald, Arbitrator
June 30, 2023
Chicago, Illinois
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.