Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jackie Lee Brooks, Petitioner v. United States

Case: 25-60195

Document: 35-2

Page: 1

Date Filed: 09/22/2025

Wniteti States: Court of Appeals

for tlje jFiftfj Ctrruit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 22, 2025

No. 25-60195

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Jackie Lee Brooks,

Defendant—Appellant.

Application for Certificate of Appealability

the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:19-CV-241

USDC No. 3:17-CR-33-l

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Before Willett, Ho, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

Jackie Lee Brooks, federal prisoner # 10686-042, seeks a certificate of

appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 motion, which challenged his convictions for conspiracy to possess

with intent to distribute and distribution of methamphetamine, possession of

firearms by a felon, and conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with

Case: 25-60195

Document: 35-2

Page: 2

Date Filed: 09/22/2025

No. 25-60195

intent to distribute proceeds from an unlawful activity. He contends that the

Government breached his proffer agreement when it used protected

statements he made during his proffer sessions against him in connection

with his sentencing and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to same.

As a preliminary matter, Brooks’s claim that his counsel was

ineffective for failing to insist that the district court hold an evidentiary

hearing to determine the source of the information that was used in the

presentence report to determine his offense level is raised for the first time in

his COA pleadings and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. See Black

»■ Davis, 902 F.3d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 2018). Otherwise, a COA may issue

only if the applicant has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 336 (2003). When the district court denies relief on the merits, an

applicant must show that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Brooks fails to meet the requisite standard. See id. His motion for a

COA is DENIED. As Brooks fails to make the required showing for a

COA, we do not reach the issue whether the district court erred by failing to

hold an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Davis, 971 F.3d 524, 534-35

(5th Cir. 2020).

2

APPENDIX

B

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

OXFORD DIVISION

JACKIE LEE BROOKS

MOVANT

v.

No. 3:17CR33-SA-RP

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the court on the motion of Jackie Lee Brooks to vacate, set aside, or

correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The government has responded to the motion; Brooks

has replied, and the matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the instant motion to

vacate, set aside, or correct sentence will be denied.1

Habeas Corpus Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

The writ of habeas corpus, a challenge to the legal authority under which a person may

be detained, is ancient. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar

Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 983 (1978); Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 St.

John’s L.Rev. 55 (1934). It is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law

of England,” Secretary ofState for Home Affairs v. O’Brien, A.C. 603, 609 (1923), and it is

equally significant in the United States. Article I, § 9, of the Constitution ensures that the right

of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in the case of rebellion or

invasion, public safety may require it. Habeas Corpus, 20 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Deskbook § 56.

1 Brooks did not initially file a reply, and the court issued its opinion and final judgment once

the reply deadline had expired. Brooks then moved for reconsideration, stating that he did not receive

a copy of the Government’s Response to the § 2255 motion. The court granted reconsideration;

Brooks has replied, and the court now issues the instant revised opinion and final judgment in light of

Brooks’ reply.

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Its use by the federal courts was authorized in Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Habeas

corpus principles that developed over time in both English and American common law have

since been codified:

The statutory provisions on habeas corpus appear as sections 2241 to 2255 of the

1948 Judicial Code. The recodification of that year set out important procedural

limitations and additional procedural changes were added in 1966. The scope of the

writ, insofar as the statutory language is concerned, remained essentially the same,

however, until 1996, when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act, placing severe restrictions on the issuance of the writ for state prisoners

and setting out special, new habeas corpus procedures for capital cases. The changes

made by the 1996 legislation are the end product of decades of debate about habeas

corpus.

Id.

Section 2255 Proceedings

Section 28 U.S.C. § 2255 permits an inmate serving a sentence after conviction of a federal

crime “to move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28

U.S.C. § 2255(a). As with the writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241,2254, a § 2255 motion

sets forth only four bases on which a motion may be made: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation

of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the

sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is “otherwise

subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Thus, a prisoner must claim either a constitutional

violation or want of subject matter jurisdiction to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In the absence of

constitutional or jurisdictional defects, a federal prisoner may invoke § 2255 only if the error

constitutes “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage ofjustice.”

United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 1,85 (1979).

The district court must first conduct a preliminary review of a section 2255 motion, and “[i]f it

plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of the prior proceeding that the

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moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion.” Rules Governing Section

2255 Proceedings, Rule 4(b). If the motion raises a non-frivolous claim to relief, the court must order

the Government to file a response or to take other appropriate action. Id. The judge may then require

the parties to expand the record as necessary and, if good cause is shown, authorize limited discovery.

Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, Rules 6-7.

After reviewing the government’s answer, any transcripts and records of prior proceedings,

and any supplementary materials submitted by the parties, the court must decide whether an

evidentiary hearing is warranted. Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, Rule 8. Under the

statute, an evidentiaiy hearing must be held unless “the motion and the files and records of the case

conclusively-show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). However, the court

need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the prisoner fails to produce “independent indicia of the likely

merit of [his] allegations.” United States v. Edwards, 442 F.3d 258,264 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting

United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Ultimately, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims of error by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980). For

certain “structural” errors, relief follows automatically once the error is proved. See Burgess v. Dretke,

350 F.3d 461,472 (5th Cir. 2003). For other errors at the trial court level, the court may grant relief

only if the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence” in determining the outcome of the

case. Brecht v. Abrahmson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also United States v. Chavez, 193 F.3d 375,

379 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying Brecht’s harmless error standard in a § 2255 proceeding). If the court

finds that the prisoner is entitled to relief, it “shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall

discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear

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j

1

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appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

Facts and Procedural Posture2

A federal grand jury returned a multi-count indictment on March 23, 2017, charging

Jackie Brooks and others with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine

)

as well as violations of federal firearms laws. Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)

j

On August 23, 2017, Brooks was charged with the same counts in a Superseding Indictment.

j

Count One charged conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation

of Title 21, U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A) and 846.

< )

Counts Two through Five charged possession with intent to distribute fifty (50) grams or

1-7.

more of methamphetamine, in violation of Title 21, U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A). Counts Six and

j

Seven charged aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute fifty (50) grams or more of

methamphetamine, in violation of Title 21, U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A). Count Eight charged

possession of.firearms by a convicted felon, in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and

' j

924(a)(2). Count Eleven charged conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with the proceeds

,

of his unlawful drug trafficking activity and distribution of the proceeds, in violation of Title 18,

5

U.S.C. § 371 and 1952. (PSR 8).

Brooks was the leader of a drug trafficking organization that operated in Benton County,

Mississippi and acquired, sold, and distributed large quantities of methamphetamine purchased

from sources of supply in Southern California and Georgia. (PSR

16, 19, 49). On six

2 The court has drawn the facts and procedural posture from the Government’s response to the

instant motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, as they are both well-documented and

uncontested.

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occasions over the course of the government’s investigation, Brooks sold varying amounts of

methamphetamine to an undercover government agent or government confidential informant.

(PSR H 28). Brooks was also the subject of a court authorized wire intercept. He was intercepted

on phone calls and text messages communicating with members of the conspiracy concerning

their drug trafficking activities. (PSRH 17). The PSR contained several examples of the

substance of Brooks’ phone calls and the amounts of methamphetamine he discussed with his co­

conspirators over the wire and electronic intercepts (PSR

29-36), as well as evidence acquired

during the government’s investigation derived from interviews and proffers made by confidential

sources. (PSR

18-22).

JDn February 7, 2017, Brooks and his co-conspirator gathered approximately $120,000 of

drug money and drove from Benton County, Mississippi to Southern California to meet his

supplier in order to purchase approximately fifty (50) pounds of methamphetamine. He met with

his supplier but was only able to purchase approximately thirty-five (35) pounds of

methamphetamine. PSR 23. On February 11, 2017, as a result of the government’s

investigation, Brooks was stopped on Interstate 72 in Marshall County, Mississippi in possession

of 14,913 grams of methamphetamine. During the stop, Brooks attempted to shift the truck into

drive and flee the scene with law enforcement officers hanging from the truck. Brooks was

stopped at gunpoint. PSR

24, 25.

The PSR calculated the following amounts of methamphetamine attributable to Brooks

and his role as the leader of the drug trafficking conspiracy:

■ CS 1 described trips to Atlanta with Brooks to acquire over 13 pounds of

methamphetamine (PSR 19)

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■ CS 1 described seven to nine trips to California with Brooks to purchase approximately

150 pounds of methamphetamine plus an additional 10 pounds (PSR | 20)

■ Co-defendant statements conservatively estimated 40 pounds of methamphetamine

purchased by Brooks in Southern California between November 2016 and his arrest in

February 2017 (PSR 122)

■ February of 2017, Brooks arrested in possession of approximately 35 pounds of

methamphetamine (PSR | 23)

* Intercepted communications between Brooks and co-conspirator revealed distribution of

10 pounds of methamphetamine (PSR | 30)

As a result of the information contained in the PSR, Brooks was held responsible for 48.9

kg of methamphetamine. PSR | 38. Brooks’ base offense level under U.S.S.G. §2D1.1 for any

amount of methamphetamine over 4.5 kg was an offense level 38. PSR | 46. He received the

following.adjustments: +2 for possession of a dangerous weapon; +4 for organizer/leader; and

+2 for recklessly creating a risk of bodily injury to another while fleeing from law enforcement.

PSR ||| 47, 49, 50). With a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, Brooks’ total

offense level was 43. PSR | 55. Brooks’ criminal history score was one, which resulted in a

criminal history category of I. PSR | 63. The PSR also noted “[n]one” under the category,

“Offense Behavior Not Part of Relevant Conduct.” PSR | 56. Put another way, the PSR made

no mention of any information obtained from Brooks’ proffers with the government.

On October 3, 2018, the court held a sentencing hearing. The government did not have

any objections to the PSR. Though Brooks initially filed one objection to the PSR, at the

beginning of the sentencing hearing, he withdrew it. See Exhibit A, Sent. Tr. 2, 5. At

sentencing, the court noted that the government filed a motion for downward departure from the

sentencing guidelines based upon Brooks’ substantial assistance. Sent. Tr. 3. The court also

recognized the “22 letters on behalf of Mr. Brooks, and I have reviewed those letters of family,

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friends, prior acquaintances ...” Id. The court also noted “the fact that there are many, many,

many people here in the courtroom in support of Mr. Brooks.” Id. The court was mindful of

“the times and occasions in the past that you have brought aid to persons in need and helped

others that were less fortunate.” Sent. Tr. 8.

The government then addressed the court:

Your Honor, I don’t want to belabor this. The government did file a motion for a 5K1

based upon Mr. Brooks’substantial assistance. I won’t go into any details of that. It

speaks for itself. And I know Your Honor has read that and will give it

whatever weight the Court deems necessary.

And, Your Honor, he did provide—he did provide substantial assistance, as reflected

in the government’s motion. And I know the Court has read the PSR, and the PSR

speaks for itself, and being no objections, the Court I assume will adopt it.

But I can’t let the opportunity pass to convey to the Court, and I supposed to those

present in the gallery, I have no reason to take issue with any of the letters that have

been written on his behalf. I have not, in fact— I’ve not seen them, but I’ve seen

letters like them, and I can only imagine what they say. And I’m sure the Court will

give those whatever weight it deems necessary.

But in my humble opinion and in my humble experience of ten years in the U.S.

Attorney’s Office, I’m not aware of a more significant drug trafficker in the Northern

District of Mississippi than Mr. Brooks. Now, that’s just my opinion, Your Honor.

That’s just based on the knowledge I have of the cases that I’ve seen in our office over

ten years. And that’s reflected in the PSR, significant quantities of methamphetamine.

The historical quantities are in the hundreds of pounds... [b]ut I would be remiss—

and I’m pointing out the obvious to the Court, Your Honor. I apologize for that, but

Mr. Brooks is a very significant drug trafficker, and that’s reflected in his guideline

range....

Sent. Tr. 9.

The court adopted the PSR without change, again noting the withdrawal of Brooks’

objection. Brooks’ guideline range for Count One was life imprisonment; Count Eight, 120

months; and Count Eleven, 60 months. PSR ^91. The court departed from the guideline range

based upon the government’s motion for downward departure. Sent. Tr. 14. Brooks was

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sentenced to 240 months on Count One; 120 months on Count 8; and 60 months on Count

Eleven; to run concurrently. Sent. Tr. 14. In pronouncing sentence, the court discussed the need

for the sentence to reflect Brooks’ offense level, criminal history background, the scheme of the

criminal conduct, and his role as leader of the conspiracy. Sent. Tr. 15. The court entered

judgment on October 10, 2018. Doc. 282.

On October 31, 2019, Brooks filed the instant Motion to Vacate Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by “failing to object to the government’s

breach of the proffer agreement at sentencing,” as Brooks (incorrectly) believes that the

govemment.provided information from his proffer agreement to the Probation Service to include

in his Presentence Investigation Report - and that the government revealed some of that

information during sentencing. Doc. 306, p. 4. The government responded to the motion;

Brooks has replied, and the matter is ripe for resolution.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Brooks’ sole claim in the instant motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 is that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by “failing to object to the

government’s breach of the proffer agreement at sentencing.” Id. The court must address claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668,104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prove that defense counsel was ineffective, the

petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in

prejudice to her defense. Under the deficiency prong of the test, the petitioner must show that counsel

made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

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The court must analyze counsel’s actions based upon the circumstances at the time - and must

not use the crystal clarity of hindsight. Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493,498 (5th Cir. 1988). The

petitioner “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). To prove

prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate that the result of the proceedings would have been different

or that counsel’s performance rendered the result of the proceeding fundamentally unfair or unreliable.

Vuong v. Scott, 62 F.3d 673, 685 (5th Cir. 1995), cert, denied, 116 S.Ct. 557 (1995); Lockhart v.

Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,369 (1993); Sharp v. Johnson, 107 F.3d 282, 286 n.9 (5th Cir. 1997). “When

§2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is

whether*there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential

standard.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733

(2011).

Deficient Performance by Counsel

The first prong of the Strickland test requires that the defendant show that counsel’s

performance was deficient, or that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The movant must show that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment. Strickland, 449 U.S. at 687. The court’s review of counsel’s performance must be

“highly deferential,” and the court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 449 U.S. at 689

(emphasis added); see United States v. Walker, 68 F.3d 931, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (attorney

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performance enjoys strong presumption of adequacy and is deficient only if it is objectively

unreasonable).

The petitioner bears the burden to prove that the conduct of trial counsel fell below the

constitutional minimum guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The

court may consider only whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the

circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. No set of rules can legitimately take into account

the nearly infinite circumstances counsel faces - or the range of legitimate decisions regarding

how best to represent a criminal defendant that counsel must consider. Id. at 689. A court must

make evefy„effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances

of counseTssChallenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.

Brooks’ entire claim is based on a false premise: that the government breached the

proffer agreement by passing information he provided during his proffer regarding his crimes to

the Probation Service to use in drafting the Presentence Investigation Report - and that the

government revealed some of that information during sentencing. However, Brooks’ proffer

agreement was not mentioned at sentencing. See, generally, Sent. Tr. The government merely

commented on facts contained in the PSR - which is both normal and permissible. Id. Brooks

also states that the court used the information to increase his sentence - even though the court

imposed a sentence below the guideline range. Id.

In his reply, Brooks argues that, in the absence of his proffer interviews, “the government

would never have known that [he] was the ‘most significant drug trafficker’ in Mississippi or that he

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had trafficked in ‘hundreds of pounds of methamphetamine. ’” Doc. 415 at 5 (Movant’s Reply). He

believes that

the government disclosed [his] incriminating proffer statements to the Court’s

probation officer who, in turn, used them to increase his sentencing range.

Furthermore, [the] AUSAused Mr. Brooks’ proffer information to advocate against

him at sentencing.

Id. In support of his allegation, Brooks states that the government’s anonymous sources provided

information regarding his trips to California to obtain and transport methamphetamine - and their

statements “parrot[ed] statements made by the Movant during his proffer sessions [verbatim].” Id.

Brooks seems to imply (without proof) that the anonymous sources did not exist, and the

government’s information came solely from his first or second proffer. He argues that the

government’s reference to “hundreds of pounds of methamphetamine” must come from his proffer

because the PSR “calculated the weight at 48.9 kilograms.” Doc. 415 at 8. However, 48.9 kilograms

is 107.8 pounds — which is more than 100 pounds. In any event, the PSR also reflects that Brooks and

other conspirators acquired some 258 pounds of methamphetamine during the course of the

conspiracy — which also qualifies as “hundreds of pounds.” PSR ffl[ 19,20,22,23, 30.

Ultimately, Brooks believes that he was entitled to a more lenient sentence, arguing that his

initial proffer was sufficient to justify a reduction in his sentence based upon United States Sentencing

Guideline 5K1.1 - and that the government withheld seeking that reduction to induce him to provide

additional information in a second proffer. He believes that if the government had properly considered

his second proffer - and the outpouring of community support - he may have enjoyed “immediate

release,” or at least a more lenient sentence than the 240 months the court imposed. Brooks argues

that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the government’s alleged use of his

proffer to calculate his sentence in the PSR—and during the sentencing hearing.

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The type of information that Brooks believes was improperly put in the PSR (and used during

sentencing) would be found under the heading “Offense Behavior Not Part of Relevant Conduct,”

which can contain references to information provided by the defendant to the government under the

terms of a “proffer agreement” under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.8. This section

provides that, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, information provided by the defendant

“shall not be used in determining the applicable guideline range, except to the extent provided in the

agreement.” However, in Brooks ’PSR there is no information under that heading. Neither did the

government make reference to such information during sentencing; instead, the government referred

to the PSR each time it mentioned Brooks’ conduct or the quantity of drugs attributed to him. Sent. Tr.

p, 8-10. As set forth above, the PSR contains no reference to any information Brooks provided in his

proffer to the government; instead, it contains information gleaned from other sources: court-

authorized surveillance, intercepted telephone calls, and various other types of electronic intercepts.

PSR

17,29-36,18-22.

Finally, to the extent that Brooks relies on the government’s reference to “hundreds of pounds

of methamphetamine,” the Probation Service attributed 48.9 kilograms (107.8 pounds) to him. As this

is more than 100 pounds, the reference to “hundreds of pounds” was accurate. In addition, as set forth

above, he and the other conspirators acquired some 258 pounds of methamphetamine during the

relevant period. For these reasons, this ground for relief is without substantive merit.

Actual Prejudice

Even if Brooks had shown that counsel’s performance was deficient, he has not met the

second prong of the Strickland test (actual prejudice to his legal position), as he has not shown that

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

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proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Conley, 349 F.3d 837, 841-42 (5th Cir. 2003).

It is not enough to show that errors may have had an effect on the outcome of the proceeding.

Strickland, supra, at 694.

In this case, Brooks has offered no evidence to show that counsel’s actions had a detrimental

effect on the outcome of his criminal case. The PSR was well-documented, including Brooks’

admissions — and both sides agreed to its content. Brooks has offered no evidence to support his

allegation that the Probation Service used statements from his proffer in drafting the PSR - or that the

|

government used those statements at sentencing. Attorneys are not required by the Sixth Amendment

i

to file meritless motions. United States v. Gibson, 55 F.3d 173,179 (5th Cir. 1995); Koch v. Puckett,

907 F.2d 524,527 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Clark v. Collins, 19 F. 3d 959, 966 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Failure

]

to raise meritless objections is not ineffective lawyering, it is the very opposite.”) Indeed, failure to

raise a frivolous objection cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the result of

the proceeding would not have changed had the attorney raised the issue (because the court would

overrule a frivolous objection). See United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 892 (5th Cir. 1999);

Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1994).

Finally, the court granted the government’s motion for downward departure, and Brooks

received a sentence well below the recommended guideline range - a fact weighing against a

finding of prejudice. Doc. 296 at 14 (Sentencing transcript). Brooks has not shown that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s decision not to object to the government’s discussion

regarding his participation in the crime — and the amount of methamphetamine attributed to him

in the PSR. Ultimately, Brooks and his co-conspirators trafficked an enormous amount of

j

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methamphetamine for more than a year, and — in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines and

governing authority - the sentence imposed reflects the gravity of the offense.

Conclusion

In sum, Brooks has shown neither deficient performance by counsel nor prejudice from

counsel’s actions; as such, his claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. Brooks’ sole

ground for relief is thus without substantive merit, and the instant motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct sentence will be denied. A final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion will issue

today.

SO ORDERED, this, the 26th day of March, 2025.

/s/ Sharion Aycock___________ _

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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