Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefDec 19, 2025

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No. ____

_____________

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

______________________________

EDIN ANAEL SOLIS-RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

______________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

To the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

______________________________

APPENDIX

______________________________

John G. Baker

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Joshua B. Carpenter

Appellate Chief

Counsel of Record

One Page Avenue, Suite 210

Asheville, NC 28801

Telephone: (828) 232-9992

Joshua_Carpenter@fd.org

Ashley A. Askari

Assistant Federal Public Defender

129 West Trade Street, Suite 300

Charlotte, NC 28202

Telephone: (704) 374-0720

Ashley_Askari@fd.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit,

filed July 23, 2025 ....................................................................................... App. 1

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit,

filed July 23, 2025 ..................................................................................... App. 28

Judgment of the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina,

filed October 31, 2022 ............................................................................... App. 29

Bill of Indictment from the United States District Court for

the Western District of North Carolina,

filed February 17, 2021............................................................................. App. 36

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4654

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

EDIN ANAEL SOLIS-RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at

Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Senior District Judge. (3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK-1)

Argued: March 19, 2025

Decided: July 23, 2025

Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Judge

Heytens joined. Judge Traxler joined except as to Part II.B and wrote an opinion concurring

in the judgment.

ARGUED: Ashley Ali Askari, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John G.

Baker, Federal Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for

Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

App. 1

ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

App. 2

QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:

Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez twice brandished firearms in local restaurants during a

sixteen-month span. The second time, he shot a patron at point-blank range. Because SolisRodriguez had entered the United States illegally, the government charged him with two

counts of possessing a firearm as an illegal alien. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).

Solis-Rodriguez pled guilty. He now challenges his Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11 colloquy as plainly erroneous and his sentence as procedurally unreasonable.

We reject his challenges. Even assuming a plain error at the Rule 11 colloquy, it did not

affect Solis-Rodriguez’s substantial rights. And the district court reasonably considered

Solis-Rodriguez’s mitigating arguments before explaining why it issued the sentence.

Thus, we affirm.

Solis-Rodriguez grew up in Honduras. Having unlawfully entered the United States,

he was deported in 2018. He then reentered—again unlawfully.

In August 2020, Solis-Rodriguez entered a Charlotte, North Carolina restaurant with

a Hi-Point .45 caliber pistol visibly tucked in the back of his pants. Scared staff called the

police. When police officers arrived, they asked Solis-Rodriguez if he had a gun or spoke

English. He answered “no” to both questions. The officers, with his consent, then frisked

Solis-Rodriguez and found the loaded Hi-Point pistol.

In November 2021, Solis-Rodriguez and Chris Silva got into an argument at The

Taco Bar restaurant, also in Charlotte, North Carolina. According to Solis-Rodriguez, Silva

threatened to kill him and his family. Silva and Solis-Rodriguez went outside, and Silva

App. 3

spoke with a security guard. At the same time, Solis-Rodriguez got a pistol from his car.

He began arguing with Silva again, pulled out his pistol and shot him at point-blank range.

The bullets struck Silva’s chest and left hand. He went into a four-day coma and required

several surgeries.

Police officers collected nine-millimeter shell casings at the shooting scene. Two

days later, they arrested Solis-Rodriguez at his apartment. Solis-Rodriguez admitted to the

police that he shot Silva but claimed he did so only in response to Silva’s threats. Police

officers found a nine-millimeter pistol in Solis-Rodriguez’s apartment that they later

determined matched the shell casings found at the crime scene, along with the clothes SolisRodriguez wore the night of the November shooting. Solis-Rodriguez admitted he had used

that pistol. He also admitted to entering the country unlawfully.

A grand jury indicted Solis-Rodriguez on two counts of possessing a firearm as an

illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)—one count for the August 2020 incident and

another for the November 2021 shooting. 1 After Solis-Rodriguez agreed to plead guilty,

the government filed a written factual basis, which Solis-Rodriguez did not dispute.

A federal magistrate judge conducted a plea hearing. 2 Solis-Rodriguez received

assistance from a Spanish-language interpreter. The judge explained that Solis-Rodriguez

Solis-Rodriguez told the police officers about a third incident that occurred in

October 2021. He brought a gun to a party in someone’s yard, and when a fight broke out,

he fired the gun into the ground to break it up. According to him, the bullet ricocheted and

hit someone in the leg. The government did not charge Solis-Rodriguez for the October

2021 party incident.

Solis-Rodriguez consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See J.A. 17.

App. 4

faced two counts, and “[e]ach of these counts alleges the same offense, possession of a

firearm by an illegal alien. The difference between the counts is that they occurred on

different dates.” J.A. 18. The judge further clarified that “[e]ach of these offenses is a

violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(5). Each of these offenses alleges

possession of a firearm by an illegal alien.” J.A. 19. He then asked the prosecutor “what’s

the maximum penalty for that offense?” Id. The prosecutor responded, “[t]he maximum

term of imprisonment [is] 10 years, a $250,000 fine, and up to three years of supervised

release.” 3 Id. The prosecutor mentioned that the Armed Career Criminal Act might apply,

but the magistrate judge promptly determined it did not. Id. Then the magistrate judge

stated “[i]t sounds like the maximum penalty for these offenses would be 10 years

imprisonment, $250,000 fine, or both, and period of supervised release.” J.A. 20. SolisRodriguez’s counsel agreed with that statement. Then, Solis-Rodriguez pled guilty to both

counts.

A probation officer prepared a presentence report (“PSR”) following the guilty plea.

To determine his offense level, the PSR applied a 4-level enhancement for SolisRodriguez’s use of a firearm in connection with attempted murder. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2018). The base offense level plus the enhancement resulted in an

offense level of 37. The PSR then subtracted 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility, for

At the time of Solis-Rodriguez’s plea, § 922(g)(5) carried a statutory maximum of

10 years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2018). Congress has since amended

the statute to provide up to 15 years’ imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) (2022), but

the 10-year maximum applies to Solis-Rodriguez’s case.

App. 5

a total offense level of 34. Solis-Rodriguez had 1 criminal history point for entering the

country illegally. Combining the total offense level with his criminal history point, the

guidelines range for Solis-Rodriguez’s potential imprisonment term was 151 to 188

months. The PSR also stated that each § 922(g)(5) count carried a maximum term of 10

years’ imprisonment. Finally, the PSR flagged that under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) (2018), the

sentences must run consecutively up and until the combined sentences reach the total

maximum punishment—here, 20 years’ imprisonment.

Solis-Rodriguez raised a couple of objections to the PSR. He argued that the

attempted murder enhancement should not apply because he shot Silva in self-defense. And

he argued that the two § 922(g)(5) offenses were really just one continuing offense with a

maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court first accepted Solis-Rodriguez’s guilty

plea. The court then rejected Solis-Rodriguez’s “continuing offense” argument. It

explained that the use of two different guns in the two incidents meant there were “two

separate counts of conviction,” allowing for stacked sentences. J.A. 91. And the court

rejected Solis-Rodriguez’s objection to the murder enhancement because Solis-Rodriguez

acted unreasonably by using violence and not retreating. So, it adopted the PSR’s

guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.

Next, the court proceeded with Solis-Rodriguez’s allocution. Solis-Rodriguez

expressed remorse during his allocution and requested to be placed close to his family in

Charlotte. The district court agreed to make such a recommendation.

App. 6

Then, the court asked for arguments about the appropriate sentence. SolisRodriguez’s counsel argued for a 151-month sentence. He pointed out that “Mr. SolisRodriguez stands before the Court a very young man.” J.A. 108. He was 22 years old at

the time. And counsel noted Solis-Rodriguez’s lack of any violent or weapons-related

criminal history. The government then responded by arguing for a 180-month sentence. It

recounted the details of the two charged incidents as well as the October 2021 party

incident. It described the calculated nature of the November 2021 shooting. And it argued

Solis-Rodriguez “thinks violence is the answer to his problems.” J.A. 110.

The district court first determined the standard conditions of supervision “are correct

and appropriate to be imposed in this case as to this defendant” after reviewing the facts of

the case. J.A. 112. It then addressed Solis-Rodriguez as it “consider[ed] a series of

sentencing factors that were enacted by Congress that guide courts in fashioning sentences

that are sufficient but not greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.” 4

J.A. 114. The court emphasized it “has considered all of the sentencing factors. Whether it

mentions a sentencing factor or not, I want it clear on the record that the Court has

considered all of the sentencing factors.” Id.

Congress enacted these factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). They include the (1) “nature

and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2)

“the need for the sentence imposed” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford

adequate deterrence and protect the public; (3) “the kinds of sentences available”; (4) “the

kinds of sentence and the sentencing range [under the guidelines]”; (5) “any pertinent

policy statement” (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”; and (7) “the

need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

App. 7

The court then “highlighted some [factors] that it finds particularly important.” J.A.

115. It discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense as “very, very disturbing.”

J.A. 114. The district judge, describing himself “[a]s a father like you,” acknowledged

Solis-Rodriguez’s frustration with Silva’s threats. Id. But he pointed out that violence was

not the proper solution. The court also highlighted a need to specifically deter SolisRodriguez from further criminal conduct before flagging the importance of general

deterrence. And finally, it “need[ed] to promote respect for the law. And the law is the

mechanism for resolving disputes, not shooting somebody in their chest and in their arm.”

J.A. 115. The court wrapped up by reiterating it had considered all the sentencing factors.

The court imposed a 120-month sentence on Count 1 and a 60-month sentence on

Count 2, running consecutively for a total of 180 months’ imprisonment. After explaining

the sentence, the district court asked counsel “if there’s any legal reason why this sentence

as proposed should not be imposed?” J.A. 121. Solis-Rodriguez’s counsel responded,

“[j]ust the issues that we previously raised that the Court overruled.” Id.

II.

Solis-Rodriguez now appeals, alleging errors at both the Rule 11 colloquy and

sentencing hearing. 5 In particular, he argues that the magistrate judge erred under Rule 11

by never clarifying that each § 922(g)(5) count carried up to 10 years’ imprisonment. So,

he wants his guilty plea vacated. And he alleges his sentence is procedurally unreasonable

We have jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

App. 8

because the district court failed to properly consider his nonfrivolous mitigating arguments

about remorse, age and lack of criminal history. For that, he wants a new sentencing.

We reject both challenges. First, we assume the magistrate judge erred “plainly”

during the Rule 11 colloquy. But Solis-Rodriguez has failed to demonstrate that error

affected his substantial rights. Second, the district court sufficiently considered SolisRodriguez’s nonfrivolous mitigating arguments and explained the sentence. So, the

sentence was procedurally reasonable.

A. Plea Colloquy

“Before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with the defendant,

must ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to which the plea is

offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and the various

rights the defendant is relinquishing by pleading guilty.” United States v. Williams, 811

F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)). Solis-Rodriguez argues the

district court erred by stating he faced a combined maximum penalty of 10 years’

imprisonment when he really faced a maximum penalty of 20 years—10 years on each of

the two § 922(g)(5) counts.

“Because [Solis-Rodriguez] neither objected to the judge’s [colloquy], nor made an

attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, we consider his appellate argument under the rigorous

plain error standard.” United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). To succeed

on plain-error review, Solis-Rodriguez must show (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was

plain or obvious; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Even if Solis-Rodriguez makes these showings, we will exercise

App. 9

our discretion to correct the error only if a refusal to do so would “seriously affect[] the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States

v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(H) requires the court to inform the

defendant of “any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of

supervised release.” The magistrate judge first mentioned that Solis-Rodriguez faced two

counts under § 922(g)(5). The magistrate judge asked the prosecutor to explain the

maximum penalty, and the prosecutor responded, “[t]he maximum term of imprisonment

[is] 10 years.” J.A. 19. Shortly after, the magistrate judge described “the maximum penalty

for these offenses [as] 10 years imprisonment.” J.A. 20. According to Solis-Rodriguez, the

magistrate judge plainly erred by failing to clarify each count carried a maximum 10-year

penalty.

Considering this argument, we assume, without deciding, that the magistrate judge

erred in not informing Solis-Rodriguez that each individual offense carried up to 10 years’

imprisonment, for a maximum penalty of 20 years. We also assume that his error in doing

so was obvious under existing law. Even so, the error did not affect Solis-Rodriguez’s

substantial rights. To demonstrate that a Rule 11 error affected his substantial rights, SolisRodriguez “must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have

entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004).

In several prior § 922(g) cases, we addressed a similar context where a court failed

to mention the potential applicability of the Armed Career Criminal Act at the plea

colloquy. In United States v. Hairston, at the time the defendant pled guilty, he thought

App. 10

that he faced a maximum prison term of 30 years. 522 F.3d 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2008). After

the plea, a probation officer recommended that the Act should apply. Id. at 338. Thus, at

the sentencing hearing, the defendant learned he faced a minimum of 45 years in jail. Id.

at 339. The district court rejected Hairston’s request to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. After

finding that the district court erred in failing to notify Hairston of his full minimum

sentence, we reviewed that error for harmlessness. See id. at 341; see also Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(h). In doing so, we concluded that the government failed to meet its burden to show the

error was harmless. Hairston, 522 F.3d at 341–42. The record clearly showed a reasonable

probability that without the error, Hairston would not have entered the plea. 6 Id. We

rejected the government’s harmless error argument because of the significant disparity

between the sentences, Hairston’s statement to the district court that he would not have

pled guilty if he knew the full minimum sentence and his attempt to withdraw his plea. Id.

In United States v. Massenburg, the district court notified a felon-in-possession

defendant of his potential maximum prison term of 10 years. 564 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir.

2009). Massenburg pled guilty before the probation officer recommended applying the

Armed Career Criminal Act and its mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’

imprisonment. Id. Massenburg objected to the PSR on several grounds, but he never raised

a Rule 11 error and did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. Accordingly, we reviewed

The Hairston defendant preserved the plea colloquy issue for appellate review by

“seeking to withdraw his guilty plea below.” Hairston, 522 F.3d at 341. The court applied

the same “reasonable probability” standard that we apply today, except the government

carried the burden to show harmlessness. Id.

App. 11

his plea colloquy appeal for plain error. Id. at 342. And although the district court plainly

erred, Massenburg had not established a “reasonable probability that, but for the error, he

would not have entered the plea.” Id. at 343 (quoting Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83).

Unlike the Hairston defendant, Massenburg never stated he would not have pled guilty

with full information. Id. Nor did he move to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 343–44. And

“there does not appear to be any dispute that the case against Massenburg is a strong one,”

so Massenburg had little to gain by going to trial. Id. at 344. Thus, we concluded

Massenburg had not shown an effect on his substantial rights.

Most recently, we reversed a plea colloquy for plain error in United States v.

Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Lockhart pled guilty to felon-inpossession under § 922(g)(1), with knowledge of the statute’s maximum of 10 years’

imprisonment. Id. at 190–91. Yet again, the PSR recommended applying the Armed Career

Criminal Act and its minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 191. And the district court

applied it, sentencing Lockhart to 180 months’ imprisonment. Id. Lockhart challenged the

plea colloquy on appeal, and we reviewed for plain error since he never objected below or

moved to withdraw his plea. Id. at 192. Lockhart also argued that the Supreme Court’s

decision in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), constituted an intervening change

in law requiring vacatur of his plea. Lockhart, 947 F.3d at 192. The parties agreed that the

magistrate judge plainly erred. Id. And we concluded that the error affected Lockhart’s

substantial rights—and was thus distinct from Massenburg—because (1) Lockhart gained

only an 8-month, 4.2% reduction in his total sentence by pleading guilty, compared with

Massenburg’s 23% reduction; and (2) appellate counsel represented that Lockhart would

App. 12

go to trial following vacatur. Id. at 194–95. Finally, the Supreme Court’s intervening Rehaif

decision clarified the scienter requirements for § 922(g) offenses and was not available at

the time of the plea colloquy. Id. at 196. The combined prejudice of the plea colloquy and

Rehaif errors indicated a reasonable probability that Lockhart would not have pled guilty

absent the court’s errors.

Taking our precedent into account and considering this record, we find no

reasonable probability that Solis-Rodriguez would have proceeded to trial absent the

magistrate judge’s alleged error. Unlike the defendant in Hairston—and like the defendant

in Massenburg—Solis-Rodriguez neither objected to, nor moved to withdraw, his guilty

plea below. See Hairston, 522 F.3d at 341; Massenburg, 564 F.3d at 343–44. Nor did he

indicate any surprise at the sentencing hearing when presented with the possibility of 20

years’ imprisonment. See Hairston, 522 F.3d at 342; Massenburg, 564 F.3d at 343–44.

Like the defendant in Massenburg, Solis-Rodriguez faced the government’s strong

evidence—police testimony about finding the Hi-Point pistol on Solis-Rodriguez during

the first incident, his admission that he owned the nine-millimeter pistol used at The Taco

Bar shooting and security footage of that shooting. See Massenburg, 564 F.3d at 344.

Unlike the Lockhart defendant’s 8-month, 4.2% sentence reduction for pleading guilty,

Solis-Rodriguez’s plea slashed the applicable guidelines range from 210–240 months to

151–188 months. See Lockhart, 947 F.3d at 194. And unlike Lockhart’s intervening change

in law because of the Supreme Court’s Rehaif decision, no prejudicial and intervening

change of law has occurred here. See id. at 196.

App. 13

In sum, we assume the magistrate judge plainly erred in describing the maximum

statutory penalty to Solis-Rodriguez. Even so, Solis-Rodriguez has failed to show a

reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial absent the magistrate judge’s

assumed error. He has, therefore, failed to meet his burden on plain-error review.

B. Sentencing

Solis-Rodriguez also argues his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because he

raised three nonfrivolous mitigating arguments—remorse, age and lack of violent criminal

history—that the district court failed to consider or address. When a party “draw[s]

arguments from § 3553 for a sentence different than the one ultimately imposed, an

aggrieved party sufficiently alerts the district court of its responsibility to render an

individualized explanation addressing those arguments, and thus preserves its claim.”

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir. 2010).

Solis-Rodriguez never argued his remorse supported a sentence at the low end of

the guidelines range. Instead, he expressed remorse during his allocution. After the

allocution, Solis-Rodriguez’s counsel argued for a lower sentence but did not rely on

remorse. Because remorse was not a “non-frivolous reason[] presented for imposing a

different sentence,” the district court had no obligation to consider it. United States v. Ross,

912 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).

The government argues that Solis-Rodriguez’s comments about his age and criminal

history didn’t amount to arguments either. And it is true that he could have clarified that

he was relying on these as mitigation arguments. For example, saying that “Mr. SolisRodriguez stands before the Court a very young man,” J.A. 108, sounds as much like a

App. 14

statement of fact as a mitigation argument. Counsel did not elaborate on this. He did not

say, for example, that Solis-Rodriguez’s brain wasn’t fully developed. But counsel’s

comments followed the district court’s invitation to argue for “the appropriate sentence in

this case.” J.A. 107. For that reason, we conclude here that Solis-Rodriguez did argue his

young age and lack of violent criminal history supported a sentence at the low end of the

guidelines range. These are nonfrivolous reasons that can support a lower sentence. See

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 58 (2007) (age); Lynn, 592 F.3d at 581 (criminal

history). So, Solis-Rodriguez preserved his sentencing challenge regarding age and

criminal history. See Lynn, 592 F.3d at 578.

We review the procedural reasonableness of a criminal sentence “under a deferential

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 41. In doing so, “[w]e consider ‘whether

the district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory guidelines range, gave the

parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.’” United States v.

Shields, 126 F.4th 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ross, 912 F.3d at 744). The district

court must conduct an “individualized assessment on the facts before the court” and

“explain adequately the sentence imposed to allow for meaningful appellate review and to

promote the perception of fair sentencing.” United States v. Fowler, 58 F.4th 142, 153 (4th

Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2020)).

As relevant here, the “district court must address or consider all non-frivolous

reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why [it] has rejected those

arguments.” Ross, 912 F.3d at 744. And in a routine case with a within-Guidelines

App. 15

sentence, the explanation “need not be elaborate or lengthy.” Fowler, 58 F.4th at 153

(quoting United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174–75 (4th Cir. 2020)). In fact, we can

sometimes “discern a sentencing court’s rationale from the context surrounding its

decision.” Ross, 912 F.3d at 745. In United States v. Montes-Pineda, the defendant argued

that sentence disparities between jurisdictions with “fast track” programs for immigrant

defendants and those without them supported a lower sentence. 445 F.3d 375, 379–81 (4th

Cir. 2006). And even though the district court did not explicitly mention any jurisdictional

disparities when issuing the sentence, “the court entertained arguments from both sides on

whether to grant Montes-Pineda’s request and engaged counsel in a discussion about the

disparities” between the two kinds of jurisdictions. Id. at 381. We had “no basis for

doubting that the district court considered Montes-Pineda’s contentions.” Id.

Turning to the case at hand, the district court adequately considered SolisRodriguez’s age and lack of criminal history arguments and explained its reasoning. Two

elements of the record, taken together, demonstrate this.

First, the district court clarified—twice—that it considered “all of the [§ 3553(a)]

sentencing factors.” J.A. 114; see also J.A. 115 (“So the Court has considered all the

sentencing factors.”). Section 3553(a)(1) requires a sentencing court to consider “the nature

and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” The

age and criminal history arguments fall under the § 3553(a) “history and characteristics of

the defendant” factor. Thus, while the district court didn’t mention age and criminal history

specifically, it twice mentioned that it had considered a factor including those things. So,

App. 16

the record indicates the district court considered Solis-Rodriguez’s arguments for a lower

sentence.

Considering non-frivolous arguments is one thing. Our precedent also requires an

explanation that allows for meaningful appellate review, which brings us to the second

element of the record that supports the district court’s conclusion. 7 See Gall, 552 U.S. at

50. The “context surrounding [the] district court’s explanation” sufficiently demonstrates

why the court rejected Solis-Rodriguez’s arguments about his age and criminal history.

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 381. Recall that after describing what it considered, the court

“highlighted some [factors] that it [found] particularly important.” J.A. 115. It addressed

the “very, very disturbing” nature and circumstances of the offense. J.A. 114. The district

judge explained that as a father, he too shared concerns about his family. But he warned

that threats against one’s family do not “allow you to go and shoot and attempt to kill

somebody that is not attempting to do imminent death or seriously bodily injury to you.”

J.A. 115. Next, the court specifically noted a need to deter Solis-Rodriguez from further

criminal conduct. It also expressed the importance of generally deterring the resolution of

disputes through violence. And finally, the court explained that it needed to promote

respect for the rule of law.

Reviewing this discussion in its totality, the district court’s reasoning is sufficiently

clear. It considered the § 3553(a) factors that include age and criminal history. It then

Indeed, the government conceded that the district court’s statement that it

considered all factors is not sufficient, on its own, to satisfy procedural reasonableness. See

Oral Arg. at 34:53–35:10.

App. 17

highlighted factors it felt were “particularly important.” J.A. 115. This indicates that the

court felt the highlighted factors were more important than—or said differently,

outweighed—others. 8 That explanation permits meaningful appellate review. Thus, the

sentence was procedurally reasonable.

Finally, although not necessary for, nor a basis of, our decision, we also note that

the district court asked counsel “if there’s any legal reason why this sentence as proposed

should not be imposed?” J.A. 121. By doing so, the court offered both parties an

opportunity to raise concerns with the sentence. Neither did. In light of that silence, we

take this opportunity to encourage some efficiency. To minimize the risk of overlooking

any unaddressed objections, district courts would be wise to ask the parties if they have

any concerns with the sentence. A district court can be even more precise by asking if there

are any objections to the sentence that the court has failed to address. And as for the

lawyers, bringing any unaddressed objections to the court’s attention while there is an

opportunity to fix any perceived problems seems consistent with the duties defense counsel

and the government owe as officers of the court and is compatible with the lawyers’ duties

to zealously represent their clients. 9

At oral argument, Solis-Rodriguez’s counsel conceded the district court would not

have erred if it said the highlighted factors “outweighed” Solis-Rodriguez’s age and lack

of criminal history. See Oral Arg. at 13:14–13:31.

Our concurring colleague believes Solis-Rodriguez forfeited his sentencing

challenge by failing to raise it in response to the district court. See Concurring Op. at 21–

22. If so, we would apply plain error review to Solis-Rodriguez’s procedural

unreasonableness challenge. See Lynn, 592 F.3d at 577. But for two reasons, we decline to

App. 18

III.

For these reasons, Solis-Rodriguez’s conviction and sentence are,

AFFIRMED.

reach this issue. One, the government never raised this argument in its brief. So, we lack

Solis-Rodriguez’s position on whether he forfeited his challenge. Two, we have already

concluded the district court imposed a procedurally reasonable sentence within its

discretion. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If Solis-Rodriguez cannot show abuse of discretion,

applying the more difficult plain-error standard of review will not change our conclusion.

App. 19

TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:

I fully join Judge Quattlebaum’s well-reasoned opinion with a modest exception to

Part II.B. I agree that the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) sentencing

factors and sufficiently explained the chosen sentence. Therefore, Solis-Rodriguez has

failed to prevail on his sentencing challenge under both the harmless error and plain error

standards of review. I write separately to address, in more detail, my view that plain error

review is appropriate in this case.

District courts have certain well-defined duties when sentencing criminal

defendants. The court must properly calculate the defendant’s advisory guidelines range,

give the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, consider the § 3553

factors, and sufficiently explain the selected sentence. See United States v. Shields, 126

F.4th 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2025). “Directly relevant here is the requirement that a sentencing

court address the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence, and if

it rejects those arguments, explain why in a sufficiently detailed manner to allow this Court

to conduct a meaningful appellate review.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, the district court properly calculated the advisory guideline range and gave

the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence. The court then noted that

it had considered all of the sentencing factors, and highlighted the factors that it found

particularly important—specifically the “very, very disturbing” nature and circumstances

App. 20

of the offense, the need to deter Solis-Rodriguez from further criminal conduct, and the

need to promote respect for the law. J.A. 114.

But the district court did not immediately impose a sentence. Instead, the district

court advised the parties that it would first “propose a sentence that it believes is sufficient

but not greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing,” and “invite[d] the

attorneys to listen to the proposed sentence before it [was] actually imposed so if there is a

legal reason why it should not be imposed, [they could] so advise,” J.A. 115-16 (emphasis

added). After announcing the proposed sentence, and providing the basis for it, the court

then asked “counsel if there [was] any legal reason why th[e] sentence as proposed should

not be imposed.” J.A. 121. Defense counsel responded, “Just the issues that we previously

raised that the Court overruled.” Id. 1 At no point did defense counsel assert that the district

court had not sufficiently considered his mitigation arguments, nor did counsel challenge

the adequacy of the district court’s statement of reasons for the proposed sentence. Hearing

no further objection or argument, the district court imposed the sentence as proposed.

I believe that the district court’s question to counsel prior to imposing the proposed

sentence, and defense counsel’s silence in the face of that question, operated as a forfeiture

The issues raised and overruled were defense counsel’s objection to the attempted

murder enhancement and his argument that defendant’s two § 922(g)(5) offenses were a

continuing offense with a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. The district court

assured defense counsel that these objections were preserved.

App. 21

of defendant’s argument that the district court procedurally erred in imposing the

sentence—triggering plain error review.

II.

“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional

right, or a right of any other sort, may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the

failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to

determine it.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (cleaned up). The failure

to do so has consequences: the “silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plain-error

rule,” and the “reviewing court may consult the whole record when considering the effect

of any error on substantial rights.” United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). This

“[p]lain error review in the sentencing context serves worthy purposes, including inducing

the timely raising of claims and objections.” United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th

Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).

Thus, the district court has specific responsibilities when sentencing defendants.

But so does defense counsel. “[T]he value of finality requires defense counsel to be on his

toes, not just the judge, and the defendant who just sits there when a mistake can be fixed

cannot just sit there when he speaks up later on.” Vonn, 535 U.S. at 73. He must

demonstrate plain error on appeal. This “contemporaneous objection rule [also] prevents

a litigant from ‘sandbagging’ the court—remaining silent about his objection and belatedly

raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor.” Puckett v. United States,

556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009); id. at 140 (“[R]equiring the objection means the defendant

App. 22

cannot ‘game’ the system, waiting to see if the sentence later strikes him as satisfactory,

and then seeking a second bite at the apple by raising the claim.”) (cleaned up). When the

district court is apprised of the claim, it “can grant an immediate remedy . . . and thus avoid

the delay and expense of a full appeal.” Id.

In this case, appellant’s counsel (who was not defense counsel at sentencing) argued

that the district court failed to adequately consider the arguments and failed to adequately

explain the sentence at the hearing—necessitating a full resentencing. When questioned

as to whether plain error review should apply because defense counsel did not speak up in

response to the district court’s inquiry, appellate counsel relied upon our decision in Lynn

to argue that there was no such obligation. I disagree.

In Lynn, we held that defense counsel is not required “to complain about a judicial

choice after it has been made” to preserve an objection. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 578 (emphasis

added) (cleaned up). We observed that “[r]equiring a party to lodge an explicit objection

after the district court explanation would saddle busy district courts with the burden of

sitting through an objection—probably formulaic—in every criminal case.” Id. (emphasis

added) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009)

(“[T]he rules do not require a litigant to complain about a judicial choice after it has been

made. Such a complaint is properly called, not an objection, but an exception”—which the

rules do not require.) (emphasis added).

But that is not what happened here. The district court ensured that the parties

understood that it would first propose a sentence. The district court then explained the

App. 23

proposed sentence and the reasons for it. And before imposing the proposed sentence, the

court invited counsel to point out any legal reason as to why the sentence should not be

imposed. In other words, the court was inviting further argument and objections before

imposing the sentence. If counsel believed that the court had failed to sufficiently consider

a mitigating argument or that its explanation was inadequate, this was the opportunity to

speak up. Otherwise, counsel could indeed sandbag the court, standing quietly by and

gambling on the prospect of a remand for resentencing if this court, in hindsight, questions

whether the explanation was sufficient.

III.

I concur with the majority’s determination that the district court did not commit

procedural error in imposing Solis-Rodriquez’s sentence. I also applaud the majority’s

decision to encourage judicial efficiency by recommending that district courts ask the

parties if they have concerns about the sentence or if there are any objections that the court

failed to address. But I would go farther, confront the question of what standard of review

applies, and provide some needed guidance—even if only prospectively—to our

hardworking district courts.

This court receives countless appeals by criminal defendants premised on the failure

of a sentencing court to tick through each nonfrivolous argument offered in support of a

lower sentence and explain how it was considered and why it was rejected. District courts

unquestionably have duties to the parties and this court, but the parties have duties too.

When a district court, following argument, proposes a sentence and invites the attorneys to

App. 24

tell the court if there is any legal infirmity, the duty of counsel becomes paramount. If

counsel believes the court has failed to sufficiently consider an argument or adequately

explain the proposed sentence, he should not be allowed to sit silently by, preserve an

opportunity to complain about it on appeal, and put the government to the task of proving

harmless error.

I also commend the district court in this case for its attempt to elicit objections to

the proposed sentence, including any objection to the sufficiency of the district court’s

explanation for the proposed sentence. If Solis-Rodriguez’s counsel “had objections to the

sentence imposed or, more particularly, to the decision-making process, he could and

should have raised them at a time and in such a way as to afford the trial judge an

opportunity to correct any error, clarify any ambiguity or elaborate as necessary.” United

States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 2010). And because he did not, plain error

was, in my judgment, the proper standard of review.

Prospectively, I also encourage our district courts to take steps to verify with the

parties that the court has adequately addressed all of the arguments for a sentence they have

advanced and sufficiently explained the court’s reasons for a proposed sentence before it

is imposed. This will “allow[] the judge to immediately remedy omissions or clarify and

supplement inadequate explanations,” United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 258

(3rd Cir. 2014), and serve the additional purpose of “guiding appellate review,” United

States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Pyles, 862

F.3d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Where either the defense or the prosecution believe that the

App. 25

trial court has overlooked an argument in favor of mitigating or enhancing the sentence,

we should ‘induce the timely raising of claims and objections, which gives the district court

the opportunity to consider and resolve them,’ and thereby ‘correct or avoid the mistake so

that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome.’”) (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134);

United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that the sentencing

“appeal could have been avoided if the court, after pronouncing sentence, had asked

counsel whether there were any objections—to the sentence or to the manner in which the

court pronounced it—other than those previously stated for the record.”). Such an inquiry

will “ensure that the parties, especially the defendant, have been heard and that the record

is complete for purposes of appeal”; and any burden associated with this approach “pales

in comparison to the time and resources required to correct errors through a lengthy appeal

and resentencing.” United States v. Hunter, 809 F.3d 677, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned

up); see also Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 258 (“Our strong interest in judicial economy,

heightened in these times of fiscal restraint and judicial budgetary concerns, weighs heavily

in favor of a rule under which the defendant must contemporaneously object to concerns

regarding the procedural reasonableness of a sentence.”).

I see no reason why these important considerations should not also lead this court

to require that the parties contemporaneously object, when given the opportunity, to the

sufficiency of the district court’s consideration of a mitigating argument or its explanation

for a proposed sentence. If the opportunity is given and squandered, an assertion of error

App. 26

in the court’s explanation later on appeal should be deemed forfeited and therefore subject

to plain error analysis. 2

My colleagues have declined to address the question of whether Solis-Rodriguez

forfeited his procedural reasonableness challenge because the government did not raise this

argument in its brief and a finding of forfeiture would not change the outcome of this

appeal. They are correct on both counts. But the question of whether the issue was

forfeited by the defendant affects our standard of review. And I would take the opportunity

to reach that issue. See United States v. Naum, 134 F.4th 234, 241 (4th Cir. 2025)

(“[C]ourts must apply the proper standard of review even if the parties have not.”); Sierra

Club v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 286 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[P]arties

cannot waive the proper standard of review by failing to argue it.”) (cleaned up); United

States v. Escobar, 866 F.3d 333, 339 n.13 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“A party cannot

waive, concede, or abandon the applicable standard of review.”); see also Moody v.

Netchoice, LLC., 603 U.S. 707, 779-780 (2024) (Alito, concurring) (“It is one thing to

allow parties to forfeit claims, defenses, or lines of argument; it would be quite another to

allow parties to stipulate or bind a court to the application of an incorrect legal standard.”).

In any event, even if the government could forfeit the standard of review applicable to

sentencing errors, we can always exercise our “discretion to reach a forfeited issue.” Stokes

v. Stirling, 64 F.4th 131, 136 n.3 (4th Cir. 2023). When defense counsel remains silent in

the face of a district court’s request that it be advised of any potential sentencing errors

before sentence is formally imposed, sandbagging courts in derogation of concerns for

judicial efficiency and economy, I would do so.

App. 27

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4654

Doc: 69-2

Filed: 07/23/2025

Pg: 1 of 1

Total Pages:(3 of 3)

FILED: July 23, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 22-4654

(3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK-1)

___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

EDIN ANAEL SOLIS-RODRIGUEZ

Defendant - Appellant

___________________

JUDGMENT

___________________

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in

accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ NWAMAKA ANOWI, CLERK

App. 28

AO 245B (WDNC Rev. 01/2020) Judgment in a Criminal Case

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Western District of North Carolina

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EDIN ANAEL SOLIS-RODRIGUEZ

)

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

(For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987)

Case Number: DNCW321CR000053-001

USM Number: 48338-479

Kevin Tate

Defendant’s Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

 Pleaded guilty to count(s) 1s & 2s.

 Pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was accepted by the court.

 Was found guilty on count(s) after a plea of not guilty.

ACCORDINGLY, the court has adjudicated that the defendant is guilty of the following offense(s):

Title and Section

18:922(g)(5),

18:924(a)(2)

18:922(g)(5),

18:924(a)(2)

Nature of Offense

Possession of a Firearm by an Illegal Alien

Date Offense

Concluded

08/28/2020

Counts

Possession of a Firearm by an Illegal Alien

11/14/2021

The Defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed

pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

 The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s).

 Count(s) 1 (is)(are) dismissed on the motion of the United States.

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any

change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this

judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay monetary penalties, the defendant shall notify the court and United States

attorney of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances.

Date of Imposition of Sentence: 10/26/2022

United States District Judge

Date: October 31, 2022

Case 3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK Document 35 Filed 10/31/22 Page 1 of 7

App. 29

•

AO 245B (WDNC Rev. 01/2020) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Defendant: Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez

Case Number: DNCW321CR000053-001

Judgment- Page 2 of 7

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of

Count 1s: ONE HUNDRED & TWENTY (120) MONTHS; Count 2s: SIXTY (60) MONTHS to run consecutively for a total

term of ONE HUNDRED & EIGHTY (180) MONTHS.

 The Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

Placed in a facility as close to Charlotte, NC as possible, consistent with the needs of BOP.

Participation in any available educational and vocational opportunities.

Participation in the Federal Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

Defendant shall support all dependents from prison earnings.

 The Defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

 The Defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this District:

 As notified by the United States Marshal.

 At on .

 The Defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

 As notified by the United States Marshal.

 Before 2 p.m. on .

 As notified by the Probation Office.

RETURN

I have executed this Judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on __________ to _______________________________________ at

________________________________________, with a certified copy of this Judgment.

United States Marshal

By:

Deputy Marshal

Case 3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK Document 35 Filed 10/31/22 Page 2 of 7

App. 30

AO 245B (WDNC Rev. 01/2020) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Defendant: Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez

Case Number: DNCW321CR000053-001

Judgment- Page 3 of 7

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of Counts 1s & 2s: THREE (3) YEARS each

count to run concurrently.

☐ The condition for mandatory drug testing is suspended based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of

future substance abuse.

CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

The defendant shall comply with the mandatory conditions that have been adopted by this court.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from

imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the Court (unless omitted by the Court).

The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer (unless omitted by the Court).

The defendant shall comply with the discretionary conditions that have been adopted by this court and any additional conditions ordered.

The defendant shall report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where he/she is authorized to reside within 72 hours of release from

imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs the defendant to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.

The defendant shall report to the probation officer in a manner and frequency as directed by the Court or probation officer.

The defendant shall not leave the federal judicial district where he/she is authorized to reside without first getting permission from the Court or probation

officer.

The defendant shall answer truthfully the questions asked by the probation officer. However, defendant may refuse to answer a question if the truthful answer

would tend to incriminate him/her of a crime. Refusal to answer a question on that ground will not be considered a violation of supervised release.

The defendant shall live at a place approved by the probation officer. The probation officer shall be notified in advance of any change in living arrangements

(such as location and the people with whom the defendant lives). If advance notification is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant

shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

10.

The defendant shall allow the probation officer to visit him/her at any time at his/her home or any other reasonable location as determined by the probation

office, and shall permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of his/her supervision that the probation officer observes.

11.

The defendant shall work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at lawful employment, actively seek such gainful employment or be enrolled in a full time

educational of vocational program unless excused by the probation officer. The defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of any change

regarding employment or education.

12.

The defendant shall not communicate or interact with any persons he/she knows is engaged in criminal activity, and shall not communicate or interact with any

person he/she knows to be convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer.

13.

The defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer.

14.

The defendant shall not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or

was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).

15.

The defendant shall not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential informant without first getting the permission of the

Court.

16.

The defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not unlawfully purchase, possess, use, distribute or administer any narcotic or controlled

substance or any psychoactive substances (including, but not limited to, synthetic marijuana, bath salts) that impair a person’s physical or mental functioning,

whether or not intended for human consumption, or any paraphernalia related to such substances, except as duly prescribed by a licensed medical

practitioner.

17.

The defendant shall participate in a program of testing for substance abuse. The defendant shall refrain from obstructing or attempting to obstruct or tamper,

in any fashion, with the efficiency and accuracy of the testing. The defendant shall participate in a substance abuse treatment program and follow the rules

and regulations of that program. The probation officer will supervise the defendant’s participation in the program (including, but not limited to, provider,

location, modality, duration, intensity) (unless omitted by the Court).

18.

The defendant shall not go to, or remain at any place where he/she knows controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered without

first obtaining the permission of the probation officer.

19.

The defendant shall submit to a search if the Probation Officer has a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed a crime or a violation of a

condition of supervised release. Such a search may be conducted by a U.S. Probation Officer, and such other law enforcement personnel as the probation

officer may deem advisable, without a warrant or the consent of the defendant. Such search may be of any place where evidence of the above may

reasonably be expected to be found, including defendant’s person, property, house, residence, vehicle, communications or data storage devices or media or

office.

20.

The defendant shall pay any financial obligation imposed by this judgment remaining unpaid as of the commencement of the sentence of probation or the term

of supervised release in accordance with the schedule of payments of this judgment. The defendant shall notify the court of any changes in economic

circumstances that might affect the ability to pay this financial obligation.

21.

The defendant shall support all dependents including any dependent child, or any person the defendant has been court ordered to support.

22.

The defendant shall participate in transitional support services (including cognitive behavioral treatment programs) and follow the rules and regulations of such

program. The probation officer will supervise the defendant’s participation in the program (including, but not limited to, provider, location, modality, duration,

intensity). Such programs may include group sessions led by a counselor or participation in a program administered by the probation officer.

23.

The defendant shall follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

Case 3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK Document 35 Filed 10/31/22 Page 3 of 7

App. 31

AO 245B (WDNC Rev. 01/2020) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Defendant: Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez

Case Number: DNCW321CR000053-001

Judgment- Page 4 of 7

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS:

24.

In accordance with established procedures provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq, the

defendant, upon release from imprisonment, is to be surrendered to a duly-authorized immigration official for deportation.

As a condition of supervised release, if ordered deported, the defendant shall remain outside the United States unless

legally authorized to reenter. If deportation should not occur or if the defendant is allowed to reenter, the defendant shall

report in person to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the

custody of the Bureau of Prisons or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency or return to the United States. As

a further condition of supervised release, the defendant shall abide by all orders and directives of the United States

immigration officials.

Case 3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK Document 35 Filed 10/31/22 Page 4 of 7

App. 32

AO 245B (WDNC Rev. 01/2020) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Defendant: Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez

Case Number: DNCW321CR000053-001

Judgment- Page 5 of 7

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant shall pay the following total criminal monetary penalties in accordance with the Schedule of Payments.

ASSESSMENT

$200.00

RESTITUTION

$0.00

FINE

$0.00

 The determination of restitution is deferred until. Upon such a determination an Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case

(AO 245C) will be entered. Failing such a determination by, restitution amount becomes $0.00 without further Order of the

Court.

INTEREST

The defendant shall pay interest on any fine or restitution of more than $2,500.00, unless the fine or restitution is

paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options

on the Schedule of Payments may be subject to penalties for default and delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

 The court has determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

 The interest requirement is waived.

 The interest requirement is modified as follows:

COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL FEES

 The defendant shall pay court appointed counsel fees.

Case 3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK Document 35 Filed 10/31/22 Page 5 of 7

App. 33

AO 245B (WDNC Rev. 01/2020) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Defendant: Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez

Case Number: DNCW321CR000053-001

Judgment- Page 6 of 7

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties shall be due as follows:

A  Lump sum payment of $0.00 due immediately, balance due

 Not later than

 In accordance  (C),  (D) below; or

B  Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with  (D) below); or

C  Payment in equal monthly installments of $50.00 to commence 60 days after the date of this judgment; or

D  In the event the entire amount of criminal monetary penalties imposed is not paid prior to the

commencement of supervision, payments shall be made in

equal monthly installments of $50.00 to commence 60 days after release from imprisonment to a term of

supervision. The U.S. Probation Officer shall pursue collection of the amount due, and may request to modify

a payment schedule if appropriate 18 U.S.C. § 3572.

Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

 The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

 The defendant shall pay the following court costs:

 The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States as set forth in the

Consent Order document #26 entered 6/7/2022:

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise in the special instructions above, if this judgment imposes a period of

imprisonment payment of criminal monetary penalties shall be due during the period of imprisonment. All criminal

monetary penalty payments are to be made to the United States District Court Clerk, 401 West Trade Street,

Room 1301, Charlotte, NC 28202, except those payments made through the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program. All criminal monetary penalty payments are to be made as directed by the court.

The Defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties

imposed.

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment,

(5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of

prosecution and court costs.

Case 3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK Document 35 Filed 10/31/22 Page 6 of 7

App. 34

AO 245B (WDNC Rev. 01/2020) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Defendant: Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez

Case Number: DNCW321CR000053-001

Judgment- Page 7 of 7

STATEMENT OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I understand that my term of supervision is for a period of _______months, commencing on ____________________.

Upon a finding of a violation of probation or supervised release, I understand that the court may (1) revoke supervision,

(2) extend the term of supervision, and/or (3) modify the conditions of supervision.

I understand that revocation of probation and supervised release is mandatory for possession of a controlled substance,

possession of a firearm and/or refusal to comply with drug testing.

These conditions have been read to me. I fully understand the conditions and have been provided a copy of them.

(Signed)

____________________________________ Date: _________________

Defendant

(Signed)

____________________________________ Date: _________________

U.S. Probation Office/Designated Witness

 The Court gives notice that this case may involve other defendants who may be held jointly and severally liable for

payment of all or part of the restitution ordered herein and may order such payment in the future.

Case 3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK Document 35 Filed 10/31/22 Page 7 of 7

App. 35

FILED

CHARLOTTE,NC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EDIN ANAEL SOLIS-RODRIGUEZ

)

DOCKET NO.

FEB 17 2021

US DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NC

3:21 cr53-FDLJ

BILL OF INDICTMENT

Violation:

18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(5)

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

COUNT ONE

(Possession of a Firearm by an Illegal Alien)

On or about August 28, 2020, in Mecklenburg County, within the Western District of N01ih

Carolina, the defendant,

EDIN ANAEL SOLIS-RODRIGUEZ,

knowing that he was an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States, did lmowingly possess one or

more fireanns, that is, a Hi-Point, model JHP, .45 caliber pistol, in and affecting commerce, in violation of

Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(5).

NOTICE OF FORFEITURE AND FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2, notice is hereby given of 18 U.S.C. § 924 and

28 U.S.C. § 246l(c). The following property is subject to forfeiture in accordance with Section 924 and/or

Section 2461(c): all firearms or ammunition involved or used in the violations set fo1ih in this bill of

indictment.

The Grand Jury finds probable cause to believe that the following property is subject to forfeiture

on one or more of the grounds stated above:

a. One a Hi-Point, model JHP, .45 caliber pistol and magazine seized during the investigation.

A TRUE BILL

R. ANDREW MURRAY

UNITED ST TES 1JtTTORNEY

L-

STEPHANIE'L. SP' UGH

SPECIAL ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

Case 3:21-cr-00053-FDW-DCK Document 1 Filed 02/17/21 Page 1 of 1

App. 36

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