Opposition Brief — Steven Matthew Wolf, Petitioner v. Florida

No. 25-6279

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STEVEN MATTHEW WOLF,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

JAMES UTHMEIER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA

Office of the Attorney General

3507 E. Frontage Rd., Ste. 200

Tampa, Florida 33607

Telephone: (813) 287-7900

scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com

capapp@myfloridalegal.com

SCOTT A. BROWNE

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL W. MERVINE

Special Counsel, Assistant

Attorney General

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether this Court should review a fact-bound application of Wainwright

v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), where the Florida Supreme Court upheld the

excusal of a potential juror who displayed visible distress when she

equivocated about following the law and expressed specific reluctance to

recommend a sentence of death when warranted, and where Petitioner

identifies no conflict, no misapplication of precedent, and no legal

question of national importance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......................................................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................. ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................ iii

OPINION BELOW ....................................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ........................................................................................................... 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................... 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............................................................. 4

I.

The Florida Supreme Court’s Application of This Court’s Precedent Was

Correct, Fact-Specific, and Provides No Basis for Certiorari Review. ........... 5

II.

The Petition Raises No Conflict and No Question of National

Importance. ....................................................................................................... 8

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 9

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Adams v. Texas,

448 U.S. 38 (1980) ....................................................................................................... 6

Braxton v. United States,

500 U.S. 344 (1991) ................................................................................................. 1, 9

Foster v. Chatman,

578 U.S. 488 (2016) ..................................................................................................... 9

Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue,

482 U.S. 182 (1987) ..................................................................................................... 1

Tolan v. Cotton,

572 U.S. 650 (2014) ..................................................................................................... 8

Uttecht v. Brown,

551 U.S. 1 (2007) ......................................................................................................... 7

Wainwright v. Witt,

469 U.S. 412 (1985) ............................................................................................. 1, 4, 6

Witherspoon v. Illinois,

391 U.S. 510 (1968) ..................................................................................................... 5

Wolf v. State,

416 So. 3d 1117 (Fla. 2025) ............................................................................ 1, 2, 3, 4

Statutes

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 .................................................................................................... 1

iii

OPINION BELOW

The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion is reported at Wolf v. State, 416 So. 3d

1117 (Fla. 2025).

JURISDICTION

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 authorizes this Court’s jurisdiction and limits it to

federal constitutional issues that were properly presented below. A principal purpose

of certiorari jurisdiction “is to resolve conflicts among United States courts of appeals

and state courts concerning the meaning of provisions of federal law.” Braxton v.

United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991) (b) (listing conflict among federal appellate

and state supreme courts as a consideration in the decision to grant review). Cases

that do not divide the federal or state courts or present important, unsettled questions

of federal law usually do not merit certiorari review. Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dept.

of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182, 184 n.3 (1987).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Respondent accepts Petitioner’s statement regarding the constitutional and

statutory provisions involved.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 21, 2018, a fisherman discovered the nude body of a woman near

the Vaca Cut Bridge in Marathon, Florida. Wolf, 416 So. 3d at 1123. Her body bore

deep ligature marks and extensive abrasions; smeared blood and scratches were on

her buttocks. Id. There was freshly damaged vegetation and broken van parts nearby.

Id. During a canvas of the area, law enforcement saw a conversion van with damage

consistent with the van parts found near the scene; it also had vegetation lodged in

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its windows. Id. Petitioner was the driver. Id. After initially denying any

involvement, he admitted to giving the victim a ride earlier that day and ultimately

claimed that her boyfriend had killed her in the back of Petitioner’s van. Id. at 112324. Petitioner also described disposing of evidence, cleaning blood from the van, and

washing his hands. Id. at 1124.

The autopsy revealed that the victim had been strangled with a distinctive

ligature that matched a cord recovered from Petitioner’s van. Id. The victim suffered

blunt force injuries and catastrophic, fatal lacerations to the vaginal and anal

cavities, injuries the medical examiner concluded must have been inflicted while she

was alive and could not have been caused by male genitalia. Id. Petitioner’s DNA was

found under the victim’s fingernails and on an apparent bite mark on her chin. Id.

His Y-STR DNA matched sperm recovered from the victim’s anal swabs. The victim’s

blood and DNA were located throughout Petitioner’s van and on items he discarded.

Id. Petitioner’s phone history revealed searches for extreme insertion pornography

on the days preceding the murder. Id.

Petitioner was charged with first-degree murder, two counts of sexual battery

with force likely to cause serious injury, and tampering with physical evidence. Id. at

1124. A jury convicted him of all counts. Id. During the penalty phase, the State

introduced evidence of Petitioner’s 1978 second-degree murder conviction. Id. The

jury unanimously found three aggravating circumstances and unanimously

recommended a sentence of death. Id. at 1125. After reviewing the aggravation and

limited mitigation, the trial court imposed a death sentence, finding that the

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aggravating circumstances overwhelmingly outweighed the mitigating evidence and

that the murder was among “the worst of the worst.” Id.

Petitioner raised ten issues on appeal, including whether the trial court erred

by granting the State’s cause challenge to Prospective Juror 225. During voir dire,

Prospective Juror 225 repeatedly gave equivocal or evasive answers when asked

whether she could recommend a sentence of death. Id. at 1128. She admitted that she

would be reluctant to do so even when appropriate. Id. She voiced concerns that the

execution could be botched or inappropriate, referenced podcast discussions and

media reports criticizing lethal injection, and refused to directly answer whether she

could set those concerns aside even if the evidence warranted a death

recommendation. Id. Prospective Juror 225 also expressed broader practical

objections to the death penalty, stating it might be better not to have a death penalty

and referencing the financial burden on taxpayers. Id. Although she briefly stated

that she could “consider” the death penalty in the abstract, she failed to give any clear

assurance that she could recommend it in a case such as Petitioner’s. Id.

The trial court, observing Prospective Juror 225’s demeanor firsthand, found

that she was “really in distress” when questioned, and lacked “a meaningful

willingness to genuinely consider both options.” Id. The trial judge concluded that she

held an “absolute prejudice against the death penalty” and her excusal was “not a

close call.” Id.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the judgments and sentences on July 10,

2025. Applying Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), the court reiterated that a

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juror must be excused when her views would prevent or substantially impair the

performance of her duties, and such impairment need not be shown with

“unmistakable clarity.” Wolf, 416 So. 3d at 1127. It emphasized that equivocation,

reluctance, and visible distress are relevant indicators of substantial impairment,

and that reviewing courts must defer to the trial judge’s credibility assessments,

particularly when the juror’s demeanor cannot be captured by a transcript. Id. at

1127-28. Given Prospective Juror 225’s repeated reluctance, specific concerns about

recommending a sentence of death, and the trial court’s firsthand observations of her

distress, the Florida Supreme Court held that the cause excusal was proper. Id. at

1128.

Petitioner now seeks certiorari review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision

affirming the judgments and sentences.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The petition identifies no conflict, raises no unsettled question of federal law,

and instead asks this Court to revisit a fact-bound application of Wainwright v. Witt

to a prospective juror whose demeanor and answers demonstrated substantial

impairment. This Court does not grant certiorari review to reweigh voir dire

responses or to second-guess a trial judge’s firsthand credibility findings. Sup. Ct. R.

10. The Florida Supreme Court correctly applied this Court’s precedent and certiorari

review is unwarranted.

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II.

The Florida Supreme Court’s Application of This Court’s

Precedent Was Correct, Fact-Specific, and Provides No Basis for

Certiorari Review.

Petitioner’s claim fails because the Florida Supreme Court did nothing more

than apply well-settled precedent to the cause challenge of a prospective juror who

repeatedly expressed reluctance to recommend a sentence of death even when

warranted, invoked fears of “botched” executions based on podcasts and media

reports, suggested Florida might be better without the death penalty, and

equivocated when asked whether she could recommend a sentence of death. The trial

court found she was “really in distress,” lacked a “meaningful willingness to

genuinely consider both options,” and held an “absolute prejudice” against

recommending a sentence of death. These are quintessential factual findings

supporting substantial impairment.

Because the decision below simply applied well-established precedent to this

record, the petition raises no conflict, no novel legal question, and no issue warranting

this Court’s review.

A. Witherspoon permits excusal where a juror cannot consider

the lawful range of penalties.

Petitioner relies heavily on Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), but

the actual holding of Witherspoon directly undermines his position. Witherspoon

addressed jurors who possess “general scruples,” not those whose views prevent them

from considering death when warranted. Id. at 522 n.21. Prospective Juror 225’s

statements went well beyond general reservations. She consistently indicated

reluctance to recommend a sentence of death, based that reluctance on extra-record

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podcasts and media reports, questioned the legitimacy of capital punishment itself,

and never assured the court she could recommend death in a case such as Petitioner’s.

These are not general objections to capital punishment. They are specific beliefs tied

directly to the juror’s ability to perform her duty. Under Witherspoon, such views go

directly to a juror’s ability to perform her legal duty and justify removal.

B. Adams confirms that substantial impairment and not

categorical refusal is the constitutional standard.

Petitioner next invokes Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). Adams holds that

the proper inquiry is whether a juror’s views “would prevent or substantially impair”

her ability to follow the law. Id. at 45. It does not require a juror to declare an absolute

refusal to recommend death. Prospective Juror 225’s inability to state that she could

recommend a death sentence when appropriate, refusal to state that she could set

aside fears about botched executions, and visible distress demonstrate substantial

impairment under Adams. Id. at 46-47. Petitioner’s suggestion that a juror must

express categorical opposition to a recommendation of death is contrary to Adams’

controlling inquiry and is not the law.

C. The Florida Supreme Court correctly applied Witt.

This Court’s decision in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), provides the

controlling standard. It reaffirmed the Adams inquiry and held that: (1) impairment

need not be shown with “unmistakable clarity”; (2) equivocation or partial assurances

do not negate impairment; and (3) reviewing courts must defer to the trial judge’s

assessment of demeanor. Id. at 424-26.

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The Florida Supreme Court followed that framework. It examined Prospective

Juror 225’s entire voir dire including her hesitations, extra-record concerns,

emotional distress, and inability to commit to following the law. It relied on the trial

court’s firsthand observations that she was overwhelmed and unable to genuinely

consider both sentencing options. These findings fall squarely within Witt’s

deferential standard.

In contrast, Petitioner’s argument hinges entirely on ignoring that deferential

standard and evaluating one or two isolated statements rather than the totality of

the record. Witt prohibits this approach.

D. The petition seeks impermissible error correction in

contravention of Uttecht v. Brown.

In Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007), this Court reversed a lower court for

failing to defer to a trial judge’s demeanor-based excusal of a juror. Uttecht

emphasized that trial courts occupy a superior vantage point and that appellate

courts may not isolate snippets of juror responses to override findings grounded in

firsthand observations not necessarily captured by the transcript. Id. at 7-9, 20.

Yet that is exactly what Petitioner asks this Court to do, seize on individual

statements while ignoring the trial judge’s demeanor assessment and the full context

of the juror’s reluctance and equivocation. Under Uttecht, such record reweighing is

impermissible and provides no basis for certiorari review. Sup. Ct. R. 10.

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II. The Petition Raises No Conflict and No Question of National

Importance.

Even setting aside the correctness of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, the

petition independently fails because it identifies no conflict among the lower courts,

and no unsettled legal question. Instead, Petitioner asks this Court to review a factbound, credibility-dependent ruling that is unique to this case and will have no

impact beyond it.

A. There is no conflict among state courts or federal courts

regarding the application of Witt and Uttecht.

Petitioner identifies no state or federal jurisdiction that would evaluate

Prospective Juror 225 differently under the substantial impairment test set forth in

Adams, Witt, and Uttecht. In the absence of disagreement, there is no certiorariworthy division.

B. The issue is fact-bound and heavily dependent on demeanor

factual findings.

This Court “rarely” grants certiorari to revisit factual determinations or

applications of settled law to unique facts. Sup. Ct. R. 10; Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.

650, 661 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). This is exactly such a case. The ruling below

rests on the trial judge’s evaluation of Prospective Juror 225’s distress, hesitation,

and demeanor, findings that are inherently unrepeatable and carry no broader legal

significance. Nothing about this record suggests a legal issue transcending the facts

of this particular voir dire.

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C. Petitioner seeks error correction rather than resolution of an

unsettled federal question.

Petitioner essentially asks this Court to examine the transcript and reach a

different conclusion of what Prospective Juror 225 meant, how distressed she

appeared, and whether she was substantially impaired. But this Court has long

rejected efforts to obtain certiorari for such case-specific error correction. Baxton v.

United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991). The petition identifies no principle in need

of clarification and no broader doctrinal inconsistency. Instead, it presents a factual

disagreement about voir dire. Such claims are precisely the type of case that does not

warrant certiorari review. See Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 500 (2016)

(explaining how the Court defers to the state court’s factual findings).

CONCLUSION

Because the Florida Supreme Court correctly applied Witherspoon, Adams,

Witt, and Uttecht, properly deferred to the trial court’s demeanor findings, issued a

fact-bound decision with no broader legal implication, and identified no conflict or

unsettled federal question, the petition for certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES UTHMEIER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA

/s/ Scott A. Browne

SCOTT A. BROWNE

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

Michael W. Mervine

Special Counsel, Assistant

Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

9

3507 East Frontage Road, Suite 200

Tampa, Florida 33607

scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com

(813) 287-7900

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

December 15, 2025

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