Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Shane Vinales, Individually and as Next Friend of L. V. and S. V., et ux., Petitioners v. AETC II Privatized Housing, L.L.C., et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 24, 2025

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No. _______

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

SHANE VINALES, Individually and as Next of Friend of

L.V. and S.V.; BECKY VINALES, Individually and as Next

of Friend of L.V. and S.V.;

Petitioners,

AETC II PRIVATIZED HOUSING, L.L.C.; AETC II PROPERTY

MANAGERS, L.L.C; HUNT ELP, LIMITED, d/b/a HUNT

MILITARY COMMUNITIES,

Respondents.

________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

________________

RANDALL A. PULMAN

C. HARKER RHODES IV

RYAN C. REED

Counsel of Record

PULMAN LEFLORE

NICHOLAS A. AQUART

PULLEN & REED LLP CLEMENT & MURPHY, PLLC

2161 N.W. Military

706 Duke Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

Highway, Suite 400

San Antonio, TX 78213 (202) 742-8900

harker.rhodes@clementmurphy.com

Counsel for Petitioners

(additional counsel listed on inside cover)

November 24, 2025

FRANCISCO GUERRA IV

J. CALEB RACKLEY

ROBERT BRZEZINSKI

JENNIFER A. NEAL

GUERRA LLP

875 E. Ashby Place

Suite 1200

San Antonio, TX 78212

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Federal Enclave Clause authorizes Congress

to “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases

whatsoever” over federal enclaves. U.S. Const. art. I,

§8, cl.17. That grant of plenary legislative authority,

however, does not prevent Congress from borrowing

state law to provide a rule of decision on federal

enclaves. Instead, this Court has held for well over a

century that when the federal government acquires a

federal enclave, federal law on that enclave borrows

state law that is not inconsistent with controlling

federal law.

In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit recognized

that federal law typically borrows state law to provide

a rule of decision in federal enclaves. But based on

language in this Court’s prior decisions, it held—in

agreement with other circuits, but contrary to at least

four state supreme courts—that federal law borrows

state law only as it existed when the federal

government acquired the enclave, regardless of any

subsequent changes in that state law. That approach

not only conflicts with how federal law borrows state

law in all other contexts, but would subject millions of

Americans—especially military servicemembers and

their families—to an unpredictable patchwork regime

under which each federal enclave across the country

borrows its own distinct (and distinctly outdated)

version of state law.

The question presented is:

Whether federal law on federal enclaves borrows

current state law, rather than state law only as it

existed when the enclave was created.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Shane Vinales, individually and as next friend of

L.V. and S.V., and Becky Vinales, individually and as

next friend of L.V. and S.V., are petitioners here and

were plaintiffs-appellants/cross-appellees below.

AETC II Privatized Housing, L.L.C., is a

respondent here and was defendant-appellee/crossappellant below. AETC II Property Managers, L.L.C.

and Hunt ELP, Limited d/b/a Hunt Military

Communities are also respondents here and were

defendants-appellees below.

iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The following proceedings are directly related to

this case within the meaning of Rule 14.1(b)(iii):

Vinales v. AETC II Privatized Housing, L.L.C.,

No. 24-50113 (5th Cir.) (opinion issued June 27, 2025;

mandate issued July 18, 2025).

Vinales v. AETC II Privatized Housing, L.L.C.,

No. 5:19-cv-1280 (W.D. Tex.) (judgment issued

October 2, 2023).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS ....... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................ 1

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 3

JURISDICTION ......................................................... 4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ....... 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 4

A. Legal Background ........................................ 4

B. Factual Background ..................................... 9

C. Procedural Background .............................. 12

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION....... 13

Federal Law Borrows Current State Law On

Federal Enclaves, Not Whatever State Law

Existed When The Enclave Was Created ......... 15

A. The Federal Enclave Clause Does Not

Require Federal Enclaves to Borrow

Only Long-Superseded State Law ............. 15

B. To the Extent This Court’s Prior

Decisions Have Suggested That Federal

Enclaves Borrow Only Past State Law,

They Should Be Reconsidered.................... 24

II. The Decision Below Contributes To Ongoing

Confusion In The Federal And State Courts.... 29

III. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally

Important ........................................................... 32

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 35

APPENDIX

Appendix A

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit, Vinales v. AETC II

Privatized Housing, L.L.C., No. 24-50113

(June 27, 2025) ............................................ App-1

Appendix B

Order, United States District Court for

the Western District of Texas, Vinales v.

AETC II Privatized Housing, LLC,

No. 19-cv-01280 (Jan. 4, 2023) .................. App-22

Appendix C

Final Judgment, United States District

Court for the Western District of Texas,

Vinales v. AETC II Privatized Housing,

LLC, No. 19-cv-01280 (Oct. 2, 2023) ......... App-43

Appendix D

Relevant Constitutional Provision............ App-46

U.S. Const. art I, §8, cl.17 .................. App-46

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allison v. Boeing Laser Tech. Servs.,

689 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2012).............................. 29

Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant,

278 U.S. 439 (1929) .................................................. 6

Balderrama v. Pride Indus., Inc.,

963 F.Supp.2d 646 (W.D. Tex. 2013)..................... 20

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Arapahoe Cnty.

v. Donoho,

356 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1960) ...................................... 30

Black Hills Power & Light Co. v. Weinberger,

808 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1987).................................. 29

Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC v. Donaldson,

2007 WL 2319141 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007) ........... 31

Brown v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico Hous., LLC,

No. 3:23-cv-567 (S.D. Cal. filed Mar. 30, 2023) .... 33

Burks v. Lasker,

441 U.S. 471 (1979) .......................................... 17, 18

Burnett v. Grattan,

468 U.S. 42 (1984) .................................................... 6

Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,

174 U.S. 1 (1899) .................................................... 16

Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn,

114 U.S. 542 (1885) ...................................... 5, 25, 26

Childs v. S.D. Fam. Hous., LLC,

150 F.4th 1151 (9th Cir. 2025) ........................ 20, 33

City of Wichita Falls v. Bowen,

182 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1944) ................................... 30

vii

Cobb v. Cobb,

545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989) ............................... 30

Cole v. AMC W. Hous. LP,

No. 5:22-cv-44 (W.D. Okla. dismissed after

settlement Aug. 30, 2023)...................................... 33

Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,

170 F.App’x 496 (9th Cir. 2006) ............................ 29

De Sylva v. Ballentine,

351 U.S. 570 (1956) .......................................... 17, 18

Fischer v. Belvoir Land LLC,

No. 1:22-cv-286 (E.D. Va. dismissed after

settlement Aug. 7, 2024)........................................ 33

Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe,

114 U.S. 525 (1885) ................................................ 16

Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of

City of Louisville,

344 U.S. 624 (1953) ...................................... 7, 16, 23

In re Salem Transp. Co. of N.J.,

264 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1970) ......................................... 30

In re Terry Y.,

161 Cal.Rptr. 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ................. 30

James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula,

309 U.S. 94 (1940) ........................................ 6, 16, 23

James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,

302 U.S. 134 (1937) .................................................. 4

Janus

v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps.,

585 U.S. 878 (2018) .................................... 25, 27, 28

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,

500 U.S. 90 (1991) ............................ 6, 17, 18, 23, 26

viii

Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp.,

25 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.P.R. 1998) ................................ 31

King v. Akima Glob. Servs., LLC,

775 F.App’x 617 (11th Cir. 2019) .......................... 29

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) ................................................ 25

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) .................................... 25, 27, 28

M.R.S. v. State,

745 So.2d 1139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ............. 30

Murillo Eid v. Michaels Org., LLC,

No. 8:24-cv-1544 (M.D. Fla. dismissed after

settlement June 24, 2025) ..................................... 33

Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co.,

291 U.S. 315 (1934) ...................................... 6, 23, 25

Overseas Mil. Sales Corp. v. Giralt-Armada,

503 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2007) .................................... 30

Pac. Coast Dairy v. Dep’t of Agric. of Cal.,

318 U.S. 285 (1943) ...................................... 6, 23, 26

Parker Drilling Management Servs. Ltd.

v. Newton,

587 U.S. 601 (2019) .................................. 8, 9, 13, 23

Paul v. United States,

371 U.S. 245 (1963) ............................ 7, 8, 20, 23, 31

Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cnty.,

328 U.S. 204 (1946) .......................................... 17, 18

Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Wetherill,

622 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1980) ................................... 21

Splattstoesser v. Fort Sam Houston Fam. Hous., LP,

No. 5:22-cv-9 (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 7, 2022) ......... 33

State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t

v. Debbie F.,

905 P.2d 205 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)........................ 30

Talarico v. Balfour Beatty Cmtys. LLC,

No. 4:25-cv-10037 (S.D. Fla. filed May 6,

2025) ....................................................................... 33

United States v. Kimbell Foods,

440 U.S. 715 (1979) .......................................... 17, 18

United States v. State Tax Comm’n of Miss.,

412 U.S. 363 (1973) ............................................ 8, 23

Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc.

v. United States,

841 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2016) ................................... 29

Vincent v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,

427 F.Supp. 786 (N.D. Tex. 1977) ......................... 20

W. River Elec. Ass’n

v. Black Hills Power & Light Co.,

918 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1990).................................. 20

Constitutional Provision

U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.17 ................................... 4, 16

Statutes

10 U.S.C. §2875 .......................................................... 9

Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186 (1996) ................. 9

Other Authorities

Am.Jur.2d Federal Courts (2d ed. 2025).............. 6, 18

Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) ..................... 1

Change the Air Found., Unsafe and Unheard:

Military Service Members and Their Families

Sound Off on Dangerous Living Conditions

(2025), available at perma.cc/YNG6-2SJ5 ............ 10

141 Cong. Rec. S18853

(daily ed. Dec. 19, 1995)........................................... 9

Cyc. of Fed. Proc. (3d ed. 2025) ............................ 6, 18

Chad DeVeaux, Trapped in the Amber: State

Common Law, Employee Rights, and

Federal Enclaves, 77 Brook. L. Rev. 499

(2012) ................................................................ 28, 32

Fed. Proc., L. Ed. (Nov. 2025) .............................. 6, 18

Mark E. Sullivan, On Base and Beyond,

perma.cc/4FFB-7BG4

(last visited Nov. 24, 2025) ........................ 19, 20, 22

U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Legislative

Jurisdiction: Report Prepared for U.S.

Public Land Review Commission

Jurisdiction (1969), perma.cc/2XDL-X2FB........... 32

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Under the Federal Enclave Clause, Congress has

plenary and exclusive authority to enact legislation

governing federal enclaves—areas where the federal

government has exclusive jurisdiction, and so federal

law alone controls.1 State law accordingly cannot

apply on federal enclaves of its own force. But that

does not mean that state law has no role at all to play

on federal enclaves; instead, on federal enclaves as in

other contexts, federal law often borrows state law for

its rule of decision, as long as the borrowed state law

does not conflict with federal law or any overriding

federal interest.

In all other contexts, when federal law borrows

state law, it borrows current state law as it exists at

the time when the court is rendering its decision. In

the decision below, however, the Fifth Circuit held—

relying on dicta from this Court—that federal law on

federal enclaves does not borrow current state law.

Instead, the panel held, it borrows whatever state law

existed when the federal enclave was created. Under

that approach, millions of Americans—including

numerous military servicemembers and their

families—would live under a patchwork regime in

which each federal enclave is governed by its own

unique and distinct version of historical state law,

frozen forever in time just as it was when the enclave

was created.

This petition uses “federal enclave” to refer specifically to

areas where the federal government exercises exclusive

jurisdiction, as opposed to areas where the federal government

shares legislative jurisdiction with a state government. See

federal enclave, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); infra p.4.

This case illustrates the practical consequences of

that misguided rule. Petitioners are a military family

that leased a house from respondents, private

companies that operate military housing on Randolph

Air Force Base in Texas. The house that respondents

provided was uninhabitable, with pervasive mold,

inadequate electrical systems, structural issues,

asbestos in the walls, water leaks, and severe insect

problems. Anywhere in Texas outside a federal

enclave, petitioners would have had numerous claims

against respondents, including statutory claims under

the Texas deceptive trade practices statute and

common-law claims under the implied warranty of

habitability and for negligent misrepresentation. But

according to the Fifth Circuit, because the land that

became Randolph Air Force Base was transferred to

exclusive federal jurisdiction in 1951, petitioners (and

all other military families on that base) were limited

to the causes of action and remedies that existed under

Texas law at that time, wiping out practically all of

their claims and requested forms of relief.

That holding cries out for further review. Nothing

in the text or history of the Federal Enclave Clause

requires federal law on federal enclaves to borrow

state law only as it existed when the federal

government obtained exclusive jurisdiction, and that

approach departs starkly from the normal rule in all

other contexts. The Fifth Circuit’s approach also

creates immense practical problems, imposing a

different body of antiquated state law on each federal

enclave and making it almost impossible for private

parties to determine what law governs their actions.

To the extent this Court’s cases have endorsed that

misguided approach, they are thinly reasoned, conflict

with other relevant jurisprudence, and should be

reconsidered.

The decision below is not only wrong, but also

deepens a split of authority between the federal and

state courts on this issue. While a number of other

federal circuits have taken the Fifth Circuit’s view, at

least four state supreme courts have squarely rejected

it, holding instead (based likewise on this Court’s

precedent) that federal law borrows current state law

on federal enclaves, not some past version of state law.

Only this Court can resolve that conflict and end the

severe uncertainty that the decision below

perpetuates.

The question presented is also exceptionally

important. There are some 5,000 federal enclaves

across the Nation, and millions of Americans live and

work in those areas. Unless and until this Court

intervenes, the governing law for all of those areas will

remain unsettled, and those who live and work on

federal enclaves under the Fifth Circuit’s rule will be

stripped of the rights that current state law would

otherwise afford them. The heaviest burden will fall

on military families like petitioners, who are often

housed on federal enclaves and who should not be

deprived of the rights that borrowing current state law

would afford them. This Court should grant review

and reverse.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Fifth Circuit’s decision is reported at 146

F.4th 434 and reproduced at App.1-21. The district

court’s opinion granting summary judgment in part

and its final judgment are unreported, but reproduced

at App.22-42 and App.43-45 respectively.

JURISDICTION

The Fifth Circuit issued its decision on June 27,

2025. On September 18, Justice Alito extended the

time to file a petition for certiorari to October 27. On

October 14, Justice Alito further extended the time to

file a petition for certiorari to November 24, 2025.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Federal Enclave Clause is reproduced at

App.46.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal Background

1. The Federal Enclave Clause authorizes

Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all

Cases whatsoever … over all Places purchased by the

Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the

Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,

Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”

U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.17. That exclusive federal

jurisdiction over federal enclaves distinguishes them

from other areas that the federal government may

hold as a mere proprietor, while the state retains full

legislative jurisdiction, or over which the federal and

state governments may share legislative authority.

See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134,

142-43 (1937).

While the Federal Enclave Clause ensures that

the authority of federal law on federal enclaves is

exclusive, it does not prevent federal law from

borrowing state law for its rule of decision. On the

contrary, as this Court has held for more than a

century, federal law typically does borrow state law to

provide a rule of decision on federal enclaves, as long

as that state law is not inconsistent with federal law

or overriding federal interests.

That rule dates back to this Court’s pathmarking

decision in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway

Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542 (1885). In McGlinn, the

plaintiff’s cow wandered onto railroad tracks on the

Fort Leavenworth military reservation, where it was

killed by a train. Id. at 543. The plaintiff sued the

railroad, relying on a Kansas statute enacted before

Fort Leavenworth became a federal enclave that made

railroads liable for any cattle their trains killed. Id. at

544. The railroad objected, arguing that because Fort

Leavenworth was a federal enclave, no Kansas law

could apply within its boundaries. Id. at 546.

This Court rejected the railroad’s argument.

When Fort Leavenworth became a federal enclave, the

Court explained, the transfer of exclusive jurisdiction

to the federal government abrogated state laws

“inconsistent with any law of the United States.” Id.

at 547. As to all other state laws, however, the

“change of government leaves them in force until, by

direct action of the new government, they are altered

or repealed.” Id. at 546-47. Because the Kansas

statute was “in no respect inconsistent with any law of

the United States,” and had not been “changed or

abrogated” by Congress, federal law continued to

borrow that state statute to provide the controlling

rule of decision. Id. at 547.

2. While it has long been clear that federal

enclaves borrow some state law, it is less clear what

(or more precisely, when) state law is borrowed. In all

other contexts, when federal law borrows state law, it

borrows current state law as it exists when the court

is rendering its decision, including any state statutes

enacted and state judicial decisions issued up to that

point. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500

U.S. 90, 108-09 (1991) (federal law borrows state law

“as it is defined by the law of the State”); Burnett v.

Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48 (1984) (federal law borrows

state law “as modified and changed by the constitution

and statutes of the forum State”); 32 Am.Jur.2d

Federal Courts §360 n.1 (2d ed. 2025) (federal law

borrows “existing state law rules”); 3 Cyc. of Fed. Proc.

§6:17 (3d ed. 2025) (“existing state law”); 8 Fed. Proc.,

L. Ed. §20:554 (Nov. 2025) (“existing state law”).

After McGlinn, however, this Court issued several

decisions suggesting—usually in dicta, and without

significant analysis or explanation—that federal

enclaves borrow state law only as it existed when the

federal enclave was created, without any subsequent

developments in that state law. In Arlington Hotel Co.

v. Fant, for instance, this Court concluded that Hot

Springs National Park was a federal enclave, and

assumed without deciding that as a result an

Arkansas statute passed after the national park was

established did not apply. 278 U.S. 439 (1929); see,

e.g., Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S. 315, 318

(1934) (relying on Arlington Hotel in dicta for the

proposition that “laws subsequently enacted by the

state” are “ineffective” on a federal enclave); James

Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100

(1940) (relying on Arlington Hotel, and Murray in

dicta for the same proposition); Pac. Coast Dairy v.

Dep’t of Agric. of Cal., 318 U.S. 285, 294 (1943) (relying

on Sadrakula).

In Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund of

City of Louisville, however, this Court took a different

approach. 344 U.S. 624 (1953). That case involved a

naval ordnance plant that became a federal enclave in

1941. Id. at 625. The City of Louisville subsequently

enacted ordinances annexing the area where the naval

ordnance plant was located, and began charging the

plant’s employees a city license tax for working in the

city. Id. The employees sued, arguing that the city’s

ordinance annexing the plant was ineffective because

it was enacted after the plant became a federal

enclave. Id. at 626.

This Court rejected that argument. Instead,

consistent with the general rule that federal law

borrows state law as it exists at the time of decision

absent any conflict with federal law or federal

interests, the Court explained that the existence of a

federal enclave “can have no validity to prevent the

state from exercising its power over the federal area

within its boundaries, so long as there is no

interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the

Federal Government.” Id. at 627. The federal

government’s exclusive jurisdiction over a federal

enclave and the state’s exclusive ability to amend

state law “are not antagonistic”; instead,

“[a]ccommodation and cooperation are their aim.” Id.

As a result, federal enclaves should borrow all current

state law that does not conflict with federal law or

federal interests.

A decade later, the Court complicated matters

further in Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963).

There, California enacted minimum wholesale price

regulations for milk, and sought to enforce those

regulations on milk sold to the United States at three

military bases. Id. at 247. Without mentioning

Howard, the Court cited Sadrakula and Arlington

Hotel for the proposition that on federal enclaves,

“only state law existing at the time of the acquisition

remains enforceable, not subsequent laws.” Id. at 268.

But the Court refused to carry that proposition to its

logical consequence; instead, even though the relevant

state regulations were issued after the federal

government acquired the bases, the Court held that

those regulations could remain enforceable as long as

the “same basic scheme” of state regulation had

existed before the United States purchased the bases.

Id. at 269. That is, because there was “no conflicting

federal policy” that would displace those state

regulations, they remained applicable as long as the

“basic state law authorizing [them]” had been in effect

since before the United States acquired the bases,

even though the regulations themselves were only

enacted afterwards. Id. The Court provided no

further guidance on how to determine whether a

subsequent state law or judicial decision is sufficiently

close to a prior “basic scheme” for federal law to borrow

that subsequent law or decision on a federal enclave.

Id.; see also United States v. State Tax Comm’n of

Miss., 412 U.S. 363, 369-73 (1973) (applying Paul and

Pacific Coast to decline to borrow current state law on

a federal enclave, without addressing either Howard

or Paul’s same-basic-scheme provision).

This Court’s most recent word came six years ago

in Parker Drilling Management Services Ltd. v.

Newton, 587 U.S. 601 (2019). In that decision, the

Court again stated in dicta that “[g]enerally, when an

area in a State becomes a federal enclave,” federal law

on that enclave borrows “only the state law in effect at

the time of the transfer of jurisdiction,” and “going

forward, state law presumptively does not apply to the

enclave.” Id. at 611-12 (citing Paul, Pacific Coast, and

Sadrakula). The Court did not attempt to reconcile

that statement with Howard or with the general rule

that federal law borrows state law as it exists at the

time of decision, and did not address Paul’s samebasic-scheme provision. Id.

B. Factual Background

The question of whether federal law borrows

current or past state law on federal enclaves arises on

a regular basis (and has created especially significant

problems) in one area in particular: landlord-tenant

rights for military servicemembers leasing housing

from private contractors on federal military bases,

many but not all of which are federal enclaves.

In 1996, Congress established the Congressional

Military Housing Privatization Initiative, which was

meant to improve housing conditions for military

personnel living on military bases by outsourcing the

military housing to private entities. See Pub. L.

No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186 (1996) (codified at 10

U.S.C. §2871 et seq.); see also 10 U.S.C. §2875; 141

Cong. Rec. S18853 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1995).

Unfortunately, that program has had the opposite

effect. Instead of the improved conditions that

Congress expected, many military servicemembers at

bases around the country have found themselves

leasing degraded and, at times, hazardous properties

from private entities that have shown little

willingness or ability to provide military families with

decent homes. See, e.g., Change the Air Found.,

Unsafe and Unheard: Military Service Members and

Their Families Sound Off on Dangerous Living

Conditions 5 (2025), available at perma.cc/YNG6-2SJ5

(reporting that 97% of servicemembers could list at

least one significant and dangerous issue with their

military housing, such as mold, water damage, or pest

infestations, and that 76% said housing-related

problems had harmed their family’s health).

This case provides a disheartening but not

unusual example. In 1951, Texas gave the United

States exclusive jurisdiction over a large parcel of land

that later became Randolph Air Force Base. App.2.

For some time, the federal government itself operated

the military housing on the base. But in 2007, the

government outsourced that job to a private entity—

Respondent AETC II Privatized Housing, LLC,

working with its authorized agent Respondent AETC

II Property Managers, LLC, and Respondent Hunt

ELP, Limited. App.2.

In October 2017, petitioners Lt. Col. Shane

Vinales, his wife Becky Vinales, and their two children

leased military housing owned and operated by

respondents at Randolph Air Force Base. Before

moving in, petitioners walked through the house with

respondents’ representative and asked about a musty

smell that they noticed. App.3. The representative

reassured them that the house was clean and safe, and

that the smell was “normal” for an old house and just

“what grandma’s house smells like.”

App.3.

Petitioners followed up with respondents’ leasing

office, who again reassured them that there were “no

problems” with the house. App.24.

Petitioners proceeded to sign a 12-month lease on

the property, which automatically renewed on a

month-to-month basis. App.3. After moving in,

however, petitioners quickly learned that the house

had extensive problems that made it unfit for human

habitation, including pervasive mold, structural

issues, asbestos in the walls, faulty electrical systems,

water leaks, and severe insect problems. App.4; see

D.Ct.Dkt.9 at 25-29.

Instead of solving those

problems, respondents ignored or exacerbated them.

Rather than remediate the house’s mold problems,

respondents simply painted over the areas where mold

had appeared, after which the mold promptly

reappeared in the same place. D.Ct.Dkt.9 at 26.

Petitioners asked respondents to test the house for

mold, but respondents refused, saying that it was

against company policy. D.Ct.Dkt.9 at 27. And in an

attempt to repair the house’s electrical system,

respondents hired contractors who hacked into the

walls of the house with pickaxes and concrete saws,

spreading asbestos dust throughout the house.

D.Ct.Dkt.9 at 26; see App.4.

Unsurprisingly, the squalid conditions in the

house and respondents’ inadequate efforts to address

them caused petitioners serious health issues. App.4;

see D.Ct.Dkt.9 at 27. Mrs. Vinales required sinus

surgery and continued to suffer from ongoing sinus

infections, and both Vinales children required medical

treatment. D.Ct.Dkt.9 at 27. The pervasive mold

throughout the house also contaminated petitioners’

property, growing on their furniture and ruining

practically everything porous that they owned.

D.Ct.Dkt.9 at 28-29; see D.Ct.Dkt.319-8 at 4-5. The

mold in the house was so bad that when Lt. Col.

Vinales received orders to transfer to Hawaii in 2019,

the military transporters who were supposed to move

petitioners’ belongings refused to do so because of

contamination concerns. App.4.

C. Procedural Background

1. In October 2019, petitioners and seven other

military families who had leased equally inadequate

housing from respondents sued in federal district

court. App.4; see D.Ct.Dkt.9 at 7-25, 29-41 (describing

the equally appalling experiences of the seven other

families). Petitioners alleged a variety of state-law

causes of action, including breach of the Texas

Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act

(“DTPA”), breach of the implied warranty of

habitability, breach of contract, and negligent

misrepresentation. App.4.

The parties consented to proceed before a

magistrate judge, who granted two motions for

summary judgment against petitioners, dismissing

most of their claims. App.4; see App.25. The

magistrate judge concluded that because Randolph

Air Force Base is a federal enclave, petitioners’ claims

were governed by federal law, which borrows state law

(here, Texas law) for its substantive rules of decision.

App.27-30. But rather than borrowing current Texas

law, the magistrate judge held that federal law would

borrow Texas law as it existed in 1951, when the

federal government first acquired exclusive

jurisdiction over the land that later became the base.

App.30. And because most of petitioners’ claims and

requested forms of relief—including their statutory

claims under the DTPA, their implied warranty of

habitability and negligent misrepresentation claims,

their claim for damages for mental distress, and their

claim for damages for personal injury under their

lease—did not exist under Texas law in 1951, the

magistrate judge held petitioners could not pursue

them. App.30; see App.4-5.

Petitioners proceeded to a jury trial on the only

claim that survived: their breach of contract claim for

diminution in the value of their lease and damage to

their personal property. See App.5. The jury found for

petitioners, and awarded them $31,654 for diminution

in the value of their lease and $60,000 for the damages

to their personal property.

App.5.

Petitioners

proceeded to appeal the dismissal of their various

statutory and common-law claims that are available

under current Texas law but that the magistrate judge

held are unavailable on Randolph Air Force Base

because those claims did not exist in Texas in 1951.

2. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Relying on this

Court’s dicta in Parker Drilling, it held that

“[g]enerally, when an area in a State becomes a federal

enclave, only the state law in effect at the time of the

transfer of jurisdiction continues in force as surrogate

federal law.” App.6 (quoting Parker Drilling, 587 U.S.

at 611-12). As a result, in the panel’s view, the only

landlord-tenant law that exists on Randolph Air Force

Base is historical Texas law as it existed in 1951,

leaving petitioners with only a fraction of the rights

that any tenant in Texas outside a federal enclave

would have. App.6-9.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision below adopts an extraordinarily

anomalous rule that should not be permitted to stand.

In all other contexts where federal law borrows state

law, the law that it borrows is current state law, as it

exists at the time when the court renders its decision.

The decision below, however, takes a different

approach for federal enclaves: Instead of borrowing

current state law, and thereby ensuring that federal

enclaves will live under the same legal regime as

everywhere else in the state unless federal law or

federal interests require otherwise, the decision below

held that federal law on federal enclaves instead

borrows state law only as it existed at the moment

when the enclave was created, subjecting each federal

enclave to its own unique and idiosyncratic version of

historical state law that remains permanently frozen

in time and ignores any subsequent developments in

state jurisprudence. That reading finds no basis in the

text or history of the Federal Enclave Clause, serves

no federal interest, and creates an untenable

patchwork system that makes it almost impossible to

determine the governing law on any given federal

enclave (which will be different for each and every

federal enclave across the entire country). To the

extent this Court’s prior decisions have adopted that

profoundly misguided approach, they should be

reconsidered.

The decision below is not only wrong, but also

deepens an entrenched conflict between federal and

state courts on this issue. Several other federal courts

of appeals have taken the same unlikely approach as

the Fifth Circuit, limiting federal law on federal

enclaves to borrowing state law as it existed when the

enclave was created. At least four state supreme

courts, however, have taken the opposite view,

correctly concluding that federal law on federal

enclaves borrows current state law (including state

law adopted after the enclave was created) as long as

that law does not conflict with federal law or

overriding federal interests. Only this Court can

resolve that conflict, and end the persistent

unpredictability and uncertainty that the Fifth

Circuit’s approach creates.

The question presented is also extraordinarily

important. The federal government exercises

exclusive jurisdiction over thousands of federal

enclaves across the country, on which millions of

Americans live and work. Those federal enclaves and

their residents deserve to know what law governs

their daily lives—and should be able to determine the

answer by consulting current federal and state law,

not state law as it might have existed decades ago. The

need for this Court’s intervention is further

exacerbated by the heavy burdens that the Fifth

Circuit’s approach places on military families like

petitioners, whose service often requires them to move

between federal enclaves every few years. Put simply,

serving our Nation on a federal enclave should not

deprive military servicemembers and their families of

their rights and protections under current state law.

This Court should grant review and reverse.

Federal Law Borrows Current State Law On

Federal Enclaves, Not Whatever State Law

Existed When The Enclave Was Created.

A. The Federal Enclave Clause Does Not

Require Federal Enclaves to Borrow

Only Long-Superseded State Law.

1. The text of the Federal Enclave Clause grants

Congress the power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation

in all Cases whatsoever” over all federal enclaves.

U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.17. That text serves a dual

purpose:

By authorizing Congress to exercise

legislative power “in all Cases whatsoever,” it gives

Congress the plenary legislative authority over federal

enclaves that otherwise belongs only to the states in

our federal system. Id.; see, e.g., Capital Traction Co.

v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (1899) (explaining that the

Federal Enclave Clause authorizes Congress to

“exercise … all legislative powers that the legislature

of a state might exercise within the state”). And by

making

federal

legislation

“exclusive,”

the

constitutional text makes clear that the only

governing law on federal enclaves is federal law, not

state law. U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.17; see, e.g., Fort

Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 532

(1885) (federal jurisdiction over federal enclaves “is

exclusive of all state authority”).

But while the Federal Enclave Clause makes

federal law the exclusive governing law on federal

enclaves, it “does not command that every vestige of

the laws of the [state] must vanish.” Sadrakula, 309

U.S. at 99. Instead, federal law can and does continue

to borrow local state law to provide the rule of decision

on federal enclaves in all cases where that state law is

not inconsistent with federal law or any overriding

federal interest, to “assure[] that no area however

small will be left without a developed legal system for

private rights.” Id. at 100; see, e.g., Howard, 344 U.S.

at 626-27 (recognizing that the Federal Enclave

Clause does not “prevent the state from exercising its

power over the federal area within its boundaries, so

long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction

asserted by the Federal Government”).

That is not surprising. In numerous contexts, this

Court has held that in areas governed exclusively by

federal law, federal courts should typically

“incorporate state law as the federal rule of decision,”

as long as that state law is not inconsistent with

federal law or specific federal objectives. Kamen, 500

U.S. at 98 (brackets omitted); see id. (recognizing the

“presumption that state law should be incorporated

into federal common law”); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S.

471, 477-80 (1979) (borrowing state corporate law);

United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 728-29

(1979) (borrowing state commercial law); De Sylva v.

Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (borrowing

state family law); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver

Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) (borrowing state

property law).

So too for federal enclaves. Although federal law

is exclusive on federal enclaves, it typically borrows

local state law to provide the rule of decision for the

countless legal disputes that can arise on a federal

enclave just as they do in the surrounding state, and

that federal law itself does not directly address.

Because “there is little need for a nationally uniform

body of law” to address those local problems, “state law

may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision” to

resolve those disputes on federal enclaves just as they

would be in the surrounding state, ensuring

predictability and equal treatment for those who live

and work on and off of federal enclaves. Kimbell

Foods, 440 U.S. at 728; see Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98

(recognizing that “[t]he presumption that state law

should be incorporated into federal common law is

particularly strong in areas in which private parties

have entered legal relationships with the expectation

that their rights and obligations would be governed by

state-law standards”).

2. In all other contexts, when federal law borrows

state law to provide a rule of decision, it borrows state

law as it exists at the time when the court is rendering

its decision, not some past version of state law. See,

e.g., Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98-109 (borrowing current

state corporate law, not state law as it existed when

the relevant federal statute was enacted); Burks, 441

U.S. at 477-86 (same); Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 72940 (same); De Sylva, 351 U.S. at 580-82;

Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 328 U.S. at 209-10 (same);

see also 32 Am.Jur.2d Federal Courts §360 n.1 (federal

law borrows existing state law); 3 Cyc. of Fed. Proc.

§6:17 (same); 8 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. §20:554 (same).

That is for good reason. When federal law adopts

state law to provide a rule of decision, it generally does

so because it recognizes that states have more

experience in addressing the relevant area of law and

because it seeks to preserve settled expectations with

respect to the governing law. See, e.g., Kamen, 500

U.S. at 98; Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29, 739-40.

Both rationales support adopting current state law,

which reflects the sum total of the state’s legislative

experience and which is the benchmark that sets

private parties’ expectations regarding the governing

law, rather than some past version of state law that

the state has since discarded and that no private party

believes is still in effect.

The same rule should likewise control in the

federal enclave context. Neither the text of the

Federal Enclave Clause nor anything in the history of

its enactment remotely suggests that the Clause

somehow creates a unique borrowing rule that

borrows state law for each federal enclave only as it

existed at the moment when that enclave was created,

ignoring all subsequent state-law developments. On

the contrary, adopting that unlikely rule—as the Fifth

Circuit did—entirely undermines the basic reasons for

borrowing state law in the first place, and serves no

countervailing federal interest.

By refusing to

acknowledge any later changes in state law, the Fifth

Circuit’s approach deprives federal enclaves of the

benefit of ongoing state experience in addressing the

relevant legal areas. And by borrowing whatever longsuperseded state laws may have existed when each

particular enclave was created rather than current

state law, the Fifth Circuit’s approach would wreak

havoc on private parties’ settled expectations

regarding the governing legal standards.

That is just the beginning of the problems with

the Fifth Circuit’s approach. Applying that approach

in any given case depends on the threshold questions

of whether the case arose on a federal enclave, and if

so, when that enclave was created. Those threshold

questions, however, can be remarkably difficult to

answer. Not all federal military bases, for instance,

are federal enclaves; instead, numerous bases (like

Laughlin Air Force Base, less than three hours from

Randolph Air Force Base) are held by the federal

government as a mere proprietor, or under concurrent

legislative jurisdiction with the surrounding state.

See Mark E. Sullivan, On Base and Beyond 31-35,

perma.cc/4FFB-7BG4 (last visited Nov. 24, 2025)

(listing 78 federal military bases over which the

federal government has only proprietary or concurrent

jurisdiction).

And even if it is clear that some part of a military

base is a federal enclave, that does not necessarily

mean that all of the base is. Instead, “because

different measures of jurisdiction apply to parcels of

land acquired at different times,” the Fifth Circuit’s

approach means that the governing law “must be

considered on a tract-by-tract basis.” Id. at 27. That

is a severe problem for military bases, which are often

composed of “numerous units [of land] acquired at

various times, some of which may be subject to

‘exclusive’ federal jurisdiction and some of which may

not be.” Paul, 371 U.S. at 269-70; see, e.g., W. River

Elec. Ass’n v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d

713, 715 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that “approximately

88%” of Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota is a

federal enclave, while the rest is not); Balderrama v.

Pride Indus., Inc., 963 F.Supp.2d 646, 657-58 (W.D.

Tex. 2013) (explaining that “different sections of Fort

Bliss were acquired in a series of different

transactions over many decades,” and so “it may be

that not all of Fort Bliss is subject to the same

jurisdiction”); Vincent v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 427

F.Supp. 786, 798-99 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (finding 74.65%

of a military base in Fort Worth was on a federal

enclave, while at least 24.22% was not). As a result,

the Fifth Circuit’s approach can require extensive

preliminary litigation over whether a particular case

arises on a federal enclave, and if so, when that

enclave was created. Cf. Childs v. S.D. Fam. Hous.,

LLC, 150 F.4th 1151 (9th Cir. 2025) (holding, after six

years of litigation, that Naval Amphibious Base

Coronado in California is not a federal enclave).

The problems continue. Once it is decided that a

case arises on a federal enclave (and when that

enclave was created), the Fifth Circuit’s approach

requires federal courts not just to predict how state

law would resolve thorny legal issues, but how state

law would have resolved those thorny legal issues

years or decades ago when the enclave was created—

substantially multiplying the already-daunting

“difficulties of the ascertainment of applicable state

law.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Wetherill, 622 F.2d 685,

688 (3d Cir. 1980).

And it requires not only

reconstructing long-superseded state law, but also

deciding how to characterize later state decisions, to

determine whether they actually changed the relevant

state law or merely clarified existing state law. It is

hard to imagine consistent and predictable answers to

those kinds of inquiries—let alone answers that

private parties living and working on federal enclaves

would be able to ascertain and rely on.

The Fifth Circuit’s patchwork approach also

creates random and irrational disparities. Under the

Fifth Circuit’s view, a military servicemember who

rents housing on Randolph Air Force Base will have

entirely different (and much more limited) rights than

an identical servicemember who rents housing just

outside the base’s boundaries, or who rents housing on

a nearby base that happens not to be a federal enclave.

Still worse, that servicemember will also have entirely

different (and much more limited) rights than an

identical servicemember who rents housing on a

nearby military base that is a federal enclave, but

became one only a few decades later, after Texas

enacted its deceptive-practices statute and recognized

its common-law implied warranty of habitability and

negligent misrepresentation claims. Worst of all, two

military servicemembers on the exact same base may

likewise have entirely different rights, depending on

when (and whether) the particular part of the base on

which they live and work became subject to exclusive

federal jurisdiction. See Sullivan, supra, at 27; see also

supra pp.19-21.

Those disparities are not only

unjustifiable on their own terms, but underscore the

impossible burden that the Fifth Circuit’s approach

places on private parties living or working on a federal

military base who want to know what law governs

their rights and obligations.

The correct approach, by contrast—borrowing

current state law except where inconsistent with

federal law or overriding federal objectives—avoids all

of these problems. Except in the rare case where

federal law or federal priorities require a different

result, it makes the law on federal enclaves exactly the

same as the law in the surrounding state. That

ensures that the governing law comports with private

parties’

expectations,

avoids

irrational

and

unjustifiable disparities, and makes it entirely

unnecessary to determine when a particular area

became a federal enclave (and in most cases, even

whether that area is a federal enclave). And, of course,

it aligns the rules for borrowing state law in the

federal enclave context with the rules for borrowing

state law in every other context where the issue arises.

See supra pp.18-19. As between that straightforward

and sensible rule and the Fifth Circuit’s inconsistent

and impractical patchwork approach, the case is not

even close.

3. The Fifth Circuit pointed to nothing in the text

or history of the Federal Enclave Clause to support its

unlikely rule. Instead, the Fifth Circuit relied entirely

on this Court’s dicta in Parker Drilling, treating it as

dispositive despite the unresolved tension between

that dicta and this Court’s holding in Howard that

state law applies on federal enclaves “so long as there

is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the

Federal Government.” 344 U.S. at 627; see supra p.7.

The Fifth Circuit acknowledged petitioners’ argument

that Howard should control, but rejected it based on

circuit precedent without further analysis. App.6-7.

Nothing in the Fifth Circuit’s brief discussion

provides any persuasive rationale for its misguided

approach. There is certainly language in some of this

Court’s prior opinions saying that federal law on

federal enclaves borrows state law only as it existed

when the federal enclave was created. See Parker

Drilling, 587 U.S. at 611-12; State Tax Comm’n, 412

U.S. at 369-73; Paul, 371 U.S. at 268; Pac. Coast, 318

U.S. at 294; Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 100; Murray, 291

U.S. at 318. But nearly all of that language is dicta,

and this Court has never attempted to reconcile it

either with Howard’s holding that state law applies as

long as it is not inconsistent with federal law, or with

Paul’s holding that federal law borrows state law

adopted after the enclave was created as long as it

follows the same basic scheme as prior state law. See

Paul, 371 U.S. at 269; Howard, 344 U.S. at 627. Nor

has this Court ever attempted to reconcile its dicta in

Parker Drilling and similar cases with the rule in all

other contexts that when federal law borrows state

law, it borrows current state law, not historical state

law. See, e.g., Kamen, 500 U.S. at 108-09.

At best, then, this Court’s prior decisions are

conflicting and unclear on whether federal enclaves

should follow the normal rule and borrow current

state law unless it conflicts with federal law or federal

priorities, or instead follow a unique and impractical

rule of borrowing state law only as it existed when the

federal enclave was created. Given that conflict, the

better course by far is to adopt the typical and much

more sensible rule of borrowing current state law

rather than whatever long-superseded state law

happened to exist when the federal enclave came to be.

B. To the Extent This Court’s Prior

Decisions Have Suggested That Federal

Enclaves Borrow Only Past State Law,

They Should Be Reconsidered.

For the same reasons, to the extent this Court’s

prior decisions have suggested that each federal

enclave borrows state law only as it existed when that

particular federal enclave was created, those decisions

should be overruled. None of those decisions points to

anything in the text or history of the Federal Enclave

Clause requiring that unlikely result; that result is

inconsistent with this Court’s other decisions,

including Howard and Paul, and with the rule in all

other contexts; and that result produces an

unworkable and unpredictable patchwork regime that

undermines settled expectations and creates

irrational disparities. To the extent this Court’s

precedent adopts that ill-advised approach, it is wrong

and should not be permitted to stand.

The relevant stare decisis factors confirm that

there is no good reason to preserve any such

misguided rule. As this Court has often recognized,

stare decisis “is not an inexorable command.” Janus

v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 585 U.S.

878, 917 (2018) (citing numerous cases). In deciding

whether to overrule past precedent, this Court

considers “the quality of [its] reasoning, the

workability of the rule it established, its consistency

with other related decisions, developments since the

decision was handed down, and reliance on the

decision.” Id.; see, e.g., Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 407 (2024); Knick v. Twp. of

Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 203 (2019). Each of those factors

weighs against requiring each federal enclave to

borrow its own unique form of long-discarded state

law.

1. To the extent this Court’s precedents have

suggested that federal enclaves should borrow past

rather than current state law, they have done so

largely in dicta and with minimal reasoning. The first

time that this Court explicitly made that suggestion

was in Murray, where it did so in dicta and with no

explanation other than a citation to Arlington Hotel,

which never discussed the issue at all. Murray, 291

U.S. at 318. The Court has since repeated that

suggestion in several other cases, but typically only in

dicta (as in Parker Drilling, Paul, and Sadrakula), and

it has never provided any meaningful reasoning to

support that rule.

To the extent that this Court has ever gestured at

any reason for that misguided rule, its reasons have

been entirely unpersuasive. In McGlinn, for instance,

the Court drew an analogy between federal enclaves

and territory acquired by the United States from a

foreign country, where laws that are later enacted by

the foreign country would not apply to that territory

once it became American soil. See 114 U.S. at 546.

But as McGlinn itself recognized, there is a “wide

difference between a cession of political jurisdiction

from one nation to another, and a cession to the United

States by a state of legislative power over a particular

tract.” Id. at 547. While “the principle which controls

as to laws in existence at the time is the same in both”

(i.e., prior laws remain in force), it does not follow that

the principle as to subsequent laws is the same in

both—which is why McGlinn said nothing about

whether federal law should continue to borrow

subsequent state-law developments after acquiring

the enclave. Id.

The only other rationale that this Court has

advanced for borrowing state law only as it existed

when the enclave was created is to briefly suggest in

Pacific Coast that adopting subsequent changes in

borrowed state law would “ignore” the federal

government’s exclusive jurisdiction and Congress’

exclusive legislative power over the enclave. 318 U.S.

at 294. But that is a classic non sequitur: While

federal law is the exclusive governing law on federal

enclaves, nothing prevents it from borrowing current

state law (including any changes made after the

enclave was created) to provide its rule of decision, just

as federal law does in every other context where it

borrows state law. That does not “ignore” the

exclusive nature of federal law on the enclave, any

more than borrowing current state law ignores the

exclusive nature of federal common law in other

contexts. See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 108-09; supra pp.1819. In short, to the extent this Court’s precedent has

provided any reasoning at all for suggesting that

federal enclaves should borrow only past rather than

current state law, the minimal “quality of [its]

reasoning” weighs heavily against affording that

misguided rule any significant stare decisis effect.

Janus, 585 U.S. at 917.

2. The utter unworkability of borrowing state law

for each enclave only at the time when that particular

enclave was created likewise weighs heavily against

applying stare decisis here. See id. at 917; Loper

Bright, 603 U.S. at 407-08 (overruling the

“unworkable” Chevron doctrine). As already described

(and as this case demonstrates), that approach creates

a crazy-quilt regime in which each federal enclave is

forced to apply its own unique corpus of antiquated

state law, different from everywhere else in the state

and even from every other federal enclave in the state

that was established at a different time. See App.8-9;

supra pp.19-21.

It creates random and utterly

unwarranted disparities between otherwise identical

parties, based solely on when the particular federal

enclave (or part of a federal enclave) on which they live

or work happened to come under exclusive federal

jurisdiction. And it makes the governing law on

federal military bases and other federal enclaves

unpredictable and largely unknowable, by forcing it to

turn on difficult questions of whether and when

particular areas came under exclusive federal

jurisdiction and what the governing state law was at

that time. See supra pp.19-21. Those considerations

confirm that any endorsement of that unworkable rule

by this Court’s previous decisions does not warrant

stare decisis.

3. Borrowing only past rather than current state

law on federal enclaves also creates “[in]consistency

with other related decisions” and with “developments

since the [rule] was handed down.” Janus, 585 U.S. at

917. Again, that unique (and uniquely misguided)

approach is inconsistent with the settled rule that

federal law in all other contexts borrows current

rather than past state law, and also conflicts with this

Court’s decisions in Howard and Paul. See supra pp.78, 18-19. That inconsistency further weighs against

giving stare decisis effect to any precedent endorsing

that problematic approach.

4. Finally, to the extent there are any reliance

interests at play here, they further confirm that this

Court should not preserve any rule that would require

federal enclaves to borrow past rather than current

state law. That approach does not create “the sort of

stable background rule that fosters meaningful

reliance,” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 410; instead, it

creates a fractured kaleidoscope of different legal

regimes for each federal enclave, making it practically

impossible to determine in advance (let alone rely on)

the actual governing law. Because that doctrine “does

not provide a clear or easily applicable standard …

arguments for reliance based on its clarity are

misplaced.” Id. (quoting Janus, 585 U.S. at 927). On

the contrary, reliance interests weigh strongly in favor

of preserving private parties’ expectations by adopting

current state law on federal enclaves, rather than

turning those federal enclaves into “jurisprudential

Jurassic Parks, where long-dead legal doctrines prey

upon unsuspecting litigants.”

Chad DeVeaux,

Trapped in the Amber: State Common Law, Employee

Rights, and Federal Enclaves, 77 Brook. L. Rev. 499,

529 (2012). For all of those reasons, to the extent this

Court’s prior decisions could be read to require federal

enclaves to borrow state law only as it existed when

those enclaves were created, this Court should revisit

those decisions.

II. The Decision Below Contributes To Ongoing

Confusion In The Federal And State Courts.

The decision below is not only wrong, but

contributes

persistent

confusion

and

unpredictability in the law in this area. Perhaps

unsurprisingly, federal and state courts have been

unable to agree on whether to follow this Court’s dicta

in Parker Drilling and similar cases or its holdings in

Howard and Paul. And courts (like the Fifth Circuit

below) that have taken the former approach have only

multiplied the resulting confusion, by making the

governing law on federal enclaves turn on complicated

jurisdictional and historical inquiries into when and

whether the federal government acquired exclusive

jurisdiction and what the state law was at that time.

This Court should grant review and end that ongoing

confusion and instability in the law.

1. The Fifth Circuit’s decision below is misguided,

but not unique. Like the Fifth Circuit, several other

federal courts of appeals have read this Court’s

precedent to require that federal law on federal

enclaves borrows state law only as it existed when the

enclave was created, not current state law. See, e.g.,

King v. Akima Glob. Servs., LLC, 775 F.App’x 617, 620

(11th Cir. 2019); Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v.

United States, 841 F.3d 556, 571 (2d Cir. 2016); Allison

v. Boeing Laser Tech. Servs., 689 F.3d 1234, 1237

(10th Cir. 2012); Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170

F.App’x 496, 497 (9th Cir. 2006); Black Hills Power &

Light Co. v. Weinberger, 808 F.2d 665, 668-69 (8th Cir.

1987).

A number of state supreme courts, by contrast,

have reached the opposite conclusion and held that

federal law borrows current state law on federal

enclaves, creating a clear split on the issue—including

in several states where the regional federal circuit is

on the other side of the split, making the governing

law in federal enclaves in those states different in the

federal and state courts. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs of Arapahoe Cnty. v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267,

270-73 (Colo. 1960) (en banc) (conflicting with the

Tenth Circuit); Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161, 1164

(Mass. 1989); In re Salem Transp. Co. of N.J., 264 A.2d

47, 49 (N.J. 1970); City of Wichita Falls v. Bowen, 182

S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1944) (conflicting with the Fifth

Circuit). As those courts have correctly explained,

federal law continues to borrow current state law on

federal enclaves as long as that state law “does not

interfere with the primary jurisdiction of the Federal

government.” Cobb, 545 N.E.2d at 1163 (relying on

Howard); see also, e.g., Salem Transp., 264 A.2d at 49

(“[S]o long as there is no interference with the

jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government, the

State’s domain continues.” (citations omitted)).2

Several intermediate state appellate courts have likewise

agreed that federal law on federal enclaves borrows current state

law, also often in conflict with their regional federal circuits, see,

e.g., In re Terry Y., 161 Cal.Rptr. 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)

(conflicting with the Ninth Circuit); M.R.S. v. State, 745 So.2d

1139, 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (conflicting with the

Eleventh Circuit); State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t v.

Debbie F., 905 P.2d 205, 207 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (conflicting

with the Tenth Circuit), and several district courts have reached

the same conclusion, see, e.g., Overseas Mil. Sales Corp. v. GiraltArmada, 503 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing the district

court’s conclusion that “the federal enclave doctrine permit[s] the

Those conflicting understandings of the governing

law on federal enclaves have been recognized by

several courts. See, e.g., Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC

v. Donaldson, 2007 WL 2319141, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.

9, 2007) (recognizing “three theories” of the

“relationship between laws enforced on a federal

enclave and state law”: borrowing current state law,

borrowing current state law “consistent with” state

law before the enclave was created, or borrowing only

state law as it existed when the enclave was created);

Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F.Supp.2d 1,

4 (D.P.R. 1998) (same). That nationwide conflict—

with multiple federal circuits lined up on one side and

multiple state supreme courts lined up on the other—

warrants this Court’s intervention, particularly when

both sides of the split claim that their view is based on

this Court’s precedents.

2. The need for this Court’s review is exacerbated

by the further confusion caused by the Fifth Circuit’s

approach itself, which makes it practically impossible

to determine what law governs on federal military

bases and other federal properties. For instance, as

already noted, military installations are often

composed of “numerous units [of land] acquired at

various times, some of which may be subject to

‘exclusive’ federal jurisdiction and some of which may

not be.” Paul, 371 U.S. at 269-70; see supra pp.20-21.

The result, under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, is

extensive confusion and uncertainty, as the governing

law can differ dramatically and unpredictably for

otherwise identical litigants based solely on whether

application of state law to activities on federal enclaves except

where federal and state law conflict”).

and when the particular military base (or particular

part of that military base) became subject to exclusive

federal jurisdiction. See supra pp.21-22. This Court

should grant review and end that confusion and

uncertainty by establishing a uniform rule that

federal law on federal enclaves borrows current state

law, not whatever state law might have existed when

the enclave was created.

III. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally

Important.

The question presented is also extraordinarily

important. There are some 5,000 federal enclaves

across the country, and millions of Americans live or

work in those enclaves. See U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

Federal Legislative Jurisdiction: Report Prepared for

U.S. Public Land Review Commission Jurisdiction

146 (1969), perma.cc/2XDL-X2FB; DeVeaux, supra, at

500 & n.11, 503 & n.40. Under the Fifth Circuit’s

approach, federal law on each of those federal enclaves

borrows not the current state law with which its

inhabitants are familiar, but whatever historical form

of state law existed when that federal enclave was

created—subjecting each federal enclave to its own

distinct version of antiquated state law, and depriving

anyone on that enclave of any of the benefits of

subsequent changes to state law. That approach

radically upsets settled expectations, subjecting

countless everyday transactions on federal enclaves to

whatever law might have existed in that state years

or decades ago—often depriving the parties of the

present-day state-law protections on which consumers

and businesses routinely rely.

As this case illustrates, that is not just an abstract

jurisprudential concern, but a severe practical

problem for numerous Americans—especially for our

Nation’s military servicemembers, who often live and

work on federal military bases subject to exclusive

federal jurisdiction. Because federal law itself has

little to say on the subject of landlord-tenant relations,

practically all of the law governing military housing

on federal military bases is borrowed state law. But

under the Fifth Circuit’s approach, the landlordtenant law that is borrowed is a random patchwork of

past state law that depends entirely on the

happenstance of whether and when the particular

base (or relevant portion of that base) became a federal

enclave.

That crazy-quilt approach makes it impossibly

difficult for military families who are subjected to

uninhabitable housing conditions to even determine

what law governs their landlord-tenant claims—a

problem that has arisen not only in this case, but in

numerous similar cases across the country,

underscoring the pressing need for this Court’s

intervention.3 And even when military families do

manage to learn what long-superseded state law

3 See, e.g., Childs, 150 F.4th at 1154-56; Talarico v. Balfour

Beatty Cmtys. LLC, No. 4:25-cv-10037 (S.D. Fla. filed May 6,

2025); Brown v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico Hous., LLC, No.

3:23-cv-567 (S.D. Cal. filed Mar. 30, 2023); Splattstoesser v. Fort

Sam Houston Fam. Hous., LP, No. 5:22-cv-9 (W.D. Tex. filed Jan.

7, 2022); see also Murillo Eid v. Michaels Org., LLC, No. 8:24-cv1544 (M.D. Fla. dismissed after settlement June 24, 2025);

Fischer v. Belvoir Land LLC, No. 1:22-cv-286 (E.D. Va. dismissed

after settlement Aug. 7, 2024); Cole v. AMC W. Hous. LP, No.

5:22-cv-44 (W.D. Okla. dismissed after settlement Aug. 30, 2023).

governs their claims, that law (as here) often affords

them far less protection than otherwise identical

tenants living just outside the base. See App.30

(dismissing petitioners’ DTPA, implied warranty of

habitability, and negligent misrepresentation claims,

and claims for personal injury under their lease and

mental distress).

That, in turn, leaves private

companies like respondents that provide military

housing with substantially less incentive to ensure

that the housing they offer to military servicemembers

is actually habitable—resulting in egregious

conditions like the ones that petitioners and many

other military families have suffered.

All of those problems have a straightforward

solution: Federal law on federal enclaves borrows

current state law, not whatever past state law might

have existed when the particular enclave or relevant

portion of that enclave became subject to exclusive

federal jurisdiction. This Court should grant review,

resolve the ongoing conflict and confusion on this

issue, and eliminate the significant practical problems

that borrowing long-superseded state law has caused

for military servicemembers subjected to inadequate

housing and for countless other Americans who live or

work on federal enclaves.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

RANDALL A. PULMAN

C. HARKER RHODES IV

RYAN C. REED

Counsel of Record

PULMAN LEFLORE NICHOLAS A. AQUART

CLEMENT & MURPHY, PLLC

PULLEN & REED

706 Duke Street

LLP

Alexandria, VA 22314

2161 N.W. Military

(202) 742-8900

Highway, Suite 400

San Antonio, TX 78213 harker.rhodes@clementmurphy.com

FRANCISCO GUERRA IV

J. CALEB RACKLEY

ROBERT BRZEZINSKI

JENNIFER A. NEAL

GUERRA LLP

875 E. Ashby Place

Suite 1200

San Antonio, TX 78212

Counsel for Petitioners

November 24, 2025

APPENDIX

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Appendix A

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit, Vinales v. AETC II

Privatized Housing, L.L.C., No. 24-50113

(June 27, 2025) ............................................ App-1

Appendix B

Order, United States District Court for

the Western District of Texas, Vinales v.

AETC II Privatized Housing, LLC,

No. 19-cv-01280 (Jan. 4, 2023) .................. App-22

Appendix C

Final Judgment, United States District

Court for the Western District of Texas,

Vinales v. AETC II Privatized Housing,

LLC, No. 19-cv-01280 (Oct. 2, 2023) ......... App-43

Appendix D

Relevant Constitutional Provision............ App-46

U.S. Const. art I, §8, cl.17 .................. App-46

App-1

Appendix A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 24-50113

________________

SHANE VINALES, INDIVIDUALLY and as Next of Friend

of L.V. and S.V.; BECKY VINALES, Individually and as

Next of Friend of L.V. and S.V.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants/

Cross-Appellees,

AETC II PRIVATIZED HOUSING, L.L.C.,

Defendant-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant,

AETC II PROPERTY MANAGERS, L.L.C.; HUNT ELP,

LIMITED, doing business as HUNT MILITARY

COMMUNITIES,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________

Filed: June 27, 2025

________________

Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and King and Graves,

Circuit Judges.

________________

OPINION

________________

App-2

Per Curiam:

The Vinales family Appellants sued Appellees, a

collection of private military housing providers, on

claims related to their leased home’s condition and

resulting personal property damages. On summary

judgment, the magistrate judge held that most of

Appellants’ claims were barred by the federal enclave

doctrine and dismissed their fraud claim for failure to

raise a genuine dispute of material fact.1 After trial on

the remaining claim, a jury awarded Appellants over

$90,000 in damages, but the magistrate judge rejected

Appellants’ motion for attorneys’ fees. Appellants

appeal the application of the federal enclave doctrine,

the dismissal of the fraud claim, the exclusion of

evidence at trial, and the denial of attorneys’ fees. One

Appellee cross-appeals, challenging the jury awards

on multiple grounds. We AFFIRM.

Background

In 1951, Texas ceded exclusive jurisdiction over

land that would become Randolph Air Force Base

(“Randolph”) to the United States. In 2007, the United

States Air Force entered a lease with AETC II

Privatized Housing, LLC (“AETC Housing”) to operate

and maintain housing at Randolph. The lease requires

AETC Housing to “comply with all Applicable Laws,”

and to design and construct buildings to a standard “to

meet the Bexar County, Texas building codes,” but

also notes that “[n]othing in this Lease shall be

construed to constitute a waiver of Federal

1 The parties consented to the magistrate judge conducting

proceedings and entering final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

App-3

Supremacy,” and that “the United States presently

exercised exclusive federal jurisdiction over the

Leased Premises.”2 AETC Housing manages military

housing at Randolph in conjunction with its

authorized agent, AETC II Property Managers, LLC

(“AETC Managers”), and Hunt ELP, Limited (“Hunt”)

(collectively, “Appellees”).

Lt. Col. Shane Vinales, his wife Becky Vinales,

and their two children (collectively, “Appellants”)

leased and moved into housing owned and operated by

Appellees at Randolph in October 2017. Prior to

moving in, Appellants walked through the house with

a Hunt representative and asked about a “musty”

smell. The representative responded that “these

homes are old, and this is what grandma’s house

smells like,” and that the smell was “normal.” After

the walkthrough, Appellants signed a 12-month lease

which then automatically renewed on a month-tomonth basis. The lease required AETC Housing to

“make a diligent effort to repair or remedy the

condition at the Premises.” The lease also

incorporated AETC Housing’s Resident Guidelines.

Under the Resident Guidelines, AETC Housing was

responsible for the “maintenance and operation” of the

housing, agreed to maintain various facilities “in good

and safe working condition,” and agreed “to comply

with all applicable building and housing code

A Master Development and Management Agreement

(“MDMA”) between the Air Force and Appellees further governs

the relationship. In its definitions and interpretation section, the

MDMA defines “applicable law” as referring to “all federal, state

and local laws . . . which are applicable to the Project Owner or

the Project during the Agreement Term.”

App-4

requirements governing residential property in the

State of Texas.” Appellants lived in the home until

May 22, 2019.

On a website, Appellees allegedly advertised their

properties as “quality housing” and represented

themselves as “one of the best” providers of military

housing in the country. But Appellants alleged that

“the house smelled musty, was dirty, and was littered

with insects,” and that Appellees addressed asbestos

problems so poorly that Appellants suffered

significant health issues. Appellants further alleged

Appellees did nothing to address ongoing mold until

after Appellants received orders transferring them to

Hawaii, but even then, the efforts were so haphazard

that the military transporters refused to move

Appellants’ personal property due to contamination

concerns.

In October 2019, Appellants and seven other

military families who had lived in AETC Housing

properties sued Appellees in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Appellants stated eleven causes of action including

breach of the Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesConsumer Protection Act (“DTPA”), breach of

contract, common-law fraud, and a variety of other

claims. Appellants also sought attorneys’ fees and

exemplary damages under various Texas Codes. The

magistrate judge granted two motions for summary

judgment against Appellants, dismissing most of their

claims and forms of relief. The magistrate judge

reasoned that because the federal enclave doctrine

applied, Appellants’ claims were governed by federal

law and non-conflicting pre-cession state law, and

App-5

most of their causes of actions or forms of relief were

not recognized at the time Texas ceded the land. The

magistrate judge also granted summary judgment

against Appellants on their common-law fraud claim,

finding no genuine dispute of material fact.3

The breach of contract claim proceeded to a jury

trial. At trial, the magistrate judge excluded several

pieces of Appellants’ evidence. Appellees filed a motion

for judgment as a matter of law, which the magistrate

judge denied. During closing statements, Appellants

requested $40,654.10, the total rent paid, for

diminution in the value of the lease, and a minimum

of $56,157.48 for damage to their personal property,

while arguing the total damage to personal property

“was as much as $10,000 greater than this amount.”

The jury found that Appellees failed to make a diligent

effort to repair or remedy conditions at the house

under the terms of the Lease Agreement, and failed to

maintain appliances, facilities, and common areas in

good and safe working condition under the terms of

the Resident Guidelines and Lease Agreement, and

awarded Appellants $31,654 for diminution in value of

the lease and $60,000 for damages to personal

property.

After trial, Appellants filed a motion for attorneys’

fees, seeking $2,888,035.08 for services rendered and

costs, plus an additional 300% fee enhancement,

under the operative pre-cession state law. The

magistrate judge denied all fees. Appellees also

renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law

3 The magistrate judge also ordered that each of the families’

cases be tried separately.

App-6

or for a new trial. The magistrate judge largely

rejected that motion but agreed that the claims

against AETC Managers had to be dismissed.4

Appellants timely appealed, Appellees responded, and

one Appellee—AETC Housing—cross-appealed.

II. Federal Enclave Doctrine

At summary judgment, the magistrate judge

dismissed most of Appellants’ claims as barred by the

federal enclave doctrine. We review that legal

conclusion de novo. Pinkston v. Kuiper, 67 F.4th 237,

240 (5th Cir. 2023). “Generally, when an area in a

State becomes a federal enclave, ‘only the [state] law

in effect at the time of the transfer of jurisdiction

continues in force’ as surrogate federal law.” Parker

Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U.S. 601,

611-12 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting James

Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940)).

“Existing state law typically does not continue in force,

however, to the extent it conflicts with ‘federal policy.’”

Id. at 612 (quoting Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245,

269 (1963)). “And going forward, state law

presumptively does not apply to the enclave.” Id.

Appellants make multiple arguments why the federal

enclave doctrine does not bar their claims.

Appellants first argue that “[t]here is an

increasing realization that federal laws on enclaves

are simply inadequate for a full and fair adjudication

of disputes that are commonplace in modern life,” and

therefore “contemporary state laws are valid within

4 The magistrate judge held that AETC Managers was not a

party to the lease and could not be held liable as a disclosed

agent.

App-7

federal enclaves unless they interfere with the

jurisdiction asserted by the federal government.”

Appellants rely heavily on Howard v. Commissioners

of the Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville, 344 U.S.

624 (1953). But this circuit has squarely rejected

reading Howard to mean that post-cession state law is

valid if it does not conflict with federal objectives.

Miss. River Fuel Corp. v. Cocreham, 382 F.2d 929, 937

n.17 (5th Cir. 1967) (“Howard did not . . . imply that a

state has legislative power within a federal enclave

unless exercise of that power interferes with the

federal government.”). If federal law has become

inadequate or out of step with contemporary state law,

“[c]ongressional action is necessary to keep it current.”

Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 100.

Appellants next argue that an exception to the

federal enclave doctrine applies to their DTPA claim.

28 U.S.C. § 5001(b), titled “Personal injury,” provides

that “[i]n a civil action brought to recover on account

of an injury sustained” within a federal enclave, “the

rights of the parties shall be governed by the law of

the State in which the place is located.” The

magistrate judge held § 5001(b) inapplicable,

suggesting it likely applies only to physical injuries,

but finding at the very least that it does not apply to

claims brought under the DTPA. Indeed “Texas

appellate courts have repeatedly admonished that the

DTPA does not provide relief for personal injury

claims.” Roberts v. Zev Techs., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-309

RP, 2015 WL 7454688, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2015);

see, e.g., Last v. Quail Valley Country Club, L.P., No.

01-08-00759-CV, 2010 WL 1253782, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (“The Legislature has expressed its intent that the

App-8

DTPA does not provide a cause of action for personal

injury claims.”). Because the DTPA does not allow for

personal injury claims, Appellants’ DTPA claim

cannot fit under § 5001(b)’s personal injury exception.

Appellants next argue that references to Texas

law in the lease, Resident Guidelines, and MDMA

demonstrate that the parties intended to incorporate

Texas law into the lease. We need not decide whether

a choice-of-law provision could even abrogate the

federal enclave doctrine because the various excerpts

Appellants cite merely reference “the local applicable

laws,” state laws, or housing codes.5 References to

“applicable law” do not evince an intent to apply any

specific law. Cf. Cap. Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v.

Bennett, 680 F.3d 214, 230 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining

reference to applicable laws “simply raises the

question of what laws were applicable”).6 And

Appellants offer no authority to suggest a choice-oflaw provision can be implied from these other

relatively oblique references. Therefore, federal and

5 For example, a provision of the lease notes that the parties’

rights are “in accordance with the provisions of applicable law,”

while a provision of the rental agreement notes that “[t]he Lease

and Resident Guidelines are intended to comply with and shall

be construed in accordance with all applicable state, federal and

local laws.”

Appellants’ reference to the principle that “the current

iteration of the law, as it stands when parties make a contract,

must be deemed incorporated into the contract even if not done

so expressly,” also misses the mark. While that principle is

correct, it does nothing to address the fact that the current

iteration of the law within this federal enclave as it stood when

these parties entered this contract was Texas’s pre-cession law to

the extent it had not been modified by later congressional action.

App-9

pre-cession state law govern. Accord JAAAT Tech.

Servs., LLC v. Tetra Tech Tesoro, Inc., No. 3:15CV235,

2017 WL 4003026, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2017)

(“Thus, if no enforceable choice-of-law provision

governs the parties’ subcontracts, federalized state

law would likely govern these claims.”).

In summary, the magistrate judge correctly held

that the federal enclave doctrine applied, that no

exception was valid, and therefore that federal law

and pre-cession state law governed Appellants’ claims.

Because many of Appellants’ claims do not exist under

federal or pre-cession state law, the magistrate judge

correctly granted summary judgment in favor of

appellees on those claims.

III. Fraud Claims

The magistrate judge also granted summary

judgment on Appellants’ common-law fraud claim,

holding that Appellants failed to identify any

actionable fraudulent statements. “A common-law

fraud claim requires ‘a material misrepresentation,

which was false, and which was either known to be

false when made or was asserted without knowledge

of its truth, which was intended to be acted upon,

which was relied upon, and which caused injury.’”

Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 153

(Tex. 2015) (quoting Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v.

Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47

(Tex. 1998)); see also Wilson v. Jones, 45 S.W.2d 572,

573 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1932, holding approved,

judgm’t adopted) (same under precession law). On

appeal, Appellants point to five sources of allegedly

App-10

material misrepresentations.7 We review each de

novo, viewing all facts and inferences in favor of

Appellants, while rejecting conclusory allegations,

speculation, or unsubstantiated assertions. Chaney v.

Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 228-29 (5th Cir.

2010).

First, as to alleged misrepresentations in the

lease and Resident Guidelines—Appellees’ guarantees

to sufficiently maintain the home—Appellees’ later

breach of their duties under the lease does not

demonstrate that they had no intention of honoring

them at the time. See Wells v. Burroughs, 65 S.W.2d

396, 397 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1933, no writ).8

Second, as to alleged misrepresentations on Hunt’s

websites—boasting about housing quality—the

magistrate judge was correct that such statements

were non-actionable puffery. See Prudential Ins. Co. of

Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 163

(Tex. 1995) (holding statements that “building was

7 Appellants also argue the magistrate judge violated the law

of the case doctrine by referencing the Rule 9(b) standard while

discussing the summary judgment motion. But that doctrine is

inapplicable here. See United States v. Palmer, 122 F.3d 215, 220

(5th Cir. 1997). Regardless, the magistrate judge still conducted

the proper summary judgment analysis, analyzing each of the

alleged misstatements.

8 Appellants cite the post-cession case Schindler v. Austwell

Farmers Co-op., 841 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam), but

there the court held that “[f]or a promise of future performance

to be the basis of actionable fraud, it must have been false at the

time it was made.” Id. at 854. As that court noted, although a

failure to perform is “a circumstance to be considered with other

facts to establish intent,” that failure, “standing alone, is no

evidence of the promisor’s intent not to perform when the promise

was made.” Id. (citation omitted).

App-11

‘superb’, ‘super fine’, and ‘one of the finest little

properties in’” the city were non-actionable puffery);

see also Tex. Cooperative Inv. Co. v. Clark, 216 S.W.

220, 221 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1919) (applying precession law distinguishing between “puffing” and false

representations), modified 239 S.W. 198 (Tex. Comm’n

App. 1922). Third, as to pre-lease walkthrough

statements—essentially that the smell in the house

was normal—the magistrate judge was correct that

Appellants failed to identify why these constituted

anything beyond non-actionable statements of

opinion. Accord Wilson, 45 S.W.2d at 574 (“[A]

representation which is expressed and understood as

nothing more than a statement of opinion cannot

constitute fraud and form a basis for recovery.”).9

Fourth, the move-in day statement—described

variously as representing that there were “no

problems” with the house or that a Hunt

representative had “no recollection of prior work

orders”10—fails both because it is paraphrased and

unspecific, see Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d

175, 177 (5th Cir. 1997), and because a statement that

9 See also Clark v. City of Alexandria, 116 F.4th 472, 478 (5th

Cir. 2024) (“To make a showing of a genuine dispute of material

fact, ‘the party opposing summary judgment is required to

identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the

precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.’”

(quoting Diaz v. Kaplan Higher Educ., L.L.C., 820 F.3d 172, 176

(5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added))).

10 Becky testified to the “no problems” comment, whereas

Shane testified to the “no recollection of prior work orders”

comment. As both state that this comment(s) was made on movein day when they inquired with Hunt, it seems this is actually

the same alleged misrepresentation.

App-12

there were “no problems” is a non-actionable

statement of opinion, considering there was no

evidence that there was a live problem known to Hunt

at the time of move-in, see Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646

S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1983) (citing pre-cession law

indicating that for opinion statements to be

actionable, they typically must be based on or

accompanied by false facts). Finally, as to the allegedly

fraudulent repair scheme—whereby Appellees failed

to input work orders and performed deceptive

repairs—Appellees are correct that because

Appellants never saw these alleged misstatements,

they could not serve as the basis for fraud. See Coffield

v. Cox, 162 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

1942, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The law is settled that to

constitute actionable fraud the representations relied

on must be material and must be false at the time they

were made.” (emphasis added)). Appellants’ attempts

to identify a material misrepresentation are

unavailing.11

IV. Attorneys’ Fees

The magistrate judge denied Appellants’ repeated

motions for attorneys’ fees, explaining in a post-trial

order that Appellants had failed to confer, lacked any

legal basis for fees, and requested excessive hours and

11 Appellants also hint at a fraud by omission theory but have

forfeited that argument by failing to substantively brief it both

here and below. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th

Cir. 1993); Shahrashoob v. Tex. A&M Univ., 125 F.4th 641, 649

(5th Cir. 2025).

App-13

rates.12 “[T]his court reviews a denial of attorney’s fees

for abuse of discretion, reviewing factual findings for

clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” N. Cypress

Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. Cigna Healthcare, 952

F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2020). Appellants argue they

properly conferred but merely omitted certification

from their original motion and had a legal basis for

fees under the pre-cession law, Article 2226 of the

Texas Revised Civil Statutes. Appellants have likely

waived their Article 2226 argument by failing to

certify under the local rules. See Zimmerman v. City

of Austin, 969 F.3d 564, 570 (5th Cir. 2020).

Regardless, Article 2226 only allows for recovery of

attorneys’ fees against a “person” or “corporation.”

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2226 (1949). But Appellees are

all limited liability companies, barring recovery.

There was no abuse of discretion.

V. Exclusion of Evidence

Appellants challenge the exclusion at trial of

three categories of evidence: conditions of other

homes; the pre-lease condition of their home; and the

post-lease condition of their home. “The trial judge’s

assessment of relative probative value of evidence and

unfair prejudice is generally accorded great deference

because of his or her first-hand exposure to evidence

and familiarity with the course of the trial

proceedings.” Int’l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281,

300 (5th Cir. 2005). Therefore, we review for abuse of

discretion and will only reverse upon a showing of

12 The magistrate judge also initially held that Appellants’

motion was untimely, but later noted he had likely miscalculated

the deadline.

App-14

substantial prejudice. Huynh v. Walmart Inc., 30

F.4th 448, 458 (5th Cir. 2022).

The magistrate judge did not abuse its discretion

in excluding evidence of other servicemembers’ homes

because, although Appellants argued the evidence was

indicative of Appellees’ habit, they did not meet the

bar for admission of such evidence under Federal Rule

of Evidence 406. See Mobil Expl. & Producing U.S.,

Inc. v. Cajun Constr. Servs., Inc., 45 F.3d 96, 100 (5th

Cir. 1995) (holding that to qualify as habit evidence

admissible as a routine business practice, “the

plaintiff must show regularity over substantially all

occasions or with substantially all other parties with

whom the defendant has had similar business

transactions”); accord Federico v. Lincoln Mil. Hous.

LLC, No. 2:12-CV-596, 2015 WL 12806532, at *4 (E.D.

Va. Nov. 13, 2015). Nor did the magistrate judge abuse

its discretion in excluding evidence of the pre-lease

condition of Appellants’ home because Appellants

articulated no theory on how the exclusion prejudiced

them; the only case cited by Appellants found similar

evidence “irrelevant.” Federico, 2015 WL 12806532, at

*2. Lastly, the magistrate judge did not abuse its

discretion in excluding evidence of post-lease

conditions, because “the general rule [is] that evidence

of subsequent corrective measures is not admissible.”

Bailey v. Kawasaki-Kisen, K.K., 455 F.2d 392, 395 (5th

Cir. 1972).13

13 Appellants’ argument that they would merely use this for

impeachment is undermined by their argument it “would have

assisted the jury in accurately understanding the true condition

of the home during the Appellants’ tenancy.” This argument

exposes the danger that the evidence presented a danger of unfair

App-15

VI. Diminution of Rental Value Damages

On cross-appeal, AETC Housing asserts multiple

reasons why the diminution of rental value damages

must be reversed. AETC Housing first argues that

pre-cession law barred diminution of rental value

claims. But the very case it cites for this proposition

recognized such a claim. See Mitchell v. Weiss, 26

S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1930, no writ).

Next AETC Housing argues that Appellants’ exclusive

remedy under the lease was to surrender possession.

But an exclusive remedy provision must be explicit

and clear. See, e.g., Stark v. George, 252 S.W. 1053,

1056 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, judgm’t adopted); see

also Nunn v. Brillhart, 242 S.W. 459, 461 (Tex.

Comm’n App. 1922, judgm’t adopted). Here, there was

no such clear intent to mandate surrender as an

exclusive remedy.

Finally, AETC Housing argues that after the

initial lease expired and went month-to-month,

Appellants’ continued renewal of the lease despite

knowledge of the conditions waived a right to any

recovery for that period. AETC Housing cites Tony v.

McClelland, 283 S.W. 679 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

1926, writ dism’d w.o.j.). In Tony, the court held that

a commercial landlord could not cancel a lease based

on the lessee’s violation of a term of the lease when the

landlord had continually accepted rent despite earlier

knowledge of that violation. Id. at 681. But as the Tony

court noted, “[t]he waiver of a known contract right

will not be implied contrary to the intention of a party,

prejudice that substantially outweighed its probative value. Fed.

R. Evid. 403.

App-16

except when required to prevent the imposition of a

fraud, or inequitable consequences to the adverse

party.” Id. AETC Housing points to no basis to imply

waiver of a known contract right under Tony. Cf. id.

(“[T]he receipt of rent is not a waiver of a continuing

breach of covenant, such as . . . a covenant to repair.”

(quoting 35 Corpus Juris 1082 (1924)). The magistrate

judge did not err in finding this claim was not barred

by precession law, an exclusive remedy clause, or

waiver.

VII. Sufficiency of Evidence

At trial, the jury awarded Appellants $60,000 in

personal property damages and $31,654 for

diminution in value of the lease. AETC Housing

challenges the denial of its motion for judgment as a

matter of law, arguing these awards lack evidentiary

support both in terms of causation and valuation. The

law governing what damages are recoverable is

substantive, and therefore pre-cession state law

“governs what damages are available for a given claim

and the manner in which those damages must be

proved,” while the “sufficiency of the evidence

supporting a damages award . . . is a matter of federal

procedure.”14 Homoki v. Conversion Servs., Inc., 717

14 Stated differently, the distinction is that we “apply federal

standards of review to assess ‘the sufficiency or insufficiency of

the evidence in relation to the verdict,’ but in doing so we refer to

state law for ‘the kind of evidence that must be produced to

support a verdict.’” Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

361 F.3d 875, 884 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ayres v. Sears, Roebuck

& Co., 789 F.2d 1173, 1175 (5th Cir.1986)). So, whether damages

require direct proof or allow circumstantial evidence, or require

expert testimony or allow anecdotal evidence, is determined here

App-17

F.3d 388, 398 (5th Cir. 2013); accord Lawler v. Miratek

Corp., No. EP-09-CV-252-KC, 2010 WL 2838359, at *3

(W.D. Tex. July 16, 2010).

“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a

motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the

same standard as the district court.” Heck v. Triche,

775 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Foradori v.

Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2008)). “A motion

for judgment as a matter of law in a case tried by a

jury, however, ‘is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of

the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.’” Id.

(quoting Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir.

1995)). “Although our review is de novo, we recognize

that our standard of review with respect to a jury

verdict is especially deferential.” Id. at 273 (quoting

Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229,

235 (5th Cir. 2001)). And “we draw all reasonable

inferences and resolve all credibility determinations

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,”

and therefore will reverse “only if the evidence points

so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of the

nonmoving party that no reasonable jury could return

a contrary verdict.” Id. (quoting Foradori, 523 F.3d at

485 & n.8).

As to personal property damages, AETC Housing

first argues that Appellants cannot prove causation

because they disposed of property even though it was

“cleared

for

shipment

and

found

without

contamination.” Under pre-cession law, contract

damages are recoverable if they “arise naturally from

by pre-cession state law. See id. But the standard of review,

discussed infra, is federal. Id.

App-18

the breach itself,” or could be reasonably contemplated

to flow from a breach. Humble Oil & Refin. Co. v.

Wood, 292 S.W. 200, 201 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927,

judgm’t adopted). Here, it was reasonably foreseeable

that disposal of property would flow from a breach of

AETC Housing’s duty to diligently repair. Further, it

was not unreasonable for a jury to conclude that

Appellants felt compelled to dispose of property,

despite AETC Housing’s assurances it was mold free,

given the evidence of insufficient remediation

efforts.15

AETC Housing next argues that Appellants failed

to particularly value the damaged personal items and

offered only their own conclusory testimony. ECF 93,

84. Appellants respond with several pieces of evidence

that were before the jury.16 Pre-cession state law on

the manner in which a party must prove personal

property damages is admittedly inconsistent on both

the level of itemization needed, compare Hou., E. &

W.T. Ry. Co. v. Seale, 67 S.W. 437, 438 (Tex. App.—

Galveston 1902, no writ), with Halsell v. Scurr, 297

S.W. 524, 530 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1927, writ

15 For example, Shane testified that even after moving they

“saw mold on stuff,” while Becky testified about compromised

containment measures. Appellants further submitted evidence of

complaints about the restoration company used, photos of fallen

containment measures, and testimony on cross-contamination

between “clean” rooms.

16 For the personal property, Appellants offered an email they

had previously sent to Appellees itemizing several dozen items

and providing their replacement cost totaling $9,157.48 + tax, as

well as Becky’s testimony at trial that the value of her damaged

LuLaRoe inventory was $38,000-$39,000 and that of her family’s

personal clothes was $8,000.

App-19

dism’d w.o.j.), and the evidentiary weight afforded to

an owner’s valuation, compare Cluck v. Hou. & T.C.R.

Co., 79 S.W. 80, 81 (Tex. App.—Austin 1904, no writ),

with Pecos & N.T. Ry. Co. v. Grundy, 171 S.W. 318,

318-19 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1914, no writ). And

though AETC Housing’s argument that Appellants

should have testified about the cost, manner of use,

and general condition of their items has some support,

see Black v. Nabarrette, 281 S.W. 1087, 1088 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1926, writ dism’d w.o.j.), other authority

suggests such testimony was unnecessary, see

Grundy, 171 S.W. at 319.

As to the rental diminution, AETC Housing

argues the jury heard no evidence about the amount,

length, or extent of the diminution. But Appellants

counter that that they offered a ledger documenting

their lease payments, provided the jury examples of

the problems with the home, and argue that they were

well-positioned to comment on the conditions and

resulting diminution. The precedent here is similarly

unilluminating.17 While AETC Housing is correct that

17 AETC Housing principally relies on Sanger v. Smith, 135

S.W. 189 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1911, writ ref’d). In Sanger, a jury

had awarded damages for diminution in rental value where a

lessor had failed to repair a leaking roof, id. at 190, but the

appellate court reversed because the lessee had “used the leased

building, notwithstanding the leaky roof . . . , to its full capacity,

transacting therein the business he contemplated transacting

when he leased it,” id. at 193. But in Sanger, the lease was for a

commercial building and the lessee received the benefit of the

bargain by using the building “with practically the same

profitable result as would have been realized had the covenant to

repair been strictly kept.” Id. In contrast, here even though

Appellants continued to use the building, they submitted

App-20

Appellants did not show any sort of formula or

calculations for diminution damages, they sought

100% of their rent paid and put on evidence showing

why they believed they received none of the benefit of

the bargain—and the jury largely agreed by awarding

over 75% of the requested diminution damages.

We echo the magistrate judge in concluding that

we are “not inclined to second-guess the jury’s

determination” despite our “misgivings about the

damages evidence at trial.” Given the high standard

to overturn a jury’s damages findings and the

inconsistent pre-cession law on how those damages

must be proved, AETC Housing has not demonstrated

that “the evidence points so strongly and so

overwhelmingly” in its favor that “no reasonable jury”

could have found Appellants suffered these damages.

See Heck, 775 F.3d at 273 (citation omitted).18

VIII.

Jury Instructions

AETC Housing argues that under pre-cession law,

Appellants had to obtain findings that they satisfied

all their contractual obligations to pursue their breach

of contract claim, and that because they did not

request and secure a jury charge requesting the same,

they waived recovery. Because AETC Housing

preserved its challenge to the jury instructions by

objecting at trial, we review that challenge for an

substantial evidence that they did not receive the same benefit of

the bargain—a safe, well-maintained house.

18 See also City Hotel Co. v. Aumont Hotel Co., 107 S.W.2d 1094,

1095 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1937, no writ) (upholding $700

damages award value based on single witness’s testimony that

the difference in market value with versus without repairs “was

anywhere from $1,000 to $2,000”).

App-21

abuse of discretion. In re 3 Star Props., L.L.C., 6 F.4th

595, 609 (5th Cir. 2021). Initially, a “‘challenger must

demonstrate that the charge as a whole creates

substantial and ineradicable doubt whether’ the

instructions ‘properly guided’ the jury ‘in its

deliberations.’” Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 922 F.3d 285,

291-92 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pelt v. U.S. Bank Tr.

Nat. Ass’n, 359 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Under pre-cession law, “to recover for the breach

of a written contract evidencing concurrent and

mutual obligations, that plaintiff must aver

compliance on his part,” and provide evidence of that

compliance. Jessen v. Le Van, 161 S.W.2d 585, 586

(Tex. App.—El Paso 1942, no writ). Here, the second

jury question noted that AETC Housing’s duty to

maintain was “subject to the covenants and duties

undertaken by Resident(s),” which suggests the jury

found Appellants satisfied all relevant covenants and

duties under the contract. Therefore, AETC Housing

has not created “substantial and ineradicable doubt”

that the questions failed to guide the jury. Puga, 922

F.3d at 291 (citation omitted). There was no abuse of

discretion.

IX. Conclusion

Because no party has shown reversible error, we

AFFIRM the judgment of the magistrate judge.

App-22

Appendix B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

________________

No. 19-cv-01280

________________

SHANE VINALES, et al.

Plaintiffs,

AETC II PRIVATIZED HOUSING, L.L.C., AETC II

PROPERTY MANAGERS, L.L.C.; HUNT ELP, LTD.,

Defendants.

________________

Filed: Jan. 4, 2023

________________

ORDER

________________

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary

Judgment Against Vinales Plaintiffs, Dkt. No. 260,

and the Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Declarations and

Summary Judgment Exhibit, Dkt. No. 332, both filed

by Defendants. The motions have been fully briefed,

and the Court held a motions hearing on November

17, 2022, attended by all parties.

For the reasons stated below, the Motion for

Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 260, is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court is

persuaded by Defendants’ arguments on the federalenclave doctrine and fraudulent misrepresentation,

App-23

and therefore partially grants summary judgment

accordingly. The Motion to Strike, Dkt. No. 332, is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as

to the Vinales Plaintiffs for the purposes of summary

judgment and without prejudice. The Court

STRIKES the DOJ press release, Dkt. No. 319-12.

In all other respects, the motions are DENIED

without prejudice to reraising at trial.

Background

In a deed of cession dated October 4, 1951, the

State of Texas officially ceded to the United States

“exclusive jurisdiction” over the land that would

become Randolph Air Force Base. Dkt. No. 160-1 at 8,

14. Texas expressly retained for itself “concurrent

jurisdiction . . . so far, that all process, civil and

criminal, . . . may be executed by the proper officers of

the State of Texas” within the ceded land. Dkt.

No. 160-1 at 14.

In 2007, the Air Force entered into a 50-year

ground lease with Defendant AETC II Privatized

Housing, LLC, to operate and maintain the on-base

housing residences at Randolph. See Dkt. No. 305. The

ground lease instructs the lessee to “comply with all

Applicable Laws,” including local sanitation and

building codes, while noting “that the United States

presently exercises exclusive federal jurisdiction over

the Leased Premises.” Dkt. No. 305 at 26-27. The

Master Development and Management Agreement

also defines the term “Applicable Law” as including

“all federal, state and local laws.” Dkt. No. 305-2 at 6.

App-24

Plaintiffs Shane and Becky Vinales requested onbase housing at Randolph in October 2017.1 On their

first walk-through of the house they would ultimately

lease, Plaintiffs say they noticed a “musty smell” and

dead cockroaches on the floor. The leasing agent told

Plaintiffs that the houses were “old” and smelled like

“grandma’s house.” On October 16, 2017, Plaintiff

Shane Vinales signed a lease for military housing at

Randolph with Defendant AETC II Privatized

Housing, LLC. See Dkt. No. 260-2. The lease noted

that any landlord-tenant disputes must be resolved “in

accordance with the local applicable laws.” Dkt.

No. 260-2 at 8. The Resident Guidelines incorporated

into the lease also state that the landlord will “comply

with all applicable building and housing code

requirements governing residential rental property in

the State of Texas.” Dkt. No. 260-3 at 6.

Plaintiffs allege that upon moving into the house,

a previous tenant informed them of problems with the

house. Plaintiffs explain that they followed up with

the leasing office but were told that there were “no

problems” with the house. Shortly thereafter,

according to Plaintiffs, they noticed mold growing on

several items in the house and indicated as much on

their move-in checklist. Plaintiffs allege a series of

requests for routine maintenance due to mold or other

housing problems throughout their time at Randolph.

And according to Plaintiffs, Defendants would respond

to those calls, conduct maintenance, and then inform

Plaintiffs that the problem had been fixed, only for

1 The Court draws upon the undisputed facts stated in the

parties’ briefing and the attached exhibits, including Plaintiffs’

deposition testimony. See Dkt. Nos. 260, 319.

App-25

Plaintiffs to encounter the same issues later. In early

2019, Plaintiffs agreed to a remediation project for the

house and were temporarily relocated, after which

Plaintiffs received transfer orders to another base.

During and after the move-out process, Plaintiffs

noticed mold on personal items and had to discard

them. Plaintiffs also paid monthly rent to Defendants

while living at Randolph in the form of BAH

payments.

On October 29, 2019, Plaintiffs initiated this

lawsuit, alleging breach of contract, negligence, fraud,

and other state-law causes of action in connection with

their housing at Randolph.

Standard of Review

On a motion for summary judgment, the moving

party bears the initial burden of showing both the lack

of any genuine dispute of material fact and that it “is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986); Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 484

(5th Cir. 2014). Where the moving party bears the

ultimate burden of proof at trial, such as a defendant

seeking summary judgment on an affirmative defense,

then “he must establish beyond peradventure all of the

essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant

judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780

F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). But where the moving

party does not bear the burden of proof, summary

judgment may be obtained “simply by disproving the

existence of any essential element of the opposing

party’s claim.” Id. Once the moving party has met this

initial burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forth with “specific facts

App-26

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; accord Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). While courts

resolve any factual disputes in favor of the non-moving

party, the party opposing summary judgment must

come forth with more than “conclusory allegations,” as

“only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence” will not suffice. Little, 37

F.3d at 1075. Even where an affidavit or declaration

“conflicts to some degree with an earlier statement,”

courts cannot disregard the proffered summary

judgment evidence but “must consider all the

evidence.” Winzer v. Kaufman Cnty., 916 F.3d 464, 472

(5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).

Analysis

A. Many of Plaintiffs’ Claims are Barred

Due to the Federal-Enclave Doctrine.

When the federal government acquires exclusive

jurisdiction over a tract of state land, thereby

transferring it into a “federal enclave,” the general

rule is that “local law not inconsistent with federal

policy remain[s] in force until altered by national

legislation.” Pac. Coast Dairy v. Dep’t of Agric. of Cal.,

318 U.S. 285, 293 (1943). But state laws enacted after

acquisition have no effect within the federal enclave,

even if application of those laws would not conflict

with federal laws or regulations. See Paul v. United

States, 371 U.S. 245, 269 (1963) (permitting

nonconflicting state price controls in federal enclaves

only where “the basic state law authorizing such

control has been in effect since the times of these

various acquisitions”). A state’s reservation of

“concurrent jurisdiction for service of civil and

criminal process” does not affect this analysis. Lord v.

App-27

Loc. Union No. 2088, 646 F.2d 1057, 1060 & n.6 (5th

Cir. 1981).

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Randolph is a

federal enclave. In any event, Randolph became a

federal enclave when Texas ceded exclusive

jurisdiction over the land to the United States in 1952.

See Dkt. No. 160-1 (deed of cession); United States v.

Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 286 (1958) (referring to

Randolph as “a federal enclave in Texas”). Plaintiffs

even

plead

“federal

enclave

subject-matter

jurisdiction” in their Amended Complaint and state

that all “pertinent events” occurred within a federal

enclave. See Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 8-11. Accordingly, federal

law applies within Randolph, in addition to any nonconflicting Texas state law in effect at the time of

cession.

Because Defendants have met their initial burden

on the federal-enclave doctrine, the burden rests with

Plaintiffs to identify some caveat that would allow any

otherwise-barred claims to proceed. Plaintiffs do not

take issue with the list of claims and damages that

Defendants assert were unavailable in 1952 and thus

must be dismissed if the Court agree that the federalenclave doctrine applies. Instead, Plaintiffs raise

several arguments urging that some of their claims

should be allowed to proceed despite the fact that

Randolph is a federal enclave. See Dkt. No. 319 at 413.

Potentially the most persuasive argument

Plaintiffs raise urges that Congress authorized the

application of state law to any “civil action brought to

recover on account of an injury” occurring within a

federal enclave. 28 U.S.C. § 5001(b) (titled “Personal

App-28

injury”). Most district courts faced with this issue have

treated the term “injury” in § 5001(b) as meaning only

physical injuries. See, e.g., Kelly v. Lockheed Martin

Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.P.R. 1998)

(reviewing legislative history). A few unreported

district court decisions have extended this statute to

include “purely emotional injuries.” See, e.g., Andersen

v. Lewis McChord Communities LLC, No. 3:21-CV05391-DGE, 2022 WL 874774, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar.

24, 2022) (relying on modern definitions). No court, it

appears, has ruled that § 5001(b) encompasses

economic injuries. See id. at *4-5.

Plaintiffs do not bring any claims to recover for

“purely emotional injury.” See id. at *4 (negligent

infliction of emotional distress); Kasperzyk v. Shetler

Sec. Servs., Inc., No. C-13-3383 EMC, 2014 WL 31434,

at *13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2014) (intentional infliction of

emotional distress). The only claim Plaintiffs

reference in conjunction with this argument is their

Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) claim.

See Dkt. No. 319 at 10-11 & n.6. But the DTPA is not

a cause of action “to recover on account of an injury”

under 28 U.S.C. § 5001(b).2 Indeed, the DTPA’s main

purpose is “to protect consumers by encouraging them

to bring consumer complaints.” PPG Indus., Inc. v.

JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146

S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.44(a)). The DTPA’s

primary focus is redressing economic injuries—

damages for mental anguish are only available in

2 The Court additionally notes that Plaintiffs have already

stipulated to the dismissal of all claims to recover damages for

physical injury or illness. See Dkt. No. 220.

App-29

limited circumstances. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code

§ 17.49(e) (“Except as specifically provided . . . ,

nothing in this subchapter shall apply to a cause of

action for bodily injury or death or for the infliction of

mental anguish.”); id. § 17.50(b)(1) (permitting

“damages for mental anguish” only for knowing

violations, with treble damages available for

intentional conduct); cf. Roberts v. Zev Techs., Inc., No.

1:15-CV-309 RP, 2015 WL 7454688, at *5 (W.D. Tex.

Nov. 23, 2015) (“Texas appellate courts have

repeatedly admonished that the DTPA does not

provide relief for personal injury claims.”). Plaintiffs

cite no cases where a court has allowed claims based

on state consumer-protection law to proceed under

§ 5001(b). This Court is aware of none. Plaintiffs

provide no persuasive rationale for this Court to break

new ground here.

Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments for exceptions to

the federal-enclave doctrine are also unpersuasive.

See Dkt. No. 319 at 4-13. The Court adopts the

arguments in Defendants’ Reply that take issue with,

and dispose of, these various attempts to sidestep the

doctrine. See Dkt. No. 330 at 1-5. To briefly summarize

in general terms: there is no applicable choice-of-law

clause here; the caveat for service of process in the

cession deed is limited to just that; there is no legal

distinction between “adopting” and “recognizing”

common-law causes of action; and policy arguments

are best raised before Congress. And to the extent

Plaintiffs invoke a purported factual dispute about

whether Defendants’ policy decisions occurred

(geographically) outside of any federal enclave, the

only supporting evidence offered is the signature page

of the Declaration of Chris Radliff. See Dkt. No. 262-1

App-30

at 19. The declarant’s business address and where he

signed his declaration in June 2022 are immaterial to

where Plaintiffs’ injuries occurred from 2017 to 2019.

Plaintiffs cannot conjure a genuine factual dispute

from such speculation.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the federalenclave doctrine applies, and that Plaintiffs’ claims

are governed by federal law and non-conflicting, precession Texas law. As a result, any statutory or

common-law claims premised on causes of action

adopted after 1952 are unavailable, as are any forms

of damages or relief not recognized at the time. As

Defendants have explained, this requires dismissal of

Plaintiffs’ statutory claims (Counts 1, 2, 5, and 10),

common-law claims for implied warranty (Count 2)

and negligent misrepresentation (Count 4), damages

for personal injury under the lease (Count 3), damages

for mental distress, and attorney’s fees.3

The Court must pause at this juncture to observe

a fundamental tension between the federal-enclave

doctrine and Defendants’ structuring of their

remaining

summary

judgment

arguments:

Defendants correctly assert that the federal-enclave

doctrine limits the available causes of action to Texas

substantive law in effect at the time of cession and yet

the remainder of Defendants’ briefing relies

exclusively on post-cession Texas case law.

Defendants thus have not met their initial burden of

Plaintiffs note that if the federal-enclave doctrine applies,

then Texas’s current statutory cap on punitive damages is

inapplicable. See Dkt. No. 319 at 13. The Court does not reach

this issue but will consider such arguments if and when the issue

is squarely presented.

App-31

establishing entitlement to summary judgment under

the law in effect in 1952.4 Nevertheless, as explained

below, the Court will consider Defendants’ arguments

on Plaintiffs’ fraud claims, which the parties

substantially narrowed at oral argument and

appeared to agree upon as to the basic elements.

B. Plaintiffs

Not

Identify

Any

Actionable Fraudulent Statements.

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

fraud claims for failure to satisfy several of the basic

elements. See Dkt. No. 260 at 11-15, 27. Because the

Court has already determined that Plaintiffs’ DTPA,

negligent misrepresentation, and statutory fraud

claims must be dismissed under the federal-enclave

doctrine, the only fraud claim remaining is common4 In particular, the parties have not addressed how the federal-

enclave doctrine affects certain defenses, such as the economic

loss rule, and whether subsequent developments in other areas of

federal common law apply within federal enclaves to modify precession state law. The parties have also not sufficiently addressed

whether damage to personal property should be treated any

differently from purely economic losses, or how the existence of a

lease agreement might affect the analysis for law in effect in

1952. The Court would be receptive to further briefing and

argument on these questions.

On the other hand, regardless of what the applicable

limitations period was in 1952 for each of Plaintiffs’ claims, the

Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ arguments on the statute

of limitations. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ view that discreet

harms and causes of action can accrue at different times,

including whenever rent is paid, regardless of when Plaintiffs

were first aware of any “musty smell.” At most, the two-year

limitations period, assuming that is what applies, would bar

recovery for discreet claims occurring only within the first two

weeks of Plaintiffs’ occupancy.

App-32

law fraud in Count 6. See Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 180-83.

Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs failed to plead

fraud with particularity as required under Civil Rule

9(b) are well-taken.5 In response, Plaintiffs attach the

Declaration of Shane Vinales. See Dkt. No. 319-8.

Citing only the averments contained therein,

Plaintiffs insist that “a fact issue exists” as to each

element of fraud. Dkt. No. 319 at 28-29. Plaintiffs

additionally assert fraudulent inducement as a

defense to avoid the lease contract. See Dkt. No. 319

at 16-17 & n.12. At oral argument, the Court further

pressed the parties to clarify which allegedly

fraudulent statements Plaintiffs believe constitute

actionable claims (or defenses) in fraud. Plaintiffs

identified two: “grandma’s house” and “no problems.”6

5 Indeed, the Amended Complaint fails to identify any allegedly

false statements pertaining to the Vinales Plaintiffs’ housing

issues. See Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 88-102. “At a minimum, Rule 9(b)

requires allegations of the particulars of ‘time, place, and

contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the

person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained

thereby.’” Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134,

1139 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1297, at 590 (1990)). Plaintiffs insist

that Rule 9(b) is a “moot point” given the current summary

judgment posture. Dkt. No. 319 at 28. The Court disagrees. If

anything, Rule 9(b) supplies a more lenient standard by which

pleadings are judged at the motion-to-dismiss stage. If Plaintiffs

cannot satisfy Rule 9(b) at this late stage, where their claims

have benefitted from significant discovery, then the fraud claims

must be dismissed.

6 While Plaintiffs insist that statements on Defendants’

websites also contained misrepresentations, counsel effectively

conceded at the hearing that such language was “puffery.”

Moreover, as Defendants point out, the Vinales Plaintiffs stated

App-33

As explained below, the Court concludes that neither

statement is actionable in fraud.

Claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and

fraudulent inducement under the common law involve

similar elements, which have remained largely

unchanged throughout statehood. To state a claim for

fraud, a plaintiff must show:

(1) That a material representation was made;

(2) that it was false; (3) that, when the

speaker made it, he knew it was false or made

it recklessly without any knowledge of its

truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that he

made it with the intention that it should be

acted upon by the party; (5) that the party

acted in reliance upon it; and (6) that he

thereby suffered injury.

Wilson v. Jones, 45 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Comm’n

App. 1932); accord Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d

927, 930 (Tex. 1983). The same elements must be

established to avoid a contract on the grounds of

fraudulent inducement, with an additional showing of

“a promise of future performance made with no

intention of performing at the time it was made.”

Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 153

(Tex. 2015); accord Turner v. Biscoe, 171 S.W.2d 118,

119 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1943). It is a “well-settled rule”

that “a statement of opinion cannot constitute fraud

and form a basis for recovery.” Wilson, 45 S.W.2d at

574; accord Transp. Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d

269, 276 (Tex. 1995). Thus, whether applying present

under oath that they never looked at any websites or advertising

before signing the lease. See Dkt. No. 332-1 at 56-57.

App-34

common law or that in effect at the time of cession,

Plaintiffs must introduce some evidence to show a

“material representation,” as opposed to mere opinion,

as well as falsity and reliance, to survive summary

judgment. The first allegedly fraudulent statement is

outlined in the Declaration of Shane Vinales:

When we were offered a house at Randolph

AFB, we did have the ability to walk through

the house. However, it was not a true

inspection, but simply a walk through. We

immediately noticed a “musky” smell when

we entered the home and when we inquired

about it, we were told by a Hunt

representative that “these homes are old, and

this is what grandma’s house smells like”. We

never had an opportunity to delve deep into

anything before we signed a lease, let alone

hire an inspector with knowledge and

training to inspect the house before we signed

a lease. Further, we were pressured to sign

the lease promptly, as Hunt’s representatives

told us that there was a long list to get a

house and if we did not take the house that

was available, we may not get another house.

Dkt. No. 319-8 ¶ 6. Plaintiffs also assert that

Defendants’ leasing agent, Terri Hefford, explained

that “the musty ‘old house’ was normal.” Id. ¶ 7. Becky

Vinales likewise described this exchange during the

first walk-through of the house at Randolph:

Q. Okay. You said you do remember a

conversation in the walk-through? What do

you remember?

App-35

A. Yes. So, both homes were actually dirty.

The one that we ended up with, we asked

them to re-clean it because there were

cockroaches on the—like, dead cockroaches

on the floor. And both buildings smelled

musty. And I actually brought it up to her, to

Terri, and her response was so vague. It was

just like, “Oh, it smells like grandma’s—

grandma’s house.” Like, an old smell.

...

Q. And—and your walk-through of the unit

that you eventually lived in, you didn’t see

any kind of mold, moisture stains, leaks,

standing water? None of that?

A. I didn’t see any standing water or any of

that, no. Just the cockroaches and musty

smell.

Dkt. No. 286-1 at 5; Deposition of Becky Vinales at

48:2-24 (Oct. 12, 2021).

The Court is unconvinced that there is any

actionable misrepresentation here. The only

representations are: (1) the house is “old”; (2) the

house smells like “grandma’s house”; and (3) the house

is “normal.” Plaintiffs do not explain sufficiently how

any of these representations are false. Defendants

concede that the homes at Randolph are indeed “old.”

Plaintiffs do not assert that “grandma’s house” smells

the way it does because it isn’t moldy. As for what

“normal” means, this is obviously a statement of

opinion and too vague to form any basis for fraud, as

is the “grandma’s house” comment. And although

Plaintiffs contend that they felt “pressured to sign the

lease promptly” due to a long waiting list for on-base

App-36

housing, Plaintiffs do not allege any falsity in the

waiting-list representation.7

The second alleged misrepresentation—“no

problems”—is first identified by Defendants in their

Motion; Plaintiffs do not actually rely on the “no

problems” statement in their Response. This allegedly

false statement arose during the following deposition

exchange:

Q. And how did you know Ms. Dyer?

A. So, I’ve never met her. I met her husband,

actually the day the movers were coming into

the house. He showed up in his car

and . . . came in like, “Hey, I was a previous

tenant and we had some problems with this

house,” and walked us in. And that was

interesting.

So, I went to Housing after that and told them

that he came by and inquired like, are there

problems with this home, like this previous

tenant came and told us that they had

problems. And I remember this day clear. It

was Audra and it was the brunette that works

up front, I cannot remember her name, but

they were looking at the computer. They were

7 Moreover, this description appears to be contradicted by the

deposition testimony, which explains that it was Fort Sam

Houston that had a “six-month wait” for housing, whereas at

Randolph “there was availability immediately,” and that

Plaintiffs chose on-base housing because they “like[d] the

military feel of being on base, the security,” and therefore “chose

not to” even consider looking at “civilian housing.” Dkt. No. 2861 at 2; Becky Vinales Depo. at 44:9-25 (Oct. 12, 2021).

App-37

like, no, there’s no problems. Like, nothing

was ever previously wrong with this home.

Q. Okay. So, when you said, “the day the

movers arrived,” you’re talking about the day

the movers arrived to move y’all into the

home, not move you out?

A. Right.

Q. Okay.

A. So, I had no reason to not trust what the

Hunt employee said. I mean, they seemed

really friendly when we moved in.

Q. Okay.

A. So I took their word. I went, I asked, they

said everything was fine, and that was that.

Dkt. No. 286-1 at 85-86; Deposition of Becky Vinales

at 231:19-232:21 (Oct. 12, 2021).

There are several shortcomings with this

argument. First, there is no actual representation

identified here, just Plaintiffs’ generic description of a

conversation as conveying the sense that there were

“no problems” with the house. The Court cannot

distinguish between what was said, which might be

actionable, as opposed to Plaintiffs’ subjective belief,

which is not. Second, such a vague representation as

“no problems,” without context, is indistinguishable

from an expression of opinion. Third, and perhaps

most importantly, there is no indication that Plaintiffs

relied on this representation. Indeed, this

conversation purportedly occurred “the day the

movers were coming,” or in other words after Plaintiffs

signed the lease. Even if this did constitute a false

App-38

statement, Plaintiffs cannot argue fraudulent

inducement based on after-the-fact representations.

The Court also observes that dismissal of

Plaintiffs’ fraud claims may implicate some of the

other claims seeking equitable relief. Defendants

assert that the existence of a valid lease agreement

bars any claims for unjust enrichment or money had

and received. Plaintiffs do not disagree but insist they

can properly plead these equitable doctrines in the

alternative because “the lease was fraudulently

induced.” Dkt. No. 319 at 30. Indeed, the case

Plaintiffs cite in response explicitly states that “unjust

enrichment is unavailable when a valid, express

contract governing the subject-matter of the dispute

exists.” Gordon v. Sig Sauer, Inc., No. CV H-19-585,

2019 WL 4572799, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2019)

(quoting Eun Bok Lee v. Ho Chang Lee, 411 S.W.3d 95,

112 (Tex. App. 2013)). While the Court agrees that

Plaintiffs are generally permitted to plead in the

alternative, Plaintiffs offer no rationale why their

unjust enrichment claim, premised solely on their

payment of BAH for housing at Randolph, see Dkt.

No. 9 ¶ 184, can proceed independent of their

fraudulent-inducement defense to the lease

agreement. The Court thus concludes that Counts 6

(fraud) and 7 (unjust enrichment/money had and

received) must both be dismissed.

C. The Motion to Strike Is Granted in Part.

Defendants move to strike a DOJ press release

announcing a settlement against different entities in

a different military base for unrelated fraud

allegations, which is attached to Plaintiffs’ Response

as Exhibit L. See Dkt. No. 319-12. Defendants seek to

App-39

exclude that evidence on grounds of relevance,

hearsay, and settlement offer. See Dkt. No. 332 at 7-8;

Fed. R. Evid. 402, 408, 801. The Court agrees that the

press release is simply not relevant. The press release

describes a recent settlement reached between the

DOJ and Hunt Companies, Inc., for allegedly

submitting false information to the Air Force

regarding housing operations at the Dover Air Force

Base in Connecticut. Plaintiffs argue that the press

release is admissible to establish a “pattern and

practice” of fraud. See Dkt. No. 333 at 5-6. But the

Hunt entity in the release is not a party to this case;

nor do Plaintiffs allege in this case that Defendants

made any fraudulent representations to the

government. Moreover, because the announced

settlement was without admission of fault, the Court

struggles to see how the press release helps to

establish any facts related to Plaintiffs’ (nowdismissed) claims of fraud here. To the extent

Plaintiffs attempt to conflate different Hunt entities,

the evidence would be confusing, misleading, and

unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.

Defendants also ask the Court to strike the

declarations attached to Plaintiffs’ responses to each

of the eight plaintiff-specific summary judgment

motions filed by Defendants. As it pertains to the

Vinales Plaintiffs, Defendants attack the Declaration

of Shane Vinales, Dkt. No. 319-8, on grounds of

personal knowledge, hearsay, and contradiction with

prior testimony. See Dkt. No. 332-1 at 50-61.

Defendants fault Plaintiffs for utilizing “template,

cookie-cutter Declarations from one Plaintiff in each

family” with minor adjustments. Dkt. No. 332 at 1.

But Defendants identify no authority for such broad

App-40

relief and cite no cases where other courts struck an

entire declaration for similar deficiencies.8 Even

accepting arguendo Defendants’ objections, the Court

is disinclined to strike entire declarations based on

evidentiary concerns as to individual statements or

even in the aggregate. Indeed, it appears that the

proper remedy in such a situation where a declaration

fails to point to admissible evidence or evidence

capable of being presented in admissible form is

simply to grant summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e). The Court—without having to strike every

declaration as Defendants request—is fully capable of

8 Defendants direct the Court to the following passage from

Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455 (5th Cir. 1998),

in support of their requested relief:

Needless to say, unsubstantiated assertions are not

competent summary judgment evidence. The party

opposing summary judgment is required to identify

specific evidence in the record and to articulate the

precise manner in which that evidence supports his or

her claim. Rule 56 does not impose upon the district

court a duty to sift through the record in search of

evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary

judgment.

Id. at 458 (citations and quotations omitted). But Ragas did not

involve striking declarations. It involved a grant of summary

judgment for failure to identify sufficient evidence to withstand

summary judgment. See id. In other words, per Ragas, the proper

remedy where the non-moving party only cites a declaration full

of conclusory or vague statements is granting summary

judgment—there is no need to strike the declarations to reach

that result. See also Hinds v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 188 F.

Supp. 2d 664, 676 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (affording no weight to

tendered affidavit full of speculation and conjecture as opposed

to striking affidavit entirely).

App-41

determining which statements are not afforded any

weight on summary judgment.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED

that the Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 260,

is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

In particular, the Court GRANTS summary judgment

on the federal-enclave doctrine, as well as Defendants’

arguments

pertaining

fraudulent

misrepresentation.

Accordingly,

the

Court

DISMISSES Counts 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 10, as well as

claims for personal injury in Count 3, negligent

misrepresentation in Count 4, attorney’s fees, and

damages for mental distress from the Amended

Complaint, Dkt. No. 9, as it pertains to Plaintiffs

Shane Vinales and Becky Vinales, individually and as

next friend of Landon Vinales and Savannah Vinales.

In all other respects, the Court DENIES summary

judgment on the grounds raised in the motion without

prejudice to reraising at trial in a motion for judgment

as a matter of law. To clarify, the causes of action

remaining at issue are: Count 3 (breach of contract),

Count 4 (negligence), Count 8 (intentional nuisance),

Count 9 (negligent nuisance), and Count 11 (gross

negligence). Plaintiffs also assert claims for exemplary

damages and joint liability.

Additionally, the Motion to Strike, Dkt. No. 332,

is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as

to the Vinales Plaintiffs for the purposes of summary

judgment and without prejudice to reraising

inconsistencies and evidentiary objections at trial or

in a motion in limine. The Court hereby STRIKES as

not relevant the DOJ press release attached as Exhibit

App-42

L to the Vinales Plaintiffs’ Response, Dkt. No. 319-12,

but in all other respects, the requested relief is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED this 4th day of January, 2023.

[handwritten: signature]

Richard B. Farrer

United States Magistrate

Judge

App-43

Appendix C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

________________

No. 19-cv-01280

________________

SHANE VINALES, et al.

Plaintiffs,

AETC II PRIVATIZED HOUSING, L.L.C., AETC II

PROPERTY MANAGERS, L.L.C.; HUNT ELP, LTD.,

Defendants.

________________

Filed: Oct. 2, 2023

________________

VINALES FINAL JUDGMENT

________________

This action proceeded to a jury trial, which began

on June 5, 2023. All parties consented to have the

assigned United States Magistrate Judge conduct all

proceedings, including trial and entry of judgment.

See Dkt. No. 267; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

On June 23, 2023, the jury returned a unanimous

verdict and answered the questions submitted to it in

accordance with the Court’s instructions. Following

receipt of the jury verdict, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to

Enter Judgment on the Jury Verdict. See Dkt. No. 452.

Defendants responded. See Dkt. No. 456. The Court

entered judgment, but that judgment was not final

App-44

and appealable; it did not dispose of all parties and all

claims in the case. See Dkt. No. 460.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Court

has found there is no just reason for delay to entry of

final judgment as to the parties subject to this Vinales

Final Judgment. A host of issues presented in the

Vinales case will be revisited in subsequent cases,

which are already on file. Judicial economy and the

related interests of the parties warrant certification

under Rule 54(b). All claims as to the parties to this

Vinales Final Judgment are final. This Vinales Final

Judgment is therefore intended to serve as a final,

appealable judgment as to all claims between and

among the following:

•

Plaintiffs Shane Vinales, individually and as

next friend of L.V and S.V., and Becky

Vinales, individually and as next friend of L.V

and S.V.

•

Defendants AETC II Privatized Housing,

LLC; AETC II Property Managers, LLC; and

Hunt ELP, Ltd. d/b/a Hunt Military

Communities.

This Vinales Final Judgment is entered in accordance

with Rule 54(b) as to all claims between and among

the aforementioned parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant

AETC II Privatized Housing, LLC breached the lease

agreement with Plaintiffs Shane Vinales, Becky

Vinales, and their minor children and is accordingly

liable to Plaintiffs Shane Vinales, Becky Vinales, and

their minor children for damages in the amount of

$91,654.00. The Court therefore enters FINAL

JUDGMENT against Defendant AETC II Privatized

App-45

Housing, LLC, in the amount of $91,654.00 and in

favor of Plaintiffs Shane Vinales, Becky Vinales, and

their minor children. Plaintiffs shall take nothing on

any and all claims against Defendants AETC II

Property Managers, LLC and Hunt ELP, Ltd. d/b/a

Hunt Military Communities.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are

entitled to recover post-judgment interest from

Defendant AETC II Privatized Housing, LLC as of the

date of this judgment’s entry on the docket and at a

rate equal to the weekly average one-year constant

maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the

calendar week preceding the date of the judgment,

which the Court determines at this time to be 5.42%.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no party shall

recover attorneys’ fees and that, in its discretion, the

Court determines the parties shall bear their own

costs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED all claims between

the above-listed parties that are not expressly

addressed herein are denied, and Plaintiffs shall take

nothing on them.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED this 2nd day of October, 2023.

[handwritten: signature]

Richard B. Farrer

United States Magistrate

Judge

App-46

Appendix D

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.17

The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise

exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over

such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may,

by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of

Congress, become the Seat of Government of the

United States, and to exercise like Authority over all

Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of

the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection

of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other

needful Buildings;

...

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