Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sherri Richardson, Petitioner v. Irongate Mutual Homes, Inc., t/a Pear Tree Park Townhomes

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

Document 18

Page 1 of 3 PagelD# 961

Filed 05/19/25

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2238

/

___________________

IRONGATE MUTUAL HOMES, INC., trading as Pear Tree Park Townhomes,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHERRI RICHARDSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at

Newport News. Elizabeth W. Hanes, District Judge. (4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK-l)

Submitted: May 15, 2025

Decided: May 19, 2025

Before NIEMEYER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sherri Richardson, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

Document 18

Filed 05/19/25

Page 2 of 3 PagelD# 962

PER CURIAM:

Sherri Richardson seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting the motion to

remand filed by Irongate Mutual Homes, Inc. (“Irongate”), and remanding Irongate’s suit

to Virginia state court. A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court

of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction ... to the district

court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such

action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “An order remanding a case to the State court

from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”

28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(d). But § 1447(d)’s prohibition is limited to remand orders based on a lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Thermtron Prods., Inc. v.

Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346-52 (1976), overruled on other grounds by

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996). “We . . . look to the substantive

reasoning behind the order to determine whether it was issued based upon the district

court’s perception that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.” In re Blackwater Sec.

Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 584 (4th Cir. 2006).

Here, the district court remanded Irongate’s suit based on its determination that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. And Richardson’s

counterclaims, raising various claims under federal law, cannot serve as grounds for

removal. See Old Dominion Elec. Coop. v. PJMInterconnection, LLC, 24 F.4th 271, 279

(4th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, § 1447(d) prohibits review of the district court’s order, so

we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because

2

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

Document 18

Filed 05/19/25

Page 3 of 3 PagelD# 963

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

3

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

Document 12

Filed 11/19/24

Page 1 of 5 PagelD# 918

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Newport News Division

IRONGATE MUTUAL HOMES, INC.,

t/a PEAR TREE PARK TOWNHOMES,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-70

v.

SHERRI RICHARDSON,

Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiff Irongate Mutual Homes, Inc., t/a Pear Tree Park Townhomes (“Irongate”) filed a

Complaint and Motion for Judgment for Unlawful Detainer (“Complaint”) against pro se

Defendant Sherri Richardson (“Richardson”) in the Newport News Circuit Court. Compl., ECF

No. 11-1. Richardson filed counterclaims against Irongate and subsequently removed the state

court action to this Court.1 Answer & Counterclaim, ECF No. 11-6; Notice Removal, ECF No. 11.

This matter is before the Court on Irongate’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 4, and Motion to

Dismiss, ECF No. 2.2 For the reasons set forth below, Irongate’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 4,

is GRANTED; this action is REMANDED to the Newport News Circuit Court; and Irongate’s

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 2, is DENIED as moot.

1

Richardson initially asked the Court to waive the filing fees; however, after the Court

denied Richardson’s fee waiver request, Richardson paid the filing fees. See Order, ECF No. 8;

Filing Fee, ECF No. 9.

2

In its Motion to Dismiss, Irongate seeks to dismiss Richardson’s counterclaims. Mot.

Dismiss, ECF No. 2.

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

Document 12

I.

Filed 11/19/24

Page 2 of 5 PagelD# 919

BACKGROUND

On March 8, 2024, Irongate filed a Complaint against Richardson in the Newport News

Circuit Court (Case No. CL2401063P-00). Compl. at 1-8. In the Complaint, Irongate alleges that

it is a Virginia non-stock corporation that owns and manages a cooperative residential community

(the “Cooperative”) in Newport News, Virginia. Id.

1. Richardson is a “former member of the

Cooperative,” who “executed an Occupancy Agreement with Irongate on December 29,2019.” Id.

ffl] 8-9. Pursuant to the Occupancy Agreement, Richardson “was permitted to reside at 164 Matoka

Drive, Unit 5, Newport News, Virginia 23602” (the “Property”). Id.

11. The Occupancy

Agreement “provided for an initial residency term of twelve (12) months with automatic renewal

on the same terms, conditioned upon compliance with the terms set forth in the [Occupancy]

Agreement.” Id.

10.

Irongate alleges that Richardson failed to comply with the “Civil Conduct” requirement set

forth in the Occupancy Agreement, and as a result, Irongate notified Richardson that “she was

ineligible to renew her [Occupancy] Agreement upon its expiration on December 29, 2023.” Id.

14-15. Irongate further alleges that Richardson “did not vacate the Property upon the

termination of her membership and the nonrenewal of her Occupancy Agreement.” Id.

18.

Irongate filed its Complaint against Richardson pursuant to Virginia law in an attempt to

obtain possession of the Property. Id. 28 (stating that “[p]ursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-124, a

party from whom possession of real property has been unlawfully detained may file a Motion for

Judgment in the circuit court alleging that the Defendant is in possession of and unlawfully

withholds possession of the property from the Plaintiff’). As relief, Irongate seeks an Order:

A.

Finding and ordering that Irongate is entitled to possession of the Property

and that a writ of eviction shall issue pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-470

upon the request of Irongate’s representative, or its counsel acting on its

behalf;

2

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

B.

C.

Document 12

Filed 11/19/24

Page 3 of 5 PagelD# 920

Granting an award in favor of Irongate and against [Richardson] for

Irongate’s actual damages of an amount to be determined, its reasonable

attorney fees, and court costs, less any credits for amounts [Richardson] has

remitted to Irongate following the nonrenewal of the Agreement;

Granting such other and further relief the Court deems appropriate.

Id. at 7-8.

H.

IRONGATE’S MOTION TO REMAND

Irongate argues that this action should be remanded to the Newport News Circuit Court

based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand at 3-10, ECF No. 5. “A

defendant is permitted to remove a state court action to federal court only if the plaintiff could

have originally filed such action in federal court.” Fannie Mae v. Young, No. 2:12-cv-471, 2013

WL 5488513, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2013); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts are courts

of limited jurisdiction, meaning that a federal court is only empowered to consider certain types of

claims. United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). A federal court

has subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases (i) “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States” (“federal question jurisdiction”); and (ii) in which the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and in which diversity of citizenship exists

between the parties (“diversity jurisdiction”). 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Because removal

jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, [the court] must strictly construe removal

jurisdiction . . . [and] any doubts about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of

remand to state court.” Dominion Pathology Labs, P.C. v. Anthem Health Plans of Va., Inc., Ill

F. Supp. 3d 731, 735 (E.D. Va. 2015) (first alteration in original) (first citing Mulcahey v.

Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148,151 (4th Cir. 1994); and then Dixon v. Coburg Dairy,

Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).

Irongate argues that diversity jurisdiction cannot serve as the basis for jurisdiction in this

matter because Irongate and Richardson “are both citizens of Virginia” and the amount in

3

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

Document 12

Filed 11/19/24

Page 4 of 5 PagelD# 921

controversy does not exceed $75,000. Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand at 6-9. Irongate further argues

that “[n]othing in Irongate’s Complaint implicates federal law.” Id. at 10. Thus, federal question

jurisdiction is likewise inapplicable. Id. Irongate acknowledges that Richardson filed

counterclaims against Irongate that seek a significant amount of monetary damages based on the

alleged violation of various federal laws; however, Irongate argues that Richardson “cannot create

federal question through her own claims” and cannot rely on her counterclaims to reach the

monetary threshold necessary for diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 9-10; see Answer & Counterclaim,

ECFNo. 11-6.

Upon review, the Court finds that diversity jurisdiction cannot serve as the basis for

removal in this action, as the citizenship of the parties is not diverse. See Compl.

1 (identifying

Irongate as a Virginia non-stock corporation); Answer & Counterclaim 9 (identifying Richardson

as a resident of Newport News, Virginia); Va. State Corp. Comm’n Clerk’s Info. Sys.,

https://cis.scc. virginia.gov/EntitySearch/BusinessInformation?businessId=362746&source=From

EntityResult&isSeries%20=%20false (last visited Nov. 14, 2024) (identifying Irongate as a

Virginia non-stock corporation with a principal place of business in Newport News, Virginia).

When a party seeks to remove a state court action to federal district court based on federal

question jurisdiction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explained that

“the presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint without consideration of any

potential defenses.” Harless v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 389 F.3d 444, 450 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Aetna

Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004)). One of the “paramount policies” of the “well-

pleaded complaint rule” is that “the plaintiff is the master of the complaint.” Id. (quoting

4

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

Document 12

Filed 11/19/24

Page 5 of 5 PagelD# 922

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987)). The rule prevents a defendant from

“injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim” and

“transform[ing] the action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which

the claim shall be litigated.” Id.

Here, the Complaint filed by Irongate against Richardson in the Newport News Circuit

Court is based solely on Virginia law. See Compl. at 1-8. In her Notice of Removal, Richardson

asserts that the Complaint contains claims “arising under the Constitution and laws of the United

States”; however, Richardson appears to base this assertion on her counterclaims, as opposed to

Irongate’s Complaint.3 Notice Removal at 2. It is clear that there is no federal question presented

on the face of Irongate’s Complaint. Compl. at 1-8. As a result, the Court finds that it cannot

exercise federal question jurisdiction over this action. See Harless, 389 F.3d at 450.

in.

CONCLUSION

Because the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action, Irongate’s

Motion to Remand, ECF No. 4, is GRANTED; this action is REMANDED to the Newport News

Circuit Court; and Irongate’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 2, is DENIED as moot.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to Richardson, counsel for Irongate,

and the Newport News Circuit Court.

It is SO ORDERED.

/* l/l 1

Js!

Elizabeth W. Hanes

United States District Judge

3

In her Opposition to Irongate’s Motion to Remand, Richardson claims that this Court may

exercise jurisdiction over this action “under the federal enclave doctrine.” Opp’n at 2, ECF No. 7.

However, the Court finds that Richardson has not established that federal enclave jurisdiction

applies to this case. See Hall v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 2:18-cv-244, 2018 WL 4928976, at *2-4 (E.D.

Va. Oct. 11, 2018) (discussing the requirements for federal enclave jurisdiction).

5

USCA4 Appeal: 24-2238

Doc: 11

Filed: 06/17/2025

Pg: 1 of 1

FILED: June 17, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2238

(4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK-l)

IRONGATE MUTUAL HOMES, INC., trading as Pear Tree Park Townhomes

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

SHERRI RICHARDSON

Defendant - Appellant

ORDER

The court denies the petition for rehearing.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Niemeyer, Judge Heytens, and

Senior Judge Keenan.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

Document 19

Filed 05/19/25

Page 1 of 1 PagelD# 964

FILED: May 19,2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2238

(4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK-l)

IRONGATE MUTUAL HOMES, INC, trading as Pear Tree Park Townhomes

Plaintiff - Appellee

SHERRI RICHARDSON

Defendant - Appellant

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the decision of this court, this appeal is dismissed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in

accordance with Fed. R, App. P. 41.

/s/ NWAMAKA ANOWI, CLERK

Case 4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK

Document 22

Filed 06/25/25

Page 1 of 1 PagelD# 967

FILED: June 25,2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2238

(4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK-l)

IRONGATE MUTUAL HOMES, INC., trading as Pear Tree Park Townhomes

Plaintiff - Appellee

SHERRI RICHARDSON

Defendant - Appellant

MANDATE

The judgment of this court, entered May 19,2025, takes effect today.

This constitutes the formal mandate of this court issued pursuant to Rule

41 (a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

/s/Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

USCA4 Appeal: 24-2238

Doc: 10

Filed: 06/03/2025

Pg: 1 of 1

FILED: June 3,2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2238

(4:24-cv-00070-EWH-RJK-l)

IRONGATE MUTUAL HOMES, INC., trading as Pear Tree Park Townhomes

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

SHERRI RICHARDSON

Defendant - Appellant

TEMPORARY STAY OF MANDATE

Under Fed. R. App. P. 41(b), the filing of a timely petition for rehearing or

rehearing en banc stays the mandate until the court has ruled on the petition. In

accordance with Rule 41(b), the mandate is stayed pending further order of this

court.

/s/Nwamaka AnowLClerk