Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Melvin Leon Myrick, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefNov 24, 2025

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No. 25-____

IN THE

MELVIN MYRICK,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Robert J. Wagner

Counsel of Record

Robert J. Wagner, PLC

101 Shockoe Slip, Suite I

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 814-8172

robwagnerlaw@gmail.com

November 24, 2025

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a final ruling at a pretrial hearing stops the Speedy Trial Act

clock from running, consistent with the dictates of 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

United States v. Myrick, No. 3:22cr148 (December 20,

2023)

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

United States v. Myrick, No. 23-4768 (September 9,

2025)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED............................................................................. i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ......................................................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................iv

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................................................1

OPINIONS BELOW .......................................................................................1

JURISDICTION .............................................................................................1

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS.....................................................1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................3

Background………….......................................................................3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT….................................................. 8

Whether a final ruling at a pretrial hearing stops the Speedy

Trial Act clock from running, consistent with the dictates of 18

U.S.C. § 3161.

…………………………………………………......................8

CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................17

APPENDIX

A. Court of Appeals Decision, dated August 13, 2025….....................A

B. Denial of Rehearing En Banc, dated September 9, 2025.............B

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Barton v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 63 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1933) ...

Kline & Berry v. Wynne, Haynes & Co., 10 Ohio St. 223, 228 (1859) .. 12

Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894) ..................................................... 14

Malony v. Adsit, 175 U.S. 281 (1899) ..................................................... 14

McCuing v. Bovay, 60 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1932) ..................................... 14

Norton v. Livingston, 14 S.C. 177, 178 (1880) ....................................... 12

People v. Torres, 38 Cal. 141 (1869) ...................................................... 12

Snelling v. Yetter, 25 A.D. 590, 592, 49 N.Y.S. 917, 918–19 (App. Div.

1898)) ....................................................................................................... 12

Young v. Martin, 75 U.S. 354 (1869) ....................................................... 14

United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1982) ........................ 16

United States v. Martinez, 749 F.2d 623 (11th Cir. 1984) ....................... 9

United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1994) ........................... 1, 9

United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2005) ...................... 16

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 3161................................................................................. passim

21 U.S.C. § 841............................................................................................ 1

28 U.S.C. § 1254.......................................................................................... 1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Melvin Myrick respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Fourth Circuit, Pet. App. A, is available at 15 0 F.4th

3 0 8 . The Fourth Circuit’s order denying rehearing en banc, Pet. App. B, is

unpublished.

JURISDICTION

The Fourth Circuit entered judgment on August 13, 2025, Pet. App. A ,

and denied petitioner’s timely petition for rehearing en banc on September 9,

2025, Pet. App. B . This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Speedy Trial Act entitles a defendant to dismissal of charges pending

against him if he is not brought to trial within 70 days of his initial appearance

or indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). In calculating the running of the 70day period, the Speedy Trial Act excludes certain periods of delay resulting

from pretrial proceedings, including “delay resulting from any pretrial motion,

from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other

prompt disposition of, such motion,” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D).

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Melvin Myrick was sentenced to 22 years in federal prison after

being convicted of Possession with the Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine,

approximately 200 grams, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and an accompanying

gun count, after proceeding to trial. The district court incorrectly tolled the

speedy trial clock at a critical juncture in the proceedings, effectively denying

Mr. Myrick his statutory speedy trial rights. This decision was improperly

upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The district court incorrectly

tolled the speedy trial clock for the entire period between the filing of the

suppression motions and the rendering of the written opinion—despite the fact

that the district court clearly ruled against Mr. Myrick during the hearing.

Excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act should not have run between the

“date the judge render[ed] his decision orally in open court” for the motions

hearings and the date the court issued written orders documenting the findings.

See United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1994). The Speedy Trial

Act specifically calls for the suspension of the speedy trial clock tolling by either

“the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.”

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) (emphasis added). The district court promptly disposed

of the motions during the suppression hearing and the speedy trial clock,

therefore, should have resumed following the hearing.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Background

On October 4, 2022, Melvin Myrick was indicted by a federal Grant Jury

in the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, for Possession with the

Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. J.A. 1819. An arrest warrant was issued the next day and Mr. Myrick was arrested and

brought to court for his initial appearance on October 14, 2022. J.A. 3. An

attorney was appointed to represent Mr. Myrick on that day. Id.

On November 7, 2022, Mr. Myrick filed a Motion for Substitution of

Counsel. J.A. 4. Counsel entered his appearance and, on November 13, 2022,

filed a Motion to Continue, to allow for “newly-retained counsel to file

appropriate motions,” for “both sides to arrange the presence of any required

witnesses,” and for “counsel to attempt to achieve a just and mutually

acceptance resolution of the matter.” J.A. 34. The district court granted the

motion to continue the trial on November 28, 2022, finding that “the interests of

justice are served by continuing this case beyond the speedy trial cut-off and

that such action outweighs the best interests of the public and Defendant to a

speedy trial.” J.A. 41.

On December 9, 2022, Mr. Myrick filed a Motion and Memorandum to

Suppress

Cellphones

and

Motion

and

Memorandum

Suppress

Identification. J.A. 42-54, 55-63, respectively. Counsel’s motion to suppress cell

phones was premised almost entirely on state law and a procedural state law

argument. J.A. 48-49, 52-53. His identification suppression motion presented a

very vague and unclear basis for relief, providing no authority on point which

tied the factual basis to the point of law referenced. J.A. 57-63. 1

On January 3, 2023, the government filed its opposition to Mr. Myrick’s

suppression motions, aptly pointing out all of the deficiencies in the motions.

J.A. 64-83. The defendant filed his replies on January 11, 2023, seemingly

conceding many of the points made by the government. J.A. 89 (contested basis

for traffic stop “will be withdrawn”); J.A. 90 (there is “no dispute that the stateissued search warrants were valid when issued”). It was difficult to distinguish

through the pleadings what counsel was arguing and what authority, if any, he

relied upon in making the arguments.

The district court held a hearing on the suppression motions on January

24, 2023. J.A. 101. The essence of the hearing was to determine whether the

search of Mr. Myrick’s cell phones was lawful and whether the officer’s

identification of Mr. Myrick was subject to suppression. J.A. 105. In actuality,

the hearing appeared to be an exercise by the district court to allow defense

On January 10, 2023, the parties jointly filed a Motion to Continue Trial Date

(J.A. 86), which had been scheduled for January 31–February 1, 2023. On

January 11, 2023, the Court issued an order, granting the parties’ joint motion

and continuing the case until March 21, 2023, stating that, “the ends of justice

are served by continuing this case beyond the speedy trial cut-off and that such

action outweighs the best interests of the public and Defendant to a speedy

trial.” J.A. 88.

counsel to make a record, then to summarily reject the arguments. There was

nothing to suggest at the hearing that the district court was seriously

considering granting any of the arguments. J.A 101-204.

At the hearing, the police officer, Officer Jackson, testified for the

government, setting forth the reasons why the cell phones were seized and

explaining the process for identifying the defendant as the driver of the vehicle.

J.A. 106-137. Ms. Daniels testified for the defendant about how her car had been

stolen; however, the merit of her testimony was lost on the court after cross

examination. J.A. 155-164. The government did a very effective job of

impeaching Ms. Daniels. J.A. 164-182.2 At the hearing, defense counsel

presented argument on the cell phone issue that was devoid of relevant

authority. J.A. 133 (“There is no case law on this point”).

After the evidence was presented on the phone suppression issue, the

government submitted its argument on the matter with no questions or

interruptions from the Court. J.A. 190-194. Defense counsel then began his

argument and the Court almost immediately interrupted and offered that the

good faith exception would “preclude any kind of suppression.” Id. at 194-195.

The Court then chimed in with disagreements with the defendant’s position and

a very clear message to the parties that the Court was denying the motion. J.A.

196.

At one point Ms. Daniels was going to testify as an alibi witness. J.A. 5. That

alibi notice was withdrawn prior to trial. J.A. 9.

At one point the district court inquired of counsel if he cited to “any

authority that has ever precluded a federal court from admitting that kind of

evidence because perhaps the clerk of the court erred in state court?” Id. at 197.

The Court asked if counsel had the state court information in question and had

“an opportunity to use it in defending” the client. Id. Counsel then conceded

there was probable cause to search the phone. Id. at 199. The Court stated that

“[m]aybe this is a matter you ought to take up with Judge Johnson at the Circuit

Court of Chesterfield.” Id. The Court then definitively stated that the state court

findings do not “preclude” the use of the phone records “in federal court, with all

due respect.” Id. at 199. The Court commended counsel for raising such a “novel

issue,” but announced that “I just don’t think a flaw in the state’s handling of

the search warrant in any way affects a matter that is on proper legal footing in

federal court.” Id. at 199-200. Counsel responded by stating, “Very well, Your

Honor. Note my exception?” The Court responded by stating, “Sure. I will,”

disposing of that issue and argument Id. at 200.

Counsel turned to the identification suppression issue, arguing that the

officer did not do anything improper, but was “simply mistaken” about her

investigation. Id. Counsel presented no authority in support of his position that

the identification should be suppressed. In response to counsel’s argument, the

district court made very clear that this was not a matter for suppression or

admissibility, but would simply “merit cross-examination at trial.” The court

found conclusively that the matter raised “goes to the weight and not the

admissibility.” J.A. 202. Counsel noted his exception to that finding, and the

court responded, “Okay.” Id. The district court then proceeded to confirm the

trial date, without any reference to taking the matters under advisement or

noting that a written opinion will follow. J.A. 202. The suppression matters

before the court simply had no legal teeth to them, and were easily and

summarily rejected by the district court at the hearing on January 24, 2023.

On February 9, 2023, the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and

Order denying Mr. Myrick’s suppression motions. J.A. 207-221.

Fourth Circuit’s Three-Judge Panel Opinion

The Fourth Circuit improperly denied relief for Mr. Myrick, failing to

recognize that the district court did in fact rule on Counsel’s motions during the

hearing. In its opinion, the court followed the findings of the district court,

stating that “the district court never actually made a decision on those points

and certainly not on the motions.” Opin. at 14. The court gave short shrift to the

exceptions noted by the district court, stating that the court merely “expressed

skepticism with the theory under lying Myrick’s first motion,” and that the

second exception referenced how the contested evidence could affect cross

examination, but was “not a basis to exclude evidence whatsoever.” Opin. at 13.

The court never actually analyzed what it means for counsel to articulate an

exception and for the district court to note the exception. For these reasons, the

Fourth Circuit erred.

Mr. Myrick takes issue with these findings.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In assessing Mr. Myrick’s Speedy Trial Act Motion, the Fourth Circuit

and the district court erred by including in the time tolling the speedy trial clock

days that should have been excluded. The courts incorrectly tolled the speedy

trial clock between the hearing on Mr. Myrick’s suppression motion, at which

time the motion was disposed of and denied, and the rendering of the written

opinion. This was a time period of 16 days. Adding 16 days to the 65 days found

by the courts results in the passage of 82 days, a time period well in excess of

the 70-day limit.

The courts erred in their Speedy Trial Act calculations,

denying Mr. Myrick his statutory right under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). This Court

should reverse and remand the matter to the district court.

The Speedy Trial Act entitles a defendant to dismissal of charges pending

against him if he is not brought to trial within 70 days of his initial appearance

or indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). In calculating the running of the 70day period, the Speedy Trial Act excludes certain periods of delay resulting from

pretrial proceedings, including “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from

the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt

disposition of, such motion,” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D). “Where a hearing is required,

[the Speedy Trial Act] excludes the entire period from the filing of the motion to

the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, regardless of whether any delay in

holding the hearing was ‘reasonably necessary.’” See Parker, 30 F.3d at 546, n.

1 (finding that, “A court ‘finally disposes of the motion’ when either (1) the clerk

of the court officially files the judge’s written decision, or (2) the judge renders

his decision orally in open court, whichever is earlier. See also United States v.

Martinez, 749 F.2d 623, 625 & n. 1 (11th Cir. 1984)).” If, after holding a hearing,

the court requires post-hearing submissions needed for proper disposition, the

court may take the motion under advisement, and the speedy trial clock will be

tolled up to 30 additional days, until the court finally disposes of the motion. Id.;

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H).

The Judicial Conference’s “Guidelines to the Administration of the

Speedy Trial Act,” in which the guidelines provide that the starting date is the

day following the day on which the court has received everything it expects from

the parties, and the “ending date is the earliest of (1) the date the judge’s

decision is filed, (2) the date the judge renders his decision orally in open court,

or (3) the expiration of the 30-day maximum period.” Parker, 30 F.3d at 547; See

Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law of the Judicial

Conference of the United States, Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy

Trial Act of 1974, as Amended, 106 F.R.D. 271, 292 (1984).

In this case, Mr. Myrick’s speedy trial clock began on October 15, 2022—

the date of his first appearance. J.A. 4, 1472. On November 7, 2022, Mr. Myrick’s

counsel filed a Motion to Substitute Counsel and on November 13, 2022, filed a

motion to continue. J.A. 30, 31, 1472. The motion to continue was granted on

November 28, 2022 and the district court tolled the speedy trial clock between

November 7 and November 28, 2022. J.A 1472, The district court properly found

that 21 days had been assessed against the 70-day speedy trial clock at that

time. See Opin. at 11-12; J.A. 1473.

Following its granting of the motion to continue on November 29, 2022,

suppression motions were filed on December 9, 2022. J.A. 42, 55, 1473. That

period between November 29 and December 9 added another 10 days against

the 70-day period, bringing the total to 33 days. J.A. 1473. The critical issue

presented in this case involved the hearing conducted on January 24, 2023.

During the January 24, 2023 suppression motions hearing, the district

court conclusively resolved the two issues before the court. First, regarding the

suppression of the phones, the court stated that “[i]t’s a novel issue, and I

commend you for bringing it up. But I just don’t think that a flaw in the state’s

handling of the search warrant in any way affects a matter that is on proper

legal footing in federal court.” J.A. 199-200. Counsel for Mr. Myrick then stated,

“Very well, Your Honor. Note my exception?” J.A. 200. The court said, “Sure. I

will.” Id.

The district court noted Mr. Myrick’s counsel’s exception on the record

and moved on to address the next issue. Related to the second suppression issue

at the January 24, 2023 suppression hearing - the identification issue - the

district court stated that Mr. Myrick’s counsel “may have a very good point here”

and “[i]t certainly will merit cross-examination at trial, but that goes to the

weight and not the admissibility of the identification.” J.A. 202. The court

continued to explain that at cross examination at trial, Mr. Myrick’s counsel

“may very well be able to hone in on that. It’s grist for the cross-examination

mill, but it does not preclude being admissible. It goes to the weight and not the

admissibility.” Id. Once again, the court noted Mr. Myrick’s counsel’s exception

for the record; the parties proceeded to discuss with the district court

administrative matters leading to the trial of the case. J.A. 202. The hearing

was concluded at that point. The parties proceeded as if the decision of the

district court was rendered and final. The district court did not even mention a

forthcoming written order or opinion to be issued at the hearing.

If there was any question whether the district court had conclusively

ruled on the suppression motion at the time of the hearing, the district court

would not have noted defense counsel’s exception. Rather, the district court

would have instructed the parties that it was going to rule on the matter in a

written opinion. The district court did not do that. And the issues before the

district court were essentially non-issues. There was no relevant authority

offered to support the defendant’s positions, counsel retreated from positions

filed in support of the motions, and the witness for the defendant was found to

be not credible. Her proposed alibi testimony was later withdrawn. J.A. 9. There

were no credible arguments for the district court to consider, as the court found

in its opinion. J.A. 207-221.

But that is almost beside the point, because noting an exception, as

commonly understood in motions and trial practice, is the act of stating to the

court on the record that a party disagrees with the finding or decision of the

court. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “exception,” as used in this context, as

an “(o)bjection to order or ruling of trial court . A formal objection to the action

of the court, during the trial of a cause, in refusing a request or overruling an

objection; implying that the party excepting does not acquiesce in the decision

of the court, but will seek to procure its reversal, and that he means to save the

benefit of his request or objection in some future proceeding.” See Black’s Law

Dictionary, Definition of Exception (5th Edition) (emphasis added). 3 The Fourth

Circuit, in their decision, failed to address this salient point.

Although the custom of noting an exception is not widely used in current

practice, the district court clearly knew and understood what counsel for Mr.

The term “exception,” as used in this case, has a commonly understood meaning

– that the attorney disagrees with the order or ruling of the court. See Snelling

v. Yetter, 25 A.D. 590, 592, 49 N.Y.S. 917, 918–19 (App. Div. 1898) (“An

exception is but the formula of dissent from a ruling”); People v. Torres, 38 Cal.

141 (1869) (“An exception is a formal protest against the ruling of the Court upon

a question of law”); Norton v. Livingston, 14 S.C. 177, 178 (1880) (“We

understand an ‘exception’ to be an objection stated ‘to a decision on matter of

law arising upon the trial.’”); Kline & Berry v. Wynne, Haynes & Co., 10 Ohio

St. 223, 228 (1859) (“The code defines an exception to be ‘an objection taken to a

decision of the court upon a matter of law.’ Sec. 290.”).

Myrick was doing when the exception was noted. The judge in this case is one of

the most experienced judges on the bench in the Eastern District of Virginia,

was a state Circuit Court judge for years before his appointment to the federal

bench in 2001, and was the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of

Virginia for an extended period of time in the 1980s and 1990s. The district court

clearly understood that counsel for Mr. Myrick was objecting to the final decision

that the court was making on the suppression issues. No other reasonable

construction or meaning could have been gleaned from counsel noting an

exception to a finding of the court. The Circuit court also failed to even mention

this matter.

The written findings of the district court were rendered on February 9,

2023 - 16 days after the hearing; the district court failed to credit the 16 days to

the Speedy Trial Act calculations. J.A. 1474. In its decision rejecting Mr.

Myrick’s renewed Speedy Trial Act claim, the district court specifically stated

that the court “noted Defendant’s exception,” but curiously also found that “it

did not dispose of the Suppression Motions” at that time, referring to the clerk’s

minute entry. J.A. 1473-1474, 205. The minute entry of the clerk cannot be

construed as governing the resolution of this matter. This is especially true

under the applicable code section which counsels for inclusion within the speedy

trial act clock upon the “prompt disposition” of the matter. 18 U.S.C.

§3161(h)(1)(D).

In its Order, the district court relied upon the minutes of the clerk to

suggest that the matter was not disposed of at the time of the hearing. J.A. 1474.

The clerk’s minutes reflected that the matter was taken under advisement and

that a memorandum order would follow. J.A. 206. Minutes entered by the clerk

can by no means represent the findings of the court. This Court in Young v.

Martin found that the “minutes of the clerk” are entries that “do not represent

the action of the court.” See Young v. Martin, 75 U.S. 354, 356–57 (1869) (this

Court found that “to be of any avail, exceptions must not only be drawn up so as

to present distinctly the ruling of the court upon the points raised, but they must

be signed and sealed by the presiding judge. Unless so signed and sealed, they

do not constitute any part of the record which can be considered by an appellate

court.”); see also Malony v. Adsit, 175 U.S. 281, 287 (1899) (citing to Young);

Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551, 554 (1894) (“a mere memorandum made by a

clerk” has no significance in the case); Barton v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford,

Conn., 63 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1933) (same); McCuing v. Bovay, 60 F.2d 375,

376 (8th Cir. 1932) (same).

It is this finding regarding the 16 days between the hearing and the

written opinion that constituted the difference between granting Mr. Myrick’s

Speedy Trial Act motion and the denial of the motion. That is because the

remaining findings of the district court, if included with the 16 days the district

court excluded between January 24, 2023 and February 9, 2023, would have

resulted in a total of 82 days against the Speedy Trial Act clock – well in excess

of the 70-day limit. The district court found that, notwithstanding the 16 days

in question, “65 days elapsed under the speedy trial clock.” J.A. 1476.

The courts clearly erred in tolling the clock between January 24, 2023 and

February 9, 2023, inappropriately adding 16 days to the 70-day limit.

Interestingly, motions in limine were filed on March 10 and March 12, 2023,

with a hearing on the motions held on March 17, 2023. Again, the district court

ruled on the motions during the hearing, and counsel noted his exceptions,

which the court accepted. J.A. 257. The district court, at the hearing, granted

Mr. Myrick’s motion to question the expert on inconsistent witness statements,

stating explicitly, “Mr. Lorey, your motion is granted.” J.A. 239-240. Later,

regarding to the government’s motion to admit intrinsic drug trafficking

evidence, the district court found it admissible, granting the motion at the

hearing, stating that it would “give a cautionary instruction limiting the jury’s

use of that evidence solely to the issue of the identity of the driver, and nothing

else.” J.A. 252. The district court noted counsel’s exception to his findings. J.A.

257. In the minutes of the proceeding, it was recorded that both motions were

granted. J.A. 272.

The district court properly found that the time between the hearing on

March 17 and the date the written order was entered did in fact count against

the 70-day Speedy Trial Act clock. The same finding should have been made

with regard to the suppression motions earlier that year, adding the 16 days to

the 65 days found by the district court. During both hearings related to the

suppression motions and the motions in limine, the district court rendered

decisions orally in open court. The Fourth Circuit should have reversed the

district court on these points.

Excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act should not have tolled the

clock between the “date the judge render[ed] his decision orally in open court”

for the suppression motion hearing, and the date the court issued its written

order. The Speedy Trial Act specifically calls for the end of Speedy Trial clock

tolling by either “the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition

of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) (emphasis added). The use of “prompt

disposition” underscores one of the fundamental purposes of the Speedy Trial

Act—to protect a defendant from prejudice as a result of delays. See United

States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 2005). “The Speedy Trial Act is

intended to mandate an orderly and expeditious procedure for federal criminal

prosecutions by fixing specific, mechanical time limits within which the various

progressions in the prosecution must occur.” United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d

260, 264 (4th Cir. 1982). The language of the Act makes clear that the excludable

time shall come to an end as soon as a pretrial motion is disposed of or resolved.

The courts below incorrectly tolled the Speedy Trial clock; the critical

juncture between the suppression motion hearing and the written opinion

rendered by the district court was not excludable time. The suppression issues

were promptly resolved at the hearing when counsel voiced his exception to the

decision of the court, and the court noted that exception. When a court notes an

exception, the matter is ruled upon, disposed of and resolved. No other

reasonable construction or lawful interpretation of the proceedings can be

properly found. For this reason, the district court committed legal error in failing

to comply with the Speedy Trial Act’s procedural requirements. Accordingly,

the courts erred in denying Mr. Myrick’s Speedy Trial Act motion under 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, the Court should grant the petition for a

writ

certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand for further

consideration.

Respectfully submitted,