Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sherrod Goodspeed, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefDec 18, 2025
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No. ______________
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
Sherrod Goodspeed,
Petitioner,
v.
United States of America,
Respondent.
___________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
___________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
___________
Christy Martin
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Federal Public Defender’s Office
Northern District of Texas
525 S. Griffin Street, Suite 629
Dallas, TX 75202
(214) 767-2746
christy_martin@fd.org
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
Texas robbery may be committed by a reckless use of force
merely incidental to the taking of property. Did the Fifth Circuit
misapply the categorical approach by dismissing an elemental
mismatch as a mere variation in terminology and misconstruing
the mens rea required in the amended definition of robbery in
the Guidelines, in finding that Texas robbery is a crime of
violence.
II.
Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second
Amendment?
III.
Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g) permits conviction for the possession
of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in
the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner is Sherrod Goodspeed, who was the Defendant-Appellant in the
court below. Respondent, the United States of America, was the Plaintiff-Appellee in
the court below.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................................................................ i
I.
Texas robbery may be committed by a reckless use of force merely
incidental to the taking of property. Did the Fifth Circuit misapply
the categorical approach by dismissing an elemental mismatch as a
mere variation in terminology and misconstruing the mens rea
required in the amended definition of robbery in the Guidelines, in
finding that Texas robbery is a crime of violence. ....................................... i
II. Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?......... i
III. Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any
firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite
past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional? ......................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................................................................... II
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... III
INDEX TO APPENDICES ......................................................................................... V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................VI
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ..............................................................1
OPINION BELOW.......................................................................................................1
JURISDICTION...........................................................................................................1
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS...........................................2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....................................................................................4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..........................................................6
I.
The Fifth Circuit misapplied the categorical approach by dismissing an
elemental mismatch as a mere variation in terminology and in
misconstruing the mens rea required in the amended definition of
robbery in the Guidelines by finding that the reckless offense of
Texas robbery is a crime of violence. ............................................................6
iii
II. This Court should decide the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)
under the Second Amendment. It should hold the instant Petition
pending resolution of any merits cases presenting that issue. .................13
III. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the tension between
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1963) on the one hand,
and Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) and
Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014) on the other. .........................20
CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................27
iv
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Appendix A Opinion of Fifth Circuit, United States v. Goodspeed, No. 25-10209 (5th
Cir. Sept.19, 2025)(unpublished).
Appendix B Judgment and Sentence of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, United States v. Goodspeed, No. 4:24-cr000172-1 (Jan. 16, 2025).
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Federal Cases
Bond v. United States,
572 U.S. 844 (2014) .............................................................................. 20, 21, 25, 26
Borden v. United States,
593 U.S. 420 (2021) .................................................................................................. 7
Carter v. United States,
530 U.S. 255 (2000) .................................................................................................. 8
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008) .................................................................................... 14, 15, 19
Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824)................................................................................... 23
Loughrin v. United States,
573 U.S. 351 (2014) ................................................................................................ 11
Mathis v. United States,
579 U.S. 500 (2016) ................................................................................................ 13
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012) .................................................................. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022) .............................................................................. 5, 13, 14, 15, 18
Range v. Att'y Gen. U.S.,
124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) .................................................................................. 19
Scarborough v. United States,
431 U.S. 563 (1963) .............................................................................. 20, 21, 22, 25
Stutson v. United States,
516 U.S. 163 (1996) ................................................................................................ 20
Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575 (1990) ................................................................................................ 10
United States v. Barrett,
102 F.4th 60 (2d Cir. 2024) ................................................................................ 8, 12
vi
United States v. Betancourt,
— F.4th —, 2025 WL 1571854 (5th Cir. Jun. 4, 2025).......................................... 17
United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941) ................................................................................................ 21
United States v. Diaz,
116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024) ........................................................................... 16, 17
United States v. Dominguez,
954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020), overruled on other grounds by Taylor
v. United States, 596 U.S. 845 (2015) ...................................................................... 8
United States v. Duarte,
No. 22-50048, 2025 WL 1352411 (9th Cir. May 9, 2025) ...................................... 18
United States v. Dubois,
94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated, No.
24-5744, 2025 WL 76413 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2025) ...................................................... 19
United States v. Garcia-Ortiz,
904 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2018) ............................................................................... 8, 12
United States v. Gay,
98 F.4th 843 (7th Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, 2024 WL 3816648 (7th
Cir. Aug. 14, 2024) .................................................................................................. 18
United States v. Gray,
260 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) .......................................................................... 8, 12
United States v. Hunt,
123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................. 19
United States v. Ivey,
60 F.4th 99 (4th Cir. 2023) ................................................................................. 8, 12
United States v. Jackson,
110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................... 18
United States v. Moore,
111 F.4th 266 (3d Cir. 2024) .................................................................................. 19
United States v. Moore,
666 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................. 13
United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) ................................................................................................ 21
vii
United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. 680 (2024) ........................................................................ 13, 14, 15, 16, 20
United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez,
469 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................... 6
United States v. Schnur,
132 F.4th 863 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................. 17
United States v. Smith,
153 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir. 1998) .......................................................................... 10, 11
United States v. Stevens,
70 F.4th 653 (3d Cir. 2023) ................................................................................ 8, 12
United States v. Wickware,
143 F.4th 670 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................... 5, 9, 10, 12
United States v. Williams,
113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) ........................................................................... 17, 18
Vincent v. Bondi,
127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025) ............................................................................. 19
Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) ................................................................................................ 23
Federal Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 229 ............................................................................................................. 25
18 U.S.C. § 229(a) .................................................................................................. 25, 26
18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A) ................................................................................................. 26
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ................................................... 4, 5, 13, 16, 17, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i)...................................................................................... 15, 16
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) ........................................................................................................ 7
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) .................................................................................................... 7
18 U.S.C. § 2111 ............................................................................................................. 7
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) .................................................................................................... 7, 8
18 U.S.C. § 2118(a) ........................................................................................................ 7
viii
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................................................................ 1
Affordable Care Act ..................................................................................................... 22
Hobbs Act at 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) .................................................................... 4, 7, 11
United States Sentencing Guidelines
U.S.S.G. § 2K1.2 ............................................................................................................ 6
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 ............................................................................................................ 4
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) ........................................................................................................ 4
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 ......................................................................................................... 2, 5
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) ........................................................................................................ 6
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) .......................................................................................... 4, 7, 11
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(e)(3) .................................................................................. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11
State Statutes
N.Y. Penal Law ............................................................................................................ 14
Tex. Penal Code § 29.02 ............................................................................................. 2, 4
Tex. Penal Code § 29.02(a)(1) ...................................................................................... 12
Tex. Penal Code § 29.03 ............................................................................................. 2, 4
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. II .......................................................3, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20
U. S. Const. art. I, § 8 ................................................................ 3, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25
Other Authorities
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2022) ..................... 8
Letter of Scott Meisler to Chairman Reeves regarding Proposed
Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, (February 3, 2025) (“DOJ
Comments”), at p. 10-11 ........................................................................................... 8
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 1,
2023).......................................................................................................................... 2
ix
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Sherrod Goodspeed seeks a writ of certiorari to review the judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
OPINION BELOW
The unpublished opinion of the court of appeals is reported at United States v.
Goodspeed, No. 25-10209, 2025 WL 2682520 (5th Cir. Sept. 19, 2025) (unpublished).
It is reprinted in Appendix A to this Petition. The district court’s judgment and
sentence entered in United States v. Goodspeed, No. 4:24-cr-000172-1 (Jan. 16, 2025),
is attached as Appendix B.
JURISDICTION
The panel opinion and judgment of the Fifth Circuit were entered on Sept. 19,
2025. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
1
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Question I
Section 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual:
Section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines lists “robbery” as a “crime of violence.”
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 1, 2023). A
separate subsection defines the enumerated offense as:
[T]he unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property
from the person or in the presence of another, against his
will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or
fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or
property, or property in his custody or possession, or the
person or property of a relative or member of his family or
of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or
obtaining. The phrase ‘actual or threatened force’ refers to
force that is sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(e)(3).
Tex. Penal Code § 29.02:
(a) A person commits an offense if, in the course of committing theft as defined in
Chapter 31 and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he:
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or
(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent
bodily injury or death.
Tex. Penal Code § 29.03 defines aggravated robbery as a violation of § 29.02 plus one
of two aggravating factors.
Question II
Section 922(g) of Title 18:
It shall be unlawful for any person—
(1)
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year …
2
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
Question III
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power
***
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes…
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
Proceedings in District Court
Petitioner Sherrod Goodspeed entered a plea of guilty to a single count of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The factual basis in support of the plea set forth the
elements of the offense, including, as pertinent here, that “the possession of the
firearm affected interstate or foreign commerce; that is, before the defendant
possessed the charged firearm, it had traveled at some time from one state to another
or between any part of the United States and any other country.” See Goodspeed, No.
4:24-cr-000172-1 (N.D. Tx.), Factual Resume, D.E. 21. The court accepted the plea.
At sentencing, Mr. Goodspeed challenged the use of a prior Texas robbery
conviction as a “crime of violence” to enhance his Guidelines range under U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(a) in light of Amendment 822 to the Guidelines Manual. The amendment
redefined “robbery” consistent with the definition used in several federal statutes
including the Hobbs Act at 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). The district court overruled the
objection.
II.
Appellate Proceedings
On appeal, Mr. Goodspeed argued that Texas robbery is not a categorical
match to the newly added definition of robbery in the enumerated offenses provision
of U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.2(a)(2) and (e)(3). He asserted that his sentence was improperly
enhanced by application of the cross-reference to that definition in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.
This argument was two-fold: that is, Texas robbery (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02)
and aggravated robbery (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03) lack both (1) the intent, and
4
(2) the causal nexus between the assault and the taking elements necessary to meet
the amended definition of robbery in the Guidelines.
The Fifth Circuit rejected both arguments. First, with respect to the nexus
issue, it held that “Texas robbery still constitutes a crime of violence under the
Guidelines because its elements are the same or narrower than those of the generic
definition of robbery added to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2” consistent with its previous decision
in United States v. Wickware, 143 F.4th 670, 673–75 (5th Cir. 2025). Second, on the
mens rea error, the court held that Mr. Goodspeed could not establish that the
unpreserved error was clear based only on the revised Guidelines’ language.
Mr. Goodspeed also appealed his conviction, arguing that he had a Second
Amendment right to possess arms and that following this Court’s decision in New
York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), Section 922(g)(1)
violates the Second Amendment. Finally, he asserted that the interstate commerce
nexus, as interpreted and applied in Section 922(g), exceeds the authority of Congress
under the Commerce Clause. Mr. Goodspeed acknowledged that both of these issues
are foreclosed in the Fifth Circuit.
The court of appeals affirmed. See Pet.App.A.
5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
The Fifth Circuit misapplied the categorical approach by dismissing
an elemental mismatch as a mere variation in terminology and in
misconstruing the mens rea required in the amended definition of
robbery in the Guidelines by finding that the reckless offense of Texas
robbery is a crime of violence.
In federal sentencing, in order to apply a crime of violence offense level
enhancement, a predicate offense must qualify under either the force clause or the
enumerated offenses clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), as incorporated into U.S.S.G. §
2K1.2. The enumerated offenses clause includes “robbery,” and previously Texas
robbery was considered a crime of violence under the enumerated offenses clause as
match to the generic definition of the offense. See United States v. SantiestebanHernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2006). “[T]he elements of the Texas statute,”
the Fifth Circuit held, “substantially correspond to the basic elements of the generic
offense, in that they both involve theft and immediate danger to a person,” without
regard to the mens rea or any nexus between force and taking. Id. Any “difference[s]”
were “not enough to remove the Texas statute from the family of offenses commonly
known as ‘robbery.’” Id.
a.
The amended Guidelines definition of robbery
Effective November 1, 2023, Amendment 822 to the Sentencing Guidelines
provided a definition to the robbery offense in § 4B1.2(e)(3):
“Robbery” is the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property
from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means
of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or
future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or
possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his
6
family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2), (e)(3) (Nov. 1, 2023)
(emphasis added). The Commission did not create this definition on its own. It instead
imported the definition for “robbery” found in a federal statute criminalizing
interference with interstate commerce by “robbery or extortion.” See 18 U.S.C. §
1951(a), (b)(1). Section 4B1.2’s new definition is identical to the one from the statute.
Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(e)(3), with 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). Per the Commission,
the recent amendment ensures that a conviction under that statute—frequently
referred to as Hobbs Act robbery—will qualify as a conviction for a “crime of violence”
under the Guidelines Manual. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Supplement to Appendix C
at 247 (Nov. 1, 2023).
The Hobbs Act and other federal robbery statutes are accepted force clause
predicate offenses and define robbery to require an intentional use or threat or force,
and a causal connection between a defendant’s assaultive conduct and the unlawful
taking. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(b)(1), 2111, 2113(a), 2118(a). To qualify as robbery
under the Hobbs Act, the “unlawful taking” must be accomplished “by means of actual
or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). Two other
federal statutes likewise define robbery to include takings “by force and violence, or
by intimidation.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 2113(a). A third defines robbery to require
takings “by force or violence or by intimidation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2118(a). These statutes,
as force clause predicates, require intent and a nexus. See Borden v. United States,
7
593 U.S. 420, 429 (2021) (“the ‘use of force,’ demands that the perpetrator direct his
action . . . . Reckless conduct is not aimed in that prescribed manner.”).
Further, in each case, the preposition “by” connects the taking and the defendant’s
assaultive conduct, and on the plain meaning of that term, thereby requires that the taking be
accomplished “[w]ith the use or help of” or “through” the assault. By, The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2022). By saying that the defendant must take
property “by means of force or violence,” the Guideline definition does not merely say
that the defendant must use force – it says that it must use it to accomplish a defined
goal, namely the acquisition of property. This necessarily describes an intentional
act. See e.g. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)(similarly worded robbery statute,
18 U.S.C. §2113(a), requires knowledge, not recklessness). Multiple circuit courts of appeals
have interpreted the Hobbs Act to exclude reckless offenses. See United States v.
Barrett, 102 F.4th 60, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2024); United States v. Stevens, 70 F.4th 653, (3d
Cir. 2023); United States v. Ivey, 60 F.4th 99, 116-17 (4th Cir. 2023); United States v.
Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 2020), overruled on other grounds by Taylor
v. United States, 596 U.S. 845 (2015); United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102,
108 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001). In
its comments to the Sentencing Commission regarding the proposed Guideline
amendment, the DOJ recognized the same. See Letter of Scott Meisler to Chairman
Reeves regarding Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, (February 3, 2025)
8
(“DOJ Comments”), at p.10-11, PDF pages 725-726 (“The current definition, like that
in the Hobbs Act, requires intentional conduct.”).1
b.
Texas robbery does not require a causal nexus between the force and
taking elements required by Guidelines robbery and the Fifth Circuit
erred in its application of the categorical approach.
In rejecting Mr. Goodspeed’s argument that Guidelines robbery now requires
a nexus or causal connection between the required force and the taking element of
the offense, the Fifth Circuit relied on its prior decision in United States v. Wickware,
143 F.4th 670, 673–74 (5th Cir. 2025)(per curiam). Wickware argued that Texas
robbery was broader than the Guidelines definition because “the addition of the
phrase ‘by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury’ requires
a ‘causal connection’ between the defendant’s assaultive conduct and the unlawful
taking; the property must be taken from the person through actual or threatened
force.” Id. at 674 (emphasis in original). By contrast, according to Wickware, Texas
robbery “simply requires harm to another in the course of committing theft[.]” Id.
(cleaned up) (emphasis in original). “For us to agree with Wickware,” said the Court,
“we must find that ‘in the course of’ and ‘by means of’ are substantially dissimilar.”
Id. It declined to do so, because “both phrases require the use of force preceding,
during, or throughout the theft. And since minor variances in terminology should not
distract us from the substance of the text, we do not find this difference compelling.”
Id. (cleaned up).
1 Available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-
comment/202502/90FR128_public-comment_R.pdf#page=716, PDF page 716 at link,
last visited April 29, 2025.
9
The panel instead, in following Wickware, resolved the merits based on a plainmeaning comparison of the texts alone. Pet.App.A (citing Wickware, 143 F.4th 67375). This approach dismisses the difference between the two phrases at issue as a
“minor variation[] in terminology,” see Wickware, at 673 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at
599), but the challenge goes beyond a merely textual comparison. The Fifth Circuit
should have considered the scope of the elements embodied in those texts and their
interpretation by courts in response to real-world prosecutions.
That comparison would have revealed a categorical mismatch between the
conduct qualifying as robbery in Texas and the conduct necessary to establish
“robbery” under the Guidelines. Texas courts have interpreted its robbery statute’s
“in the course of” language to reach the reckless causation of bodily injury to a random
passerby after an abandoned attempt at shoplifting. See Craver, 2015 WL 3918057,
at *5. The Tenth Circuit, by contrast, has interpreted the Hobbs Act’s “robbery”
definition to exclude the same after-the-fact injuries. In United States v. Smith, the
Tenth Circuit considered a Hobbs Act robbery conviction based on a non-violent theft.
There, the defendant committed larceny by “enter[ing] a sporting goods store” and
“ask[ing] a sales associate if he could see two” handguns “from the display case.”
Smith, 156 F.3d at 1048. After an employee handed over the requested firearms, the
defendant ran out of the store and into a getaway car waiting for him in the parking
lot. Id. Three employees chased him into the parking lot, and while the getaway car
drove off, the driver “struck” one of the employees and “broke his ankle.” Id. On
those facts, a jury voted to convict the defendant for Hobbs Act robbery, but on appeal,
10
the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction for insufficient evidence. Id. at 1056. That
holding turned on the non-violent taking. The employee at the gun counter “handed
two guns to someone who he obviously thought was an ordinary customer.” Id. “The
‘customer’ then simply turned and ran.” Id. At that point, the taking was complete,
and the ensuing relationship between the taking and the employee’s injury was
insufficient to make out a Hobbs Act robbery. “The fact that several employees
followed Mr. Smith into the parking lot, and that [one] was injured by the getaway
car, does not support a finding that Mr. Smith took the guns by means of force or
violence.” Id.
The same analysis applies to the “robbery” definition from the Guidelines.
That definition tracks the Hobbs Act verbatim. Compare U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,
Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2), (e)(3) (Nov. 1, 2023), with 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1).
To qualify as a “robbery” conviction, and thus a “crime of violence,” a prior conviction’s
elements must now include an “unlawful taking” committed “by means of actual or
threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), (e)(3). As the
Tenth Circuit recognized in Smith, the phrase “by means of” requires a means-end
relationship between the assault and the taking, and “the connection between the
two” must therefore be “more than oblique, indirect, and incidental.” See Loughrin
v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 363 (2014). The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the
Hobbs Act recognized as much, and an after-the-fact injury following a non-violent
theft cannot “transform the nature of the original crime from a theft into a robbery”
under the Hobbs Act or the Guidelines. See Smith, 156 F.3d at 1056. In Texas, the
11
same conduct qualifies as robbery. See Craver, 2015 WL 3918057, at *5. That
substantive difference should have played a central role in the Fifth Circuit’s
analysis. It did not, and the Fifth Circuit instead characterized the substantive
distinction between the two crimes as a “minor variation[] in terminology.”
Wickware, at 673. That is a fundamental misapplication of the categorical approach
and review should be granted to correct the error.
c.
Texas robbery does not require the knowing or intentional mens rea
of Guidelines robbery and the Fifth Circuit erred again in its
application of the categorical approach.
The Fifth Circuit futher held below that Mr. Goodspeed could not establish
that the unpreserved mens rea error he raised was clear based only on the revised
Guidelines’ language. As set forth above, the mismatch between the Guidelines
definition and the Texas robbery statute is plain. The Texas Penal Code criminalizes
as robbery the intentional, knowing, or reckless causation of bodily injury “in the
course of committing theft.” Tex. Penal Code § 29.02(a)(1)(emphasis added).
The language explicitly taken from the Hobbs Act robbery definition to define
Guidelines robbery plainly requires intent. Circuit courts have recognized this. See
e.g. Barrett, 102 F.4th at 78 (mens rea element of Hobbs Act robbery is knowing and
willful); Stevens, 70 F.4th at 660 (same); Ivey, 60 F.4th at 116-17 (same); Garcia-Ortiz,
904 F.3d at (same); Gray, 260 F.3d at 1283 (same). See Letter of Scott Meisler, supra.
At 8.
A straightforward application of the categorical approach demonstrates the
error in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion. A prior conviction will qualify only if the “elements
12
are the same as, or narrower than” those of the comparator. Mathis v. United States,
579 U.S. 500, 504 (2016)). The Texas robbery fails to meet that criteria.
II.
This Court should decide the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)
under the Second Amendment. It should hold the instant Petition
pending resolution of any merits cases presenting that issue.
The Second Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to keep and bear
arms.” Yet 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) denies that right, on pain of 15 years imprisonment,
to anyone convicted of a crime punishable by a year or more. Despite this facial
conflict between the statute and the text of the constitution, the courts of appeals
uniformly rejected Second Amendment challenges to the statute for many years. See
United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 316-317 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases).
This changed, however, following New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and then United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). But
Circuit Courts of Appeals applying Bruen and Rahimi have adopted different
approaches to testing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against Second Amendment challenges. A
few have interpreted the Second Amendment to allow Congress to disarm those
considered dangerous based on historical analogues to laws disarming armed rebels
and suspected traitors. For its part, the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the Second
Amendment as constitutional when applied to a defendant whose disqualifying
conviction would have faced capital punishment or forfeiture of estate in or around
the Founding Era. The Court needs to clarify the Second Amendment’s relationship
to § 922(g)(1).
13
a. The legal framework of Bruen and Rahimi
In Bruen, the Court held that where the text of the Second Amendment covers
regulated conduct, the government may defend that regulation only by showing that
it comports with the nation’s historical tradition of gun regulation. 597 U.S. at 17. It
may no longer defend the regulation by showing that the regulation achieves an
important or even compelling state interest. Id. The opinion began with a comparison
between the Second Amendment’s text and the challenged law. The State of New
York criminalized the unlicensed possession of a firearm in the home and on the
street, and any New Yorker who wanted to obtain a license to carry a firearm outside
the home needed to make a showing of “proper cause.” Id. at 1 (quoting N.Y. Penal
Law Ann. § 400.00(2)(f)). This Court began by finding a conflict between this law and
the Second Amendment’s plain text. The right to bear arms, this Court explained,
“refers to the right to wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in
a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action
in a case of conflict with another person.” Id. at 32 (quoting District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008)). Since the “definition of ‘bear’ naturally encompasses
public carry,” the Second Amendment “presumptively guarantee[d]” the petitioner’s
“right to ‘bear’ arms in public for self-defense.” Id. at 32-33.
The Court then turned to history. The plain-text analysis established a conflict
between New York’s licensing regime and the Second Amendment, so the burden
shifted to the State of New York to establish the challenged law’s consistency with
historical firearm regulations. On this topic, the Court began with a word of caution:
14
“[N]ot all history is created equal.” Id. at 34. “Constitutional rights are,” after all,
“enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted
them.” Id. at 34 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35). Given that reality, “historical
evidence that long predates” the Second Amendment’s enactment “may not
illuminate the scope of the right[s]” at issue “if linguistic or legal conventions changed
in the intervening years.” Id. This Court similarly cautioned “against giving
postenactment history more weight than it can rightly bear.” Id. at 35. “[T]o the
extent later history contradicts what the text says, the text controls.” Id. at 36.
With those rules in mind, this Court surveyed “the Anglo-American history of
public carry” and ultimately declared New York’s proper-cause licensing regime
unconstitutional. Id. at 70. Sure enough, various laws “limited the intent for which
one could carry arms, the manner by which one carried arms, [and] the exceptional
circumstances under which one could not carry arms,” but the historical evidence
established no tradition of “prohibit[ing] the public carry of commonly used firearms
for personal defense.” Id. New York’s argument from history failed, and this Court
held the challenged licensing regime to be an unconstitutional infringement on the
right to bear arms. Id. at 70-71.
In Rahimi, this Court held that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8)(C)(i), which prohibits
possession of a firearm based on the existence of a restraining order issued after a
state court has found one poses “a credible threat to the physical safety” of another
person, comports with the Second Amendment. 602 U.S. at 690. The Court resolved
Mr. Rahimi’s claim by comparing “the tradition the surety and going armed laws
15
represent” to § 922(g)(8)(C)(i). Id. at 699. All three, this Court explained, “restrict[]
gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence.” Id. All three “involved
judicial determinations of whether a particular defendant likely would threaten or
had threatened another with a weapon.” Id. All three were also temporary. Id. at 698.
The Court emphasized its limited holding, which was “only this: An individual found
by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be
temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” Id. at 702.
That rationale raises serious questions about the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§922(g)(1). Section (g)(1) imposes a permanent, not a temporary, firearm disability.
And that disability can arise from all manner of criminal convictions that do not
involve a judicial finding of future physical dangerousness.
b. The circuit courts’ inconsistent application to § 922(g)(1)
There is no circuit-court consensus on how to judge § 922(g)(1)’s
constitutionality. In United States v. Diaz, the Fifth Circuit recognized the possibility
of as-applied relief and asked whether the defendant’s disqualifying conviction (or a
conviction for a crime like it) would have faced capital punishment or forfeiture of
estate at some point in or around the Founding Era. 116 F.4th 458, 468-69 (5th Cir.
2024). This test turns on the nature of the disqualifying convictions and places the
burden of persuasion on the government. Id. at 467. The court held § 922(g)(1) to be
constitutional as applied to a defendant with a disqualifying conviction for felony
theft. Id. at 470-71 & n.4. The Fifth Circuit premised this holding on the historical
existence of harsh penalties for theft, which included capital punishment and
16
forfeiture of estate. Id. at 469. “[I]f capital punishment was permissible to respond to
theft,” the Fifth Circuit reasoned, “then the lesser restriction of permanent
disarmament that § 922(g)(1) imposes is also permissible.” Id. The Fifth Circuit’s asapplied holding resolved the defendant’s facial challenge in the government’s favor.
Id. at 471-72.
More recently, the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant’s felony aggravated
battery conviction was a “crime of violence” indicating that “he poses a threat to public
safety and the orderly functioning of society[,]” and therefore, disarming him “is
consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and
punishment of people who have been convicted of violent offenses.” United States v.
Schnur, 132 F.4th 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted) (cleaned up). Then, in
yet another case, the court looked to the facts of the defendant’s felony aggravated
assault convictions—in which he disregarded a red light, drove at 107 miles per hour,
caused a major crash and seriously injured two people—and determined that he could
be disarmed pursuant to Schnur because he “poses a threat to public safety.” United
States v. Betancourt, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 1571854 at *3 (5th Cir. Jun. 4, 2025)
(quoting Schnur, 132 F.4th at 870) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Sixth Circuit upheld § 922(g)(1)’s as-applied constitutionality against a
defendant with a series of violent criminal convictions after analogizing § 922(g)(1)’s
application to that defendant with a broad array of historical laws from both England
and America disarming those considered simply “dangerous.” United States v.
Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 662-63 (6th Cir. 2024). The Sixth Circuit’s as-applied test
17
turns on a defendant’s entire criminal record rather than the disqualifying offense
and asks whether that record reveals the defendant to be “dangerous.” Williams, 113
F.4th at 657. The Seventh Circuit has also embraced a similar approach of inquiring
of any reason an individual could constitutionally be disarmed. United States v. Gay,
98 F.4th 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, 2024 WL 3816648 (7th Cir. Aug. 14,
2024) (rejecting challenge from defendant previously convicted of 22 felonies and
presently on supervision).
The Eighth Circuit rejected the availability of as-applied challenges and
declared the statute facially constitutional based on historical laws disarming either
those “unwilling to obey the law” or “those deemed more dangerous than a typical
law-abiding citizen.” United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1125, 1126-29 (8th
Cir. 2024). Those analogues, the Eighth Circuit concluded, would authorize modernday laws disarming “persons who deviated from legal norms [and] persons who
presented an unacceptable risk of dangerousness,” Id. at 1129, in other words, any
felon. The Ninth Circuit has joined this camp. United States v. Duarte, No. 22-50048,
2025 WL 1352411, at *14 (9th Cir. May 9, 2025) (Ҥ 922(g)(1)'s permanent and
categorical disarmament of felons is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition
of firearm regulations”).
The Fourth Circuit differs from each in having held that Bruen “did not
disturb” prior Fourth Circuit “holdings about whether a given situation is outside the
ambit of the individual right to keep and bear arms,” thus the law does not regulate
protected Second Amendment activity because “people who have been convicted of
18
felonies are outside the group of law-abiding responsible citizens” that the Second
Amendment protects. United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 704 (4th Cir. 2024)
(internal quotations omitted). The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits seems to agree. See
Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 2025) (relying on pre-Rahimi
precedent that resolved the matter citing Heller and observing that the prohibition
on felon firearm possession is “presumptively lawful”); United States v. Dubois, 94
F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated, No. 24-5744, 2025
WL 76413 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2025) (holding that Bruen did not abrogate circuit precedent
foreclosing such challenges).
The Third Circuit resolved an appeal from a defendant on supervised release
without considering the defendant’s record at all. United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th
266, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2024). The court instead declared the existence of Founding Era
laws authorizing temporary forfeiture for those convicted of some crimes as analogous
to a modern-day defendant’s disarmament while serving a term of supervised release.
Id. at 271-72. Thereafter, the Third Circuit upheld an as applied challenge by a
petitioner with a decades-old food stamp fraud conviction, holding that the
government could not show a historical tradition of depriving people such as
petitioner of his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm. Range v. Att'y Gen.
U.S., 124 F.4th 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2024).
So, as it stands, the circuit courts of appeals have staked out different
approaches to this important question, but each approach is unconvincing. The Fifth
Circuit’s as-applied test, initially categorical but evolving toward an ill-defined
19
violence test, will create impossible line-drawing exercises for each defendant. The
analysis from the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, in turn, are varied and
too general, and depend on “vague” principles implicitly rejected by this Court in
Rahimi. See 602 U.S. at 701. The Fourth Circuit disagrees as to whether felons are
among those protected by Second Amendment at all.
This Court should accordingly grant certiorari to decide this momentous issue,
and, if it does so in another case, should hold the instant Petition pending the
outcome. See Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 163, 181 (1996)(Scalia, J.,
dissenting)(“We regularly hold cases that involve the same issue as a case on which
certiorari has been granted and plenary review is being conducted in order that (if
appropriate) they may be ‘GVR'd’ when the case is decided.”).
III.
This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the tension
between Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1963) on the
one hand, and Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012) and Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014) on the other.
Courts have held for years that the mere travel across state lines at any time
is sufficient to find that later possession of a firearm affected interstate commerce.
These cases follow from this Court’s jurisprudence in Scarborough v. United States,
431 U.S. 563, 577 (1963), finding federal commerce authority over items that at any
point moved across state lines. These cases stand in tension with more recent
precedents on the scope of Commerce Clause authority, that is Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (“NFIB”) and Bond v. United States, 572 U.S.
844 (2014).
20
Because Scarborough cannot be reconciled with these more recent precedents
this Court should grant review to resolve that tension. “In our federal system, the
National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain
the remainder.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 533 (2012) (“NFIB”). Powers
outside those explicitly enumerated by the Constitution are denied to the National
Government. Id. at 534 (“The Constitution's express conferral of some powers makes
clear that it does not grant others.”) There is no general federal police power. See
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-619 (2000). Every exercise of
Congressional power must be justified by reference to a particular grant of authority.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 535 (“The Federal Government has expanded
dramatically over the past two centuries, but it still must show that a constitutional
grant of power authorizes each of its actions.”). A limited central government
promotes accountability and “protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary
power.” Bond, 572 U.S. at 863.
The Constitution grants Congress a power to “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
But this power “must be read carefully to avoid creating a general federal authority
akin to the police power.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 536. Despite these
limitations, and the text of Article I, Section 8, this Court has held that “[t]he power
of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce
among the states,” and includes a power to regulate activities that “have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.” United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-119 (1941).
21
Relying on this expansive vision of Congressional power, this Court held in
Scarborough, that a predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. §922(g) reached every case in
which a felon possessed firearms that had once moved in interstate commerce. It
turned away concerns of lenity and federalism, finding that Congress had intended
the interstate nexus requirement only to insure the constitutionality of the statute.
431 U.S. at 577.
It is hard to square Scarborough, and the expansive concept of the commerce
power on which it relies, with more recent holdings of the Court in this area. In Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus., five members of this Court found that the individual mandate
component of the Affordable Care Act could not be justified by reference to the
Commerce Clause. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 557-558 (Roberts., C.J.
concurring). Although the Court recognized that the failure to buy health insurance
affects interstate commerce, five Justices did not think that the constitutional phrase
“regulate Commerce ... among the several States,” could reasonably be construed to
include enactments that compelled individuals to engage in commerce. Id. at 550
(Roberts., C.J. concurring). Rather, they understood that phrase to presuppose an
existing commercial activity to be regulated. Id. (Roberts., C.J. concurring).
The majority of this Court in NFIB thus required more than a demonstrable
effect on commerce: the majority required that the challenged enactment itself be a
regulation of commerce – that it affect the legality of preexisting commercial activity.
Possession of firearms, like the refusal to buy health insurance, may “substantially
affect commerce.” But such possession is not, without more, a commercial act.
22
To be sure, NFIB does not explicitly repudiate the “substantial effects” test.
Indeed, the Chief Justice’s opinion quotes Darby’s statement that “[t]he power of
Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce
among the states...” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 549 (Roberts., C.J.
concurring); see also id. at 552-553 (Roberts., C.J. concurring)(distinguishing Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)). It is therefore perhaps possible to read NFIB
narrowly: as an isolated prohibition on affirmatively compelling persons to engage in
commerce. But it is hard to understand how this reading of the case would be at all
consistent with NFIB’s textual reasoning.
This is so because the text of the Commerce Clause does not distinguish
between Congress’s power to affect commerce by regulating non-commercial activity
(like possessing a firearm), and its power to affect commerce by compelling people to
join a commercial market (like health insurance). Rather, it simply says that
Congress may “regulate ... commerce between the several states.” And that phrase
either is or is not limited to laws that affect the legality of commercial activity. Five
justices in NFIB took the text of the Clause seriously and permitted Congress to enact
only laws that were, themselves, regulations of commerce. NFIB thus allows
Congress only the power “to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.”
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
And indeed, much of the Chief Justice’s language in NFIB adheres to this view.
This opinion rejects the government’s argument that the uninsured were “active in
the market for health care” because they were “not currently engaged in any
23
commercial activity involving health care...” Id. at 556 (Roberts., C.J. concurring)
(emphasis added). The Chief Justice significantly observed that “[t]he individual
mandate's regulation of the uninsured as a class is, in fact, particularly divorced from
any link to existing commercial activity.” Id. (Roberts., C.J. concurring)(emphasis
added). He reiterated that “[i]f the individual mandate is targeted at a class, it is a
class whose commercial inactivity rather than activity is its defining feature.” Id.
(Roberts., C.J. concurring)(emphasis added). He agreed that “Congress can anticipate
the effects on commerce of an economic activity,” but did not say that it could
anticipate a non-economic activity. Id. (Roberts., C.J. concurring)(emphasis added).
And he finally said that Congress could not anticipate a future activity “in order to
regulate individuals not currently engaged in commerce.” Id. (Roberts., C.J.
concurring)(emphasis added). Accordingly, NFIB supports the proposition that
enactments under the Commerce Clause must regulate commercial or economic
activity, not merely activity that affects commerce.
Here, the factual basis for the plea did not state that Petitioner’s possession of
the gun was an economic activity. Under the reasoning of NFIB, this should have
been fatal to the conviction. As explained by NFIB, the Commerce Clause permits
Congress to regulate only activities: the active participation in a market. But 18
U.S.C. §922(g)(1) criminalizes all possession, without reference to economic activity.
Accordingly, it sweeps too broadly.
The factual basis also did not show that Petitioner was engaged in the relevant
market at the time of the regulated conduct. The Chief Justice has noted that
24
Congress cannot regulate a person’s activity under the Commerce Clause unless the
person affected is “currently engaged” in the relevant market. Id. at 557. As an
illustration, the Chief Justice provided the following example: “An individual who
bought a car two years ago and may buy another in the future is not ‘active in the car
market’ in any pertinent sense.” Id. at 556 (emphasis added). Thus, NFIB brought
into serious question the long-standing notion that a firearm which has previously
and remotely passed through interstate commerce should be considered to
indefinitely affect commerce without “concern for when the [initial] nexus with
commerce occurred.” Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 577.
Scarborough also stands in tension with Bond, so §922(g) ought not be
construed to reach the possession by felons of every firearm that has ever crossed
state lines. Bond was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §229, a statute that
criminalized the knowing possession or use of “any chemical weapon.” Bond, 572 U.S.
at 853; 18 U.S.C. §229(a). She placed toxic chemicals – an arsenic compound and
potassium dichromate – on the doorknob of a romantic rival. Id. The Court reversed
her conviction, holding that any construction of the statute that can reach such
conduct would compromise the chief role of states and localities in the suppression of
crime. Id. at 865-866. It instead construed the statute to reach only the kinds of
weapons and conduct associated with warfare. Id. at 859-862.
Section 229 defined the critical term “chemical weapon” broadly as “any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term
25
includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production,
and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.”
18 U.S.C. §229F(8)(A). It also criminalized the use or possession of “any” such
weapon, not of a named subset. 18 U.S.C. §229(a). This Court still applied a more
limited construction of the statute, reasoning that statutes should not be read to
sweep in purely local activity:
The Government’s reading of section 229 would “‘alter sensitive federalstate relationships,’” convert an astonishing amount of “traditionally
local criminal conduct” into “a matter for federal enforcement,” and
“involve a substantial extension of federal police resources.” [United
States v. ]Bass, 404 U.S. [336] 349-350, 92 S. Ct. 515, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488
[(1971)]. It would transform the statute from one whose core concerns
are acts of war, assassination, and terrorism into a massive federal antipoisoning regime that reaches the simplest of assaults. As the
Government reads section 229, “hardly” a poisoning “in the land would
fall outside the federal statute’s domain.” Jones [v. United States], 529
U.S. [848,] 857, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 [(2000)]. Of course
Bond’s conduct is serious and unacceptable—and against the laws of
Pennsylvania. But the background principle that Congress does not
normally intrude upon the police power of the States is critically
important. In light of that principle, we are reluctant to conclude that
Congress meant to punish Bond’s crime with a federal prosecution for a
chemical weapons attack.
Bond, 572 U.S. at 863
As in Bond, it is possible to read §922(g) to reach the conduct admitted here:
possession of an object that once moved across state lines, without proof that the
defendant’s conduct caused the object to move across state lines, nor even proof that
it moved across state lines in the recent past. But to do so would intrude deeply on
the traditional state responsibility for crime control. Such a reading would assert the
federal government’s power to criminalize virtually any conduct anywhere in the
26
country, with little or no relationship to commerce, nor to the interstate movement of
commodities.
The better reading of the phrase “possess in or affecting commerce” – which
appears in §922(g) – therefore requires a meaningful connection to interstate
commerce. Such a reading would require either: 1) proof that the defendant’s offense
caused the firearm to move in interstate commerce, or, at least, 2) proof that the
firearm moved in interstate commerce at a time reasonably near the offense.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner asks this Court to grant certiorari to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, or if it does so in another case to
decide the above issues, should hold the instant Petition pending the outcome.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of December, 2025.
JASON D. HAWKINS
Federal Public Defender
Northern District of Texas
/s/ Christy Martin
Christy Martin
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Federal Public Defender's Office
525 S. Griffin Street, Suite 629
Dallas, Texas 75202
Telephone: (214) 767-2746
E-mail: christy_martin@fd.org
Attorney for Petitioner
27
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.