Amicus Curiae Brief — Mark Hanneman, Minneapolis Police Officer, et al., Petitioners v. Karen Wells, as Co-Trustee for the Next of Kin of Amir Rahkare Locke, et al.

No. 25-637

In the

Supreme Court

of the United States

______________

MARK HANNEMAN, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITY AS A MINNEAPOLIS POLICE

OFFICER, AND THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS,

Petitioners,

v.

KAREN WELLS AND ANDRE LOCKE AS

CO-TRUSTEES FOR THE NEXT OF KIN OF

AMIR RAHKARE LOCKE,

Respondents.

______________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

______________

BRIEF OF MINNESOTA POLICE AND PEACE

OFFICERS ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

______________

CHRISTOPHER W. MADEL

Counsel of Record

MADEL PA

434 Lake Street

Excelsior, MN 55331

(612) 605-0630

cmadel@madellaw.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

2025 - Bachman Legal Printing n (612) 339-9518

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS

CURIAE ....................................................................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4

I. THIS COURT HAS REPEATEDLY

EMPHASIZED THE SPECIFICITY REQUIRED

FOR CONDUCT TO VIOLATE “CLEARLY

ESTABLISHED” LAW ............................................ 4

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN

PERFORMING ITS “CLEARLY ESTABLISHED”

ANALYSIS............................................................... 6

III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY

DISREGARDING LIGGINS AND THIS COURT’S

CLEAR COMMAND TO RESOLVE QUALIFIEID

IMMUNITY AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE

OPPORTUNITY ...................................................... 8

IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT WRONGLY

REFUSED TO CONSIDER THESE

ARGUMENTS ....................................................... 14

V. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT LEAVE THE

UNDERLYING DECISIONS IN PLACE ............ 15

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 17

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635 (1987) ............................................... 12

Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194 (2004) ............................................. 4, 5

City of Tahlequah v. Bond,

595 U.S. 9, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021) ................................ 4

Cole v. Hutchins,

959 F.3d 1127 (8th Cir. 2020) ................................. 6

Craighead v. Lee,

399 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2005) ............................... 6, 7

District of Columbia v. Wesby,

583 U.S. 48 (2018) ............................................... 4, 5

Dooley v. Tharp,

856 F.3d 1177 (8th Cir. 2017) ................................. 9

Evans v. Krook,

1006 F.4thh 790 (8th Cir. 2024) ........................... 14

Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386 (1989) ................................................. 5

Kisela v. Hughes,

584 U.S. 100 (2018) ......................................... 11, 12

Liggins v. Cohen,

971 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2020) ................... 8, 9, 10, 11

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. 7, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) .................... 4, 5, 7

Partridge v. City of Benton,

70 F.4th 489 (8th Cir. 2023) ............................... 6, 7

Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009) ..................................... 4, 12, 13

Plumhoff v. Rickard,

572 U.S. 765 (2014) ............................................... 14

Reichle v. Howards,

566 U.S. 658 (2012) ................................................. 4

Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna,

595 U.S. 1 (2021) ................................................. 4, 5

Tennessee v. Garner,

471 U.S. 1 (1985) ..................................................... 5

Thompson v. Hubbard,

257 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2001) ................................... 8

White v. Pauly,

580 U.S. 73 (2017) ................................................... 5

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Statistics on Law Enforcement Officer Deaths in

the Line of Duty from January through September

2024, FBI Resources for Law Enforcement,

FBI.gov (available at https://le.fbi.gov/cjisdivision/cjis-link/statistics-on-law-enforcementofficer-deaths-in-the-line-of-duty-from-januarythrough-september-2024)

(accessed Oct. 30, 2024) ........................................ 15

Steve Karnowski & Mark Thiessen,

Minneapolis Police Officer Dies in Ambush

Shooting that Killed 2 Others, including Suspected

Gunman, APNews.com (May 31, 2024) (available

at https://apnews.com/article/minneapolis-policeshooting-injuredca68f99b50603ac905237d407514485b) ................ 16

Steve Karnowski,

Investigators: Man Who Killed 3 Minnesota

Responders Opened Fire Without Warning, Inside

His House, APNews.com (Feb. 23, 2024)

(available at https://apnews.com/article/burnsvilleminnesota-police-shooting-details9fbfc2bd2bc54dcf8e95b5577507e591) .................. 16

Trisha Ahmed, Anita Snow, & Jim Salter,

Three Slain Minnesota First Responders

Remembered for Their Commitment to Service,

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

APNews.com (Feb. 20, 2024) (available at

https://apnews.com/article/information-ofresponders-killed-minnesota9812539198ab57a855f4edcbf6cdc243) ................. 16

The MPPOA submits this brief in support of Petitioner Officer Mark Hanneman (“Officer Hanneman”)

and urgers reversal of the decision below in Karen

Wells, et al. v. Mark Hanneman et al., 144 F.4th 1015

(8th Cir. 2025).

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS

CURIAE

Founded in 1922, the Minnesota Police and Peace

Officers Association (“MPPOA”) is the largest association representing licensed peace officers in the State

of Minnesota.1 As the legislative voice for public safety

professionals, the MPPOA seeks to promote laws and

policies that support public safety and the working

conditions and retirement benefits for the professionals that uphold it, while opposing those laws and policies that do not. The MPPOA provides training and

promotes high ethical standards in policing across the

state of Minnesota. It also provides legal representation to member officers acting in their official capacities for, inter alia, critical incidents that might expose

the officer to criminal liability.

The MPPOA has a strong interest in this case because it bears directly on the liability and legal scrutiny its members face when suddenly confronted with

individuals wielding firearms in dangerous situations. As a result, it also impacts how the MPPOA’s

members respond in these situations—when their

1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, counsel for the MPPOA

states that no part of this brief was authored by counsel for any

party, and no person or entity other than the MPPOA or its members made any monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief. Parties received timely notice of the

MPPOA’s intent to file this brief.

2

safety and the safety of the community is most in jeopardy.

The MPPOA respectfully submits this brief to emphasize the significant negative impact that the decisions below will have on peace officers’ ability to act

when suddenly confronted with armed, noncooperative suspects in the most dangerous and uncertain of

circumstances.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Officer Hanneman was confronted with a sudden,

immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury

while executing a high-risk search warrant targeting

a suspect in a recent murder when decedent Amir

Locke (1) grabbed a pistol in response to the officer’s

presence (2) ducked out of view and underneath a

blanket, then (3) suddenly emerged from the blanket

holding the pistol mere feet from Officer Hanneman.

In response to this sudden and imminent threat, Officer Hanneman shot and killed Locke. All this is established on the body-worn camera videos of the incident.

Both the trial court and Eighth Circuit ruled based

on the mistaken assumption that clearly established

law. Held that unless Amir Locke pointed his weapon

at Officer Hanneman or others, then Officer Hanneman’s use of deadly force could not be reasonable

under the circumstances and denied qualified immunity. Specifically, the District Court recognized that Officer Hanneman was forced into a split-section decision and that no warning was feasible. But the District Court found that the videos of the incident did

not establish that Locke pointed his gun at one of the

officers and that absent such a clear showing, Officer

3

Hanneman’s shooting could not have been justified

under clearly established law. But this finding was

contradicted by recent Eighth Circuit precedent holding that deadly force can be justified before the subject

points the firearm at another person.

Rather than correcting the District Court’s error,

the Eighth Circuit compounded upon this error by

holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Officer Hanneman’s appeal because the videos were insufficiently

definite, creating a dispute of fact over whether Locke

had pointed his weapon at officers or was attempting

to comply with orders to show his hands.

Both the Eighth Circuit and the District Court erred

in these holdings. Consistent with this Court’s repeated instruction, both lower courts should have considered, at the earliest possible stage, whether Officer

Hanneman was entitled to qualified immunity irrespective of whether Locke pointed the gun in his direction. But they failed or declined to do so, despite

recent precedent to that effect. This decision, if left in

place, not only complicates Eighth Circuit precedent

regarding use of force, but sows doubt in the minds of

officers everywhere regarding perhaps the most difficult circumstance for an officer to face.

This Court should grant the petition and take this

opportunity to both clarify that individuals holding

firearms can be an immediate threat to officers even

if they are not actively pointing the gun at the officers,

and to reinforce its instruction that issues of qualified

immunity be resolved as early in the case as possible.

4

ARGUMENT

I.

THIS

COURT

HAS

REPEATEDLY

EMPHASIZED

THE

SPECIFICITY

REQUIRED FOR CONDUCT TO VIOLATE

“CLEARLY ESTABLISHED” LAW

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officers

from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12,

142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). The doctrine protects “all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). “A clearly established

right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he

is doing violates that right.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577

U.S. 7, 11, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Reichle

v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).

For an asserted right to be clearly established, this

Court has explained that existing precedent must

have placed the statutory or constitutional question

“beyond debate.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595

U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam). And the right may not

be defined at a general level. To the contrary, the inquiry must be undertaken “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). This specificity “is especially in the Fourth Amendment context,

where . . . it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer

5

confronts.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (alternations and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

Whether an officer has used excessive force depends

on “the facts and circumstances of each particular

case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

And where an officer has probable cause to believe

that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm

or death, either to the officer or others, the use of

deadly force is not unreasonable. Tennessee v. Garner,

471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). “However, Graham’s and Garner’s standards are cast ‘at a high level of generality.’”

Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5 (quoting Brosseau, 543

U.S. at 199). “Given its imprecise nature, officers will

often find it difficult to know how the general standard of probable cause applies in the precise situation

encountered.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).Therefore, outside of the obvious

case, these standards are not sufficient to “clearly establish” the reasonableness of the use of force. RivasVillegas, 595 U.S. at 5. In a not-obvious case, the

plaintiff “must identify a case that put [the officer] on

notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.” Id. See

also Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64 (explaining that it is crucial

for a plaintiff to “identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have

violated the Fourth Amendment.”) (quoting White v.

Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)) (per curiam)).

6

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN

PERFORMING

ITS

“CLEARLY

ESTABLISHED” ANALYSIS

Relying on Cole v. Hutchins, 959 F.3d 1127, 1132

(8th Cir. 2020), the District Court held that Locke

needed to point his gun at another individual, or

take other similar “menacing action,” for Officer

Hanneman to have probable cause to believe that

Locke posed an immediate threat of death or serious

bodily injury. (App. 18a-19a.) But in Cole itself the

Eighth Circuit recognized that this proposition is

true only in a general sense. See Cole, 959 F.3d at

1132 (“Generally, an individual’s mere possession of

a firearm is not enough for an officer to have probable cause to believe that individual poses an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury; the suspect must also point the firearm at another individual or take similar menacing action.” (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added)). And generalized propositions do not suffice to render an alleged

rule of law clearly established, as discussed supra. In

any event, neither Respondents nor the District

Court identified a case with a similar fact pattern

holding that a subject emerging from concealment

wielding a firearm failed to qualify as a “menacing

action” within the meaning of Cole.

Perhaps recognizing the high level of generality with

this initial rule, the District Court also held, “Well before February 2, 2022, it was clearly established that

an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when he

uses deadly force on an armed individual who is moving his gun in compliance with officers’ commands.”

(App. 19a (citing Partridge v. City of Benton, 70 F.4th

489, 792 (8th Cir. 2023); Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d

954, 961 (8th Cir. 2005)). But Partridge concerns

7

officers shooting an individual who was pointing a gun

at himself (i.e., was apparently suicidal) that they approached knowing he possessed a gun and shot him

from 45 feet away. See Partridge, 70 F.4th at 490. And

Craighead concerns an officer firing a shotgun at two

individuals, knowing that one of whom was not suspected of any criminal activity and was holding a pistol high above his head pointed upward, keeping it

away from the other man, and did not issue a warning

despite one being feasible. Craighead, 399 F.3d at

962-63. Neither case is comparable to the situation

that confronted Officer Hanneman, who was executing a high-risk search warrant searching for a murder

suspect when suddenly he emerged, mere feet away,

holding a pistol he had grabbed in response to the officers’ presence. This is particularly true given the

District Court’s finding that no warning was feasible

for Officer Hanneman, unlike the officers in

Craighead and Partridge.

Consequently, neither the District Court nor Respondents have identified a prior case with facts sufficiently like those facing Officer Hanneman such

that “every reasonable officer” would have understood that firing his weapon was prohibited by law.

As a result, the District Court’s holding that the facts

as alleged and revealed in the videos show a violation of clearly established law is in error. Mullenix,

577 U.S. at 12.

8

III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY

DISREGARDING LIGGINS AND THIS

COURT’S

CLEAR

COMMAND

TO

RESOLVE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AT

THE

EARLIEST

POSSIBLE

OPPORTUNITY

At bottom, the thrust of the District Court’s holding

is that because the videos did not clearly show Locke

pointing gun at the officers at the time Officer Hanneman fired, Officer Hanneman was not entitled to

qualified immunity at the pleading stage. But as discussed above, there was no precedent in the Eighth

Circuit that would put Officer Hanneman on notice

that it was unlawful for him to fire upon Locke when

he suddenly emerged holding a firearm, or that he

needed to wait until Locke actually pointed the firearm at him or the other officers.

To the contrary, Eighth Circuit precedent establishes that “[i]n dangerous situations where an officer

has reasonable grounds to believe that there is an imminent threat of serious harm, the officer may be justified in using a firearm before a subject actually

points a weapon at the officer or others.” Liggins v.

Cohen, 971 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2020). In fact, the

Eighth Circuit previously held that an officer need not

even see a weapon to be justified in using deadly force

for fear of a weapon in certain circumstances. See, e.g.,

Thompson v. Hubbard, 257 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir.

2001) (“An officer is not constitutionally required to

wait until he sets eyes upon the weapon before employing deadly force to protect himself against a fleeing suspect who turns and moves as though to draw a

gun.”).

The District Court acknowledged, and the video

shows, that less than eight seconds elapsed between

9

when Officer Hanneman entered the apartment and

when he fired—and less than two seconds elapsed between when Sgt. Carlson kicked the couch that Locke

was on and when Officer Hanneman fired. (App. 14a.)

Even less time, therefore, passed between when Locke

emerged from the blanket mere feet from Officer Hanneman and holding the gun by the handle and pointed

in—at least—Officer Hanneman’s general direction

and when Officer Hanneman fired. This is simply not

enough time to issue a warning or definitively determine whether the gun Locke was holding when he

suddenly popped out was aimed sufficiently directly

at the officers to satisfy later scrutiny of the video in

slow-motion. See Dooley v. Tharp, 856 F.3d 1177,

1182–83 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[L]aw enforcement officers

are not afforded the opportunity of viewing in slow

motion what appears to them to constitute life-threatening action.”).

Compare the situation confronting Officer Hanneman to the one in Liggins. In Liggins, defendant Officer Cohen arrived at an apartment complex in response to a call regarding possession of a stolen pistol

(not executing a search warrant looking for a murder

suspect who used armor-piercing bullets). Liggins,

971 F.3d at 800. “B.C.,” a minor, was in possession of

the stolen pistol when officers arrived, carrying it in

an over-the-shoulder bag while standing in the apartment’s breezeway. Id. When onlookers shouted, “Police!” in response to the arriving the officers, B.C. began running down the breezeway, as officers positioned themselves on either side of the breezeway. Id.

As B.C. ran down the breezeway, he pulled the gun

out of the bag and held it by the barrel (not the handle), pointed down, in his right hand. Id. Officer Cohen, who had just arrived in the parking lot behind

10

the complex when he saw B.C. merge from the breezeway holding the gun, exited the vehicle, rounded the

back of a truck and, without warning and within two

seconds of exiting his vehicle, shot B.C. three times.

Id. The district court denied summary judgment and

qualified immunity, holding there was a dispute of

facts about “whether a reasonable officer in Cohen’s

position ‘would have perceived’ that B.C. was running

toward the officer before he fired and whether it was

feasible for the officer to give a warning before shooting.” Id. The Eighth Circuit disagreed.

In reversing the district court in Liggins, the Eighth

Circuit explained, “Once the court has assumed a particular set of facts about where and how B.C. was running in relation to Cohen's position, whether B.C.'s actions rose to a level warranting Cohen's use of force is

a question of law for the court, not a question of fact.”

Id. at 801. And, this Court explained, “B.C. was running in Cohen’s general direction, even if not directly

at him,” was “carrying in his right hand a gun that

moved while he ran[,]” the “officers were investigating

a report of a stolen firearm,” and “B.C. was fleeing

from police who had arrived at the front of the building.” Id. Under these facts, the Eighth Circuit held

that “a reasonable officer was justified in discharging

his firearm.” Id. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that

Cohen had “only a second or two to react as he

rounded the parked truck . . . had reasonable grounds

to believe that the fleeing subject who was running toward the back of the property could raise the gun and

shoot” and “[i]t would only take an instant to do so if

the person were ready to fire.” Id. Regarding the way

the gun was held or pointed, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that it “was a split-second decision for the

officer. It was not practical in that moment for Cohen

11

to discern whether B.C. was carrying the gun in an

unusual manner or to shout a warning and wait for

him to react. There was simply no time.” Id.

All these considerations apply here. Even if the District Court could not conclude that Locke pointed the

gun at Officer Hanneman, he was facing Officer Hanneman’s “general direction.” Cf. id. (holding dispute

over whether B.C. was running directly at officer was

not material because individual was running in officer’s “general direction”). Officer Hanneman, like the

officer in Liggins, had at most “a second or two to react” to seeing Locke emerge feet from him with gripping a pistol. While Liggins concerned only a stolen

firearm, Officer Hanneman was executing a high-risk

search warrant looking for a murder suspect who had

used armor piercing bullets—and was suddenly confronted by an individual who had grabbed a pistol in

response to his entry into the apartment. And like in

Liggins, “[i]t was not practical in that moment for [Officer Hanneman] to determine whether” Locke had his

finger on the trigger or was pointing it directly at him

rather than merely in his general direction. Id. “There

was simply no time.” Id.

The District Court acknowledged that “like the officer in Liggins, Officer Hanneman faced a ‘split-second decision.’” (App. 20a.)2 And the District Court

2 In fact, the District Court further recognized that Officer

Hanneman would reasonably perceive an immediate threat from

Locke and did not have time to fully evaluate, because the District Court held that it was not feasible for Officer Hanneman to

issue a warning before shooting. (App. 21a-22a.) Specifically, citing Liggins, the District Court rejected Appellees’ argument that

Officer Hanneman’s failure to warn was unreasonable, because

“[w]hen the hesitation involved in giving a warning could readily

cause such a warning to be the officer’s last, then a warning is

12

recognized that “the Supreme Court has found an officer’s conduct reasonable when the officer ‘had mere

seconds to assess the potential danger.’” (Id. (quoting

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018)))

But despite these findings, the District Court held

that “Liggins [was] nonetheless distinguishable for its

procedural posture”—meaning that Liggins was decided on summary judgment, not on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (App. 21a.) But the District

Court provides no explanation for why that, alone, justifies disregarding the Eighth Circuit’s clear holding

in Liggins. To the contrary, this Court has “repeatedly

. . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity

questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quotations omitted). Indeed,

this Court has emphasized that the “driving force behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was

a desire to ensure that insubstantial claims against

government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery.” Id. at 232-33 (internal quotation marks omitted,

other alterations supplied by Pearson, quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, n.2 (1987)). In

light of this Court’s clear command in Pearson and repeated in other cases, the District Court cannot distinguish Liggins merely by referencing the procedural

not feasible.” (Id.) The District Court cannot hold both that Officer Hanneman was confronted with such an immediate threat

that a warning was not feasible before shooting and find that

Officer Hanneman’s use of force in response to that threat was

unreasonable—even plausibly so. It is paradoxical. The District

Court’s holding in this respect—an implicit finding that it was

objectively reasonable for Officer Hanneman to perceive an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury—demonstrates

that, irrespective of the procedural process of the case, the facts

as they are established in the video show that Officer Hanneman

is entitled to qualified immunity.

13

posture of the latter case. To do so effectively robs Officer Hanneman of the benefit of qualified immunity—

the immunity from suit rather than merely from liability. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

Under Liggins, between what is alleged and easily

discernible from the video recordings, Officer Hanneman’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances.

And in light of Liggins itself, and its similarity to the

circumstances here, it cannot be said that any reasonable officer in Officer Hanneman’s position should

have known that the law clearly prohibited them from

responding with deadly force when suddenly confronted with an individual emerging from hiding holding a pistol during the execution of a no-knock search

in connection with a murder using armor-piercing

rounds. Nor would a reasonable officer understand

that they were required to wait until Locke pointed

his firearm directly at officer or another—particularly

not when required to act within a split second and

without opportunity for a warning, as the District

Court recognized. Consequently, regardless of

whether Officer Hanneman’s actions were reasonable,

they cannot be said to have violated clearly established law.

14

IV.

THE EIGHTH

REFUSED

TO

ARGUMENTS

CIRCUIT WRONGLY

CONSIDER

THESE

As discussed above, the Eighth Circuit held that it

lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, citing the fact disputes and the lack of clarity in the videos of the incident. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit held that the

District Court’s assumed facts were not blatantly contradicted by the record, the Eighth Circuit lacked jurisdiction “to address whether the evidence is sufficient to support the allegations in the complaint[.]”

(App. 6a (citing Evans v. Krook, 1006 F.4thh 790, 792

(8th Cir. 2024)). But an appellate court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of a qualified immunity defense if, even accepting the factual allegations, officers

contend that their conduct did not violate the Fourth

Amendment or clearly established law. Plumhoff v.

Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 773 (2014).

Despite Plumhoff, the Eighth Circuit declined to

consider whether Officer Hanneman would be entitled

to qualified immunity even if Locke did not point his

weapon at the officers. (App. 6a-7a.) Namely, the

Eighth Circuit noted MPPOA’s brief amicus curiae advancing this argument but declined to consider because the Eighth Circuit believed that Officer Hanneman had not raised it in the District Court or on

appeal. (Id.)

The Eighth Circuit was mistaken. While MPPOA focused its amicus brief on this specific issue, Officer

Hanneman raised (and thereby preserved) arguments

that Locke need not have pointed his weapon at the

officers for Officer Hanneman to be entitled to qualified immunity—and in particular on Liggins and similar cases. In support, MPPOA seconds Officer

15

Hanneman’s thoughtful discussion of the record on

this issue. (See Pet. 24-26.)

V.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT LEAVE THE

UNDERLYING DECISIONS IN PLACE

This Court should grant the Petition and reverse the

decisions of the lower courts in the interest of clarity

of law and officer safety not just in the Eighth Circuit,

but nationwide. At bottom, the District Court failed to

grant the consideration due to officers making splitsecond judgments in situations that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving as required by Graham,

Liggins, and similar cases. This Court’s precedents require this deference for good reason. Hesitation in

these circumstances puts officers’ and bystanders’

lives in danger. Indeed, according the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, between January 2020 and October

2024, there were 240 felonious killings of peace officers in the line of duty.3 From January through September of 2024, there were 54 felonious killings, a 12.5

percent increase compared to the same time period for

both 2023 and 2022.4 Firearms were used in 75.9 percent of these killings.5

In 2024 in the Twin Cities area alone, multiple officers were murdered with firearms. These include

3 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statistics on Law Enforcement Officer Deaths in the Line of Duty from January through

September 2024, FBI Resources for Law Enforcement, FBI.gov

(available at https://le.fbi.gov/cjis-division/cjis-link/statistics-onlaw-enforcement-officer-deaths-in-the-line-of-duty-from-january-through-september-2024) (accessed Oct. 30, 2024).

4 Id.

5 Id.

16

Minneapolis Police Department Officer Jamal Mitchell, ambushed and shot by a man who appeared to be

a victim, rather than a suspect, while Officer Mitchell

was attempting to render first aid to him6; and Burnsville Police Department Officers Paul Elmstrand and

Matthew Ruge, murdered when a man opened fire on

them without warning while they were responding to

a domestic incident in his home (Burnsville Fire Department Firefighter/Paramedic Adam Finseth was

also killed by the shooter while attempting to render

aid to the officers).7

These incidents are merely the most recent, and

most local, examples of the risks posed to law-enforcement officers when dealing with armed individuals—

whether or not they are suspects. And they underscore

why controlling precedent requires Courts to grant

deference to officers acting in, what the District Court

acknowledges, was a situation requiring a split-second decision with no time to give a warning. The District Court erred by failing to grant that deference,

6 Steve Karnowski & Mark Thiessen, Minneapolis Police Officer Dies in Ambush Shooting that Killed 2 Others, including

Suspected Gunman, APNews.com (May 31, 2024) (available at

https://apnews.com/article/minneapolis-police-shooting-injuredca68f99b50603ac905237d407514485b).

7 Steve Karnowski, Investigators: Man Who Killed 3 Minnesota Responders Opened Fire Without Warning, Inside His

House, APNews.com (Feb. 23, 2024) (available at https://apnews.com/article/burnsville-minnesota-police-shooting-details9fbfc2bd2bc54dcf8e95b5577507e591); Trisha Ahmed, Anita

Snow, & Jim Salter, Three Slain Minnesota First Responders Remembered for Their Commitment to Service, APNews.com (Feb.

20, 2024) (available at https://apnews.com/article/information-ofresponders-killed-minnesota9812539198ab57a855f4edcbf6cdc243).

17

and the Eighth Circuit compounded that error by refusing to consider Officer Hanneman’s meritorious arguments. This Court should take the opportunity to

correct these errors and protect the safety of officers

and bystanders in accord with the Court’s well-settled

precedents.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant

the petition and reverse the decision below.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTOPHER W. MADEL

MADEL PA

434 Lake Street

Excelsior, MN 55331

(612) 605-0630

cmadel@madellaw.com

Counsel of Record for Amicus

Curiae