Opposition Brief — Frank A. Walls, Petitioner v. Florida, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 17, 2025
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No. 25-6357
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FRANK WALLS,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR DEC. 18, 2025, AT 6:00 P.M.
JAMES UTHMEIER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA
Office of the Attorney General
3507 E. Frontage Rd., Ste. 200
Tampa, Florida 33607
Telephone: (813) 287-7900
scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
SCOTT A. BROWNE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
CHARMAINE MILLSAPS
SPECIAL COUNSEL, ASST. ATTORNEY
GENERAL
JASON RODRIGUEZ
SENIOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
BENJAMIN HOFFMAN
SENIOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
OUNSEL
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
QUESTION 1
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the Florida
Supreme Court that affirmed the denial of an intellectual disability
claim pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Hall v.
Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), based on an adequate and independent
state law procedural bar and on a determination that Hall is not
retroactive under the state law test for retroactivity.
QUESTION 2
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the Florida
Supreme Court concluding that the state’s constitutional conformity
clause regarding the Eighth Amendment does not violate the Supremacy
Clause of the Federal Constitution.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................................................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii
OPINION BELOW ......................................................................................................... 1
JURISDICTION ............................................................................................................. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED........................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................. 2
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .............................................................. 4
QUESTION 1 Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the
Florida Supreme Court that affirmed the denial of an intellectual disability
claim pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Hall v. Florida,
572 U.S. 701 (2014), based on an adequate and independent state law
procedural bar and on a determination that Hall is not retroactive under the
state law test for retroactivity………………………………………………………....4
QUESTION 2 Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the
Florida Supreme Court concluding that the state’s constitutional conformity
clause regarding the Eighth Amendment does not violate the Supremacy Clause
of the Federal Constitution…………………………………………………..………26
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 31
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) ......................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 19
Barwick v. Florida,
143 S. Ct. 2452 (2023) ............................................................................................... 29
Barwick v. State,
361 So. 3d 785 (Fla.) ................................................................................................. 28
Braxton v. United States,
500 U.S. 344 (1991) ............................................................................................. 23, 30
Brumfield v. Cain,
576 U.S. 315 (2015) ................................................................................................... 14
Carroll v. State,
114 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 2013) .......................................................................................... 5
Clark v. State,
418 So. 3d 1226 (Miss. 2025) .................................................................................... 25
Clemons v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr.,
967 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2020) ................................................................................. 16
Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722 (1991) ..................................................................................................... 7
Commonwealth v. Hackett,
99 A.3d 11 (Penn. 2014) ............................................................................................ 19
Coonce v. United States,
142 S. Ct. 25 (2021) ................................................................................................... 13
Dillbeck v. State,
357 So. 3d 94 (Fla.) ..................................................................................................... 5
Durley v. Mayo,
351 U.S. 277 (1956) ..................................................................................................... 7
Edwards v. Vannoy,
593 U.S. 255 (2021) ................................................................................................... 22
Foster v. Chatman,
578 U.S. 488 (2016) ..................................................................................................... 6
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,
296 U.S. 207 (1935) ..................................................................................................... 6
iii
Franqui v. State,
59 So. 3d 82 (Fla. 2011) ............................................................................................ 11
Franqui v. State,
301 So. 3d 152 (Fla. 2020) .......................................................................................... 9
Glossip v. Oklahoma,
604 U.S. 226 (2025) ..................................................................................................... 6
Goodwin v. Steele,
814 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 20, 24
Hall v. Florida,
572 U.S. 701 (2014) ......................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19
Hendrix v. State,
136 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 2014) .................................................................................... 5, 7
Hill v. Humphrey,
662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................. 10
In re Henry,
757 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................. 20
In re Payne,
722 Fed. Appx. 534 (6th Cir. 2018) .................................................................... 20, 24
In re Walls,
No. 23-10982-P, 2023 WL 3745103 (11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2023) ........................... 20, 24
James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971) ................................................................................................... 29
Jones v. Florida,
222 L. Ed. 2d 1240, 2025 WL 2775490 (2025) ........................................................... 7
Jones v. Mississippi,
593 U.S. 98 (2021) ................................................................................... 13, 20, 21, 22
Jones v. State,
231 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 2017) .......................................................................................... 9
Kilgore v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
805 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2015) ........................................................................... 20, 24
Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ................................................................................................... 6
Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012) ................................................................................................... 20
minor: 88 ...................................................................................................................... 18
Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U.S. 190 (2016) ................................................................................................... 20
iv
Moore v. Texas,
581 U.S. 1 (2017) ................................................................................................. 15, 22
Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989) ............................................................................................... 9, 10
Phillips v. State,
299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020) .................................................................................... 6, 9
Pittman v. State,
417 So. 3d 287 (Fla.) ................................................................................................... 5
Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue,
482 U.S. 182 (1987) ............................................................................................. 23, 30
Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) .................................................................................................... 3
Salazar v. State,
188 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 2016) .......................................................................................... 9
State v. Lotter,
311 Neb. 878, 976 N.W.2d 721 (2022) ................................................................ 20, 24
State v. Payne,
721 S.W.3d 204 (Tenn. 2025).............................................................................. 20, 24
Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989) ................................................................................................... 20
Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) ............................................................................................... 10, 27
United States v. Wilson,
170 F. Supp. 3d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ....................................................................... 11
Walker v. Martin,
562 U.S. 307 (2011) ..................................................................................................... 7
Walls v. Florida,
144 S. Ct. 174 (2023) ......................................................................................... 5, 8, 22
Walls v. Florida,
513 U.S. 1130 (1995) ................................................................................................. 20
Walls v. State,
213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016) ............................................................................ 13, 14, 21
Walls v. State,
361 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 2023) ...................................................................................... 5, 7
Walls v. State,
580 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1991) .......................................................................................... 2
v
Walls v. State,
641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994) .......................................................................................... 2
Walls v. State,
No. SC2025- 1915, 2025 WL 3550358 (Fla. Dec. 11, 2025) ......... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 27
Welch v. United States,
578 U. S. 120 (2016) ............................................................................................ 20, 21
Witt v. State,
387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980) .................................................................................... 6, 14
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ........................................................................................................ 1
28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) ......................................................................................................... 1
Art. I § 12, Fla. Const .................................................................................................. 27
Article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution ................................................... 27, 28
O.C.G.A. § 17–7–131 .................................................................................................... 11
U.S. Const. amend. VIII ................................................................................................ 1
U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ 1 ........................................................................................... 2
U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2 ............................................................................................. 2, 28
§ 921.137 ........................................................................................................................ 9
§ 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2024)……………………………………………………8, 13
§ 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) ............................................................................... 11, 18
§ 921.173, Fla. Stat. (2024).......................................................................................... 17
Rules
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2) ............................................................................................ 7
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 ................................................................ 5, 7
vi
OPINION BELOW
The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion is reported at Walls v. State, No. SC20251915, 2025 WL 3550358 (Fla. Dec. 11, 2025).
JURISDICTION
On December 11, 2025, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the summary
denial of the third successive state postconviction motion and denied the successive
state habeas petition in this active warrant capital case. On December 15, 2025,
Walls, represented by Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle (CCRC-M), filed
a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court seeking review of the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision. The petition was timely. Sup. Ct. R. 13.3; 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c).
Typically, this Court has jurisdiction over a “final” judgment issued by the “highest
court of a State” under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). But this Court lacks jurisdiction over the
first question raised in the petition because it rests on an independent and adequate
state law ground.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, section one,
which provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
1
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ 1.
The Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution which provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The litigation in this case spans nearly 40 years.
Facts of the crime
Walls confessed to investigators that he entered the mobile home of the
Edward Alger and Ann Peterson to commit a burglary, intentionally knocked over a
fan to awaken them, forced Peterson to tie up Alger, and then restrained Peterson
himself. Alger got loose and attacked Walls, which led to Walls cutting Alger’s throat.
Walls then shot Alger several times in the head. Peterson was crying and asked
whether Alger was all right. Walls told her no, blamed the murder on Alger attacking
him, and started wrestling with Peterson and taking her clothes off before shooting
her in the back of the head. Walls explained that after the first shot, Peterson was
“doing all kinds of screaming.” He then forced her face into a pillow and shot her a
second time in the head. Walls v. State, No. SC2025-1915, 2025 WL 3550358, *1 (Fla.
2
Dec. 11, 2025) (citing Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131, 132 (Fla. 1991), and Walls v.
State, 641 So. 2d 381, 384-85 (Fla. 1994)).
Procedural history
The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion details the procedural history of the case
including the federal habeas litigation. Walls, 2025 WL 3550358, at *1-*4.
Current warrant litigation in state court
On November 18, 2025, Governor DeSantis signed a death warrant scheduling
the execution for Thursday, December 18, 2025, at 6:00 p.m. On November 25, 2025,
Walls, represented by Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle (CCRC-M), filed
a third successive postconviction motion in state court raising three claims: (1) an
intellectual disability claim based on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Hall
v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); (2) a newly discovered evidence claim alleging a new
scientific consensus regarding brain development that requires the prohibition
established in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), be expanded to defendants
under the age of 22 years old; and (3) a claim that the thirty-seven years he has spent
on death row, in conditions he characterized as solitary confinement, constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On November 26,
2025, the State filed an answer to the third successive postconviction motion
asserting all three claims should be summarily denied. On Wednesday, December 3,
2025, the circuit court entered a final order summarily denying the third successive
postconviction motion.
3
Walls appealed the summary denial of his third successive postconviction
motion to the Florida Supreme Court raising three issues, including his intellectual
disability claim. He also filed a state habeas petition asserting that the Florida
Supreme Court receding from its prior precedent and holding that Hall is not
retroactive under the state retroactivity test was a manifest injustice and a denial of
due process. On December 11, 2025, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
postconviction court’s summary denial of his postconviction motion and denied the
state habeas petition. Walls v. State, Nos. SC2025-1915, SC2025-1917, 2025 WL
3550358 (Fla. Dec. 11, 2025).
On December 15, 2025, Walls filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court
raising two questions.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
QUESTION 1
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the Florida
Supreme Court that affirmed the denial of an intellectual disability
claim pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Hall v.
Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), based on an adequate and independent
state law procedural bar and on a determination that Hall is not
retroactive under the state law test for retroactivity.
Walls seeks review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision finding his
intellectual disability claim based on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),
procedurally barred and affirming the denial of a third evidentiary hearing based on
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), because Hall does not apply retroactively to
Walls. Pet. at 6. He argues that categorical prohibitions from execution, such as
Atkins claims, should not be subject to procedural bars. But this Court lacks
4
jurisdiction over this question due to the adequate and independent state law
procedural bar. Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Hall was
not retroactive based on the state law test for retroactivity which is a matter of state
law. Additionally, this Court previously denied review following the second
evidentiary hearing of this intellectual disability claim. Walls v. Florida, 144 S. Ct.
174 (2023) (No. 22-7866). The issue is even less worthy of this Court’s consideration
in its current posture. Moreover, there is no conflict between this Court or the other
appellate courts and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision regarding the retroactivity
of Hall. Therefore, review of this question should be denied.
The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the intellectual disability claim was
“procedurally barred” because Walls had “already raised and been denied relief on
this claim.” Walls v. State, No. SC2025-1915, 2025 WL 3550358, at *5 (Fla. Dec. 11,
2025) (citing Walls v. State, 361 So. 3d 231, 233 (Fla. 2023)). The Florida Supreme
Court cited Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and Hendrix v. State, 136 So.
3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014), as support for the procedural bar. Walls, 2025 WL 3550358,
at *5. While Walls contended that categorical prohibitions, such as Atkins claims, cannot
be time-barred or procedurally barred, the Florida Supreme rejected that contention based
on its prior precedent. Id. (citing Pittman v. State, 417 So. 3d 287, 292 (Fla.) (rejecting an
argument that procedural bars should not be applied to intellectual disability claims), cert.
denied, 2025 WL 2649015 (Sept. 16, 2025) (No. 25-5605); Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94,
5
100 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct 856 (2023) (No. 22-6819); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883,
886 (Fla. 2013)).
Alternatively, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the intellectual disability
claim based on Hall failed “on the merits,” reaffirming it prior decision that Hall did not
apply retroactively to Walls. Walls, 2025 WL 3550358 at *6 (stating “Phillips forecloses
application of Hall to Walls”). The Florida Supreme Court relied on their prior
decision in Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020), which held that Hall was
not retroactive under the state test for retroactivity of Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922
(Fla. 1980).
Jurisdiction and Matters of State Law
Whether a claim of intellectual disability, filed in state court, pursuant
to a state rule of court, is procedurally barred is solely a matter of state law.
This procedural bar was an adequate and independent state law ground
precluding this Court’s review. This Court has explained that if “the state
court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will
not undertake to review the decision.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041
(1983). This Court’s jurisdiction “fails” if the non-federal ground is
independent and adequate to support the judgment. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038,
n.4 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)). If the state
law ground is not clear from the face of the state court ‘s opinion, this Court
assumes the state court decided the question based on federal law. Glossip v.
6
Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 242-43 (2025). A decision is independent if it “does
not depend on a federal holding” and is “not intertwined with questions of
federal law.” Glossip, 604 U.S. at 242 (2025) (citing Foster v. Chatman, 578
U.S. 488, 498 (2016), and Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41). “In the context of direct
review of a state court judgment, the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine is jurisdictional.” Id. at 242 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 729 (1991)).
The Florida Supreme Court found the intellectual disability claim
procedurally barred because Walls had “already raised and been denied relief”
on his intellectual disability claim following a full evidentiary hearing. Walls,
2025 WL 3550358, at *5 (citing Walls v. State, 361 So. 3d 231, 233 (Fla. 2023)).
“As a result,” the claim is “procedurally barred.” Id. at *5. Florida’s highest
court explained that claims “raised and rejected in prior postconviction
proceedings are procedurally barred from being relitigated in a successive
motion.” Id. (quoting Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014)). The
Florida Supreme Court’s decision regarding the procedural bar was based on a
state rule of court. Id. at *5 (noting that Rule 3.851 “prohibits both untimely and repetitive
claims” citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2)).
The procedural bar was clear from the face of the opinion and is solely a matter of
state law. The Florida Supreme Court’s analysis regarding the procedural bar
mentioned only state law; it was not intertwined with federal law in any
7
manner. So, the procedural bar is jurisdictional and this Court lacks
jurisdiction over this question.
This Court explicitly recognized Florida’s re-litigation bar is an
adequate state-law ground that deprives this Court of jurisdiction in Durley
v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 281, 283-85 (1956). Cf. Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307,
315 (2011) (recognizing that time bars are an independent and adequate
state-law ground precluding review). And this Court recently denied review
of a procedurally barred intellectually disability claim in Jones v. Florida, 222
L. Ed. 2d 1240, 2025 WL 2775490 (2025) (No. 25-5745). This Court should do
likewise in this case.
Moreover, this Court previously denied review of the Atkins/Hall claim
after the second evidentiary hearing. Walls v. Florida, 144 S. Ct. 174 (2023) (No.
22-7866). This attempt has the added hurdle of a procedural bar. The issue is even
less worthy of this Court’s consideration now when it involves a jurisdictional
procedural bar and is being raised during warrant litigation.
Florida’s Statutory Test for Intellectual Disability
Florida prohibits death sentences for intellectually disabled defendants.
Florida’s “Imposition of the death sentence upon an intellectually disabled defendant
prohibited” statute, section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2024), provides:
As used in this section, the term “intellectually disabled” or “intellectual
disability” means significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the period from conception to age 18. The term
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,” for the
purpose of this section, means performance that is two or more standard
8
deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test
specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The
term “adaptive behavior,” for the purpose of this definition, means the
effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of
personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her
age, cultural group, and community. The Agency for Persons with
Disabilities shall adopt rules to specify the standardized intelligence
tests as provided in this subsection.
§ 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2024).
Florida’s statutory definition of intellectual disability was derived from the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV), which was the standard clinical definition in 2001, when the
statute was enacted by the Florida legislature, before Atkins had even been decided.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (reciting the definition of intellectual disability in the
DSM-IV published in 2000); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 & n.15 (noting that in 2000 and
2001 several states, including Florida, enacting statutes prohibiting the death
sentence for defendants with intellectual disability citing § 921.137. Florida Statutes
in a footnote).
Under current Florida law, if a capital defendant fails to prove any one of the
three prongs of the statutory test for intellectual disability, the defendant will not be
found to be intellectually disabled. Franqui v. State, 301 So. 3d 152, 154 (Fla. 2020)
(quoting Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 812 (Fla. 2016)); Phillips v. State, 299 So.
3d 1013, 1024 (Fla. 2020) (“if a defendant fails to prove that he or she meets any one
of the three prongs of the intellectual disability standard, he or she will not be found
to be intellectually disabled” citing Jones v. State, 231 So. 3d 374, 376 (Fla. 2017), and
Salazar, 188 So. 3d at 812).
9
Atkins and Trop
This Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the execution of defendants who are intellectually disabled.
Id. at 321 (concluding that “death is not a suitable punishment” and is “excessive”
under the Eighth Amendment for intellectually disabled offenders). This Court
overruled Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), which had rejected a claim that the
Eighth Amendment precluded the death penalty for intellectually disabled
defendants, just a few years earlier. The Penry Court had limited its analysis to the
common law prohibition in existence at the time of the adoption of the Eighth
Amendment which was limited to a prohibition on the execution of idiots (in modern
terms, those defendants with IQ below 35). Penry, 492 U.S. at 331-32 (quoting 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *24-*25).
The Atkins Court relied on the evolving standards of decency standard
established in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311, 321. This
Court relied on several state statutes that had been enacted prohibiting the death
penalty for intellectually disabled defendants, starting in 1986, as well as the Federal
Death Penalty Act. Id at 313-15 & n.9-n.18 (listing the states and statutes of Georgia,
Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington,
Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida,
Missouri, North Carolina, and Texas).
Those legislatures thought they were enacting a statutory prohibition that
would involve objective numbers on widely used and standardized IQ tests that would
10
be final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual functioning. Hall v.
Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712 (2014) (stating that Florida’s rule erred by disregard
“established medical practice” by taking “an IQ score as “final and conclusive evidence
of a defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other
evidence”).
Those statutes typically placed the burden on the defendant to establish his
intellectual disability, so that the prohibition would only apply to clear cases of
disability. Indeed, some states went further. Georgia, which was the first state to
enact a statute prohibiting death sentences for intellectually disabled defendants, for
example, required that the defendant prove his intellectual disability beyond a
reasonable doubt. Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding
that Georgia's reasonable doubt standard of proof for claims of intellectual disability,
O.C.G.A. § 17–7–131, does not violate the Eighth Amendment). And Florida’s statute
required that the defendant prove his intellectual disability by clear and convincing
evidence. § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. (2001); Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 92 (Fla. 2011).1
1 Courts typically use the 5-point SEM instead of the more accurate test-specific SEM
because Hall seems to mandate the use of a 5-point SEM. Hall, 572 U.S. at 713–14
(noting the SEM for the WAIS–IV is 2.16 points and the SEM for the Stanford–Binet
is 2.3 points). The Hall Court did not provide clear guidance on the appropriate
confidence intervals courts should apply to claims of intellectual disability. United
States v. Wilson, 170 F. Supp. 3d 347, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting the Court does not
indicate whether courts must utilize a 68% confidence interval, which is IQ score ±
one SEM, or a 95% confidence interval, which is the IQ score ± two SEMs). But the
use of the 5-points and the 95% confidence interval that Hall recommended
undermines the burden of proof aspect of the state statutes that were the basis for
the holding in Atkins. Hall, 572 U.S. 741 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the 5-point
SEM and how it transfers the burden of proof to the State and dramatically heightens
the burden of proof to 95% rather than 50.1% contrary to the various statutes). A
11
The state legislatures that enacted the statutes that were the basis for the
decision in Atkins never envisioned that courts would basically rewrite those statutes
in numerous ways, such as blurring the three separate prongs for intellectual
disability, use of the Flynn effect, adjusting IQ scores with psychometric tests, and
the use of overinflated statistical error of measurements (SEMs). The Hall Court
referring to “established medical practice” rather than the statute allows the view of
experts regarding what is conclusive evidence to trump the views of elected
representatives who enacted the statutes that were the basis of the decision in Atkins
in the first place. Hall, 572 U.S. at 712; compare Hall, 572 U.S. at 736, n.12 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (noting that States appear to require defendants to prove each prong
separately by a preponderance of the evidence and observing that until recently the
“longstanding views” of professional organizations was that intellectual functioning
and adaptive behavior were “independent factors” citing DSM–IV–TR, at 39), with
Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (“It is not sound to view a single factor as dispositive of a
conjunctive and interrelated assessment”).
One of the problems with blending objective IQ scores with highly subjective
measures of adaptive deficits is that capital defendants are often raised in deprived
capital defendant in Georgia with an IQ score of 73 on the WAIS–IV using a 68%
confidence interval cannot possibly meet his burden of establishing his intellectual
disability beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor can a Florida defendant with an IQ score
of 73 on the WAIS–IV meet his burden of establishing his intellectual disability by
clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, a 68% confidence interval means even
defendants in states that only require a showing of intellectual disability by a
preponderance of the evidence cannot meet their burdens either.
12
circumstances, so adaptive deficits among them are quite common and blending the
two nearly always operates to lower the more objective and reliable IQ scores. See,
e.g. Hall, 572 U.S. at 706 (2014) (noting Hall’s adaptive deficits were adversely
affected by being raised in the “most horrible family circumstances imaginable”).
Adaptive deficits are a “malleable factor” without a firm empirical foundation that
does not involve standardized tests and whose measurement relies “largely on
subjective judgments.” Hall, 572 U.S. at 737 (Alito, J., dissenting).
And psychometric tests have that same flaw albeit to a lesser degree.
Psychometric tests often measure abilities such as language skills that are often
subpar in capital defendants due to their deprived backgrounds. Psychometric tests
often have behavioral or personality components to them which simply should not be
considered in the intellectual ability determination. Psychometric tests, while more
objective than adaptive deficits instruments, are not as objective or reliable as IQ
tests.
State legislatures did not envision that professional organizations would alter
the definition of intellectual disability and courts would seemingly defer to those
organizations over the requirements of the statutes. See, e.g., Coonce v. United States,
142 S. Ct. 25, 25-26 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting form the denial of certiorari)
(noting the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
(AAIDD), has change the age of onset from requiring manifestation of the disability
before the age of 18, which was the requirement at the time Atkins was decided to
now allow manifestation before the age of 22); § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2024)
13
(requiring manifestation before the age of 18). When courts modify the contours of
the statutes, the statutes are no longer an “objective indicia of society’s standards.”
Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 108 (2021). All of these various modifications to the
statutes that were the font for Atkins amount to improperly moving the Trop goalpost
on the States.
Prior Testimony and Findings
At the first evidentiary hearing on the intellectual disability claim in 2007, the
record established that Walls failed the third prong of the statutory test for
intellectual disability which requires onset of the disability as a minor, because his
IQ scores as a minor were normal. Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 349-52 (Fla. 2016)
(Canady, J., dissenting) (noting Walls had IQ scores of 102 at age 12 and 101 at age
14 and taking the position that no remand for a second evidentiary hearing was
required by Hall v. Florida because, regardless of any additional facts proven at
another hearing on his intellectual abilities, Walls was not intellectually disabled
based on his IQ scores as a minor). But the majority of the Florida Supreme Court
held that Hall was retroactive under the state law test for of Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d
922 (Fla.1980). Walls, 213 So. 3d at 346. The majority read this Court’s decisions in
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 723 (2014), and Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 315-22
(2015), as mandating that “all three prongs of the intellectual disability test be
considered in tandem and that the conjunctive and interrelated nature of the test
requires no single factor to be considered dispositive.” Id. at 346-47. The Florida
14
Supreme Court then remanded for a second evidentiary on Walls’ intellectual
abilities. Walls, 213 So. 3d at 347.
In 2021, the state postconviction court held a six-day evidentiary hearing on
the renewed intellectual disability claim and concluded Walls failed both the first and
second prong. (2022 Succ. PCR at 6262-72). The state postconviction court observed
that Walls “consistently obtained average IQ scores as a child.” (2022 Succ. PCR 6275)
(emphasis in original). The state postconviction court found the State’s expert, Dr.
Prichard, to be the “most credible.” (2022 Succ. PCR 6272). Dr. Prichard diagnosed
Walls with ADHD, conduct disorder, and antisocial personality disorder, but not with
intellectual disability because he did not think Walls’ adult IQ scores were valid.
(2022 Succ. PCR 6271).
At the second evidentiary hearing, it was established that Walls’ two IQ scores
as an adult were 74 and 72. (2022 Succ. PCR at 350, 370, 419, 489, 535, 538, 563, 613,
910, 1043, 1096, 1152-53, 1197, 1203, 1238-39). And it was also established at the
hearing that Walls’ three IQ scores as a minor were 88, 102, and 101. (2022 Succ.
PCR at 427, 506, 544, 554, 563, 773, 777, 782-83, 808-09, 854, 1043, 1089, 1202, 1252).
So, the testimony established that Walls failed the first prong of the statutory test for
intellectual disability of significant subaverage intellectual functioning as an adult
and reestablished that Walls failed the third prong of onset of the disability as a
minor as well.
Walls was granted a second evidentiary hearing in state court to explore his
Atkins claim but failed to establish his intellectual disability yet again. The state
15
postconviction court’s findings following the second evidentiary hearing completely
negates any claim that Walls is intellectually disabled.
Averaging Multiple IQ scores
The issue of accounting for multiple IQ scores is currently pending in this
Court. Hamm v. Smith, No. 24-872; Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1, 34 n.1 (2017) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (noting Hall reached “no holding” regarding intellectual disability
claims involving multiple IQ scores, and observing that Hall “cannot be read to call
into question the approach of States that would not treat a single IQ score as
dispositive” when there are additional higher IQ scores). While the Hall Court
observed, the “analysis of multiple IQ scores jointly is a complicated endeavor,” the
majority did not explain why averaging the valid multiple IQ scores was not a
mathematically sound alternative. Hall, 572 U.S. at 714 (citing Schneider, Principles
of Assessment of Aptitude and Achievement, in The Oxford Handbook of Child
Psychological Assessment 286, 289–291, 318 (D. Saklofske, C. Reynolds, V. Schwean,
eds. 2013)). Schneider has a complicated formula for multiple IQ scores called a
“composite” score. But he acknowledges that an average is a “rough approximation”
of a composite score and only advocates the use of a “composite” score in cases of low
and high scorers. Principles at 290.
Mathematicians are the true experts when it comes to numbers and how
numbers should be considered collectively, not psychologists. The most common
method for considering scores collectively that are measuring the same phenomena
is a mean or average. Averaging multiple scores is standard mathematical practice.
16
Indeed, part of the Hall Court’s reason for mandating the use of the statistical error
of measurement (SEM) to adjust a single IQ score was that the SEM was commonly
employed in other contexts by testing professionals. Hall, 572 U.S. at 722 (observing
that the “SEM is not a concept peculiar to the psychiatric profession and IQ tests,”
rather, it “is a measure that is recognized and relied upon by those who create and
devise tests of all sorts”). This Court described the SEM as “one of the most important
concepts in measurement theory.” Id.
This Court should not mandate the use of mathematical principles regarding
only some aspects of the determination of intellectual functioning or only mandate
the use of mathematical principles that inure to the defendant’s benefit. The use of
means and medians is also standard mathematical practice and should be used with
multiple IQ scores as well. See, e.g., Clemons v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 967 F.3d
1231, 1249 (11th Cir. 2020) (using an average of four IQ scores to determine that the
defendant’s IQ was 70.25 and denying the Atkins claim), cert. denied, Clemons v.
Dunn, 141 S. Ct. 2722 (2021) (No 20-1197).2 Averaging all the valid IQ scores is a
perfectly sound method of dealing with multiple IQ scores and has the advantage of
A mean is the statistical term for an average. A median is another method of
calculating the center point for a set of numbers that is often used for skewed data so
that the outliers do not distort the prototypical value. But IQ scores for a single
individual do not usually involve dramatically skewed data. IQ scores for a single
individual are often within a 10-point spread. The case of Smith pending in this Court
involved only a 6-point spread. And even in this case where there is a 30-point
differential between Walls’ highest IQ score of 102 and his lowest score of 72, the
spread for his adult IQ scores is two points and the spread for his IQ scores as a minor
is 14 points. Use of the median is not necessary for IQ scores of a single individual
because they do not involve skewed data.
2
17
being simple rather than being “complicated” like the “composite” score. An average
of multiple IQ scores is a more accurate measure of true IQ than a single IQ score
adjusted by the SEM. Hall, 572 U.S. at 742 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting the “well
accepted view is that multiple consistent scores establish a much higher degree of
confidence”). And an average of multiple IQ scores is a more accurate measure of a
person’s true intellectual ability than IQ scores adjusted by an overinflated SEM of
five points.
Using averages, Walls fails both the first prong of subaverage intellectual
functioning and the third prong of onset as a minor under Florida’s statutory test for
intellectual disability. § 921.173, Fla. Stat. (2024). In 1991, after the murders, when
Walls was 24 years old, he obtained an IQ score of 74. In 2006, when he was 39 years
old, he obtained an IQ score of 72. So, his two adult IQ scores were 74 and 72, which
is an average of 73. The average of Walls’ adult IQ scores is 73, which is not
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.”
If an average of multiple IQ scores is available, no adjustment for the SEM is
required. Adjusting for the SEM is only necessary with single IQ scores because both
the SEM and averaging are employed for the same purpose of accounting for
numerical anomalies and to better reflect the actual or true IQ score. So, the use of
both calculations when there are multiple IQ scores is not necessary. Adjusting an
average IQ score with the SEM is mathematically unwarranted. Walls’ average IQ of
73 as an adult should not be adjusted using a SEM.
18
But even adjusting the average of 73 with the SEM of 2.16 using a 68%
confidence interval, Walls’ IQ is in the range of 70.8 to 75.1, which does not establish
significant subaverage intellectual functioning and certainly not by clear and
convincing evidence, as required by Florida’s statute. § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat.
Walls also fails the third prong of onset under any standard or calculations.
Walls had three IQ scores as a minor: 88, 102, and 101. The average of these three
childhood scores is 97. An IQ score of 97 reflects normal intelligence.3 And, the third
prong, when it involves IQ scores from childhood, is the most objective and reliable of
the three prongs, because malingering is rarely an issue with that prong.
Commonwealth v. Hackett, 99 A.3d 11, 33 (Penn. 2014) (noting that capital
defendants have a “powerful incentive to malinger and to slant evidence” after
Atkins); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that a capital
defendant who feigns intellectual disability “risks nothing at all.”). Walls’ average IQ
score of 97 as a minor standing alone completely negates his Atkins claim.4
3 Walls actually had four IQ tests as a minor. When he was seven years old, Walls
was IQ tested for the second time but no numerical score was recorded for that
particular IQ test. The only notation for that second IQ test made in his records was
that his IQ was “normal.” Because there is no actual number available for that test,
only the three IQ scores with numerical scores were used to calculate his average IQ
as a minor. But that IQ test serves to corroborate that Walls’ IQ was “normal” in his
childhood.
4 Malingering was an issue in this case regarding Walls’ two adult IQ scores. The
postconviction court in 2021, following the second evidentiary hearing, concluded that
Walls “intentionally underperformed” on the 1991 IQ test and the 2006 IQ test, both
of which were administered to him after he had been convicted of capital murder,
when he had a “powerful incentive” to underperform, in the words of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. But even accepting the two adult scores as valid, Walls
fails the first prong of “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” because the
19
Walls is not intellectually disabled under Florida’s statutory definition of
intellectual disability. The average of Walls’ three IQ scores as a minor is 97 and the
average of his two IQ scores as an adult is 73. Walls is not now intellectually disabled
and never was.
Hall v. Florida Does Not Apply to Walls
Walls insists that Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), applies to him, despite
being granted another evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim based
on Hall, at which he failed to prove his Atkins claim yet again. Walls boldly sought a
third evidentiary hearing based on Hall during the recent warrant litigation, despite
the circuit court having conducted a six-day evidentiary hearing on the intellectual
disability claim in 2021.
Hall does not apply retroactively to Walls under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989). Walls’ death sentence became final on Tuesday, January 24, 1995, the day
after this Court denied review of his convictions and sentences following the retrial.
Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995) (No. 94-7005). So, his death sentence was final
nearly two decades before Hall was decided in 2014. Hall is procedural and therefore
not retroactive under Teague, as both state and federal courts have uniformly held.5
average of his two adult IQ scores is 73. An IQ of 73 reflects borderline intellectual
ability but Atkins does not protect those with borderline intellectual disability.
5 In re Payne, 722 Fed. Appx. 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2018) (concluded that Hall is not
retroactive under Teague because it “merely created new procedural requirements”
citing Goodwin v. Steele, 814 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2014); In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151
(11th Cir. 2014); Kilgore v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 805 F.3d 1301, 1314 (11th Cir.
2015)); State v. Lotter, 311 Neb. 878, 976 N.W.2d 721, 741 (2022); In re Walls, No. 2310982-P, 2023 WL 3745103 (11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2023) (rejecting the same argument
20
Walls, relying on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), argued to the Florida Supreme Court that Hall is
retroactive because it was a substantive decision. To be substantive for purposes of
Teague retroactivity, the case must alter the “range of conduct or the class of persons
that the law punishes.” Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 111 n.4 (2021) (quoting
Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. 120, 130-31 (2016). On the other hand, a case is
procedural and therefore not retroactive “if it regulates only the manner of
determining the defendant's culpability.” Jones, 593 U.S. at 111 at n.4 (citing Welch,
578 U. S. at 129).
Hall is a procedural decision, not a substantive decision. Hall addressed which
capital defendants were entitled to an evidentiary hearing to prove their claim of
intellectual disability and present evidence of adaptive deficits. It is Atkins alone that
is the substantive Eighth Amendment decision. Furthermore, this Court has clarified
that Montgomery, which conflated substantive and procedural rules, will not be
followed by the Court in the future for purposes of retroactivity determinations under
Teague. Jones, 593 U.S. at 111 n.4. Welch is the current controlling precedent
regarding retroactivity, not Miller or Montgomery. And under Welch, Atkins is
substantive, while Hall is procedural. So, Atkins is retroactive but Hall is not.
And, regardless of its retroactivity, Hall does not apply to Walls. Hall does not
apply to any capital defendant whose IQ scores as a minor definitively establishes
that Hall is retroactive based on Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016)); State
v. Payne, 721 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tenn. 2025).
21
that they are not intellectually disabled. Hall did not involve the third prong. But
Walls’ case does involve the third prong. Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 349 (Fla. 2016)
(Canady, J. dissenting) (expressing the view that the trial court correctly denied
Walls’ intellectual disability claim because the evidence at the first evidentiary
hearing “showed without dispute” that Walls failed the third prong of the test for
intellectual disability based on his IQ scores as a minor). Walls was never entitled to
a second evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim based on Hall in the
first place due to his IQ scores as a minor, but he, in fact, received a second
evidentiary hearing. Walls certainly is not entitled to a third evidentiary hearing
based on Hall.
No Conflict with this Court’s Jurisprudence
There is no conflict between this Court’s jurisprudence and the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in this case. Sup. Ct. R. l0(c) (listing conflict with this Court
as a consideration in the decision to grant review).
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the Hall claim on nonretroactivity grounds does not conflict with this Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.
Under this Court’s retroactivity test of Teague and its progeny, such as Edwards v.
Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255 (2021), and Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021), Hall is not
retroactive. In Edwards, this Court abolished the watershed exception to Teague and
held that new procedural rules which only alter the manner of determining the
defendant's culpability or a substantive right “do not apply retroactively on federal
collateral review.” Id. at 276.
22
This Court has repeatedly declined to grant review of petition raising the
question of the retroactivity of Hall in Florida capital cases under Phillips which used
the state law test for retroactivity, including previously in this case. Walls v. Florida,
144 S. Ct. 174 (2023) (No. 22-7866) (denying review of the questions of whether Hall
is retroactive and whether Phillips violated Bouie).
And the Florida Supreme Court’s affirmance of the summary denial of the
intellectual disability claim without conducting a third evidentiary hearing does not
conflict with this Court’s decision in Hall. None of the three lead cases from this
Court dealing with intellectual disability─Atkins, Hall, or Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1
(2017), involved the third prong of onset. Moore, 581 U.S. at 7, n.3 (noting that the
third element of onset of the disability as a minor was “not at issue”). A capital
defendant with a normal IQ as a child is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a
claim of intellectual disability, much less a third evidentiary hearing.
Nor does the Florida Supreme Court’s decision denying any relief on the Atkins
claim conflict with Atkins itself. Even ignoring the third prong of the test for
intellectual disability and limiting the analysis solely to the first prong of
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, there is no conflict with this Court’s
decision in Atkins. Walls’ average IQ score of 73 reflects, at most, borderline
intellectual functioning. But the prohibition established in Atkins is limited to
defendants with mild intellectual disability and does not extend to defendants with
borderline intellectual functioning.
23
No Conflict with Other Appellate Courts
There is also no conflict with either the federal circuit courts or the state courts
of last resort and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case. As this Court has
observed, a principal purpose for certiorari jurisdiction “is to resolve conflicts among
the United States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the meaning of
provisions of federal law.” Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991); see also
Sup. Ct. R. l0(b) (listing conflict among federal appellate courts and state supreme
courts as a consideration in the decision to grant review). Issues that have not divided
courts or are not important questions of federal law do not merit this Court's
attention. Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182, 184, n.3 (1987).
There is no identified conflict between any decision of any federal circuit court
and the Florida Supreme Court. Petitioner cites no decision from any federal
appellate court holding Hall is retroactive. The circuit courts have addressed the
retroactivity of Hall have unanimously held that Hall is not retroactive under
Teague. In re Payne, 722 Fed. Appx. 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2018); Goodwin v. Steele, 814
F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2014); Kilgore v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 805 F.3d 1301, 1314
(11th Cir. 2015); In re Walls, No. 23-10982-P, 2023 WL 3745103 (11th Cir. Apr. 13,
2023) (reaffirming In re Henry and Kilgore). Nor does Petitioner cite to any federal
circuit court holding that a defendant with IQ scores of 88, 101, and 102, as a minor
is entitled to the protection of Atkins or that Atkins extends to borderline intellectual
functioning.
24
There is also no identified conflict between any decision of any other state court
of last resort and the Florida Supreme Court's decision either. Petitioner cites no
decision from any state supreme court holding Hall is retroactive. The few state
supreme courts that have reached the issue have uniformly agreed with the Florida
Supreme Court’s holding that Hall is not retroactive. State v. Lotter, 311 Neb. 878,
976 N.W.2d 721, 741 (2022); State v. Payne, 721 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tenn. 2025). Nor
does Petitioner cite to any state supreme court holding that a defendant with IQ
scores of 88, 101, and 102 as a minor is entitled to the protection of Atkins or that
Atkins extends to borderline intellectual functioning. There is no conflict between the
other state supreme courts and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision regarding these
issues.
Petitioner relies on a Mississippi Supreme Court case that was remanded for
an evidentiary hearing on an Atkins claim. Pet. at 10-11 (citing Clark v. State, 418
So. 3d 1226 (Miss. 2025)). In Clark, the State argued that the Atkins claim was
procedurally barred because it could have been raised at trial but the Mississippi
Supreme Court rejected application of a procedural bar to Atkins claims, reasoning
that applying bars to such a claim carries “the risk that an intellectually disabled
individual will be executed, which the Eighth Amendment prohibits.” Clark, 418 So.
3d at, 1230. But Clark is different both legally and factually from this case. The facts
of Clark are dramatically different and therefore, there is no true conflict. Clark was
seeking an initial evidentiary hearing on his Atkins claim, unlike Walls who is
seeking a third evidentiary hearing on his Atkins claim (or perhaps appellate review
25
of his second evidentiary hearing). Furthermore, Clark presented experts’ affidavits
that his IQ scores were 64 and 65 but there seems to have been no information
regarding Clark’s IQ score as a minor in those affidavits. In contrast, Walls’ IQ scores
as a minor were normal, as established at two prior evidentiary hearings. That
threshold issue of the third prong of onset makes the two cases legally distinguishable
as well. And one state supreme court holding that bars should not be applied to Atkins
claims is not a deep or wide conflict.
In sum, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision due to the state law procedural bar. Alternatively, because there is no conflict
with this Court or among lower appellate courts on the issue of the retroactivity of
Hall, review of this question should be denied.
QUESTION 2
Whether this Court should grant review of a decision of the Florida
Supreme Court concluding that the state’s constitutional conformity
clause regarding the Eighth Amendment does not violate the Supremacy
Clause of the Federal Constitution.
Walls asserts that the state constitutional conformity clause, Article I, section
17 of the Florida Constitution, is itself unconstitutional because it violates the
Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution by prohibiting arguments based on the
evolving standards of decency standard from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01
(1958), from being raised in Florida courts. Pet. at 15.
The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the Supremacy Clause challenge to
Florida’s conformity clause regarding Eighth Amendment issues. Walls, 2025 WL
26
3550358, at *7. The Court rejected the argument that Florida courts following the
conformity clause somehow resulted in Florida falling below the floor established by
this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The Florida Supreme Court also
rejected the argument that the Florida Legislature’s recent enactments and political
statements operated to “release the judiciary from its obligation to adhere to a
constitutionally mandated conformity clause.” Id. at *7.
State Constitutional Conformity Clauses
Florida’s constitution contains two conformity clauses, one regarding the
Fourth Amendment and another one regarding the Eighth Amendment. Art. I § 12,
Fla. Const; Art. I § 17, Fla. Const. Florida’s Eighth Amendment conformity clause
provides that the “prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed in conformity
with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” Art. I § 17, Fla. Const.
The Florida Supreme Court has explained that this conformity clause means
this Court’s “interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is both the floor and the ceiling
for protection from cruel and unusual punishment in Florida” and that Florida courts
“cannot interpret Florida's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment” to
provide greater protection than this Court has done. Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785,
794 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2452 (2023).
Walls oddly asserts Florida’s Eighth Amendment conformity clause, which
27
requires conformity to this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, somehow
violates the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. Art. 6, cl. 2, U.S. Const. It is
nonsensical to speak of a state court strictly following this Court’s precedent as a
violation of the Supremacy Clause. A state conformity clause mandating strict
adherence to this Court’s caselaw, by its very nature, cannot violate supremacy
principles. The fundamental premise of this question, which is that conformity
clauses prevent the development of the law, is flawed. A state conformity clause
certainly does not prevent this Court from granting a petition for writ of certiorari
raising a question regarding the Eighth Amendment, including a petition from a
Florida capital defendant or indeed from Walls himself. A state conformity clause
does not prevent the further development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence based
on Trop; it simply limits any expansion of the Eighth Amendment from a Florida case
to the nation’s highest court. A state constitutional conformity clause is a limit on
state courts; it does not limit this Court in any manner.
No Conflict with this Court’s Jurisprudence
There is no conflict between this Court’s jurisprudence and the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in this case. Sup. Ct. R. l0(c) (listing conflict with this Court
as a consideration in the decision to grant review).
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the constitutional challenge to
Florida’s Eighth Amendment conformity clause does not conflict with this Court’s
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140 (1971)
(finding Supremacy Clause regarding a state constitutional provision based on a
28
referendum to be “unpersuasive”). The citizens of Florida are entitled to amend their
own state constitution by a referendum to prohibit judges in their state from
expanding the cruel and unusual punishment provision of their state constitution in
a manner they disapproved of. Walls cites no case from this Court addressing the
issue of a state constitution’s conformity clause violating the Supremacy Clause,
much less a case holding that a state constitution’s conformity clause violated the
Supremacy Clause.
Furthermore, this Court has denied review of this question previously in a
petition involving an active warrant in a Florida capital case. Barwick v. Florida, 143
S. Ct. 2452 (2023) (No. 22-7424). This Court should do likewise in this case and deny
review of this question.
No Conflict with Other Appellate Courts
There is also no conflict with either the federal circuit courts or the state courts
of last resort and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision. As this Court has observed,
a principal purpose for certiorari jurisdiction “is to resolve conflicts among the United
States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the meaning of provisions of
federal law.” Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991); see also Sup. Ct. R.
l0(b) (listing conflict among federal appellate courts and state supreme courts as a
consideration in the decision to grant review). Issues that have not divided courts or
are not important questions of federal law do not merit this Court's attention.
Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182, 184, n.3 (1987).
29
There is no identified conflict between any decision of any federal circuit court
and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case rejecting the Supremacy
challenge to the state constitution. Petitioner cites no decision from any federal
appellate court holding a conformity clause in a state constitution violates the
Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, the state’s conformity
clause limits only Florida courts, not the federal courts. Florida’s federal district
courts and the Eleventh Circuit are free to address Eighth Amendment issues under
Trop.6
There is also no identified conflict between any decision of any other state court
of last resort and the Florida Supreme Court's decision either. Petitioner cites no
decision from any state supreme court holding a conformity clause in their state
constitution violates the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. There is no
conflict between the other state supreme courts and the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision.
In sum, because the claim makes little sense under the Supremacy Clause and
because there is no conflict among the courts on the question, review of this question
should be denied.
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari review should be denied.
6 While the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) limits federal
courts in federal habeas review from expanding the Eighth Amendment beyond the
current limits established by this Court, that is a result of a federal statute, not
Florida’s conformity clause. Before the AEDPA, the lower federal courts were free to
perform a Trop analysis. Congress did not approve of lower federal court’s expansive
views of criminal’s rights any more than Florida’s citizens did of those of the Florida
courts.
30
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
JAMES UTHMEIER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA
/S/ SCOTT A. BROWNE
SCOTT A. BROWNE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
Office of the Attorney General
3507 E. Frontage Rd., Ste. 200
Tampa, Florida 33607
Telephone: (813) 287-7900
scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
CHARMAINE MILLSAPS
Special Counsel, Asst. Attorney General
JASON RODRIGUEZ
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Benjamin Hoffman
Senior Assistant Attorney General
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
31
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.