Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Crystal Stranger, Petitioner v. Cleer LLC, fka Greenback Business Services LLC, dba Cleer Tax

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

SEP 1 0 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

CRYSTAL STRANGER,

Petitioner,

v.

CLEER LLC, FKA Greenback Business

Services LLC,

DBA Cleer Tax,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Crystal Stranger

30 N Gould St. Ste 3088

Sheridan, WY 82801

(310) 739-7699

crystalstranger@gmail.com

Petitioner, Pro Se

Legal PRINTERS LLC • Washington, DC • 202-747-2400 • legalprinters.com

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether due process permits contempt sanctions to

be imposed under a Temporary Restraining Order

that was never reviewed on appeal, where the court

of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot and refused

to vacate the order despite ongoing legal

consequences.

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner:

•

Crystal Stranger, Defendant-CounterClaimant-Appellant below.

Respondents:

•

Cleer LLC, formerly known as Greenback

Business Services LLC, doing business as

Cleer Tax — Plaintiff-Counter-DefendantAppellee below.

Other Parties:

•

Optic Tax Inc., named Defendant below, was

dismissed from the case for lack of personal

jurisdiction and is not a party to this petition.

ii

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS

1.

United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut

Case No. 3:24-cv-01496-MPS

Cleer LLC v. Stranger et al.

• Temporary Restraining Order entered October

22, 2024

• Order denying clarification entered March 3,

2025

• Preliminary Injunction entered June 17, 2025

• Order denying reconsideration entered July 3,

2025

• Contempt Order entered July 17, 2025

2.

United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit

Case Nos. 25-530, 25-663, 25-1575

Stranger v. Cleer LLC

• Appeal from TRO dismissed as moot July 14,

2025 (No. 25-530)

• Appeal from Preliminary Injunction pending

(No. 25-1575)

• Order denying stay entered August 28, 2025

3.

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 25A212

• Application(s) for Stay pending (Justice

Sotomayor, in chambers)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED....................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING............................ ii

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS......................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................ vi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI................ 1

OPINIONS BELOW........................................................2

JURISDICTION............................................................. 3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED.......................................... 4

INTRODUCTION........................................................... 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................. 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT................. 8

I. The Circuits Are Divided on Whether Sanctions

May Rest on Orders Deemed Moot.............................. 8

II. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally

Important and Recurring............................................ 10

III. This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle for Resolving the

Question Presented...................................................... 12

IV. Due Process Errors Warrant This Court’s

Review.............................................................................. 13

A. The Second Circuit’s Mootness Dismissal

Violates Due Process.................................... 13

B. Jurisdictional Defects Compound the Due

Process Deficiencies..................................... 14

C. Timing Issues Further Created Due

Process Defects ............................................. 16

D. The Pattern of Irregularities Undermines

the Integrity of the Proceedings.............. 17

V. The Mootness Created a Procedural Mechanism

for Evading First Amendment Strict Scrutiny......19

A. The TRO Was a Classic Prior Restraint,

Presumptively Invalid ............................. 19

B. The TRO Was Content-Based and SpeakerBased, Triggering Strict Scrutiny.......... 20

C. Certiorari Is Needed to Prevent Further

Erosion of First Amendment Review.... 21

VI. The Refusal to Vacate Conflicts with

Munsingwear....................................................................21

VII. Unpublished, Unexplained Orders Compound

the Constitutional Harm..............................................23

VIII. Certiorari Is Warranted to Prevent Recurring

Harm and Promote Judicial Efficiency.................... 25

CONCLUSION.............................................................. 27

APPENDICES

Appendix A - Second Circuit opinion dismissing TRO

appeal (July 14, 2025, Dkt 55.1) and MANDATE

ISSUED (August 28, 2025, Dkt 63)......................... A-l

Appendix B -, Second Circuit order denying

rehearing (Aug. 21, 2025, Dkt 62.1)........................ A-3

Appendix C - Order dismissing Optic Tax for lack of

personal jurisdiction (Jul. 29, 2025, ECF No.

236)

.......................................................... A-4

Appendix D - District court contempt order enforcing

TRO (July 17, 2025, ECF No. 229)....................... A-18

Appendix E - Order denying clarification of TRO

(Mar. 3, 2025, ECF No. 164).................................... A-27

Appendix F - TRO issued by district court (Oct. 22,

2024, ECF No. 34)..................................................... A-28

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v.

Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996)........ 15

Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011)................ 3, 9

Carroll v. President & Comm ’rs of Princess Anne, 393

U.S. 175 (1968).............................................................. 17

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469

(1975)................................................................................. 3

Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160

(5th Cir. 1993)........................................................... 9-10

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415

U.S. 423 (1974).......................................................... 7, 11

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond

Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999)................................. 16

In re Establishment Inspection of Hern Iron Works,

Inc., 881 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1989)........................... 9, 10

Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 992 F.2d 326 (2d

Cir. 1993)........................................................................ 22

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

526 U.S. 344 (1999)..................................................... 16

Nebraska Press Ass h v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539

(1976)...................................................................... 10,20

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015)......... 20

Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974)................. 14

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011)..... 20

vi

Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.

546 (1975)

20

Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019)

7

Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm t, Inc., 60

F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995)

17

United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418

(1993)

24

United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S.

263 (1982)

3

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36

(1950)...........................

21-22

United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629

(1953)

10

U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights

Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988)

13, 14, 15

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)

25

Constitutional Provisions and Rules

U.S. Const, amend. I

4, 5-6, 15, 20-21, 24

U.S. Const, amend. V

4, 5-6, 12-17, 22-24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)

4, 12, 15-16, 23-24

vii

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Crystal Stranger, respectfully

prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, which dismissed as moot her

timely appeal from a Temporary Restraining Order

that later formed the basis for contempt sanctions.

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissing

Petitioner’s appeal from the Temporary Restraining

Order as moot. The order was entered July 14, 2025,

and the mandate issued August 28, 2025. It appears

at Appendix A.

The order of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit denying panel

rehearing and rehearing en banc appears at

Appendix B.

The Temporary Restraining Order entered by

the United States District Court, which was never

reviewed on appeal but served as the sole basis for

contempt. It appears at Appendix C.

The order of the United States District Court

denying Petitioner’s motion to clarify or modify the

TRO, reaffirming its continued enforceability,

appears at Appendix D.

The order of the United States District Court

dismissing Optic Tax Inc. for lack of personal

jurisdiction, while simultaneously asserting that the

injunction bound Optic Tax, appears at Appendix E.

The ruling of the United States District Court

for the District of Connecticut finding Petitioner in

contempt and imposing sanctions based solely on the

previously issued TRO appears at Appendix F.

All opinions and orders below are unpublished.

None contain substantive analysis of the

constitutional implications raised, and none have

precedential effect, despite resulting in sanctions and

ongoing legal consequences.

2

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit entered its order dismissing

Petitioner’s appeal as moot on July 14, 2025. The

same panel denied Petitioner’s timely motion for

panel rehearing, and the full court denied rehearing

en banc, by order entered on August 21, 2025. This

petition is timely under Supreme Court Rule 13.3.

The Second Circuit’s August 28, 2025 mandate

(Dkt. 63.1) makes that dismissal final. In it, the court

expressly held that it lacked power to grant relief as

to the expired TRO and lacked jurisdiction over the

companion appeal. With the mandate issued, there is

no remaining avenue for review in the lower courts.

This secures this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1), which authorizes review by writ of

certiorari of “[c]ases in the courts of appeals” by a

party seeking review of a final judgment or decree.

Although the court of appeals dismissed Petitioner’s

appeal as moot, that decision had the practical effect

of denying review of a sanctioning order that

continues to impose legal consequences, and is

therefore final for purposes of this Court’s review.1

1 See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707-08 (2011) (review

appropriate where collateral consequences persist even after

the challenged order expires); cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.

Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 480 (1975) (recognizing that judgments

may be ‘final ’for certiorari purposes when constitutional claims

would otherwise escape review); and cf. United States v.

Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (emphasizing

that interlocutory rulings generally are not immediately

reviewable, underscoring the need for appellate jurisdiction

where, as here, collateral consequences make the order

effectively final).

3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Constitution, Amendment V

No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law...

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment guarantees individuals the right to fair

procedures and meaningful judicial review before

being deprived of liberty or property through the

imposition of civil contempt sanctions.

U.S. Constitution, Amendment I

Congress shall make no law ... abridging the

freedom of speech...

The First Amendment prohibits vague and

overbroad judicial orders that chill protected speech

without clear boundaries or constitutional

safeguards.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1)

Contents and Scope of Every Injunction and

Restraining Order.

Every order granting an injunction and every

restraining order must:

(A) state the reasons why it issued;

(B) state its terms specifically; and

(C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by

referring to the complaint or other document—

the act or acts restrained or required.

Rule 65(d) ensures that individuals subject to

restraining orders or injunctions have clear notice of

the conduct prohibited. Orders that fail to meet this

standard cannot serve as the basis for contempt

without violating due process.

4

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner brings this case not only to

challenge a grave constitutional error, but to

highlight the quiet erosion of the very freedoms this

nation was founded upon.

While preparing this writ, Petitioner opened a

box of family keepsakes and found a World War II

medal. Cold bronze, heavy in her hand. On its back

were etched Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: “freedom

from fear and want,” and “freedom of speech and

religion.” It was not just a relic. It was a message

passed through bloodlines, a vow that future

generations would live under the freedoms their

families died to defend.

But today, those same freedoms have been

quietly stripped away by the very institutions sworn

to protect them. Petitioner was silenced by a vague

and overbroad order, sanctioned without clear notice,

and denied the right to appeal. The courts imposed

punishment, then closed the doors to challenge it.

The Constitution forbids this. So do the principles

forged in wartime sacrifice.

This case asks whether liberty can be erased

by silence. Whether speech can be chilled, property

taken, and due process denied, while appellate courts

look away. The Founders did not enshrine due

process of law and freedom of speech as ceremonial

language. They meant them to shield the individual

from precisely this kind of unchecked judicial power.

Petitioner now asks this Court to reaffirm that

protection, and to ensure that the freedoms engraved

on that medal, freedom from fear, freedom of speech,

are not lost to history, but defended as law.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Crystal Stranger seeks review of a

constitutional error that left her sanctioned under an

order never subject to appellate review. The case

presents a recurring and important question:

whether courts may impose sanctions under orders

shielded from review. That question implicates core

due process and First Amendment protections.

Petitioner seeks not vindication of private interests,

but assurance that punishment cannot rest on

unreviewable orders.

The district court issued a TRO on October 22,

2024, set to expire at the January 29, 2025

preliminary injunction hearing. No ruling followed.

On March 3, 2025 the court denied Petitioner’s

request for clarification, leaving the TRO in effect

indefinitely. In practice, it governed until June 17,

2025,2 when the court finally entered a materially

narrower Preliminary Injunction (“PI”). The TRO

imposed indefinite, open-ended restraints on speech

and contact with undefined individuals; the PI, by

contrast, limited restrictions to a defined class of

former clients for one year.

Cleer moved for contempt on January 17,

2025, citing three marketing emails attributed to

Optic Tax Inc., a party later dismissed for lack of

personal jurisdiction. The court did not rule until

2 TROs are rarely intended to last more than a few weeks. See

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423,

439-40 (1974) (noting that TROs are “limited in duration” and

intended only as short-term measures until a hearing can be

held). The TRO here persisted for eight months, far longer than

many preliminary injunctions, amplifying its legal

consequences.

6

July 17, 2025, three days after the Second Circuit

dismissed Petitioner’s TRO appeal as moot. It then

imposed sanctions under that same TRO, without an

evidentiary hearing, simply presuming Petitioner’s

responsibility for the emails.3

No appellate court was permitted to address

the TRO’s legality or enforceability. This denial of

review is not a mere procedural irregularity, it

strikes at the core of constitutional safeguards. The

Four Freedoms etched on Petitioner’s family medal

echo today, as she seeks redress for chilled speech,

denied due process, and the creeping normalization

of judicial discretion untethered from first principles.

The Constitution forbids punishment under

unreviewable orders, yet that is precisely what

occurred here, and occurs regularly under the

expansive timelines with which TROs are often

enforced in practice.

Without this Court’s intervention, litigants

may be sanctioned under expired, ambiguous orders

with no opportunity for review. This undermines the

rule of law and erodes freedoms prior generations

fought to defend. Petitioner does not raise this case

for the Court’s blessing, but to secure justice for all:

the assurance that punishment cannot rest on orders

shielded from review.

3 This Court has held that civil contempt must be supported by

clear and convincing evidence. See Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.

Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019). Without an evidentiary hearing or

factual findings distinguishing individual from corporate

conduct, the district court's contempt ruling raises serious due

process concerns.

7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Circuits Are Divided on Whether

Sanctions May Rest on Orders Deemed Moot

The Second Circuit’s ruling squarely conflicts

with decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which

hold that even expired or superseded orders remain

reviewable if they carry continuing legal

consequences, especially when enforced through

contempt.

The Fifth Circuit. In Doe v. Duncanville

Independent School District, 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.

1993), the court rejected mootness where a contempt

sanction was predicated on an expired injunction.

The court explained that expiration did not erase the

need for appellate review, because sanctions imposed

under the order kept the controversy alive.4

The Ninth Circuit. In In re Establishment

Inspection of Hern Iron Works, 881 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.

1989), the Ninth Circuit likewise held that an OSHA

inspection order, though no longer operative,

remained reviewable because it had “continuing legal

consequences.” Id. at 724. The court warned that

allowing expired orders to escape review while still

imposing obligations “would permit courts to insulate

questionable rulings from scrutiny.”

4 In Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District, 994 F.2d

160 (5th Cir. 1993), a school district was held in contempt for

violating an injunction that had expired. The court rejected

mootness, holding that “[t]he expiration of the injunction did

not moot the issues involved in the contempt appeal.” Id. at 166.

Because the expired order was the basis for sanctions, appellate

review remained essential.

8

The Second Circuit. In direct contrast, the

Second Circuit deemed the TRO appeal moot, then

enforced the TRO through contempt.5 That sequence

insulated the TRO from review altogether: it was

unappealable when entered, deemed moot when

appealed, and then enforced through contempt after

dismissal.

The conflict is doctrinal, not factual.6

Respondents may argue that the Fifth and Ninth

Circuit cases involved expired or superseded orders

rather than TROs. But that distinction is

immaterial. The principle animating those decisions

is that when sanctions or continuing obligations rest

on an order, appellate review cannot be mooted by

subsequent developments. The Second Circuit

rejected that principle, holding moot an appeal from

the very order later used to punish Petitioner.

Nor does the later preliminary injunction

eliminate the controversy. The contempt sanctions

rested solely on the TRO; the PI neither cured its

defects nor supplied the basis for punishment.

Supersession cannot moot sanctions that have

already been imposed.

5 Although labeled a TRO, the order here remained operative

for months and carried ongoing legal obligations, functionally

indistinguishable from the injunctions in Duncanville and Hern.

See Statement of the Case, supra, at 1.

6 See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011)

(explaining that appellate review remains appropriate where

“collateral consequences” persist); United States v. W.T. Grant

Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) (“voluntary cessation” of

challenged conduct does not moot a case if legal consequences

remain). These principles confirm that the relevant inquiry is

not whether an order has technically expired, but whether

sanctions or ongoing consequences keep the controversy alive.

9

This divergence is outcome-determinative.

Under Fifth or Ninth Circuit law, the TRO would

have remained reviewable precisely because it

formed the basis of contempt. In the Second Circuit,

however, it was deemed unreviewable yet still

enforced.7 That sharp doctrinal conflict threatens

uniformity in federal law, invites forum-shopping,

and undermines due process. Only this Court can

resolve it.

II. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally

Important and Recurring

The issue here is whether courts may impose

contempt sanctions under temporary restraining

orders that have been dismissed as moot on appeal,

thereby depriving litigants of any opportunity for

review. This problem is not confined to this case.

TROs are among the most common emergency

remedies in federal litigation, and they often contain

broad, vague restrictions that remain operative for

weeks or months before any preliminary injunction

hearing can occur.

This Court has long recognized that questions

of recurring importance warrant certiorari even

absent a circuit split. Supreme Court Rule 10

emphasizes that review is appropriate when a

federal question is of “exceptional importance” or

when lower courts have insulated constitutional

issues from meaningful review. Prior restraint

7 The problem is particularly acute with TROs, which this Court

has emphasized are “limited in duration” and “intended only as

short-term measures.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of

Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439-40 (1974). Allowing such orders to

persist for months and then escape review undermines both

Rule 65(d)’s clarity requirements and basic fairness.

10

jurisprudence reflects the same concern: because

restraints on speech carry immediate constitutional

costs, delay or denial of review compounds the harm.

See Nebraska Press Ass h v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559

(1976). Likewise, due process requires meaningful

opportunity to challenge orders before they can be

enforced through contempt. See U.S. Catholic

Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487

U.S. 72, 76 (1988).

Applied here, the importance is manifest. The

district court’s TRO remained in place for nearly

eight months, used vague terms such as “prospective

customers” and “sales,” and was enforced through

contempt after the Second Circuit dismissed the

appeal as moot. That sequence—prolonged TRO,

dismissal, then contempt—creates a structural

loophole that deprives litigants of any appellate

forum. Unless this Court intervenes, future parties

will face the same trap: sanctioned under ambiguous

orders that no appellate court will ever review.

The consequences extend far beyond this case.

If appellate courts may dismiss TRO appeals as moot

while district courts continue to enforce those orders

through contempt, litigants in different jurisdictions

will face radically different protections for due

process and free speech. That invites forum

shopping, incentivizes procedural gamesmanship,

and undermines the uniformity of federal practice.

This is not a one-off error but a recurring systemic

vulnerability that only this Court can address.

11

III. This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle for Resolving

the Question Presented

The question presented is cleanly framed in

this case: whether due process permits contempt

sanctions to be imposed under a temporary

restraining order that was dismissed as moot on

appeal, leaving no opportunity for review.

First, the facts are undisputed. The court

entered a TRO on October 22, 2024, denied

clarification March 3, 2025, and issued a narrower

preliminary injunction on June 17, 2025. The Second

Circuit dismissed the TRO appeal as moot on July

14, 2025. Three days later on July 17, 2025, the

district court imposed contempt sanctions based

solely on that TRO.8 These dates are uncontested.

Second, the issue was properly

preserved. Petitioner timely appealed the TRO

(Case No. 25-530), requested clarification, and sought

rehearing when the appeal was dismissed. At every

stage, the constitutional concerns were pressed and

passed upon. There is no vehicle problem of waiver or

forfeiture.

Third, the question presented was

outcome-determinative. The only basis for the

contempt order was the TRO. Had the TRO been

subject to appellate review, its vagueness,

overbreadth, and lack of notice would have been

8 Respondents may note that Petitioner sought relief below

under Rule 60(b). But collateral efforts to set aside a contempt

order cannot substitute for appellate review of the underlying

injunction. See U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights

Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988) (holding that contempt

sanctions imposed under an invalid order require appellate

review to safeguard due process).

12

squarely before the Second Circuit. The dismissal of

the appeal as moot foreclosed that review and

directly led to the sanctions at issue.

Fourth, there are no alternative holdings

or factual complications. The contempt ruling

rests exclusively on the TRO, not on the later

preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit’s refusal

to review or vacate the TRO left Petitioner

sanctioned under an unexamined order.

Finally, this case is not “messy” but

unusually clear. Respondents may argue that the

presence of overlapping orders (TRO, preliminary

injunction, contempt) makes this case complex. To

the contrary, the sequence underscores the problem

in its starkest form: the TRO was unappealable when

entered, dismissed as moot when appealed, and then

enforced through contempt after dismissal. That is

the entire controversy.

In short, this case presents precisely the kind

of straightforward procedural posture that makes for

an excellent vehicle. The legal issue was preserved,

dispositive, and free of factual or procedural

entanglements. Only this Court can resolve whether

litigants may be sanctioned under unreviewable

orders, a question this record tees up perfectly.

IV. Due Process Errors Warrant This Court’s

Review

A. The Second Circuit’s Mootness

Dismissal Violates Due Process.

Petitioner was held in civil contempt and

sanctioned under a TRO that the Second Circuit

dismissed as moot, foreclosing all appellate review.

13

The order could not be appealed when entered, was

dismissed as moot when appealed, and yet was

enforced through contempt after dismissal. This

sequence created a due process trap: punishment

imposed under an order insulated from review at

every stage. See U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion

Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988).

The TRO itself violated Rule 65(d), which

requires injunctions to “state their terms specifically”

and “describe in reasonable detail... the act or acts

restrained.” Instead, it used undefined terms such as

“prospective customers,” “sales,” and “solicitations,”

leaving Petitioner without clear notice of what

conduct was prohibited. Clarification was denied, yet

the court later imposed contempt sanctions based on

its own interpretation of this vague language.

Enforcing an ambiguous order without fair notice

contravenes due process.9

B. Jurisdictional Defects Compound the

Due Process Deficiencies

The due process deficiencies were compounded

by jurisdictional defects. The district court later

dismissed Optic Tax Inc., the corporate entity

originally named, for lack of personal jurisdiction. In

its dismissal ruling, the court stated that the

injunction still binds any party “all persons in active

concert or participation with, through, or under”

Petitioner, yet never explained how that conclusion

9 See Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974) (per curiam)

(“Since an injunctive order prohibits conduct under threat of

judicial punishment, basic fairness requires that those enjoined

receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed.”);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(l)(B)-(C).

14

could apply to a party it lacked jurisdiction to bind.10

This form of backdoor enforcement, sanctioning one

party for another’s speech, without findings or

jurisdiction, offends both due process and the

structural limits of judicial power.

Despite the lack of personal jurisdiction over

the corporate entity, the contempt order sanctioned

Petitioner personally for three marketing emails sent

by Optic Tax. Petitioner promptly moved under Rule

60(b) to set aside and vacate the contempt ruling11,

emphasizing these jurisdictional and due process

defects, yet the court has not acted on that motion

and has instead permitted Plaintiff to pursue its

request for sanctions fees. Sanctioning one individual

for another’s speech, under a vague and overbroad

order, offends both due process and the structural

limits of judicial power.12

10 The district court explicitly found that it lacked personal

jurisdiction over Optic Tax and rejected Cleer’s alter ego theory.

The same order emphasized that the injunction bound Optic

Tax, despite having just dismissed it from the case. See App. E

(EOF No. 236) at 11. Nonetheless, the court sanctioned

Petitioner based on marketing emails allegedly sent by that

very entity, without holding any evidentiary hearing to

determine authorship or control. See App. C (EOF N. 229).

11 Petitioner has moved under Rule 60(b) to set aside and vacate

the contempt order, citing the TRO’s ambiguity, lack of

evidentiary hearing, conflation of Petitioner with Optic Tax Inc.

(later dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction), and resulting

First Amendment and due process violations. See EOF No. 261.

12 See Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata,

Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1395 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A court must have

personal jurisdiction over a party to enjoin it.”); cf. Grupo

Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527

U.S. 308, 326 (1999) (noting the importance of personal

jurisdiction as a limit on equitable remedies).

15

C. Timing Issues Further Created Due

Process Defects

The notice problem was compounded by

timing. On January 30, 2025, more than three

months after entry of the TRO and nearly two weeks

after the contempt motion, the court ordered that

Petitioner be provided a copy of the TRO, implicitly

acknowledging uncertainty about whether she had

ever received it. Yet the court later sanctioned her for

alleged violations predating that order. Petitioner

timely appealed the TRO’s defects, but the Second

Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot once a narrower

Preliminary Injunction issued. Three days later,

however, the district court imposed contempt

sanctions based solely on the TRO. The result was a

procedural cul-de-sac: punishment under an order

already deemed unreviewable.

This timing reveals a structural vulnerability:

courts may insulate prior restraints from review by

mooting appeals with later orders, yet still enforce

the earlier restraints through contempt.13 Labeling

the order “temporary” did not change its effect: it was

enforced as binding law for nearly eight months and

then used as the sole basis for sanctions.

Allowing contempt sanctions to stand while

insulating the underlying TRO from appellate review

erodes confidence in judicial process. Certiorari is

warranted to ensure that punishment cannot be

imposed under expired, ambiguous, or

jurisdictionally defective orders that escape review.

13 Cf. Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393

U.S. 175, 180 (1968).

16

pending, the court deprived Petitioner of her

right to contest ownership on the merits.

3. Avoidance of Sanctions Review. When

Plaintiff filed a duplicative second TRO motion

containing misstatements and without any

evidentiary base, Petitioner moved for Rule 11

sanctions. The district court denied the motion

“without prejudice” solely because a preliminary

injunction had issued, never addressing the

misconduct allegations.

4. Disproportionate Seizure of Property. The

court ordered turnover of Petitioner’s personal

laptop for expedited discovery, but no forensics

have been conducted by the opposing party. When

Petitioner sought return of the device or security

to account for its value, the court denied relief,

and ordered it could remain in opposing counsel’s

custody indefinitely without protective protocols.

This open-ended deprivation of personal property,

without safeguards or proportional limits,

contravenes Rule 26(b)’s requirement that

discovery be balanced against privacy and

fairness.

5. Ex Parte Communication. At an August 27,

2025 status conference, the magistrate disclosed

that Plaintiffs counsel had sent an ex parte email

to chambers regarding mediation. The message

was not docketed or shared until Petitioner

herself moved to preserve it. See ECF No. 273.

Even if limited in subject, undisclosed

communications with the court outside the

adversarial process raise fairness concerns and

18

contribute to the appearance of asymmetry in the

proceedings.

Taken together, these departures reveal not

isolated error but a structural imbalance that

deprived Petitioner of fair process at every stage.

This pattern reinforces why certiorari is warranted.

V. Mootness Created a Procedural Mechanism

for Evading First Amendment Strict Scrutiny

The Second Circuit’s dismissal also silenced

Petitioner’s underlying constitutional challenges to

the TRO. That order functioned as a classic prior

restraint, prohibiting broad categories of speech,

including communications with prospective clients

and undefined “sales” activity. Petitioner’s appeal

(Case No. 25-530) directly challenged the TRO’s

unconstitutional breadth, vagueness, and chilling

effect. By dismissing that appeal as moot, the Second

Circuit foreclosed any opportunity for constitutional

review.

A. The TRO Was a Classic Prior Restraint,

Presumptively Invalid

The TRO operated as a prior restraint,

prohibiting future speech without adjudication of its

legality or harm. Prior restraints on speech are the

most disfavored form of restriction under the First

Amendment. They are presumptively

unconstitutional and may only be upheld if they meet

strict scrutiny. See Nebraska Press Ass h v. Stuart,

427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Southeastern Promotions,

Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975).

The TRO restrained Petitioner’s ability to

communicate with undefined “prospective

19

customers,” engage in “sales,” or even issue

“communications,” all without a finding of unlawful

conduct or imminent harm. The restrictions applied

prospectively and broadly, chilling lawful and

constitutionally protected speech, with no time limit,

and lacking any safe harbor for lawful

communications unless the Plaintiff “approved”

them. Petitioner’s appeal (Case No. 25-530) directly

raised this issue, but the Second Circuit's mootness

ruling foreclosed any opportunity to challenge the

restraint on constitutional grounds. Dismissing an

appeal that squarely raised a First Amendment

challenge to a judicial prior restraint, without any

review of the order's legality, strikes at the heart of

constitutional accountability.

B. The TRO Was Content-Based and

Speaker-Based, Triggering Strict Scrutiny

The TRO restricted speech based on who was

speaking (Petitioner), to whom it was addressed

(prospective clients), and what it was about (tax

services or business). Restrictions that target specific

speakers, audiences, or content are presumptively

unconstitutional and subject to the highest level of

judicial scrutiny. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576

U.S. 155 (2015); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S.

552, 566 (2011).

Here the TRO prohibited Petitioner from

communicating with “prospective clients,” and barred

all “sales” and “solicitations”, regardless of whether

the speech was truthful, commercial, or lawful. These

terms target specific categories of speech and speaker

identity, not conduct per se. They functionally barred

Petitioner from engaging in routine professional

20

dialogue with the public or the media. The Second

Circuit’s failure to review this content-based and

speaker-specific restriction, due solely to mootness,

allowed a constitutionally suspect order to go

unexamined. That departure from settled First

Amendment principles warrants certiorari.

C. Certiorari Is Needed to Prevent

Further Erosion of First Amendment Review

This Court has long held that prior restraints

must receive immediate and rigorous review, and

that courts must not use procedure to evade

substantive constitutional scrutiny. The Second

Circuit’s mootness ruling here prevents any court

from ever examining the speech-restrictive, vague,

and punitive nature of the TRO. This is not a

technical flaw, it is a constitutional failure.

Certiorari is thus warranted to ensure that

First Amendment protections are not nullified by

judicial inaction, procedural gamesmanship, or artful

litigation strategy.

VI. The Refusal to Vacate Conflicts with

Munsingwear

Even if this Court accepts the Second Circuit’s

determination that the appeal from the TRO was

moot, the court of appeals erred by refusing to vacate

the TRO under United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,

340 U.S. 36 (1950). The central purpose of the

Munsingwear doctrine is to prevent a party from

being bound by a lower court judgment that becomes

unreviewable due to intervening mootness. When a

litigant is denied appellate review through no fault of

their own, vacatur is the appropriate remedy to

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preserve fairness and the integrity of the judicial

process.

That principle applies squarely here.

Petitioner timely appealed the TRO.15 The Second

Circuit dismissed the appeal on the mistaken

assumption that a subsequent preliminary injunction

had rendered the TRO obsolete. But just days later,

the district court issued a contempt ruling based

solely on the TRO, imposing sanctions and a finding

of willful violation. Because the appeal was already

dismissed, Petitioner had no opportunity to challenge

the TRO’s validity on the merits, even though it

remained legally operative for enforcement.

Petitioner explicitly requested Munsingwear

vacatur in the alternative, citing the ongoing legal

consequences of the TRO. Yet the Second Circuit

denied that request without explanation. This refusal

leaves Petitioner subject to the sanctions of a judicial

order that no appellate court reviewed, and that the

issuing court refused to clarify.

This result is inconsistent with Munsingwear

and the Second Circuit’s own precedent. In Long

Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 992 F.2d 326, 327 (2d

Cir. 1993), the court emphasized that its “usual

practice when a case becomes moot on appeal is to

vacate the judgment below and remand with

directions to dismiss.’That is precisely the

15 This is not a case where the appeal was dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction due to the TRO’s interlocutory nature. Petitioner’s

appeal was timely and properly before the court, but was

dismissed as moot due to the mistaken assumption that the

TRO had been superseded. The subsequent contempt ruling

showed that the TRO remained legally operative — a fact the

court of appeals never considered on the merits.

22

circumstance here. The TRO continues to affect

Petitioner’s legal position, both in terms of monetary

sanctions and the basis for additional contempt

motions.

This Court should grant certiorari or remand

to the lower court with an order to reaffirm that

Munsingwear vacatur is not discretionary where the

challenged order carries ongoing legal consequences

but has been rendered unreviewable. Sanctions

should not rest on an order that no appellate court

has reviewed and that fails to meet Rule 65(d)’s

clarity requirements. Without vacatur, the denial of

review itself operates as punishment.

VII. Unpublished, Unexplained Orders

Compound the Constitutional Harm

The due process violation in this case is not

only substantive, but systemic. The Temporary

Restraining Order, the civil contempt ruling

enforcing it, and the Second Circuit’s dismissal of the

appeal were all issued as unpublished orders. None

carry precedential weight. None provide public

guidance on when a TRO enforced through contempt

may be reviewed.16 None contain any substantive

discussion of the First Amendment, Rule 65(d), or

due process.

16 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (emphasizing

that “[t]he point of precedent is to ensure that the law will not

merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and

intelligible fashion”). When constitutional questions are

resolved through unpublished and even worse, unreasoned

orders, the development of federal law lacks the transparency

and guidance this Court has stressed is essential.

23

Even more troubling, the Second Circuit’s

denial of panel rehearing and rehearing en banc was

also issued without any explanation.17 The panel

provided only a conclusory sentence in dismissing the

appeal as moot, and declined to address Petitioner’s

detailed arguments for why review was still

necessary. In declining rehearing, the court offered

no analysis, no engagement with circuit splits, and

no recognition of the broader constitutional

implications. This silence occurred despite the clear

significance of the issues raised: punishment under a

potentially unlawful order, the foreclosing of First

Amendment review, and the invocation of sanctions

without clear standards.

This judicial opacity obscures the stakes for

future litigants. It allows courts to impose sanctions

without review, then cloak both the reasoning and

the consequences behind procedural language. The

result is not only an unreviewable sanction, but an

17 In a separate but related appeal, the Second Circuit granted a

partial stay of the Preliminary Injunction on August 12, 2025

(No. 25-1575, Doc. 36), only to reverse itself and dissolve the

stay less than 48 hours later, on August 13, 2025 (Doc. 38),

again with no change in facts or filings and no explanation. This

unexplained reversal significantly affected Petitioner’s legal

exposure and demonstrates the broader lack of transparency in

appellate decision-making across proceedings arising from the

same underlying case.

24

untraceable one.18 A judgment with real-world

effects, yet no accountable legal explanation.19

While unpublished opinions serve an

administrative function in many routine cases, they

are ill-suited for constitutional questions involving

contempt and prior restraints. When the judiciary

speaks without explanation, especially in cases

involving liberty, speech, and fairness, it frustrates

accountability and undermines public confidence in

the rule of law. Where constitutional rights are

chilled, and penalties imposed, the public is entitled

to know why.

Certiorari is warranted not just to correct the

outcome below, but to reaffirm that transparency is

essential when courts exercise the power to punish.

VIII. Certiorari Is Warranted to Prevent

Recurring Harm and Promote Judicial

Efficiency

This is not a one-time procedural error. The

district court has left open the possibility of

additional contempt motions based on the same TRO

language. At the time of this petition, a second

contempt motion remains pending (D. Ct. ECF No.

18 Cf. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 n.3

(1993) (noting the Court’s reluctance to allow constitutional

adjudication to rest on unexplained or nonprecedential

dispositions). This Court has long recognized that constitutional

adjudication requires reasoned explanation accessible to the

public.

19 The contradiction is especially stark given that the same

court ruling (App. E) both dismissed Optic Tax for lack of

jurisdiction and claimed the injunction bound it. This raises

further due process concerns regarding the scope and

enforceability of orders against parties over whom no

jurisdiction exists.

25

135). Because the appellate court refused to review

the TRO or vacate it, Petitioner may be forced to

initiate multiple future appeals, each arising from

the same unreviewed and ambiguous order.

This kind of piecemeal litigation serves no one.

It wastes judicial resources, burdens the parties, and

delays resolution. Future contempt rulings would

compound the constitutional error, layering sanctions

atop an unreviewed order.

Reinstating the TRO appeal, or granting

certiorari now, would resolve the legal question at

the heart of these enforcement efforts. It would

prevent an indefinite series of appeals, preserve

judicial economy, and and ensure that constitutional

safeguards, especially those protecting speech,

fairness, and clarity, cannot be evaded through

procedural manipulation.

26

CONCLUSION

Without this Court’s intervention, the

protections that Americans have fought and died for,

including Petitioner’s own family, will continue to

erode under the guise of procedural formality. The

Four Freedoms are not ceremonial relics; they are

promises. It is this Court’s duty to ensure they do not

become casualties of unchecked judicial discretion.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted. This Court’s review is

needed to keep those freedoms not only engraved in

bronze, but alive in law.

Respectfully submitted,

Crystal Stranger

Pro Se Litigant

30 N Gould St. Ste 3088

Sheridan, WY 82801

(310)739-7699

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