Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brian N. Terry, Petitioner v. Oklahoma

TABLE OF APPENDIX

Appendix A Oklahoma Court of Criminal Opinion Affirmed Case No. F-2024-85

Appendix B Judgement and Sentence Case No. CF-22-1651

Appendix C Information and Amended Information

Appendix D Affidavit for Search Warrant

Appendix E Search Warrant for Premises

Appendix F RE: [EXTERNAL] residential search warrant 4608 s. 23 WA

Appendix G Letter to Special Judge Tanya n Wilson

Appendix H Officer's Return

Appendix I Tulsa Police Department Property Receipt

Appendix J Letter to Investigator/Detective Anna Cox

Appendix K Mrs. Feral's sworn Affidavit

Appendix L Out of Custody Affidavit

Appendix M Relevant Page showing Randall Armstrong as Detective

Appendix N Tulsa Police Department Forensic Laboratory Serology Certificate of

Analysis

liWilHSOI

*1061870334*

I ORIGINAL

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

BRIAN N. TERRY,

Appellant,

v.

)

)

)

)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Case No. F-2024-85

)

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

)

)

Appellee.

FILED

)

MAY 2 2 2025

SUMMARY OPINIONJQHn d. hadden

CLERK

LUMPKIN, PRESIDING JUDGE:

Appellant Brian N. Terry was tried by jury and convicted of three

(3) counts of First Degree Rape (Counts 1-3) (21 O.S.2021, § 1114(A))1;

three (3) counts of Forcible Sodomy (Counts 5-7) (21 O.S.2021, §

888(A)); Kidnapping (Count 8) (21 O.S.2021, § 741); and Stalking

(misdemeanor) (Count 9) (21 O.S.2021, § 1173) in the District Court of

Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2022-1651. The jury returned sentences

of imprisonment for five (5) years in each of Counts 1 and 3; ten (10)

years in Count 2; one year in each of Counts 5, 6, and 7; two (2) years

in Count 8; and a one-thousand-dollar ($1,000.00) fine in Count 9.

1 The trial court sustained a demurrer to the First-Degree Rape charge in Count

4.

APPENDIX A

The trial court suspended the fine in Count 9, but otherwise sentenced

accordingly, ordering the sentences to run consecutively with credit for

time served.2 Appellant appeals from this conviction and sentence and

raises the following propositions of error:

I.

The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain

a conviction for the felony of Sodomy as charged in

Count Six;

IL

The jury was given contradictory information in the

instructions as to Count Six;

III.

[Appellant] was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial

misconduct;

IV.

[Appellant] was denied a fair trial before an unbiased

jury when the trial court denied [Appellant’s]

challenges for cause against jurors number 10 and

15, RP and LG;

V.

[Appellant] was denied the effective assistance of

counsel;

VI.

The accumulation of errors deprived [Appellant] of a

fair trial.

After thorough consideration of these propositions and the

entire record before us on appeal including the original record,

2 Appellant must serve 85% of his sentence in Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 before

becoming eligible for consideration for parole. 21 O.S.2021, § 13.1.

2

transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we have determined that under

the law and the evidence, no relief is warranted.

In Proposition I, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the conviction for forcible sodomy in Count 6.

Specifically, he argues that A.S.’s testimony was insufficient to prove

the required element of penetration. See Hicks v. State, 1986 OK CR

7, 5 7, 713 P.2d 18, 20 (penetration is an essential element of sodomy).

In challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court follows

the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979); Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21,

Spuehler u. State, 1985 OK CR 132,

15, 90 P.3d 556, 559;

7, 79 P.2d 202, 203-04. See

Cochlin v. State, 2020 OK CR 23, | 4, 479 P.3d 534, 536. Under this

test, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Cochlin, 2020 OK CR 23,

4, 479 P.3d at 536

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Easlick^ 2004 OK CR 21,

5,

90P.3d at 558; Spuehler, 1985 OK CR 132, K 7, 709 P.2d at 203-04).

“This Court must accept all reasons, inferences, and credibility choices

3

that tend to support the verdict.” Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 2011 OK

CR 8, J 13, 248 P.3d 362, 368).

In prosecution for forcible sodomy, we “do not require graphic

testimony concerning the actual penetration but will review the

evidence as a whole to see if ‘any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Bales

v. State, 1992 OK CR 24,

5, 829 P.2d 998, 999 (quoting Simms v.

State, 1987 OK CR 67, H 11-12, 735 P.2d 344, 347).

See also

Commander v. State, 1987 OK CR 43, | 5, 734 P.2d 313, 315 (“[t]he

testimony need not be graphic; it is sufficient if there is some testimony

to show penetration.”). Proof of any penetration, however slight, is

sufficient. See Hicks, 1986 OK CR 7,

7, 713 P.2d at 20 (citing 21 O.S.

§ 887).

A.S. testified in part that Appellant forced her to “put my mouth

on his butt and perform oral sex on him.” Leah Oliver, the

SANE

nurse, testified that during the SANE exam, she asked A.S. very

pointed questions about penetration of different parts of her body and

Appellant’s body. Oliver testified that A.S. told her “[h]e made her give

him head, suck his balls, eat him out anally.” Considered together, this

testimony generally conveys the idea of penetration. Considering the

4

entirety of A.S.’s testimony, her descriptions of the act sufficiently

established the element of penetration.

The credibility of witnesses and the weight and consideration to

be given to their testimony are within the exclusive province of the trier

of facts. Wall v. State, 2020 OK CR 9, H 20, 465 P.3d 227, 233-34;

Bland v. State, 2000 OK CR 11,129,4 P.3d 702, 714. “It is well settled

that where there is competent evidence from which the jury could

reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty as charged, this Court

will not interfere with the verdict despite a conflict in the evidence from

which different. inferences may be drawn.” Palmer v. State, 1994 OK

CR 16, U 14, 873 P.2d 429, 433. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found

beyond a reasonable doubt the State proved the element of penetration

and the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt of forcible

sodomy. This proposition is denied.

In Proposition II, Appellant again raises a challenge to Count 6

and argues that the jury instructions were contradictory on a material

fact. Specifically, he argues that it was contradictory to inform the jury

that he was charged in Count 6 for having A.S. “put her mouth on his

anus” (emphasis added), but then instruct them that the elements of

5

forcible sodomy required “penetration of the anus”. Appellant asserts

that “[d]ue to the contradictory information contained in the

instructions, the jury was not provided an ample understanding of the

issues presented and the standards to be applied to a material issue”,

and as such his conviction in Count 6 should be reversed.

As Appellant did not raise this objection at trial (defense counsel

even specifically stated he had no objection to the instruction) review

on appeal is only for plain error. Arce v. State, 2023 OK CR 9, 1 13,

530 P.3d 472, 477-78. Under the plain error test set forth in Simpson

v. State, 1994 OK CR 40,10, 26, 30, 876 P.2d 690, 694, 699, 701

and Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, 1 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923 this

Court determines whether the appellant has shown an actual error,

which is plain or obvious, and which affects his or her substantial

rights. This Court will only correct plain error if the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial

proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage ofjustice. See also

Chadwell v. State, 2019 OK CR 14,1 4, 446 P.3d 1244, 1246; Bivens

v. State, 2018 OK CR 33, 1 11, 431 P.3d 985, 992.

It is the trial court’s duty to fully instruct the jury on the

applicable law. Jones v. State, 2009 OK CR 1,

6

63, 201 P.3d 869, 886.

Jury instructions are sufficient if when read as a whole they state the

applicable law. Id. “It is implicit that in order for jury instructions to

accurately state the law they must provide the jury with ample

understanding of the issues presented and the standards to be

applied.” Omalza v. State, 1995 OK CR 80

52, 911 P.2d 286, 303.

“When instructions are self-contradictoiy on material issues and

cannot be harmonized, plain error occurs.” Id.

The jury was instructed, both verbally before the presentation of

evidence, and in writing, after the presentation of evidence, on the

charges against Appellant in the words of the felony Informations. This

included language in Count 6 that A.S. was forced to “put her mouth

on his anus”.

After being informed of the charges, the jury was

instructed, both orally and in writing, that the felony Information was

only the formal method of accusing the defendant of a crime and was

not evidence of guilt.

In the written instructions given at the close of evidence, the jury

was also informed that the following instructions “contain all rules of

the law that are to be applied by you in this case, and all the rules of

law by which you are to weigh the evidence and determine the facts in

issue in deciding this case and in reaching a verdict.” The jury was

7

then instructed on the statutory elements of the charged offenses with

the proviso that no one could be convicted of the charged offenses

unless the State proved each of those elements beyond a reasonable

doubt. This included Instruction No. 32 which properly set out the

elements of Forcible Sodomy pursuant to 21 O.S. § 887, 888(A). See

Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction Criminal (2d) 4-128. The jury was

further instructed that “any sexual penetration, however slight, is

sufficient to complete the crime.”

Appellant has failed to show how any inconsistencies between

terms used in the felony Informations and jury instructions misled

or confused the jury as to what was required to find guilt. The

difference between the charging information and the requirements

for a finding of guilt were repeatedly and explicitly explained to the

jury. “Juries are presumed to follow their instructions.” Zafiro v. U.S.,

506 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1993) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S.

200, 211 (1987); Sanders v. State, 2015 OK CR 11, U 15, 358 P.3d

280, 285. Appellant has not shown the jury had any problems in

following their instructions.

Reviewing the instructions in their entirety, the jury was properly

instructed on the applicable law. Therefore, we find no error and thus

8

no plain error. See Mitchell v. State, 2018 OK CR 24,

22, 424 P.3d

677, 684 (“[t]his Court will deny relief on a claim of jury instruction

error when the juiy instructions, as a whole, accurately state the

applicable law”). This proposition is denied.

In Proposition III, Appellant claims the prosecutor improperly

vouched for the credibility of A.S. on numerous occasions during

closing argument.

However, no objections were raised by defense

counsel at any point in the State’s closing on the grounds of improper

vouching. Therefore, our review on appeal is for plain error under the

standard set forth above. Oliver v. State, 2022 OK CR 15, | 4, 516

P.3d 699, 704-705.

We evaluate alleged prosecutorial misconduct within the context

of the entire trial, considering not only the propriety of the prosecutor’s

actions, but also the strength of the evidence against the defendant

and the corresponding arguments of defense counsel. Sanders, 2015

OK CR 11, H 21, 358 P.3d at 286. We will reverse the judgment or

modify the sentence only where grossly improper and unwarranted

argument affects a defendant’s rights. Id.

“It is error for the State to personally vouch for the credibility of

its witnesses.” Nickell v. State, 1994 OK CR 73,

9

7, 885 P.2d 670, 673.

“Argument ...

is impermissible vouching only if the jury could

reasonably believe that the prosecutor is indicating a personal belief in

the witness’ credibility, either through explicit personal assurances of

the witness’ veracity or by implicitly indicating that information not

presented to the jury supports the witness’ testimony.” Id. (quoting

United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990). See also

Oliver, 2022 OKCR 15,

5, 516 P.3d at 705 (citing Bench v. State,

2018 OK CR 31, 1 90, 431 P.3d 929, 957).

Appellant directs us to specific comments made during the

second portion of the State’s closing argument where the prosecutor

said that A.S. was honest. Appellant also makes a general reference

to “other opportunities” which the prosecutor had “to make the vety

same argument that A.S. was honest.” He references four (4) pages in

the transcript but does not identify the specific comments to which he

is now objecting, nor does he make any further argument as to why

the comments are improper. This conclusory statement of error

without development of any argument has waived that part of the claim

for our appellate review. See Rule 3.5.(A)(5)), Rules of the Oklahoma

Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2025) (requiring

argument in support of a proposition of error supported by citation of

10

authorities, statutes and parts of the record). See Knapper v. State,

2020 OK CR 16,

89, 73 P.3d 1053, 1080 (finding claim waived where

inadequately developed).

We have reviewed the comments specifically challenged by

Appellant and find they do not constitute improper vouching.

Reviewing the comments in context, and in light of defense counsel’s

closing argument we find the comments proper as 1) they were made

in response to arguments raised in defense counsel’s closing

argument, Oliver, 2022 OK CR 15, | 17, 516 P.3d at 707; ( “[t]he

prosecution may [] properly respond to the defense theory or to the

defense characterization of the State’s case”); 2) they were based on

the evidence and within the wide range of discussion allowed in closing

argument, Bench, 2018 OK CR 31,

123, 431 P.3d at 963. (“[c]ounsel

are permitted to fully discuss from their standpoint the evidence, the

inferences and deductions arising from it”); and 3) the prosecutor did

not tell the jury to abandon its duty to consider the evidence and

convict based only on the prosecutor’s opinion, Williams v. State, 2008

OK CR 19,

107, 188 P.3d 208, 228 (“the prosecutor is not telling the

jury to abandon its duty and convict based on the prosecutor’s own

opinion.”).

11

Having thoroughly reviewed Appellant's challenges, we find the

prosecutor’s conduct was not so improper or prejudicial so as to have

infected the trial so that it was rendered fundamentally unfair. The

prosecutor’s comments were not personal assurances of the victim’s

credibility, and did not urge the jury to divert from its duty to decide

the case on the law and the evidence. We find no error, and thus no

plain error. This proposition of error is denied.

In Proposition IV, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its

discretion when it refused his requests to dismiss prospective jurors

R.P. and L.G. for cause. Appellant argues that the trial court’s ruling

forced him to use peremptory challenges to remove the two prospective

jurors from the jury which exhausted his peremptory challenges. A

request for additional peremptory challenges to strike A.K. and K.P.

from the jury was denied, leaving A.K. and K.P., who Appellant calls

"unacceptable”, on the jury. Appellant asserts he was prejudiced by

their service on the jury.

“In order to properly preserve for appellate review an objection to

a denial of a challenge for cause, a defendant must demonstrate that

he was forced over objection to keep an unacceptable juror.”5 Nolen v.

State, 2021 OK CR 5,

97, 485 P.3d 829, 852-53 (quoting Eizember v.

12

State, 2007 OK CR 29, 1 36, 164 P.3d 208, 220). “This requires a

defendant to excuse the challenged juror with a peremptory challenge

and make a record of which remaining jurors the defendant would

have excused if he had not used that peremptory challenge to cure the

trial court’s alleged erroneous denial of the for cause challenge.’” Id.

Appellant has properly preserved for appellate review his challenge to

the jury.

“The United States Supreme Court has held that, ‘[i]n essence,

the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial

by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’jurors.1” Nolen, 2021 OK CR 5,

111, 485 P.3d at 856 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722,

(1961)). “This guarantee includes the right to be tried by jurors who

are capable of putting aside their personal impressions and opinions

and rendering a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in

court.” Id. “The decision of whether to disqualify a prospective juror

for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Nolen,

2021 OK CR 5, | 98, 485 P.3d at 853 (citing Mitchell v. State, 2010 OK

CR 14, H 19, 235 P.3d 640, 647). “The trial court’s decision will not be

overturned absent a finding of an abuse of discretion.” Id.

13

“We give broad deference on appeal to the trial court’s rulings on

for-cause challenges.” Tryon v. State, 2018 OK CR 20,

30, 423 P.3d

617, 631. “The trial court is vested with considerable discretion in

matters involving selection of jurors, because it is able to personally

observe the panehsts, and take into account a number of non-verbal

factors that do not transfer well, if at all, to the transcript page.” Grant

v. State, 2009 OKCR 11,1 17, 205 P.3d 1, 11. See also Mitchell, 2010

OK CR 14, 1 19, 235 P.3d at 647-48 (“we “generally defer to the

impressions of the trial court, which can better assess whether a

potential juror would be unable to fulfill his or her oath”).

Appellant argues that R.P. should have been removed for cause

because “he had clear leanings toward the State,” his “histoiy as a

sexual abuse victim”, and his “hesitation in responding to questions

regarding his ability to be a fair juror.” Regarding prospective juror

L.G., Appellant argues he should have been excused for cause because

of his “express leanings for the State” and affirming that even without

knowing anything about the case, he was leaning towards the State,

that it wasn’t even a “50-50 balance” for the defendant.

To determine if the trial court properly ruled on a challenge for

cause, this Court will review the entirety of the prospective juror’s voir

14

dire examination, and not just isolated answers. Underwood v. State,

2011 OK CR 12,1 37, 252 P.3d 221, 240; Gilbert v. State, 1997 OK CR

71,

26, 951 P.2d 98, 108. “We will reverse the lower court’s ruling on

a for-cause challenge where there is no support for it in the record.”

Tryon, 2018 OK CR 20, ^[31, 423 P.3d at 631. Reviewing the entirety

of the voir dire of R.P. and L.G., and not just isolated responses as

urged by Appellant, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in refusing to excuse either prospective juror for cause. Both R.P. and

L.G. said they could be fair and impartial, and as their voir dire

examinations progressed, it became clear that each could set aside his

personal experiences and render a fair and impartial verdict based

solely on the evidence admitted in court. See Tryon, 2018 OK CR 20,

H 35, 423 P.3d at 631 (finding no abuse in trial court’s denial of for

cause challenge where “voir dire made it evident that he could in fact

set aside his personal experiences and render a fair and impartial

verdict based solely on the evidence admitted in court”). Any

ambiguities or inconsistencies in L.G.’s responses to counsel were

resolved through the trial court’s additional questioning. Having

personally observed L.G.’s demeanor throughout voir dire, the court

found his responses credible and insufficient to excuse for cause. Id.,

15

(“[hjaving benefit of observing [the prospective juror’s] demeanor

throughout voir dire, the court found her responses credible and

insufficient to excuse her for cause.”)

Our review of the totality of the voir dire examinations of both R.P.

and L.G. supports the trial court's decision not to remove them for

cause.

Further, Appellant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by

the service of A.K. and K.P. on the jury. “Any claim of jury partiality

must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat.” Frederick, v. State, 2017

OK CR 12, H 15, 400 P.3d 786, 800, (overruled on other grounds by

Williamson v. State, 2018 OK CR 15, If 5, n. 1, 422 P.3d 752, 762 n. 1).

Appellant must establish prejudice in order to warrant relief. Id (citing

Rojem v. Stale, 2006 OK CR 7, 1] 36, 130 P.3d 287, 295).

Appellant has not provided any argument supporting his claims

that A.K. and K.P. were “unacceptable” jurors and “should not have

been permitted to serve.” The record of voir dire shows that defense

counsel objected to A.K.’s service because of “mental health

background” and to K.P’s service because he had relatives who were

prosecutors and two other family members who were crime victims.

16

The relevant question in this situation is whether “as a result of

the trial court’s rulings, Appellant was forced, over objection, to keep

an ‘unacceptable’juror.” Dauison v. State, 2020 OK CR 22, If 54, 478

P.3d 462, 476. “An ‘unacceptable juror’—which the Court has at times

referred to as a juror who is ‘undesirable’ to the defendant’s position—

means a trial juror: (1) who served over the defendant's objection after

the trial court denied the defendant an additional peremptory to

remove the juror as unacceptable; (2) who voiced views or opinions in

voir dire that raise a reasonable doubt about the juror’s bias against

the defendant and/or the defendant's position; and (3) whom any

reasonable attorney in the position of defense counsel would have

removed with a peremptory.” Id. 2020 OK CR 22,

56, 478 P.3d at

476.

We have thoroughly reviewed the voir dire of both A.K. and K.P.

and find nothing in their responses indicating that either of them could

not be a fair and impartial juror. See Grant v. State, 2009 OK CR 11, If

22, 205 P.3d 1, 12 (prospective juror assured court that police officers

she came in contact with while working at a restaurant would have no

impact on her ability to serve as a juror). The “mental health

background” of Juror A.K. can only refer to her saying she had taken

17

a mental health class as part of occupational therapy training. She

made no other references to any issues with her personal mental

health. Defense counsel’s general comment before the trial court

regarding A.K. that “there were other questions and answers that did

not sit well with me” does not support a conclusion that any reasonable

attorney in defense counsel’s position would have removed her with a

peremptory.

As for K.P., he said both an aunt and uncle were prosecutors,

another aunt had been raped in 2000 and yet another aunt was

murdered in 1995. In response to questioning by the court and both

counsel, K.P. said there was nothing about his personal experiences

that would cause him to favor or disfavor one side over the other, and

that having prosecutors in his family would not make him biased

towards or against the defendant in any way. K.P. provided no reasons

why his family relationships and experiences would cause him to be

biased.

Having thoroughly reviewed Appellant’s claims of error in context

of the entire voir dire, we find Appellant has failed to show that as a

result of the trial court’s denying his request to excuse R.P. and L.G.

18

for cause that he was denied a fair and impartial jury by the inclusion

of A.K. and K.P. on the jury. This proposition is denied.

In Proposition V, Appellant contends he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel by counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s

vouching for the credibility of A.S. during closing argument.

We review Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance under the

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Sanders, 2015 OK CR 11, | 29, 358 P.3d at 287. In order to show

that counsel was ineffective, Appellant must show both deficient

performance and prejudice. Id (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). In

Strickland, the Supreme Court said there is a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional conduct,

i.e.,

an appellant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, counsel’s conduct

constituted sound trial strategy. Sanders, 2015 OK CR 11,

29, 358

P.3d at 287. To establish prejudice, Appellant must show that there

is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the

confidence in the outcome. Id. (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

19

86, 111-112 (2011)). When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

can be disposed of on the ground of lack of prejudice, that course

should be followed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.

In Proposition III, we addressed Appellant’s claims of improper

vouching and found no grounds for relief. We found the prosecutor’s

comments were within the range of discussion allowed in closing

argument as the comments were: 1) made in response to comments

made during defense counsel’s closing argument; 2) based on the

evidence; and 3) did not give the jury personal assurances of the

victim’s credibility, and did not urge the jury to divert from its duty

to decide the case on the law and the evidence. As the comments were

not improper, any objection by defense counsel would have been

overruled. Counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to raise

objections that would have been overruled. Coffinan v. State, 2022

OK CR 23, 1) 15, 519 P.3d 101, 107.

Based upon the record before us, Appellant has failed to show

a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial if counsel had

raised the objections he now finds appropriate. Counsel’s conduct

did not constitute the kind of serious professional error that amounts

to deficient performance under Strickland. As Appellant has shown

20

neither deficient performance nor prejudice under Strickland, his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is denied.

In Proposition VI, Appellant argues the cumulative effect of the

errors addressed above denied him a fair trial. Appellant “respectfully

requests” this Court reverse his conviction or in the alternative

favorably modify his sentence.

This Court has held that a cumulative error argument has no

merit when this Court fails to sustain any of the other errors raised by

Appellant. Gillioms v. State, 2022 OK CR 3, Tf 44, 504 P.3d 613, 623.

Finding no errors in this appeal warranting relief, we find no relief is

warranted by the accumulation of errors. This proposition is denied.

DECISION

The JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to

Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22,

Ch. 18, App. (2025), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the

delivery and filing of this decision.

AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY

THE HONORABLE DAWN MOODY, DISTRICT JUDGE

21

APPEARANCES AT TRIAL

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL

BEVERLY A. ATTEBERRY

1861 EAST 15™ ST.

TULSA, OK 74104

COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE

WYNDI THOMAS HOBBS

OKLAHOMA INDIGENT

DEFENSE SYSTEM

111 N. PETERS, STE. 100

NORMAN, OK 73069

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

STEPHEN KUNZWEILER

DISTRICT ATTORNEY

ASHLEY NIX

MITCHELL WELLS

ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

TULSA CO. COURTHOUSE

500 SOUTH DENVER

TULSA, OK 74103

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE

GENTNER F. DRUMMOND

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

OKLAHOMA

BRENNA C. GIBSON

ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL

313 N.E. 21STST.

OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE

OPINION BY: LUMPKIN, P.J.

MUSSEMAN, V.P.J.: Concur

LEWIS, J.: Concur

HUDSON, J.: Concur

ROWLAND J.: Concur

22

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.